[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 63 (Tuesday, May 4, 1999)]
[House]
[Page H2617]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               A FRAMEWORK FOR SETTLING THE KOSOVO CRISIS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Sweeney). Under a previous order of the 
House, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders) is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, some of us have recognized for a long time 
that it was terribly important that Russia become increasingly involved 
in the crisis in Yugoslavia.
  Russia is, I think as everybody knows, Yugoslavia's major ally and 
major supporter. If Russia could be brought into the process supporting 
the humanitarian goals of the stopping of ethnic cleansing, it would be 
a major step forward in solving what is increasingly becoming a very, 
very horrible situation in the Balkans.
  Within that light, I was very delighted to learn about a trip to 
Vienna, Austria, that was being organized by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Curt Weldon), who has done an excellent job in trying 
to improve relations between the United States Congress and the Russian 
Duma. He was organizing a trip which would involve 11 Members of the 
United States Congress to meet with the leaders of the Russian Duma.
  On that trip, in addition to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Weldon), were the gentleman from New York (Mr. Maurice Hinchey), the 
gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Neil Abercrombie), the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Dennis Kucinich), the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Corinne 
Brown), the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Don Sherwood), the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Roscoe Bartlett), the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Saxton), the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Jim Gibbons), and 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Joseph Pitts). There were six 
Republicans, four Democrats, and myself, who is an Independent.
  Mr. Speaker, in arriving in Vienna and meeting with the Russians, I 
think we were all delighted that the Russians shared our strong 
concerns about bringing peace to Yugoslavia. We were able, after a lot 
of discussion, to come up with an agreement.
  As others have said, we were not there to negotiate the fine points 
of a treaty. That was not our job. But we were there to see if we could 
come together on the broad outlines of what a peace process would mean 
for the Balkan area, and I think we did that.
  Mr. Speaker, let me just touch on some of the important points that 
the Russians and our delegation agreed upon.
  ``We call on all of the interested parties to find practical measures 
for a parallel solution to three tasks, without regard to sequence;'' 
in other words, to do it in a simultaneous manner. That is, ``the 
stopping of the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the 
withdrawal of Serbian Armed Forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of 
the military activities of the KLA.''
  What we have said is that these steps should be accomplished through 
a series of confidence-building measures, which include but should not 
be limited to the following:
  A, the release of all prisoners of war. When we stated that, our 
three POWs were, of course, still being held by Yugoslavia, and a few 
hours after this agreement was reached Milosevic, as it turns out, 
released our three POWs.
  My own view is that, consistent with this agreement, in an act of 
good faith on our part, we should release the two Serbian POWs that we 
are holding. But our agreement called for the release of all prisoners 
of war.
  Second of all, what we said is the voluntary repatriation of all 
refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to 
them by humanitarian aid organizations. In other words, what we were 
agreeing to is that the people who have been driven out of their homes 
whose villages were burned by Yugoslavia should be allowed to return to 
their homes and be allowed all of the humanitarian help they can 
receive.
  Thirdly, and on a very important point, there was agreement on the 
composition of the armed international forces which would administer 
Kosovo after the Serbian withdrawal.
  The composition of the group should be decided by a consensus 
agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, 
in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership of Kosovo.
  This is a very important step forward, because what this means is the 
Russians are saying very clearly that there should be armed 
international forces, something that many of us understand is 
absolutely necessary if the people of Kosovo are to return safely and 
with protection to their homes.
  I think increasingly, within our own administration and all over the 
world, there is an understanding that that armed international force 
need not strictly be NATO. That is what we are saying here, and that is 
what the Russians have agreed to.
  Then we said that the above group would be supplemented by the 
monetary activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.
  In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I think that this trip was a significant 
step forward in bringing the Russians into the peace process. I was 
very proud and delighted to be there with my fellow representatives 
from the United States Congress.

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