[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 74 (Thursday, May 20, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5780-S5785]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                                 TREATY

  Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to 
executive session to consider the following treaty on today's Executive 
Calendar: No. 2. I further ask unanimous consent that the treaty be 
considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up 
to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification; 
that all committee provisos, reservations, understandings, declarations 
be considered agreed to; that any statements be printed in the 
Congressional Record as if read; I further ask consent that when the 
resolution of ratification is voted upon the motion to reconsider be 
laid upon the table; the President be notified of the Senate's action 
and that following the disposition of the treaty, the Senate return to 
legislative session.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The treaty will be considered to have passed through its various 
parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the 
resolution of ratification.
  The resolution of ratification is as follows:

                         Amended Mines Protocol

       Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein),

[[Page S5781]]

     SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO A 
                   RESERVATION, UNDERSTANDING, AND CONDITIONS.

       The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
     Amended Mines Protocol (as defined in section 5 of this 
     resolution), subject to the reservation in section 2, the 
     understandings in section 3, and the conditions in section 4.

     SEC. 2. RESERVATION.

       The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the 
     Amended Mines Protocol is subject to the reservation, which 
     shall be included in the United States instrument of 
     ratification and shall be binding upon the President, that 
     the United States reserves the right to use other devices (as 
     defined in Article 2(5) of the Amended Mines Protocol) to 
     destroy any stock of food or drink that is judged likely to 
     be used by an enemy military force, if due precautions are 
     taken for the safety of the civilian population.

     SEC. 3. UNDERSTANDINGS.

       The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the 
     Amended Mines Protocol is subject to the following 
     understandings, which shall be included in the United States 
     instrument of ratification and shall be binding upon the 
     President:
       (1) United States Compliance.--The United States 
     understands that--
       (A) any decision by any military commander, military 
     personnel, or any other person responsible for planning, 
     authorizing, or executing military action shall only be 
     judged on the basis of that person's assessment of the 
     information reasonably available to the person at the time 
     the person planned, authorized, or executed the action under 
     review, and shall not be judged on the basis of information 
     that comes to light after the action under review was taken; 
     and
       (B) Article 14 of the Amended Mines Protocol (insofar as it 
     relates to penal sanctions) shall apply only in a situation 
     in which an individual--
       (i) knew, or should have known, that his action was 
     prohibited under the Amended Mines Protocol;
       (ii) intended to kill or cause serious injury to a 
     civilian; and
       (iii) knew or should have known, that the person he 
     intended to kill or cause serious injury was a civilian.
       (2) Effective Exclusion.--The United States understands 
     that, for the purposes of Article 5(6)(b) of the Amended 
     Mines Protocol, the maintenance of observation over avenues 
     of approach where mines subject to that Article are deployed 
     constitutes one acceptable form of monitoring to ensure the 
     effective exclusion of civilians.
       (3) Historic Monuments.--The United States understands that 
     Article 7(1)(i) of the Amended Mines Protocol refers only to 
     a limited class of objects that, because of their clearly 
     recognizable characteristics and because of their widely 
     recognized importance, constitute a part of the cultural or 
     spiritual heritage of peoples.
       (4) Legitimate Military Objectives.--The United States 
     understands that an area of land itself can be a legitimate 
     military objective for the purpose of the use of landmines, 
     if its neutralization or denial, in the circumstances 
     applicable at the time, offers a military advantage.
       (5) Peace Treaties.--The United States understands that the 
     allocation of responsibilities for landmines in Article 
     5(2)(b) of the Amended Mines Protocol does not preclude 
     agreement, in connection with peace treaties or similar 
     arrangements, to allocate responsibilities under that Article 
     in a manner that respects the essential spirit and purpose of 
     the Article.
       (6) Booby-Traps and Other Devices.--For the purposes of the 
     Amended Mines Protocol, the United States understands that--
       (A) the prohibition contained in Article 7(2) of the 
     Amended Mines Protocol does not preclude the expedient 
     adaptation or adaptation in advance of other objects for use 
     as booby-traps or other devices;
       (B) a trip-wired hand grenade shall be considered a 
     ``booby-trap'' under Article 2(4) of the Amended Mines 
     Protocol and shall not be considered a ``mine'' or an ``anti-
     personnel mine'' under Article 2(1) or Article 2(3), 
     respectively; and
       (C) none of the provisions of the Amended Mines Protocol, 
     including Article 2(5), applies to hand grenades other than 
     trip-wired hand grenades.
       (7) Non-Lethal Capabilities.--The United States understands 
     that nothing in the Amended Mines Protocol may be construed 
     as restricting or affecting in any way non-lethal weapon 
     technology that is designed to temporarily disable, stun, 
     signal the presence of a person, or operate in any other 
     fashion, but not to cause permanent incapacity.
       (8) International Tribunal Jurisdiction.--The United States 
     understands that the provisions of Article 14 of the Amended 
     Mines Protocol relating to penal sanctions refer to measures 
     by the authorities of States Parties to the Protocol and do 
     not authorize the trial of any person before an international 
     criminal tribunal. The United States shall not recognize the 
     jurisdiction of any international tribunal to prosecute a 
     United States citizen for a violation of the Protocol or the 
     Convention on Conventional Weapons.
       (9) Technical Cooperation and Assistance. The United States 
     understands that--
       (A) no provision of the Protocol may be construed as 
     affecting the discretion of the United States to refuse 
     assistance or to restrict or deny permission for the export 
     of equipment, material, or scientific or technological 
     information for any reason; and
       (B) the Amended Mines Protocol may not be used as a pretext 
     for the transfer of weapons technology or the provision of 
     assistance to the military mining or military counter-mining 
     capabilities of a State Party to the Protocol.

