[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 65 (Thursday, May 6, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2910-H2917]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PEACEFULLY RESOLVING THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of
January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is
recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my
colleagues for holding some time while I ran over from Rayburn. I was
expecting that the other side would offer a special order, and I did
want to make sure that we took this special out this evening, and I am
happy that my good friend from Nevada is going to be joining us as we
review, Mr. Speaker, the past 4 weeks and actually 5 weeks and discuss
an effort by this Congress to move the process involving Kosovo to a
new level and a new direction, and that is to try to find a way to
solve the situation peacefully.
Mr. Speaker, it was actually a little bit over 4 weeks ago, the week
of April 6, when Russian friends of mine who I have been involved with
for the past 5 years in a formal Duma-Congress relationship called me
at my home and asked if I would be open to some ideas about engaging
with them to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis. They were
calling me for several reasons.
One, they said they had, the Russians had been shut out of the
process by our government in terms of working with them once the
bombing campaign began, that there had been no overture on the part of
our State Department or our administration to involve Russia, but
rather our administration in the minds of the Russians had become
convinced that they could solve the problem of the ethnic cleansing in
Serbia by bombing and bombing in a massive way.
The second reason they called, Mr. Speaker, was because these pro-
western leaders in Russia were concerned. They saw their country
heading down the wrong path. In fact, they cited examples of evidence
that Russia had become much more anti-American than at any point in
time that they had seen since the days of the Soviet communist regime.
In fact, they said that Americans were now being told not to speak
English on the streets of Russia, that the Duma had canceled all
activities interconnecting with America, cancelling all conferences.
The Harvard University Study Group that goes on every year was
canceled. The initiative to involve exchanges of staffers was canceled.
Every possible contact between us and Russia had been severed, not just
because of the bombing but because of our administration's refusal to
work with Russia in a proactive way.
In fact, as I mentioned earlier today, Mr. Speaker, a Duma member was
here in this Capitol building, and he said something very interesting:
that for decades and decades the Soviet Communist Party had spent
billions of dollars to try to convince the Russian people that America
was bad, that we were a Nation that was filled with hate and that
Russia should not in the end want to be friends with, and he went on to
say that the Soviet Communist Party failed. All the money they spent,
all the activities they engaged in could not convince the Russian
people that America was evil or that America was not a nation of the
highest standards.
And he went on to say today that in just 45 days this President has
done what the Soviet Communist party could not do in decades and
decades of attempts, and that is because of the Kosovo crisis, because
of the incessant bombing of the people of Serbia; because of the lack
of involvement of Russia, the Russian people had turned against
America, and that the polls were showing that Russians all over that
nation now see America in their minds and in their eyes in a negative
way.
What they have told us is that if we continue this policy, we are
going to push Russia right into the hands of the communists and the
ultra nationalists who want to revert back to the Cold War days when
America was the enemy.
Russia has elections scheduled for this year, Mr. Speaker, and the
Russians that are friends of ours, the pro-Western forces, are saying
if you continue the policies that you are currently pursuing, you will
defeat us in the election and you will end up with the Duma, a
federation council and a president who are anti-American, who are anti-
West and who will turn toward the Middle Eastern, in many cases the
rogue states.
That is not what we want, Mr. Speaker.
So when the Russians called me 5 weeks ago at home, I said, ``Send me
what you would like us to pursue.'' They sent me a simple document that
contained three ideas.
The first one was that Russia should accept responsibility for
helping to stop the ethnic cleansing, and they called it ethnic
cleansing.
Number two, that Milosevic had to come to grips with the NATO
requirements. The only problem Russia had with that was that they felt
U.S. and British troops on the ground would not be appropriate, since
America and Britain were the primary bombers that were persecuting the
raids over Serbia.
And, number three, that there be a commission established between the
Congress and the Duma to oversee any agreement that would be reached.
Now, Mr. Speaker, that was a simple plan, but as I looked at it, I
said, ``You know, it's something we can build on.'' So I took that
document. Not wanting to work outside of our government, I wrote up a
memo.
I first of all called the White House and talked to Leon Fuerth, the
top security adviser to Vice President Gore, and I said, ``Mr. Fuerth,
this is what the Russians have done. You know of my involvement with
them. I want to send you a copy of their proposal, and I want to let
you know I am going to work with them quietly.''
He and I suggested that I follow up that call with Carlos Pascual
from the National Security Council who focuses on Russian issues. I
called him. I faxed him the same memo.
In that first week of April I told no Republican what I was doing,
but I kept our government informed.
Over the weekend we had additional calls.
The following week I decided to brief the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet. I let him know that I had been contacted,
what my response was and that I had told the Russians that I was
supportive of the five points that NATO had eventually come to put into
writing and the administration's approach, that I was willing to work
with them to try to find a peaceful solution.
Also that week, Mr. Speaker, which was the week of August or April
13, I contacted two Democrat colleagues in this body: the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Murtha). Congressman Hoyer is my cochair on the Russian Duma-Congress
Initiative, he is very well respected by the administration, and he is
a good friend of mine who I trust. Congressman Murtha, also a good
friend, is a key person that the administration relies on.
I asked the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from
Maryland to talk to the administration, to talk to Strobe Talbott and
talk to the White House and let them know what I was doing, and they
both did that, and they told me they did. The gentleman from Maryland
talked to Strobe Talbott, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania talked to
the White House.
Also that week, Mr. Speaker, I approached three other Democrats in
this body: the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Blagojevich) because of his
Serbian background and ethnic ties; the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr.
Abercrombie) who had just returned from Kosovo; and the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Hinchey) who had gone with me to Moscow in December.
So during the second week of this process I contacted no Republicans
but again focused on the other party and the administration, trying to
find common ground.
