[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 73 (Wednesday, May 19, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1028-E1031]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  INTRODUCTION OF H.R. 1835, NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 1999

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, May 19, 1999

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to announce the introduction of 
the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999, H.R. 1835. I am joined in 
introducing this legislation by a very distinguished bipartisan list of 
cosponsors, including Congressmen Sherrod Brown and Mark Sanford of our 
Committee on International Relations, Chris Cox, chairman of our House 
Republican Policy Committee, John Kasich, chairman of our Committee on 
the Budget, Joe Knollenberg of our Committee on Appropriations, and 
David McIntosh of our Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.
  This legislation seeks to improve U.S. policy toward North Korea by 
weaving together the various elements of our policy into a 
comprehensive whole, and redirecting our policy in ways that will 
better advance our national interest.
  It has long been obvious that U.S. policy toward North Korea is in 
need of an overhaul. That is why the Administration agreed last year to 
appoint a Special Policy Coordinator for North Korea, Dr. William 
Perry, to review the policy and make recommendations for restructuring 
it.
  The legislation that we are introducing today is designed to 
complement and reinforce Dr. Perry's efforts to rationalize U.S. policy 
toward North Korea. Our new policy must be: comprehensive; integrated 
and coordinated with our Japanese and South Korean allies; backed by 
strengthened conventional military deterrence and theater missile 
defense; engender a willingness to undertake tough measures in the name 
of national security; and be founded on a step-by-step program of 
conditional reciprocity.
  There remains a great deal of skepticism in the Congress about the 
1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, under 
which North Korea has become the largest recipient of U.S. foreign 
assistance in East Asia. The underground facility at Kumchang-ri may 
indicate that North Korea continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program 
notwithstanding the Agreed Framework. Other press reports suggest that 
North Korea may be building a parallel, uranium-based nuclear program.

[[Page E1029]]

  Despite the skepticism of many of us in Congress, H.R. 1835 does not 
seek to terminate U.S. support for the Agreed Framework. To the 
contrary, our legislation would, for the first time ever, authorize the 
Administration's full request for U.S. assistance to the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization in FY 2000. The 
Administration's request of $55 million includes a $20 million increase 
over this year's funding level, and we have not taken issue with this 
increase.
  We have, however, insisted on strict adherence by North Korea to its 
obligations under the Agreed Framework before these funds can be 
released. Our conditions are, with one exception, based on those 
contained in current law, and therefore should be acceptable to the 
Administration.
  The one exception is a new requirement we have added for a 
certification by the President that North Korea is not seeking to 
develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium. This requirement 
is intended to draw attention to the fact that it would make no sense 
for the United States to proceed with the Agreed Framework--which 
fundamentally is intended to deny North Korea plutonium that it could 
use to build nuclear bombs--if North Korea is developing the capability 
to enrich uranium as an alternative source of fissile material.
  Our legislation also insists on strict compliance by North Korea with 
its obligations under the Agreed Framework before key U.S. nuclear 
components can be transferred to North Korea in connection with the 
construction there of two light water nuclear reactors. The Agreed 
Framework's most important requirements in this respect are that the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be fully satisfied that 
North Korea is not cheating on its obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and that North Korea must allow the IAEA to carry 
out whatever inspections it deems necessary to verify that North Korea 
is not cheating. Under our legislation, key U.S. nuclear reactor 
components cannot be transferred to North Korea unless the President 
certifies that these requirements of the Agreed Framework have been 
met, and Congress has approved legislation concurring in the 
President's certification.
  Our legislation addresses the North Korean missile threat by 
conditioning any relaxation of the current U.S. trade embargo of North 
Korea on progress in eliminating that threat. Specifically, our 
legislation requires North Korea to accept the Administration's current 
demands that North Korea institute a total ban on missile exports, and 
terminate its long-range missile program.
  Finally, our legislation addresses a number of other elements of our 
North Korea policy. The legislation requires effective monitoring of 
U.S. food shipments to North Korea to ensure that the assistance is not 
being diverted to the North Korean military. It authorizes $10 million 
to begin to set up a joint early warning system in the Asia-Pacific 
region to continuously share information on missile launches detected 
by governments participating in the system. It authorizes $30 million 
to assist North Korean refugees in China and to support the 
resettlement of such refugees in South Korea and other neighboring 
countries.
  We do not anticipate moving H.R. 1835 forward through the legislative 
process until we have received Dr. Perry's recommendations regarding 
U.S. policy toward North Korea. As Dr. Perry completes his final 
deliberations later this month, it is imperative that his policy 
recommendations address the issues identified in H.R. 1835 if the 
Administration hopes to garner the support of Congress and the American 
people. We are confident that Dr. Perry's recommendations will address 
these issues, and that the upshot will be a convergence between 
Congress and the Administration over policy toward North Korea.