     SEC. 4. CONDITIONS.

       The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the 
     Amended Mines Protocol is subject to the following 
     conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
       (1) Pursuit deterrent munition.--
       (A) Understanding.--The Senate understands that nothing in 
     the Amended Mines Protocol restricts the possession or use of 
     the Pursuit Deterrent Munition, which is in compliance with 
     the provisions in the Technical Annex.
       (B) Certification.--Prior to deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to 
     the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives that the Pursuit Deterrent Munition shall 
     continue to remain available for use by the United States 
     Armed Forces at least until January 1, 2003, unless an 
     effective alternative to the munition becomes available.
       (C) Effective alternative defined.--For purposes of 
     subparagraph (B), the term ``effective alternative'' does not 
     mean a tactic or operational concept in and of itself.
       (2) Humanitarian demining assistance.--The Senate makes the 
     following findings:
       (A) United states efforts.--The United States contributes 
     more than any other country to the worldwide humanitarian 
     demining efforts, having expended more than $153,000,000 on 
     such efforts since 1993.
       (B) Development of detection and clearing technology.--The 
     Department of Defense has undertaken a program to develop 
     improved mine detection and clearing technology and has 
     shared this improved technology with the international 
     community.
       (C) Expansion of united states humanitarian demining 
     programs.--The Department of Defense and the Department of 
     State have expanded their humanitarian demining programs to 
     train and assist the personnel of other countries in 
     developing effective demining programs.
       (3) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
       (A) Limitation on assessment for cost of implementation.--
     Notwithstanding any provision of the Amended Mines Protocol, 
     and subject to the requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C), 
     the portion of the United States annual assessed contribution 
     for activities associated with any conference held pursuant 
     to Article 13 of the Amended Mines Protocol may not exceed 
     $1,000,000.
       (B) Recalculation of limitation.--
       (i) In general.--On January 1, 2000, and at 3-year 
     intervals thereafter, the Administrator of General Services 
     shall prescribe an amount that shall apply in lieu of the 
     amount specified in subparagraph (A) and that shall be 
     determined by adjusting the last amount applicable under that 
     subparagraph to reflect the percentage increase by which the 
     Consumer Price Index for the preceding calendar year exceeds 
     the Consumer Price Index for the calendar year three years 
     previously.
       (ii) Consumer price index defined.--In this subparagraph, 
     the term ``Consumer Price Index'' means the last Consumer 
     Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the 
     Department of Labor.
       (C) Additional contributions requiring congressional 
     approval.--
       (i) Authority.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the 
     President may furnish additional contributions for activities 
     associated with any conference held pursuant to Article 13 of 
     the Amended Mines protocol which would otherwise be 
     prohibited under subparagraph (A) if--
       (I) the President determines and certifies in writing to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress that the failure to 
     make such contributions would seriously affect the national 
     interest of the United States; and
       (II) Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the 
     certification of the President under subclause (I).
       (ii) Statement of reasons.--Any certification made under 
     clause (i) shall be accompanied by a detailed statement 
     setting forth the specific reasons therefor and the specific 
     activities associated with any conference held pursuant to 
     Article 13 of the Amended Mines Protocol to which the 
     additional contributions would be applied.
       (4) United states authority for technical cooperation and 
     assistance.--Notwithstanding any provision of the Amended 
     Mines Protocol, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of 
     the United States for any payment or assistance (including 
     the transfer of in-kind items) under Article 11 or Article 
     13(3)(d) of the Amended Mines Protocol without statutory 
     authorization and appropriation by United States law.
       (5) Future negotiation of withdrawal clause.--It is the 
     sense of the Senate that, in negotiations on any treaty 
     containing an arms control provision, United States 
     negotiators should not agree to any provision that would have 
     the effect of prohibiting the United States from withdrawing 
     from the arms control provisions of that treaty in a timely 
     fashion in the event that the supreme national interests of 
     the United States have been jeopardized.
       (6) Land mine alternatives.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of