At the end of that week, Mr. Speaker, I called the State Department
and
[[Page H2911]]
talked at length two times to Steve Sestanovich, who is in charge of
Russian affairs within the State Department. I talked to his assistant
from my home, Andre Lewis, who had traveled with a delegation that I
chaired to Moscow in early December of last year. I briefed them on
what had happened and told them that I was trying to work out an idea
that the Russians had brought to my attention because of their
frustration in seeing that the administration had cut off contact with
Russia in trying to solve the Kosovo conflict peacefully.
Mr. Speaker, besides talking to Sestanovich and Andre Lewis and all
of the others that I mentioned earlier, I decided to challenge the
Russians because they asked me to bring a bipartisan delegation to meet
with them when they travel to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. I said:
Give me that in writing. Give me the request on your official
letterhead. Tell me who the colleagues will be from the Russian side
that we will interact with. Give me the written time and date of the
meeting with Milosevic. Give me an understanding and a commitment that
we will meet with our POWs, who up until this point in time had not
been talked to by anyone, even the Red Cross. And commit to me that you
will go to a refugee camp of our choosing to see the pain and suffering
brought forward by Milosevic.
Mr. Speaker, the Russians agreed to all five points. They wrote to
me. First, Deputy Speaker Ryshkov and now chairman of Chernomyrdin's
political faction, Nosh Dom, Our Home is Russia, wrote to me a very
personal letter, and he asked me to get formally involved. Again, Mr.
Speaker, I did not go to my Republican colleagues. I went to my
Democrat friend and colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer),
and I said, ``Can you help me get a meeting with the White House? Can
you help me get a meeting with Sandy Berger so I can run this idea by
him?''
I called Sandy Berger three times, Mr. Speaker. He never had the
courtesy to return my phone call. So I asked again the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) if he would work with me to get a meeting with
Strobe Talbott. He said, ``Call Talbott. He will return your call and
you'll get a meeting.''
{time} 2045
This was Thursday, Mr. Speaker, April 23. Strobe Talbott said I will
meet with you today.
I said I want to bring the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) with
me. I picked the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) up. We drove down
to the State Department and for 90 minutes we met with Strobe Talbott
and three of his top deputies.
We went over with him the offer of the Russians to come to Budapest
to achieve a dialogue of understanding based on those first three
principles; then the drive together on a bus to Belgrade, where at 1:00
on that following Monday we would have a face-to-face meeting with
Milosevic; we would have lunch with our POWs and travel to a refugee
camp so the Russians would see the horror that Milosevic has
perpetrated on the Kosovar people.
After the meeting, Strobe Talbott said, I have concerns about what
you want to do but I will talk to the Secretary of State and Sandy
Berger. Two hours later that evening, Thursday, April 23, Strobe
Talbott called back and said, you can do what you want as a citizen, we
cannot stop you, but our advice is that you should not travel to
Belgrade.
I said to him if my government says we should not go, I will not be a
renegade. I will call the Russians and tell them that we are not coming
to meet with them, and I did.
That was a very upsetting telephone call to the Russians because they
had also arranged for one of Milosevic's top aides, Dragomir Karic, to
meet with us and drive with us to Belgrade. Karic is a very successful
businessman in Belgrade, in Russia. His companies employ 64,000. He
owns a TV station in Serbia. He owns a bank. He owns extensive
companies. He is not a member of the government but is a key financial
supporter and a close personal friend of Milosevic and his wife. He was
going to be the person who accompanied us into Belgrade for these
meetings.
When we were turned down by our government, I told the Russians that
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) had suggested that we have
another meeting in a neutral site, and the State Department, through
Strobe Talbott, agreed and thought that would be a good idea. So I told
the Russians that weekend that they should plan a trip to a neutral
city, and they said we will go to Vienna on April the 30; Vienna,
Austria.
Then Monday of last week, Mr. Speaker, I developed a 3-page letter
which I sent to all 435 Members of the House. That 3-page letter
documented everything I had been doing, including the fact that I had
not involved the Republicans because I did not want our friends on the
minority side and the administration to say somehow we were doing
something partisan or that somehow we were doing something that was
less than honorable or that somehow we were doing something to
embarrass the President. No one could say that. In fact, no one can say
that today.
That letter went out to every Member and I invited every Member of
this body to join with me and with others in trying to find a
bipartisan solution to the Kosovo crisis that would end the bombing and
end the hostility.
On Tuesday and Wednesday evening of last week, we had meetings with
Members of Congress. We sat together and we talked. A number of us at
our Republican Conference on Wednesday asked our leadership not to have
the votes on Thursday, because we felt they would be too confusing to
have votes about whether or not to declare war or whether or not to
withdraw the troops.
We asked our leadership to postpone those votes until this week. We
were not successful, because the gentleman who offered that resolution,
the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), wanted to have the votes
on that day, which, in fact, is a requirement of the War Powers
resolution.
In fact, I went to the Committee on Rules that night at 10:30 and
asked the Committee on Rules to consider a motion to be made in order
to allow me to table the votes until this week so we could meet with
the Russians to see if there was some possibility of common ground.
We were not successful in that attempt. The votes occurred, and all
day Thursday I sought to get the approval for a plane to take a
delegation to Vienna.
Working with colleagues like my friend, the gentleman from Nevada
(Mr. Gibbons), we got the approval and at 6:00 last Thursday evening,
11 Members of Congress got on an airplane that holds 12 people. We flew
all night and we arrived in Vienna the next morning.
That delegation, Mr. Speaker, included the most liberal Members of
this body, including now a good friend of mine, the gentleman from
Vermont (Mr. Sanders), our only socialist and independent; Democrats
who support the President, like the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Hinchey) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Brown); Democrats who
have been concerned about the President's policy, like the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) and the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr.
Abercrombie) and 5 Republican Members who ranged from moderate to the
very right in terms of the political spectrum, like the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Pitts).
