[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 65 (Thursday, May 6, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2910-H2917]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              PEACEFULLY RESOLVING THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is 
recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my 
colleagues for holding some time while I ran over from Rayburn. I was 
expecting that the other side would offer a special order, and I did 
want to make sure that we took this special out this evening, and I am 
happy that my good friend from Nevada is going to be joining us as we 
review, Mr. Speaker, the past 4 weeks and actually 5 weeks and discuss 
an effort by this Congress to move the process involving Kosovo to a 
new level and a new direction, and that is to try to find a way to 
solve the situation peacefully.
  Mr. Speaker, it was actually a little bit over 4 weeks ago, the week 
of April 6, when Russian friends of mine who I have been involved with 
for the past 5 years in a formal Duma-Congress relationship called me 
at my home and asked if I would be open to some ideas about engaging 
with them to find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis. They were 
calling me for several reasons.
  One, they said they had, the Russians had been shut out of the 
process by our government in terms of working with them once the 
bombing campaign began, that there had been no overture on the part of 
our State Department or our administration to involve Russia, but 
rather our administration in the minds of the Russians had become 
convinced that they could solve the problem of the ethnic cleansing in 
Serbia by bombing and bombing in a massive way.
  The second reason they called, Mr. Speaker, was because these pro-
western leaders in Russia were concerned. They saw their country 
heading down the wrong path. In fact, they cited examples of evidence 
that Russia had become much more anti-American than at any point in 
time that they had seen since the days of the Soviet communist regime.
  In fact, they said that Americans were now being told not to speak 
English on the streets of Russia, that the Duma had canceled all 
activities interconnecting with America, cancelling all conferences. 
The Harvard University Study Group that goes on every year was 
canceled. The initiative to involve exchanges of staffers was canceled. 
Every possible contact between us and Russia had been severed, not just 
because of the bombing but because of our administration's refusal to 
work with Russia in a proactive way.
  In fact, as I mentioned earlier today, Mr. Speaker, a Duma member was 
here in this Capitol building, and he said something very interesting: 
that for decades and decades the Soviet Communist Party had spent 
billions of dollars to try to convince the Russian people that America 
was bad, that we were a Nation that was filled with hate and that 
Russia should not in the end want to be friends with, and he went on to 
say that the Soviet Communist Party failed. All the money they spent, 
all the activities they engaged in could not convince the Russian 
people that America was evil or that America was not a nation of the 
highest standards.
  And he went on to say today that in just 45 days this President has 
done what the Soviet Communist party could not do in decades and 
decades of attempts, and that is because of the Kosovo crisis, because 
of the incessant bombing of the people of Serbia; because of the lack 
of involvement of Russia, the Russian people had turned against 
America, and that the polls were showing that Russians all over that 
nation now see America in their minds and in their eyes in a negative 
way.

  What they have told us is that if we continue this policy, we are 
going to push Russia right into the hands of the communists and the 
ultra nationalists who want to revert back to the Cold War days when 
America was the enemy.
  Russia has elections scheduled for this year, Mr. Speaker, and the 
Russians that are friends of ours, the pro-Western forces, are saying 
if you continue the policies that you are currently pursuing, you will 
defeat us in the election and you will end up with the Duma, a 
federation council and a president who are anti-American, who are anti-
West and who will turn toward the Middle Eastern, in many cases the 
rogue states.
  That is not what we want, Mr. Speaker.
  So when the Russians called me 5 weeks ago at home, I said, ``Send me 
what you would like us to pursue.'' They sent me a simple document that 
contained three ideas.
  The first one was that Russia should accept responsibility for 
helping to stop the ethnic cleansing, and they called it ethnic 
cleansing.
  Number two, that Milosevic had to come to grips with the NATO 
requirements. The only problem Russia had with that was that they felt 
U.S. and British troops on the ground would not be appropriate, since 
America and Britain were the primary bombers that were persecuting the 
raids over Serbia.
  And, number three, that there be a commission established between the 
Congress and the Duma to oversee any agreement that would be reached.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, that was a simple plan, but as I looked at it, I 
said, ``You know, it's something we can build on.'' So I took that 
document. Not wanting to work outside of our government, I wrote up a 
memo.
  I first of all called the White House and talked to Leon Fuerth, the 
top security adviser to Vice President Gore, and I said, ``Mr. Fuerth, 
this is what the Russians have done. You know of my involvement with 
them. I want to send you a copy of their proposal, and I want to let 
you know I am going to work with them quietly.''
  He and I suggested that I follow up that call with Carlos Pascual 
from the National Security Council who focuses on Russian issues. I 
called him. I faxed him the same memo.
  In that first week of April I told no Republican what I was doing, 
but I kept our government informed.
  Over the weekend we had additional calls.
  The following week I decided to brief the Director of Central 
Intelligence, George Tenet. I let him know that I had been contacted, 
what my response was and that I had told the Russians that I was 
supportive of the five points that NATO had eventually come to put into 
writing and the administration's approach, that I was willing to work 
with them to try to find a peaceful solution.
  Also that week, Mr. Speaker, which was the week of August or April 
13, I contacted two Democrat colleagues in this body: the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Murtha). Congressman Hoyer is my cochair on the Russian Duma-Congress 
Initiative, he is very well respected by the administration, and he is 
a good friend of mine who I trust. Congressman Murtha, also a good 
friend, is a key person that the administration relies on.
  I asked the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from 
Maryland to talk to the administration, to talk to Strobe Talbott and 
talk to the White House and let them know what I was doing, and they 
both did that, and they told me they did. The gentleman from Maryland 
talked to Strobe Talbott, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania talked to 
the White House.
  Also that week, Mr. Speaker, I approached three other Democrats in 
this body: the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Blagojevich) because of his 
Serbian background and ethnic ties; the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. 
Abercrombie) who had just returned from Kosovo; and the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Hinchey) who had gone with me to Moscow in December.
  So during the second week of this process I contacted no Republicans 
but again focused on the other party and the administration, trying to 
find common ground.
  At the end of that week, Mr. Speaker, I called the State Department 
and

