[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 64 (Wednesday, May 5, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2777-H2778]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     PROCEED WITH CAUTION BEFORE BANNING SCIENTIFIC TIES WITH INDIA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I rise today to draw my colleagues' 
attention to legislation that has been introduced in the other body 
that could have the potentially destructive effects of cutting off 
important exchanges between American scientists and their counterparts 
from other countries.
  The legislation in question, offered by Senator Shelby, would impose 
a moratorium on visiting scientists from so-called sensitive countries 
in American nuclear labs. The Senator's proposal comes on the heels of 
recent reports of compromises to our national security with regard to 
the Peoples' Republic of China.
  While I agree that Chinese espionage activities should cause us to be 
more vigilant with regard to that country, I am concerned that this 
proposed legislation casts a wide net and would give too much 
discretion to officials at the Department of Energy. The result could 
be a cutting off of positive scientific exchanges that do not affect 
our national security, depriving all of us of valuable knowledge and 
disrupting the types of scientific contacts that actually promote 
security and cooperation.
  One country, Madam Speaker, that could be affected by this 
legislation is India. While the Senate legislation does not mention any 
countries by name, a recent report in the newspaper India Abroad quotes 
an Energy Department official that the list of seven sensitive 
countries includes, in addition to China and Russia, India and 
Pakistan.
  The official indicated that different criteria were used for putting 
countries on the list, and that India and Pakistan were included 
because they are not signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty.
  Madam Speaker, I, too, am deeply concerned about the persistent 
pattern of China's theft of our nuclear secrets. I have come to this 
floor on several occasions to call for more safeguards against Chinese 
espionage, as well as to focus more attention on China's documented 
actions with regard to nuclear proliferation, which include providing 
nuclear and missile technology to unstable countries like Pakistan.
  But in the case of India, we clearly do not have the facts to support 
the conclusion that India is involved in the same types of activities 
as China. Thus, I would urge Members of the Senate and the House, as 
well as the administration, not to jump to any conclusions about India 
without the facts.
  What we know, Madam Speaker, is that U.S.-India relations have 
suffered in the past year because of the nuclear tests conducted by 
India last May. But one key fact that is often overlooked is that 
India's nuclear program is essentially indigenous, developed by India's 
own scientists.
  Export controls on supercomputers and other dual use technology have 
been in effect against India for years, forcing India to develop its 
own highly advanced R&D infrastructure.
  Another very important point, Madam Speaker, is that India has kept 
its nuclear technology to itself, out of the hands of rogue regimes and 
international sponsors of terrorism. This is in marked contrast to 
China, which has not only stolen our technology, but has shared very 
sensitive information with unstable countries in Asia and the Middle 
East.
  Madam Speaker, I fully agree that we need to be more wary of China. 
This is an authoritarian country, a one-party state, the Communist 
party, with a terrible record on human rights and a record of 
intimidation and aggression against its neighbors.
  Indeed, Madam Speaker, some of India's recent actions, including the 
nuclear tests and the test-firing of the

[[Page H2778]]

Agni intermediate-range missile, which have caused diplomatic problems 
with the U.S., have to be seen in the context of China. India shares a 
long border with China, the two countries have fought a border war 
started by China, and India is directly threatened by China's provision 
of weapons technology to Pakistan.
  The bottom line, Madam Speaker, is that India is not China. India is 
a democracy with multiple political parties. So we need to be careful 
before we go on a witch hunt against countries, particularly India, 
which do not pose the same type of security risk posed by China.
  The legislation introduced in the Senate is too open-ended, in my 
mind, allowing the Department of Energy overly broad discretion. At a 
time when there is an emerging bipartisan consensus that we should lift 
the sanctions that have been imposed on India, this legislation could 
end up imposing another punitive sanction that will further set back 
our relations, to the detriment, in my opinion, of both countries.
  The question, should we protect our sensitive nuclear secrets from 
potentially hostile countries, like China, that have already been shown 
to have stolen those secrets, I think the answer is absolutely yes, 
Madam Speaker. But let us not cut off cooperation and scientific 
exchanges with countries, like India, that have not been stealing our 
secrets and which could be partners for a more stable and secure world.

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