[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 64 (Wednesday, May 5, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2795-H2802]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1664, KOSOVO 
   AND SOUTHWEST ASIA EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

  Mrs. MYRICK, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged 
report (Rept. No. 106-127) on the resolution (H. Res. 159) providing 
for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1664) making emergency supplemental 
appropriations for military operations, refugee relief, and 
humanitarian assistance relating to the conflict in Kosovo, and for 
military operations in Southwest Asia for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 1999, and for other purposes, which was referred to the 
House Calendar and ordered to be printed.
  Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, well, we will go back to the Kosovo 
discussion, but I do, first of all, want to acknowledge the Committee 
on Rules.
  As my colleagues can see, it is after 10 o'clock at night back here 
in the East, and that Committee on Rules is still working hard. They 
put in a lot of late hours, and I know they are appreciated by the 
Members on this floor.
  Let us go back to my outline about what I am going to discuss this 
evening on Kosovo and Yugoslavia.
  First of all, we are going to talk a little on the brief history, 
just give you summary.
  I am not a historian, I am not a teacher or a professor, so I am not 
going to go into great detail, but I do want to summarize kind of the 
scenario or the historical perspective that I think is important for me 
to get to the other points of this speech. We are going to talk about 
what are the interests of the United States.
  As my colleagues know, before the United States enters any type of 
military action, we need to define, we need to have a clear 
interpretation and a clear definition of why it is that we are doing 
what we are doing, what is it about the authority. Do you have the 
authority to invade the sovereign territory of another country? Under 
what conditions does that authority exist, and do we meet those 
conditions?
  Talk about what the European responsibility is in this situation, 
what the cost is to the American taxpayers, and I think you will be 
surprised by the numbers that I give you this evening as to what it is 
going to cost the American taxpayers to complete this action over the 
next 2 to 3 years.
  We should talk about the humanitarian effort. Clearly, no matter 
where you fall on the side of the policy that is now being followed by 
this country in regards to Kosovo, we can all agree on one thing, and 
that is that there is a just cause for a humanitarian effort. We will 
talk a little bit about the humanitarian effort.
  We will also talk about the deployment of ground troops. I have read 
the press lately, I have read and been briefed and so on that there is 
an urge to put ground troops in over there. Let us talk a little about 
that this evening.
  What are the logistics involved? What do ground troops really mean? 
What kind of numbers of ground troops are we going to have to have to 
go into this situation, not just to keep the peace, but do we ever 
stand a chance of making the peace? And tonight my colleagues will see 
that I distinguish between keeping the peace and making the peace.
  We will talk a little bit about NATO, what the military facts are of 
NATO,

[[Page H2796]]

and I want to visit about what I think how this conflict will probably 
end, what my best guess is, what the wild card is. We know what the 
wild card is out there. We are going to talk a little more about the 
Russians; that is the key, that is the wild card; talk about the 
refugee problem, and of course we will emphasize our support for the 
troops.
  But let us talk a little about and let us look first at the map and 
talk a little bit about the history.
  This is Yugoslavia, just an outline right here.
  To give you an example, right there where the red dot is, that is 
Belgrade. Probably as we are speaking, as I am speaking right now, 
there are bombing missions or sorties being taken over the community or 
the city of Belgrade.
  The important region down here, this is Kosovo, right here where I am 
circling with the red dot. That is called Kosovo.
  The reason that I brought the map is that my colleagues need to 
understand there are some individuals who are talking about an 
occupation of this portion of Yugoslavia. By going in there with a 
military force some have even suggested a partition, partition out this 
area called Kosovo away from the sovereign mother country of 
Yugoslavia.
  What is key about that is to remember that in any country and with 
any of us sitting in these Chambers one of the things of which we have 
the strongest fundamental views about is our religion. This is a key 
issue here. Remember that in Yugoslavia the Serbs, many of the 
monuments of their religion, the birthplace of their religion, is in 
this very territory down here that some people are suggesting to 
separate from the main country and to put under some type of partition 
or under some type of occupation by a foreign force.
  That is a key issue, to see whether we can resolve it by the 
occupation, and that is how are you going to address this religious 
difference? What are you going to say to those people? What are you 
going to say to the Serbs, the Serb citizens, by the way, not the 
leadership, but the Serbs and the citizens of Yugoslavia, that they 
cannot go down to the territory and visit their religious monuments. It 
is a point we ought to remember.
  Remember that in this country, and we have left the map now. We 
probably will not have to come back to where we may come back a little 
later on to talk about Macedonia and Albania and so on. But the history 
of this country, I have heard many people talk about this is a 
genocide. I have no disagreement with these individuals when we talk 
about the tragedies that are going on, but I want to point out that 
this is different than Hitler.
  I have seen a lot of comparisons to Hitler. There are atrocities, but 
remember the atrocities and the historical perspective have occurred on 
both sides. We are in between two bad characters.
  Now I am not talking about the innocent citizens of the country. I am 
talking about the leaders of the KLA, the Kosovo liberation 
organization, and I am talking about Milosevic and Yugoslavia, the 
leaders, the dictators, over in that country. They are both bad 
characters.
  And when we talk about the genocide, that would infer a Hitler type 
of situation where we went to an innocent population, the Jewish 
population. They were not engaged in a civil war. He just wiped them 
out because they were Jewish.
  In this particular country there is killing going on in both sides. 
It has been for hundreds of years. Take a look at the history 1389. The 
Serbs and the Turks engaged in the battle over the disputed territory 
here in Kosovo. In Yugoslavia, the Serbs lost that battle, but to this 
day they still celebrate it as a holiday.
  This conflict has lots of history. This conflict has guilty parties, 
so to speak, on all sides.
  I am going to talk a little more extensively about the KLA as we get 
into it, but what we are intervening in here is not a genocide. We are 
intervening in a war of which we know very little about, a civil war. 
To me, it makes as much sense as having the Mexican Army come across 
the borders of the United States to try and resolve the battle between 
the North and the South. How well do you think that would have gone 
over? What did the Mexican Army really understand about the conflict 
between the North and the South? What does the United States really 
understand on the historical conflict in Yugoslavia?
  I think our understanding is limited. I think their understanding, it 
is their home territory, it is their religion, it is a battle that has 
been going on for a long time.