[[Page H2911]]

talked at length two times to Steve Sestanovich, who is in charge of 
Russian affairs within the State Department. I talked to his assistant 
from my home, Andre Lewis, who had traveled with a delegation that I 
chaired to Moscow in early December of last year. I briefed them on 
what had happened and told them that I was trying to work out an idea 
that the Russians had brought to my attention because of their 
frustration in seeing that the administration had cut off contact with 
Russia in trying to solve the Kosovo conflict peacefully.
  Mr. Speaker, besides talking to Sestanovich and Andre Lewis and all 
of the others that I mentioned earlier, I decided to challenge the 
Russians because they asked me to bring a bipartisan delegation to meet 
with them when they travel to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. I said: 
Give me that in writing. Give me the request on your official 
letterhead. Tell me who the colleagues will be from the Russian side 
that we will interact with. Give me the written time and date of the 
meeting with Milosevic. Give me an understanding and a commitment that 
we will meet with our POWs, who up until this point in time had not 
been talked to by anyone, even the Red Cross. And commit to me that you 
will go to a refugee camp of our choosing to see the pain and suffering 
brought forward by Milosevic.
  Mr. Speaker, the Russians agreed to all five points. They wrote to 
me. First, Deputy Speaker Ryshkov and now chairman of Chernomyrdin's 
political faction, Nosh Dom, Our Home is Russia, wrote to me a very 
personal letter, and he asked me to get formally involved. Again, Mr. 
Speaker, I did not go to my Republican colleagues. I went to my 
Democrat friend and colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), 
and I said, ``Can you help me get a meeting with the White House? Can 
you help me get a meeting with Sandy Berger so I can run this idea by 
him?''
  I called Sandy Berger three times, Mr. Speaker. He never had the 
courtesy to return my phone call. So I asked again the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) if he would work with me to get a meeting with 
Strobe Talbott. He said, ``Call Talbott. He will return your call and 
you'll get a meeting.''

                              {time}  2045

  This was Thursday, Mr. Speaker, April 23. Strobe Talbott said I will 
meet with you today.
  I said I want to bring the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) with 
me. I picked the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) up. We drove down 
to the State Department and for 90 minutes we met with Strobe Talbott 
and three of his top deputies.
  We went over with him the offer of the Russians to come to Budapest 
to achieve a dialogue of understanding based on those first three 
principles; then the drive together on a bus to Belgrade, where at 1:00 
on that following Monday we would have a face-to-face meeting with 
Milosevic; we would have lunch with our POWs and travel to a refugee 
camp so the Russians would see the horror that Milosevic has 
perpetrated on the Kosovar people.
  After the meeting, Strobe Talbott said, I have concerns about what 
you want to do but I will talk to the Secretary of State and Sandy 
Berger. Two hours later that evening, Thursday, April 23, Strobe 
Talbott called back and said, you can do what you want as a citizen, we 
cannot stop you, but our advice is that you should not travel to 
Belgrade.
  I said to him if my government says we should not go, I will not be a 
renegade. I will call the Russians and tell them that we are not coming 
to meet with them, and I did.
  That was a very upsetting telephone call to the Russians because they 
had also arranged for one of Milosevic's top aides, Dragomir Karic, to 
meet with us and drive with us to Belgrade. Karic is a very successful 
businessman in Belgrade, in Russia. His companies employ 64,000. He 
owns a TV station in Serbia. He owns a bank. He owns extensive 
companies. He is not a member of the government but is a key financial 
supporter and a close personal friend of Milosevic and his wife. He was 
going to be the person who accompanied us into Belgrade for these 
meetings.
  When we were turned down by our government, I told the Russians that 
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) had suggested that we have 
another meeting in a neutral site, and the State Department, through 
Strobe Talbott, agreed and thought that would be a good idea. So I told 
the Russians that weekend that they should plan a trip to a neutral 
city, and they said we will go to Vienna on April the 30; Vienna, 
Austria.
  Then Monday of last week, Mr. Speaker, I developed a 3-page letter 
which I sent to all 435 Members of the House. That 3-page letter 
documented everything I had been doing, including the fact that I had 
not involved the Republicans because I did not want our friends on the 
minority side and the administration to say somehow we were doing 
something partisan or that somehow we were doing something that was 
less than honorable or that somehow we were doing something to 
embarrass the President. No one could say that. In fact, no one can say 
that today.
  That letter went out to every Member and I invited every Member of 
this body to join with me and with others in trying to find a 
bipartisan solution to the Kosovo crisis that would end the bombing and 
end the hostility.
  On Tuesday and Wednesday evening of last week, we had meetings with 
Members of Congress. We sat together and we talked. A number of us at 
our Republican Conference on Wednesday asked our leadership not to have 
the votes on Thursday, because we felt they would be too confusing to 
have votes about whether or not to declare war or whether or not to 
withdraw the troops.
  We asked our leadership to postpone those votes until this week. We 
were not successful, because the gentleman who offered that resolution, 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), wanted to have the votes 
on that day, which, in fact, is a requirement of the War Powers 
resolution.
  In fact, I went to the Committee on Rules that night at 10:30 and 
asked the Committee on Rules to consider a motion to be made in order 
to allow me to table the votes until this week so we could meet with 
the Russians to see if there was some possibility of common ground.
  We were not successful in that attempt. The votes occurred, and all 
day Thursday I sought to get the approval for a plane to take a 
delegation to Vienna.
  Working with colleagues like my friend, the gentleman from Nevada 
(Mr. Gibbons), we got the approval and at 6:00 last Thursday evening, 
11 Members of Congress got on an airplane that holds 12 people. We flew 
all night and we arrived in Vienna the next morning.
  That delegation, Mr. Speaker, included the most liberal Members of 
this body, including now a good friend of mine, the gentleman from 
Vermont (Mr. Sanders), our only socialist and independent; Democrats 
who support the President, like the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Hinchey) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Brown); Democrats who 
have been concerned about the President's policy, like the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) and the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. 
Abercrombie) and 5 Republican Members who ranged from moderate to the 
very right in terms of the political spectrum, like the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Pitts).
  Eleven of us traveled to Vienna overnight. We had discussions on the 
way over about what our approach would be. I briefed them on the 
backgrounds of the Russian delegates. I told them what we would hope to 
accomplish, and we reached agreement.
  When we arrived in Vienna at 8:30 in the morning on Friday, we went 
right to our hotel. We had just enough time to change and we proceeded 
to go to the state house of Austria, where we had a meeting for an hour 
and a half with the chairman or the speaker of the Austrian parliament.
  We wanted to get a feel for what Austria, an independent, nonaligned 
nation, would think about the Kosovo crisis and the bombing and the 
ethnic cleansing.
  After we got the chance to meet with the speaker of that body, we 
went to the Russian hotel where the Russian delegates were staying and 
we began our meetings.