[[Page S5782]]

     ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--
       (A) the President, in pursuing alternatives to United 
     States anti-personnel mines or mixed anti-tank systems, will 
     not limit the types of alternatives to be considered on the 
     basis of any criteria other than those specified in 
     subparagraph (B); and
       (B) in pursuit of alternatives to United States anti-
     personnel mines, or mixed anti-tank systems, the United 
     States shall seek to identify, adapt, modify, or otherwise 
     develop only those technologies that--
       (i) are intended to provide military effectiveness 
     equivalent to that provided by the relevant anti-personnel 
     mine, or mixed anti-tank system; and
       (ii) would be affordable.
       (7) Certification with regard to international tribunals.--
     Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of 
     ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that, 
     with respect to the Amended Mines Protocol, the Convention on 
     Conventional Weapons, or any future protocol or amendment 
     thereto, the United States shall not recognize the 
     jurisdiction of any international tribunal over the United 
     States or any of its citizens.
       (8) Tactics and operational concepts.--It is the sense of 
     the Senate that development, adaptation, or modification of 
     an existing or new tactic or operational concept, in and of 
     itself, is unlikely to constitute an acceptable alternative 
     to anti-personnel mines or mixed anti-tank systems.
       (9) Funding regarding the international humanitarian 
     crisis.--The Senate finds that--
       (A) the grave international humanitarian crisis associated 
     with anti-personnel mines has been created by the use of 
     mines that do not meet or exceed the specifications on 
     detectability, self-destruction, and self-deactivation 
     contained in the Technical Annex to the Amended Mines 
     Protocol; and
       (B) United States mines that do meet such specifications 
     have not contributed to this problem.
       (10) Approval of modifications.--The Senate reaffirms the 
     principle that any amendment or modification to the Amended 
     Mines Protocol other than an amendment or modification solely 
     of a minor technical or administrative nature shall enter 
     into force with respect to the United States only pursuant to 
     the treaty-making power of the President, by and with the 
     advice and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, 
     section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
       (11) Further arms reductions obligations.--The Senate 
     declares its intention to consider for approval an 
     international agreement that would obligate the United States 
     to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the 
     United States in a militarily significant manner only 
     pursuant to the treaty-making power as set forth in Article 
     II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 
     States.
       (12) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally-based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition 
     (1) of the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, 
     approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, and condition (8) of 
     the resolution of ratification of the CFE Flank Document, 
     approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997.
       (13) Primacy of the united states constitution.--Nothing in 
     the Amended Mines Protocol requires or authorizes the 
     enactment of legislation, or the taking of any other action, 
     by the United States that is prohibited by the Constitution 
     of the United States, as interpreted by the United States.

     SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this resolution:
       (1) Amended mines protocol or protocol.--The terms 
     ``Amended Mines Protocol'' and ``Protocol'' mean the Amended 
     Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
     Booby-Traps and Other Devices, together with its Technical 
     Annex, as adopted at Geneva on May 3, 1996 (contained in 
     Senate Treaty Document 105-1).
       (2) CFE flank document.--The term ``CFE Flank Document'' 
     means the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the 
     Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
     November 19, 1990, done at Vienna on May 31, 1996 (Treaty 
     Document 105-95).
       (3) Convention on conventional weapons.--The term 
     ``Convention on Conventional Weapons'' means the Convention 
     on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
     Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
     Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, done at Geneva 
     on October 10, 1980 (Senate Treaty Document 103-25).
       (4) United states instrument of ratification.--The term 
     ``United States instrument of ratification'' means the 
     instrument of ratification of the United States of the 
     Amended Mines Protocol.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am very pleased to speak today in support 
giving the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Amended 
Mines Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. This amended 
protocol was adopted on May 3, 1996, and submitted to the Senate for 
its advice and consent to ratification on January 7, 1997. The Foreign 
Relations Committee approved this resolution of ratification on March 
23 of this year, with no dissents.
  While this is not as big an issue as NATO enlargement or the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, ratification of the Amended 
Mines Protocol will be a real achievement. Its enactment is a further 
demonstration that the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee can, 
in fact, reach agreement upon treaties that deal with difficult issues.
  My colleagues are well aware of the humanitarian crisis that has 
developed in the world as a result of the millions of unexploded land 
mines left from the last generation of wars in the world. The United 
States is a leader in humanitarian de-mining efforts, and we have all 
supported those efforts. But a few examples may help explain to the 
public why the issue of land mines is of such deep concern.
  In April 1996, Newsweek magazine wrote about one victim of land mines 
as follows:

       He served three years on Bosnia's front lines and survived. 
     But within days of being demobilized, Petr Jesdimir became a 
     casualty of the peace.
       He was working with a private road crew on the outskirts of 
     Sarajevo last month when an anti-personnel mine buried at the 
     roadside blew up under his left foot. As he stumbled down the 
     road to get help, another mine shattered his right leg.
       Today he lies in a Sarajevo orthopedic clinic where battle-
     tested doctors have made their own transition--from treating 
     soldiers hit by grenades to amputating the arms and legs of 
     mine victims, mostly children. Jesdimir, 50, realizes that 
     until he dies he'll probably be a drain on the nation he 
     fought to preserve.
       ``I know I have to live with this now,'' he sobbed last 
     week, holding up the trembling stump of a leg. ``Now I 
     understand war.''

  A year later, The Washington Post recounted the story of another 
Bosnian victim:

       The June weather was perfect as 14-year-old Tibomir Ostojic 
     returned home from a dip in a nearby river. ``Cherries,'' he 
     thought. ``Wouldn't it be nice to have some cherries?''
       So he climbed a cherry tree not far from his apartment in 
     the Sarajevo neighborhood of Dobrinja. As he was climbing 
     down--and a split-second before his foot hit the ground--he 
     realized the grass he was about to step on clearly had been 
     avoided by others, and he knew instantly he was in trouble.
       The first explosion threw him into the air and onto a 
     second land mine. By then he had his hands over his head for 
     protection. The second blast blew them off.

