[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 69 (Thursday, May 13, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H3112-H3141]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Wilson). Pursuant to House Resolution 
167 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
bill, H.R. 1555.
  The Chair designates the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette) as 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Rogers) to assume the chair temporarily.

                              {time}  1110


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Rogers, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to bring to the attention of the 
House H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2000, backed by the unanimous bipartisan recommendation of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  I would say that our committee worked diligently to conduct rigorous 
oversight of the programs and the activities that fall within our 
jurisdiction and, indeed, they are extensive responsibilities. We held 
numerous full committee hearings and briefings, backed up by literally 
hundreds of staff briefings about specific programs and items in this 
budget.
  As Members know, we are required by law to provide an annual 
authorization for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity. 
That is because of the seriousness with which we take our oversight 
responsibility, making sure we understand what is going on in the 
intelligence community.
  Because of the sensitivity of the material we deal with within this 
bill, and its direct implications for our national security, many of 
the specifics of our work and the recommendations we have made must 
remain secret. However, as I announced upon the filing of this bill, 
the entirety of our work is available to any Member wishing to review 
it in the committee's secure facility upstairs. Because of this 
arrangement and the reality of Members' schedules, all of us on the 
committee recognize the special responsibility that we have assumed and 
the trust our colleagues place in us.
  I am pleased to report that we have had Members upstairs pursuing the 
opportunity to understand all the details, sensitive as they are, in 
this bill.
  We know that we have the added burden of assuring our colleagues and 
the public that the programs and projects in this bill are worthwhile, 
legitimate, well-designed, properly managed, and critical to our 
national security. Our colleagues and our constituents trust us to 
conduct our oversight carefully, thoroughly and with a critical eye. I 
believe we have done our job, and I hope we have done it well.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a solid bill. It recommends funding for the 
Nation's intelligence community at a rate slightly less than 1 percent 
higher than what the President requested. This is a very modest 
increase and is, frankly, the bare minimum needed to continue our 
effort of rebuilding our capabilities started in the 105th, and 
ensuring that we are best positioned to meet the diverse challenges 
that the century holds for American interests, as varied as they are.
  We have, for the last few years, been on a course toward that goal 
and we are making progress, but we have had to reverse a very serious 
inherited trend of decline and atrophy in the core programs of some of 
our intelligence capabilities; of signals intelligence, of human 
intelligence, of imagery intelligence, of analysis and covert action.

                              {time}  1115

  These are areas where we need help. These are disciplines that 
require long-term investment and consistent commitment. We cannot 
simply turn them on and off like a light switch. We have for too long 
taken shortcuts and underfunded and undervalued our intelligence 
capabilities, and our entire defense posture, as a matter of fact.
  We see this in stark terms in the world today, currently in Kosovo, 
but also in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, China, India, Pakistan, perhaps a 
number of places in the African continent, just to mention a string of 
other hot spots that have not yet flared up but could at any moment. I 
know Members can fill in their own blanks.
  I know that some believe and state that we have no more use for 
intelligence, that investment in eyes, ears and brains has become 
unnecessary because the world is at peace. I adamantly reject that 
point of view. Intelligence is arguably the best investment

[[Page H3113]]

we have to protect ourselves. Because good information, timely and on 
point, is a force multiplier and a force protector that can help us 
avoid crises altogether.
  Recently Americans have heard about so-called intelligence failures. 
Specifically, just last weekend, we saw what happens when information 
is wrong, when a missile is directed at the wrong target. Rather than 
simply blaming our intelligence entities for a bad call, we on the 
committee have to look further and ask, how did this actually happen?
  In part, this is unfortunately a predictable outcome of stretching 
our finite resources too thin. We have had to juggle and divert our 
limited assets to address the multitude of far-flung foreign policy 
initiatives and transnational threats that are the reality of the world 
today. And as a result, we have asked our intelligence community to do 
with less in more places, for more time, and under more complicated 
circumstances.
  It is a formula for mistake. And this is a formula that we have been 
trying to rewrite these past 3 years and again in this bill today, and 
that is why it is so important that we have Members' support.
  Mr. Chairman, we have emphasized several important themes this year. 
In general terms, they include recapitalizing signals intelligence. And 
no one should be in any way surprised by this need to spend money given 
the rapid advance of technology, correcting the imbalance between 
collection on the one hand and processing the information on the other. 
This has been a serious problem which we have reversed, but we have a 
long way to go to get more analysis involved; innovating paradigms for 
imagery, to include commercial resources, a great opportunity for the 
intelligence communities; and building a stronger and more extensive 
clandestine human intelligence capability worldwide and putting new 
tools into our covert action toolbox so that the choices our President 
has range more robustly and are not limited to doing nothing or 
bombing.
  Although it is true that we may be at less risk in today's world of a 
direct all-out nuclear confrontation, we nevertheless face enormously 
complex challenges from rogue interests who continue to seek nuclear 
capabilities, not to mention the very real threat of chemical or 
biological agents that are continuing to proliferate around the world, 
the ``cheap nukes'' as they are called.
  We also are increasingly threatened by terrorists, who do not play by 
the same ``Marquess of Queensbury'' rules that Americans are used to 
and by a whole new generation of narcotraffickers, whose deadly wares 
threaten the health and safety of our kids. And, tragically, that is a 
war that we are not doing well enough on.
  The only certainty in this uncertain world, as far as I am concerned, 
is that the threats are out there and they are getting more dangerous 
and more widespread, and that is why most agree that we need to rebuild 
our intelligence capability.
  I do not want to think of intelligence as the 9-1-1 of our defenses. 
To me we should strive to prevent bad things from happening in the 
first place so we do not have to call 9-1-1 at all. That is what good 
intelligence should be about. And we have had some successes stopping 
bad things from happening to good people. Regrettably, those are the 
ones we do not read about in the paper.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, the headlines these past weeks have been 
replete with stories about an issue of grave concern and one that we 
have addressed in our bill. I am speaking about our counterintelligence 
capabilities, our defense, as it were, of our Nation's secrets, 
specifically with respect to aggressive efforts by the Chinese and 
others to target our crown jewels, the secrets of our nuclear program 
housed in our national labs.
  We have addressed that in this bill. We authorized the significant 
funding increase to enhance DOE's counterintelligence, CI programs 
those would be, specifically cyber security, and to enhance the 
Department of Energy's ability to conduct comprehensive intelligence 
analysis of foreign nuclear weapons programs and proliferation, which 
need to be done.
  We have taken strong steps to better challenge our analysts and to 
improve the counterintelligence abilities at FBI, DOD, Department of 
Defense so we can better meet the threat of nations like China who, not 
surprisingly, seek to steal our secrets.
  In sum, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill; and 
I thank all members of our committee, especially my ranking member, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for their diligent, applied work, 
unquestioned commitment, and great wisdom to help us in our quest to 
improve our national security.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by commending the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) on the efforts he has made to ensure that the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence operates in a bipartisan 
manner. While the unanimous vote reporting this legislation is an 
indication of the success of his efforts, those of us who serve on the 
committee know that on a daily basis, on matters large and small, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) ensures that the views of the 
Democrats are solicited and considered.
  The bill as reported, in the aggregate, is less than one percent more 
than requested by the administration. Although the committee recommends 
slightly more for certain programs, like those managed by the National 
Security Agency, and slightly less for others, like those managed by 
the National Reconnaissance Office, the fact remains that the total 
authorized for intelligence in this bill is not significantly different 
than that sought by the President.
  This result reflects budgetary realities, but it also reflects a 
judgment about what the intelligence agencies can effectively and 
efficiently spend next year. Investments in the kind of intelligent 
capabilities the Nation will need in the years to come requires a 
steady commitment over time of resources. This legislation, as has been 
the case in the past, should be seen as an installment in that effort, 
not as its end.
  H.R. 1555 provides a substantial amount of money for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities. How much, even in the aggregate, is 
classified. I believe that no harm to the national security would be 
caused by making the aggregate budget request, the aggregate 
authorization, or the aggregate appropriations public.
  The arguments for retaining the classification of these amounts, 
which focus on the utility of the aggregate information to the average 
American are irrelevant to security considerations, and the arguments 
which deal with the utility of the information to foreign governments 
are, in my judgment, not persuasive. I have in the past supported 
amendments to make certain budget information public, and I will do so 
again when presented with an opportunity.
  I believe the Director of Central Intelligence was right in October 
of 1997 and March of 1998 when he disclosed the appropriated amounts 
for intelligence. I hope he will reconsider his current position with 
respect to additional annual disclosures.
  Regrettably, publicity about intelligence activities normally centers 
on problems rather than successes. Problems, however, need to be 
acknowledged and corrected.
  I want to mention my concerns in two areas, although these concerns 
do not affect my support for this bill. Both concerns involve the 
People's Republic of China. The counterintelligence shortcomings at the 
Department of Energy's national laboratories have over the past 20 
years or so provided valuable information to the PRC and may, more 
recently, have allowed the PRC access to extremely sensitive 
information about our nuclear weapons.
  The bill contains significant increases in funding for 
counterintelligence activities at the Department of Energy requested by 
the President, including additional amounts sought by the President for 
computer security. The bill also contains additional, more modest 
amounts for analytic activities related to the PRC. There may be more 
that needs to be done to make sure that the national labs are secure, 
either initiatives recommended by the Cox Committee or other proposals.

[[Page H3114]]

  I believe that we have ample time before we go to conference on this 
bill to consider these matters in a deliberative way and endorse those 
which make sense and which will not produce unintended consequences of 
greater harm than the problems they seek to correct. I do not believe 
we know enough today about what more should be done beyond those steps 
already taken or proposed by the President and Secretary Richardson.
  The accidental bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade at this point 
defies understanding. To be of use to policymakers and military 
commanders intelligence needs to be reliable. The intelligence which 
confused a military target with the embassy most certainly failed to 
meet that essential standard. Explanations which, in some cases, seem 
more like excuses have been offered, but it is clear that a serious 
mistake was made. We need to be sure we know why and take corrective 
action expeditiously.
  The responsibility for congressional oversight of intelligence 
extends beyond the drafting of the authorization bill. It must 
vigorously review the manner in which the activities authorized each 
year are managed. We need to be able to assure the public that a degree 
of care commensurate with the importance of, and risks associated with, 
these activities is constantly present. Determining the cause of 
problems once they are identified is essential to the provision of that 
type of assurance. I look forward to working with our chairman, as I 
have in the past, to provide this kind of oversight.
  In closing, I want to mention a matter concerning the committee's 
access to information. I am disturbed by the fact that the intelligence 
agencies that are funded by the national foreign intelligence program 
budget pursue a large number of programs and activities requiring 
special access which are not systematically reported to the Select 
Committee on Intelligence or the Committee on Appropriations. I do not 
mean to suggest that the intelligence community refuses to brief the 
committee on individual programs or activities. Rather, I mean that 
there appear to be many special access programs, and the executive 
branch does not rigorously ensure that each of them is routinely 
reported to Congress.
  The Committee on Armed Services faced a similar situation in the 
Defense Department's handling of special access programs, and years ago 
required in law that the Department provide Congress with a written 
report on every program that the Secretary of Defense decided was 
important and sensitive enough to warrant special handling.
  My impression is that this reporting system works very well and that 
we may need similar legislation for the intelligence community. I 
intend to examine this matter in more detail in the coming months and 
may even decide to pursue it further in the conference committee.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1555 will, in my judgment, enhance the ability of 
the intelligence community to respond to the national security 
challenges we face now and which we will face in the future. I urge its 
adoption by the House.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for his fine statement and 
particularly my full support and agreement on the last point he made 
with the special access programs.
  Mr. Chairman, let me note that there is a mistake in the printed 
committee report concerning the CBO estimate. That is not an 
intelligence failure. This is a printing mistake.
  The CBO letter provided to the Select Committee on Intelligence 
states that the unclassified portion of the bill ``would not affect 
direct spending or receipts, thus pay-as-you-go procedures would not 
apply.'' In the process of printing the committee report, the GPO 
omitted the final ``not,'' making it appear as if pay-as-you-go 
procedures would apply.
  I would like the Record to reflect accurately the CBO estimate and, 
therefore, will submit at the appropriate time the CBO letter for 
inclusion in the Record.
  Likewise, Mr. Chairman, in our review of the materials in preparation 
for floor action today, we also noted the inadvertent inclusion of 
language in the committee report that does not accurately reflect the 
committee's position in one instance. The offending language is found 
at page 15 of the published committee report and concerns the Joint 
Airborne's SIGINT program.
  This language also indicates a cut to the program office of $1.6 
million. This, too, is not an accurate accounting of the committee's 
intent on this program.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to my distinguished ranking member for any 
comment he may wish to make on this point.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost) noted in the adoption of the 
rule, I felt that we should have had more time before we got to the 
floor, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) worked hard to at 
least allow us a few more days. Regardless of that, the errors that the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) talked about did occur, and it is 
appropriate to correct them. Specifically, with respect to the Joint 
Airborne SIGINT Program, the committee's intention is not accurately 
reflected in page 15 of the report as printed.
  Mr. Chairman, I insert the following correspondence for the Record:

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 4, 1999.
     Mr. Dan L. Crippen
     Director, Congressional Budget Officer,
     Washington, DC
       Dear Mr. Crippen: In compliance with the Rules of the House 
     of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate 
     of H.R. 1555, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2000,'' pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of 
     the bill as approved by the House Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence on April 28, 1999.
       As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in 
     the very near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited 
     response to this request by the CBO's staff. Should you have 
     any questions related to this request, please contact Patrick 
     B. Murray, the Committee's Chief Counsel, at 225-4121. Thank 
     you in advance for your assistance with this request.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
                                                         Chairman.
       Attachment.
                                  ____



                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                                    U.S. Congress,
                                      Washington, DC, May 5, 1999.
     Hon. Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House 
         of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
     prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1555, the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
       If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn 
     Sauter, who can be reached at 226-2840.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Barry B. Anderson
                                   (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
       Enclosure.
     H.R. 1555--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
         2000
       Summary: H.R. 1555 would authorize appropriations for 
     fiscal year 2000 for intelligence activities of the United 
     States government, the Community Management Account, and the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System 
     (CLARDS). The bill would also authorize such sums as may be 
     necessary to fund an emergency supplemental appropriation for 
     fiscal year 1999.
       This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
     the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting 
     H.R. 1555 would result in additional spending of $194 million 
     over the 2000-2004 period, assuming appropriation of the 
     authorized amounts. CBO has no basis for determining the cost 
     of an emergency supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 
     1999. The unclassified portion of the bill would not affect 
     direct spending or receipts; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures 
     would not apply.
       The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from 
     application of that act legislative provisions that are 
     necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that 
     the unclassified provisions of this bill either fit within 
     that exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or 
     private-sector mandates as defined by UMRA.
       Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
     budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 1555 is 
     shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary 
     information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because 
     parts are

[[Page H3115]]

     classified at a level above clearances held by CBO employees. 
     For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 1555 
     will be enacted by October 1, 1999, and that the authorized 
     amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2000.

                                    [By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                                        Spending subject to appropriation
 
Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community Management
    Budget Authority \1\........................................     102       0       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................     104      39       9       2       0       0
Proposed Changes
    Authorization level.........................................       0     194       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0     120      58      12       4       0
Spending Under H.R. 1555 for Intelligence Community Management
    Authorization level.........................................     102     194       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................     104     159      67      14       4      0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1999 level is the account appropriated for that year.

       Outlays are estimated according to historical spending 
     patterns. The costs of this legislation fall within budget 
     function 050 (national defense).
       The bill would authorize appropriations of $194 million for 
     the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds 
     the coordination of programs, budget oversight, and 
     management of the intelligence agencies. In addition, the 
     bill would authorize $209 million for CIARDS to cover 
     retirement costs attributable to military service and various 
     unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered 
     mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the 
     same as assumed in the CBO baseline.
       Section 501 of the bill would allow the Director of the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), in coordination 
     with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
     to exempt certain documents from provisions of the Freedom of 
     Information Act (FOIA). The bill would allow exemptions for 
     files concerning the activities of NIMA that, prior to its 
     creation in 1996, were performed by the National Photographic 
     Interpretation Center (NPIC) within the CIA and that document 
     the means by which foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence is collected through scientific and 
     technical systems. H.R. 1555 would also require a decennial 
     review under rules and procedures similar to those governing 
     operational files of the CIA.
       CBO believes this section could result in discretionary 
     savings from reduced administrative and legal costs the NIMA 
     might otherwise incur to respond to FOIA requests. These 
     potential savings could be partially offset by any future 
     legal costs arising from the limited judicial review that 
     H.R. 1555 would permit. (Judicial review would allow legal 
     challenges of NIMA's decisions to exempt certain files.) H.R. 
     1555 would also require NIMA to review the exempt status of 
     operational files every 10 years, but CBO believes that the 
     resulting cost would be small, considering the classification 
     reviews that occur under current law. CBO cannot estimate the 
     budgetary impact of section 501 because we have no 
     information about the number of files that this section would 
     affect or the unit cost for NIMA to review them.
       Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
       Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded 
     Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from application of the 
     act legislative provisions that are necessary for the 
     national security. CBO has determined that the unclassified 
     provisions of this bill either fit within that exclusion or 
     do not contain intergovernmental or private-sector mandates 
     as defined by UMRA.
       Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Dawn Sauter. Impact on 
     State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Teri Gullo. Impact on 
     the Private Sector: Eric Labs.
       Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant 
     Director for Budget Analysis.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) a valued member of the 
committee.
  (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1555, 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
  Mr. Chairman, the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), 
and the ranking minority member, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dixon), are to be commended for the outstanding work that they have 
done to lead our committee to make the appropriate investments in the 
intelligence community in these difficult and demanding times.

                              {time}  1130

  I am now serving in the second term of my service on the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence. Let me clear up a mystery that many 
might point to as we deliberate. I have never seen a committee act in a 
more responsible manner without regard to partisanship, and I am proud 
to serve under the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Dixon). They have the best interest of our Nation 
at heart. We work in a truly bipartisan fashion. That does us all 
proud.
  Let me focus in particular on one portion of our bill which will fund 
a substantial increase in the language training that our intelligence 
community will need as it rebuilds its presence around the world and 
rebuilds the analytic capability to cover more than just the hot spots 
of the day.
  The need for more language skill within the intelligence community, 
as my colleagues on the committee are aware, is a subject of special 
concern to me. It is critically important that we have our people, our 
best talent, our most dedicated officers scattered around the world 
working on our behalf. It is also important that they be fluent in the 
language in the country in which they find themselves. I think that 
there is room for improvement in that area.
  But we have made a step this year. I intend to help ensure that it is 
one of a number of steps along the path to the fluency our intelligence 
assets need to operate as we approach the next century and as we find 
ourselves with a desperate need for a presence all over the globe.
  As a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I have 
closely followed the issues that have made unusual demands upon the 
intelligence community and the problems that have produced headlines 
that we sometimes would rather not see. Much has been said about these 
problems. That is to be expected, and I think it certainly is in order. 
But let me add a thought.
  Central to every intelligence operation is a balance between risk and 
benefit. Within the committee, we are aware of the often unbelievable 
benefit our government derives from the operations of our clandestine 
service. We are aware as well of risk and, on occasion, the damage that 
comes from some of our operations. Given the full picture of the 
benefits and of the risks, we come to understand that we will 
inevitably hear a news report and see in the headlines the acronym CIA 
and sort of wince at what we read or the report on the radio. We will 
also appreciate as we hear this news sometimes on occasion, not news we 
want to hear, that intelligence officers are overseas scattered around 
the world putting oftentimes their very lives at risk to get the 
President and our policymakers the intelligence they must have to make 
responsible public policy.
  I encourage Members to put the unfortunate headline about the 
bombing--and, boy, it was unfortunate--of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade in that context. I know as well as my colleagues that a 
mistake was made that was avoidable. I also know and encourage my 
colleagues to consider that hundreds of intelligence officers are 
overseas hard at work as we discuss that. We will never read about 
them, we will never know much about them, but they are doing something 
critically important for all of us each and every day. We should 
recognize that.
  This bill is an attempt to give them the resources they need as this 
dedicated talent is scattered around the world working around the clock 
often under very adverse conditions to assure a safe and secure 
America.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, the Washington Times headline said,

[[Page H3116]]