[[Page H2912]]

  Mr. Speaker, in those meetings, besides the 11 Members of Congress 
representing Republicans and Democrats, I invited a State Department 
employee, who works in the Russian desk, who works for Stestanovich, 
Andre Lewis, to sit with us at our meetings, not to be a participant 
because this was a legislative session, but to listen to what we were 
saying so that no one could misconstrue our approach, our methodology 
and our process.
  He sat through every meeting and every dinner and every breakfast and 
session that we had. Along with the Russians and along with the 
Americans, we had Dragomir Karic. He is, as I said earlier, one of the 
strongest financial supporters of Milosevic. He was there to advise the 
Russians. The Russian delegation included Vladimir Ryshkov who was most 
recently the first deputy speaker, number two, in the state Duma, their 
parliament. He now is the chairman of a very successful political party 
in Russia called Our Home is Russia. In fact, it is the party that 
Chernomyrdin is a member of. He is a very close associate of 
Chernomyrdin, who was Russia's envoy on the Balkan issue, the Kosovo 
issue, and he had had conversations with Chernomyrdin both before and 
during the time he arrived in Vienna.

  The second member of the Russian side was Vladimir Luhkin, the former 
Soviet ambassador to the U.S., a member of the Yabloko, a moderate 
faction in the Duma, and also the chairman of the International Affairs 
Committee. Luhkin is a very well respected member of the Duma, someone 
that Duma deputies look to for advice on foreign affairs and 
international issues.
  The third representative in the Duma delegation was Alexander 
Shapanov. Shapanov represented Seleznyov, the Communist faction, the 
largest faction in the state Duma. He was there to bring the broad 
coalition of political ideology to the table so that if we reached 
agreement it was not just with one faction or with one part of the 
government, but actually represented a consensus in Russia of what 
should be our approach to solving this problem peacefully.
  Along with those three deputies was Segie Konovalenko. Konovalenko, 
who is a good friend of mine, is the chief protocol officer for the 
Russian Duma who works with all the players in the Duma and all the 
political factions in Russia. There are seven major factions in the 
Duma. He works with all seven.
  In beginning our discussions, Mr. Speaker, I said that we had some 
basic premises that we needed to understand. Number one, we were not 
representing our government. We were not there as official 
representatives of President Clinton, nor were we representing our 
State Department. We were parliamentarians, engaging in parliamentary 
discussions as we have on numerous times over the past 5 years on a 
variety of issues.
  The second point was that the five points that NATO had put forth 
were the basis of our discussion. We were not deviating from the policy 
of this administration. We were building on what President Clinton and 
the NATO countries said had to be the basis for a peaceful resolution 
of this conflict.
  With that in mind, we started our discussions, and for the rest of 
Friday every member on both sides had a chance to give their views. 
During our discussions, the Russian side, and the representative of 
Milosevic, said to us you all have to come with us to Belgrade on this 
trip. It is extremely important that you meet with Milosevic. They said 
to us, if you come to Belgrade, you will be given one, perhaps two or 
possibly three, of our POWs. They will be released if you come to 
Belgrade for discussions.
  I told our Russian friends, and I told the representative of 
Milosevic, that we would not be going to Belgrade; that I had given my 
word to Speaker Hastert that our delegation would not go down to 
Belgrade because in his conversations with Madeleine Albright they had 
agreed that we should not do that. So I told the delegates that could 
not be acceptable, but we continued our deliberations.
  On Saturday morning, after our staffs worked through the night to 
develop the framework of an agreement or a discussion paper, a report 
if you will, we met for breakfast. We continued our discussions through 
breakfast, stayed in one room in our hotel until we went over every 
word in every sentence in the document.
  If any one member of the American side or the Russian side objected, 
we stopped. It was not a vote. It was where any one member could object 
to any one word or phrase we would go back and revisit that until we 
reached agreement.
  We did that for every line in the document until at 1:00 p.m. Mr. 
Speaker, on Saturday, this past Saturday, we reached agreement with our 
Russian friends and colleagues.
  The agreement, I thought, was somewhat significant, because it was 
the first time that Russian leadership acknowledged that there must be 
a multinational peace force placed inside of Kosovo, and the Russians 
agreed with that. It was the first time that Russian representatives 
agreed that Milosevic must remove the armed Serbian military and armed 
personnel out of Kosovo, and Russia agreed with that.
  It was the first time that Russia allowed the acknowledgment of the 
phrase, ethnic cleansing, in a document involving Kosovo, and the 
Russian side agreed with that.
  It was the first time that an acknowledgment by Russia offered the 
opportunity for the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council 
to determine the makeup of the multinational force. It was a document 
that was plain, that was simple, but gave a framework for a peaceful 
settlement and negotiation of this crisis.
  We did not negotiate. We did not get into how many troops should be 
left in Kosovo. We did not get into the makeup of the military force, 
because that is the job of our government, but we did agree on a 
framework.
  We also said that three things must occur simultaneously, without 
regard to the order. We said, first of all, the bombing must stop. 
Number two, Milosevic must remove all of his armed forces from Kosovo. 
Number three, that KLA aggression must also stop. The Russians agreed 
to that as well.
  When we finished the document about 1:00 in the afternoon, we were 
pleased because we had come together as representatives of different 
points of views but now deciding on a common agenda to move forward 
together that we could take back to our governments as parliamentarians 
and encourage them to work on.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, Milosevic's representative, Mr. Karic, took the 
document that the Russians gave him and faxed it to Belgrade. 
Approximately one half-hour later, Milosevic himself was on the phone 
with Dragomir Karic for the third time in our discussions, and he told 
Karic that if we came to Belgrade, this delegation of 11 members, if we 
went to Belgrade, and they would provide the bus, that was not a 
question, it would have been a 7-hour journey down through Budapest 
into Belgrade, if we went to Belgrade that two things would happen. 
Number one, and this was said to all 11 members in the room at the same 
time, at 1:00 on Saturday, we were told all three prisoners of war 
would be released to the American delegation.
  In addition, Mr. Speaker, we were told, as a group, that Karic felt 
100 percent certain that if we went to Belgrade the framework that we 
had agreed upon with the Russians would be publicly embraced by 
Milosevic. Now, that was certainly something new, Mr. Speaker, in both 
regards.
  We had not gone to Vienna to talk about the POWs, but this was the 
way that Karic was wanting to get us to go to Belgrade.
  I thought to myself, this is significant. Even though I have given 
the Speaker of the House my word, I have got to check with our State 
Department.
  So I asked the representative of the State Department who was with 
us, Andre Lewis, to call back to Washington, the special ops center for 
the State Department, and see what the response would be of his bosses. 
He made a call and got on the phone with Steve Stestanovich, who is in 
charge of Russian affairs at the State Department. He asked me to get 
with him on the phone, and I did.
  I read him the 2-page document. I told him about the agreement. I 
told him that we were not negotiating on behalf of the country but we 
reached an agreement on a framework, and I told him what Milosevic had 
said through Karic and what the Russians had agreed to, that if we went 
to Belgrade we would bring the POWs out