  Take a look at the historical perspective of the United States. How 
successful have we been in our history when we have intervened in the 
civil war of another country? We have never been successful in that 
kind of intervention.
  Now there are times, if you get a mass of enough force, that we are 
able to step between two warring parties; for example, Cyprus. On the 
island of Cyprus we have something called the green line. It is the 
line that separates the Greeks from the Turks. We have been there for 
27 years under the auspices of the United Nations. Have we made the 
peace between the Greeks and the Turks? No. We stood between them. We 
have kept them apart from each other.
  What will happen in my opinion the day that we will pull U.N. forces 
or American forces or a peacekeeping force out from between these 
parties? They are going to go back to doing what they have done for a 
long, long time. In my opinion, they do not like each other any better 
today than they did 30 years ago when we put the green line in. So the 
green line is able to keep peace between the parties as long as we are 
willing to continue this long-term commitment, but they have never made 
peace between the parties.
  Is the United States or NATO going to be able to make the peace 
between these parties?
  You will note during my conversation that I keep referring to the 
United States. Well, the United States is, in fact, operating under the 
auspices of NATO. But take a look at what the proportions are. The 
United States by far is carrying a minimum of 90 percent, in my 
opinion, a minimum of 90 percent of the cost, 90 percent of the forces, 
90 percent of the bombs, 90 percent of the equipment. So when I talk 
about the United States, I understand that this is a NATO operation. 
But I also think it is fair for us to determine what proportion the 
United States is carrying, and I think it is also fair for us to 
explain to the American people, whom I think already know, that the 
United States by far has the heaviest weight on their shoulders.
  Well, is the United States going to be able to go into this country, 
into this dispute that involves hundreds of years of history, that 
involves religion, that involves atrocities on both sides? Is the 
United States militarily going to be able to go in and make the peace? 
I do not think so. Is the United States willing to go in and give the 
kind of long-term, expensive commitment, expensive not just in dollars 
but, even more importantly, in human lives to try and keep the peace? I 
do not know. I do not think so once we have a clear understanding of 
just how difficult this will be and what the small chances of success 
are.
  Now I do, as I mentioned earlier, believe that the United States has 
a very clear role from a humanitarian aspect. As my colleagues know, 
that is one of the things we can be awful proud about in this country. 
I am darn proud to be an American. I am very, very proud of our 
forefathers, of our children and of the obligations that this country 
voluntarily takes on to help people in need. This country's greatness 
is in part built on our humanitarian efforts throughout history for 
other countries, but there is a large difference between humanitarian 
effort and the military effort.
  Let me talk about the next issue that I think we need to talk about, 
and what are the interests of the United States? Of course, the United 
States, we are God-loving people. We are people who, generally, we do 
believe in peace. We oppose oppression. The question here is, how do we 
distinguish between an action in Yugoslavia and, say, an action in the 
Sudan or Rwanda?
  Now granted Sudan and Rwanda are not on the CNN news every hour or 
every half an hour and have not been for the last several months, but I 
can tell you that the atrocities that are being committed in those 
countries

[[Page H2797]]

greatly exceed the atrocities that were being committed in Yugoslavia 
before we started the invasion.
  In fact, you will see that the punishment being dealt up unfairly in 
Yugoslavia to the Albanians, to the Kosovo Albanians, was actually 
much, much less prior to the NATO invasion, much, much less than any of 
these other countries, but the United States must make a very conscious 
decision on where the interests of this country are that are necessary 
for us to enter into a conflict.