Greenspan's Warning Sends Stocks Reeling. Chairman Greenspan said that 
our economic expansion could end badly because of a ballooning trade 
deficit. He further said, somewhere in the future, unless reversed, our 
growing international imbalances are apt to create significant problems 
for America.
  Now, I know that the trade matter is under the jurisdiction of 
another committee. But we all realize that there have been nations 
buying and spying their way into our trade secrets, our patents, our 
technology with a powerful impact and influence on our productivity and 
competitiveness. I want to thank the committee for allowing an 
amendment to be made in order by me that would require a report 
describing the effects of espionage against America conducted by other 
nations relative to our trade secrets, our patents, our technology 
development and basic competitiveness. It shall also include an 
analysis of the effects of such espionage on our trade deficit and on 
the employment rate in the United States.
  This bill handles the intelligence community's needs quite well, but 
I think that we take a passive role when we do not look at spying and 
buying into our economic viability. It is not just the military aspects 
that produce a great national security threat. I believe a great 
national security threat is also present through our economic activity.
  With that, I want to thank them for allowing the amendment to be made 
in order.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield 4 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum), a more than highly 
valued member of the committee, chairman of one of our subcommittees, a 
member who has led the task force on drug efforts that have been 
ongoing these years, a man whose contributions through the Committee on 
the Judiciary and his value from that position on the committee is 
extraordinary.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. As chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence, I am very 
pleased to report that this bill continues four key investments we must 
make in order for our government to be more effective against narcotics 
traffickers, terrorists, proliferators and rogue states.
  The first investment we must make is in human intelligence. Mr. 
Chairman, the unintentional bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
underscores what our combat pilots and our diplomats have been telling 
us all along. On-the-ground, human intelligence is as essential to the 
targeting of our bombs as it is to the drafting of our demarches. To 
wage an effective war or to maintain an effective peace, we must deploy 
intelligence officers overseas to penetrate the war rooms and the 
boardrooms of our adversaries.
  This bill, Mr. Chairman, helps us get there. It will indeed help put 
more eyes and ears out into the problem areas of the world to get us 
the intelligence that we need to win wars, to keep the peace and to 
protect our national interests.
  The second investment we must make is in the all-source analyst. 
Intelligence is the enabler of policy. The all-source analyst must 
provide our policymakers and our military with finished intelligence 
and assessments on matters from Kosovo to the Congo, from Pyongyang to 
Papua New Guinea.
  In that light, Mr. Chairman, I am particularly pleased to report that 
the authorization bill continues the rebuilding of our analyst cadre. 
In the bill we provide for better training of our analysts, for more 
competitive analysis and for broader and longer term assessments than 
are done at present. Finally, as in past years, we provide more support 
for the efforts of our analysts to integrate overt with covert 
information and to determine what information must, in fact, be 
collected clandestinely.
  The third investment is in counterintelligence. This bill provides 
more funding for the counter-intelligence programs of the FBI and the 
Department of Defense.
  We are all aware of the serious espionage case involving the 
Department of Energy. For some time the committee has urged the 
Department of Energy to improve its counterintelligence program. In 
this bill we provide for better monitoring of foreign visitors to the 
labs, for better support of FBI investigative activities, for better 
cyber security and personnel security, and for better analysis of 
foreign intelligence threats. Those threats are real, they are growing, 
and they will be present with us for a long time to come. We really 
need to improve counter- intelligence with whatever support resources 
we can.
  This bill takes steps in that direction. We will need to take more in 
future years.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, this bill invests in a major way in a matter 
of deep and long-standing personal interest to me, the war on 
international crime and on narcotics trafficking. In drafting this 
bill, we have worked closely with the House Committee on Armed Services 
in order to rebuild our intelligence community's capabilities against 
the world's most dangerous criminal organizations, from the United Wa 
State Army in Burma to the Colombia drug cartels to the Tijuana cartel 
in Mexico.
  It strikes me that if we are going to make the efforts we did in 
legislation the President signed into law last year in the Western 
Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act come to life and be real, we need to 
properly support that legislation in our budget and in our funding 
programs both in intelligence and in terms of programs for Customs, for 
DEA and for the Coast Guard. We need more planes to survey the region. 
We need the kind of radar we do not have now. We need to have chase 
planes. We need to have more vessels and ships. We need to have 
alternative crop programs. We need to interdict drugs as well as, of 
course, get at the education side of this.
  Intelligence is a very important part of that. If we do not have the 
right intelligence apparatus in place in Central and Latin America in 
particular, we will never be able to do what the bill calls for and 
that is to reduce the flow of drugs into this country by 80 percent 
over a 3-year period of time. I believe that can be done, I believe the 
intelligence component of that is in this bill, and it is very 
important.
  In sum, this bill supports our eyes and ears overseas, assists our 
analysts back home and revitalizes our counterintelligence and counter-
narcotics efforts throughout the intelligence community. The bill is 
one part of a coordinated effort against the evils of international 
crime.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and congratulate him 
on a bill well done.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank our ranking member for yielding me 
this time and commend both the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) 
and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for their leadership on our 
committee and in conducting the proceedings, in the gentleman from 
Florida's case as our chairman, in a very fair and nonpartisan way.
  I as one from the left of the spectrum came to the committee to 
subject the budget to the very harshest scrutiny, to declassify as many 
documents as was possible in our national interest, and also to 
hopefully see more diversity among the people who work in the 
community. I think that is important because we should have the 
community tap the talents of all the people in our society. I think it 
will lead to better intelligence because we will have resources far 
beyond those that we have now.
  Today, I wanted to address a couple of issues which are current in my 
remarks about the bill, and because we may be called into the 
appropriations supplemental conference at any moment, I am going to 
talk about some of the amendments in my remarks here today. But on two 
issues, Chinese espionage and the mistaken bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade, I wanted to make a couple of observations.
  In terms of the alleged espionage at our labs, I think this is a 
very, very serious problem. I believe it is unfortunate that the 
safeguards were not in place to protect our critical advantage, our 
competitive advantage in terms of national security and the weapons 
that are at our disposal. I think that what is happening in Kosovo is a 
demonstration that war should be obsolete as an

[[Page H3117]]

option. But that not being the case, we have to protect the investment 
we are making in our national defense and we have to, as our chairman 
has said, have a force multiplier in the intelligence that we have to 
prevent conflict and to equip our President with the best possible 
information.
  But in dealing with the espionage issue, I hope that we will be 
careful not to impugn the good reputations of the many Asian Americans 
who are so excellent in the field of mathematics and science and who 
have provided great service to our country, our Asian American 
community. We must be very, very careful about how we deal with that 
issue in those terms.
  We must also not impede the free flow of scientific information. I am 
not talking about our secrets. I am talking about that kind of 
information that should flow freely among scientists and it should flow 
internationally. I think every person and every country in the world 
benefits from that.
  We also must not demoralize all of the scientists at the labs. We 
must recognize the service they have all provided to our country and 
not investigate any one of them because of their national origin, that 
we must have real cause, and it be directed toward programs that they 
are working on rather than, as I say, national origin.
  In terms of the air strike, there are accidents that happen in war. 
This was not an accident. This was a stupid mistake. I think that the 
Chinese government--and I have never been one to pull a punch in my 
criticism of the Chinese government as everyone here knows--deserves 
the apology which it has received from the President of the United 
States. I think the Chinese government deserves an inquiry into how 
this happened to allay any suspicions that they may have that it was 
anything but a mistake or an accident.
  I also think that our country should make reparations to the families 
of those who died and those who were injured in that tragedy.

                              {time}  1145

  I do not think that we should, as some in China and the China 
Business News have suggested, hatch some economic favors for the 
Chinese to make up for the bombing of the embassy, and I do think that 
the Chinese, in respect for all the catering to the Chinese that 
President Clinton has done, owed him the courtesy and the respect of 
showing his apology to the Chinese people far earlier so as not to 
inflame the sentiments of the Chinese people against the United States.
  It is interesting to me to see these young people driven up in buses, 
corralled by the Chinese military to the front of our embassy where 
they threw pieces of sidewalk over a number of days at our embassy with 
our ambassador inside. I did not see anybody being taken away by the 
police except to be escorted to safety where young people 10 years ago, 
almost to the day, when they demonstrated peacefully in Tiananmen 
Square were rolled over by tanks.
  So I would hope that in addition to our apology, our reparations and 
our inquiry that the Chinese would also look into the perpetrators of 
that demonstration, that violent demonstration, against the American 
embassy in China.
  Since I do not have very much time, I am going to go on to the 
amendments since I might have to go to committee and I will not be here 
to speak on them. I think that most of the amendments offered by our 
colleagues should be accepted by the committee, specifically that of 
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr), and the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Engel) relating to the Kosovo Liberation Army. I hope the 
committee will be able to accept the amendment of the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Hinchey), which I think is very well founded, about the 
investigation of the assassination of President Allende. I understand 
the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) may or may not offer his, but I 
hope we can work out the amendment of the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. 
Sanders), the gentleman from California (Mr. Stark) and the gentleman 
from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio), which I think is a valuable addition to the 
bill. I hope that the committee will accept the recommendation of the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney), and I certainly support the 
recommendation of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), and I 
hope that that will be worked out.
  With that I again commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for 
the way he conducts our meetings and the proud leadership of our 
ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New 
Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a new member of our committee, who has already 
established her credentials in helping us with the matters in Los 
Alamos, which happens to be in her district.
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the ranking member and 
the staff for their hard work on this authorization bill. I would like 
to take a few moments to talk about Chinese espionage directed at the 
Department of Energy and at our national laboratories, including Los 
Alamos and Sandia, which are in my home State of New Mexico.
  Since the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Dicks) completed their extensive review of this issue 
last fall, we have been reviewing the evidence, and listening to 
experts and thinking about what we should do. Some facts are clear.
  First, the Chinese have obtained classified information on our 
nuclear weapons program that has endangered American national security.
  Second, while public attention has focused on a few individuals and 
principally Los Alamos National Lab, this was not a single instance of 
a lucky break by the Chinese. It is just one piece in a mosaic of 
Chinese espionage activity.
  Likewise, the failure to protect these secrets was not just a failure 
of an individual, but of institutions, lousy communication between 
agencies, lost files, weak procedures, inadequate resources and just 
plain poor judgment show up again and again in the history of this 
incident.
  Now it is up to Congress to begin to correct these failures, and let 
us be clear from the beginning. There are not going to be any simple 
solutions.
  There are several elements of this authorization bill that begin to 
address these deficiencies.
  The bill includes additional funds to subject the China-Taiwan Issues 
Group at the CIA to rigorous external competitive analysis, to 
challenge thinking more aggressively, and to report to the Congress 
biannually on this effort.
  Second, the committee is recommending a substantial funding increase 
to the Department of Energy for analysis of foreign nuclear weapons 
programs. Special emphasis will be on the Chinese and Russian programs 
as well as proliferation.
  The bill authorizes substantial increase in funding for the DOE 
Office of Counterintelligence, including new counterintelligence 
computer information security programs, and we increase funding for the 
FBI for counterintelligence and investigative training.
  Finally, the committee has added substantial funding for language 
training to correct a serious shortage of linguists in the intelligence 
community.
  These efforts are only the beginning of what must be done to improve 
our national counterintelligence activity. I believe that we need 
further comprehensive legislation to remedy this problem and have been 
working in a bipartisan way with my colleagues to begin the drafting of 
that legislation. There are at least a dozen recommendations that we 
have developed thus far, and I will include those recommendations at 
the appropriate point for the Record.
  Mr. Chairman, we will be dealing with the consequences of this 
situation for a long time. The bill before us is the beginning of that 
process. I look forward to working with my colleagues to that end.
  1. We must create a special set of security requirements for DOE and 
DOE contractor employees who have access to nuclear information. Those 
who have physical access to sensitive area must all be investigated, 
cleared and readily identifiable. As difficult as it is to believe, 
there are people with rather superficial background checks that have 
physical access to sensitive facilities who are not allowed to have 
access to the information in them.
  2. The FBI, no contractors, should handle all Q clearances background 
checks.

[[Page H3118]]

  3. Sensitive employees, as a condition of clearance must agree to 
take polygraphs, which would then trigger further investigation if the 
polygraph indicates deception.
  4. The government must be allowed to monitor e-mail and telephone 
traffic into and out of the national laboratories an nuclear weapons 
plants.
  5. The FBI must be allowed to search ad monitor computers and 
telephones within national laboratories, something we don't allow now, 
as incredible as that sounds.
  6. Compel the FBI to inform the DOE office of counter-intelligence 
and the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs within fifteen days of 
the initiation of an espionage investigation of any DOE or DOE 
contractor employee. In one of the Los Alamos cases, no notification 
was made for four years.
  7. Require the DOE official responsible for Q clearances to be 
informed of all issues that might impact the issuance of a clearance, 
even when such issues fail to rise to the level of an indictment.
  8. Improve timely communication of all such matters to the leadership 
of Congress and the appropriated committees of jurisdiction.
  9. Set clear conditions and procedures for unclassified and 
classified visits to our national laboratories by foreign visitors from 
sensitive countries.
  10. Require that DOE develop and maintain a comprehensive 
counterintelligence plan which must be reviewed and certified as 
adequate annually by the FBI to the President and the relevant 
committees of the Congress.
  11. Establish vulnerability assessment group with responsibility or 
assessing and evaluating the vulnerability of DOE and the labs to 
espionage, including conducting classified operational tests of lab 
security. The group will report annually to the relevant Congressional 
Committees.
  12. Establish in law a special assistant for counter intelligence 
reporting to the Secretary of Energy with responsibility for management 
and oversight of the DOE counter-intelligence program. This individual 
must have professional experience in intelligence and counter-
intelligence matters. The bill that is before us today is the beginning 
of that process.
  Mr. Chairman, we will be dealing with the consequences of this 
situation for some time. It is my hope that we can develop a bi-
partisan consensus bill in the House that will provide real protection 
of America's secrets.
  We have a serious problem and we need to address it. But, at the same 
time, we must be careful. The national laboratories are tremendous 
national assets which employ some of the most brilliant scientific 
talent in America. In our eagerness to solve a problem, we must make 
sure that we do not damage that which we are trying to protect.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues to that end.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a very valuable member of our committee.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I want to, first of all, thank my good 
friend, the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) 
and applaud him forever his hard work on the committee and also our 
chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for the way that the 
majority and the minority parties work together.
  With that preface, Mr. Chairman, I voted for this bill, to send it to 
the floor, but I do have a host of hesitations, caveats, concerns and 
reservations. I will vote for this bill today, but I hope these 
reservations and hesitations and caveats are addressed between now and 
the conference report. I will also vote for this bill because I think 
it is important for our intelligence community and our intelligence 
assets to cooperate with our military at a time that we find ourselves 
at war not only in Kosovo but at war in Iraq, and that cooperation is 
vital.
  But my concerns are fivefold, Mr. Chairman:
  One, the Chinese embassy bombing. I disagree strongly with Senator 
Shelby, who has stated that this is a funding priority concern and we 
are not spending enough money. This is an individual mistake, this is a 
system mistake, this is a CIA mistake, and not updating the maps I 
think is a failure of the CIA to provide some basic information in this 
instance, and I am hopeful that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) 
as our chairman will have not only a hearing on this but an open 
hearing followed by possibly a closed hearing.
  Secondly, I am concerned about the string of failures in our missile 
launches and our access to space. The gentleman from Delaware (Mr. 
Castle) and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop) have shown their 
concern on this issue, and that is something that we are following up 
on.
  Thirdly, I am concerned about the security of the national 
laboratories, and I hope that this is not a partisan political and 
wedge issue that the parties will get into. This again, Mr. Chairman, 
is a failure of institutions, it is a failure of administrations, and 
it is a failure of systems.
  Fourthly, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about something that the 
chairman is very, very concerned about and trying to address, and that 
is the ongoing need for hiring more linguists and analysts, and it is 
something he is very devoted to and something we need to continue to 
work on.
  And lastly, and our ranking member said this better than I did or I 
could, we have concerns about the SAPs, or the special access programs, 
are not being systematically reported to the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence. We do need to address this between now and the 
conference, and this is something that I think is important to a host 
of different members on the committee on both sides. We need more 
oversight of the SAPs, we need more reporting of the SAPs, we may even 
need a person in charge of this process.
  So those are the five concerns I have, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that 
we will address those in the ensuing months with the Senate 
Intelligence Committee in conference and again applaud the chairman and 
the ranking member for their working relationship.


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would remind all Members to avoid personal 
references to Members of the United States Senate.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me assure the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) that all five 
of the points he made are very much on my schedule.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Delaware 
(Mr. Castle), another subcommittee chairman of our subcommittee system 
on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence who has served us 
very well and recently addressed one of the points about missiles which 
we may hear more about.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding this time to me, and, Mr. Chairman, I do rise in very strong 
support for this bill, and I really do commend the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), our chairman of the committee, and the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Dixon), our ranking member, for their efforts and 
the other members of this committee. They are a pleasure to work with 
as well as the staff which works so well together in a truly bipartisan 
sense, and I think that today together we have brought to the floor a 
good bipartisan bill that continues to work toward rebuilding our 
intelligence capabilities, and, Mr. Chairman, these capabilities have 
been seriously and dangerously hollowed out. We have been saying this 
for 4 years now, and unfortunately there are now stark reminders of the 
risks we have taken.
  Mr. Chairman, our chairman has discussed the intelligence issues that 
contributed to the errors that related to the bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade. Therefore I do not want to dwell on this except to 
say that I also view this issue as a result of past policies and 
emphasize collection at the expense of processing and analysis and 
emphasize tactical intelligence at the expense of strategic 
intelligence, and I emphasize at the expense because there is an issue 
of imbalance here. We cannot do one and not the other. If we collect 
data but do not have the wherewithal to analyze it expertly, the value 
of the collection is diminished regardless of how much users say it is 
needed.
  Tactical intelligence gives a pilot the information that tells him or 
her when life-threatening missiles may be in the area of operations, 
but strategic intelligence gives us the data to know the types of 
missiles in the area in the first place and gives the data that 
distinguishes an embassy from a storage facility.
  Put simply, we cannot do one without the other and be successful in 
protecting our security and reducing the chance of mistakes.
  But there are other issues that are just as important in this debate 
that point to the fragility of our intelligence community.

[[Page H3119]]

  As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence, I face some of the most perplexing and costly problems in 
front of the committee. I would like to mention two such problems. 
First is the issue that I mentioned briefly before relating to that 
imbalance between collection on the one side and processing and 
analysis on the other. This is an area of great concern to the 
committee and one that we specifically highlight in this bill.
  Put simply: We have new imagery collection systems coming down the 
pike, and the administration has done virtually nothing by way of 
preparing for the processing and analysis of the images taken. There is 
supposedly a plan that is under development, but there is no budget for 
it. Yet experts have privately indicated that the cost over the next 5 
or so years could be in the billions.
  Without this investment in processing and analysis the collected 
imagery will be almost useless. Without this investment mistakes will 
continue to be made. There will be more misidentified buildings, 
especially as we learn from one foreign policy crisis to the next 
around the globe. In this bill we have not only sent a warning shot to 
the administration but have also begun an investment, although modest, 
to try and fix this imbalance between collection and analysis.
  A second area of concern is the recapitalization of our signals 
intelligence capabilities. Again put simply, I am afraid that we run 
the risk of going deaf to the worldwide explosion of communications 
technologies. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, I cannot go into the details in 
this area, but suffice it to say that there is a very serious issue 
here, and again we address that issue in this bill.
  One last area of concern to me is our ability to launch satellites 
into space. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) mentioned this 
moments ago. As many of as my colleagues know from reading recent press 
reports, we are having a crisis of confidence in our launch systems 
based on a series of failures within the past year. This is an issue 
that we are looking into now, and we have had a series of discussions 
with various experts on this particular subject already that will 
probably go to the hearing stage next.

                              {time}  1200

  This is an issue that we must continue to look into, but it points to 
the fact that intelligence resources cannot be taken for granted. 
Without the proper care and investment in the infrastructure, we place 
our resources at risk.
  Mr. Chairman, the concerns that I have addressed are not the only 
ones we need to address. There are many more, some large, some small. 
It is clear, however, that a long-term commitment to investment in 
intelligence is needed. The administration is not doing it, so we have 
to.
  The adds proposed in this bill are fairly modest, especially compared 
to the need, but it is a start. It invests in the recapitalization of 
our signals intelligence capabilities, it begins the process of 
investment for processing and analysis, and it provides the guidance 
and support that the Director of Central Intelligence needs but seems 
only to be getting from Congress.
  The bill addresses the most urgent needs that get us going in the 
process of rebuilding our capabilities. It is a good bill. It works to 
both balance and invest in our national security future. It is a must, 
and I ask the Members of the House to give it our full support.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank our distinguished ranking member, 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), for affording me a little 
bit of time to clarify my position on the Sweeney amendment, which I 
said earlier that I had hoped the committee could accommodate.
  It was more in the spirit of what the amendment says about the 
willful identification of U.S. intelligence agents also including such 
protections to cover former agents. I think there should be a stern 
penalty for those who would be involved in the willful identification. 
I do not think that, as the Sweeney amendment says, there should be 
minimum mandatory penalties but that should be left up to the judges.
  These people put themselves in harm's way. They deserve our 
protection, but the minimum mandatory sentence is not what it should 
be.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Bishop), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 
Technical and Tactical Intelligence of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dixon) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1555, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
  I would note, first of all, that this legislation was approved 
unanimously in the committee, a reflection of the efforts of the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, and ranking Democrat 
member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), to produce a 
bipartisan bill.
  This year I became the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 
Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and in plain language this 
subcommittee is responsible for oversight of the ways in which 
intelligence is collected using machines like satellites and airplanes, 
rather than human beings.
  The subcommittee is also responsible for intelligence systems and 
activities that support our military forces tactically. These systems 
are critically important for virtually all of the intelligence 
community's missions, from combatting terrorism and narcotics 
trafficking to supporting our troops in combat in the Balkans and the 
Persian Gulf.
  This bill is very consistent with the request submitted by the 
President. In several areas, the committee recommends modest increases 
in the amount requested by the President.
  In general, I am very supportive of these decisions. For example, 
this bill adds funds to help the National Security Agency reshape 
itself to keep pace with the incredible growth in the size and 
complexity of the global telecommunications network.
  The committee is concerned that NSA needs some organizational and 
management reforms as well as some engineering expertise from industry 
to sustain its remarkable record in defense of the Nation.
  The committee also recommends additional funding in selected areas of 
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, or NIMA. NIMA faces a very 
large shortfall in its capacity to exploit the volume of imagery that 
we will be able to collect in the near future for intelligence needs 
and for mapmaking. The committee has recommended increased funds for 
NIMA to begin this expansion and to increase its productivity.
  The committee has also recommended funds for additional procurement 
of pictures and products from the commercial sector.
  On the debit side, the committee recommends a relatively modest 
reduction in the budget for the National Reconnaissance Office, or NRO, 
which builds, launches and operates the Nation's intelligence 
satellites. Included in the committee's recommended actions is a 
proposal to defer a decision until conference with the Senate on 
whether to continue production of an NRO satellite or to initiate a new 
design.
  I believe that this proposal was a reasonable compromise, and I 
appreciate the chairman's willingness to accommodate the concerns of 
Democrats on it.
  The committee bill also contains recommendations for increases in 
several important tactical intelligence missions and systems, including 
the RC-135 signals intelligence aircraft, the Predator and Global Hawk 
unmanned aerial vehicles, and tactical antisubmarine warfare programs.
  Since the committee marked up this bill, there have been three 
successive satellite launch failures to go along with another three 
suffered just since last August. The Subcommittee on Technical and 
Tactical Intelligence held its first briefing yesterday on this very 
disturbing string of failures, and the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. 
Castle), the chairman of the subcommittee, along with the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) have pledged to continue the subcommittee's 
examination of this potentially serious problem over the coming months.