[[Page H2913]]

and that Milosevic would embrace the framework publicly.

                              {time}  2100

  He said to me, Curt, I have got to have someone higher up talk to 
you. I will have someone call you. I said, fine.
  At the same time, Mr. Speaker, one of the Members of the other side 
of the aisle who was with us, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Maurice 
Hinchey), who is a strong supporter of the President, called the White 
House from Vienna.
  Through the White House Special Operations Center he got in touch 
with the Chief of Staff for President Clinton, Mr. Podesta. He told Mr. 
Podesta that the five Democrats on our trip were convinced that 
something was happening of significance, that the White House should 
talk to the State Department, because we had faxed them the two-page 
document.
  Mr. Podesta said he would immediately contact the State Department to 
see what the significance of this event was, and through the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Hinchey) we encouraged the White House to encourage 
the State Department to consider whether or not we should pursue the 
opportunity available to us.
  Mr. Speaker, by that time a phone call came in from Washington that I 
was asked to get involved with from the Under Secretary of State, Tom 
Pickering. Tom Pickering is a longtime friend, and someone who I have a 
great deal of respect and admiration for. Five years ago when we 
started the Duma-Congress effort, he was the ambassador from our 
country to Russia in Moscow.
  He said to me, Curt, what is happening? I said, Mr. Ambassador, and I 
read the document to him. I said, we have come to an agreement, a 
framework which I think might be useful to bring Russia and Milosevic 
in line with what you, the State Department, want in terms of a 
peaceful resolution of this conflict.
  I said, I'm not asking you to endorse this paper, but I'm telling you 
what we have agreed upon as parliamentarians. Let me tell you what they 
want us to do. I said, Mr. Ambassador, they want us to go into 
Belgrade. They have committed to us, Milosevic through Karic, that all 
three POWs will be released. In addition, they have said that they are 
100 percent certain that Milosevic will embrace the principles that the 
Russians and Americans agreed to.
  He said, Curt, those promises have been made before. You can't trust 
Milosevic's word. What makes you think you are going to be successful? 
He went on to say, you know, a couple of missions have tried to get the 
POWs out. In fact, he said, Jesse Jackson's mission has been a failure. 
He is not bringing out the POWs.
  Mr. Speaker, that phone conversation was at approximately 1:30 or 2 
o'clock last Saturday afternoon. I had not been following the Jackson 
delegation, although I was supportive of what he was doing because he 
was trying to get our POWs out.
  I said, all I am telling you, Mr. Pickering, is what the Russians and 
Karic tell us. I will not take this delegation to Belgrade if you say 
that you advise against that, because I understand that we are not to 
interfere with the policies and the negotiations of this government, 
and that we are not to go in and, in effect, create interference, 
especially when hostilities are occurring. So if you say don't go, even 
though we could go as independent citizens, we won't go.
  At the end of that conversation I thanked Ambassador Pickering and 
went downstairs. I told my friends from the Congress, the Russian Duma 
deputies, and Karic on behalf of Milosevic, that we would not be going 
into Belgrade. They were disappointed, very upset. In fact, a couple of 
our Members who were with us from both parties wanted to go into 
Belgrade on their own. I said, no, we are not going to do that. We are 
going to stay together as a group.
  We did open the possibility of Milosevic making some kind of a public 
statement which would perhaps change things. Pickering had told me, if 
that happens, call me back.
  That was about 2 o'clock, Mr. Speaker. We met in the same meeting 
room that we had been in all day to decide further actions that we 
would take in both Moscow and the U.S. to create a visibility of our 
agreement, to spread it throughout the country and throughout Russia 
and Europe; that we thought there was a capability for a common 
framework, for a solution, a negotiated settlement on the terms of NATO 
and our government.
  Two hours and 15 minutes after we had told Milosevic that we would 
not go to Belgrade, we were sitting in the room together and one of our 
military escorts came in the room and announced to us that CNN had just 
announced on television that Milosevic had agreed that he would release 
the POWs within 3 to 5 hours to Jesse Jackson's delegation.
  We were ecstatic, Mr. Speaker, because that is not why we went to 
Vienna, but we were happy that they were being released. Obviously, we 
were disappointed because we could have been there, and perhaps if we 
would have been there we could have also done something that I think 
was equally important, and that was to get Milosevic to publicly 
embrace what I think will be the final process for achieving a peaceful 
settlement in Kosovo.
  With the release of the POWs to occur in a matter of hours, we felt 
it was impossible to convince our State Department to give us the okay 
to go into Belgrade just to discuss this framework that we had agreed 
on.
  So instead, we went to dinner with the Russians and with Milosevic's 
Rep, Karic, and we had a great time discussing how we had come together 
and how we would work together in the future to implement this process. 
Upon arriving back in Washington on Saturday, we agreed to meet this 
week, and all week we have had an aggressive agenda to move forward our 
agenda.
  Mr. Speaker, on Monday we mailed letters to every Member of the House 
describing what had occurred in the delegation, along with the 
document. On Tuesday, every member of our delegation signed 40 letters. 
Those letters went to the Pope, they went to the chief cleric of the 
Muslim faith in Yugoslavia, they went to the head of the orthodox 
church in Yugoslavia.
  A copy of the document went with a signed letter by all of us to Kofi 
Anan, and I called the U.N. and told them we were available for 
meetings. We faxed our document to every parliament from every NATO 
country, all 19 NATO countries.
  I met with representatives of Ukraine and gave them a copy to give to 
the Rada, and the Rada is now considering passing a resolution equal to 
the one that my good friend and colleague that I am going to recognize 
in a moment prepared for consideration by this Congress, a resolution 
supporting the basic framework that we agreed upon.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, beside those contacts, we mailed copies of this 
to Trent Lott and Tom Daschle, Denny Hastert and Dick Gephardt, the 
White House, the State Department, so that everyone in America has been 
given not just last Saturday from Vienna, but this week, a copy of a 
framework that we felt could begin the peace process.
  Imagine how we felt this morning, Mr. Speaker, when we all heard on 
the news and read in the papers that the G-7 countries plus Russia had 
met, and their meeting was historic because they announced this one-
page statement.

