Congressional Record, Volume 145 Issue 65 (Thursday, May 6, 1999)

[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 65 (Thursday, May 6, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2901-H2906]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

THE FAA, DOT IG, NTSB AND AVIATION SAFETY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, on March 10, 1999, the House Appropriations
subcommittee on Transportation held a hearing on the topic of aviation
safety. At that hearing, Jane Garvey, administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) testified, as did Ken Mead, Department of
Transportation inspector general (IG), and Jim Hall, chairman of the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Last year, domestic air carriers had an excellent safety record: no
passengers died on U.S. commercial flights. Many worked diligently to
make safety a priority, and in the transportation appropriations
subcommittee we have focused our efforts on aviation safety as well as
all transportation modes.
In listening to the testimony prepared by each agency, it appeared
that there was a difference of opinion in some areas with regard to the
progress being made in aviation safety. Therefore, I requested that the
IG and NTSB review the FAA's testimony and the FAA review the testimony
of the IG and NTSB. In addition, I asked each to respond to the
comments made by the others. I have provided this information for the
Federal Register.
In general, the oversight agencies (NTSB and IG) believe that the FAA
could be moving more aggressively in the referenced areas of aviation
safety. For example, the NTSB noted that the FAA should be moving more
quickly to ensure that aircraft registered in the United States have
new flight data recorders. Similarly, the IG points out that draft
regulations seeking to reduce the number of runway incursions have not
yet been published while the number of runway incursions continues to
rise.
Both oversight agencies suggest that the FAA should use more
realistic measures of aviation safety. For example, the IG notes that a
good measure of airport security is not the number of new explosive
detection machines purchased and distributed, but the number of bags
screened by the machines. After all, it's one thing to purchase and
place explosive detection machines and it is quite another to put them
into service and screen bags.
For its part, the FAA agrees that more should be done in the areas of
runway incursions, airport security and project oversight.
Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that the FAA will continue to work with
the IG, NTSB and the aviation industry to fund and implement additional
safety initiatives. The safety record of the industry last year was
good, but we must remain vigilant in our efforts to improve the safety
of the traveling public. As chairman of the House Appropriations
subcommittee, I am committed, as I know all members of the subcommittee
are, to do what we can to make sure that transportation safety remains
a priority.

OIG Comments on FAA's Statement

We have the following comments on FAA's statement before
the Subcommittee on Transportation, Committee on
Appropriations.

I. Air Traffic Control Modernization

FAA's statement gives the impression that final deployment
of the HOST and Oceanic Computer System Replacement for Phase
1 hardware has been completed. However, final deployment has
not yet occurred and is currently planned to be complete by
October 1999.

II. Security

FAA's testimony on deploying explosives detection systems
state that FAA has been very effective in getting advance
explosives detection systems up and running. FAA's statement
cites the fact that security equipment for checked baggage
has been installed at over 30 airports, and that trace
explosive detection devices for carry-on bags are being used
at more than 50 airports.
The issue is not whether security equipment has been
installed at more than 30 airports or whether the equipment
has been ``procured'', ``installed'' or is ``operational.''
In our opinion, the true measure of effectiveness is the
number of fully operational, FAA-certified bulk explosives
detection machines in use at Category X and I airports that
are screening at or near the demonstrated mean capacity of
125 bags per hour per machine. In our opinion, this usage
rate is reasonable as it includes time to resolve alarms and
is just more than half of the certified rate of 225 bags per
hour.
Accordingly, our message to Congress in the past 2 years
has focused on the underutilization of explosives detection
equipment at this country's largest airports. In our opinion,
it is ultimately the number of bags screened that makes the
difference in aviation security, not the number of explosives
detection machines installed.
FAA also stated that it continues to expand the use of
realistic operational testing of the aviation security
system. While FAA may be expanding the use of realistic
operational testing, much of the testing to date has not been
``realistic.''
In our recneltly completed audit of Secretary of Checked
Baggage, we found that checked baggage security testing by
over 300 FAA security field agents assigned to FAA regions
was limited to air carrier compliance with manual profiling
and positive passenger bag marching requirements. Also, at
the time of our audit, only a few ``red team'' \1\ security
agents assigned to FAA Headquarters were testing the new
automated passenger profiling systems, explosives detection
equipment, and equipment operators. Therefore, red team
testing of the new checked baggage security requirements has
been infrequent, limited to specific testing criteria, and
applied to only a few air carriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Red team refers to a group of security agents assigned to
FAA's Civil Aviation Security Special Activities Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In prior audits, we found similar conditions. For example,
in 1993 and 1996, we reported that FAA testing of airport
access control was ineffective (not realistic or aggressive)
and, in 1998, we reported that FAA testing of air carrier
compliance with cargo security requirements was not
comprehensive. We ntoed certain compliance requirements were
omitted from the test plans.
Current OIG efforts indicate little improvement. For
example, in our current audit of airport Access Control, we
found FAAs airport access control assessments were limited in
scope, included little testing of controls, and were
conducted without using a standard testing protocol.
Our test results confirm the importance of a standard test
protocol that includes realistic and aggressive testing
procedures. In a majority of our tests involving airport
access control, we successfully penetrated secure areas and
boarded a large number of passenger and cargo aircraft. The
majority of individiuals we encountered failed to challenge
us for unauthorized access. FAA recognizes that improvements
are needed and, on

[[Page H2902]]

March 3, 1999, issued a letter to Airport Security
Consortiums to take immediate action to fix the problems.