  Land mines were also the major cause of casualties for NATO forces in 
Bosnia. Yet Bosnia is hardly the only land where this occurs.
  A Washington Times article of June 10, 1997, reported: ``The land 
mines are strewn so widely in the jungles along the cease-fire zones 
between Ecuador and Peru that when peacekeepers kick a soccer ball out 
of their compound, it stays there.'' Last year, in the wake of 
Hurricane Mitch, still more innocent people fell victim to land mines 
left over from the civil war in Nicaragua.
  The catalogue of countries ravaged by land mines--long after the end 
of the wars in which those mines were laid--goes on and on: 
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Vietnam. It was the need to 
put an end to these seemingly endless post-war tragedies that motivated 
both the Administration and the Foreign Relations Committee to 
recommend ratification of the Amended Mines Protocol.
  The new Protocol is not a complete ban on anti-personnel land mines. 
Many of us regret that the United States is not in a position to sign 
and ratify the Ottawa Convention that institutes such a ban. The 
Amended Mines Protocol is supported, however, by several mine-producing 
or mine-using powers that would not sign the Ottawa Convention.
  It is a sad fact of life that countries with fortified borders are 
not yet willing to do without land mines. By adhering to this Protocol, 
they will save many innocent lives while we work to make a world-wide 
ban feasible for all countries.
  The new Protocol bans mines that are designed to be exploded by the 
presence of a mine detector, and it requires anti-personnel mines to be 
detectable. These provisions will greatly aid mine-clearing efforts in 
future wars.
  The Protocol severely limits the use of land mines unless they are 
both self-destructing within 30 days and self-deactivating within 120 
days (in case the self-destruct mechanism should fail). Adherence to 
these provisions should end the senseless post-war slaughter inflicted 
by so many mines today.
  The Protocol establishes an obligation to clean up minefields after 
wars