Eleven of us traveled to Vienna overnight. We had discussions on the
way over about what our approach would be. I briefed them on the
backgrounds of the Russian delegates. I told them what we would hope to
accomplish, and we reached agreement.
When we arrived in Vienna at 8:30 in the morning on Friday, we went
right to our hotel. We had just enough time to change and we proceeded
to go to the state house of Austria, where we had a meeting for an hour
and a half with the chairman or the speaker of the Austrian parliament.
We wanted to get a feel for what Austria, an independent, nonaligned
nation, would think about the Kosovo crisis and the bombing and the
ethnic cleansing.
After we got the chance to meet with the speaker of that body, we
went to the Russian hotel where the Russian delegates were staying and
we began our meetings.
[[Page H2912]]
Mr. Speaker, in those meetings, besides the 11 Members of Congress
representing Republicans and Democrats, I invited a State Department
employee, who works in the Russian desk, who works for Stestanovich,
Andre Lewis, to sit with us at our meetings, not to be a participant
because this was a legislative session, but to listen to what we were
saying so that no one could misconstrue our approach, our methodology
and our process.
He sat through every meeting and every dinner and every breakfast and
session that we had. Along with the Russians and along with the
Americans, we had Dragomir Karic. He is, as I said earlier, one of the
strongest financial supporters of Milosevic. He was there to advise the
Russians. The Russian delegation included Vladimir Ryshkov who was most
recently the first deputy speaker, number two, in the state Duma, their
parliament. He now is the chairman of a very successful political party
in Russia called Our Home is Russia. In fact, it is the party that
Chernomyrdin is a member of. He is a very close associate of
Chernomyrdin, who was Russia's envoy on the Balkan issue, the Kosovo
issue, and he had had conversations with Chernomyrdin both before and
during the time he arrived in Vienna.
The second member of the Russian side was Vladimir Luhkin, the former
Soviet ambassador to the U.S., a member of the Yabloko, a moderate
faction in the Duma, and also the chairman of the International Affairs
Committee. Luhkin is a very well respected member of the Duma, someone
that Duma deputies look to for advice on foreign affairs and
international issues.
The third representative in the Duma delegation was Alexander
Shapanov. Shapanov represented Seleznyov, the Communist faction, the
largest faction in the state Duma. He was there to bring the broad
coalition of political ideology to the table so that if we reached
agreement it was not just with one faction or with one part of the
government, but actually represented a consensus in Russia of what
should be our approach to solving this problem peacefully.
Along with those three deputies was Segie Konovalenko. Konovalenko,
who is a good friend of mine, is the chief protocol officer for the
Russian Duma who works with all the players in the Duma and all the
political factions in Russia. There are seven major factions in the
Duma. He works with all seven.
In beginning our discussions, Mr. Speaker, I said that we had some
basic premises that we needed to understand. Number one, we were not
representing our government. We were not there as official
representatives of President Clinton, nor were we representing our
State Department. We were parliamentarians, engaging in parliamentary
discussions as we have on numerous times over the past 5 years on a
variety of issues.
The second point was that the five points that NATO had put forth
were the basis of our discussion. We were not deviating from the policy
of this administration. We were building on what President Clinton and
the NATO countries said had to be the basis for a peaceful resolution
of this conflict.
With that in mind, we started our discussions, and for the rest of
Friday every member on both sides had a chance to give their views.
During our discussions, the Russian side, and the representative of
Milosevic, said to us you all have to come with us to Belgrade on this
trip. It is extremely important that you meet with Milosevic. They said
to us, if you come to Belgrade, you will be given one, perhaps two or
possibly three, of our POWs. They will be released if you come to
Belgrade for discussions.
I told our Russian friends, and I told the representative of
Milosevic, that we would not be going to Belgrade; that I had given my
word to Speaker Hastert that our delegation would not go down to
Belgrade because in his conversations with Madeleine Albright they had
agreed that we should not do that. So I told the delegates that could
not be acceptable, but we continued our deliberations.
On Saturday morning, after our staffs worked through the night to
develop the framework of an agreement or a discussion paper, a report
if you will, we met for breakfast. We continued our discussions through
breakfast, stayed in one room in our hotel until we went over every
word in every sentence in the document.
If any one member of the American side or the Russian side objected,
we stopped. It was not a vote. It was where any one member could object
to any one word or phrase we would go back and revisit that until we
reached agreement.
We did that for every line in the document until at 1:00 p.m. Mr.
Speaker, on Saturday, this past Saturday, we reached agreement with our
Russian friends and colleagues.
The agreement, I thought, was somewhat significant, because it was
the first time that Russian leadership acknowledged that there must be
a multinational peace force placed inside of Kosovo, and the Russians
agreed with that. It was the first time that Russian representatives
agreed that Milosevic must remove the armed Serbian military and armed
personnel out of Kosovo, and Russia agreed with that.
It was the first time that Russia allowed the acknowledgment of the
phrase, ethnic cleansing, in a document involving Kosovo, and the
Russian side agreed with that.
It was the first time that an acknowledgment by Russia offered the
opportunity for the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
to determine the makeup of the multinational force. It was a document
that was plain, that was simple, but gave a framework for a peaceful
settlement and negotiation of this crisis.
We did not negotiate. We did not get into how many troops should be
left in Kosovo. We did not get into the makeup of the military force,
because that is the job of our government, but we did agree on a
framework.
We also said that three things must occur simultaneously, without
regard to the order. We said, first of all, the bombing must stop.
Number two, Milosevic must remove all of his armed forces from Kosovo.
Number three, that KLA aggression must also stop. The Russians agreed
to that as well.
When we finished the document about 1:00 in the afternoon, we were
pleased because we had come together as representatives of different
points of views but now deciding on a common agenda to move forward
together that we could take back to our governments as parliamentarians
and encourage them to work on.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, Milosevic's representative, Mr. Karic, took the
document that the Russians gave him and faxed it to Belgrade.