III. Safety

FAA's testimony states that Runway Incursion Action Teams
have helped Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport reduce
its incursion rate to an all-time low. However, data provided
by FAA staff in the Runway Safety Office indicate that the
incursion rate at the airport is not at its all time low. In
1995, the runway incursion rate at the Cleveland airport was
0.375 per 100,000 operations. The rate climbed in 1996 and
has remained steady over the last three years at just over
1.9 per 100,000 operations. The number of runway incursions
(six occurrences) has also remained steady in the past 3
years.

IV Financing

FAA's statement suggests that the proposed performance-
based organization (PBO) for air traffic control will be
funded in FY 2000, in part, by $1.5 billion in new, cost-
based user fees. This estimate is highly optimistic because
the proposed user fee system will require FAA's cost
accounting system to be in place and operating. Although FAA
plans to being implementing its cost accounting system this
summer in the oceanic and enroute environment to support
overflight fees, other types of air traffic under fees will
require further deployment of the cost accounting system and
concurrence of both Congress and users.
FAA's statement also suggests that the proposed PBO will
make air traffic control more accountable for good
performance. Accountability for performance was also a main
tenet of personnel reform and part of the impetus behind
exempting the agency from most Federal personnel rules in
1996. In our September 30, 1998, report on the status of
FAA's personnel reform, we found that even with the new
flexibilities provided by reform, accountability for
performance had not been uniformly instilled throughout the
agency. Accordingly, in our opinion, there is no guarantee
that reorganizing air traffic control into a PBO will provide
the necessary catalyst to ensure greater accountability for
performance within that organization.

FAA's Response to the Inspector General's Comments on FAA's Testimony

nas modernization

HOST and Oceanic System Replacement (HOCSR):
The FAA did not mean to imply that final deployment of the
HOCSR hardware is complete. We are on schedule and anticipate
final deployment to be complete by October, 1999.

aviation security

Explosive Detection Equipment:
We agree with the IG that the utilization rates should be
significantly higher and we are working with air carriers to
do that. Recent data indicates an upward trend.
Airport Access Control:
We agree that airport access control needs improvement in
many areas. We have initiated an aggressive plan with our
industry partners at 78 of the Nation's largest airports.
Over the next 6 weeks, we will conduct inspections and tests
to identify vulnerabilities systematically. We will use the
information to direct appropriate corrective action. The FAA
issued a letter, on March 3, 1999, to Airport Security
Consortiums to take immediate action to fix the problems.

aviation safety

Runway Incursions:
Specific reference by FAA that Cleveland runway incursions
``dropped to an all-time low'' is, regrettably, incorrect
information.

Financing

We agree with the IG that the estimated $1.5 billion in
new, cost based user fees for FY 2000 is optimistic. However,
we believe that ultimately moving to a cost based system is
essential to the development of a more independent, more
businesslike and more efficient air traffic service.

FAA's Response to the Inspector General's Testimony

At the FY 2000 House Appropriation hearing on March 10,
Chairman Wolf asked the FAA to respond to testimony from the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General (IG) and the
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
This is the FAA's response to the IG testimony on NAS
Modernization, Security, Safety and Financing.

nas modernization

Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS):
The Inspector General recommends that FAA defer decisions
on the full range of software development needed for human
factors on full STARS until testing on the DOD system is
completed.
Although we understand the IG's concern about software
development, we disagree with their recommendation. We have
worked very closely with NATCA to identify and find mutually
agreeable solutions to the human factors issues for the Early
Display Configuration. These changes will be incorporated
into the Initial System Capability (ISC), or full STARS. We
believe that NATCA is fully committed to STARS as the system
for the future and wants to work with FAA to successfully
field a STARS product with minimally agreed to human factors
additions as soon as possible.
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS):
The Inspector General indicates that the program continues
to experience schedule slippage.
The FAA was under pressure several years ago to accelerate
the WAAS schedule. Considering the many uncertainties and
unknowns with this type of cutting edge technology, we knew
there was a great deal of risk with such a compressed,
aggressive schedule. We would like to point out that even
with the 14-month schedule slip that we now project, the WAAS
program is well within the initial (pre-accelerated)
schedule. What caused the 14-month delay was a greater than
expected challenge in developing a critical software package
that monitors the performance and safety of the WAAS. All the
other major software modules have been completed, the ground-
based master and reference stations are in place, and the two
leased geostationary satellites are in orbit providing
service.
With regard to the Hopkins risk assessment study, the
Inspector General discusses several issues that are
unresolved and that considerable work remains to be done.
The Inspector General may have left the impression that
nothing is being done by way of follow-up to the Hopkins
study. In fact, the FAA is addressing the various items in
the Hopkins study and will have a plan completed by this
summer. The FAA is working on a ``Satellite Navigation
Investment Analysis Plan,'' also due out this summer. This
will include an analysis of the alternatives of backups to
WAAS. The FAA discussed these alternatives in a public
Satellite Navigation User Forum here in Washington, the
first of three such forums to get user input in the
investment/alternatives analysis process.
HOST and Oceanic System Replacement (HOCSR):
The Inspector General's comments suggest that meeting the
HOCSR deadline was a relatively modest accomplishment.
The Inspector General testimony from a year ago before the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, said
with regard to HOCSR, ``the FAA faces significant challenges
and risks.'' The testimony also said ``Rehosting in less than
2 years at all centers is extremely optimistic. It is
unlikely that FAA can completely replace the HOST hardware at
all 20 enroute centers in less than 2 years.''
HOCSR phase 1, while being a hardware replacement only, is
not simple. Host is connected to almost everything else in
the NAS and the transition strategy [akin to changing a tire
on a moving car] is fairly involved. Complex networks of
cables and switches were installed, tested and connected to
the existing NAS with no disruption of service. Centers were
able to switch back and forth between old and new systems
seamlessly. This was a major accomplishment, and we are
within cost and on schedule.
Display System Replacement (DSR):
The Inspector General's testimony minimizes the DSR
accomplishment because it did not involve large-scale
development of software.
DSR should fit the definition of a software-intensive
system. DSR required development, integration and test of
almost 800,000 lines of operational software and also
required integration of over 70 commercial, off-the-shelf
software packages as part of the support system.
Data Link:
The Inspector General raised concerns about a prolonged
transition and the associated impact on cost, schedule, and
human factors.
We believe that our current plans adequately address the
Inspector General's concerns. Rather than a transition to
data link, the FAA will be conducting an insertion of data
link technology into the NAS. Benefits will be realized
immediately, both by data link and non-data link users,
because of a reduction of frequency congestion on
conventional voice frequencies. Data link will never
completely replace voice communications especially in
conditions of aircraft or system emergencies, rapidly
changing severe weather, and similar high communications
workload environments. From the standpoint of cost, only
those users who derive a supportive cost/benefit analysis
will equip; those that don't will derive the operational
benefit of greater access to conventional communications
frequencies. FAA costs are offset as data link provides a
solution for current and future bandwidth problems. Those
users that will equip will do so as the business case
dictates. Human factors suggests that data link be used for
routine messages; voice messages will still be available for
time critical communications, and, because of the use of data
link in routine traffic, a higher level of safety and
efficiency will be maintained through reduced frequency
congestion.