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have ended. You might think that this was an obvious duty, but 
countries have often failed to clean up their lethal mess.
  Finally, the new Protocol applies to civil wars, as well as 
international ones. This is a desperately needed provision, as so many 
of the worst land mine disasters have been the result of civil wars. 
The Amended Mines Protocol is the first protocol of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons to be applied to civil wars, and this is an 
important achievement that is in keeping with U.S. policy and 
practices.
  These provisions will go a long way, if adopted and fully implemented 
by the major mine users and producers, to curtail Future humanitarian 
crises due to land mines. The amended Protocol specifically meets 
concerns that the Senate articulated in 1995, when we gave our advice 
and consent to ratification of the original Mines Protocol and the 
underlying Convention on Conventional Weapons. For all these reasons, 
the Amended Mines Protocol deserves our wholehearted support.
  Bringing the Amended Mines Protocol to the Senate floor has required 
us to reconcile sharply differing and strongly held views regarding the 
utility and morality of using anti-personnel mines that meet the 
standards of the Amended Mines Protocol. We owe a debt of gratitude to 
our colleagues who agreed to accept resolution provisions and report 
language that safeguarded each other's positions on the broader land 
mine issues.
  One colleague who put the lives of innocent civilians ahead of his 
personal policy preferences is our esteemed Chairman, Senator Helms of 
North Carolina. Senator Helms has stated that anti-personnel mines are 
essential to the U.S. Armed Forces and that a ban on such weapons would 
needlessly place U.S. forces at risk.
  The Amended Mines Protocol does not pre-judge, however, the question 
of U.S. adherence to the Ottawa Convention. Both supporters and 
opponents of that treaty can support the Protocol's limits on the use 
of anti-personnel land mines by those countries that retain them.
  Adherence to the amended Protocol will not require any adjustment of 
U.S. military weaponry or tactics, moreover. Rather, it will make other 
countries meet standards that we already have achieved. U.S. military 
leaders want this Protocol to succeed, because it will save the lives 
of U.S. service men and women.
  In the interests of securing ratification of the Amended Mines 
Protocol, Senator Helms agreed to several major changes in the 
resolution of ratification, both last year and again this year, to 
remove from that resolution any language that would jeopardize this 
effort by pre-judging the broader land mine questions in his favor. He 
also issued a Committee report this year that omitted extensive 
material on land mines and the Ottawa Convention, thus minimizing any 
unintended affront to colleagues who favor a complete ban on anti-
personnel mines.
  Another colleague who has put other people's lives ahead of his own 
views is Senator Leahy of Vermont. Senator Leahy has said many times in 
this chamber that the United States should adhere to the Ottawa 
Convention as soon as possible. He has sponsored successful legislation 
to fund the search for land mine alternatives, and he has an 
understandable interest in ensuring the effectiveness of that search.
  Senator Leahy is in an interesting position, however: he actually 
helped to bring about the Amended Mines Protocol. Although he favors a 
world-wide ban on anti-personnel mines, Senator Leahy has stated that 
he also considers the Amended Mines Protocol an improvement over the 
existing Protocol.
  Senator Leahy agreed not to seek to amend this resolution of 
ratification, even though he opposes some of its provisions. For 
example, the resolution will preserve the Pursuit Deterrent Munition 
until January 1, 2003, even though the U.S. military found that this 
weapon was too heavy to be of great use to U.S. personnel.
  It was not easy to bring Chairman Helms and Senator Leahy to 
agreement on a resolution of ratification for the Amended Mines 
Protocol. Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and I, as well as Executive 
branch officials from several agencies, had to work at this beginning 
in 1997.
  Chairman Helms and Senator Leahy agreed early on, however, that 
ratification of this Protocol was worth doing, if it could be done 
without prejudicing their stands on the larger issues. I am very 
pleased that we achieved such a resolution. I am also proud to be 
associated with two fine colleagues who kept their eye on the ball and 
arrived at an agreement.
  I want to recognize some of the staff members who have labored so 
hard to bring about successful U.S. ratification of the Amended Mines 
Protocol. Marshall Billingslea and Edward Levine of the Foreign 
Relations Committee staff have kept at this for over a year and a half, 
framing the issues and enabling Chairman Helms and me to reconcile our 
own differences as well as those between the Chairman and Senator 
Leahy.
  Senator Hagel's staff also played a major role in reconciling those 
differences, especially in the early stages. Tim Rieser of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee staff ably served Senator Leahy in crafting 
language that would not subvert the cause of eventual land mine 
abolition.
  Two State Department lawyers deserve special recognition for their 
roles. The Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Michael J. Matheson, was 
instrumental in the negotiation of the Amended Mines Protocol and in 
explaining to the Senate its legal intricacies.
  Steve Solomon, an attorney in the office of the Assistant Legal 
Adviser for Political-Military Affairs, was tireless and expert in 
explaining why U.S. ratification is in our national interest. Time and 
again, Mr. Solomon kept us on track toward reasonable solutions. 
Without the assistance of those fine civil servants, we would not be 
ratifying this Protocol today.
  In closing, Mr. President, I want to emphasize that U.S. ratification 
of the Amended Mines Protocol is an action of which all Senator can 
feel proud. It will save innocent lives. It will reaffirm U.S. 
leadership in codifying the laws of war. Irrespective of whether we 
eventually renounce all anti-personnel mines, and without prejudicing 
that debate, the Amended Mines Protocol will serve our national 
interest and the interests of humanity.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, in 1981 the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) came into force. The United States was instrumental in 
drafting that Convention, including Protocol II which imposed modest 
limits on the use of landmines. The United States signed the CCW, but 
another 15 years elapsed before President Clinton forwarded it to the 
Senate for its advice and consent. The U.S. finally ratified it in 
1995.
  Protocol II, commonly known as the Mines Protocol, was, during those 
years, the only international agreement which explicitly dealt with the 
use of landmines, and it was routinely ignored--not by the United 
States military, but by many other countries. And throughout that 
period the United States and other mine producers sold and gave away 
tens of millions of mines to other governments and rebel groups who 
used them against civilian populations. Our mines can be found today, 
and we are paying millions of dollars annually to help remove them and 
assist the victims, in some thirty countries.
  By the early 1990's, it was widely recognized that the Mines Protocol 
had utterly failed to protect civilians from landmines. In fact, during 
the previous decade, the number of civilian casualties from mines 
skyrocketed.
  There were many reasons for the failure of the Mines Protocol, but 
certainly among them was that it was riddled with loopholes, and that 
its rules were difficult to verify and impossible to enforce.
  In 1992, convinced that far stronger leadership was needed to solve 
the mine problem, I sponsored legislation to halt United States exports 
of anti-personnel mines. I did so because I felt it was wrong for the 
United States to contribute to the carnage caused by mines, and I 
believed that little would change unless the United States, by setting 
an example, encouraged others to act. And that is what happened. In a 
matter of two or three years, close to fifty governments stopped 
exporting mines. Today, there is a de facto global export ban in 
effect. Even governments

