[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 65 (Thursday, May 6, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E902-E903]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            CRISIS IN KOSOVO--REMARKS BY ADM. EUGENE CARROLL

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, May 6, 1999

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on April 21, 1999, I convened the first in 
a series of Congressional Teach-In sessions on the Crisis in Kosovo. If 
a peaceful resolution to this conflict is to be found in the coming 
weeks, it is essential that we cultivate a consciousness of peace and 
actively search for creative solutions. We must construct a foundation 
for peace through negotiation and mediation, and through honest 
diplomacy.
  Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful 
dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a 
constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will 
contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of Congress 
and the public to explore alternatives to the bombing and options for a 
peaceful resolution. We will hear from a variety of speakers on 
different sides of the Kosovo situation. I will be introducing into the 
Congressional Record transcripts of their remarks and essays that shed 
light on the many dimensions of the crisis.
  First is a presentation by Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret) who now 
serves as the Deputy Director of the Center for Defense Information 
(CDI). Adm. Carroll analyzes the stated objectives of the bombing of 
Serbia and whether the exercise of military power is capable of 
realizing those objectives. He also discusses the fundamental character 
of the Rombouillet plan that was presented to Mr. Milosevic, and the 
importance of Russian intervention in achieving a durable resolution to 
the crisis. I commend this excellent presentation to my colleagues.

  Presentation by Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret) To Congressional 
                   Teach-In on Kosovo--April 21, 1999

       The conventional wisdom is that war is much too important 
     to be left to generals and admirals. As a result, in a 
     democratic society, the question of going to war and the 
     objectives to be sought in a war are political 
     responsibilities. The objectives are defined in political 
     terms. It is very important at this point that the objectives 
     be attainable by military force. The two must match. And the 
     objective must merit the use of this blunt, destructive, 
     indiscriminate process we call war. The outcome, the 
     achievements, must outweight the damage and destruction and 
     loss occasioned by the war.
       Looking at Kosovo we find that the objectives have been a 
     little hard to nail down. But two of them stand out. Deter 
     and degrade the ability of Serian forces to effect ethnic 
     cleansing in Kosovo. And, to compel Serbian compliance with 
     the Rambouillet plan. The first objective, the protection of 
     the Kosovars, was never obtainable by the means employed. The 
     air war cannot protect these abused people. It is impossible 
     to control military and political conditions on the ground 
     with air power alone. The power, the authority, on the ground 
     will control the situation. There is so much evidence of this 
     that it is simply undeniable. We have the ability to punish, 
     we can destroy, we can kill. But to control the situation, 
     and protect the Kosovars? No. The means of air warfare alone 
     did not match the objective. What does the destruction of the 
     Socialist Party headquarters in Belgrade do to mitigate the 
     conditions of Kosovars in Kosovo?
       The second objective, namely compelling compliance with the 
     Rambouillet plans, was also unattainable by air power. 
     Rambouillet was a demand for total capitulation by the 
     Milosevic government. The capitulation did not just apply in 
     Kosovo. I don't think this is entirely understood. It was far 
     broader than that. Appendix B of the Rambouillet plan spelled 
     out the problem this way. ``NATO personel shall enjoy 
     together with

[[Page E903]]

     their vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment free and 
     unrestricted passage, and unimpeded access, throughout the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including associated air 
     space and territorial waters.'' So NATO is to have access to 
     and control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). NATO 
     is granted the use of airports, roads, rails and ports 
     without payment of fees. This goes on and on. NATO will 
     exercise police power. It will have full use of the 
     electronic spectrum in the region. It will have immunity 
     from all FRY jurisdiction related to criminal offenses. 
     The plan required total surrender of sovereignty by the 
     FRY.
       The terms were presented to the Milosevic government in 
     non-negotiable form--here is the plan, you sign here or we 
     bomb. Obviously, no government could accept such a usurpation 
     of its sovereignty. In human terms, it would have been the 
     end of Milosevic. If someone had designed a plan to be 
     certain that it was going to be refused, they could not have 
     done better than the Rambouillet plan. Thus the second 
     objective fails until military force produces an 
     unconditional surrender, the total collapse of the power and 
     authority of the central government. And that cannot be 
     achieved from the air.
       NATO can clearly defeat Serbia on the ground. I don't think 
     that was ever in doubt. But before you make the decision to 
     proceed that way, you have to figure the time required and 
     what will happen during that time. The bombing will go on. 
     The Kosovars will be eliminated because we are talking about 
     a matter of months. The cost in terms of the total 
     destruction in the Serbian-Kosovo region is immeasurable.
       We have been bombing for about a month. We've done a lot 
     damage. But we will go a lot further, in terms of wiping out 
     the Serbian economy, if we push troops forward. The cost and 
     difficulties of invading with ground forces, of going to the 
     point of effecting an unconditional surrender by the Serbian 
     government, simply are incalculable. This would constitute 
     total defeat for Milosevic. But does that constitute a NATO 
     victory?
       I think it is very important that we distinguish between a 
     Milosevic defeat and a NATO victory. Certainly the Kosovars 
     have already lost. The Serbs have lost already. They have 
     lost lives, property, much of their economy and this will 
     only intensify. In terms of its own stated objectives, even 
     with unconditional surrender, NATO loses. NATO becomes 
     responsible for restoration of a devastated nation and this 
     is a task which will take years and billions of dollars. And 
     a continuing military presence because none of the 
     fundamental problems that produced the violence in the 
     beginning have been addressed or resolved. If anything, many 
     of the factors have been exacerbated. We have inherited a 
     tragedy. We are responsible for it. We cannot call that 
     victory.
       Will it bring peace to the Balkans? That's the word being 
     bandied about Washington. We're going to pacify the Balkans 
     and bring stability to Europe. Will it bring peace to the 
     Balkans? No. We can stay there on guard over them with guns 
     and tanks, but we cannot pacify the Balkans when we don't 
     treat the fundamental issues that guide the conflict there.
       The solution must ultimately be political and it must be 
     based upon negotiations, not ultimata. You are going to have 
     to come to understandings and agreements and accommodations 
     which have merit and benefit for both sides if you hope to 
     produce any enduring quality to the solution. NATO has to get 
     out of the way. The United Nations must live up to its 
     responsibilities--with American support for a change--
     financial and otherwise, and the OSCE must step in and play a 
     leading role in attempting to separate the military element 
     of NATO from the people of Serbia. NATO cannot, I believe, be 
     the honest broker in the final resolution of this.
       The last point. This is the time and opportunity to bring 
     Russia back into the European security equation. If anyone 
     thinks there can be peace in the Balkans, or peace in Europe 
     indefinitely--stable, cooperative security arrangements--
     without Russia being part of it, they are very mistaken. Yet 
     what we have done so far in the Balkans is to isolate Russia, 
     to denigrate them, to humiliate them, by ignoring their 
     interests and their concerns. I believe that Russia, under 
     the UN Security Council, can play a leading role as a 
     mediator in bringing about an end to violence in Serbia.
       As much as I oppose the bombing as being irrelevant to 
     solving the Balkan situation, I do not at this moment favor a 
     moratorium on the part of NATO. I favor negotiations going 
     forward with the understanding that when there is an 
     unequivocal commitment on both sides--the withdrawal of 
     Serbian forces from Kosovo and the end of bombing--then is 
     when the cease fire would go into effect. There would have to 
     be positive evidence and good faith on both sides to bring 
     about the end of violence in Kosovo.
       My message to you: There is no military solution in Kosovo 
     or Serbia.