aviation security

Explosive Detection Equipment:
The Inspector General raises concerns about the
underutilization of explosive detection equipment and
recommends that the machines be used more aggressively. The
Inspector General indicates that FAA's goal is to have air
carriers ultimately screen all checked baggage.
We want to emphasize that the long-term goal to screen all
checked baggage is very long term. With the technology that
exists

[[Page H2903]]

today, we have more confidence in the process of screening
CAPS selectee bags rather than trying to screen as many bags
as possible.

aviation safety

Runway Incursions:
The Inspector General stated that the FAA has made limited
progress in implementing the Runway Incursion Plan.
The FAA has made significant progress but we realize there
is much more to do. We are finalizing the program
implementation plan, which establishes tasks, schedules and
funding required to accomplish prevention strategies. We
expect to publish this plan in April, 1999. We are well aware
that we must provide appropriate funds for these priority
initiatives.
We have on-site evaluations underway. Runway incursion
action teams are focusing on airports experiencing an
unusually high rate of incidents. We have completed 6 and
plan to complete at least 14 additional evaluations by
September 30, 1999.
The FAA is currently in the final stages of investment
analysis that is addressing the validity of a wide range of
technical and non-technical solutions, such as: improved
controller, pilot, vehicle operator education and training;
procedural changes; and improvements in airport signs,
lighting, surface marking and other equipment (such as low
cost ASDE, loop technology).
The FAA is focusing on immediate initiatives to reduce
runway incursions and prevent surface accidents. We are in
the process of implementing 18 separate actions, which are
all funded. Some examples follow:
``Awareness blitz'' targeted for operators and users.
Monthly Air Traffic/Airport Operator/User meetings at top
20 runway incursion airports.
Develop and distribute videos to address controller and
pilot awareness.
Develop and safety related brochures and materials to
aviation organizations.
The FAA's Safer Skies also identifies runway incursions as
one of the focus areas for commercial and general aviation. A
commercial and general aviation analysis team that includes
FAA, NASA, industry and aviation union representatives [the
Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT)] was chartered and met on
February 11-12, 1998. A schedule over the next 6-month period
was established to analyze commercial and general aviation
runway incursions and develop intervention strategies based
on this data analysis. This effort is fully coordinated with
and complements the efforts in the Runway Incursion Program
plan.
The Inspector General indicates that FAA has completed only
two of the eight recommendations included in the February,
1998 OIG report.
We continue to work towards completion of all of the 1998
recommendations from the IG. With regard to the IG's emphasis
on completing the AA/AOPA education project, we would like to
point out that the final part of the project is underway--the
distribution of educational materials (videos, posters and
brochures).
Clarification on Runway Incursion Data included in the
Inspector General's Statement:
With regard to the chart on page 5 of the Inspector
General's statement, the data is accurate. This data was
obtained from FAA through the National Airspace Information
Monitoring System.
Specific reference by FAA that Cleveland runway incursions
``dropped to an all-time low'' is, regrettably, incorrect
information.
Flight Operations Quality Assurance:
The Inspector General raised concerns about the status of
rulemaking to obtain air carrier safety data that would be
used to proactively identify risks. The statement discusses
the protection of safety data and the ability of FAA to move
forward with FOQA.
The FAA is addressing the safety data protection concerns
in a separate notice of proposed rulemaking which we hope to
release for public comment in the near future.
The Inspector General suggests that an option for gaining
industry and Government acceptance of FOQA would be to
include a ``sunset provision'' in the final rule.
The FAA disagrees. The FAA has already gathered ample
documentation of the value-added safety benefits that FOQA
will provide, including improvements to air traffic
procedures, pilot training, and airport equipage. The FAA
wants accelerated industry-wide implementation of FOQA in the
interest of public safety. Given the investment required by
both the airlines and the FAA to achieve that goal, a
``sunset provision,'' which automatically terminates the
program by a set date seems inappropriate.
Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS):
The Inspector General raises concerns about budget
reduction and the impact on ATOS.
The FAA has made difficult choices this year in order to
manage within a very constrained budget. We have deferred
hiring ATOS data analysts his year. However, in order to keep
the program on track with Phase I, we have reprioritized work
plans to support ATOS until additional analysts can be hired.
We have fully funded the ATOS baseline training. This
includes initial indoctrination training and travel for air
carrier specific training needed by the certificate
management team (CMT). Some of the flight training and air
carrier systems training needed by team members has been
deferred.
Regardless of the budget situation, we believe that a
slower approach to ATOS is prudent. It is important to note
that we will evaluate ATOS Phase I before a decision is made
to expand the program.
The IG indicates that the FAA will complete an evaluation
of ATOS implementation by June 30, 1999. FAA will begin an
evaluation of ATOS Phase I implementation by June 30, 1999,
and we expect to complete this activity September 30, 1999.
Air Tour Operations:
The Inspector General urges the FAA to issue rulemaking to
extend more stringent safety and oversight of air tour
operators.
FAA has developed a notice of proposed rule making (NPRM)
that will establish a set of national safety standards for
those operators. The rule will require that each operator
obtain an air carrier certificate and associated operations
specifications. The rule would also make operational
information on air tour operators more readily available.
Both the IG and NTSB have insisted on the need for a data
base on air tour operators. They have provided no rationale
as to how a data base will improve safety. The FAA disagrees
and believes establishment of such a data base is costly and
unnecessary and would provide no safety benefit. Once all air
operators are certificated, FAA will have sufficient
information in its operation specifications data base to
provide safety oversight.