                              {time}  2215

  One of them is we do not like to see people being killed. We do not 
like it anywhere. We value human life at the very highest of the rungs 
on the ladder. It is supreme to us, human life. But we cannot be the 
world's police officer. We cannot go to Rwanda tomorrow. We cannot go 
to Sudan.
  The question is: What is the difference here? Why are we over there 
in Yugoslavia? What justifies that any more than acting or failing to 
act in the Sudan or in Rwanda? Is it a national security interest? Is 
the Yugoslav Army capable of a military threat to the continental 
United States? The answer is, no.
  Is it a threat to the European continent? I have heard over and over 
and over again about how this is going to spread throughout Europe; 
this is how the world war started. It is not how World War I started by 
the way. And this is going to lead to World War III if we do not 
quickly get in there and contain this situation.
  I disagree with that very, very strongly. I do not see this as a 
threat to the European continent, meaning that it is going to flow 
throughout its borders and create a war on the European continent. If, 
in fact, that is true, the Europeans ought to frankly pick up a little 
heavier load on this particular mission.
  Maybe the Europeans ought to handle the military aspect of this 
mission and let the United States handle the humanitarian aspect of it.
  I frankly do not think the Europeans are carrying their fair share of 
the load here. Once again, it is the good old United States that is 
carrying the load. So we do not have a national security threat; we do 
not have a threat to the European continent. Do we have an economic, a 
world economic threat? Do we have even a more specific economic threat 
as a result of the actions occurring in Yugoslavia? The answer to that 
is, no, as well.
  Once we address what kind of interests that we have, then we have to 
address how do we get out of it? What is the exit strategy? What is the 
end game? Do we have one here?
  I think it is very confusing out there. I think NATO is confused by 
it. I think the American public is confused about it. I can talk to any 
one of my colleagues out here and I do not think any one of us have a 
unified exit strategy.
  Now what are we going to do? That question keeps coming up, now what 
are we going to do? Where do we go from this point? How well did we 
think out the fact that hundreds of thousands of refugees would be 
coming across these borders; in fact, the possibility of creating now a 
political upheaval in some of these other countries?
  We have to figure out what our national interests are. I have a 
pretty simple test to do that. I think that before the United States 
puts our young men and women in harm's way, we need to, as elected 
officials, as representatives of the people of this country, we have an 
awesome responsibility, we have a fiduciary responsibility, to the 
people of this country, before we commit those young people to harm's 
way, I think we need to do this test, and this is how I do it, this is 
the burden I put upon myself: Can I look to the parents of one of these 
young people right in the eye and tell them that the loss of the life 
of their young child was necessitated by the best interests of this 
country, that this young person giving the ultimate supreme sacrifice, 
their life, was necessary to protect the national interest of the 
United States of America?
  My own feeling, my own deep personal belief, I do not think we can 
meet that standard. I cannot meet that standard because I fail to see 
what are the national interests.
  As I mentioned earlier, clearly there are atrocities, and I do not 
want a misinterpretation coming here, there are atrocities that are 
being committed. The question is, what role should the United States 
play? I think the role of the United States would much better be 
defined and much easier justified and would fall within the realm of 
our national interests for us to carry out the humanitarian mission, 
not to be the 90 percent partner, 90 percent partner, on a military 
action; 90 percent meaning we pick up the bulk of it.
  Now we have heard some people say, well, yes but the United States 
just has the heavy load on the beginning. Then as this action proceeds, 
the other members of NATO will pitch in and carry their fair share, but 
the United States really needs to carry the burden because they have 
the equipment, they have the soldiers, they have the money.
  I can say this, Mr. Speaker, in my opinion, with all due respect to 
our European colleagues, they are going to sit back and say, hey, let 
the United States do it; let the taxpayers of the United States pay for 
it; let the United States put its troops in harm's way; let the United 
States supply the airplanes; let the United States supply the arsenals; 
let the United States go in and rebuild what the United States has 
bombed; let the United States put in what I think is going to be 
necessary, a miniature Marshall Plan to rebuild all of the destruction 
and try and create some kind of an economy over there if, in fact, we 
can get the refugees back in there.
  This partnership ratio, in my opinion, is not going to change as long 
as we sit on our hands and are content with carrying 18 other partners, 
with us carrying 90 percent of the load. It should not work that way. 
This is a partnership.
  So we need to figure out, do we have national interests that, in 
fact, dictate, mandate, require, that we enter into a military action? 
Well, we certainly did not going into it. I would love to debate any 
one of my colleagues, anybody in here, to really justify it. Now, 
remember, we have a humanitarian mission justified but a military 
mission, based on the history of this country, based on our lack of 
success, this country's lack of success in the intervention of any 
civil war, I would like to debate whether we have that national 
interest going in.
  Now, of course, the question arises, has the national interest been 
created now that we are in? Should we just drop NATO? Does it hurt the 
alliance, the defense alliance, for the United States to all of a 
sudden stop operations?
  Well, there is a debate there, and that is a logical question to ask. 
It is a question I do not fully know the answer to, but I do think that 
the United States can step forward without jeopardizing the alliance, 
the importance of the NATO alliance. I am a NATO supporter as far as 
the concept of that alliance.
  I do not think we jeopardize that alliance at all for us to step up 
to our European neighbors and say, hey, the balance is going to change 
here; you are going to start to carry a heavier burden on your 
shoulders, European colleagues, European partners, and we are going to 
start to focus more on the humanitarian effort. That kind of shift, in 
my opinion, needs to take place.
  Let us talk about the legal authority. Remember what we had here in 
Yugoslavia? See the red dot there? What is that following? There is a 
little tiny line. That little tiny line is what humans have decided to 
use as a designation of what? Of a border, of a boundary. Someone wants 
to find a border, as a line drawn in the sand, to see how close they 
could get to it without going on to the other side of it.

  Well, that is what this is. This is a sovereign country. Every party 
involved in this conflict acknowledges that this right here, 
Yugoslavia, it is a sovereign country and that to go into the region 
called Kosovo, borders have to be crossed; the sovereign territory of 
another country has to be crossed.
  NATO has never gone, without invitation, across a sovereign territory 
of another country, but they did this time.
  Now remember not too many years ago the Persian Gulf War? Remember 
the quotes from our leaders back then? How could Iraq possibly think it 
is a violation of international law for Iraq to invade the sovereign 
territory of Kuwait? So the United States went to war

[[Page H2798]]