[[Page H3120]]

  Mr. Chairman, this bill would provide the funds that are needed to 
sustain our efforts to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking and 
weapons proliferation and to support our military forces. It is a 
responsible and prudent measure, and I am pleased to support this bill, 
and I urge my colleagues across the aisle, on both sides of the aisle, 
to support it as well.
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, there has a flurry of news articles, 
exposes and anti-China speeches in recent weeks over the Los Alamos 
Labs Espionage Case. But it didn't start with that. For months 
politicans have been making fantastic accusations of Chinese smuggling 
AK-47s into the port of Los Angeles, PLA owned businesses acquiring 
warehouses in Long Beach, California, Chinese bases at either entrance 
of the Panama Canal, Chinese campaign donations to the Democratic party 
and Chinese theft of dual-use technologies. These are only some of the 
more outrageous of stories.
  This takes us to our current crisis, recently stoked by the 
accidental and unfortunate bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
by NATO forces. No doubt the collective sum of our concerns with 
Chinese, both true and imagined, have led to the souring of U.S.-China 
relations. The Chinese, in all likelihood do indeed spy against the 
United States. Just, as I would suspect, many other nations both 
friendly and adversarial. We should not be so alarmed, so offended. 
This is the reality that nation-states must accept and must employ for 
their own security. Accusations of Chinese espionage notwithstanding, 
security weaknesses in our weapons labs are a serious concern. However, 
these problems can and will be corrected. And they must be corrected 
responsibly. Legislation aimed at destroying the free exchange of 
scientific knowledge through our foreign visitors program would do more 
harm to our national security than good. We can stem the illegal flow 
of classified information in other, non-draconian ways. Indeed we are 
capable of such feats.
  For the past couple of months now, committees and subcommittees have 
held hearings on the Los Alamos case and the allegations of Chinese 
espionage. As we discuss today's Intelligence Reauthorization 
legislation, we have to ensure that the current rash of stories and the 
current state of our relationship with China has no impact upon the 
lives and the employment or economic opportunities of individual Asian 
Americans around the country. We in Congress have a special 
responsibility to make sure that our sentiments about these matters of 
espionage, these matters of our relationship with China or any Asian or 
Pacific country in clearly separate from any reflection upon the ethnic 
communities in our country. As we deal with the Cox Report, as we deal 
with the Department of Energy revelations, let us remember that there 
is a very deal danger of stereotyping and stigmatizing all members of 
our Asian American communities.
  Let us also remember the contributions Asian Pacific Americans have 
made to our nation. May is Asian Pacific American Heritage Month, and I 
encourage my colleagues to participate in the month-long activities 
held in honor of the Asian Pacific Americans in our districts and in 
our nation. Especially at this time when allegations of espionage and 
relations with countries like China are scrutinized and questioned, as 
Members of Congress, we must take measures and assure our Asian Pacific 
American communities that their professional advancement and employment 
in federal agencies will not be impeded and obstructed, that their 
diligence and dedication will not be erased and forgotten in the face 
of mere speculation.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises in support of the rule 
for H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. 
The distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] Chairman and the 
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] Ranking member of 
the House Intelligence Committee are to be commended for their 
leadership and fine work on this bill.
  Intelligence, Mr. Chairman, is an enabler of policy. On occasion, 
where its sources and methods take us where diplomacy cannot go, 
intelligence is the sole enabler of policy.
  Let me give you an example. Some time ago, in what used to be called 
the Third World, a large rebel force invaded and occupied almost a 
third of a country with whom we enjoyed good relations. From way back 
here, in Washington, it looked as if a rogue state had precipitated 
that invasion. Some back here, in fact, were so convinced that the 
invasion was the doing of that rogue state that they decried the lack 
of proof as an ``intelligence failure'' on the part of CIA. Only later, 
after looking at the Agency's reporting, did Washington realize that 
the facts in the field did not fit the preconception here at home: The 
invasion was fundamentally indigenous in cause and in makeup. This 
affected our actions against the rogue state and shaped our policy 
toward the friendly nation.
  The better the intelligence, the better the policy. Our ambassadors 
around the world, especially those in unstable or underdeveloped 
countries, understand that and urge our help in obtaining or retaining 
an intelligence presence in their countries. In those countries, 
particularly, intelligence can reach beyond the bounds of diplomacy and 
provide the ambassador and the Department of State with the 
understanding they must have to make sound policy. Secretary Albright 
recently visited the CIA at the Bush Center for Intelligence to give 
the rank-and-file there this same message.
  As an alumnus of the Intelligence Committee and the Vice Chairman and 
subcommittee chairman in the International Relations Committee, this 
Member well knows how important intelligence can be to the formation of 
policy. H.R. 1555 will help put more intelligence officers out in the 
field to collect the intelligence that policymakers must have. The bill 
will help hone the skills of the analysts who interpret and asses that 
intelligence for our policymakers. In short, H.R. 1555 will continue 
the process of rebuilding the capability of our intelligence community 
to support the policymaking process. This bill, and the hours of care 
and guidance from the Chairman and Ranking Member that produced it in 
its present form, deserve your support.
  Finally, after hearing much in recent days about what went wrong over 
Belgrade last week, this Member would like to end his remarks with a 
recent quote from President Bush during the dedication of the Bush 
Center for Intelligence at Langley:
  ``Some people think, `what do we need intelligence for?' My answer to 
that is we have plenty of enemies. Plenty of enemies abound. 
Unpredictable leaders willing to export instability or to commit crimes 
against humanity. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, narco-trafficking, people killing each other, 
fundamentalists killing each other in the name of God. These and more. 
Many more. As your analysts know, as our collectors know--these are our 
enemies. To combat them, we need more intelligence, not less.

                           *   *   *   *   *

  ``And when it comes to the mission of CIA and the Intelligence 
Community, Director George Tenet has it exactly right. Give the 
President and the policymakers the best possible intelligence product 
and stay out of the policymaking or policy implementation except as 
specifically decreed in the law.''
  President Bush then closed with this:
  ``It has been said that `patriotism is not a frenzied burst of 
emotion, but rather the quiet and steady dedication of a lifetime.' To 
me, this sums up CIA--Duty, Honor, Country. This timeless creative 
service motivates those who serve at Langley and in intelligence across 
the world.
  ``It is an honor to stand here and be counted among you.''
  Mr. Chairman, this Member agrees with those words and urges support 
for the rule for H.R. 1555.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill 
for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule by title, and each 
title shall be considered read.
  No amendment to the committee amendment is in order unless printed in 
the Congressional Record and pro forma amendments for the purpose of 
debate.
  The chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time 
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request 
for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed 
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device 
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by 
electronic device in the first in any series of questions shall not be 
less than 15 minutes.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

[[Page H3121]]

Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for 
              fiscal year 1999.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Two-year extension of CIA central services program.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Protection of operational files of the National Imagery and 
              Mapping Agency.


  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title I.
  The text of title I is as follows:
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2000 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2000, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1555 of the One Hundred 
     Sixth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the Executive Branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2000 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by 
     this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2000 the sum of $193,572,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee shall remain available until September 
     30, 2001.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence are authorized 348 full-time personnel as of 
     September 30, 2000. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Community Management Staff or 
     personnel detailed from other elements of the United States 
     Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community 
     Management Account by subsection (a), there are also 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2000 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall 
     remain available until September 30, 2001.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 2000, there 
     are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such 
     elements as of that date as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2000, any officer or employee of the United 
     States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the 
     staff of the Community Management Account from another 
     element of the United States Government shall be detailed on 
     a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, 
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a 
     period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
     functions as required by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 
     shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. 
     Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2001, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2002.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the 
     United States funds available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General 
     shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the 
     National Drug Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

     SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL 
                   APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999.

       (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     for fiscal year 1999 under section 101 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272) 
     for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of 
     the United States Government listed in such section are 
     hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount, 
     by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such 
     authorization were increased by an emergency supplemental 
     appropriation in a supplemental appropriations Act for fiscal 
     year 1999 that is enacted after May 1, 1999, for such amounts 
     as are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement 
     pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 
     901(b)(2)(A)).
       (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation 
     or expenditure of those amounts deemed to have been 
     specifically authorized by Congress in the Act referred to in 
     subsection (a) is hereby ratified and confirmed.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
  The text of title II is as follows:

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2000 the sum of $209,100,000.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
  The text of title III is as follows:
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTING.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central 
     Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the 
     intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national 
     security interests of the United States and consistent with 
     operational and security concerns related to the conduct of 
     intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should 
     competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the 
     procurement of products properly designated as having been 
     made in the United States.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?


                   Amendment Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:


[[Page H3122]]



     SEC. 304. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE ON UNITED 
                   STATES TRADE SECRETS.

       By not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     submit to Congress a report describing the effects of 
     espionage against the United States, conducted by or on 
     behalf of other nations, on United States trade secrets, 
     patents, and technology development. The study shall include 
     an analysis of the effects of such espionage on the trade 
     deficit of the United States and on the employment rate in 
     the United States.

  Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community, even though 
they have made mistakes, is basically not patted on the back and 
rewarded for thousands of good things they accomplish; and I want to 
commend the chairman, who is a former intelligence agent and has done a 
great job educating many of us who have our concerns about the 
intelligence community, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) 
on the bill.
  While I feel we do a great job looking at the national security 
aspects through military activities, we can buoy up and should buoy up 
our efforts to look at buying and spying of foreign interests into our 
competitive industrial trade scenario. With that, the Traficant 
amendment calls for a report from the CIA to describe the effects to 
Congress of buying and spying against the United States by other 
nations relative to our trade secrets, our patents, our technology 
development and our industrial competitiveness.
  It also states that the study shall include an analysis of the 
effects of such buying and spying on our trade deficit, which is 
approaching one quarter trillion dollars this next year, $250 billion, 
with China and Japan now taking $5 billion a month each out of our 
economy. Unbelievable. I want to know how much of it is buying and 
spying.
  With that, the report shall also give us an analysis of not only the 
negative balance of payments in the trade deficit but on the impact on 
employment and competitiveness of our Nation.
  With that, I would hope that I would have the support of the 
committee. If I do not, I ask that the chairman overrule them on my 
behalf.
  In all seriousness, I believe it is necessary. It buoys up a part of 
this bill that makes us look at the domestic industrial side, and I 
would seek and ask for the support of our chairman and ranking member.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, on this side, we will accept the amendment. I think it 
is a good amendment.
  I want to just point out one mistake that the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Traficant) made, that inadvertently he made, in that there is a 
lot of confusion in the terminology as it relates to the intelligence 
community. He used the term ``agent.'' I understand the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) was an employee of the CIA, and his title was a 
``case officer.''
  There is confusion about ``agent,'' ``asset,'' and ``case officers.'' 
In the future, this reference may be made, and I know the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) did not understand that. It just goes to show 
how easily, even those of us who are involved in Congress, can make a 
mistake.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dixon), the distinguished ranking member, for making that point. It 
actually is a very important one. It may be subtle to some, but it is 
extremely important, and I appreciate it.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very much prepared to accept the amendment of the 
distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant). I think it is a good 
amendment. I think it adds substance to an area that we have already 
signalled an interest in, and it gets specific in some areas that, in 
fact, we have had some select committees working on as representative 
of this institution.
  So I think the gentleman is on target. I am very much supportive of 
the amendment and happy to accept it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?


                Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Sweeney

  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment number 10, which is 
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Sweeney:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY OF RETIRED COVERT AGENTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 606(4)(A) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426(4)(A)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``an officer or employee'' and inserting 
     ``a present or retired officer or employee''; and
       (2) by striking ``a member'' and inserting ``a present or 
     retired member''.
       (b) Imposition of Minimum Prison Sentences for 
     Violations.--Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``not less than five 
     and'' after ``or imprisoned'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``not less than 30 
     months and'' after ``or imprisoned''; and
       (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``not less than 18 
     months and'' after ``or imprisoned''.

  (Mr. SWEENEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, before addressing my amendment, allow me 
to first express my strong support for the intelligence authorization 
bill and commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, for their 
great work on this important bill.
  Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is truly our first line of 
defense; and we must do everything in our power to ensure that our 
counterintelligence operations are as strong as our potential enemies. 
The amendment I am offering today is intended to complement this fine 
bill on an important national security issue, the protection of our 
intelligence agents.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment simply increases the criminal penalty for 
individuals who expose covert agents and expands the Intelligence 
Identities Protection Act to protect the identities of former agents as 
well.
  First and foremost, my amendment establishes a minimum mandatory 
penalty for the willful identification of a United States intelligence 
agent. The existing criminal penalties against such an offense are 
woefully inadequate. While several lesser criminal offenses require 
mandatory minimums, few are as consequential to the interests of our 
national security as the protection of those who serve our country in 
this capacity.
  Secondly, the amendment extends the scope of these protections to 
former covert agents as only current agents are now covered by the law. 
By increasing the criminal penalties for disclosing identities for 
existing agents and by including former agents, my amendment 
accomplishes several important national security objectives and 
appropriately emphasizes the high priority with which we make national 
security. It protects agents and former agents from possible harm as a 
result of the disclosure of their true identities and past locations 
and activities. It also protects the entire intelligence network that 
often remains in place after an individual agent leaves his or her 
assignment.

                              {time}  1215

  By protecting retired agents, the amendment protects those active 
operatives who may have assumed the former agents' positions.
  Through the Freedom of Information Act people obtain information 
relevant to U.S. intelligence operations. Currently no statutory 
protection exists to prohibit identification of retired intelligence 
agents. This initiative strengthens the penalties against disclosing 
the information that identifies covert agents. Penalties in my 
amendment are proportional, yet tougher to those which exist under 
current law.
  The majority of our current and former intelligence agents serve or

[[Page H3123]]

have served the United States at considerable risk, Mr. Chairman, and 
there is absolutely no justification for exposing them to danger.
  Identifying current or former agents warrants serious criminal 
liability, and my amendment does just that. Ensure the safety of our 
intelligence community and provide adequate penalties to those who 
jeopardize America's national security by voting yes on the Sweeney 
amendment to H.R. 1555.


   Amendment Offered by Mr. Goss to Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. 
                                Sweeney

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Goss to amendment No. 10 offered 
     by Mr. Sweeney:
       Strike subsection (b) of section 304, as proposed to be 
     added by the amendment and insert the following:
       (b) Imposition of Minimum Prison Sentences for 
     Violations.--Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``shall be fined not 
     more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
     both.'' and inserting ``shall be imprisoned not less than 
     five years and not more than ten years and fined not more 
     than $50,000.''.
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``shall be fined not 
     more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
     both.'' and inserting ``shall be imprisoned not less than 30 
     months and not more than five years and fined not more than 
     $25,000.''.
       (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``shall be fined not 
     more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or 
     both.'' and inserting ``shall be imprisoned not less than 18 
     months and not more than three years and fined not more than 
     $15,000.''.

  Mr. GOSS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, the perfecting amendment to the Sweeney 
amendment that I have offered I am told makes a technical correction. 
The amendment filed contained a drafting error, and as a result, would 
not impose a true mandatory minimum sentencing requirement, which was 
the intent. Whether we agree or not, the intent was to make it 
mandatory.
  The amendment clarifies the intent of the amendment to toughen the 
sentencing standards and impose mandatory minimums. I understand, in 
plain English, it is both a penalty and mandatory time.
  I would ask the gentleman from New York, is my understanding correct?
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. SWEENEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, that was my intent.
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, then, Mr. Chairman, and going to what 
that would leave us with on the Sweeney amendment if the secondary 
amendment is considered and approved is that we would have an amendment 
which would in fact deal with the Agent Identities Protection Act and 
put some more teeth into it.
  I would point out that Mr. Solomon, our colleague from New York, 
former chairman of the Committee on Rules, offered a similar amendment 
in 1981 which I am told passed the House by some 300 votes and then 
disappeared in conference, as sometimes happens.
  As Members will recall, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act 
penalizes the unauthorized disclosure of identities of covert employees 
and assets of the United States. This is willful disclosure, we are 
talking about here. We are not talking about an accident or a slip of 
the tongue or leaving a document someplace by a mistake. Those are bad 
things. We are talking about setting out to deliberately expose 
classified information that can result in harm to an individual, 
serious harm.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand originally that the act was offered in 
1979 by Chairman Boland in response to the disclosure of identities of 
CIA officers and assets by Philip Agee, Louis Wolf, and others. The Act 
is sharply focused upon present and former cleared employees and upon 
those who publish deliberate and repeated disclosures of the type found 
in the Covert Action Information Bulletin.
  The Act has been an useful tool for prosecutors and the intelligence 
community, although it has not been applied aggressively, as some 
prefer, including me. The U.S. government has charged some current and 
former employees, and as an apparent consequence of that, the 
disclosures have been abated. But it has been a pretty weak tool. It 
has not been able to be used as it was originally intended.
  I honestly believe that the amendment of the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Sweeney) does add extra strength, and does it in a reasonable way. 
We are not throwing out all the rules of judicial protection or 
anything like that. What we are basically doing is putting people on 
notice that for willful disclosure of agent identities, there is a 
penalty. It is a serious penalty, because it is a serious crime.
  Having said that, I will urge acceptance of the Sweeney amendment, as 
perfected by our secondary amendment.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Sweeney) on his amendment. I will not object to it, but I do 
have some concerns with it.
  As I understand the amendment and the perfecting amendment, basically 
it does two things. It covers retired agents, but the concern I have is 
the decision to make penalties, whether they be incarceration or money 
fines, mandatory without hearings. Generally speaking, I am opposed to 
mandatory sentences. I have great faith in the Federal judiciary.
  I do not think that we should move this fast without some hearings on 
this to find out if this type of activity should be in the class of 
mandatory sentences. I would tell the gentleman from New York, I will 
not object to it, but I would like to reserve to discuss this further 
at the conference.
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DIXON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's remarks. The 
gentleman is correct in saying that what the bill essentially does is 
extend the protection to retired agents.
  Also, in establishing mandatory minimums, my intent was to raise the 
level of Section 601 to the highest levels and the highest priorities, 
which I believe our national security interests dictate.
  I will point out that what the mandatory minimum sentences that I 
have prescribed in my amendment do is cut in half the mandatory 
maximums, so I think proportionately, it is very reasonable.
  Let me also just say that in relationship to Federal mandatory 
minimums, there are hundreds, literally hundreds, as I am sure the 
gentleman knows, of Federal crimes, including food stamp fraud, 
including bribery of meat inspectors, that have mandatory minimum 
sentences.
  I think in order for this Congress to send a very strong message 
about the protection of agents and former agents, the inclusion of the 
mandatory minimum is an essential part.
  Mr. DIXON. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I may ultimately agree 
with the gentleman from New York. I just think it is worth more than 5 
minutes of time on the floor, and I will reserve to address this issue 
in conference.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney.)
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney), as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hinchey

  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 4.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hinchey:

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY IN CHILE.

       (a) In General.--By not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall

[[Page H3124]]

     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     describing all activities of officers, covert agents, and 
     employees of all elements in the intelligence community with 
     respect to the following events in the Republic of Chile:
       (1) The assassination of President Salvador Allende in 
     September 1973.
       (2) The accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the 
     Presidency of the Republic of Chile.
       (3) Violations of human rights committed by officers or 
     agents of former President Pinochet.
       (b) Documentation.--(1) The report submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall include copies of unedited documents in 
     the possession of any such element of the intelligence 
     community with respect to such events.
       (2) Any provision of law prohibiting the dissemination of 
     classified information shall not apply to documents referred 
     to in paragraph (1).
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations 
     of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate.