financing and cost control

Rising Operations Costs:
The Inspector General indicates that FAA will need to
contain increases in Operations costs in order to fund other
critical functions.
FAA is also concerned about rising Operations costs because
our ability to actually control payroll-related increases in
extremely limited. Approximately 75% of the Operations
account is payroll related. Payroll cost increases are based
on mandatory pay raises as well as increases in government
contribution rates for retirement, social security, health
insurance and medicare.
The recent NATCA agreement does cost more than we budgeted
for but represents less than 25% of our total mandatory
increases this year.
The best way the FAA can control payroll costs is through
staffing reductions. We have made significant staffing
reductions since 1993. Even though the safety workforce has
grown in recent years, the staffing levels in Operations are
4,500 lower than in 1993. These reductions have resulted in
annual cost avoidance of $250 million and cumulative cost
avoidance of over $2 billion. We have also reduced our costs
by contracting out low level air traffic control facilities
and realigning the Airway Facilities field organizations.
In the context of rising Operations costs, the Inspector
General questions an FAA funding policy that has been in
place for over six years.
We do not consider first year maintenance costs of a new
system to be a ``mask'' for rising Operations costs. The use
of F&E funds to pay for maintenance for up to one year
following commissioning new systems can be compared to a
service contract for a newly acquired product, or a warranty
period. These are appropriately considered part of the cost
of fielding new systems. This policy was coordinated with and
approved by the House and Senate Appropriation Committees.
Cost Accounting:
The Inspector General points out schedule slippages in
implementation of cost accounting.
While the IG is correct in noting there have been schedule
slippages, we have made significant changes in how the agency
approaches this critical initiative. The revised plan calls
for an incremental approach to cost accounting that allows us
to build on success as each piece is implemented.
For example, in the first phase, FAA will have the initial
cost information available this summer for the Oceanic and En
Route portions of Air Traffic Services. Once this is
completed, other parts of Air Traffic Services and then other
Lines of Business will be brought into the System.
We anticipate having the entire agency covered by the cost
accounting system by the end of FY 2001.
When compared to private sector entities that have built
similar cost accounting systems, FAA's new time schedule and
cost estimates compare favorably with best business
practices.

[Enclosure 2]

Response to FAA's Comments on Our Statements

We have the following response to FAA's comments on our
statements.

I. Air Traffic Control Modernization

FAA disagrees with our recommendation that FAA defer
decisions on the full range of software development needed
for human factors on full STARS until the testing on the
Department of Defense system in completed. FAA states that it
has worked closely with the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association to resolve the human factors issues with the
Early Display Configuration. These human factors changes will
be incorporated in full STARS.
We agree that the human factors issues identified for the
Early Display Configuration should be incorporated in full
STARS.

[[Page H2904]]

Our recommendation was intended to address the remaining
human factors work that will be needed beyond those
identified for the Early Display Configuration. Full STARS
will completely replace ARTS with independent primary and
back-up systems and includes functions not contained in the
Early Display Configuration.
FAA argues that we minimize the accomplishments to date
with the Display System Replacement (DSR), and the agency
points out that DSR was a software intensive acquisition. DSR
was indeed a software intensive acquisition. However, it is
important to recognize that considerable software development
for DSR was done as part of the Advanced Automation System,
which was contracted for in 1988 and dramatically
restructured in 1994. Therefore the success with DSR is
directly related to software development work done during
that six-year period.
FAA notes that current agency plans adequately address our
concerns about Data Link. However, we issued a report on
February 24, 1999, that made a number of recommendations
aimed at improving planning for Data Link systems. We
continue to believe that a comprehensive plan is needed to
guide industry and government efforts to transition to Data
Link over the next decade.