[[Page S5784]]

that produce mines and have refused to renounce their use, including 
Russia and China, have publicly said that they no longer export.
  At the same time that I was sponsoring legislation in Congress, I was 
also aware that ten years had elapsed since the Mines Protocol had come 
into force and that any party could request the United Nations to 
sponsor a CCW review conference. I saw this as an opportunity to 
strengthen the Protocol and to consider banning anti-personnel mines 
altogether. Since the U.S. was not a party, I and others urged the 
French Government to request the conference. By the time the review 
conference opened in late 1995, the United States had ratified the CCW 
and was able to participate fully in the negotiations.
  The negotiations were difficult. Despite efforts by myself, some 
governments, and non-governmental organizations to promote a total ban, 
the idea was hardly discussed. Instead, the basic premise of the 
original Protocol remained unchanged--that mines are legitimate weapons 
of war. To its credit, the Clinton Administration made some 
constructive proposals dealing with, for example, the detectability of 
mines, and the Amended Protocol reflects some of those proposals. It 
requires all anti-personnel mines to contain enough iron to be 
detectable, and to either contain self-destruct/self-deactivation 
devices or be placed in marked and monitored minefields. It applies to 
internal conflicts, and also contains limits on certain transfers of 
anti-personnel mines.
  These are notable improvements, but the negotiators again failed to 
include effective verification or enforcement provisions. They also 
refused to include a U.S. proposal to apply the prohibition on non-
detectable mines to anti-vehicle mines.
  Despite these significant flaws, I supported the Amended Protocol and 
encouraged the Administration to forward it to the Senate for its 
advice and consent. Indeed, I suspect that had I not sponsored the 
first law anywhere to halt exports of anti-personnel mines, or urged 
the French Government to request a review conference, there would not 
be an Amended Protocol.
  Last year, after the Foreign Relations Committee reported what I and 
others regarded as a fatally flawed Resolution of Ratification, I 
refused to consent to its adoption by unanimous consent. At that time I 
made clear that the issue was not the Amended Protocol itself, but a 
Resolution and Committee Report that contained language that was 
extraneous, inaccurate, and provocative.
  Today we are again asked to give our consent, and this time I have, 
with some reluctance, agreed. I say with some reluctance, because if 
this Resolution and the accompanying Committee Report dealt only with 
the Amended Protocol there would be no disagreement. In fact, we could 
have adopted it six months ago. But while the Resolution and Report are 
far preferable to the versions we were presented last year, they also 
contain language that has nothing whatsoever to do with the Amended 
Protocol. That is because, Mr. President, a few members of the Foreign 
Relations Committee have tried to use this Resolution as a vehicle to 
attack the Ottawa Convention, governments and individuals like myself 
who support that Convention, and current United States policy.
  After reaching a stalemate last year, Senator  Biden and I worked 
with Senator Helms to resolve our differences. While there is still 
language in the Resolution which is extraneous and I disagree with, and 
in the report which is extraneous, factually inaccurate and 
objectionable, it has been pared down substantially. For that I thank 
Senator Biden and Senator Helms and their staffs. They worked 
diligently to reach a result which, while not perfect, each of us can 
live with.
  One of the reasons that I am consenting to this resolution is that 
the objectionable report language reflects the views of only some 
members of the Committee. In fact, much of it deals with issues which 
were never considered or debated by the Committee as a whole. Rather, 
it is based on the testimony of a handful of like-minded witnesses at a 
hearing that was attended by Senator Helms and only one other Member of 
the Committee, who was a cosponsor of my legislation to ban United 
States use of anti-personnel mines except in Korea.