  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, because of recent activities by a certain 
member of the Spanish judiciary, the attention of the world has once 
again been directed at the events which took place in Chile beginning 
in September of 1973 with the assassination of the duly-elected 
president of that country, Salvador Allende, and the subsequent 
ascension to power of General Augusto Pinochet to become the President 
of the Republic of Chile.
  In the course of those events, it has been alleged in responsible 
venues over and over again in the intervening now more than 25 years 
that very inappropriate actions were taken by members of the Chilean 
military, assisted by others, including members of the military of the 
United States.
  I have an amendment which requires that no later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this act, the director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees which are mentioned in the amendment a report describing all 
activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements of 
the intelligence community with respect to the following events in the 
Republic of Chile:
  One, the assassinations of President Salvador Allende in September of 
1973;
  Two, the ascension of General Augusto Pinochet to the presidency of 
the Republic of Chile; and
  Three, the violations of human rights committed by officers or agents 
of former President Pinochet.
  The report submitted under this subsection shall include copies of 
unedited documents in the possession of any such element of the 
intelligence community with respect to such events.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that after the passage of all of this time, it 
is appropriate that the United States Congress and the people of the 
United States and the people of the world understand with much greater 
clarity than they have been able to up to this moment the specific 
events which took place in Chile which led to the assassination of the 
duly-elected president and the ascension of power by a military junta.
  It is important for us to understand these events because it is 
important for us to take action to ensure that these kinds of illegal 
activities do not occur in the future.
  So therefore, I offer this amendment with all respect in the hopes 
that the Members of the House and the chairman particularly, the 
chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will see 
fit to look upon it favorably.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the intent of the amendment very much, but 
I must say, I have some misgivings about the effect and the cost, and I 
want to take a minute to explain that.
  First, with regard to the purpose, let me say that our committee is 
trying, I think through its mark on the budget and through its 
oversight, to help our intelligence community focus on the challenges 
we have got today and coming in the next century. They are incredible 
challenges of a sort that we are really not organized to deal with, as 
we are seeing, unfortunately.
  We are in the process of getting that done, but we understand the 
Warsaw Pact is gone, and in its place we have the Osama Bin Ladens, the 
Milosevics, the Tijuana cartels, that type of problem.
  This amendment would, I think, have us take a break from the reality 
we are faced with today and go back and start sifting through some 
history of things that happened at a different time, really under a 
different agency that was operating under different rules and certainly 
under different oversight.
  That can be beneficial if it is going to yield us some lessons, but I 
think we ought to understand that if we are going to do this, it is 
going to take energy, effort, and dollars, and we want to make sure 
where we are prioritizing those relative to the lessons from history 
and whatever else we might glean from this effort.
  I am a little confused with regard to the extensive ongoing effort by 
the administration to respond to a request by the Spanish government 
under its mutual legal assistance treaty with the U.S. for documents, 
roughly in this same period. I presume these searches are related, but 
I do not know whether there is any formal coordination and how this 
amendment would fit into it.
  Going to the cost factor, legislation directing special searches, as 
I have said, is disruptive to the normal course of business, and the 
normal course of business in the intelligence communities these days, 
it is exceptionally challenging.
  I would also point out that when we have these special searches, that 
they sometimes delay requests of our own constituents under the Freedom 
of Information Act. I do not say that to say that we should not have 
special requests. I think we only need to point out that that sometimes 
happens.
  We have had considerable conversation with the head of the community, 
the intelligence community, about how we go about dealing with the 
classification and declassification process. That is ongoing. There is 
very definite bona fide concern about how much dollars and time and 
personnel we direct to that effort relative to other things that the 
intelligence community is being asked to provide for today's 
decisionmakers, to get us through the day. Of course, we have to figure 
out, where does the money come from.
  These are not new thoughts. I am only putting these on the record and 
getting them out of there because I do not want the gentleman to think 
that we are just knee-jerk reacting negatively. There are negative 
consequences to this amendment, in part.

                              {time}  1230

  The amendment would provide no new information to the public as far 
as I know, the people who are interested in the abuses of the Pinochet 
years. I think instead we are going to get lots of boxes going into a 
closed committee review, and I am not sure where that is going to lead 
us.
  So I am concerned about, if the purpose is to get at the truth and 
the history and where we are doing it, I would like to do that in a 
reasonable way. I share the desire of the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Hinchey) to do that.
  If the way we can do it passes muster with the community, and the 
costs are reasonable, and the expectations are reasonable given the 
personnel that we have, then I would possibly be in a position to 
accept this amendment with those understandings.
  So I ask to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) to accept a 
second-degree amendment which would strike paragraph (2) of the section 
304(b) in its entirety. If so, and the House agrees to the amendment 
amending the gentleman's amendment in that way, I would accept his 
amendment.
  The reason I say that is the amendment I would propose would cure the 
constitutional problem that I see in the provision which would have 
overridden all the laws authorizing the DCI and the President to 
protect sources of national security information from disclosure and 
compromise. We just accepted an amendment from the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Sweeney) to strengthen that. So I do not want to now turn 
right around and undercut it.
  So with the offending provision omitted, any threat of the veto would 
be removed, we would be consistent, and I think I could see my way to 
supporting what the gentleman is trying to get done.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) 
for response on my proposal amendment.

[[Page H3125]]

  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. 
As I understand it, the gentleman is offering an amendment to my 
amendment which would strike paragraph (2) of section 304(b) as 
proposed to be added by the amendment; is that correct?
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) is 
correct.
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
and I am happy to accept his amendment to my amendment.


Amendment Offered By Mr. Goss to Amendment No. 4 Offered By Mr. Hinchey

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Goss to amendment No. 4 offered by 
     Mr. Hinchey:
       Strike paragraph (2) of section 304(b), as proposed to be 
     added by the amendment.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, that is the amendment we have had the 
discussion on. I have nothing further.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hinchey amendment and commend 
the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of 
our committee, for his accommodation of the Hinchey amendment.
  But I want this amendment to survive the conference because I think 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) has provided some great 
leadership to us today in presenting this amendment. That is why I am 
very grateful to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) for his 
amendment to accommodate the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey).
  Our distinguished chairman laid out some important considerations in 
his observation of this amendment, and they are important. There are 
other equities to be balanced, and I am glad that my colleagues have 
come to an agreement on the amendment. But, again, I want it to survive 
the conference. I want to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Hinchey).
  Our President was in Guatemala a few months ago, or was it weeks? So 
much happens so fast around here. I was very proud of the statement 
that he made. Latin America had been in turmoil for a couple of 
generations, as we all know, some of it, sad to say, and in Guatemala 
in particular, with the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and other American entities there.
  The President, I think very courageously, recognized what happened 
there and, in doing so, I think began to open the door to a better 
future for the intelligence community.
  In Central America and in Latin America the expression ``nunca mas'' 
is so famous, because in Argentina, in Chile, and Central America, 
people are revisiting their sad recent past. An important bridge to the 
future has been truth commissions which have identified, not to find 
revenge, but to seek some level of justice and some level of openness 
and admission about what happened to clear a way for the future.
  If we, the United States and specifically the Central Intelligence 
Agency, had a role in the death of President Allende, just as if any 
Chilean had a role in it, putting it behind us requires facing the 
truth about it.
  So I think that, as far as Chile is concerned, this is a very 
important amendment, but I think it also will build credibility for us 
if we are not in a state of denial about the CIA's involvement but of 
acceptance of what the reality was. We will find out what that is as a 
result of the amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey).
  I also, though, want to say that, unless we are forthcoming on our 
role, it is very hard to see why Latin Americans will be forthcoming 
about what their role is. I think that we can lead by example in this 
way.
  I also would like to take the occasion to thank the gentleman from 
California (Mr. George Miller) for his leadership and activity in 
trying to persuade our government in making the documents available for 
the Pinochet case to the Spanish government. I hope that this will be a 
message to repressive dictators everywhere that a day of reckoning 
comes, and that they just cannot commit these atrocities and then say, 
well, let us put it all behind us.
  As I say again, this is not about revenge, it is about truth. It is 
about justice. It is about opening the way for a better future and 
building credibility for what we do.
  I agree with the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss). We should 
not jeopardize the safety of our sources and methods. I think that his 
amendment is a constructive one. These people risk their lives just the 
way our young people do in the military. We are proud of the military. 
We are proud of the people who put themselves in harm's way to gather 
intelligence for us.
  So while we are not condoning any activities that were not legal, we 
cannot proceed with reasonable intelligence gathering if those who are 
called upon to do so are in jeopardy because of unintentional 
identification.
  This is especially true at a time when we want more women, we want 
more minorities, we want more diversity, we want more language skills, 
we want more cultural understanding into the Central Intelligence 
Agency. We want them to have the same level of protection that others 
have had in the past.
  Building that diversity with an openness and an admission of what our 
past has been I think will build more support for what we need to have, 
which is the best possible intelligence to avoid conflict and to supply 
whoever the President of the United States is with the information he 
needs to lead.
  With that, again I commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) 
and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), our chairman, and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), our ranking member, for their 
leadership on this issue.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) is 
absolutely correct. The minority has no problem with this amendment.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to applaud the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Hinchey) on his amendment. It is no great secret that over the years, 
there have been many aspects of American foreign policy which have been 
wrong. It is no secret that the United States over the years has been 
involved in the overthrow of a number of democratic governments.
  In the case of Chile in 1973, there was a democratic government 
elected by the people. The President of that government was Salvador 
Allende. His policies antagonized corporate interests in the United 
States. A great deal of pressure was brought to bear in seeing him 
overthrown.
  I think it is a very positive step as we develop ideas for the 
future, as we try to develop a democratic foreign policy that we in 
fact know what we did in the past.
  So I think the amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) 
is a very important one. I think we should let the truth come out, and 
I strongly support his efforts.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong 
support of Mr. Hinchey's amendment to require a report to Congress on 
information held by the United States pertaining to human rights 
violations in Chile carried out by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and his 
forces.
  The 1973 military coup in Chile was a tragic interruption of Chile's 
proud democratic history. Thousands of innocent people were killed. 
Many more were tortured and imprisoned. American citizens are among the 
dead.
  The military coup in Chile also represents a tragic chapter in 
American history.
  It is now widely understood that the United States supported the 
violent overthrow of a democratically elected government. But the full 
details of U.S. support for the coup are still not known.
  We need to know the full details.
  In addition, the full details of U.S. information concerning the 
actions of the coup's leader, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, are not fully 
known.
  It is widely understood that Gen. Pinochet directed the coup and the 
mass killings and torture that occurred during his nearly two decade 
long reign. But the American people

[[Page H3126]]

deserve to know and would be better off knowing the full details of 
Gen. Pinochet's actions.
  Only the United States at this point has the ability to fully inform 
its citizens of this ruthless dictator's actions.
  Along with my colleagues, I have been demanding that the United 
States supply information about Gen. Pinochet's murderous actions to a 
court in Spain that has brought charges against Gen. Pinochet for 
violations of international law, including torture, murder and 
kidnapping.
  The United States is believed to house records that would corroborate 
the charges against Gen. Pinochet.
  Those records should be reviewed, declassified and turned over to the 
court in Spain. Some information has been turned over and after much 
delay the United States has established a task force to oversee this 
request. It is a slow process and many believe that some in the 
Administration would prefer that the information never see the light of 
day.
  Without objection, I would like to submit into the Record a series of 
letters between myself, my colleague, John Conyers, and other members, 
including Mr. Hinchey, and the Administration.
  These letters explain the nature of the information we seek and the 
importance of providing the information to the Spanish court.
  The actions in the 1970s of the U.S. intelligence community and the 
then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, toward Chile and other 
dictators in the southern cone are a disgrace that should never be 
forgotten by American citizens who wish to think honorably about their 
country and their government.
  A journalist, Lucy Kosimar, recently uncovered a memo that describes 
how Secretary of State Kissinger coddled Pinochet after the coup.
  In a recent article, Kosimar wrote:

       The memo describes how Secretary of State Kissinger stroked 
     and bolstered Pinochet, how--with hundreds of political 
     prisoners still being jailed and tortured--Kissinger told 
     Pinochet that the Ford Administration would not hold those 
     human rights violations against him. At a time when Pinochet 
     was the target of international censure for state-sponsored 
     torture, disappearances, and murders, Kissinger assured him 
     that he was a victim of communist propaganda and urged him 
     not to pay too much attention to American critics.

  This is what Kissinger reportedly told Pinochet in a private meeting 
in 1976, according to Lucy Kosimar:

       In the United States, as you know,'' Kissinger told 
     Pinochet, ``we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do 
     here. I think that the previous government was headed toward 
     communism. We wish your government well.
       A little while later, Kissinger added: ``My evaluation is 
     that you are a victim of all left wing groups around the 
     world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a 
     government which was going Communist.

  Kissinger decided that the international fight against communism 
justified the rape and torture of Chilean women, justified their 
mutilation. Justified their execution.
  More than 20 years later new information about the U.S. role in the 
coup and U.S. knowledge about human rights violations by Pinochet are 
still coming to light. Clearly there is more information that is housed 
in the intelligence communities' warehouses and that information should 
be made public.
  In 1976, an American citizen, Ronnie Moffitt, was blown up on the 
streets of Washington with her Chilean colleague, Orlando Letelier. 
Pinochet is widely suspected of having personally ordered their deaths.
  This act of terrorism should never be forgotten, in the hopes that it 
will never be repeated. Pinochet is living in London right now, 
awaiting the fate of an extradition hearing for trial in Spain.
  Whatever information the United States can provide on the deaths of 
Ronnie Moffitt and Orlando Letelier in Washington should be made 
available so the truth can be known once and for all and justice can be 
rendered in this ugly, ugly chapter of American and Chilean history.


Congressional Letters to the Clinton Administration on the Case Against 
                         Gen. Augusto Pinochet

       (1) November 23, 1998 Letter from Rep. George Miller to 
     Attorney General Janet Reno.
       (2) October 21, 1998 Letter from 36 Members of Congress to 
     President Clinton.
       (3) March 17, 1998 Letter from Reps. George Miller and John 
     Conyers to President Clinton, and the President's June 3 
     response.
       (4) April 15, 1997 Letter from Reps. Miller and Conyers to 
     Attorney General Reno and Mr. John Shattuck, Department of 
     State, and the Justice Department's May 23, 1997 response.
                                                November 23, 1998.
     Hon. Janet Reno,
     U.S. Attorney General,
     Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
       Dear Attorney General: I am writing to follow up on our 
     telephone conversation on the afternoon of Friday, November 
     13 concerning the United States response to the arrest of 
     Gen. Augusto Pinochet. I sincerely appreciate your taking the 
     time to speak with me about this issue.
       As you may recall, I raised three issues with you during 
     our conversation. First, I expressed my belief that the 
     United States still has not turned over to the judges in 
     Spain all materials in its possession that are relevant to 
     the cast against Gen. Pinochet. Second, I expressed my belief 
     that the United States should make available to Spain Michael 
     Townley for questioning, but that it had not yet done so. And 
     finally, I asked if you would grant a request for a meeting 
     that I understood was made by the widow and widower of the 
     Letelier-Moffitt assassinations, and their attorney.
       With regard to the meeting request for Isabel Letelier, 
     Michael Moffitt and their attorney, Sam Buffone, you informed 
     me that you were seriously considering such a meeting. I 
     sincerely appreciate your efforts in that regard.
       With regard to Michael Townley, you told me that you were 
     looking into the status of the request to make him available. 
     I wish to again urge that he be made available to the Spanish 
     judges for the purposes of questioning him about Gen. 
     Pinochet's association to criminal and terrorist activities. 
     As you probably know, Michael Townley was formerly in the 
     Witness Protection Program and his whereabouts are known to 
     the F.B.I. I would also urge you to make available Fernandez 
     Larios, a known terrorist who plead guilty to criminal 
     charges in the United States and can provide important 
     information about Gen. Pinochet. I would hope that the F.B.I. 
     and the Department of Justice have kept track of Mr. Larios 
     at least to the extent that he can be located for purposes of 
     serving a subpoena. It is my understanding that Judge Garzon 
     is prepared to come to the United States at any reasonable 
     time upon notice that Mr. Larios and/or Mr. Townley are 
     available.
       And finally, with regard to the materials requested by 
     Spain, you asked me to provide you with information about any 
     materials that may not yet already have been provided to 
     the judges. I am providing to you in this letter details 
     of materials that I believe are of interest to Spain and 
     relevant to their investigation of Gen. Pinochet but that 
     have not yet been made available.
       As you know, and as we discussed on the phone, the Spanish 
     judges conducting the Pinochet investigation have made 
     requests of the United States Government, through the Spanish 
     Ministry of Justice, for the production of testimony and 
     documents pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
     Matters Treaty between the Spanish and U.S. Governments. It 
     is my understanding that a new request has just been made.
       While you and your staff are already familiar with the 
     treaty, I thought it would be important to raise a number of 
     points here to help clarify the responsibilities of the 
     United States in this area. There are several important 
     provisions in the MLAT that bear on the Spanish request for 
     cooperation. First, under Article I, Section 3, assistance is 
     to be provided without regard to whether the act giving rise 
     to the request for assistance is a crime in the requested 
     country. Accordingly, so long as the Spanish court has 
     confirmed its jurisdiction to investigate the claims against 
     Pinochet, it is irrelevant whether or not they would be valid 
     claims under U.S. law. The only requirement under the MLAT 
     for dual criminality is in cases of claims for forfeiture or 
     restitution. Under Article IV, a request for documents 
     requires only a generalized description of what is sought for 
     production. Under Section 3 of Article IV, additional 
     specificity should be provided to the extent necessary and 
     where possible. These provisions require specificity 
     regarding individuals to be questioned, but do not contain 
     any additional requirement of specification as to the 
     description of evidence or documents. Article V, Section 6, 
     requires that the requested country respond to reasonable 
     inquiries concerning the progress towards full compliance 
     with the request.
       Confidentiality is governed in part by Article VII which 
     would permit the U.S. to require that any information or 
     evidence furnished under the Treaty be kept confidential or 
     used only under specific terms and conditions by the Spanish 
     court. Classification is further covered by Article IX which 
     provides for the production of records of government 
     agencies. Under Subsection 1, all publicly available 
     documents must be provided. Subsection 2 permits the 
     requested state to provide copies of any documents in its 
     possession which are not publicly available to the same 
     extent and under the same condition as copies would be made 
     available in Spain to judicial authorities or in the United 
     States ``to its own law enforcement and judicial 
     authorities.'' The requested state is, however, permitted to 
     deny a request pursuant to these provisions entirely or in 
     part. Accordingly, while the Treaty does not deal directly 
     with classified information, the U.S. is granted broad 
     discretion to produce or withhold classification and should 
     do so to the same extent that it would provide such 
     information to domestic law enforcement or judicial 
     authorities. Article XII requires that the U.S. use its best 
     efforts to ascertain the location or identity of persons or 
     items specified in a request.
       As I said on the phone, there are serious questions raised 
     as to whether the U.S. has complied with both the spirit and 
     letter of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Despite

[[Page H3127]]

     the long pendency of several letters of request, it is my 
     understanding that the U.S. has not discharged its 
     obligations under Article XII to use its best efforts to 
     ascertain the location of either persons or documents. The 
     U.S. has failed to produce key individuals for testimony and 
     has not conducted a complete search of documents in the 
     possession of government agencies, including the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and the FBI. 
     Further, it is my understanding the U.S. has refused to 
     produce classified documents when the letter and spirit of 
     Article IX should permit, if not require, production to the 
     same extent that documents were provided to the U.S. 
     Attorneys Office during the initial Letelier-Moffitt 
     investigation.
       The Justice Department, as the convening authority, should 
     also reassess the extent and vigor of its effort to locate 
     and produce documents. There are certain classes of 
     identifiable records that should be searched for and if 
     available, immediately produced:
       1. Defense Intelligence Agency Reports, such as 
     ``Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) Expands 
     Operations and Facilities,'' April 15, 1975 along with 
     referenced ``IRs'' and all other cables and reports from the 
     U.S. Defense Attache's office in Santiago during the mid-
     1970's that relate to the Chilean Secret police, the chain of 
     command, human rights abuses, and international terrorism.
       2. Defense Intelligence Agency Biographic Data, the yearly 
     commentary and career summaries on military commanders done 
     by the DIA--in this case on General Pinochet and Col. Gen. 
     Manual Contreras between 1974-78.
       3. State and NSC Documents identified in ``Disarray in 
     Chile Policy,'' July 1, 1975. This document states that ``a 
     number of officers in the Embassy at Santiago have written a 
     dissent'' cable arguing that all U.S. assistance to Chile be 
     cut off ``until the human rights situation improved.'' This 
     cable was discussed at a ``pre-IG (Interagency Group) 
     meeting--presumably in June 1975. It was supported by the 
     Policy Planning Office of the Bureau of Inter-American 
     Affairs.
       A specific paper trail can be ascertained, including but 
     not limited to:
       a. the ``Dissent'' cable from the U.S. Embassy officers;
       b. minutes/notes/briefing papers for/of the ``pre-IG 
     meeting;''
       c. all position papers relating to this discussion prepared 
     by the Policy Planning Office at the Bureau of Inter-American 
     Affairs.
       4. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of 
     State, reports, summaries, and briefing papers on the Chilean 
     military, DINA, and human rights violations, 1973-80.
       5. The Chile Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
     of State for Human Rights, Patricia Derian, 1977-80. These 
     files, kept by Ms. Derian's Deputy Marc Schneider, likely 
     contain a wealth of information on Chile's human rights 
     atrocities, and also on the Letelier case and the issue of 
     U.S. extradition of Chilean officials, and sanctions against 
     Pinochet's government for lack of cooperation in the case.
       In addition to the above records and document groups 
     identified by the Spanish court, U.S. cooperation under MLAT 
     should include reviews of other relevant files. These 
     include:
       1. A critical document on General Pinochet's role in the 
     Letelier bombing, read by Justice Department prosecutor 
     Eugene Propper during the federal investigation into the 
     crime.
       2. CIA Reports between 1973 and 1979 by the Agency's Office 
     of African and Latin American Affairs (A/LA) on Chile's 
     military, chain of command, DINA, Operation Condor, General 
     Pinochet and human rights violations, assassination of 
     General Carlos Prats in September 1975, and Orlando Letelier 
     in September 1976.
       3. CIA Directorate of Operations cables and reports on 
     Operation Condor--including Chile's attempt to establish an 
     Operation Condor office in Miami in 1974; the assassination 
     of Carlos Prats, and Orlando Letelier, and other human rights 
     abuses.
       4. A review by the Gerald Ford Presidential Library staff 
     (Karen Holzhausen) of the still classified Kissinger-
     Scowcroft files relating to Chile, terrorism and human rights 
     violations.
       5. A review by the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library staff 
     for the still classified Bzrezinski files on Chile, human 
     rights violations, and sanctions against Chile for the 
     Letelier assassination; and the files of National Security 
     Council advisor on Latin America, Robert Pastor, for similar 
     documentation.
       6. A search by the CIA-FBI Center for Counter terrorism for 
     files, including those of the predecessor to that agency, on 
     Chilean involvement in international terrorism.
       7. A re-review of heavily censored NSC and State Department 
     documents released during legal discovery in the Letelier-
     Moffitt civil suit.
       A thorough review and collection of relevant U.S. documents 
     is critical to the Spanish judges' investigation. But I hope 
     you would agree that it is also critical for the United 
     States to gather this material to help our own government 
     decide whether it too should take legal action against Gen. 
     Pincochet.
       As I expressed to you on the phone, I have a long history 
     of involvement with Chile, beginning with my participation in 
     a congressional investigation in Chile in 1976, prior to the 
     assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt. In 
     fact, Mr. Letelier had helped to facilitate the congressional 
     trip to Chile. Chile has a long and proud history of 
     democracy. Gen. Pinochet's military coup was an aberration in 
     Chile's history. His rule was marked by extreme violence, 
     total disregard for human and civil rights, and by 
     international act of terrorism, including the assassination 
     on U.S. soil of an American citizen and a Chilean exile.
       Given this Administration's stated commitment to promoting 
     human rights and democracy and to curbing global terrorism, I 
     consider the legal fate of Gen. Pincochet to be a matter of 
     utmost concern for the United States Government.
       Again, I sincerely appreciate your time and attention to 
     this matter and I will appreciate being appraised of the 
     status of these requests.
           Sincerely,
     George Miller, M.C.
                                  ____