II. Security

FAA said that the goal to screen all checked baggage is
very long-term (not obtainable in the near future).
We agree that screening all checked bags is a long-term
goal. However, FAA needs to begin to move forward in
achieving that goal. Utilization can be increased for several
reasons. First, the machines currently deployed at the
nation's busiest airports are clearly capable of screening
significantly more bags than the bags of selectees only. This
is currently being demonstrated by a few machines deployed at
some airports. Second, it offers a high potential for
improving aviation security. The equipment's ability to
detect explosive material does not depend exclusively on
human skill, vigilance, or judgment. Third, it represents a
significant outlay of funds. FAA estimates average costs of
$1.3 million to purchase and install each CTX 5000 SP.
Fourth, based on an FAA study, continued low use may affect
operator proficiency and prevent FAA from effectively
measuring how dependable the equipment is in actual
operations.

III. Safety

Runway Incursions
FAA stated that it has made significant progress in
implementing the Runway Incursion Plan. We acknowledge that
FAA has made some progress in implementing the Runway
Incursion Plan, which is a very sound foundation for
effectively reducing runway incursions. However, only 18 of
the 51 actions indicated in their plan have been initiated.
Additionally, we found that some deadlines have slipped and
may slip further unless funding is set aside to implement all
actions in the plan. While FAA plans to identify all funding
requirements for its Runway Incursion Plan through an
investment analysis, it does not expect to complete this
process before September 1999. Further, this analysis only
pertains to future funding beginning in FY 2001 and does not
address current funding requirements.
Runway incursions include operational errors, pilot
deviations, and vehicle/pedestrian deviations. FAA states
that surface operational error were down by 9 percent.
However, data we received from the Air Traffic Resource
Management Program Office indicates surface operational
errors were up by 5 percent. The only decrease noted in the
data was a 30 percent decrease in vehicle/pedestrian
deviations.
Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA)
FAA disagreed with our suggestion that an option for
gaining industry and Government acceptance of FOQA would be
to include a ``sunset provision'' in the final rule. FAA
stated that it has already gathered ample documentation of
the value-added safety benefits that FOQA will provide,
including improvements to air traffic procedures, pilot
training, and airport equipage. FAA wants accelerated
industry-wide implementation acceptance of FOQA in the
interest of public safety. According to FAA, given the
investment required by both the airlines and FAA to achieve
that goal, a ``sunset provision,'' which automatically
terminates the program by a set date seems inappropriate.
We agree that access to FOQA data has been accepted as a
value-added safety beneficial program. However, to gain
acceptance of the program, FAA should include enticements in
the final rule to satisfy the many reservations expressed by
government agencies. In our opinion, one enticement would be
a provision in the final rule that would sunset the program
at a specific time. A sunset provision would allow FAA, air
carriers, and government agencies to assess any concerns
experienced before the FOQA programs were extended.
Air Tour
FAA stated that both the IG and NTSB have insisted on the
need for a database on air tour operators but provided no
rationale as to how a database will improve safety. FAA
disagrees and believes establishment of such a database is
costly and unnecessary and would provide no safety benefit.
FAA stated that once all air tour operators are certificated,
FAA will have sufficient information in its operation
specifications database to provide safety oversight.
We agree with NTSB that FAA needs to know who air tour
operators are and where they are flying to provide proper
oversight. The NTSB stated in findings to its June 1995
report that:
``The lack of a national database for air tour operations
precludes effective evaluation of the accident rate of air
tour operators on the traditional basis of flight hours,
cycles, and passengers carried. Also, the adequacy of
staffing levels of FSDOs [FAA Flight Standards District
Offices] to oversee air tour operators is difficult to
evaluate because of the lack of national standards and a
database to establish the magnitude of this portion of
commercial aviation.''
Even though originally recommended by NTSB in 1993, there
is no comprehensive air tour database or survey data.
Currently the Department and FAA are proposing to act on this
recommendation 2 years after the draft rulemaking is
complete. The draft rule has not yet been published for
comment. A required comment period and the possibility of
changes based on the comments received, could mean a final
rule is still months away. FAA should not continue to delay
taking action on this recommendation.

IV. Financing

FAA stated that payroll cost increases are based on
mandatory pay raises as well as increases in government
contribution rates for retirement, social security, health
insurance and medicare--all of which are outside the control
of the agency. While we are mindful that some cost increases
associated with FAA's Operations account are outside the
control of the agency, other factors are within the agency's
control. For example, the new pay system for air traffic
controllers was the result of negotiations between FAA and
the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and not the
result of mandatory pay raises or increase in government
contribution rates for employee benefits.
FAA also stated that it does not consider first year
maintenance costs of a new system to be a ``mask'' for rising
Operations costs and that the policy was coordinated with and
approved by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
We did not question the practice used by FAA of funding
certain activities using F&E budgets. As we stated in our
testimony, FAA's procedures permit this method of accounting.
However, our statement was to demonstrate that Operations
costs may be even greater than reported because F&E funds are
used, in some cases, to finance activities normally related
to operations, such as maintenance, salaries, and travel
costs.