with Iraq because Iraq violated that boundary, a boundary very similar 
to this in definition; violated that boundary, invaded a sovereign 
country.
  So the United States, justifiably I might add, went to war to push 
Iraq back across this sovereign territory. Once the United States 
pushed Iraq back out of Kuwait and back into its own boundaries, the 
United States ceased the action because the theory of the action was 
simply to defend the sovereign nation, not exclusively but somewhat 
simply to defend those boundaries of Kuwait.
  What kind of precedent do we set by allowing NATO to invade the 
sovereign territory of Yugoslavia and maybe even carve out a part of 
the country and say we are taking this part of the country from them? 
What kind of precedent do we set?
  What happens, for example, if Quebec, in its effort to seek 
independence, decides to secede from Canada? Does that give the United 
States justification to bomb Canada? How are we going to address that. 
That is not a farfetched scenario.
  What if some of the people in Mexico want Texas either to be 
independent or go back to Mexico? Does that give Mexico the right to 
bomb the United States?
  Sure, a lot of people who are very supportive of the action, the 
military action, who say do not dare question the policy of the 
administration, they will say this does not compare, but I am saying, 
and I put out there to all of my colleagues the question, think about 
it, try and think historically where we have been successful in a civil 
war; try and think of other factors or other similar situations in the 
country, like in the world, like Quebec and Canada, and ask the 
questions what if, what kind of precedent, what kind of history are we 
setting with the action that we have undertaken?
  Let us move on. I have talked about what I think the European 
responsibility is. I think that a lot of our colleagues, a lot of our 
partners in NATO, need to pick up a bigger load. I have said that 
repeatedly during my comments but it does bear repeating again. The 
United States is a good guy. It is a good country. It is a great 
country. We truly have been the leaders of the free world for a long 
time.
  I think our country is very capable and I think our country has a 
responsibility on humanitarian aid when we see tragedies, by the way on 
both sides of this conflict, tragedies on both sides of this conflict, 
we have a humanitarian responsibility.
  How do we measure out just how much weight we put in the backpack 
that the United States is expected to carry compared to the Europeans?
  I frankly think a lot of our partners in NATO are getting a free 
ride. It is not their planes that are at substantial risk. Take a look 
at the money that this country will pay now.
  Speaking of money, and we are going to talk about cost here in a 
minute, remember there are lots of ways to shift numbers about but when 
we get to the bottom line, the bottom line is this is an action by the 
United States of America. The United States is going to pay a bigger 
part of it, and I think it is time to have another partnership meeting. 
I think in that partnership meeting it is time to say to our partners 
that they are going to have to carry a larger share of the burden here. 
We are happy to help on the humanitarian effort but from a military 
point of view, they have to participate more; they have to take a 
bigger chunk of this.
  When I talk about military, I am not just talking about the bombing 
raids, the missions, the sorties we are carrying out over there. I am 
talking about the time after. Once this thing reaches a cease-fire, and 
I think it will at some point reach a cease-fire, I am talking about 
rebuilding that territory that has been destroyed by NATO bombs, or by 
the Yugoslavia Army. How is that rebuilt and whose obligation is it 
then? Is it once again going to be 90 percent of the United States of 
America? I propose that it probably will be, unless we have an 
administration and a Congress that is strong in saying to NATO, look, 
to rebuild this, to put in a mini Marshall Plan, there are other 
countries that are going to have to participate in a very substantial 
way.
  The United States cannot be expected to spend a hundred billion 
dollars at a minimum to put this country back on track.
  Let us talk about the cost because I just mentioned a hundred billion 
dollars. I mentioned that earlier in my comments. Now I am putting 
aside the cost of human lives. Obviously the most painful, the most 
regrettable and the toughest cost out there is the loss of a human 
life.
  With all due respect, we lost two of our military people last night 
in a helicopter accident. We had our first two fatalities in this 
action. I regret those losses and to me they are, and to I am sure 
every colleague I have here, republican and democrat, it is a loss that 
is substantial to us. Every time we lose a human life in an action like 
this, it is a substantial loss.
  Let us talk not about that cost, but let us talk about the dollars. 
For a moment let us talk about the less important cost, which is the 
dollars; let us just go to that category and talk about it. Are we in 
this country prepared to spend at least a hundred billion, billion not 
million, billion dollars on this action?

                              {time}  2230

  That is what I think it is going to cost.
  Let us talk about the cost for a minute. I estimate, and now, there 
are lots of accounting shifts that go on out there in government books. 
They will say, there is a carrier out there, for example, that we have 
assigned to this mission, but we do not really assign the costs of the 
carrier to this action because we would have had to pay for this 
carrier to be somewhere, anyway. So we do not add this up.
  There are all kinds of little tricks that go on. Some of them are 
legitimate, so maybe the word ``tricks'' is not correct, maybe 
``maneuvers.'' There is all kinds of maneuvering that goes on to 
allocate these costs in different slots.
  The fact is, I think if we looked at a true cost accounting of what 
this action is incurring, I would say it is about $1 billion a week, $1 
billion a week. Tomorrow on this House floor we are going to have a 
very healthy debate on supplementing, on the first down payment or one 
of the first down payments to pay for this project.
  The expense is not just, as I mentioned earlier, our military 
mission. When the bombs stop falling, this deal is not over. In fact, 
we just signed on to a long-term contract. One of the first things that 
will be demanded is that America, is that the United States, through 
the auspices of NATO or some other organization, perhaps they will 
bring the United Nations into this, has an obligation to rebuild, to go 
in there and build those bridges, to go in there and build an economy.
  Remember, these refugees who have left this country, why have they 
left the country? One, because of NATO bombs; two, because of the 
Yugoslavian army and the slaughter that is going on over there as a 
result of a wartime action, now; three, their bridges have been 
destroyed, their drinking water has been contaminated, they do not have 
any communication abilities, they do not have heating capabilities. 
They do not have roads, bridges. You name it, it has been destroyed. 
Somebody has to rebuild it. Guess who it is going to fall upon?
  In my opinion, it will fall upon NATO, and NATO, of course, will look 
at the United States and say, look, really, you are a wealthy country. 
You really should pay for this. And part of it I think we should. I 
think we should help the refugees. I think we do have an obligation to 
help get that country on its feet. But I do not think that obligation 
extends to the percentage of 90 percent. I do not agree with that.
  But let us take a look. If it remains at about that 90 percent, or we 
continue to carry the large, unproportionate burden of this, the costs 
of this action will exceed $100 billion. I can tell the Members, we 
could do a lot with Medicare, we could do a lot with social security, 
we could do a lot with education with an extra $100 billion.
  I have addressed the humanitarian effort. I want to tonight 
acknowledge everyone from the Red Cross to the different religious 
organizations to all of the people throughout this country who have 
collection boxes at local grocery stores to send clothes and books and 
food to the refugees and to the innocent citizens that are involved in

[[Page H2799]]