                                                 October 21, 1998.
     Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
     President,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: The October 17 arrest of General 
     Augusto Pinochet in London is a good example of how the goals 
     you outlined in your anti-terrorism speech at the United 
     Nations can be put into practice. Indeed, when the rule of 
     law is applied to combat international lawlessness, 
     humanity's agenda gains.
       We are writing to urge you to reinforce your eloquent words 
     at the recent United Nations General Assembly session by 
     joining with the British government in fully cooperating with 
     the precedent-setting case against Chilean General Augusto 
     Pinochet in Spain. Specifically, we call upon you to ensure 
     that the U.S. government provides Spanish Judge Baltasar 
     Garzon material related to Pinochet's role in international 
     terrorism--material and testimony that the U.S. government 
     has thus far withheld.
       You will recall that on June 3, in response to a 
     congressional request, you wrote to assure us that the United 
     States would ``continue to respond as fully as we can to the 
     request for assistance from the Government of Spain'' for 
     information on the case against General Pinochet and other 
     Chilean military officials accused of international terrorism 
     and crimes against humanity.
       It is our understanding that the United States has 
     materials and other critical information that will help link 
     Pinochet directly to acts of international terrorism. These 
     materials and information were obtained during the U.S. 
     investigation of the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a 
     Chilean exile, and Ronni Karpen Moffitt, his American 
     colleague. They were brutally murdered in Washington, D.C., 
     in 1976 when a bomb exploded under their car while driving 
     around Sheridan Circle on their way to work. The 
     assassination was determined to be the work of the Chilean 
     secret police. It was also alleged, but unproven at the time, 
     that Pinochet was directly involved in the killings.
       Unfortunately, we have been informed that the U.S. Justice 
     Department has given only public documents to the Spanish 
     judge, and has not ordered any classified material to be 
     delivered. In addition, the Assistant United States Attorney 
     assigned to obtain testimony from key witnesses in the case 
     against Pinochet and other former military leaders has not 
     elicited key testimony from people convicted in the Letelier-
     Moffitt killings.
       We have also learned that the Spanish judge is planning to 
     submit an expanded Rogatory Commission requesting in detail 
     the documents and witness testimony the U.S. government 
     should provide.
       We urge you to direct the Justice Department and other 
     relevant agencies to act with haste in delivering the 
     appropriate solicited material. Your involvement now will 
     send a clear signal that you plan to take all steps necessary 
     to stop international terrorism and bring to justice those 
     responsible for heinous crimes against humanity, including 
     the killing of an American citizen on American soil.
       We note that the Spanish judge's petitions are based on the 
     European Convention on Terrorism that requires signatories to 
     cooperate with each other's judicial processes in cases of 
     terrorism. Certainly, the United States has a stake in 
     becoming part of this process. In addition, the Justice 
     Department previously determined that Spain properly 
     requested documents from the United States based on the 
     Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, signed by Spain and the 
     United States.
       We appreciate your commitment to stop international 
     terrorism. We strongly believe, however, that without 
     concrete actions to back up your commitment, international 
     terrorism will continue unabated. The case against Pinochet 
     and his allies presents a significant opportunity to work 
     with the world community to punish those responsible for 
     international crimes in Chile, the United States, and 
     elsewhere. We strongly urge you to support Britain and Spain 
     by releasing critical information to the Spanish judge as 
     quickly as possible. We understand that some of the materials 
     in question are of a classified nature. We believe steps can 
     be taken to comply with Spain's request without compromising 
     U.S. security interests and that these steps must be taken 
     immediately. The world is watching closely as you consider 
     this request. Absent our firm response, terrorists will 
     continue to believe they can act with impunity.
           Sincerely,
         George Miller; John Conyers; Nancy Pelosi; John Olver; 
           Maurice D. Hinchey; Alcee L. Hastings; Cynthia A.

[[Page H3128]]

           McKinney; Howard L. Berman; Bob Filner; Anna G. Eshoo; 
           Henry A. Waxman; Jim McDermott; George E. Brown, Jr.; 
           Neil Abercrombie; Barbara Lee; Sam Gejdenson; Bernard 
           Sanders; Lane Evans; John F. Tierney; Martin Olav Sabo; 
           Rosa L. DeLauro; Lynn C. Woolsey; Carolyn B. Maloney; 
           Barney Frank; Lloyd Doggett; Frank Pallone; Charles B. 
           Rangel; David E. Bonior; Nita M. Lowey; Danny K. Davis; 
           James P. McGovern; Pete Stark; Jesse L. Jackson, Jr.; 
           Lucille Roybal-Allard; Marcy Kaptur; Elijah E. 
           Cummings.
                                  ____

                         March 17, 1998, (revised March 19, 1998).
     Hon. William Jefferson, Clinton,
     President of the United States,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President, Late last year, Justice Department 
     officials assured us that they would cooperate with a Spanish 
     judge investigating charges against General Augusto Pinochet, 
     former President and Commander in Chief of Chile, for 
     terrorism, genocide and crimes against humanity. Despite the 
     assurances of cooperation under the MLTA, it is our 
     understanding that the Justice Department effectively 
     stonewalled the judge when he visited the United States in 
     January, seeking to interview witnesses and retrieve 
     documents pursuant to his investigation.
       Instead of producing the witnesses and documents, as called 
     for under the MLTA, and despite the desire of the former 
     prosecutors (Eugene Propper and Larry Barcella) to 
     communicate substantive information which they had but which 
     was still classified, we have been informed that the 
     Administration prevented Propper and Barcella from reviewing 
     their notes and file material before testifying, did not try 
     to make confessed murders Michael Townley and Fernando Larios 
     available, and handed over virtually no documents. Their 
     reasoning, according to people who had talked to officials at 
     the State Department and National Security Council, was that 
     they were processing materials which were difficult to find 
     and were not likely to lead to useable evidence. They would 
     formally comply but only when the component agencies 
     processed the materials. In private, we are told, they note 
     that by not turning over the documents promptly and 
     ultimately by not offering much that is useful ``the U.S. had 
     nothing to lose.''
       They assess the possible damage to your impending visit to 
     Chile next month from not cooperating to be very low. 
     Apparently, U.S. Embassy sources believes that the anti-
     Pinochet opposition does not have enough strength to mount 
     effective demonstrations to interfere with your visit. They 
     also assume that the Chilean press will not ask you tough 
     questions about the U.S. refusal to hand over documents and 
     produce witnesses. Apparently at the Justice Department and 
     the State Department, the belief is that the United States 
     can ``get away with'' not cooperating and receive minimum 
     public relations damage.
       The motives for not cooperating with the Spanish judge 
     included fears that an indictment of Pinochet could put the 
     Chilean government in a precarious position on--and we find 
     this particularly difficult to believe at this time--that the 
     Chilean military might initiate a military coup.
       We also find incomprehensible U.S. non-cooperation in a 
     case that involves international terrorism, specifically the 
     most horrendous act of extraterritorial violence Washington, 
     D.C. has witnessed in the last fifty years--the car-bombing 
     of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt on September 21, 
     1976. As you know, the U.S. government indicted the head of 
     Chile's Intelligence and Secret Police agency, who recently 
     asserted in Chile what U.S. officials always believed: 
     Pinochet gave the order to kill Letelier in Washington.
       It seems to us that the Administration will force Members 
     of Congress to consider changing the terms of the NAFTA 
     debate. The assumption for admitting Chile to NAFTA 
     membership is that she is a functioning democracy. By 
     allowing the Chileans to put Pinochet beyond the reach of any 
     investigation, even U.S. compliance with a Spanish request, 
     the Administration is jeopardizing the integrity of other 
     treaty obligations under the anti-terrorism treaties. The 
     Administration and Congress should be alarmed at the 
     willingness of the Chilean government to ignore the growing 
     evidence about Pinochet's involvement in the Letelier 
     assassination.
       We will propose to our colleagues that before we debate the 
     merits of the new NAFTA and fast track agreements vis a vis 
     Chile, we should air the U.S. government's passivity when it 
     comes to investigating terrorism on our own soil and crimes 
     against humanity elsewhere.
       The U.S. should either work actively to deliver the most 
     complete set of declassified documents and witnesses to 
     Spanish judge Garcia Castellon, or face a more profound 
     debate on NAFTA, one that goes to the democratic nature of 
     our partners and the critical responsibilities that must 
     accompany any trade agreement.
       We respectfully request that you look seriously and 
     expeditiously into this troubling matter.
           Sincerely,
     George Miller, M.C.
     John Conyers, M.C.
                                  ____



                                              The White House,

                                     Washington, DC, June 3, 1998.
       Dear George: Thank you for your letter regarding our 
     cooperation with a Spanish judge investigating allegations 
     that General Augusto Pinochet and other former Chilean 
     officials are responsible for human rights abuses against 
     Spanish citizens as well as others.
       As you know, the Spanish judge's request was made under a 
     mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) we have with Spain. The 
     Department of Justice coordinates the execution of such 
     requests with the appropriate U.S. Government agencies. 
     Contrary to the information you may have received, the 
     Spanish authorities have indicated to the Justice Department 
     that they are very pleased with the extent of our cooperation 
     in responding to their request. The Department has 
     facilitated for Spanish authorities the depositions of 
     several individuals in the United States and has itself 
     deposed several other witnesses in whom the Spanish indicated 
     interest. While certain limits were placed on the testimony 
     that could be offered by two of these witnesses, this was due 
     to the fact that some of the information known by these 
     witnesses remains classified.
       In addition, the Justice Department has requested that the 
     relevant agencies conduct a search for documents responding 
     to the Spanish court's request. It has already transmitted 
     four boxes of materials relating to the prosecutions of those 
     responsible for the bombing of Orlando Letelier and Ronni 
     Moffitt as well as numerous additional documents from the 
     Department of State. Other agencies are continuing to conduct 
     their searches for relevant documents and will respond in the 
     near future.
       Our cooperation on this case is consistent with the 
     extensive efforts the United States Government has undertaken 
     to bring to justice those responsible for the Letelier-
     Moffitt murders. As you know, the United States Government 
     has successfully prosecuted several individuals responsible 
     for these killings and indicted several others. Two of these 
     individuals are now serving time in a Chilean prison for this 
     crime. I believe that the efforts the United States 
     Government has taken on this case show our resolve to deal 
     quickly and decisively with acts of terrorism on our soil.
       Finally, I want to assure you that we will continue to 
     respond as fully as we can to the request for assistance from 
     the Government of Spain.
       Thank you again for writing to me about this important 
     matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Bill Clinton.  
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hinchey 
amendment.
  General Augusto Pinochet rose to power in a bloody coup d'etat in 
1973 that overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador 
Allende. This ushered in seventeen years of military dictatorship 
accompanied by the death of thousands of activists, journalists and 
ordinary citizens.
  According to the Church Committee Report of December 1975, ``The CIA 
attempted, directly, to foment a military coup in Chile.'' Before 
Allende was inaugurated, it passed weapons to coup plotters. When that 
failed, it undertook a massive effort to undermine the government. 
Senator Church found that ``Eight million dollars was spent in the 
three years between the 1970 election and the military coup in 1973. 
Money was furnished to media organizations, to opposition political 
parties and, in limited amounts, to private sector organizations.''
  Much of this is history in the sense that the repression in Chile has 
stopped, and that country has made a remarkable transition to democracy 
over the last decade. However, many are still forced to live with the 
pain of General Pinochet's legacy and there is still far too much 
information still being withheld from the public record about the 
American role in Chile during those dark years.
  The arrest of Pinochet in England last year was a tremendous step 
forward for international law, reconciliation and human rights. Much of 
the power to keep justice moving forward lies in the hands of the CIA, 
the Department of Justice and other agencies of the U.S. government who 
have been asked by the Spanish Judge prosecuting Pinochet, Garcia 
Castellon, to provide information about Pinochet's reign of terror.
  Even before the arrest of Pinochet, the Department of Justice assured 
Congressman George Miller and I that they were cooperating fully with 
Judge Castellon's inquiry. I am inserting into the Record an article 
from the New York Times of June 27, 1997 which makes this point clear.
  I am neither satisfied with the Department of Justice's response thus 
far nor with the CIA's outright refusal to cooperate with the inquiry. 
This is simply inconsistent with the American commitment to the 
promotion of human rights.
  This is especially remarkable since along with the Chileans and 
Europeans who were murdered by Pinochet's hand were several Americans. 
Ronni Moffit, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, and the 
former Chilean ambassador, Orlando Letelier were killed in one of the 
worst domestic terrorism incidents ever in Washington, DC. The attack 
was carried out by DINA, the Chilean intelligence agency whose director 
has stated that

[[Page H3129]]

Pinochet personally ordered the bombing. Even Elliot Abrams, Ronald 
Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, has 
suggested in the conservative journal Commentary that if Pinochet is 
responsible for the Letelier-Moffit bombing he should be extradited to 
the United States for trial. Section 304, Paragraph (a)(3) of the 
Hinchey Amendment and will help shed much needed light on who is 
responsible for this and other brutal murders.
  The American people will never know the truth unless their government 
expresses greater enthusiasm for prosecuting the Pinochet case both in 
London and in Washington. The Hinchey Amendment is a critical step in 
that direction and I urge my colleagues to support it.

                [From the New York Times, June 27, 1999]

      U.S. Will Give Spanish Judge Documents for Pinochet Inquiry

       Madrid, June 26.--The United States has agreed to provide 
     Government documents to a Spanish judge investigating 
     terrorism and human-rights violations in Chile during the 
     right-wing dictatorship of Gen. Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to 
     1990.
       It is the first investigation of crimes against humanity in 
     the death or disappearance of people during the Pinochet era. 
     The judge, who functions as a prosecutor under Spanish law, 
     is seeking evidence of genocide against Spanish citizens and 
     descendants of Spaniards.
       But the case is even broader, and could delve into abuses 
     against at least 3,000 people of various nationalities, 
     including Charles Horman, an American whose disappearance in 
     Chile was depicted in the film ``Missing,'' said Juan E. 
     Garces, a Madrid lawyer representing relatives of the 
     victims.
       The Madrid judge, Manuel Garcia Castellon, began the 
     criminal investigation last year, and in February requested 
     all pertinent documents from United States Government 
     agencies. Washington will cooperate ``to the extent permitted 
     by law,'' said a letter signed by Assistant Attorney General 
     Andrew Fois on May 23.
       The letter, addressed to Representative John Conyers, 
     Democrat of Michigan, was also sent to the national security 
     adviser, Sandy Berger, the State Department and ranking 
     members of the House International Relations Committee.
       Spain stands a good chance of getting useful American 
     documents about General Pinochet's Government because the 
     request came under a 1990 legal assistance treaty that allows 
     a wider sweep in searching for information, said Richard J. 
     Wilson, a law professor at American University in Washington.
       The Judge has not yet charged anyone, but might seek the 
     extradition to Spain of General Pinochet, who is still 
     commander of the Chilean Army, Mr. Garces said.
       Mr. Garces was an assistant to President Salvador Allende 
     Gossens of Chile, a Socialist, who died in September 1973 
     when General Pinochet led a coup that overthrew the elected 
     Marxist Government.
       In a separate action, another Madrid judge is investigating 
     human rights abuses against 320 Spaniards under military rule 
     in Argentina from 1976 to 1983. The judge, Baltasar Garzon, 
     has also requested United States Government documents for his 
     inquiry.
       The Chilean Government last month termed Spain's 
     investigation a ``political trial'' of Chile's transition to 
     democracy that began with elections in 1990. On Wednesday, it 
     said the American cooperation with the Spanish judge was 
     ``positive'' but ``would not lead anywhere.''
       The Madrid court and the American Embassy said today that 
     they had not received official confirmation of Washington's 
     agreement to provide documents.

  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey).
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey), as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


             Amendment No. 2 Offered By Mr. Barr of Georgia

  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Barr of Georgia:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC 
                   SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     the Director of the National Security Agency, and the 
     Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of 
     the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report in classified and 
     unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by 
     elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals 
     intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance.
       (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall 
     specifically include a statement of each of the following 
     legal standards:
       (1) The legal standards for interception of communications 
     when such interception may result in the acquisition of 
     information from a communication to or from United States 
     persons.
       (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the 
     communications to or from United States persons.
       (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States 
     sources of information pertaining to communications to or 
     from United States persons.
       (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information 
     acquired through the interception of the communications to or 
     from United States persons.
       (c) Inclusion of Legal Memoranda and Opinions.--The report 
     under subsection (a) shall include a copy of all legal 
     memoranda, opinions, and other related documents in 
     unclassified, and if necessary, classified form with respect 
     to the conduct of signals intelligence activities, including 
     electronic surveillance by elements of the intelligence 
     community, utilized by the Office of the General Counsel of 
     the National Security Agency, by the Office of General 
     Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, or by the Office 
     of Intelligence Policy Review of the Department of Justice, 
     in preparation of the report.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section:
       (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning 
     given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       (2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning 
     given such term under section 101(i) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)).
       (3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate.

  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I had the honor of serving this 
great land back in the 1970s, including those years in which the 
government of our country, in an effort to institutionalize proper 
oversight of our intelligence agencies, enacted public laws that 
established the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
  In the intervening generation, these committees, including under the 
current leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), have 
provided very, very essential oversight of the intelligence activities 
of our government.
  Hopefully in so doing, we have avoided any excesses that have given 
rise to some of the incidents in the past that have troubled our 
intelligence gathering capabilities and hurt the credibility of these 
great institutions such as the CIA.
  However, Mr. Chairman, the oversight with which the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) and many others have worked so diligently to both 
implement and then preserve over the last 24 years is under attack 
right now, and the survivability of that oversight mechanism is 
threatened.
  I speak particularly, Mr. Chairman, of efforts by the intelligence 
community to deny proper information for the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence to conduct oversight, meaningful oversight 
responsibilities.
  For example, in recent communications between the chairman and the 
NSA, the general counsel of the NSA interposed what, by any stretch of 
the imagination, is a bogus claim of attorney/client privilege in an 
effort to deny the chairman and the committee members proper 
information with which to carry out their oversight responsibilities.
  In particular, the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) was seeking 
very important information that goes to the standards whereby the 
intelligence community and the agencies comprising the intelligence 
community gather intelligence and gather information on American 
citizens.
  One such project in particular that has recently come to light, Mr. 
Chairman, is a project known as Project Echelon, which has been in 
place for several years and which, by accounts that we have recently 
seen in the media, engages in the intercession of literally millions of 
communications involving United States citizens over satellite 
transmissions, involving e-mail transmissions, Internet access, as

[[Page H3130]]

well as mobile phone communications and telephone communications.
  This information apparently is shared, at least in part, and 
coordinated, at least in part, with intelligence agencies of four other 
countries: the UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
  As part of our effort here in the Congress, both on the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, which the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) 
chairs, as well as others of us, while not serving on that committee, 
are concerned about the privacy rights for American citizens and 
whether or not there are constitutional safeguards being circumvented 
by the manner in which the intelligence agencies are intercepting and/
or receiving international communications back from foreign nations 
that would otherwise be prohibited by the prohibitions and the 
limitations on the collection of domestic intelligence.
  We have been trying to get information with regard to Project Echelon 
and others. The amendment that I propose today simply would require the 
intelligence community, and that is specifically the Department of 
Justice, the National Security Agency, and the CIA to provide to the 
Congress within 60 days of the enactment this Intelligence 
Authorization Act a report setting forth the legal basis and procedures 
whereby the intelligence community and the agencies comprising 
intelligence community gather intelligence.
  This will enable the intelligence community and the Committee on the 
Judiciary of both Houses to properly evaluate whether or not these 
procedures are being implemented properly according to proper legal and 
constitutional standards.
  It would be very interesting to see, Mr. Chairman, if the 
administration or the Senate opposes this very straightforward 
amendment, which simply requires a report on the legal basis for such 
interceptions to be furnished within 60 days to the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of both Houses and to the Committee on the Judiciary of 
both Houses.
  I ask Members on both sides of the aisle to support this very 
straightforward amendment, which not only will help guarantee the 
privacy rights for American citizens, but will protect the oversight 
responsibilities of the Congress which are now under assault by these 
bogus claims that the intelligence communities are making. I ask for 
the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to say I very much appreciate the remarks of the 
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr). He has characterized 
an ongoing vigilance of oversight matters that we carry on every day. I 
am certainly prepared to accept his amendment. I think it is useful and 
indeed helpful to some problems we are having directly now.