  In other words, to the extent that the Helms Report purports to lay 
down markers for future landmine policy, it is neither binding nor 
representative of the views of the Committee as a whole, and even less 
so of the United States Senate.
  While there is no need to address every objectionable phrase in the 
Report, two issues require a response.
  First, the Report states that it is the view of many members of the 
Committee that the United States should not agree to any prohibition on 
the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of short-duration anti-
personnel mines. Yet the Committee never debated this issue and the 
views of its members, with the exception of Senator Helms, were never 
publicly expressed. Furthermore, and most important, some 135 countries 
have signed the Ottawa Convention which bans the production, use, 
transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines, and 77 have ratified. 
They include every member of NATO except the United States and Turkey, 
and every Western Hemisphere country except the United States and Cuba. 
They also include many countries that have produced, used and exported 
mines in the past.
  To suggest that the United States should remain outside the 
Convention that is widely and increasingly seen as establishing a new 
international norm outlawing anti-personnel mines, is inconsistent with 
United States policy and the interests of the United States. The 
Administration, including the Pentagon, has stated repeatedly and 
unequivocally that it will sign the Ottawa Convention when it has 
suitable alternatives to these weapons, and that it is aggressively 
searching for such alternatives.
  Moreover, 67 members of the Senate voted for my amendment to halt 
U.S. use of anti-personnel mines, for one year. And 60 Senators, both 
Republicans and Democrats, including every Senator who fought in 
combat, cosponsored legislation introduced by myself and Senator Hagel 
to ban U.S. use of anti-personnel mines except in Korea.
  Second, the Report notes that the Administration hopes to negotiate a 
ban on exports of anti-personnel mines in the U.N. Conference on 
Disarmament. I believe such a strategy is fraught with problems. It is 
relevant here only insofar as the Helms Report states that many members 
of the Committee believes that in future negotiations on an export ban 
the Administration should differentiate between short and long-duration 
mines.
  Perhaps those members are unaware that five years ago the United 
States and Britain proposed such an ``export control regime.'' It was 
rejected out of hand not only by many of our NATO allies, but by 
developing countries who already had stockpiled millions of long-
duration mines and saw the U.S./UK proposal as an attempt to market 
their higher tech, higher priced mines. Any attempt by the United 
States to resurrect that failed approach would only further damage U.S. 
credibility on the mine issue.
  I would also refer members to the Minority views in the Report, which 
ably address this issue. Finally, it is notable that Senator Helms 
voted twice for my amendment to halt exports of antipersonnel mines, as 
did the then Majority Leader Robert Dole. Those amendments passed 
overwhelmingly, and did not differentiate between short and long-
duration mines.
  Mr. President, the Amended Mines Protocol is a step forward. If 
adhered to it will help reduce the maiming and killing of civilians, 
and United States soldiers, by landmines. If its prohibition on non-
detectable mines is applied to anti-vehicle mines, as the United States 
has proposed, that would be a significant advance.
  But like its predecessor, the Amended Protocol has too many loopholes 
and can be easily violated. It is a far cry from what is needed to 
achieve the goal declared by President Clinton and adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly of ridding the world of anti-personnel mines. I 
believe that can only occur--as was done with poison gas and as the 
Ottawa Convention would do--by stigmatizing these indiscriminate 
weapons. That will take far stronger United States leadership than we 
have seen thus far.
  Mr. HATCH. I ask for a division vote on the resolution of 
ratification.

[[Page S5785]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. A division is requested. Senators in favor of 
the resolution of ratification will rise and stand until counted. 
(After a pause.) Those opposed will rise and stand until counted.
  On a division, two-thirds of the Senators present and voting having 
voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

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