this conflict. That is what has made America great. That is what will 
continue to keep America great.
  As strongly as I question the policy of military intervention, I feel 
that strong about humanitarian intervention. It is appropriate for us 
to be in there on a humanitarian effort. Our country can handle it. Our 
country can carry it out. Our country can put a lot of smiles on these 
refugees' faces. We can clothe them, we can feed them, and we can help 
them rebuild their country. But where our expertise will get the 
biggest return is not the military intervention but the humanitarian 
intervention.
  During the discussions we have had, we hear a lot of people talk 
about or debate whether or not we should have ground troops. By 
listening to some of the government officials or by reading some of the 
articles in the media, we would think we could put ground troops in 
there tomorrow if we decided.
  Let us talk about ground troops. First of all, it would be a huge 
mistake for the United States to put in ground troops that were not of 
sufficient quantity and strength to expect a ground war over there. 
Going into Yugoslavia is not going to be like going into Iraq, where 
you have a flat desert where you can see your enemies for a long ways.
  It is not like the Colorado mountains. My district is in the State of 
Colorado, but it is probably very much like the Blue Ridge mountains in 
Virginia. I have been over there. I have seen it. This is rugged 
territory. This is their home territory.
  As I mentioned earlier, this is the birthplace of the Serbs' 
religion. This is not going to be an easy place to occupy. In order to 
do that, we cannot send in 28,000 troops and accomplish the job. If we 
send in 28,000, we will be grossly undermanned, we will take many, many 
casualties, and we will wish to God we had sent in three, four, or five 
times that amount of force.
  In order for us to really sustain the kind of military ground 
operation that would be necessary, I would say that at a minimum we 
need to send in 100,000 ground troops, and probably, more likely than 
not, closer to 200,000 than 100,000.
  Are we prepared to move those kinds of troops into Yugoslavia? 
Putting aside the political argument or the dispute whether or not they 
should be there, take a look at the logistical challenges that we face.
  It is an immense project to move just a division, and a division, a 
light army division, has say 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers. What they call 
a heavy division contains about 17,000 troops, 17,000 in a heavy 
division and then 5,000 to 15,000 more troops in support facilities.
  The equipment necessary to move a division would stretch 700 miles. 
If we put all of the equipment that is necessary to support a division 
bumper to bumper, we could probably run a line 700 miles. We have to 
move that equipment from the United States or from other military bases 
throughout the world into that region.
  Take a look at how long it took to move the Apache helicopters over 
there. What did we have, 24 helicopters? It took a month, 6 weeks? It 
was not because we were reluctant to move them over there, it is 
because it took a lot of manpower, it took a lot of mechanical, 
logistical planning to get those 24 Apache helicopters over there. Take 
that factor and multiply it by several hundred, if you want to move a 
division. Just assume several divisions. We are going to have to put 
several divisions in place if we want to have a successful military 
intervention on the ground. We cannot ignore that.
  Now, where do we stage it? This is a large staging operation to move 
that equipment over there. A lot of people say, let us go to Albania. 
Albania seems to be a logical location to put the equipment in. The 
difficulty is that Albania is a very, very poor country. Their airport 
does not have radar. Their harbor does not have the capability for 
cranes to reach in and lift tanks out of ships. We cannot move all of 
this equipment by aircraft. It would take significant infrastructure 
placement in Albania for us to utilize that as a staging area.

  The other countries are not very excited, and maybe Macedonia will 
come around, but the other countries are not very excited about the 
United States or NATO staging a military action out of their country.
  So the number one problem we have is, aside from the political 
commitment or the commitment to put those troops in there in the first 
place, is logistically, where do we start? Where is headquarters? Who 
has the logistical capability to help us move that equipment from 
throughout the world, most of it coming from the United States of 
America, into that area, servicing that equipment, fueling that 
equipment, manning that equipment, and then dispersing that equipment 
where we need to have it dispersed for a successful ground operation? I 
think it would take several months for us to get that capability in 
place.
  Now, once that is mentioned, keep in mind that we just do not have 
unlimited equipment in the United States. When we dedicate that type of 
equipment to support that large a ground force in this country, we have 
to get it from somewhere. Where do we get it from? We get it from other 
military bases, other U.S. military bases.
  My point is this: We are diluting the military force in this country 
to address this particular problem. I do not agree with the policy, but 
let us just, for the sake of the argument, say that the policy is 
correct, so we move all of that equipment over there. We have to keep 
in mind what kind of dilution do we now have in Korea, for example? 
What kind of dilution do we have in the United States? Are we taking 
the very best equipment away from our main forces in the United States?
  We know that the President has already called up the reserves, so we 
know that our military forces, our troop numbers, are being 
significantly diluted. The President asked for 30,000 more troops, 
28,000 or 30,000 more. It is my opinion if we were to launch a massive 
ground invasion, which I think would be the safest route to go, if in 
fact we agree with ground troops in there, and I do not, and I do not 
agree with the policy, but if that decision were made, I think it is 
very realistic for us to expect that the President would have to call 
up draftees.
  Is this country prepared to reengage in the draft? The draft is 
already in existence. As we know, 18-year-old males have to register 
for it. Is this administration, is this Congress, prepared to draft 
individuals to put that kind of force in place in Yugoslavia while 
maintaining our strength in Korea, while maintaining our strength in 
the mainland United States, while maintaining our strength throughout 
the other areas in Europe?
  That is a significant question for us to ask ourselves, what kind of 
dilution can we afford? Even if we want to go in there with ground 
forces, even if we think this cause justifies an American military 
action, we still must stand back and say, can we afford or to what 
extent can we afford to dilute our current military forces? That is an 
important question.
  As we know, or maybe Members have not read in the newspapers, for the 
first time in I don't know how many years we no longer have a carrier 
in the Pacific arena. We moved that carrier. Orders were given to that 
carrier to move over to assist in this operation. That is dangerous.
  Take a look at the deploying of our military forces. In my opinion, 
some of these cuts have gone way too deep. In my opinion, our military 
could not sustain, contrary to what the administration says to us, our 
military cannot sustain two simultaneous major actions at once. It 
could not do it because the military has been so downsized. Now, to 
further dilute it for this kind of action, even if it is a just action, 
we have to assess that responsibility and what the cost of doing that 
is.
  I wanted to very quickly cover the members of NATO. We have Belgium, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, one of the 
new members, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America.
  Let me say, in that list of NATO members, they are all well-intended. 
I am not sure that our fellow partners, as I mentioned earlier, are 
carrying their fair share, but I will say that, for example, the United 
Kingdom, I think they have been tremendous. I think proportionately 
they are probably carrying their fair share.
  But some of these other NATO members are going to have to step up to 
the