                               H.R. 1835

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Threat Reduction 
     Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Under the Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed 
     to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear program, in 
     exchange for annual deliveries of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel 
     oil, and the construction of two 1,000 megawatt light water 
     nuclear power reactors costing approximately $5,000,000,000.
       (2) The discovery of an apparent underground nuclear-
     related facility at Kumchang-ri, North Korea brought into 
     question North Korea's commitment to abide by the conditions 
     of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework.
       (3) North Korea's ongoing development, production, testing, 
     deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles presents 
     a clear and present danger to forward-deployed United States 
     Armed Forces in Asia, United States friends and allies, and 
     the United States.
       (4) North Korea has become the largest recipient of United 
     States foreign assistance in East Asia, valued at over 
     $225,000,000 in 1998 alone.
       (5) North Korea is a major producer of opium and 
     increasingly is involved in illicit narcotics trafficking.

     SEC. 3. ASSISTANCE FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY 
                   DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated for 
     fiscal year 2000 $55,000,000 for assistance to the Korean 
     Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
       (2) Additional requirement--Assistance under paragraph (1) 
     may be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law 
     (other than subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this 
     section).
       (b) Prohibition on Assistance to Nuclear Reactor 
     Construction.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection 
     (a), or made available under any other provision of law, may 
     be used to assist the construction of nuclear reactors in 
     North Korea.
       (c) Conditions for Release of Funds.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by subsection (a), or made available under any 
     other provision of law, may be made available to KEDO, or for 
     assistance to North Korea for purposes related to the Agreed 
     Framework, until the President determines and reports to the 
     Committees on International Relations and Appropriations of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Appropriations of the Senate that--
       (1) the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and 
     continue to take demonstrable steps to implement the Joint 
     Declaration on Denuclearization in which the Government of 
     North Korea has committed not to test, manufacture, produce, 
     receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons, and 
     not to possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment 
     facilities;
       (2) the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and 
     continue to take demonstrable steps to pursue the North-South 
     dialogue;
       (3) North Korea is complying with all provisions of the 
     Agreed Framework;
       (4) the effort to can and safely store all spent fuel from 
     North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors has been 
     successfully concluded;
       (5) North Korea has not diverted assistance provided by the 
     United States for purposes for which it was not intended;
       (6) the United States has reached agreement with North 
     Korea satisfying United States concerns regarding suspect 
     underground construction, and North Korea has complied with 
     its obligations under that agreement;
       (7) North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the 
     capability to enrich uranium, or any additional capability to 
     reprocess spent nuclear fuel; and
       (8) the United States has made and is continuing to make 
     significant progress on eliminating the North Korean 
     ballistic missile threat, including its ballistic missile 
     exports.
       (d) Withholding of Funds Pending Solicitation of All 
     Potential Donor Governments to KEDO.--Amounts appropriated in 
     excess of $35,000,000 pursuant to the authorization of 
     appropriations under subsection (a) may not be made available 
     to KEDO until the President determines and reports to the 
     Committees on International Relations and Appropriations of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Appropriations of the Senate that--
       (1) the United States has asked all potential donor 
     governments, including Taiwan, to contribute to KEDO;
       (2) no contributions offered unconditionally by such 
     governments to KEDO have been declined; and
       (3) even after such contributions are received, KEDO will 
     have financial requirements in fiscal year 2000 that can only 
     be met by the provision of more than $35,000,000 in 
     assistance from the United States.
       (e) Limitation on Use of Special Authorities.--The 
     authority of section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) may not be used to authorize the 
     provision of assistance that cannot be provided due to any 
     prohibition, restriction, or condition on release of funds 
     that is contained in subsection (b), (c), or (d).

     SEC. 4. FOOD ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the 
     funds authorized to be appropriated by section 3(a), or made 
     available under any other provision of law, may be made 
     available for food assistance for North Korea until the 
     President determines and reports to the Committees on 
     International Relations and Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
     Appropriations of the Senate that--
       (1) the Government of the Republic of Korea concurs in the 
     delivery and procedures for delivery of United States food 
     assistance to North Korea;
       (2) previous United States food assistance to North Korea 
     has not been significantly diverted to military use;
       (3) North Korean military stocks have been expended to 
     respond to unmet food aid needs in North Korea.
       (4) the United Nations World Food Program or other private 
     voluntary organizations registered with the United States

[[Page E1030]]

     Agency for International Development have been permitted to 
     take and have taken all reasonable steps to ensure that food 
     deliveries will not be diverted from intended recipients, 
     including unannounced, unscheduled, and unsupervised visits 
     to recipient institutions and farmers' markets by Korean-
     speaking monitors affiliated with the United Nations World 
     Food Program or other private voluntary organizations 
     registered with the United States Agency for International 
     Development; and
       (5) the United States Government has directly, and 
     indirectly through appropriate international organizations, 
     encouraged North Korea to initiate fundamental structural 
     reforms of its agricultural sector.