  This one-page statement, Mr. Speaker, is a statement of a process to 
begin the end of the Kosovo crisis. Mr. Speaker, this statement is 
identical to what this group did last Saturday with the Russians in 
Vienna. This group of 11 Members of Congress, liberal Democrats and 
conservative Republicans, supporters of the President and opponents of 
the President, put together a document that is almost identical to this 
document agreed to by the eight nations that govern activities in 
Europe and throughout the world, the G-8 group.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the work that we accomplished, and that we 
may or may not have had an impact on this document. I know what we did. 
I know what we accomplished. I know that Chernomyrdin was talking to 
Ryshkov, we were done, and I said to him, Vladimir, how close is what 
we did to what your country will accept? He said, it is identical. What 
we have agreed upon is what Russia in the end will accept.
  Today, Mr. Speaker, President Clinton was traveling around the world.

[[Page H2914]]

Maybe the President was not informed by his staff, maybe he does not 
read the papers. Let me read the quote when President Clinton was asked 
about the G-8 statement that was read to him.
  This is what our president said. ``Clinton described the agreement as 
important because `as far as I know, this is the first time that the 
Russians have publicly said they support international security as well 
as civilian force in Kosovo.' ''
  Mr. Speaker, the President is wrong. The first time was last 
Saturday. The first time was in Vienna. The first time was when the 
leaders of the political parties in Russia agreed with us in Vienna to 
move forward in a new direction.
  We think now is the time to seize the opportunity to reach out, to 
show some good faith by putting together a negotiated agreement that 
allows the stopping of the bombing at the same time the troops are 
removed, to stop the hostilities by the KLA, to reinstate the refugees, 
to give them protection, to provide the humanitarian assistance, to do 
all of those things that now we have an opportunity to succeed with.
  The opportunity is in the hands of this administration. They are 
going to have to again reach out to Russia, but they are going to also 
have to reach out to Milosevic. I know we do not like to talk to 
Milosevic, Mr. Speaker, but we have an opportunity to end this 
conflict.
  Forty-five days of incessant bombing, 45 days of driving people in 
Serbia who were enemies of Milosevic to become his begest supporters, 
45 days of driving 1 million people, along with Milosevic, out of 
Kosovo into the fields and to the remote areas around that country who 
are starving, who are without food, who are living in unhealthy 
conditions; and 45 days of convincing the Russian people that we are 
their enemy.
  It is time to change that, Mr. Speaker. This framework allows us to 
achieve dignity, dignity for NATO, dignity for this administration and 
our country, dignity for the Russians, dignity for the European 
community, for everyone who is concerned with a peaceful resolution.
  I would implore this administration not to miss this opportunity. 
This is a chance to end this conflict on our terms, to let NATO be able 
to say that they have achieved what they want, to let this government 
say that it had an achieved what it wants, but it has done it because 
of the help and cooperation of the leadership in Russia.
  I would say to our friends and colleagues and to the American people, 
I sure hope we do not miss this opportunity, Mr. Speaker, because it is 
going to be once in a lifetime.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to my good friend and colleague, the gentleman 
from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) for whatever comments he would like to make, 
my good friend who is a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, a distinguished member of this body, and has a 
distinguished military career on top of that.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, for yielding to me a little bit of time here to join with 
him in this very important process.
  Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we can enter into the Record a copy of 
the agreement, the report of the meeting between the U.S. Congress and 
the Russian Duma that took place over the time frame of April 30 
through the first of May that we have already been discussing, and I 
hope maybe later on if we have a little bit of time, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and I can go over some of the similarities 
between the G-8 declaration and the principles that were brought 
forward in our Congress and Duma process.
  Before I do that I want to take just a moment, and not often does 
America realize the significance or the importance of the work the 
gentleman has been doing for the last 5 years, trying to bridge the 
gap, build better and more personal relationships with our counterparts 
in the Russian Duma, and of course the Russian Duma is similar to the 
House of Representatives that we have here in Congress.
  It has been through the gentleman's hard work over the last several 
years that we have been able to call on them, to establish a working 
relationship that has resulted in what I think may be some of the most 
historic work to date from this study group.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. GIBBONS. First, let me say that there is a real important reason 
for us to work together. Of course, we all know the fact that 
proliferation of nuclear weapons around this world is primarily 
something that we have a deep and abiding interest in, and being able 
to work together with countries that are nuclear powers oftentimes 
sheds light on how we can better preserve the peace, even build a 
little security for everyone around the world.
  The relationship that I came away with from meeting with our Russian 
counterparts was one that struck me as something we should all take to 
heart. They were very concerned about the fact that NATO's attack on a 
small country, Serbia, was one that was envisioned as being 19 
countries versus one single small country like Yugoslavia.
  They were concerned that such countries, when they are threatened by 
a massive force such as NATO, would oftentimes reach back into an 
arsenal of weaponry that may include either biological, chemical, or 
even nuclear weapons which could end up escalating a war into something 
that no one, not in this body, not in the administration, in fact, I 
daresay no one in America would want to have happen.