                              {time}  1245

  I also think that it is helpful in the area of the very delicate 
balancing act that we have to do on HPSCI, and I hope we do it well. I 
think we do it well.
  It is, on the one hand, absolutely accepting no compromise on the 
rights of American citizens and, on the other hand, not tying the hands 
of our law enforcement people who are trying to catch people who are 
trying to work mischief against the United States of America. And it is 
not always as clear as it might be which it is at the beginning of a 
process involving individuals.
  So this is a very difficult judgment area for us. Nobody would want 
us, particularly in light of the news coming out of the weapons labs 
today, to release or relax our efforts to catch people who are trying 
to steal our secrets or penetrate our appropriately applied security 
arrangements. On the other hand, it is intolerable to think of the 
United States Government, of big brother, or anybody else invading the 
privacy of an American citizen without cause.
  I believe that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia 
(Mr. Barr) will help in that debate, and I am prepared to accept it. I 
know that it is offered in that spirit, and I know that it will also be 
helpful to me in my current problems, making sure the intelligence 
community understands that penetrating oversight is here to stay. I 
think most of them are getting the message.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The minority will accept this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title IV.
  The text of title IV is as follows:

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

       Section 21(h)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(h)(1)) is amended by striking out 
     ``March 31, 2000.'' and inserting ``March 31, 2002.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title IV?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title V.
  The text of title V is as follows:

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL 
                   IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 22 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 446. Protection of operational files

       ``(a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search, 
     Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency, with the coordination of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence, may exempt operational 
     files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency from the 
     provisions of section 552 of title 5 (Freedom of Information 
     Act), which require publication, disclosure, search, or 
     review in connection therewith.
       ``(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of 
     this section, the term `operational files' means files of the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency (hereinafter in this 
     section referred to as `NIMA') concerning the activities of 
     NIMA that before the establishment of NIMA were performed by 
     the National Photographic Interpretation Center of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency (NPIC), that document the means 
     by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is 
     collected through scientific and technical systems.
       ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated 
     intelligence are not operational files.
       ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational 
     files shall continue to be subject to search and review for 
     information concerning--
       ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence who have requested information on 
     themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 of title 
     5, or section 552a of title 5 (Privacy Act of 1974);
       ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not 
     exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of 
     title 5; or
       ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by 
     any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of 
     law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the 
     conduct of an intelligence activity:
       ``(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
       ``(iv) The Department of Justice.
       ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NIMA.
       ``(vi) The Office of the Director of NIMA.
       ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) 
     which contain information derived or disseminated from 
     exempted operational files shall be subject to search and 
     review.
       ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted 
     operational files in files that are not exempted under 
     paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under 
     paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from 
     search, review publication, or disclosure.
       ``(C) Records from exempted operational files which have 
     been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not 
     exempted under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to 
     exempted operational files for sole retention shall be 
     subject to search and review.
       ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded 
     except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date 
     of enactment of this section, and which specifically cites 
     and repeals or modifies its provisions.
       ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever 
     any person who has requested agency records under section 552 
     of title 5, alleges that NIMA has withheld records improperly 
     because of failure to comply with any provision of this 
     section, judicial review shall be available under the terms 
     set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5.
       ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner 
     provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
       ``(i) In any case in which information specifically 
     authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order 
     to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or 
     foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court 
     by NIMA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in 
     camera by the court.
       ``(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, 
     determine the issues of fact based on sworn written 
     submissions of the parties.
       ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records 
     are improperly withheld because

[[Page H3131]]

     of improper placement solely in exempted operational files, 
     the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn 
     written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise 
     admissible evidence.
       ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records 
     were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of 
     operational files, NIMA shall meet its burden under section 
     552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, by demonstrating to the court by 
     sworn written submission that exempted operational files 
     likely to contain responsible records currently perform the 
     functions set forth in paragraph (2).
       ``(II) The court may not order NIMA to review the content 
     of any exempted operational file or files in order to make 
     the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the 
     complainant disputes NIMA's showing with a sworn written 
     submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise 
     admissible evidence.
       ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the 
     parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 
     36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that 
     requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 
     36.
       ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NIMA 
     has improperly withheld requested records because of failure 
     to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court 
     shall order NIMA to search and review the appropriate 
     exempted operational file or files for the requested records 
     and make such records, or portions thereof, available in 
     accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, and 
     such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to 
     comply with this subsection.
       ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint 
     pursuant to this paragraph NIMA agrees to search the 
     appropriate exempted operational file or files for the 
     requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based 
     upon such complaint.
       ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the 
     court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated 
     with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission 
     to the court.
       ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) 
     Not less than once every ten years, the Director of the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force 
     under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions 
     may be removed from the category of exempted files or any 
     portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must 
     approve any determination to remove such exemptions.
       ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include 
     consideration of the historical value or other public 
     interest in the subject matter of the particular category of 
     files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying 
     a significant part of the information contained therein.
       ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NIMA has improperly 
     withheld records because of failure to comply with this 
     subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of 
     the United States of the district in which any of the parties 
     reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, 
     the court's review shall be limited to determining the 
     following:
       ``(A) Whether NIMA has conducted the review required by 
     paragraph (1) before the expiration of the ten-year period 
     beginning on the date of the enactment of this section or 
     before the expiration of the ten-year period beginning on the 
     date of the most recent review.
       ``(B) Whether NIMA, in fact, considered the criteria set 
     forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of subchapter I of chapter 22 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new item:

``446. Protection of operational files.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title V?
  Are there additional amendments to the bill?


                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Sanders

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 8 printed in the May 
12, 1999, Congressional Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Sanders:
       At the bill, add the following new title:

                   TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

     SEC. 601. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE 
                   APPROPRIATED.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     notwithstanding the total amount of the individual 
     authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, 
     including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, there is 
     authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 to carry 
     out this Act not more than the total amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1999.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by Section 201.

     SEC. 602. REPORT ON EFFICACY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress a detailed, comprehensive report in 
     unclassified form on the matters described in subsection (b).
       (b) Matters Studied.--Matters studied for the report under 
     subsection (a) shall include the following:
       (1) The bombing in March 1991 by the Armed Forces of the 
     United States during the Persian Gulf War of a weapons and 
     nerve gas storage bunker in Khamisiyah, Iraq, and errors 
     committed by the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to 
     the location and contents of such bunker and the failure to 
     disclose the proper location and contents to the Secretary of 
     Defense.
       (2) Errors with respect to maps of the Aviano, Italy, area 
     prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and used by 
     aviators in the Armed Forces of the United States which may 
     have resulted on February 3, 1996, in the accidental severing 
     of a cable car device by a United States military aircraft on 
     a training mission, which resulted in the deaths of twenty 
     civilians.
       (3) Errors with respect to maps prepared by the Central 
     Intelligence Agency of the Belgrade, Yugoslavia, area which 
     resulted on May 7, 1999, in the accidental bombing of the 
     Embassy of the People's Republic of China by forces under the 
     command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the deaths 
     of three civilians.
       (c) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     contain recommendations for such legislation and 
     administrative actions as the Director determines appropriate 
     to avoid similar errors by the Central Intelligence Agency.

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is basically about two 
issues. Number one, the issue is about priorities in how we spend our 
national wealth; and, secondly, the issue is about accountability and 
what we do when an agency is not performing up to the level that we 
want it to perform.
  Mr. Chairman, it is no secret that in our great country we are 
spending large sums of money where we should not be spending it and we 
are not spending money where we should be spending it.
  Today, in the United States, 43 million Americans have no health 
insurance, but we do not have the money to help those people. Today, in 
the United States, millions of senior citizens cannot afford their 
prescription drugs and they suffer and they die because the United 
States Government does not do what other countries around the world do 
and help seniors with their prescription drugs. Today, in the United 
States, at VA hospitals all over this country, veterans who have put 
their lives on the line defending this country are not getting the 
quality of care they need because the United States Congress is not 
adequately funding the Veterans Administration.
  I believe that within that context and the fact that we are 
underfunding many other important social needs we should not be 
increasing funding for the intelligence agencies. And what this to the 
amendment basically says is that we should level fund the intelligence 
agencies. That is the first reason.
  The second part of this to the amendment is equally important, and 
here we are talking about accountability and responsibility on the part 
of our intelligence agencies. I know, and my colleagues know, that 
almost by definition much of what the intelligence agencies do is 
quiet. I expect they do a lot of good work which we do not hear about, 
and I applaud them for what they do which is positive.
  But it is no secret that in area after area there have been major 
deficiencies and very, very poorly performed operations, and it is 
important that we talk about that and that we demand accountability.
  Let me just give my colleagues a few of the examples that I think 
need to be talked about and that we need from the Director of the CIA 
an understanding of how these things occurred and an understanding that 
they will never occur again.
  Everybody in the Congress and everybody in the United States was 
shocked when we heard recently about the bombing of the Chinese embassy 
in Belgrade. And many of us at first thought, well, it was a mistake; 
the pilot aimed for another building, and he hit the Chinese embassy, 
and those things happen. It is terrible, but it was a mistake.
  But then we learned that the pilot hit what he was supposed to hit, 
and that was altogether shocking.
  We found that the information, which was available virtually on the 
worldwide web, which was probably available in the Yugoslavian 
telephone directory, that the Chinese embassy was located at that 
location was apparently not available to the CIA, and

[[Page H3132]]

their action has caused a major international crisis. We want to know 
how that mistake could have taken place.
  Furthermore, as someone who is involved with the issue of the Gulf 
War illness, I, and I know all of our Members, are concerned about the 
explosion that took place in Kamisiyah, which is where the United 
States blew up an Iraqi arms depot which contained chemical weapons.
  Let me quote from the April 12, 1997, New York Times. ``The report 
issued this week by the CIA shows that the agency actually had detailed 
information, including geographical coordinates, during the war to 
suggest that chemical weapons are at Kamisiyah, information that was 
not passed on to the soldiers who later blew up the depot and may have 
been exposed to nerve gas.''
  In other words, our soldiers were exposed to nerve gas because the 
CIA did not communicate the information that it had.
  Thirdly, we are all familiar with the terrible accident that took 
place in Italy regarding an American plane that went into lines that 
keep the gondolas moving in a ski area. I will quote from News Day. 
This is February 1, 1999. ``Although the gondola had been traversing 
the ski area for 30 years, there was no hint of it on the Prowler's 
crew map. While the horizontal hazard to aviation was clearly marked on 
Italian Air Force charts, the Pentagon agency somehow missed it.''
  So our intelligence agencies were not providing our pilots with an 
up-to-date map, and so they had a terrible accident which could have 
been avoided.
  Mr. Chairman, these are just three examples. The fact of the matter 
is, there are many more.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Sanders was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that in light of these 
instances, and many more which I have not gone into, there is no reason 
why this body should not pass this conservative, simple amendment.
  We are calling for, as part of this to the amendment, a study of 
these three specific events; and we are also requesting recommendations 
from the intelligence community as to how these catastrophes could be 
avoided in the future.
  So that is what this to the amendment does. It says level fund; and, 
second of all, we want some accountability on the part of the 
intelligence agency.


   Amendment Offered by Mr. Dixon to Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. 
                                Sanders

  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

  Amendment offered by Mr. Dixon to amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. 
Sanders:
       On page 1, line 13 of the amendment, delete ``1999'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``1998''.

  Mr. DIXON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to make clear what the 
situation is here. I admire what the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. 
Sanders) is trying to do as it relates to the reports. I have no 
problems with that. In fact, many of us have talked today about the 
mistake that has been made with the bombing of the embassy. There is no 
apparent legitimate excuse for that. The committee is going to get to 
the bottom of it.
  As it relates to the other two instances, I think that he is right, 
that we should find out exactly what happened.
  However, through an inadvertent, and I stress inadvertent, error, the 
amendment before us, as introduced, says that the authorization will be 
frozen at the 1999 level. In an effort to have a full debate on this, I 
am offering an amendment that substitutes 1998, with the consent of the 
author. That is because the 1999 figure is not the appropriate figure. 
It would be the 1998 figure, because the 2000 authorization that we are 
now talking about is, in fact, lower than the 1999.
  So in an effort to accommodate this debate on these issues that are 
very important, I am offering this perfecting amendment, but I want to 
make it very clear that I am opposed to the authorization reduction 
part of the Sanders amendment.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DIXON. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my good friend, and I am 
happy to accept his amendment for the reasons that he gave, but I think 
the situation here tells us about another problem, and that is year 
after year the Members of the Congress are forced to debate the 
intelligence appropriation without having that concrete information out 
on the table.
  I know that year after year Members come up and say, gee, The New 
York Times has the information, the Congressional Quarterly has the 
information, but the American people do not have it from the Congress.
  So I thank the gentleman for his amendment to my amendment, and I am 
prepared to accept it, but I do raise that question again, that the day 
should come when we are public and open about how much money there is 
in the intelligence budget.
  Mr. DIXON. Reclaiming my time just for a minute, Mr. Chairman, in my 
opening statement I indicated that I disagreed with the Director of 
Central Intelligence in his reversal of a public position he took two 
years ago, and that is to make the aggregate number of the 
appropriations public. I have indicated that I support that idea, that 
it should be public, and hope that he would reconsider.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  With regard to the situation we have on the floor, I am very happy to 
accommodate the ranking member on his secondary to the amendment. I 
think that is the right way to perfect the intent of what the gentleman 
from Vermont is trying to get done. We wish to cooperate in that 
because we think it is an important issue; and I think this is the 
right way, in a parliamentary way, to go about it.
  The concern I have about some of the points that the gentleman has 
raised, in defense of his amendment, is one of puzzlement, a little 
bit. We have invited Members to come upstairs and take a look, and it 
is there. The numbers are there, and the staff is there, and the staff 
will assist Members.
  I wish to assure the gentleman that the staff will assist him, in 
whatever his effort is. The staff will assist Members. They may or may 
not agree with a Member; it does not matter. If a Member has a 
legitimate thing they wish to accomplish as a Member of Congress to 
bring to the other Members, that is why our staff is there. We offer 
that invitation, and I want to again extend that invitation to the 
gentleman for next year.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the 
gentleman very much for accepting the amendment of the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dixon) to my amendment. I appreciate that.
  The reason that I personally, and I think a number of other Members, 
do not walk into that room, frankly, is that we do not want to be 
encumbered upon if we make a statement and somebody says, ``My 
goodness, you are revealing a national secret.'' I do know the room is 
there, and I am sure that the gentleman's staff will be very helpful. I 
have not gone in there for precisely that reason, so that nobody can 
say that I am revealing something which, in fact, I have never seen.
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I understand. We do not 
want anybody to be intimidated, and we can generally make pretty clear 
what is classified and what is not. But, in any event, we can certainly 
help Members craft an amendment.
  With regard to the three areas the gentleman mentioned, obviously, I 
think if the gentleman read the newspapers yesterday, he saw that I 
spoke on behalf of the committee in saying that we intend to pursue 
further the events of the unpleasant matter of the Chinese embassy.

[[Page H3133]]

  I can tell the gentleman that there have been reports, I think they 
have now been made fully public, I think staff tells me on Kamisiyah 
and certainly on Aviano. And I would point out that that is not 
necessarily a CIA problem, although it is an intelligence community 
problem. Actually, I believe the maps were produced by NIMA, as was the 
case in Belgrade.
  Now, that is a distinction that does not matter. It is the 
intelligence community. But, again, in an abundance of trying to be 
helpful with the vernacular and the terminology of the intelligence 
community, every time somebody says CIA, it does not necessarily mean 
CIA. It is just sort of a handy way to say something we do not know 
about and, apparently, it has to do with intelligence.

                              {time}  1300

  The intelligence community is very varied. It has many different 
functions. It has a lot of accountability and a lot of responsibility. 
And I will tell my colleagues that the reason that I will oppose the 
amendment, the underlying amendment for the cut, I believe to just take 
an across-the-board cut, which is I believe what the intention of the 
gentleman is and what has now been made in order once the perfecting 
amendment of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) is in place, 
really undoes all the work that the committee does to go through the 
many agency budgets and go line by line, which we have to do, because 
we are probably the only committee that operates on the basis of having 
to go forward to the floor and our colleagues and say, look, we have 
looked at this stuff, we know we cannot talk about it publicly, we have 
looked at it and we think we have got it at about the right level and 
we are prepared to defend what is in there.
  If we take an across-the-board cut, it seriously disrupts that 
process and it hurts things that will have consequences that go well 
beyond a small proportionate cut. It is very hard to explain if we have 
an across-the-board cut like this, whatever the level is, what the 
consequences will be.
  I would prefer to let the committee work its will and try very hard 
to let every member of the committee identify what they think is 
unnecessary and debate it upstairs. That is the process we go through. 
We have many briefings, many hearings, much testimony. And then when we 
are all through and we unanimously, in a bipartisan way, pass this out, 
we have the material upstairs, and anybody who wants to come upstairs 
and second guess us is welcome. That is always the way we have done it.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I am not arguing with the proposition that 
my colleague has just put forward. But what he is not dealing with is 
the issue of priorities of a Nation as a whole.
  What I am raising the question is whether we need more money for the 
intelligence agencies or more money for prescription drugs for our 
senior citizens or college education for our middle-class families.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, to answer the gentleman, we are within our 
budget allocation, within our caps. We are playing by the rules. We are 
doing this the way we should be doing it.
  There has been a great debate about reinvesting to rebuild our 
intelligence capability in the country. I do not think it has been just 
fired by some of the headline events we have seen. I would say that 
those are tragedies. Things have happened that we do not want to 
happen, bad surprises where people have been killed, embassies blowing 
up, nuclear testing in India, which we did not catch. It turns out 
probably we could not have done anything about it. Nevertheless, we 
should have been on top of it, the things we have been reading about 
lately, the penetration of the laboratories.
  It seems to me that the way to deal with that is to look at it 
forthrightly and say, there are problems here and we need to fix them. 
Now, we do not fix all problems by throwing money at them. But we do 
need to have some resources. We need to go out and get the personnel. 
We need to spot, identify, train, build, education, get the right 
languages.
  We are expected in the intelligence community to be the eyes and the 
ears around the world for anything we can read about anytime, anywhere. 
That is, basically, what the intelligence community does this day and 
that is a huge order. And doing that, we are not going to get there by 
cutting money. We have to do a reasonable amount of investing.
  Mr. Chairman, I insert the following for printing in the Record:

                     Declaration of George J. Tenet


                              introduction

       I, George J. Tenet, hereby declare:
       1. I am the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). I was 
     appointed DCI on 11 July 1997. As DCI, I serve as head of the 
     United States intelligence community, act as the principal 
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to 
     the national security, and serve as head of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency (CIA).
       2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I am 
     generally familiar with plaintiff's civil action. I make the 
     following statements based upon my personal knowledge upon 
     information made available to me in my official capacity, and 
     upon the advice and counsel of the CIA's Office of General 
     Counsel.
       3. I understand that plaintiff has submitted Freedom of 
     Information Act (FOIA) requests for ``a copy of documents 
     that indicate the amount of the total budget request for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal 
     year 1999'' and ``a copy of documents that indicate the total 
     budget appropriation for intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities for fiscal year 1999, updated to reflect 
     the recent additional appropriation of `emergency 
     supplemental' funding for intelligence.'' I also understand 
     that plaintiff alleges that the CIA has improperly withheld 
     such documents. I shall refer to the requested information as 
     the ``budget request'' and ``the total appropriation,'' 
     respectively.
       4. As head of the intelligence community, my 
     responsibilities include developing and presenting to the 
     President an annual budget request for the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program (NFIP), and participating in the 
     development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget 
     requests for the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) 
     and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The 
     budgets for the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA jointly comprise the 
     budget of the United States for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities.
       5. The CIA has withheld the budget request and the total 
     appropriation on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(1) because 
     they are currently and properly classified under Executive 
     Order 12958, and on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(3) 
     because they are exempted from disclosure by the National 
     Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
     of 1949. The purpose of this declaration, and the 
     accompanying classified declaration, is to describe my bases 
     for determining that disclosure of the budget request or the 
     total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause 
     damage to the national security and would tend to reveal 
     intelligence methods.
       6. I previously executed declarations in this case that 
     were filed with the CIA's motion for summary judgment on 11 
     December 1998. Those two declarations described my bases for 
     withholding the budget request only. Since the CIA filed its 
     motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has filed an amended 
     complaint seeking release of the total appropriation also. 
     For the Court's convenience, the justifications contained in 
     my earlier declarations are repeated and supplemented in this 
     declaration and the accompanying classified declaration and 
     describe my bases for withholding both the budget request and 
     the total appropriation for fiscal year 1999.