Approximately one half-hour later, Milosevic himself was on the phone
with Dragomir Karic for the third time in our discussions, and he told
Karic that if we came to Belgrade, this delegation of 11 members, if we
went to Belgrade, and they would provide the bus, that was not a
question, it would have been a 7-hour journey down through Budapest
into Belgrade, if we went to Belgrade that two things would happen.
Number one, and this was said to all 11 members in the room at the same
time, at 1:00 on Saturday, we were told all three prisoners of war
would be released to the American delegation.
In addition, Mr. Speaker, we were told, as a group, that Karic felt
100 percent certain that if we went to Belgrade the framework that we
had agreed upon with the Russians would be publicly embraced by
Milosevic. Now, that was certainly something new, Mr. Speaker, in both
regards.
We had not gone to Vienna to talk about the POWs, but this was the
way that Karic was wanting to get us to go to Belgrade.
I thought to myself, this is significant. Even though I have given
the Speaker of the House my word, I have got to check with our State
Department.
So I asked the representative of the State Department who was with
us, Andre Lewis, to call back to Washington, the special ops center for
the State Department, and see what the response would be of his bosses.
He made a call and got on the phone with Steve Stestanovich, who is in
charge of Russian affairs at the State Department. He asked me to get
with him on the phone, and I did.
I read him the 2-page document. I told him about the agreement. I
told him that we were not negotiating on behalf of the country but we
reached an agreement on a framework, and I told him what Milosevic had
said through Karic and what the Russians had agreed to, that if we went
to Belgrade we would bring the POWs out
[[Page H2913]]
and that Milosevic would embrace the framework publicly.
{time} 2100
He said to me, Curt, I have got to have someone higher up talk to
you. I will have someone call you. I said, fine.
At the same time, Mr. Speaker, one of the Members of the other side
of the aisle who was with us, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Maurice
Hinchey), who is a strong supporter of the President, called the White
House from Vienna.
Through the White House Special Operations Center he got in touch
with the Chief of Staff for President Clinton, Mr. Podesta. He told Mr.
Podesta that the five Democrats on our trip were convinced that
something was happening of significance, that the White House should
talk to the State Department, because we had faxed them the two-page
document.
Mr. Podesta said he would immediately contact the State Department to
see what the significance of this event was, and through the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Hinchey) we encouraged the White House to encourage
the State Department to consider whether or not we should pursue the
opportunity available to us.
Mr. Speaker, by that time a phone call came in from Washington that I
was asked to get involved with from the Under Secretary of State, Tom
Pickering. Tom Pickering is a longtime friend, and someone who I have a
great deal of respect and admiration for. Five years ago when we
started the Duma-Congress effort, he was the ambassador from our
country to Russia in Moscow.
He said to me, Curt, what is happening? I said, Mr. Ambassador, and I
read the document to him. I said, we have come to an agreement, a
framework which I think might be useful to bring Russia and Milosevic
in line with what you, the State Department, want in terms of a
peaceful resolution of this conflict.
I said, I'm not asking you to endorse this paper, but I'm telling you
what we have agreed upon as parliamentarians. Let me tell you what they
want us to do. I said, Mr. Ambassador, they want us to go into
Belgrade. They have committed to us, Milosevic through Karic, that all
three POWs will be released. In addition, they have said that they are
100 percent certain that Milosevic will embrace the principles that the
Russians and Americans agreed to.
He said, Curt, those promises have been made before. You can't trust
Milosevic's word. What makes you think you are going to be successful?
He went on to say, you know, a couple of missions have tried to get the
POWs out. In fact, he said, Jesse Jackson's mission has been a failure.
He is not bringing out the POWs.
Mr. Speaker, that phone conversation was at approximately 1:30 or 2
o'clock last Saturday afternoon. I had not been following the Jackson
delegation, although I was supportive of what he was doing because he
was trying to get our POWs out.
I said, all I am telling you, Mr. Pickering, is what the Russians and
Karic tell us. I will not take this delegation to Belgrade if you say
that you advise against that, because I understand that we are not to
interfere with the policies and the negotiations of this government,
and that we are not to go in and, in effect, create interference,
especially when hostilities are occurring. So if you say don't go, even
though we could go as independent citizens, we won't go.
At the end of that conversation I thanked Ambassador Pickering and
went downstairs. I told my friends from the Congress, the Russian Duma
deputies, and Karic on behalf of Milosevic, that we would not be going
into Belgrade. They were disappointed, very upset. In fact, a couple of
our Members who were with us from both parties wanted to go into
Belgrade on their own. I said, no, we are not going to do that. We are
going to stay together as a group.
We did open the possibility of Milosevic making some kind of a public
statement which would perhaps change things. Pickering had told me, if
that happens, call me back.
That was about 2 o'clock, Mr. Speaker. We met in the same meeting
room that we had been in all day to decide further actions that we
would take in both Moscow and the U.S. to create a visibility of our
agreement, to spread it throughout the country and throughout Russia
and Europe; that we thought there was a capability for a common
framework, for a solution, a negotiated settlement on the terms of NATO
and our government.
Two hours and 15 minutes after we had told Milosevic that we would
not go to Belgrade, we were sitting in the room together and one of our
military escorts came in the room and announced to us that CNN had just
announced on television that Milosevic had agreed that he would release
the POWs within 3 to 5 hours to Jesse Jackson's delegation.
We were ecstatic, Mr. Speaker, because that is not why we went to
Vienna, but we were happy that they were being released. Obviously, we
were disappointed because we could have been there, and perhaps if we
would have been there we could have also done something that I think
was equally important, and that was to get Milosevic to publicly
embrace what I think will be the final process for achieving a peaceful
settlement in Kosovo.