[[Page H2800]]

plate. In my opinion, the United States of America is going to begin to 
question this policy more and more, especially when they see lives of 
American soldiers, we lost two of them last night, when that begins to 
become unproportionate, and even one death in my opinion is 
unproportionate; when they begin to see, the American taxpayers, what 
these tax dollars are costing, when they begin to see what the dilution 
is to our current military, I think some serious questions are going to 
be asked: What are the other members of NATO going to carry? What is 
their burden? What is their responsibility?
  NATO, remember, was formed as a defense alliance. This is not a 
defensive action. Some people will say it is to defend a spread 
throughout the European continent. I do not think it is, I think it is 
an offensive action.
  But nonetheless, we are there. How do we resolve this conflict? What 
do we do to get out of this conflict? Well, we are in it. While we are 
in it, I think we have an obligation to support our troops with the 
best equipment we can possibly get over to them. Granted, it dilutes 
us. We have to keep a very keen eye on how to work that. But as long as 
we have one American soldier over there, we have to make sure they are 
properly equipped and we support the troops. We may disagree with the 
policy, but we have to give the support to those troops.
  I think at some point Russia is going to play a key part in bringing 
a cease-fire to this situation over there. It is my opinion that Russia 
was not involved in the earlier stages to the extent that Russia should 
be involved.
  Why do we say Russia? I know there is a lot of resentment or a lot of 
ill will towards Russia. Some people will say, they are bygones, they 
are minute players in this. They are just the player we need, in my 
opinion, to bring a cease-fire. They have credibility with the Serbs, 
they have some credibility with the United States, they have 
credibility with the United Nations, and they have some credibility 
with members of NATO.
  Russia may just be the player at the right time and in the right 
place to bring this thing to a cease-fire. I think what will eventually 
happen is that the air war, which apparently right now is being stepped 
up, and I can say that, while I disagree with the policy of being 
there, while we are there, we might as well carry out the mission that 
the President has sent those troops over there for.
  So while this is going on, the sustained bombing, I think Russia will 
eventually, through negotiations that could be going on right now, 
bring us to a cease-fire. But there are several elements of that cease-
fire that are going to be necessary to carry it out.
  One, there is going to be a huge, a huge financial obligation put on 
the members of NATO, primarily the United States, one, to help bail 
Russia out of its economic problems; and two, to rebuild Kosovo, and to 
rebuild the infrastructure and put an economy in place that will 
sustain that country.

                              {time}  2245

  So that is where I think this action is heading. I do not think this 
conflict will spread like Vietnam spread, but I hope I do not later eat 
my words.
  By the way, speaking of Vietnam, I want to say to all of my 
colleagues, that some people have said to those of us who question the 
policy of putting ground troops in Kosovo, who question the policy of 
the United States' extent of military involvement, they say to us, 
look, any kind of action outside our boundaries, we must speak as one 
voice; do not dare question the administration's policies.
  We have an obligation to question a policy if we in our heart do not 
think that policy is right, and that is exactly what I intend to 
continue on doing. Granted, outside our borders we are a very strong 
country, and within our borders we are a very strong country. But what 
makes us as strong as we are is that we have the checks and balances in 
this country; that we are free to speak, to question authority. And 
that is exactly what has made us as strong as we are.
  Now, the wild card we have to worry about is if this bombing 
continues and if Russia is ignored. And to the administration's credit, 
I do not think they are ignoring Russia. I think the administration and 
NATO, and, frankly, NATO got in way over its head as far as the 
refugees were concerned. They never expected these refugees to come 
over, they never expected to have problems with balance of power in the 
countries which these refugees go into. NATO did not know what to do 
with them.
  I think NATO is looking for a way out. And I think the administration 
is treating Russia with respect, and I give the administration credit 
for that. But we have to be very tender with Russia, because at some 
point Russia may say, all right, we are going to go ahead and sail 
Russian oil tankers through our so-called oil blockades. And what will 
NATO do? What NATO will do is they will not stop that ship. If Russia 
decides they are going to start supplying the Serbs with weapons or, 
worse, they are going to put a few Russian troops in Belgrade and say, 
do not bomb Belgrade any more, Mr. President, that is the wild card of 
Russia.
  That is why I emphasized that Russia is an important player. They may 
not have the military significance that they used to have, they may not 
be the threat from a ground force standpoint or from an operating naval 
standpoint that they used to be, although clearly maybe they are even 
more of a threat from a nuclear capability because of our concern of an 
accidental launch, but they still have all those missiles, so they are 
a player. It is appropriate to get them right in the middle of this.
  I want to talk for a moment and then I will wrap it up. I know I have 
gone on for a while here, but I have because I feel so deeply about 
this, but I want to talk about the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA.
  In 1998, remember this is 1999, in 1998 the United States State 
Department listed the Kosovo Liberation Army on the international 
terrorist list. It is amazing to see the spin that is being put on 
these people in this Kosovo Liberation Army.
  Remember that the latest flareup started when the KLA, that is what 
we will call them, the KLA started sniping and assassinating Serb 
police officers. So the Serbs, in a typical over-response, started 
shooting innocent civilians. The KLA in our country would be known as 
terrorists. Our State Department defined them as terrorists a year ago. 
But take a look at what is happening on the spin. All of a sudden the 
KLA are no longer terrorists, now they are being known as rebels or as 
freedom fighters.
  The Washington Times this week, I think in Monday's publication, did 
a detailed article about how the Kosovo Liberation Army is running a 
heroin operation, the selling of drugs, to finance their military 
goals. We are about to jump in bed with these folks. We have taken 
sides with these folks. We have to be very, very careful before we hold 
hands with a partner like the Kosovo Liberation Army.
  Let me wrap it up, because I would like to yield to my colleague, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  My summary will be this: Number one, what is the policy of the United 
States? What are the national interests that require our investment, 
require our commitment in this country? What is the history of 
Yugoslavia? Is it a Civil War, is it a genocide? We should ask 
ourselves what is the authority, what is the precedent we are setting 
out there? Are our European partners carrying their responsibility? Are 
they carrying a fair share of the burden? Are we supporting an 
organization that, in fact, are drug dealers, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army; that is, in fact, guilty of the same atrocities or many of the 
same atrocities as the Yugoslavian troops? And if we are, how do we 
make that distinction?
  Of great importance to this country: Are we diluting our military 
forces to an extent that we are putting our country in danger of 
another military risk because we have shifted these assets too much in 
this direction? How will the conflict end? What role should Russia 
play?
  Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious conflict. We lost two American 
soldiers last night. They died. We have a lot of decisions to make. 
This is a very serious situation for each and every one of us, and the 
final test, before I yield to the gentleman, the final test is could 
any one of us, as an elected official, as a government authority, knock 
on the