                             prior releases

       7. In October 1997, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate 
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for fiscal year 1997 was $26.6 billion. At the 
     time of this disclosure, I issued a public statement that 
     included the following two points:
       ``First, disclosure of future aggregate figures will be 
     considered only after determining whether such disclosure 
     could cause harm to the national security by showing trends 
     over time.
       ``Second, we will continue to protect from disclosure any 
     and all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence 
     budget: whether the information concerns particular 
     intelligence agencies or particular intelligence programs. In 
     other words, the Administration intends to draw the line at 
     the top-line, aggregate figure. Beyond this figure, there 
     will be not other disclosures of currently classified budget 
     information because such disclosures could harm national 
     security.''
       8. In March 1998, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate 
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for fiscal year 1998 was $26.7 billion. I did so 
     only after evaluating whether the 1998 appropriation, when 
     compared with the 1997 appropriation, could cause damage to 
     the national security by showing trends over time, or 
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. Because the 
     1998 appropriation represented approximately a $0.1 billion 
     increase--or less

[[Page H3134]]

     than a 0.4 percent change--over the 1997 appropriation, and 
     because published reports did not contain information that, 
     if coupled with the appropriation, would be likely to allow 
     the correlation of specific spending figures with particular 
     intelligence programs, I concluded that release of the 1998 
     appropriation could not reasonably be expected to 
     cause damage to the national security, and so I released 
     the 1998 appropriation.
       9. Since the enactment of the intelligence appropriation 
     for fiscal year 1998, the budget process has produced: (1) 
     the fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriation; (2) the 
     Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 (a 
     subject of this litigation); (3) the fiscal year 1999 regular 
     appropriation (a subject of this litigation); and (4) the 
     fiscal year 1999 emergency supplemental appropriation (a 
     subject of this litigation). Information about each of these 
     figures--some of it accurate, some not--has been reported in 
     the media. In evaluating whether to release the 
     Administration's budget request or total appropriation for 
     fiscal year 1999, I cannot review these possible releases in 
     isolation. Instead, I have to consider whether release of the 
     requested information could add to the mosaic of other public 
     and clandestine information acquired by our adversaries about 
     the intelligence budget in a way that could reasonably be 
     expected to damage the national security. If release of the 
     requested information adds a piece to the intelligence jigsaw 
     puzzle--even if it does not complete the picture--such that 
     the picture is more identifiable, then damage to the national 
     security could reasonably be expected. After conducting such 
     a review, I have determined that release of the 
     Administration's intelligence budget request or total 
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security, or 
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. In the 
     paragraphs that follow, I will provide a description of some 
     of the information that I reviewed and how I reached this 
     conclusion. I am unable to describe all of the information I 
     reviewed without disclosing classified information. 
     Additional information in support of my determination is 
     included in my classified declaration.
       10. At the creation of the modern national security 
     establishment in 1947, national policymakers had to address a 
     paradox of intelligence appropriations: the more they 
     publicly disclosed about the amount of appropriations, the 
     less they could publicly debate about the object of such 
     appropriations without causing damage to the national 
     security. They struck the balance in favor of withholding the 
     amount of appropriations. For over fifty years, the Congress 
     has acted in executive session when approving intelligence 
     appropriations to prevent the identification of trends in 
     intelligence spending and any correlation between specific 
     spending figures with particular intelligence programs. Now 
     is an especially critical and turbulent period for the 
     intelligence budget, and the continued secrecy of the fiscal 
     year 1999 budget request and total appropriation is necessary 
     for the protection of vulnerable intelligence capabilities.


                         classified information

     FOIA exemption (b)(1)
       11. The authority to classify information is derived from a 
     succession of Executive orders, the most recent of which is 
     Executive Order 12958, ``Classified National Security 
     Information.'' Section 1.1(c) of the Order defines 
     ``classified information'' as ``information that has been 
     determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to 
     require protection against unauthorized disclosure.'' The CIA 
     has withheld the budget request and the total appropriation 
     as classified information under the criteria established in 
     Executive Order 12958.
     Classification authority
       12. Information may be originally classified under the 
     Order only if it: (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or is 
     under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls 
     within one or more of the categories of information set forth 
     in section 1.5 of the Order; and (3) is classified by an 
     original classification authority who determines that its 
     unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to 
     result in damage to the national security that the original 
     classification authority can identify or describe.\1\ The 
     classification of the budget request and the total 
     appropriation meet these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ The severity of the damage to the national security 
     affects the level of classification assigned to the 
     information: information reasonably expected to cause 
     exceptionally grave damage is classified TOP SECRET; 
     information reasonably expected to cause serious damage is 
     classified SECRET; and information reasonably expected to 
     cause damage is classified CONFIDENTIAL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       13. The Administration's budget request and the total 
     appropriation are information clearly owned, produced by and 
     under the control of the United States Government. 
     Additionally, the budget request and the total appropriation 
     fall within the category of information listed at section 
     1.5(c) of the Order: ``intelligence activities (including 
     special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or 
     cryptology.''
       14. Finally, I have made the determination required under 
     the Order to classify the budget request and the total 
     appropriation. By Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, 
     ``National Security Information'', 3 C.F.R. 513 (1996), 
     reprinted in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 435 note (Supp. I 1995), and 
     pursuant to section 1.4(a)(2) of Executive Order 12958, the 
     President designated me as an official authorized to exercise 
     original Top Secret classification authority. I have 
     determined that the unauthorized disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security. 
     Consequently, I have classified the budget request and the 
     total appropriation at the Confidential level. In the 
     paragraphs below, I will identify and describe the 
     foreseeable damage to national security that reasonably 
     could be expected to result from disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation.
     Damage to national security
       15. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     the national security in several ways. First, disclosure of 
     the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide 
     foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of 
     its intelligence capabilities and weaknesses. The difference 
     between the appropriation for one year and the 
     Administration's budget request for the next provides a 
     measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment 
     of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease 
     reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are 
     more than adequate to meet the national security needs of the 
     United States. A requested budget increase reflects a 
     decision that existing intelligence programs are insufficient 
     to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no 
     change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs 
     are just adequate to meet our needs.
       16. Similar insights can be gained by analyzing the 
     difference between the total appropriation by Congress for 
     one year and the total appropriation for the next year. The 
     difference between the appropriation for one year and the 
     appropriation for the next year provides a measure of the 
     Congress' assessment of the nation's intelligence programs. 
     Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged 
     appropriation reflects a congressional determination that 
     existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more 
     than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the 
     national security needs of the United States, but an actual 
     figure indicates the degree of change.
       17. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation would provide foreign governments with the 
     United States' own overall assessment of its intelligence 
     weaknesses and priorities and assist them in redirecting 
     their own resources to frustrate the United States' 
     intelligence collection efforts, with the resulting damage to 
     our national security. Because I have determined it to be in 
     our national security interest to deny foreign governments 
     information that would assist them in assessing the strength 
     of United States intelligence capabilities, I have determined 
     that disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     the national security. I am unable to elaborate further on 
     the bases for my determination without disclosing classified 
     information. Additional information in support of my 
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       18. Second, disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to assist foreign 
     governments in correlating specific spending figures with 
     particular intelligence programs. Foreign governments are 
     keenly interested in the United States' intelligence 
     collection priorities. Nowhere are those priorities better 
     reflected than in the level of spending on particular 
     intelligence activities. That is why foreign intelligence 
     services, to varying degrees, devote resources to learning 
     the amount and objects of intelligence spending by other 
     foreign governments. The CIA's own intelligence analysts 
     conduct just such analyses of intelligence spending by 
     foreign governments.
       19. However, no intelligence service, U.S. or foreign, ever 
     has complete information. They are always revising their 
     intelligence estimates based on new information. Moreover, 
     the United States does not have complete information about 
     how much foreign intelligence services know about U.S. 
     intelligence programs and funding. Foreign governments 
     collect information about U.S. intelligence activities from 
     their human intelligence sources; that is, ``spies.'' While 
     the United States will never know exactly how much our 
     adversaries know about U.S. intelligence activities, we do 
     know that all foreign intelligence services know at least as 
     much about U.S. intelligence programs and funding as has been 
     disclosed by the Congress or reported by the media. 
     Therefore, congressional statements and media reporting of 
     the fiscal year 1999 budget cycle provide the minimum 
     knowledge that can be attributed to all foreign governments, 
     and serve as a baseline for predictive judgments of the 
     possible damage to national security that could reasonably be 
     expected to result from release of the budget request or the 
     total appropriation.
       20. Budget figures provide useful benchmarks that, when 
     combined with other public and clandestinely-acquired 
     information, assist experienced intelligence analysts in 
     reaching accurate estimates of the nature and extent of all 
     sorts of foreign intelligence activities, including covert 
     operations, scientific and technical research and 
     development, and analytic capabilities. I expect foreign 
     intelligence services to do no less if

[[Page H3135]]

     armed with the same information. While other sources may 
     publish information about the amounts and objects of 
     intelligence spending that damages the national security, I 
     cannot add to that damage by officially releasing 
     information, such as the budget request or the total 
     appropriation, that would tend to confirm or deny these 
     public accounts. Such intelligence would permit foreign 
     governments to learn about United States' intelligence 
     collection priorities and redirect their own resources to 
     frustrate the United States' intelligence collection 
     efforts, with the resulting damage to our national 
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of 
     the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably 
     could be expected to cause damage to the national 
     security. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases 
     for my determination without disclosing classified 
     information. Additional information in support of my 
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       21. In addition, release of both the budget request and the 
     total appropriation would permit one to calculate the exact 
     difference between the Administration's request and Congress' 
     appropriation. It is during the congressional debate over the 
     Administration's budget request that many disclosures of 
     specific intelligence programs are reported in the media. 
     Release of the budget request and total appropriation 
     together would assist our adversaries in correlating the 
     added or subtracted intelligence programs with the exact 
     amount of spending devoted to them.
       22. And third, disclosure of the budget request or the 
     total appropriation reasonably could be expected to free 
     foreign governments' limited collection and analysis 
     resources for other efforts targeted against the United 
     States. No government has unlimited intelligence resources. 
     Resources devoted to targeting the nature and extent of the 
     United States' intelligence spending are resources that 
     cannot be devoted to other efforts targeted against the 
     United States. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation would free those foreign resources for other 
     intelligence collection activities directed against the 
     United States, with the resulting damage to our national 
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security.
       23. In summary, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriations reasonably could 
     be expected to provide foreign intelligence services with a 
     valuable benchmark for identifying and frustrating United 
     States' intelligence programs. For all of the above reasons, 
     singularly and collectively, I have determined that 
     disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation 
     for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be expected to cause 
     damage to the national security. Therefore, I have determined 
     that the budget request and the total appropriation are 
     currently and properly classified Confidential.


                          intelligence methods

     FOIA exemption (b)(3)
       24. Section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, 
     as amended, provides that the DCI, as head of the 
     intelligence community, ``shall protect intelligence sources 
     and methods from unauthorized disclosure.'' Disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation would jeopardize 
     intelligence methods because disclosure would tend to reveal 
     how and for what purposes intelligence appropriations are 
     secretly transferred to and expended by intelligence 
     agencies.
       25. There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA. 
     The appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the 
     intelligence community are hidden in the various annual 
     appropriations acts. The specific locations of the 
     intelligence appropriations in those acts are not publicly 
     identified, both to protect the classified nature of the 
     intelligence programs themselves and to protect the 
     classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and 
     between intelligence agencies.
       26. Because there are a finite number of places where 
     intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a 
     skilled budget analyst could construct a hypothetical 
     intelligence budget by aggregating suspected 
     intelligence line items from the publicly-disclosed 
     appropriations. Release of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation would provide a benchmark to test and refine 
     such a hypothesis. Repeated disclosures of either the 
     budget request or total appropriation could provide more 
     data with which to test and refine the hypothesis. Exhibit 
     1 is an example of such a hypothesis. Confirmation of the 
     hypothetical budget could disclose the actual locations in 
     the appropriations acts where the intelligence funds are 
     hidden, which is the intelligence method used to transfer 
     funds to and between intelligence agencies.
       27. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949 
     constitute the legal authorization for the secret transfer 
     and spending of intelligence funds. Together, these two 
     sections implement Congress' intent that intelligence 
     appropriations and expenditures, respectively, be shielded 
     from public view. Simply stated, the means of providing money 
     to the CIA is itself an intelligence method. Disclosure of 
     the budget request or the total appropriation could assist in 
     finding the locations of secret intelligence appropriations, 
     and thus defeat these congressionally-approved secret funding 
     mechanisms. Therefore I have determined that disclosure of 
     the budget request or the total appropriation would tend to 
     reveal intelligence methods that are protected from 
     disclosure. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for 
     my determination without disclosing classified information. 
     Additional information in support of my determination is 
     included in my classified declaration.


                               CONCLUSION

       28. In fulfillment of my statutory responsibility as head 
     of the United States intelligence community, as the principal 
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to 
     the national security, and as head of the CIA, to protect 
     classified information and intelligence methods from 
     unauthorized disclosure, I have determined for the reasons 
     set forth above and in my classified declaration that the 
     Administration's intelligence budget request an the total 
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 must be withheld because 
     their disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage 
     to the national security and would tend to reveal 
     intelligence methods.
       I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the 
     foregoing is true and correct.
       Executed this 6th day of April, 1999.
                                                  George J. Tenet,
                                 Director of Central Intelligence.

  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Sanders amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the last speaker was correct when he said we 
need to revamp the CIA. I think what the Sanders amendment says is that 
revamping should not involve additional money.
  The CIA budget is estimated to be somewhere around $30 billion. We 
are only spending about $23 billion on elementary and secondary 
education. It is important that it be revamped. And I am not sure that 
the intelligence community that exists now is capable of revamping it. 
We need an independent commission of some kind to revamp the CIA. It 
needs to be improved. It needs to have accountability. The long history 
of blunders in the last 10 years are such that it is obviously a 
defunct, incompetent, decaying agency. Something needs to happen.
  I am not sure the President is in charge, either. The President's 
first choice for CIA Director was not accepted by the intelligence 
community. The intelligence community protects this incompetence.
  Our history with respect to Haiti was that the CIA was determined to 
get the duly-elected President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand-Aristide. They 
did everything they could to smear him. All kinds of false things were 
generated out of the CIA. When they were later proven to be untrue, 
nobody later apologized, nobody was held accountable.
  In one of the major diplomatic moves made by the envoy to Haiti, 
where we had a delegation going in with Canadian police and a number of 
other things to start a process of peace in Haiti, there was a big 
demonstration on the docks in Haiti which turned all that around and 
threatened the U.S. Embassy personnel with gunshots; and it turned out 
that that demonstration was financed by the CIA. Emmanuel Constanz, the 
head of the organization that staged the violent demonstration was on 
the payroll of the CIA.
  We cannot fully get the story of all the things Emmanuel Constanz had 
going with the CIA because they refuse to give us the records. They 
will not let the nation of Haiti try Emmanuel Constanz for the crimes 
that he has committed.
  Then there is the Aldrich Ames affair, where the man in charge of the 
Russian spy operation managing our assets was on the payroll of the 
Soviet Union. He was on the payroll of the Soviet Union, and he exposed 
those assets. At least 10 of the people who were working for this 
nation were executed as a result of Aldrich Ames, the guy who was in 
charge at the CIA, having sold them out for quite a number of millions 
of dollars.
  And now we have the blunder at the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. It 
is not funny at all. It is not humorous at all to me. I heard some 
Members in the elevator say, ``Do you want to establish a special map 
fund for the CIA?'' I do not think this is funny at all. These people 
have life-and-death power over large numbers of people, and to talk 
about a mapping error which could have been corrected by a tourist map, 
a mapping area that was reinforced by somebody on the ground. They said 
they had assets on the ground. Was the asset on the ground drunk? What 
kind of operation is this?

[[Page H3136]]

  And when are we, as American people first of all, going to get to see 
what the budget is? But more important than that, an independent 
commission to revamp it? And before that happens, there should not be a 
single additional penny spent. Throwing money at the CIA is certainly 
not going to solve the problem. And money is not the problem. They have 
far more than they need right now.
  My colleagues will recall several years ago that the CIA accountants 
lost $4 billion in their budget. They could not find out where $4 
billion had gone. They just could not. We know it was not spent. They 
lost it and kept applying for, of course, new funds every year. And we 
never got a full explanation as to what happened to lose $4 billion in 
the budget of the CIA.
  So we very much need to have a better accounting of this life-and-
death powerful agency. The incompetence is deadly. The incompetence of 
the CIA is deadly. The incompetence of the CIA is such that it destroys 
the foreign policies of the United States.
  My constituents were all in favor of supporting the President on the 
actions taken against Slobodan Milosevic. But now, the war has been 
conducted in such a sloppy manner. And with the Chinese Embassy 
bombing, there seems to be a turnaround in public opinion in my area 
because they do not want to be a part of anything that is as sloppy as 
this, a life-and-death operation, that tells us that they bombed an 
embassy that has been existing for several years because the maps were 
not correct.
  The CIA should be revamped, and we should start with all new people 
in the intelligence community. If intelligence community means members 
of the committee, then maybe members of the committee ought to take a 
hard look at themselves and say, we need some fresher voices. If the 
committees in the House and the Senate are going to be advocates for 
the CIA, we need an objective committee that will be an oversight 
committee to really look at the CIA and revamp the CIA. But, certainly, 
do not spend an additional dime on the CIA until that happens.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, not only the United States, but I truly believe this is 
a very, very dangerous world. I believe, from my experience, that it is 
even more so than during the Cold War.
  Sandy Berger, with the CIA, told me that their assets around the 
world are spread very, very thin. I think one of our biggest threats is 
terrorist threats, not only in the United States but abroad. And he 
said their assets are not adequate to do that. Whether it is gaining 
information to protect our embassies, whether it is terrorist 
movements, whether it is just gathering intelligence on China or 
Russia, or whatever, those assets are spread very thin.
  Sandy Berger also told us that, with Kosovo, with those assets so 
thin, that they are having to draw those intelligence assets to Kosovo, 
which leaves us very, very vulnerable. And, in his words he said, an 
attack from Osama bin Laden was imminent. To me, that means fairly 
quick.
  It grieves me that we are in the situation that we are in right now 
in Kosovo. But the last thing we need to do is cut our intelligence. It 
means life and death, not only for the people here in the United 
States.
  Let me give my colleagues a good example. In Vietnam, we had 
intelligence in a place just south of Hanoi that said there were no 
surface-to-air missiles there. We lost four airplanes because of faulty 
intelligence.
  And when my colleague talked about the maps, I agree with him. But I 
went and looked at the map that they are using. Do my colleagues know 
what is in the map where the Chinese Embassy was? A vacant lot. And we 
cannot lie to the American people. We cannot spin things to make 
ourselves look good, either. That is wrong.
  I would ask my colleagues to go over and look at the maps that they 
were using where the Chinese Embassy was. It was a vacant lot. So this 
is the kind of information we need, not to destroy. We have a military 
force and we have a foreign policy and we have the protection of the 
United States, the national security of this country. They are all tied 
together.
  The intelligence we get enables us to direct our foreign policy, our 
foreign policy, using the vehicle of the military and enables us to 
stay safe and it enables our military to stay safe. And I feel from the 
bottom of my heart, with my experience, that to cut the intelligence 
budget is cutting the lifeline of the American people in our military. 
That is why I would oppose the amendment of the gentleman.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding.
  Let me ask my colleague a question: Does he believe that it is a 
question of funding that our intelligence people did not know where the 
Chinese Embassy was? Is this a question of putting billions of dollars 
more into the CIA? Or is this gross mismanagement of the process?
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I think probably 
both.
  I would say to the gentleman from Vermont, when we have people that 
are spread so thin, it is like many of us in our offices where they 
give us more to do and we cannot keep up with all that we have got to 
do, there are things that slip through the crack. When we have limited 
assets and we are trying to do things in an ad hoc way which, in my 
opinion, and I agree with the gentleman, it has not been planned well, 
and when we are doing these ad hoc and we are making these decisions 
and we have got people picking these targets to do that and the 
oversight was disastrous.
  So, yes, it is because of a lack of personnel, which was also caused 
by a lack of budget to hire people. That would be my answer to the 
gentleman. And I feel strongly. I am not being partisan with this. I 
believe it with all my heart.
  And please, look at what our military is going through right now, I 
mean we are running them into the ground, and the assets of the 
intelligence agency, both the service intelligence, the CIA, and the 
FBI. Although, I believe that in many cases it is defunct in certain 
areas. But please do not cut those assets, because it is a lifeline for 
us here in the United States and our military, as well.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, this is what the public knows about the total aggregate 
budget of our intelligence agencies. We are told somehow this figure 
needs to be kept secret.
  What solace would U.S. enemies or potential enemies abroad take from 
knowing that we lavish more money on our intelligence agencies than the 
entire gross national product of their countries and many of our other 
enemies combined around the world? None. They would probably be scared 
to death to think of the amount of money we are spending. It is kept 
secret for a reason. It is kept secret because of the extraordinary 
waste and incompetence.
  We had some discussion just now about the lack of human intelligence. 
They are right. They are lavishing so many billions on geegaws and 
satellites and things that bring down so much data that is never, ever 
to be analyzed because there are not humans there to analyze it. They 
do not have people. They do not have agents.
  They are wasting tens of millions, hundreds of millions, billions of 
dollars annually on these things instead of investing in agents and 
intelligence.