With the release of the POWs to occur in a matter of hours, we felt
it was impossible to convince our State Department to give us the okay
to go into Belgrade just to discuss this framework that we had agreed
on.
So instead, we went to dinner with the Russians and with Milosevic's
Rep, Karic, and we had a great time discussing how we had come together
and how we would work together in the future to implement this process.
Upon arriving back in Washington on Saturday, we agreed to meet this
week, and all week we have had an aggressive agenda to move forward our
agenda.
Mr. Speaker, on Monday we mailed letters to every Member of the House
describing what had occurred in the delegation, along with the
document. On Tuesday, every member of our delegation signed 40 letters.
Those letters went to the Pope, they went to the chief cleric of the
Muslim faith in Yugoslavia, they went to the head of the orthodox
church in Yugoslavia.
A copy of the document went with a signed letter by all of us to Kofi
Anan, and I called the U.N. and told them we were available for
meetings. We faxed our document to every parliament from every NATO
country, all 19 NATO countries.
I met with representatives of Ukraine and gave them a copy to give to
the Rada, and the Rada is now considering passing a resolution equal to
the one that my good friend and colleague that I am going to recognize
in a moment prepared for consideration by this Congress, a resolution
supporting the basic framework that we agreed upon.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, beside those contacts, we mailed copies of this
to Trent Lott and Tom Daschle, Denny Hastert and Dick Gephardt, the
White House, the State Department, so that everyone in America has been
given not just last Saturday from Vienna, but this week, a copy of a
framework that we felt could begin the peace process.
Imagine how we felt this morning, Mr. Speaker, when we all heard on
the news and read in the papers that the G-7 countries plus Russia had
met, and their meeting was historic because they announced this one-
page statement.
This one-page statement, Mr. Speaker, is a statement of a process to
begin the end of the Kosovo crisis. Mr. Speaker, this statement is
identical to what this group did last Saturday with the Russians in
Vienna. This group of 11 Members of Congress, liberal Democrats and
conservative Republicans, supporters of the President and opponents of
the President, put together a document that is almost identical to this
document agreed to by the eight nations that govern activities in
Europe and throughout the world, the G-8 group.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the work that we accomplished, and that we
may or may not have had an impact on this document. I know what we did.
I know what we accomplished. I know that Chernomyrdin was talking to
Ryshkov, we were done, and I said to him, Vladimir, how close is what
we did to what your country will accept? He said, it is identical. What
we have agreed upon is what Russia in the end will accept.
Today, Mr. Speaker, President Clinton was traveling around the world.
[[Page H2914]]
Maybe the President was not informed by his staff, maybe he does not
read the papers. Let me read the quote when President Clinton was asked
about the G-8 statement that was read to him.
This is what our president said. ``Clinton described the agreement as
important because `as far as I know, this is the first time that the
Russians have publicly said they support international security as well
as civilian force in Kosovo.' ''
Mr. Speaker, the President is wrong. The first time was last
Saturday. The first time was in Vienna. The first time was when the
leaders of the political parties in Russia agreed with us in Vienna to
move forward in a new direction.
We think now is the time to seize the opportunity to reach out, to
show some good faith by putting together a negotiated agreement that
allows the stopping of the bombing at the same time the troops are
removed, to stop the hostilities by the KLA, to reinstate the refugees,
to give them protection, to provide the humanitarian assistance, to do
all of those things that now we have an opportunity to succeed with.
The opportunity is in the hands of this administration. They are
going to have to again reach out to Russia, but they are going to also
have to reach out to Milosevic. I know we do not like to talk to
Milosevic, Mr. Speaker, but we have an opportunity to end this
conflict.
Forty-five days of incessant bombing, 45 days of driving people in
Serbia who were enemies of Milosevic to become his begest supporters,
45 days of driving 1 million people, along with Milosevic, out of
Kosovo into the fields and to the remote areas around that country who
are starving, who are without food, who are living in unhealthy
conditions; and 45 days of convincing the Russian people that we are
their enemy.
It is time to change that, Mr. Speaker. This framework allows us to
achieve dignity, dignity for NATO, dignity for this administration and
our country, dignity for the Russians, dignity for the European
community, for everyone who is concerned with a peaceful resolution.
I would implore this administration not to miss this opportunity.
This is a chance to end this conflict on our terms, to let NATO be able
to say that they have achieved what they want, to let this government
say that it had an achieved what it wants, but it has done it because
of the help and cooperation of the leadership in Russia.
I would say to our friends and colleagues and to the American people,
I sure hope we do not miss this opportunity, Mr. Speaker, because it is
going to be once in a lifetime.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to my good friend and colleague, the gentleman
from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) for whatever comments he would like to make,
my good friend who is a member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, a distinguished member of this body, and has a
distinguished military career on top of that.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, for yielding to me a little bit of time here to join with
him in this very important process.
Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we can enter into the Record a copy of
the agreement, the report of the meeting between the U.S. Congress and
the Russian Duma that took place over the time frame of April 30
through the first of May that we have already been discussing, and I
hope maybe later on if we have a little bit of time, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and I can go over some of the similarities
between the G-8 declaration and the principles that were brought
forward in our Congress and Duma process.
Before I do that I want to take just a moment, and not often does
America realize the significance or the importance of the work the
gentleman has been doing for the last 5 years, trying to bridge the
gap, build better and more personal relationships with our counterparts
in the Russian Duma, and of course the Russian Duma is similar to the
House of Representatives that we have here in Congress.
It has been through the gentleman's hard work over the last several
years that we have been able to call on them, to establish a working
relationship that has resulted in what I think may be some of the most
historic work to date from this study group.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. GIBBONS. First, let me say that there is a real important reason
for us to work together. Of course, we all know the fact that
proliferation of nuclear weapons around this world is primarily
something that we have a deep and abiding interest in, and being able
to work together with countries that are nuclear powers oftentimes
sheds light on how we can better preserve the peace, even build a
little security for everyone around the world.