     SEC. 5. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NORTH KOREA.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
     or any international agreement, no agreement for cooperation 
     (as defined in sec. 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
     (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.)) between the United States and North 
     Korea may become effective, no license may be issued for 
     export directly or indirectly to North Korea of any nuclear 
     material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, 
     or technology that would be subject to such agreement, and no 
     approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly 
     or indirectly to North Korea of any nuclear material, 
     facilities, components, or other goods, services, or 
     technology that would be subject to such agreement, until--
       (1) the President determines and reports to the Committee 
     on International Relations of the House of Representatives 
     and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that--
       (A) North Korea has come into full compliance with its 
     safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), and has 
     taken all steps that have been deemed necessary by the IAEA 
     in this regard;
       (B) North Korea has permitted the IAEA full access to all 
     additional sites and all information (including historical 
     records) deemed necessary by the IAEA to verify the accuracy 
     and completeness of North Korea's initial report of May 4, 
     1992, to the IAEA on all nuclear sites and material in North 
     Korea.
       (C) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations 
     under the Agreed Framework;
       (D) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations 
     under the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization;
       (E) North Korea does not have the capability to enrich 
     uranium, and is not seeking to acquire or develop such 
     capability, or any additional capability to reprocess spent 
     nuclear fuel;
       (F) North Korea has terminated its nuclear weapons program, 
     including all efforts to acquire, develop, test, produce, or 
     deploy such weapons; and
       (G) the transfer to North Korea of key nuclear components, 
     under the proposed agreement for cooperation with North Korea 
     and in accordance with the Agreed Framework, is in the 
     national interest of the United States; and
       (2) there is enacted a joint resolution stating in 
     substance that the Congress concurs in the determination and 
     report of the President submitted pursuant to paragraph (1).
       (b) Construction.--The restrictions contained in subsection 
     (a) shall apply in addition to all other applicable 
     procedures, requirements, and restrictions contained in the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other laws.

     SEC. 6. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSACTIONS WITH 
                   NORTH KOREA PENDING PROGRESS ON BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE ISSUES.

       (a) Continuation of Restrictions.--
       (1) Continuation of restrictions.--All prohibitions and 
     restrictions on transactions and activities with North Korea 
     imposed under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
     (as in effect on July 1, 1977), as set forth in part 500 of 
     title 31, Code of Federal Regulations as in effect on April 
     1, 1999, shall remain in effect until the President submits 
     the determination and report described in subsection (b), 
     and--
       (A) the authority of section 501.803 of title 31, Code of 
     Federal Regulations (relating to the authority to modify 
     chapter V of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations) and other 
     provisions of law may not be used to modify such prohibitions 
     and restrictions, as in effect on such date, and
       (B) no prohibition or restriction on transactions or 
     activities set forth in subpart B of part 500 of title 31, 
     Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on April 1, 1999, 
     may be authorized after that date, other than those 
     transactions and activities specifically authorized under 
     subpart E of such part,

     until such determination and report are so submitted.
       (2) Revocation of prior modifications and authorizations.--
     Any modification otherwise prohibited under paragraph (1)(A) 
     that is made after April 1, 1999, and before the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and any authorization granted after 
     April 1, 1999, and before the date of enactment of this Act, 
     for a transaction or activity otherwise prohibited under 
     paragraph (1)(B), shall be revoked as of such date of 
     enactment.
       (b) Termination of Restrictions.--The determination and 
     report referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by 
     the President, reported to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that--
       (1) North Korea has agreed to institute a total ban on 
     exports of missiles, missile components, and missile 
     technology;
       (2) there is no credible evidence that North Korea has, 
     during the 1-year period prior to the date of the President's 
     determination, exported missiles, missile components, or 
     missile technology;
       (3) North Korea has terminated its long-range missile 
     program, including all efforts to acquire, develop, test, 
     produce, or deploy such missiles;
       (4) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations 
     under the Agreed Framework;
       (5) North Korea is in full compliance with its obligations 
     under the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization;
       (6) North Korea does not have the capability to enrich 
     uranium, and is not seeking to acquire or develop such 
     capability, or any additional capability to reprocess spent 
     nuclear fuel; and
       (7) North Korea has terminated its nuclear weapons program, 
     including all efforts to acquire, develop, test, produce, or 
     deploy such weapons; and
       (c) Reimposition of Restrictions.--Should the President 
     become aware of information establishing that North Korea--
       (1) has exported missiles, missile components, or missile 
     technology,
       (2) is seeking to acquire, develop, test, produce, or 
     deploy long-range missiles,
       (3) is not in full compliance with its obligations under 
     the Agreed Framework or the Joint Declaration on 
     Denuclearization,
       (4) has the capability to enrich uranium or is seeking to 
     acquire or develop such capability or additional capability 
     to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, or
       (5) is seeking to acquire, develop, test, produce, or 
     deploy nuclear weapons,

     then the requirements of subsection (a) shall be reimposed 
     notwithstanding any determination and report submitted under 
     subsection (b).