                              {time}  2115

  And it is the relationship that the gentleman has with the Russians 
and the relationship that was developed in this meeting in Vienna that 
I think helps avoid conflicts like that, avoids the fact that they know 
that that is not what we want, that we do not want to face an 
escalation of military violence of that level. So the working 
relationships bridges gaps, builds friendships, and builds confidence.
  And I think one thing also that we ought to help our American viewers 
who are watching tonight understand is that the level of distrust, of 
mistrust----
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease). Members are reminded that 
remarks are to be directed to the Chair.
  Mr. GIBBONS. I thank the Speaker; and, Mr. Speaker, I would hope that 
I can remind you that the level of distrust and mistrust of our Russian 
brothers and sisters toward the United States has never been at a lower 
point except for the time of the Korean War.
  We have an obligation, we have a duty, and yes, indeed, we have an 
opportunity to sort of melt part of that iceberg that is out there so 
that we can get on with having a safer and more peaceful world.
  I was most impressed with the gentleman's effort, his energy and his 
willingness to continue this fight. As I listened to the historical 
recitation of what he went through to ensure that we had an opportunity 
and a voice to bring forth those Russian ideas, those Russian concerns, 
that cannot be overstated.
  It is so important for everyone to understand that much of this 
diplomatic process that we go through has a foundation, has a start 
somewhere, and it can only start when we reach out, reach across the 
sea to our Russian friends, and the gentleman has certainly done that 
on more than one occasion, but this is a very important time.
  As I said, Mr. Speaker, I would enter into the Record at this time a 
copy of the report of the meetings between the United States Congress 
and the Russian Duma that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
and I have talked about here this evening.

 Report of the Meetings of the U.S. Congress and Russian Duma, Vienna, 
                     Austria, 30 April-1 May, 1999

       All sessions centered on the Balkan crisis. Agreement was 
     found on the following points:
       I. The Balkan crisis, including ethnic cleansing and 
     terrorism, is one of the most serious challenges to 
     international security since World War II.
       II. Both sides agree that this crisis creates serious 
     threats to global and regional security and may undermine 
     efforts against non-proliferation.
       III. This crisis increases the threat of further human and 
     ecological catastrophes, as evidenced by the growing refugee 
     problem, and creates obstacles to further development of 
     constructive Russian-American relations.
       IV. The humanitarian crisis will not be solved by bombing. 
     A diplomatic solution to the problem is preferable to the 
     alternative of military escalation.

[[Page H2915]]