                              {time}  1315

  A much smaller, more effective post-cold war, post-gadgetry type 
intelligence service could serve our Nation well.
  The failings have been well documented, but I want to go into this 
most extraordinary recent failing for a moment. These are maps which I 
obtained through the Congressional Research Service, whose budget for 
an annual basis is equivalent to about one day's spending of our 
intelligence services. They were able to provide the maps. They 
provided two maps, in fact, where the Chinese embassy used to be and 
where the Chinese embassy is now. It is about four miles apart.
  The gentleman before me really puzzled me because he said we targeted 
an empty lot. We have already admitted we targeted a building and blew 
it up. We did not target an empty lot. And it

[[Page H3137]]

just happened to be the Chinese embassy. Maybe they did not have access 
to the same database as CRS even though CRS has a budget a tiny 
fraction of theirs, but they certainly did have a map.
  They could have accessed the Yugoslav web site. Maybe they thought it 
was disinformation, but they have a web site for tourists, and on the 
web site they have the new address of the Chinese embassy which my 
staff pulled down from the World Wide Web. Certainly, they have 486 
computers and modems at these intelligence agencies. Or maybe we do not 
allow them to have those because we have wasted so much money on these 
extraordinary spy systems flying around up there in space that provide 
very little benefit to us.
  The funny thing to me is, my colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle, as soon as we have an extraordinary failing of our intelligence 
agencies, say this proves the case for more money. Many of the same 
people stand up in the floor of this House and say the education system 
of the United States is failing our children. Do they say that needs 
more money? I think it needs more money for smaller class size. No, 
they say it needs to be reformed, dismantled, reorganized, vouchered, 
everything but more money for education. But when it comes to the 
failings of our intelligence services, the only answer, the answer 
every time is more money, more money, more money, more billions.
  Why? Why not apply that same critical viewpoint, that same scrutiny 
to these agencies? Why not reveal the budget to the light of day? There 
is nothing in the Constitution that provides for hiding this budget. It 
is not a national security issue. It is a national waste and 
incompetence issue that is being kept from the American people. It is 
being kept from Members of Congress.
  Yes, I could go upstairs and read all that stuff. That is great. But 
the minute I came to the floor of the House I could not talk about it. 
I would be crippled to talk about the waste. If I actually had facts 
about the waste, I could not use them. If I had the actual aggregate 
number, I could not use it.
  So we have to come here and have this absurd debate every year 
because we are covering up an incompetent number of bureaucracies and 
disasters, and we have a bunch of people who are on a little committee 
who go into a room and exert some light degree of scrutiny and are even 
stonewalled at times by the agencies.
  It is time for a major overhaul of these intelligence services 
because of the major failings, from the most recent failings here at 
the Chinese embassy back to being unable to predict the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the invasion of Kuwait, the explosion of nuclear weapons 
by India, failing after failing after failing. There is no other part 
of the government where Congress would take it, lay down and say, 
``Here is more money. Waste it.''
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Sanders-Stark-
DeFazio amendment to freeze the Intelligence Budget at the 1998 level 
of spending.
  Without openness regarding the level of intelligence spending, there 
is no accountability.
  Without full accountability, I am not prepared to increase funds for 
intelligence.
  On Saturday, May 8, the U.S. bombed the Beijing embassy in Belgrade. 
The blame is being placed on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for 
using an outdated map. Now, China is breaking off diplomatic ties with 
the U.S. on human rights and arms control.
  Many of my colleagues will attribute this fatal error--killing three 
Chinese journalists and wounding twenty other people--to shortfalls in 
intelligence spending on maps. However, in truth, this mistake was made 
by human error and the bombing should not be used as an excuse to spend 
more.
  There is no reason for the Intelligence Budget to be classified 
information. How can we justify a multi-billion blank check every year 
without disclosure of that amount to the American taxpayer?
  If this Congress is serious about saving Social Security and 
Medicare, we should not throw money into an unaccountable hole. Since 
almost all of the intelligence spending is hidden within the defense 
budget, we are misled about the real amount of intelligence spending 
through false line items in the defense budget. We must have budget 
integrity.
  The media, without compromising national security, routinely 
estimates the intelligence budget. When the government keeps this open 
secret clandestinely hidden, the American public grows increasingly 
cynical about their government.
  The Cold War is over. The specter of Communism no longer lurks on the 
horizon. While we face new challenges in this new age, the Intelligence 
community must share in the burden of fiscal accountability and 
discipline. I support the Sanders-Stark-DeFazio Amendment to freeze the 
Intelligence Authorization spending at the Fiscal Year 1998 level.
  Reports show that the U.S. spends more than twice the combined 
Intelligence budgets of our supposed hostile nations--North Korea, 
Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and Cuba. It is also more than the 
Intelligence budgets of the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and 
Canada combined.
  Where has all of this secrecy gotten us?
  We bombed a Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three and wounding 
others.
  We flew into a gondola in Italy, killing 20 unsuspecting civilians.
  And we destroyed a weapons and nerve facility in Iraq causing Gulf 
War illness in our military personnel serving in the Persian Gulf.
  The American taxpayer deserves to know what mistakes the CIA made and 
how they will be corrected. The Sanders-Stark-DeFazio Amendment calls 
for a CIA report on the accidents that have occurred over the past 
decade.
  I cannot, in good conscience, allow any type of spending increase 
when mistakes in U.S. Intelligence occur far too often and endanger 
innocent lives.
  For these tragedies, I urge my colleagues to support the Sanders-
Stark-DeFazio amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), as amended.
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 167, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), 
as amended, will be postponed.
  Are there further amendments to the bill?


                 Amendment No. 13 Offered by Ms. Waters

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 13 offered by Ms. Waters:
       At the end, add the following new title:

     TITLE VI--PROHIBITION ON DRUG TRAFFICKING BY EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                         INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. 601. PROHIBITION ON DRUG TRAFFICKING BY EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Purposes.--It is the purpose of this section--
       (1) to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency and other 
     intelligence agencies and their employees and agents from 
     participating in drug trafficking activities, including the 
     manufacture, purchase, sale, transport, or distribution of 
     illegal drugs; conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs; and 
     arrangements to transport illegal drugs; and
       (2) to require the employees and agents of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to report 
     known or suspected drug trafficking activities to the 
     appropriate authorities.
       (b) Prohibition on Drug Trafficking.--No element of the 
     intelligence community, or any employee of such an element, 
     may knowingly encourage or participate in drug trafficking 
     activities.
       (c) Mandate to Report.--Any employee of an element of the 
     intelligence community having knowledge of facts or 
     circumstances that reasonably indicate that any employee of 
     such element is involved with any drug trafficking 
     activities, or other violations of United States drug laws, 
     shall report such knowledge or facts to the appropriate 
     official.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) Drug trafficking activities.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``drug trafficking activities'' 
     means the possession, distribution, manufacture, cultivation, 
     sale, transfer, or the attempt or conspiracy to possess, 
     distribute, manufacture, cultivate, sell or transfer illegal 
     drugs (as those terms are applied under section 404(c) of the 
     Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 844(c)).
       (B) Inclusions.--Such term includes arrangements to allow 
     the use of federally owned or leased vehicles, or other means 
     of transportation, for the transport of illegal drugs.
       (2) Illegal drugs.--The term ``illegal drugs'' means 
     controlled substances (as that term is defined section 102(6) 
     of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)) included 
     in schedule I or II under part B of title II of such Act.

[[Page H3138]]

       (3) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual 
     employed by an element of the intelligence community, and 
     includes the following individuals:
       (A) Employees under a contract with such an element.
       (B) Covert agents, as that term is defined in paragraph (4) 
     of section 606 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 426).
       (C) An individual acting on behalf, or with the approval, 
     of an element of the intelligence community.
       (4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term under paragraph 
     (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a).
       (5) Appropriate official.--The term ``appropriate 
     official'' means the Attorney General, the Inspector General 
     of the element of the intelligence community (if any), or the 
     head of such element.

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of my amendment to H.R. 
1555, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2000.
  My amendment prohibits the employees of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the CIA, and other intelligence agencies, from participating in 
drug trafficking activities. My amendment clearly defines drug 
trafficking activities to include the manufacture, the purchase, the 
sale, the transport or distribution of illegal drugs and conspiracy to 
traffic in illegal drugs. My amendment also requires CIA employees and 
covert agents to report known or suspected drug trafficking activities 
to the appropriate authorities.
  Most Americans would assume that the CIA would never traffic in 
illegal drugs and would take all necessary actions to prosecute known 
drug traffickers. History, however, has proven that this is not the 
case. For 13 years, the CIA and the Department of Justice followed a 
memorandum of understanding that explicitly exempted the CIA from 
requirements to report drug trafficking by CIA assets, agents and 
contractors to Federal law enforcement agencies. This allowed some of 
the biggest drug lords in the world to operate without fear that their 
activities would be reported to the Drug Enforcement Agency or other 
law enforcement authorities. This remarkable and secret agreement was 
in force from February of 1982 until August of 1995.
  I have been investigating the allegations of drug trafficking by the 
Nicaraguan Contras during the 1980s. My investigation has led me to the 
conclusion that the United States intelligence agencies knew full well 
about drug trafficking by the Contras in south central Los Angeles and 
throughout the United States and chose to continue to support the 
Contras without taking any action to stop the drug trafficking.
  Last year, the CIA Inspector General released a report of 
investigation on drug trafficking by the Contras which confirms 
allegations of CIA knowledge of and support for drug trafficking in the 
United States by the Contras. The report provides extensive details of 
the evidence available to the CIA regarding drug trafficking by Contra 
rebels and their supporters.
  Even more remarkable is the fact that there is evidence that the CIA 
was actually participating in drug trafficking activities. In the late 
1980s, the CIA began to develop intelligence on Colombian drug cartels. 
To infiltrate the cartels, the CIA arranged an undercover drug 
smuggling operation with the Venezuelan National Guard. More than 1.5 
tons of cocaine were smuggled from Colombia to Venezuela and then 
stored in a CIA-financed Counternarcotics Intelligence Center in 
Venezuela. The Center's commander and the CIA's agent in Venezuela was 
General Ramon Guillen, who was also the head of the anti-drug unit of 
the Venezuelan National Guard.
  Now we know that, in certain circumstances, the Drug Enforcement 
Agency arranges controlled shipments of illegal drugs in which the 
drugs are allowed to enter the United States, then tracked to their 
destination and seized. However, the CIA was more interested in keeping 
the drug lords happy than confiscating the drugs and prosecuting the 
traffickers.
  The CIA asked the DEA for permission to let the dope walk, that is, 
allow the drugs to be sold on our Nation's streets. The DEA refused 
them, turned them down flat. But the CIA ushered this shipment of drugs 
into the United States, and it got lost on the streets of New York and 
south central Los Angeles and in our neighborhoods and our communities. 
The CIA let the drugs walk into our communities.
  On November 19, 1990, part of that shipment, 800 pounds of cocaine, 
was seized by the U.S. Customs Service at the Miami International 
Airport. Customs traced the cocaine right back to the Venezuelan 
National Guard and General Guillen and the CIA. General Guillen's top 
civilian aide, Adolfo Romero Gomez, was convicted of conspiracy to 
possess and distribute cocaine in September of 1997.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Waters) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Ms. Waters was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, on December 10, 1997, he was sentenced to 
almost 20 years in prison. Federal prosecutors have also charged 
General Guillen with a broad conspiracy to smuggle up to 22 tons of 
cocaine through Venezuela to the United States and Europe while he was 
head of the anti-drug unit of the Venezuelan National Guard between 
1988 and 1992. Since Venezuela does not extradite its citizens, General 
Guillen is still at large.
  We may never know precisely how much cocaine entered the United 
States through the CIA's pipeline or how much eventually reached our 
Nation's streets. No one at the CIA was ever charged.
  The CIA should not be allowed to bring cocaine or other illegal drugs 
into our country. Intelligence agencies should be working to stop the 
harmful trafficking in illegal drugs that is destroying our 
communities. They should not be assisting the drug traffickers.
  I urge my colleagues to support this very reasonable amendment to 
stop the drugs that are used in covert operations from seeing their way 
into our cities and our towns. I ask for an ``aye'' vote on my 
amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  As I understand the gentlewoman's amendment, it would prohibit the 
engagement in any illegal drug activity by employees, agents or other 
sources of the CIA. Is that essentially correct?
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. WATERS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I obviously support wholeheartedly the spirit 
of that. I think that, in fact, it is already a fact, that it is 
against the law for employees, agents or sources of the CIA to break 
the law, as it should be.
  The only problem I have with the gentlewoman's amendment is one I 
think we can resolve very easily, and that is the definition of what an 
employee is, whether or not it perhaps is so broad that in some 
unanticipated or unintended way it actually could limit the 
intelligence community's efforts to wage war on those involved in 
illegal narcotic trafficking and illegal drug activity. I know that the 
gentlewoman would not want that.
  With that one simple reservation, I would be simply in a position to 
accept the amendment, certainly in the spirit it is offered, and join 
the gentlewoman in saying very obviously we would not tolerate in any 
way any incidents, and we will seek out, as the gentlewoman has 
suggested, any reports we have about wrongdoing in the areas of illegal 
drug activity by not just the CIA but anybody in the intelligence 
community over which we have oversight authority.
  Having said that, I would also point out that actually some progress 
has been made by the committee since last year we had this 
conversation, and we do have some reporting, and we will soon have some 
more on some of these matters of interest to the gentlewoman.
  I will accept the amendment subject to those remarks.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment and in particular 
section 2 which says it requires the employees and agents of the 
Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to report 
known or suspected drug traffickers' activities to the appropriate 
authorities. Clearly, in the past and based on the CIA Inspector 
General's public report on this matter there has been a mixed record as 
it relates to the reporting of suspected drug

[[Page H3139]]

activities. I think that this amendment perhaps would go a long way 
toward clearing up that ambiguity, although the CIA has taken effective 
steps to correct past problems in this area.
  I agree with the chairman of the committee as it relates to the 
definition of ``employees,'' and we accept the amendment on the 
minority side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


                  Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Engel

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman referring to amendment No. 3?
  Mr. ENGEL. Yes.
  The CHAIRMAN. Title III was closed. The gentleman will need to 
proceed with unanimous consent to designate the amendment.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that we proceed with 
the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, and I will not 
object, I wish to explain why I will not object.
  I respect the gentleman from New York. He has worked hard and means 
well to bring forward a meaningful amendment. It is an amendment in 
fact which I think I am prepared to accept if I understand it properly.

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. Chairman, given the technicalities of this particular rule for 
this particular subject for this particular permanent select committee, 
I think that there is a little extra work involved for our members, and 
we try and bend over backwards to accommodate our members, and it is in 
that spirit that I am not going to object.
  Equally, I am very mindful that this year the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dixon) specifically asked if we could have as much time 
as possible so every member would be able to be fully lined up, and as 
a courtesy to my ranking member, I am prepared not to object.
  Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) may offer 
amendment No. 3.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Engel:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report (in both classified and unclassified form) on the 
     organized resistance in Kosovo known as Kosovo Liberation 
     Army. The report shall include the following:
       (1) A summary of the history of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
       (2) As of the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (A) the number of individuals currently participating in or 
     supporting combat operations of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
     (fielded forces), and the number of individuals in training 
     for such service (recruits);
       (B) the types, and quantity of each type, of weapon 
     employed by the Kosovo Liberation Army, the training afforded 
     to such fielded forces in the use of such weapons, and the 
     sufficiency of such training to conduct effective military 
     operations; and
       (C) minimum additional weaponry and training required to 
     improve substantially the efficacy of such military 
     operations.
       (3) An estimate of the percentage of funding (if any) of 
     the Kosovo Liberation Army that is attributable to profits 
     from the sale of illicit narcotics.
       (4) a description of the involvement (if any) of the Kosovo 
     Liberation Army in terrorist activities.
       (5) A description of the number of killings of noncombatant 
     civilians (if any) carried out by the Kosovo Liberation Army 
     since its formation.
       (6) A description of the leadership of the Kosovo 
     Liberation Army, including an analysis of--
       (A) the political philosophy and program of the leadership; 
     and
       (B) the sentiment of the leadership toward the United 
     States.
       (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--As used in this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means the Committee on International Relations and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to thank the chairman of 
the committee, my classmate, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss); we 
came to Congress the same year together; and the ranking member, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for their kindness, and I rise to 
offer this amendment which is very, very simple.
  I was at a speech that the President gave this morning on the current 
hostilities in Yugoslavia, and the President said that he feels very 
strongly that we must stay the course and must put an end to the ethnic 
cleansing and the atrocities being committed. I concur wholeheartedly. 
I think it is very important that we do that.
  Mr. Chairman, I have a bill which I am sponsoring along with my 
colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford) which 
provides money to arm and train the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army. It 
is identical to the McConnell-Lieberman bill which is in the Senate, 
and I believe very strongly about it because I think that in order for 
the bombing to be successful we need to have a counterbalance on the 
ground, and the Kosovo Liberation Army is right now the only 
counterbalance to the Serb atrocities on the ground, and I think that 
in Bosnia, when we had the bombing, we had the Croatian Army on the 
ground to help, and I think it would be helpful for us to arm and trade 
and aid the Kosovo Liberation Army.
  There have been a series of reports in papers talking about the 
Kosovo Liberation Army, and they have unidentified sources, I think, of 
dubious veracity saying all kinds of negative things about the Kosovo 
Liberation Army. In my discussions with people, with the intelligence 
community and others, there seems to be no substantiation whatsoever 
about negatives being put forward trying to, I believe, smear the 
Kosovo Liberation Army.
  So I think it would be very helpful, and what my amendment does is it 
says that not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
this act the director of the CIA shall submit to Congress, to the 
appropriate congressional committees, both in classified and 
unclassified form, everything it knows on the organized resistance in 
Kosovo known as the Kosovo Liberation Army. The report shall include a 
summary of the history of the KLA, the number of individuals currently 
participating in or supporting combat operations of the KLA, the types 
and quantity of each type of weapons that they have, minimum additional 
weaponry and training required to improve substantially the efficacy of 
such military operations.
  Talking about the smears, and I believe they are smears and there is 
no substantiation to them, but I want to know that somehow or other 
there are members participating in terrorist activities or illicit 
narcotics. Again, there seems to be no scintilla of evidence, but I 
think it is important that we know a description of their leadership, 
their political philosophy, and the sentiment of their leadership 
towards the United States and other things that are relative. I think 
that that would go a long way in helping this Congress to understand 
what the KLA is, and who they are and whether or not it will help us to 
decide whether or not to help them.
  Again, Mr. Chairman, I think that they are a force on the ground in 
opposition to the Serb atrocities of ethnic cleansing, and I believe we 
should aid them, and that is simply what my amendment does.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Engel) for his efforts in this area. Obviously this is a pathway 
the oversight committee has already started down, and I believe the 
amendment is supportive to interests that we all have. The purpose of 
the intelligence community is to provide the best possible factual 
information we can get on

[[Page H3140]]

a timely basis for our decision makers. We have to make some very tough 
decisions involving this part of the world these days, and I cannot see 
anything but good coming out of having the right information at the 
right time.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment takes us that way, and I wish 
I knew more about all of the things that the gentleman is speaking 
about, I think we all wish that, but I think that trying to get that 
information is exactly the right thing for us to be doing.
  Mr. Chairman, I will be supporting the gentleman's amendment.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, we have no problem with the amendment on the 
minority side. Be glad to accept it also.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


           Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Sanders, As Amended

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), 
as amended, on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 68, 
noes 343, not voting 22, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 129]

                                AYES--68

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Conyers
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Duncan
     Evans
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Hilliard
     Holt
     Hooley
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Luther
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Minge
     Mink
     Nadler
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Ramstad
     Rivers
     Rohrabacher
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Woolsey
     Wu

                               NOES--343

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeGette
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Larson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--22

     Becerra
     Brown (CA)
     Cardin
     Coyne
     Doggett
     Gephardt
     Greenwood
     Jefferson
     Kleczka
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Matsui
     McDermott
     Miller, George
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Neal
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Slaughter
     Tanner
     Thurman

                              {time}  1357

  Messrs. GANSKE, BAIRD and WATT of North Carolina, Ms. PRYCE of Ohio, 
Mrs. KELLY, and Mrs. MEEK of Florida changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  Mr. ROHRABACHER and Ms. STABENOW changed their vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment, as amended, was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained and could not be 
here to vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont 
(Mr. Sanders) to the Intelligence Authorization Appropriation. If I had 
been present, I would have voted no.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I missed the vote today (rollcall No. 
129) on the Sanders amendment to freeze all Intelligence spending at 
the FY 1999 level because I was in a meeting with the President. If I 
had been here, I would have voted against it.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there other amendments to the bill?
  If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

                              {time}  1400

  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Camp) having assumed the chair, Mr. LaTourette, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1555) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to 
House Resolution 167, he reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.

[[Page H3141]]

  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read 
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the 
table.

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