FAA's Response to the National Transportation Safety Board Testimony

International Issues

The NTSB indicates that their involvement in international
accident investigations has increased because more and more
U.S. airlines are entering into code-share arrangements with
foreign airlines. He points out that FAA oversight
responsibilities for foreign carriers is limited.
FAA has actively pursued new bilateral agreements that
define specific obligations for both parties for
airworthiness acceptance, repairs and maintenance. These new
agreements, called Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements,
offer the FAA greater flexibility in dealing with the
international oversight issues. Prior to implementing such
agreements, the FAA conducts a detailed assessment of a
partner country's aviation system and concludes
implementation procedures that outline how each authority
will interact. FAA's vision is that a network of competent
aviation authorities will share responsibility for safety
oversight and we are continuously working towards building
this network.
The NTSB references a domestic situation similar to the
international oversight issue that arose several years ago
when large U.S. carriers began code-share arrangements with
commuter airlines that did not have the same stringent safety
requirements. Chairman Hall stated, ``Consequently, the
traveling public was receiving in effect two levels of
safety, until December 1995 when the FAA acted on NTSB
recommendations and issued its final rule.''
The one level of safety initiative came from Secretary
Pena's January 1995 Safety Summit and the considerable
efforts of industry. The NTSB was involved, however, the rule
was not specifically in response to a NTSB recommendation.

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)

The NTSB indicates a significant area of concern in foreign
accidents is CFIT.
CFIT and approach and landing accidents are major safety
items in the Administrator's Safety Agenda. The FAA and
industry have extensive efforts underway to address these
accident causal factors, yet no mention of the FAA/industry
program is made by the NTSB.
FAA's short term efforts are directed toward (1)
implementing the Terrain Awareness Warning System rule while
encouraging voluntary compliance, (2) re-emphasizing current
ATC CFIT training procedures and

[[Page H2905]]

enhancing them where necessary, (3) establishing standards
for FMS equipped aircraft to enable precision-like approaches
to all airports, (4) emphasizing training on approach and
missed approach procedures, (5) installing MSAW capabilities
worldwide with an emphasis of high risk airports, and (6)
implementing the FOQA rule to better identify safety-related
issues and corrective actions. FAA will continue to work with
industry to identify the most effective mid and long range
interventions to reduce CFIT accidents.
The NTSB lumped CFIT and approach and landing accidents in
one group. We believe the two categories should not be mixed.
However, we recognize the need to address both CFIT and
approach and landing issues.

Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System

Chairman Hall states that ``during the investigation for
the (1997) Korean Air accident, it was revealed that the
installation of EGPWS would have provided the flightcrew
significant warning of the impending ground collision.
However, at that time, the system was not certified for that
model aircraft.''
The Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 was equipped with a GPWS
that provided appropriate and timely terrain warnings to the
flightcrew. For whatever reason, the flightcrew did not heed
the GPWS warnings.
At the time of the Guam accident, EGPWS was not only not
certified for the B747, it was also not available from the
manufacturer. Chairman Hall's statement could lead one to
believe that the only reason EGPWS wasn't on the KAL B747 was
a lack of effort by the FAA.

Airplane Recorders

Chairman Hall states that ``the Safety Board and this
Subcommittee have for many years prodded the FAA to require
upgraded recorders on transport category aircraft, but sadly,
most of the fleet is still equipped with outmoded
recorders.''
On July 17, the FAA revised Digital Flight Data Recorder
(DFDR) rules. The revision specified the required increase in
recorded parameters and compliance times for four categories
of aircraft. To date, the FAA believes that close to 30
percent of the affected U.S.-registered fleet (aircraft with
10 or more seats) is in compliance with the new requirements.
In addition, the FAA has data indicating that 95 percent of
the U.S. B-737 fleet is either in compliance or in the
progress of complying with the rule. We believe progress has
been made but we also recognize that there is much more to be
done. Administrator Garvey is working with the Air Transport
Association and the individual carrier's CEOs to ensure early
compliance for a major portion of the air carrier fleet.
The FAA is initiating an accelerated rulemaking effort to
mandate increased recording time (2 hours) and the provision
of a 10-minute independent power source for Cockpit Voice
Records (CVRs). Since January 1998, practically all transport
category aircraft have left the production line with a 2-hour
recorder installed as original equipment. This same
rulemaking project will also require CVR retrofits on all in-
service aircraft and mandate dual-recorder equipage for new
aircraft. Finally, the rulemaking project will amend Part 25
to require that CVRs, FDRs and redundant combination flight
recorders be powered from separate generators with the
highest reliability.

airframe structural icing

Chairman hall discusses a history of NTSB recommendations
on icing and a lack of acceptable response from the FAA. The
NTSB is hopeful that the FAA's response to the most recent
series of icing recommendations will be more acceptable.
The NTSB comments may leave the impression that the FAA has
done very little to respond to airframe icing safety.
The FAA initiatives to improve safety when operating in
icing conditions are outlined in the comprehensive FAA
Inflight Icing Plan issues in April 1997. The Plan describes
rulemaking, advisory material, research programs, and other
initiatives either underway or to be initiated to achieve
safety in icing conditions.
With regard to FAA responsiveness to NTSB icing
recommendations, the NTSB testimony is silent with respect to
the numerous Roselawn safety recommendations. In fact, there
are 11 icing recommendations from the Roselawn accident, and
all have been classified by the Safety Board in an Acceptable
status. Three are Closed Acceptable and 8 are Open
Acceptable.
The FAA has completed numerous actions which directly
respond to airframe icing safety:
May 1995: issued AD to require modification of the deicing
boots on the Aerospatiale ATR-42 and -72.
April 1996 and February 1998: issued 42 AD's requiring
aircraft with unpowered roll controls and pneumatic deicing
boots to exit icing conditions when specific visual icing
cues are observed.
May 1996: FAA sponsored International Conference on
Aircraft Inflight Icing.
April 1997: FAA Inflight Icing Plan issued.
July 1997: issued guidance on newly designed or derivative
aircraft.
December 1997: issued AD requiring installation of an ice
detector system on the EMBRAER EMB-120.
December 1998: held a mixed-phase and glaciated icing
conditions workshop.
February 1999: sponsored an International conference on
inflight operations in icing conditions.
February 1999: provided an analysis of supercooled large
droplet (SLD) data to Rulemaking Advisory Committee for
discussion on certification issues.
Additional AD's related to the operation of ice protection
systems and minimum speeds in icing conditions are planned as
a result of the February 1999 Icing Conference.
The NTSB testimony states, ``The original recommendations
that stemmed from our 1981 safety study . . . were eventually
closed as unacceptable or superseded, but the recommendations
remained in an ``Open--Unacceptable Response status for 15
years''.
The original recommendations were superseded with a new
recommendation A-96-54 which is classified as ``Open
Acceptable.''