       Taking the above into account, the sides consider it 
     necessary to implement the following emergency measures as 
     soon as possible, preferably within the next week. 
     Implementation of these emergency measures will create the 
     climate necessary to settle the political questions.
       1. We call on the interested parties to find practical 
     measures for a parallel solution to three tasks, without 
     regard to sequence: the stopping of NATO bombing of the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, withdrawal of Serbian armed 
     forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of the military 
     activities of the KLA. This should be accomplished through a 
     series of confidence building measures, which should include 
     but should not be limited to:
       a. The release of all prisoners of war.
       b. The voluntary repatriation of all refugees in the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them 
     by humanitarian aid organizations. NATO would be responsible 
     for policing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders 
     with Albania and Macedonia to ensure that weapons do not 
     reenter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the returning 
     refugees or at a later time.
       c. Agreement on the composition of the armed international 
     forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian 
     withdraw. The composition of the group should be decided by a 
     consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. 
     Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership 
     of Kosovo.
       d. The above group would be supplemented by the monitoring 
     activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
     in Europe (OSCE).
       e. The Russian Duma and U.S. Congress will use all 
     possiblities at their disposal in order to successfully move 
     ahead the process of resolving the situation in Yugoslavia on 
     the basis of stopping the violence and atrocities.
       2. We recognize the basic principles of the territorial 
     integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which 
     include:
       a. wide autonomy for Kosovo
       b. a multi-ethnic population
       c. treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with 
     international norms
       3. We support efforts to provide international assistance 
     to rebuild destroyed homes of refugees and other humanitarian 
     assistance, as appropriate, to victims in Kosovo.
       4. We, as members of the Duma and Congress, commit to 
     active participation as follows:
       Issue a Joint U.S. Congress-Russian Duma report of our 
     meetings in Vienna. Concrete suggestions for future action 
     will be issued as soon as possible.
       Delegations will agree on timelines for accomplishment of 
     above tasks.
       Delegations will brief their respective legislatures and 
     governments on outcome of the Vienna meetings and agreed upon 
     proposals.
       Delegations will prepare a joint resolution, based on their 
     report, to be considered simultaneously in the Congress and 
     Duma.
       Delegations agree to continue a working group dialogue 
     between Congress and the Duma in agreed upon places.
       Delegations agree that Duma deputies will visit refugee 
     camps and Members of Congress will visit the Federal Republic 
     of Yugoslavia.
       Members of Congress:
         Curt Weldon, Neil Abercrombie, Jim Saxton, Bernie 
           Sanders, Roscoe Bartlett, Corrine Brown, Jim Gibbons, 
           Maurice Hinchey, Joseph R. Pitts, Don Sherwood, Dennis 
           J. Kucinich.
       Duma Deputies:
         ------ ------, ------ ------, ------ ------ ------ ----
           --.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, perhaps the gentleman from Pennsylvania and 
I can go over a little bit of the similarity between our document dated 
the 1st of May here and the G-8, or the G-7 plus Russia announcement 
today.
  As I look at the calendar, today is May 6, so it has been a full 5 
days, and that is time enough, as I see it, for them to have an 
opportunity to review the good work and the hard work that we put 
forward in that meeting and the statement of the G-7 plus Russia 
principles here.
  I would just like to take the first one.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I would just like to say, before we do 
that, that for those who say that parliamentarians should not be 
involved in meeting with other parliamentarians, and I think the 
gentleman did a good job earlier today when he gave a 1-minute on this 
issue, that this administration is constantly encouraging Members of 
Congress to engage their counterparts around the world. In fact, we 
have programs that do that.
  I got involved with Russia long before I was in Congress when a U.S. 
funded program, called the American Council of Young Political Leaders, 
encouraged me as a county commissioner to travel to Russia because my 
party thought that one day I might serve in Congress. Now, little did I 
realize that a couple of decades ago those early trips to Russia would 
result in me traveling to Russia some 19 times where I would host 
literally hundreds if not thousands of Russian leaders when they come 
to America and where I would have the opportunity, working with our 
friend and colleague, who is, by the way, watching these proceedings 
tonight, a former Member, Greg Laughlin, and starting 8 years ago a 
Russian-American Energy Caucus to try to find ways to bring hard 
currency into Russia so they would not have to sell off their nuclear 
technology or their conventional weapons.
  The administration back then was supportive of our efforts. They were 
supportive of our efforts to help solve environmental problems, the 
nuclear waste problem up in the Arctic Ocean, out in the Sea of Japan. 
So it is interesting that the media in this city and the administration 
that has encouraged us so much to interact so much with these other 
leaders all of a sudden, when we do something constructive that maybe 
embarrasses them, all of a sudden says, well, we do not need 435 
armchair diplomats.
  We are not armchair diplomats, Mr. Speaker. We are doing what this 
administration asked us to do, which Vice President Gore and Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, when we started this effort 5 years ago, right down the 
hallway on the Senate side, stood up at a luncheon and said, it is 
fantastic, but now Gore-Chernomyrdin is going to be supplemented by a 
Duma-Congress study group, and applauded our foresight as 
parliamentarians coming together to try to build trust and 
understanding.
  So it is okay to do it when they think it is important, but when we 
disagree or think that things are not going the way perhaps they could 
be going, and we try to use that influence that we have, all of a 
sudden we are not doing the right thing. Is that not amazing that that 
could happen?
  Mr. GIBBONS. That is absolutely correct.
  And if the gentleman will continue to yield, I just wish to say that 
I could not be more pleased at the hard work the gentleman has done 
over the past few years in building that important relationship, 
because it came to fruition when the gentleman reached out and asked 
for them to meet with us on this very important document at this very 
important time in this Balkans crisis. They willingly came because of 
the great respect they have for the gentleman and his hard work, and 
that was evident throughout the meeting.
  I have to say that every one of us, whether we are in Congress or 
just ordinary citizens, are diplomats of this country when we travel 
abroad. So it is impossible to separate ourselves from our American 
heritage. It is part of us.
  And we have even a higher responsibility when we are an elected 
official, especially those of us in Congress, in dealing with our 
counterparts, for example in the Russian Duma, to reflect American 
policies, to reflect American ideals. And we did that without 
negotiating, without breaching fundamental trust with the 
administration.
  This was something that was established and has been established, as 
the gentleman said, over a number of years, and it has absolutely 
proven to be one of the most important relationships, one of the most 
important things that we can do as Members of Congress, to build trust 
between countries so that we never have to realize conflict, never have 
to go back to the days of the Cold War.
  I think we are teetering today on the brink of entering another cold 
war. If we lose the elections in Russia, if we lose that confidence, if 
we end up having the cynicism about U.S. relationships with Russia that 
are now starting to grow, we could very well end up back in that same 
old Cold War that we all celebrated the end of in 1989.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I agree.
  The gentleman's suggestion was a valid one, that we go through the G-
8 document and compare it side by side to what we did just so that the 
American people know that what we agreed on with the Russians has now, 
in fact, become the basis of a G-8 set of principles to negotiate an 
end to this conflict.
  Mr. GIBBONS. I would like to be the G-8, if he wants to respond to 
what our agreement said.

[[Page H2916]]