The relationship that I came away with from meeting with our Russian
counterparts was one that struck me as something we should all take to
heart. They were very concerned about the fact that NATO's attack on a
small country, Serbia, was one that was envisioned as being 19
countries versus one single small country like Yugoslavia.
They were concerned that such countries, when they are threatened by
a massive force such as NATO, would oftentimes reach back into an
arsenal of weaponry that may include either biological, chemical, or
even nuclear weapons which could end up escalating a war into something
that no one, not in this body, not in the administration, in fact, I
daresay no one in America would want to have happen.
{time} 2115
And it is the relationship that the gentleman has with the Russians
and the relationship that was developed in this meeting in Vienna that
I think helps avoid conflicts like that, avoids the fact that they know
that that is not what we want, that we do not want to face an
escalation of military violence of that level. So the working
relationships bridges gaps, builds friendships, and builds confidence.
And I think one thing also that we ought to help our American viewers
who are watching tonight understand is that the level of distrust, of
mistrust----
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease). Members are reminded that
remarks are to be directed to the Chair.
Mr. GIBBONS. I thank the Speaker; and, Mr. Speaker, I would hope that
I can remind you that the level of distrust and mistrust of our Russian
brothers and sisters toward the United States has never been at a lower
point except for the time of the Korean War.
We have an obligation, we have a duty, and yes, indeed, we have an
opportunity to sort of melt part of that iceberg that is out there so
that we can get on with having a safer and more peaceful world.
I was most impressed with the gentleman's effort, his energy and his
willingness to continue this fight. As I listened to the historical
recitation of what he went through to ensure that we had an opportunity
and a voice to bring forth those Russian ideas, those Russian concerns,
that cannot be overstated.
It is so important for everyone to understand that much of this
diplomatic process that we go through has a foundation, has a start
somewhere, and it can only start when we reach out, reach across the
sea to our Russian friends, and the gentleman has certainly done that
on more than one occasion, but this is a very important time.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I would enter into the Record at this time a
copy of the report of the meetings between the United States Congress
and the Russian Duma that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon)
and I have talked about here this evening.
Report of the Meetings of the U.S. Congress and Russian Duma, Vienna,
Austria, 30 April-1 May, 1999
All sessions centered on the Balkan crisis. Agreement was
found on the following points:
I. The Balkan crisis, including ethnic cleansing and
terrorism, is one of the most serious challenges to
international security since World War II.
II. Both sides agree that this crisis creates serious
threats to global and regional security and may undermine
efforts against non-proliferation.
III. This crisis increases the threat of further human and
ecological catastrophes, as evidenced by the growing refugee
problem, and creates obstacles to further development of
constructive Russian-American relations.
IV. The humanitarian crisis will not be solved by bombing.
A diplomatic solution to the problem is preferable to the
alternative of military escalation.
[[Page H2915]]
Taking the above into account, the sides consider it
necessary to implement the following emergency measures as
soon as possible, preferably within the next week.
Implementation of these emergency measures will create the
climate necessary to settle the political questions.
1. We call on the interested parties to find practical
measures for a parallel solution to three tasks, without
regard to sequence: the stopping of NATO bombing of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, withdrawal of Serbian armed
forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of the military
activities of the KLA. This should be accomplished through a
series of confidence building measures, which should include
but should not be limited to:
a. The release of all prisoners of war.
b. The voluntary repatriation of all refugees in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them
by humanitarian aid organizations. NATO would be responsible
for policing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders
with Albania and Macedonia to ensure that weapons do not
reenter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the returning
refugees or at a later time.
c. Agreement on the composition of the armed international
forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian
withdraw. The composition of the group should be decided by a
consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership
of Kosovo.
d. The above group would be supplemented by the monitoring
activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE).
e. The Russian Duma and U.S. Congress will use all
possiblities at their disposal in order to successfully move
ahead the process of resolving the situation in Yugoslavia on
the basis of stopping the violence and atrocities.
2. We recognize the basic principles of the territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
include:
a. wide autonomy for Kosovo
b. a multi-ethnic population
c. treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with
international norms
3. We support efforts to provide international assistance
to rebuild destroyed homes of refugees and other humanitarian
assistance, as appropriate, to victims in Kosovo.
4. We, as members of the Duma and Congress, commit to
active participation as follows:
Issue a Joint U.S. Congress-Russian Duma report of our
meetings in Vienna. Concrete suggestions for future action
will be issued as soon as possible.
Delegations will agree on timelines for accomplishment of
above tasks.
Delegations will brief their respective legislatures and
governments on outcome of the Vienna meetings and agreed upon
proposals.
Delegations will prepare a joint resolution, based on their
report, to be considered simultaneously in the Congress and
Duma.
Delegations agree to continue a working group dialogue
between Congress and the Duma in agreed upon places.
Delegations agree that Duma deputies will visit refugee
camps and Members of Congress will visit the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.
Members of Congress:
Curt Weldon, Neil Abercrombie, Jim Saxton, Bernie
Sanders, Roscoe Bartlett, Corrine Brown, Jim Gibbons,
Maurice Hinchey, Joseph R. Pitts, Don Sherwood, Dennis
J. Kucinich.
Duma Deputies:
------ ------, ------ ------, ------ ------ ------ ----
--.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, perhaps the gentleman from Pennsylvania and
I can go over a little bit of the similarity between our document dated
the 1st of May here and the G-8, or the G-7 plus Russia announcement
today.
As I look at the calendar, today is May 6, so it has been a full 5
days, and that is time enough, as I see it, for them to have an
opportunity to review the good work and the hard work that we put
forward in that meeting and the statement of the G-7 plus Russia
principles here.