[[Page H2801]]

door of a family and say to the father, the mother, or the spouse or 
the children, say to them that their loved one lost their life in this 
conflict and that the loss of their life was necessary for the national 
interests of this country?
  If my colleagues cannot now answer that question in the affirmative, 
then they ought to be questioning this policy the same way I do.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished 
colleague for yielding to me, and I thank him for his efforts on behalf 
of the understanding of the situation in Kosovo. I would add that I 
think I have some pretty provocative answers to the questions he 
raised, and I think we have good news on the horizon, perhaps as soon 
as the coming days, if not tomorrow.
  Let me first of all start out, Mr. Speaker, by saying that we have 
been calling for Russia's involvement in the Balkan crisis in Kosovo 
for about 5 weeks. It was 5 weeks ago that I was first approached by 
Russian leaders from the Duma who asked me to open new channels with 
the administration to see if we could find some common ground for a 
solution to this crisis. I got information from them, I started working 
with the National Security Council, the White House, Leon Fuerth's 
office, the State Department, as well as Democrat Members of Congress 
so that no one could say we were doing something in a partisan way.
  Those discussions and faxes went back and forth for about 3 weeks, 
and they culminated 2 weeks ago in a request by the Russians for me to 
bring a delegation to Budapest and then to travel down to Belgrade to 
jointly meet with Milosevic to convince him that he should, in fact, 
come to terms with the requirements that NATO has laid down.
  I asked the Russians to put that request in writing, Mr. Speaker. 
They did that. I asked them to meet five specific requests that I had. 
The first was to put the request in writing for us to be involved, the 
second was to identify the Russian leadership that would be involved in 
discussions with us. The third was to give me a date and time certain 
for a meeting with Milosevic. The fourth was to meet with our POWs. We 
had not met with them yet. And the fifth was to travel with me to a 
refugee camp where they could see the devastation caused by Milosevic. 
The Russians agreed to all five points. They put it in writing.
  We then went to the State Department, the gentleman from Maryland 
(Mr. Steny Hoyer) and I, a week ago this past Thursday. We met for an 
hour and a half with Strobe Talbott. We explained the opportunity. We 
said we were prepared to take a bipartisan delegation to Budapest and 
then down to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. The State Department 
said, please don't go.
  We were rebuffed by the State Department, but they did open the door 
for us to meet in a neutral city with the leadership of the Russian 
Duma. With that being said, over the weekend I continued discussions 
with the Russians and suggested that they pick a city and that on 
Friday of last week we meet in that city and discuss the issue to see 
if we could find common ground.
  The Russians decided that Vienna would be that city. I sent a letter 
to all 435 Members of the House a week ago Monday outlining in three 
pages what we had done, and I invited Members to join with us. Eleven 
Members came forward, 6 Republicans and 5 Democrats, from liberals like 
the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Bernard Sanders) to conservatives like 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Joseph Pitts) and the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Roscoe Bartlett).
  The 11 of us left on Thursday night, Mr. Speaker, and we traveled all 
night by air. We arrived in Vienna on Friday morning. We immediately 
went into meetings with the President of the Austrian Parliament to get 
a feel for what he thought should occur as an independent nation. And 
then, Mr. Speaker, we started meeting with the Russians.
  We started in the afternoon, went into the evening, continued over 
dinner, and came back Saturday morning. And during our discussions with 
the Russian leadership, which included the broad basis of Russia's 
political spectrum, Russia has 7 major political parties and 90 percent 
of those political factions were represented in our discussions. The 
leader was Vladimir Ryshkov, who was the First Deputy Speaker and 
Chairman of Chernomyrdin's party. He was in direct contact with Victor 
Chernomyrdin throughout our discussion. We had Vladimir Luhkin, the 
former Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., who represents the Yabloko 
faction. We also had the third ranking Communist in the State Duma, 
Alexander Shapanov, representing Seleznyov and the Communists, as well 
as the region and Agrarian members of the Duma.
  Ninety percent of the leadership in Russia's political spectrum was 
represented in our discussions with the 11 Members of Congress. But 
also, Mr. Speaker, we had two Serbs there. We had the largest financial 
contributor to Milosevic, who sat through our meetings as an adviser to 
the Russians in our discussions. Dragomir Karic, whose family, in fact, 
owns a significant amount of business interests in both Serbia and 
Russia sat through the meetings and kept in phone contact with 
Milosevic himself.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, these meetings were not to negotiate. Our purpose 
in going to Vienna was to see if we could find common ground on which 
negotiation could take place. We prepared a document and went through 
that document line by line. During the time of going through that 
document, Mr. Speaker, both the representative of Milosevic and the 
Russians were asking our delegation to travel to Belgrade, because they 
thought there was an opportunity for us to bring at least one of the 
POWs out, perhaps two of the POWs, as well as to meet with Milosevic 
and to get him to accept the report that we were working on.
  Mr. Speaker, at 1 o'clock on Saturday, this past Saturday, we reached 
agreement with the Russians; an historical agreement. The Russians 
agreed to a multinational peacekeeping force that had weapons. The 
Russians agreed to have Milosevic remove the Serbs from Kosovo. The 
Russians agreed that we use the term ethnic cleansing. And even though 
the Russians agreed, and we still did not have the support of 
Milosevic, they took the document we signed and faxed it to Milosevic 
at 1:30 on Saturday afternoon.
  Milosevic responded if we were to go to Belgrade he would publicly 
embrace the framework of our agreement and would, in fact, support what 
we and the Russians came up with. We then called the State Department. 
I talked to the head of NIS Affairs, Russian Affairs, Steve 
Sestanovich, told him about the offer that was being made to us, he had 
Tom Pickering, the Under Secretary of State, call me back. I read our 
document to each of them.
  Pickering told me that he did not think it was advisable that we go 
to Belgrade, even though I told him that Milosevic's representative and 
the Russians were telling us that if we went we would bring out all 
three of our POWs; and if we went, Milosevic would publicly embrace the 
document that we had agreed to.
  Mr. Speaker, that was 2 p.m. on Saturday. When we told the Russians 
and Milosevic's rep that we could not go because our government did not 
trust Milosevic, and after one of our Democrat Members had talked to 
Podesta in the White House, I told the Russians and I told the 
representative of Milosevic that we would not travel to Belgrade. That 
was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker.
  In fact, in that telephone conversation from Pickering, he said this 
to me: ``Why do you think that Milosevic would be open and candid with 
you and live up to what he is telling you about giving you the three 
POWs and agreeing to the document that you have in fact signed with the 
Russians?'' He said, ``After all, there have been other attempts to 
free the hostages. In fact, the mission being held by Jesse Jackson 
right now has been a failure. Milosevic has decided he will not give 
the POWs to Jesse Jackson's mission.''
  That was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker. We told them we would not go. And 
2\1/2\ hours later the Milosevic government announced on CNN that they 
would release the hostages to the Jackson delegation within a matter of 
3 or 4 hours.
  Mr. Speaker, those are the facts and the time lines. We have reached 
agreement with Russia, and that agreement with Russia is very close to 
what Milosevic will accept. Now we must