  Let me take the first one. Number one, immediate and verifiable end 
of violence and repression in Kosovo.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And our position on that same issue, and 
I will read it word for word, the stopping of NATO bombing, cessation 
of KLA activities, withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, calls for 
termination of violence and atrocities.
  If that is not identical, I do not know what is.
  Mr. GIBBONS. It is almost word for word.
  Let me take number two. Let us see how similar we can get with number 
two.
  Withdrawal from Kosovo of military police and paramilitary forces.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Ours says, withdrawal of Serb forces from 
Kosovo.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Identical.
  Number three, the deployment in Kosovo of effective international 
civil and (armed) security presences, endorsed and adopted by the 
United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common 
objectives.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And ours says, agreement on the 
composition of armed international forces which would administer Kosovo 
after the Serb withdrawal, to be determined by the U.N. five-member 
Security Council.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Does not get much closer.
  Let us go to number four. Number four says, the establishment of an 
interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the U.N. Security 
Council to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And our document says, the composition of 
armed forces should be decided by a consensus agreement of the five 
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in consultation with 
Macedonia, Albania, Yugoslavia and the recognized leadership of Kosovo. 
And the above group would be monitored by the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, of which both Russia and the U.S. are member 
nations.
  And we had dinner at the ambassador's home for the U.S. with the 
Russian ambassador alongside of us.
  Mr. GIBBONS. That is correct. And so all we did was broaden out a 
little bit the applicability and who would be in there helping to 
decide this very important objective.
  So it seems so far that, of the four we have talked about, we have 
almost got parallel if not word-for-word concurrence with what this 
agreement that we worked on over the weekend says.
  Let us take number five. Number five states, the safe and free return 
of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by 
humanitarian aid organizations.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. This one sounds close here. The voluntary 
repatriation of refugees in Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them by 
humanitarian aid organizations.
  Mr. GIBBONS. I guess they could not get more creative than to copy us 
word for word, could they?
  Let us look at number six. Number six says, a political process 
towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account 
of Rambouillet Accords and principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia and other countries in the region, and 
demilitarization of UCK, which is the KLA.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And ours says, recognizes the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia, including wide autonomy for Kosovo, a multi-
ethnic population, and treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in 
accordance with international norms.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Just reworded.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. We just did not use that fancy 
Rambouillet word, but the content of what we said is identical to what 
is in number six.
  Mr. GIBBONS. That is correct.
  Finally, number seven, comprehensive approach to economic development 
and stabilization of the crisis region.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. And we said, supports efforts to provide 
international assistance to rebuild destroyed refugee homes and other 
humanitarian assistance to victims in Kosovo.
  Mr. GIBBONS. And if the gentleman will yield, as we have gone down 
these seven principles that were established in the G-7 plus Russia or 
commonly known as the G-8, I think it is very clear upon a reading of 
the document that we worked out over the weekend, a reading of the 
principles that they have stated here and a comparison of the two shows 
that there is a direct, an almost word-for-word influence of their 
statement, which has come about to be, as stated in the press, a new 
framework for the peaceful solution of the Kosovo crisis.
  So I can only applaud and congratulate the gentleman here publicly 
for his effort in this, because I think it was directly because of our 
working agreement, our working relationship between the Congress of the 
United States and the Duma of Russia that we were able to bring about a 
higher public awareness of the willingness on terms that are 
satisfactory to the United States, and including many of the NATO 
countries, if not all of the NATO countries, for a peaceful solution of 
the Kosovo crisis.
  I just could not be more proud of the gentleman, and I could not be 
more pleased to be part of this effort. Certainly, as the gentleman 
mentioned earlier in the evening, we do have a resolution which is 
going to come about next week and is going to pretty much give a sense 
of Congress and stating an outline of the important work that was done 
here, the reason for it, and sort of giving congressional support to 
the framework that the gentleman worked so very hard to achieve.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Let me thank my colleague and add to what 
he has said and congratulate him, because he is the one that worked 
with the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) and also worked with the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) to develop this legislation which 
is to be the subject of a hearing next week.
  Unfortunately, the minority leadership, bowing to the White House 
again, would not let us hold the hearing on Wednesday, because that 
would require their unanimous consent, so we have to hold the hearing 
on Thursday. Another obstacle, another day of bombing. We could do this 
hearing on Wednesday and move the legislation, but, no, because we do 
not want to have the Congress discuss this issue, we cannot do it until 
Thursday because the administration has convinced the minority side, in 
spite of the support of their own Members, that we should not have this 
hearing until the full 7 days.

                              {time}  2130

  But I want to say we will have that hearing. I talked to our Russian 
counterparts this morning, and they are planning on bringing up the 
exact same resolution in the State Duma. Our hope is to have this 
Congress pass it, the Russian Duma pass it; and I am even hoping that 
members of the Ukrainian Rada will pass this.
  In fact, I had a call today from a member of the German Bundestag. He 
received our document and he wants to pursue this with members of the 
European parliaments. So momentum is building.
  I do want to take this time to acknowledge our other Members, as I 
know my colleague would. On the minority side we had an outstanding 
delegation. They would be here tonight, but since we ended the session, 
Members are on their way back to their districts. We do have a long 
weekend.
  We are staying here because we have events in town. But our Members 
did do special orders earlier this week. We could not get a full hour 
because all the time was booked. But they would have been here tonight, 
and I want to acknowledge them all personally.
  The ranking Democrat on our trip was the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. 
Neil Abercrombie), an outstanding Member, a tireless advocate for 
trying to find a peaceful resolution to this conflict;
  The gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Corrine Brown), a Member who has 
become a dynamic leader on Russian issues. She has traveled to Russia 
with me twice. She now chairs an effort with female members of the 
Russian Duma to build better relations between our two bodies;
  The gentleman from New York (Maurice Hinchey), a strong supporter of

[[Page H2917]]

President Clinton who supported the bombing efforts, support the 
President's policies, and was a very key part of our delegation. In 
fact, he is the one who talked to Podesta at the White House from 
Vienna;
  The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Dennis Kucinich), former Mayor of 
Cleveland, who is an active Member who has a background from the 
Balkans ethnically, understands the problems. Probably no one is as 
well versed in this Congress on issues involving the Balkans than the 
Democrat from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich);
  And the fifth Democrat, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Bernie 
Sanders), who is the only Independent, the only socialist in Congress, 
a self-admitted liberal. He was an outstanding contributor to our 
effort.
  In fact, it was interesting, I was in a press conference with the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Roscoe Bartlett) today and he is as far to 
the right as the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) is to the left. 
And the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) said, you know 
something, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) and I sat together 
during all the discussions and there was not one issue that he and I 
disagreed on. We were in sync on every issue in every statement. My 
colleague and I were in complete agreement. That is the kind of 
relationship we have.
  Perhaps my colleague would like to go over some of the other 
Republican Members that were with us on the delegation. I have covered 
the Democrats.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, first of all, if I can just repeat that my 
colleague down here from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) was the head of this 
delegation. It was a bipartisan delegation, as he has already stated.
  On our side we had the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Jim Saxton) who 
is a wonderful contributor to the process, brought a great deal of 
insight to the committee, both his position on his committee 
assignment, as well as having traveled to Yugoslavia earlier in the 
week in an effort on his own as an individual to learn more about the 
process and meet and be able to inform us of his findings, as well.
  We had also the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Roscoe Bartlett) as my 
colleague has said, one of the gentleman who has a defined point of 
view, as we say, but yet contributed very well to the whole process as 
we go.
  We had the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Joe Pitts) a wonderful 
colleague who came into the same Congress as I did in the same class in 
the 105th Congress, a remarkable individual, very renowned for his work 
in education and a great member of our bipartisan delegation, as my 
colleague has already stated.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. His colleague from Pennsylvania (Mr. Don 
Sherwood) was there also, a good friend of my colleague's.
  Mr. GIBBONS. And the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Don Sherwood) a 
freshman who entered this Congress this year but with a great deal of 
enthusiasm, a great deal of respect for the process, serves on the 
Committee on Armed Services and made an ideal partner in all of this as 
we went forward during this time.

                          ____________________