     SEC. 7. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) Policy of the United States.--It shall be the policy of 
     the United States to work with friendly governments in the 
     Asia-Pacific region to develop and deploy ballistic missile 
     defense capable of countering ballistic missile threats in 
     the region.
       (b) Joint Early Warning System.--Of the funds appropriated 
     to carry out the provisions of section 23 of the Arms Export 
     Control for fiscal year 2000, up to $10,000,000 is authorized 
     to be made available to support the establishment of a joint 
     early warning system in the Asia-Pacific region. Such system 
     shall have as its purpose the continuous sharing of 
     information on missile launches detected by the governments 
     participating in the system, and may include the 
     establishment by such governments of a joint early warning 
     center.

     SEC. 8. REFUGEES FROM NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Policy of the United States.--It shall be the policy of 
     the United States to oppose the involuntary return of the 
     North Korean refugees to North Korea, to support the 
     provision of international assistance to such refugees in the 
     People's Republic of China and other countries of asylum, and 
     to facilitate the resettlement of such refugees in South 
     Korea and other neighboring countries.
       (b) Authorization of Assistance for Refugees From North 
     Korea.--Of the funds appropriated for ``Migration and Refugee 
     Assistance'' for fiscal year 2000, up to $30,000,000 is 
     authorized to be made available for assistance to North 
     Korean refugees in the People's Republic of China and other 
     countries of asylum, and to support the resettlement of such 
     refugees in South Korea and other neighboring countries.

     SEC. 9. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the President shall submit to the Committees on 
     International Relations and Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
     Appropriations of the Senate a report on the following:
       (1) The projected total cost of the two 1000 MW(e) light 
     water nuclear reactors that are to be constructed in North 
     Korea pursuant to the Agreed Framework, the portion of this 
     total cost that South Korea and Japan have committed to pay, 
     the potential sources of funding for the portion of this 
     total cost that South Korea and Japan have not committed to 
     pay, and the maximum portion of this total cost, if any, that 
     the President anticipates will be paid by the United States.
       (2) Of the projected total cost identified in response to 
     paragraph (1), the portion of this cost that North Korea will 
     be obligated to repay, the likely terms upon which such 
     repayment will be required, and the possible sources of 
     revenue from which such repayment will be made.
       (3) The degree to which North Korea's electrical power 
     distribution network will have to be upgraded in order to 
     distribute the electrical power that will be generated by the 
     two 1000 MW(e) light water nuclear reactors that are to be 
     constructed in North Korea pursuant to the Agreed Framework, 
     the projected cost of such upgrades, and the possible sources 
     of funding for such upgrades.
       (4) The advantages to North Korea of building non-nuclear 
     power plants rather than light water nuclear power plants, 
     including--
       (A) the cost saving that could be realized by building non-
     nuclear electric power plants with a total generation 
     capacity of

[[Page E1031]]

     2000 MW(e) rather than two light water nuclear power plants 
     with that same capacity;
       (B) the projected date by which non-nuclear electric power 
     plants with a total generation capacity of 2000 MW(e) could 
     be completed, compared with the projected date by which two 
     light water nuclear power plants with that same capacity will 
     be completed; and
       (C) the advantages for electric power distribution that 
     could be realized by building a number of non-nuclear 
     electric power plants with a total generation capacity of 
     2000 MW(e) rather than two light water nuclear power plants 
     with that same capacity.

     SEC. 10. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Agreed framework.--The term ``Agreed Framework'' means 
     the ``Agreed Framework Between the United States of America 
     and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'', signed in 
     Geneva on October 21, 1994, and the Confidential Minute to 
     that Agreement.
       (2) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency.
       (3) KEDO.--The term ``KEDO'' means the Korean Peninsula 
     Energy Development Organization.
       (4) North korea.--The term ``North Korea'' means the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
       (5) Long range missile.--The term ``long range missile'' 
     means a missile with a range of 1000 kilometers or more.
       (6) Joint declaration on denuclearization.--The term 
     ``Joint Declaration on Denuclearization'' means the Joint 
     Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 
     signed by the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea on January 1, 1992.

     

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