[[Page H2802]]

push this document, as we are doing. We sent copies to the Pope, the 
head of the Muslim faith, the head of the Orthodox religion, the U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, the parliamentary leaders of every other 
country, as well as Ukraine and Russia, and tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, 
there will be an announcement.
  The announcement that I predict will occur tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, is 
that Russia and NATO will announce that they have reached agreement on 
a multinational force; the beginning of the end of the conflict, partly 
because of the work of this Congress and people like my colleague and 
people on the other side like the gentleman who is going to speak next, 
who have been talking about the need to end this bombing, to end this 
hostility that is causing us problems with Russia and look for a way to 
solve this crisis peacefully.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Congressional Record the document 
signed by the members of the Russian Duma and by the Members of 
Congress who were in attendance at the meetings I referred to earlier.

 Report of the Meetings of the U.S. Congress and Russian Duma, Vienna, 
                     Austria, 30 April-1 May, 1999

       All sessions centered on the Balkan crisis. Agreement was 
     found on the following points:
       I. The Balkan crisis, including ethnic cleansing and 
     terrorism, is one of the most serious challenges to 
     international security since World War II.
       II. Both sides agree that this crisis creates serious 
     threats to global and regional security and may undermine 
     efforts against non-proliferation.
       III. This crisis increases the threat of further human and 
     ecological catastrophes, as evidenced by the growing refugee 
     problem, and creates obstacles to further development of 
     constructive Russian-American relations.
       IV. The humanitarian crisis will not be solved by bombing. 
     A diplomatic solution to the problem is preferable to the 
     alternative of military escalation.
       Taking the above into account, the sides consider it 
     necessary to implement the following emergency measures as 
     soon as possible, preferably within the next week. 
     Implementation of these emergency measures will create the 
     climate necessary to settle the political questions.
       1. We call on the interested parties to find practical 
     measures for a parallel solution to three tasks, without 
     regard to sequence: the stopping of NATO bombing of the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, withdrawal of Serbian armed 
     forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of the military 
     activities of the KLA. This should be accomplished through a 
     series of confidence building measures, which should include 
     but should not be limited to:
       a. The release of all prisoners of war.
       b. The voluntary repatriation of all refugees in the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them 
     by humanitarian aid organizations. NATO would be responsible 
     for policing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders 
     with Albania and Macedonia to ensure that weapons do not 
     reenter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the returning 
     refugees or at a later time.
       c. Agreement on the composition of the armed international 
     forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian 
     withdraw. The composition of the group should be decided by a 
     consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. 
     Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership 
     of Kosovo.
       d. The above group would be supplemented by the monitoring 
     activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
     in Europe (OSCE).
       e. The Russian Duma and U.S. Congress will use all 
     possiblities at their disposal in order to successfully move 
     ahead the process of resolving the situation in Yugoslavia on 
     the basis of stopping the violence and atrocities.
       2. We recognize the basic principles of the territorial 
     integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which 
     include:
       a. wide autonomy for Kosovo
       b. a multi-ethnic population
       c. treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with 
     international norms
       3. We support efforts to provide international assistance 
     to rebuild destroyed homes of refugees and other humanitarian 
     assistance, as appropriate, to victims in Kosovo.
       4. We, as members of the Duma and Congress, commit to 
     active participation as follows:
       Issue a Joint U.S. Congress-Russian Duma report of our 
     meetings in Vienna. Concrete suggestions for future action 
     will be issued as soon as possible.
       Delegations will agree on timelines for accomplishment of 
     above tasks.
       Delegations will brief their respective legislatures and 
     governments on outcome of the Vienna meetings and agreed upon 
     proposals.
       Delegations will prepare a joint resolution, based on their 
     report, to be considered simultaneously in the Congress and 
     Duma.
       Delegations agree to continue a working group dialogue 
     between Congress and the Duma in agreed upon places.
       Delegations agree that Duma deputies will visit refugee 
     camps and Members of Congress will visit the Federal Republic 
     of Yugoslavia.
       Members of Congress:
         ------ ------, Neil Abercombie, Jim Saxton, Bernie 
           Sanders, Roscoe Bartlett, Corrine Brown, Jim Gibbons, 
           Maurice Hinchey, Joseph R. Pitts, Don Sherwood, Dennis 
           J. Kucinich.
       Duma Deputies:
         ------ ------, ------ ------, ------ ------ ------ ----
           --.

                          ____________________