I would just like to take the first one.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I would just like to say, before we do
that, that for those who say that parliamentarians should not be
involved in meeting with other parliamentarians, and I think the
gentleman did a good job earlier today when he gave a 1-minute on this
issue, that this administration is constantly encouraging Members of
Congress to engage their counterparts around the world. In fact, we
have programs that do that.
I got involved with Russia long before I was in Congress when a U.S.
funded program, called the American Council of Young Political Leaders,
encouraged me as a county commissioner to travel to Russia because my
party thought that one day I might serve in Congress. Now, little did I
realize that a couple of decades ago those early trips to Russia would
result in me traveling to Russia some 19 times where I would host
literally hundreds if not thousands of Russian leaders when they come
to America and where I would have the opportunity, working with our
friend and colleague, who is, by the way, watching these proceedings
tonight, a former Member, Greg Laughlin, and starting 8 years ago a
Russian-American Energy Caucus to try to find ways to bring hard
currency into Russia so they would not have to sell off their nuclear
technology or their conventional weapons.
The administration back then was supportive of our efforts. They were
supportive of our efforts to help solve environmental problems, the
nuclear waste problem up in the Arctic Ocean, out in the Sea of Japan.
So it is interesting that the media in this city and the administration
that has encouraged us so much to interact so much with these other
leaders all of a sudden, when we do something constructive that maybe
embarrasses them, all of a sudden says, well, we do not need 435
armchair diplomats.
We are not armchair diplomats, Mr. Speaker. We are doing what this
administration asked us to do, which Vice President Gore and Viktor
Chernomyrdin, when we started this effort 5 years ago, right down the
hallway on the Senate side, stood up at a luncheon and said, it is
fantastic, but now Gore-Chernomyrdin is going to be supplemented by a
Duma-Congress study group, and applauded our foresight as
parliamentarians coming together to try to build trust and
understanding.
So it is okay to do it when they think it is important, but when we
disagree or think that things are not going the way perhaps they could
be going, and we try to use that influence that we have, all of a
sudden we are not doing the right thing. Is that not amazing that that
could happen?
Mr. GIBBONS. That is absolutely correct.
And if the gentleman will continue to yield, I just wish to say that
I could not be more pleased at the hard work the gentleman has done
over the past few years in building that important relationship,
because it came to fruition when the gentleman reached out and asked
for them to meet with us on this very important document at this very
important time in this Balkans crisis. They willingly came because of
the great respect they have for the gentleman and his hard work, and
that was evident throughout the meeting.
I have to say that every one of us, whether we are in Congress or
just ordinary citizens, are diplomats of this country when we travel
abroad. So it is impossible to separate ourselves from our American
heritage. It is part of us.
And we have even a higher responsibility when we are an elected
official, especially those of us in Congress, in dealing with our
counterparts, for example in the Russian Duma, to reflect American
policies, to reflect American ideals. And we did that without
negotiating, without breaching fundamental trust with the
administration.
This was something that was established and has been established, as
the gentleman said, over a number of years, and it has absolutely
proven to be one of the most important relationships, one of the most
important things that we can do as Members of Congress, to build trust
between countries so that we never have to realize conflict, never have
to go back to the days of the Cold War.
I think we are teetering today on the brink of entering another cold
war. If we lose the elections in Russia, if we lose that confidence, if
we end up having the cynicism about U.S. relationships with Russia that
are now starting to grow, we could very well end up back in that same
old Cold War that we all celebrated the end of in 1989.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I agree.
The gentleman's suggestion was a valid one, that we go through the G-
8 document and compare it side by side to what we did just so that the
American people know that what we agreed on with the Russians has now,
in fact, become the basis of a G-8 set of principles to negotiate an
end to this conflict.
Mr. GIBBONS. I would like to be the G-8, if he wants to respond to
what our agreement said.
[[Page H2916]]
Let me take the first one. Number one, immediate and verifiable end
of violence and repression in Kosovo.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And our position on that same issue, and
I will read it word for word, the stopping of NATO bombing, cessation
of KLA activities, withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, calls for
termination of violence and atrocities.
If that is not identical, I do not know what is.
Mr. GIBBONS. It is almost word for word.
Let me take number two. Let us see how similar we can get with number
two.
Withdrawal from Kosovo of military police and paramilitary forces.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Ours says, withdrawal of Serb forces from
Kosovo.
Mr. GIBBONS. Identical.
Number three, the deployment in Kosovo of effective international
civil and (armed) security presences, endorsed and adopted by the
United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common
objectives.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And ours says, agreement on the
composition of armed international forces which would administer Kosovo
after the Serb withdrawal, to be determined by the U.N. five-member
Security Council.
Mr. GIBBONS. Does not get much closer.
Let us go to number four. Number four says, the establishment of an
interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the U.N. Security
Council to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all
inhabitants in Kosovo.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And our document says, the composition of
armed forces should be decided by a consensus agreement of the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in consultation with
Macedonia, Albania, Yugoslavia and the recognized leadership of Kosovo.
And the above group would be monitored by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, of which both Russia and the U.S. are member
nations.
And we had dinner at the ambassador's home for the U.S. with the
Russian ambassador alongside of us.
Mr. GIBBONS. That is correct. And so all we did was broaden out a
little bit the applicability and who would be in there helping to
decide this very important objective.
So it seems so far that, of the four we have talked about, we have
almost got parallel if not word-for-word concurrence with what this
agreement that we worked on over the weekend says.
Let us take number five. Number five states, the safe and free return
of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by
humanitarian aid organizations.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. This one sounds close here. The voluntary
repatriation of refugees in Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them by
humanitarian aid organizations.
Mr. GIBBONS. I guess they could not get more creative than to copy us
word for word, could they?
Let us look at number six. Number six says, a political process
towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
providing a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account
of Rambouillet Accords and principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia and other countries in the region, and
demilitarization of UCK, which is the KLA.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And ours says, recognizes the territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia, including wide autonomy for Kosovo, a multi-
ethnic population, and treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in
accordance with international norms.