runway incursions

The NTSB is critical of the FAA's response to the rising
number of runway incursions. Specifically, he says ``the FAA
has studied this issue for years and has developed several
action plans. Just last year, the FAA announced that reducing
runway incursions was one of its top priorities and issued
the Airport Surface Operation Safety Action Plan. However,
implementation of that plan has not been finalized.''
The FAA has made significant progress but we realize there
is much more to do. We are finalizing the program
implementation plan, which establishes tasks, schedules and
funding required to accomplish prevention strategies. We
expect to publish this plan in April, 1999. We are well aware
that we must provide appropriate funds for these priority
initiatives.
We have on-site evaluations underway. Runway incursion
action teams are focusing on airports experiencing an
unusually high rate of incidents. We have completed 6 and
plan to complete at least 14 additional evaluations by
September 30, 1999.
The FAA is currently in the final stages of investment
analysis that is addressing the validity of a wide range of
technical and non-technical solutions, such as: improved
controller, pilot, vehicle operator education and training;
procedural changes; and improvements in airport signs,
lighting, surface marking and other equipment (such as low
cost ASDE, loop technology).
The FAA is focusing on immediate initiatives to reduce
runway incursions and prevent surface accidents. We are in
the process of implementing 18 separate actions. Some
examples follow:
``Awareness blitz'' targeted for operators and users.
Monthly Air Traffic/Airport Operator/User meetings at top
20 runway incursion airports.
Develop and distribute videos to address controller and
pilot awareness.
Develop and safety related brochures and materials to
aviation organizations.
The FAA's Safer Skies also identifies runway incursions as
one of the focus areas for commercial and general aviation. A
commercial and general aviation analysis team that includes
FAA, NASA, industry and aviation union representatives [the
Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT)] was chartered and met on
February 11-12, 1998. A schedule over the next 6-month period
was established to analyze commercial and general aviation
runway incursions and develop intervention strategies based
on this data analysis. This effort is fully coordinated with
and complements the efforts in the Runway Incursion Program
plan.

Review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) comments of testimony
presented by the National Transportation Safety Board on March 10, 1999

international issues: code-sharing arrangements/one level of safety

The FAA stated ``The one level of safety initiative came
from Secretary Pena's January 1995 Safety Summit and the
considerable efforts of industry. The . . . rule was not
specifically in response to a NTSB recommendation.''
Comment.--The impetus for the one level of safety
initiative and the issue of code-sharing can be found in the
Safety Board's 1994 safety study on commuter airline safety,
in which the Board recommended that the FAA:
Revise the Federal Aviation Regulations such that:
All scheduled passenger service conducted in aircraft with
20 or more passenger seats be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 121. (Class II, Priority
Action) (A-94-191)
All scheduled passenger service conducted in aircraft with
10 to 19 passenger seats be conducted in accordance with 14
CFR Part 121, or its functional equivalent, wherever
possible. (Class II, Priority Act) (A-94-192)
These recommendations and the recommendations on pilot
training (A-94-195 and A-94-196) were classified ``Closed--
Acceptable Action'' when the FAA issued its final rule on
commuter airlines on December 20, 1995. These
recommendations, and subsequent Safety Board Congressional
testimony regarding commuter airline safety, predate
Secretary Pena's 1995 Safety Summit. To say that that rule
was not in response to Safety Board recommendations is not
accurate.
In that study, the Safety Board also recommended that the
U.S. Department of Transportation:
Require U.S. domestic air carriers certificated under 14
CFR Part 121, when involved in a code-sharing arrangement
with a commuter airline, to establish a program of

[[Page H2906]]

operational oversight that (a) includes periodic safety
audits of flight operations, training programs, and
maintenance and inspection; and (b) emphasizes the exchange
of information and resources that will enhance the safety of
flight operations. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-94-205)
Based on the safety recommendation database, that
recommendation is still in an open--acceptable action status.
While we were pleased with the initiatives outlined at the
Safety Summit (and we should point out that we participated
in the Summit), the full intent of the above recommendations
has yet to be met.
The Board recognizes that some of the concerns it had with
code-sharing arrangements between U.S. carriers can also
exist in code-sharing arrangements between foreign-based
carriers and U.S. carriers. The Board will thoroughly
consider such issues should they arise in the Board's
investigations and we will issue recommendations should they
be warranted.

controlled flight into terrain (cfit)

The FAA stated that ``CFIT and approach and landing
accidents are major safety items. . . .''
Comment.--From the time that EGPWS was first certified
(Oct. 1996), it took FAA an additional 2 years to issue the
NPRM. We are not aware that a final rule has been issued.

enhanced ground proximity warning systems

The FAA stated ``The Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 was
equipped with a GPWS that provided appropriate and timely
terrain warnings to the flight-crew.''
Comment.--This statement is not correct. The KAL Boeing 747
GPWS did not provide any terrain warnings to the flightcrew
because the airplane was in landing configuration. Only radio
altitude call were given by the GPWS during the accident
flight.
The FAA stated ``At the time of the Guam accident, the
EGPWS was not only not certified for the B747, it was also
not available from the manufacturer.''
Chairman Hall stated that at the time of the accident EGPWS
was ``not certified for that model aircraft'' (referring to
the KAL 747-300). Chairman Hall merely stated a fact and was
not implying that FAA inaction was to blame for the lack of
an EGPWS on the accident airplane.

airplane recorders

The FAA stated ``To date, the FAA believes that close to 30
percent of the affected U.S.-registered fleet (aircraft with
10 or more seats) is in compliance with new requirements.''
Comment.--Thirty percent is considered a modest
accomplishment when it is noted that most newly manufactured
airplanes delivered since 1998 meet or exceed the new
parameter requirements, and that 226 Boeing 737s were
retrofitted by one airline, namely Southwest, accounting for
most of the retrofits. Therefore, the bulk of this 30 percent
figure can be attributed to newly manufactured airplanes and
one airline's aggressive retrofit program.
The FAA stated ``. . . 95% of the U.S. B-737 fleet is
either in compliance or in the progress of complying with the
rule.''
Comment.--At this late date, the Boeing 737 operators
should be in the process of complying with the new FDR
requirements. It is the Board's understanding that ``being in
the progress'' can mean that an aircraft is simply scheduled
for a retrofit as much as two years in the future.
The FAA stated ``Administrator Garvey is working with the
Air Transport Association and the individual carrier's CEOs
to ensure early compliance for a major portion of the carrier
fleet.''
Comment.--The Metrojet Boeing 737 that experienced a rudder
incident near Baltimore--Washington International Airport was
scheduled to have a C-check in March 1999, but was not
scheduled to have the FDR up-grade until 2001. This does not
reflect early compliance.
The FAA stated ``FAA is initiating an accelerated
rulemaking effort to mandate increased recording time (2
hours). . . .''
Comment.--This statement is accurate. A Rulemaking project
has been initiated and FAA staff assigned. NTSB staff has
been invited to participate in the rulemaking effort, and
thus far, Safety Board staff have had four meetings with FAA
staff on this subject.
The FAA stated ``Since January 1998, practically all
transport category aircraft have left the production line
with a 2-hour recorder installed as original equipment.''
Comment.--While this statement is generally true, we are
aware of at least one airline's labor agreement with its
pilots required them to remove the 2-hour CVRs and replace
them with the solid-state 30-minute CVRs.

Airframe Structural Icing

The FAA stated ``The NTSB comments may leave the impression
that the FAA has done very little to respond to airframe
icing safety.''
The Safety Board does believe that the FAA did very little
to address airframe structural icing until after the ATR-72
accident at Roselawn, Indiana in 1994. Since then, the FAA
has worked with industry, primarily through the ARAC process,
to initiate several important efforts that will eventually
reduce the risk of flight in icing conditions. Chairman Hall
acknowledged these recent ARAC efforts in the Board's
testimony.
``With regard to FAA responsiveness to NTSB icing
recommendations, Chairman Hall in silent with respect to the
numerous Roselawn safety recommendations.''
Comment.--Chairman Hall mentioned both the Comair and the
Roselawn accident recommendations in his testimony, and
acknowledged that the FAA's ARAC efforts and icing
conferences are ``in response to those recommendations.''
The FAA stated ``The FAA has completed numerous actions
which directly respond to airfame icing safety.''
Comment.--The Safety Board acknowledges the FAA actions
cited in Administrator Garvey's response.
The FAA stated ``The original recommendations were
superseded with a new recommendation A-96-54 which is
classified as `Open Acceptable'.''
Comment.--Chairman Hall's testimony correctly states that
the original 1981 safety study recommendations remained in an
open-unacceptable status for 15 years. It is also correct
that the original recommendations were superseded with a new
recommendation, A-96-54, which is classified as Open-
Acceptable. The 1981 recommendation was superseded with a new
safety recommendation because acceptable action had not been
taken by FAA.

runway incursions

The Safety Board's concerns about runway incursions are
heightened by adverse trends in recent years. Although there
was a slight downward trend in runway incursions from 1990 to
1993, the trend has been moving upward since then. In 1997,
there were 300 incursions, up from 275 the previous year. In
1998, there were 326 incursions. According to the FAA, the
monthly rate in September 1998--0.73 incursions per 100,000
operations--was the highest monthly rate in 11 years.
The FAA stated, ``We are finalizing the program
implementation plan . . . we expect to publish the plan in
April 1999 . . . we are well aware that were must provide
appropriate funds . . .
Comment.--The Safety Board has expressed its disappointment
that the FAA failed to fund its program office for runway
incursions for more than two years. This safety issue needs
coordination and overall direction by the FAA, which had been
the function of the program office. The Board is pleased that
the FAA is now committing itself to the necessary
coordination and funding, and will review the FAA's plans and
budgets when they are provided. The Board hopes that the FAA
will meet its target date of April 1999.
The FAA stated, ``We have on-site evaluations underway.''
Comment.--The Safety Board is aware that several
initiatives have been started and tested by the FAA, but too
few of these have been completed. The Board will continue to
evaluate the FAA's runway incursion program based on
completed programs and equipment that is placed in operation.
For example, the Safety Board notes that several AMASS units
may be ``fielded'' or ``deployed'', but the Board further
notes that none are currently operational and the FAA has not
projected an operational date.

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