Mr. GIBBONS. Just reworded.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. We just did not use that fancy
Rambouillet word, but the content of what we said is identical to what
is in number six.
Mr. GIBBONS. That is correct.
Finally, number seven, comprehensive approach to economic development
and stabilization of the crisis region.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And we said, supports efforts to provide
international assistance to rebuild destroyed refugee homes and other
humanitarian assistance to victims in Kosovo.
Mr. GIBBONS. And if the gentleman will yield, as we have gone down
these seven principles that were established in the G-7 plus Russia or
commonly known as the G-8, I think it is very clear upon a reading of
the document that we worked out over the weekend, a reading of the
principles that they have stated here and a comparison of the two shows
that there is a direct, an almost word-for-word influence of their
statement, which has come about to be, as stated in the press, a new
framework for the peaceful solution of the Kosovo crisis.
So I can only applaud and congratulate the gentleman here publicly
for his effort in this, because I think it was directly because of our
working agreement, our working relationship between the Congress of the
United States and the Duma of Russia that we were able to bring about a
higher public awareness of the willingness on terms that are
satisfactory to the United States, and including many of the NATO
countries, if not all of the NATO countries, for a peaceful solution of
the Kosovo crisis.
I just could not be more proud of the gentleman, and I could not be
more pleased to be part of this effort. Certainly, as the gentleman
mentioned earlier in the evening, we do have a resolution which is
going to come about next week and is going to pretty much give a sense
of Congress and stating an outline of the important work that was done
here, the reason for it, and sort of giving congressional support to
the framework that the gentleman worked so very hard to achieve.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Let me thank my colleague and add to what
he has said and congratulate him, because he is the one that worked
with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) and also worked with the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) to develop this legislation which
is to be the subject of a hearing next week.
Unfortunately, the minority leadership, bowing to the White House
again, would not let us hold the hearing on Wednesday, because that
would require their unanimous consent, so we have to hold the hearing
on Thursday. Another obstacle, another day of bombing. We could do this
hearing on Wednesday and move the legislation, but, no, because we do
not want to have the Congress discuss this issue, we cannot do it until
Thursday because the administration has convinced the minority side, in
spite of the support of their own Members, that we should not have this
hearing until the full 7 days.
{time} 2130
But I want to say we will have that hearing. I talked to our Russian
counterparts this morning, and they are planning on bringing up the
exact same resolution in the State Duma. Our hope is to have this
Congress pass it, the Russian Duma pass it; and I am even hoping that
members of the Ukrainian Rada will pass this.
In fact, I had a call today from a member of the German Bundestag. He
received our document and he wants to pursue this with members of the
European parliaments. So momentum is building.
I do want to take this time to acknowledge our other Members, as I
know my colleague would. On the minority side we had an outstanding
delegation. They would be here tonight, but since we ended the session,
Members are on their way back to their districts. We do have a long
weekend.
We are staying here because we have events in town. But our Members
did do special orders earlier this week. We could not get a full hour
because all the time was booked. But they would have been here tonight,
and I want to acknowledge them all personally.
The ranking Democrat on our trip was the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr.
Neil Abercrombie), an outstanding Member, a tireless advocate for
trying to find a peaceful resolution to this conflict;
The gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Corrine Brown), a Member who has
become a dynamic leader on Russian issues. She has traveled to Russia
with me twice. She now chairs an effort with female members of the
Russian Duma to build better relations between our two bodies;
The gentleman from New York (Maurice Hinchey), a strong supporter of
[[Page H2917]]
President Clinton who supported the bombing efforts, support the
President's policies, and was a very key part of our delegation. In
fact, he is the one who talked to Podesta at the White House from
Vienna;
The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Dennis Kucinich), former Mayor of
Cleveland, who is an active Member who has a background from the
Balkans ethnically, understands the problems. Probably no one is as
well versed in this Congress on issues involving the Balkans than the
Democrat from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich);
And the fifth Democrat, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Bernie
Sanders), who is the only Independent, the only socialist in Congress,
a self-admitted liberal. He was an outstanding contributor to our
effort.
In fact, it was interesting, I was in a press conference with the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Roscoe Bartlett) today and he is as far to
the right as the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) is to the left.
And the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) said, you know
something, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) and I sat together
during all the discussions and there was not one issue that he and I
disagreed on. We were in sync on every issue in every statement. My
colleague and I were in complete agreement. That is the kind of
relationship we have.
Perhaps my colleague would like to go over some of the other
Republican Members that were with us on the delegation. I have covered
the Democrats.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, first of all, if I can just repeat that my
colleague down here from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) was the head of this
delegation. It was a bipartisan delegation, as he has already stated.
On our side we had the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Jim Saxton) who
is a wonderful contributor to the process, brought a great deal of
insight to the committee, both his position on his committee
assignment, as well as having traveled to Yugoslavia earlier in the
week in an effort on his own as an individual to learn more about the
process and meet and be able to inform us of his findings, as well.
We had also the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Roscoe Bartlett) as my
colleague has said, one of the gentleman who has a defined point of
view, as we say, but yet contributed very well to the whole process as
we go.
We had the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Joe Pitts) a wonderful
colleague who came into the same Congress as I did in the same class in
the 105th Congress, a remarkable individual, very renowned for his work
in education and a great member of our bipartisan delegation, as my
colleague has already stated.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. His colleague from Pennsylvania (Mr. Don
Sherwood) was there also, a good friend of my colleague's.
Mr. GIBBONS. And the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Don Sherwood) a
freshman who entered this Congress this year but with a great deal of
enthusiasm, a great deal of respect for the process, serves on the
Committee on Armed Services and made an ideal partner in all of this as
we went forward during this time.
____________________