[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 59 (Wednesday, April 28, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2427-H2441]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DECLARING STATE OF WAR BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GOVERNMENT OF FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 44) declaring a state of war between
the United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.
The text of H.J. Res. 44 is as follows:
H.J. Res. 44
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That pursuant
to section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.
1544(b)), and article 1, section 8 of the United States
Constitution, a state of war is declared to exist between the
United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Pursuant to section 4 of
House Resolution 151, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
General Leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on H.J. Res. 44.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, when our Committee on International Relations considered
this measure yesterday, I was sorely tempted to vote for this
resolution. This is not because I am eager for a fight and a war with
Yugoslavia, because I am not. But I am eager for our Nation and the
NATO alliance to avoid a humiliating defeat in the Balkans, which is
where we could end up if we continue down the path of halfway measures.
After the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, many of us
were relieved that our Nation finally appeared to have learned from the
bitter experiences in Vietnam how not to fight a war. But everything we
have seen to date in Operation Allied Force suggests that the lessons
of Desert Storm may have been forgotten and that we are at risk of
repeating in the Balkans the very same mistakes we made in Vietnam.
We do have an interest in preventing ethnic cleansing, the forcible
relocation of hundreds of thousands of refuges, and the destabilization
of Albania, Macedonia, and the other countries in that region. I
believe the President was right to try to stop President Milosevic from
doing these things. And now that we are involved, I believe that we
must do everything within our power to restore peace to the region.
That is a coherent position.
But what is not coherent, however, is the in-between position that we
have enough of a national interest to become involved in an armed
conflict with President Milosevic but not enough of a national interest
to do what is required to prevail in that conflict. That certainly is a
prescription for defeat. And this is what brought us the agony of
Vietnam. This is where we may end up in the Balkans if we forget the
very first lesson of Vietnam, that we have no business getting into
wars that we are not determined to win.
I oppose the Campbell joint resolution declaring war on Yugoslavia,
because I do not think Congress should declare wars if we are not
determined to prosecute them.
[[Page H2428]]
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution that is on the
floor before us to declare the United States at war with the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. In doing so, I want to make three points.
First of all, this is deadly serious business that we are talking
about. This is not an academic discussion about when war should be
declared, and what Congress's role is. As one who was a party to the
suit that was sent to the Supreme Court under the leadership of Ron
Dellums, I firmly believe in Congress's prerogative to declare war. So
on that, the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) and I agree. But
on the timing of this resolution and the substance of it I disagree.
I think that there is a tremendous need for us to do something to
stop what is happening in the former Yugoslavia. I was there myself
last week. I held those babies in my arms. I spoke to 95-year-old women
who had walked across the woods and the mountains to get to the camps.
We do not need any reiteration of all of the suffering, and we all
stipulate that we all want to end the suffering there. So this vote is
not about how serious we are about ending the suffering.
The other point I want to make is that the United States is the
greatest democracy in the world. People look to us as they aspire to be
stronger democracies, especially the emerging democracies throughout
the world. When they see us play games with something as serious as the
declaration of war, it sends a very strange message to them.
Now, I know playing games is not the intent of the gentleman, but
that is what the appearance of this is. Again, this is not an academic
discussion. It is a debate about as serious as it gets in this body.
And we have to be very clear about what our goals are. We have to be
very clear about the timing of our actions. And we have to be very
clear about what it means to other countries when they see us engage in
a debate at a time when the prospect for war, sending ground troops, is
not a lively one.
When I was in the Balkan region last week, and at the end of last
week, talking to the representatives of NATO who were here for the 50th
anniversary, there was no will for sending in ground troops. So there
is no urgency to this resolution today. The timing is very bad. The
lesson that we send to other democracies is very poor.
I urge my colleagues, for the sake of the seriousness of the war and
the example that we set as a democracy, to vote ``no'' on the Campbell
resolution.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Salmon) a member of our committee.
(Mr. SALMON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SALMON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to applaud the gentleman from
California (Mr. Campbell) for having the courage to stand up in a very
tumultuous time and risk I think some very, very nasty accusations
about playing games and trying to create this academic discussion in
the face of a very, very tumultuous time.
I congratulate him, because he understands that our duty as
Congressmen of the United States of America is to uphold the law of the
land and the law of the land, as passed in 1973, under the War Powers
Act requires this kind of action.
Many of us believe this very strongly. It is not just an academic
discussion. It is the law of the land. And we take that very seriously.
{time} 1715
I opposed this mission from the get-go for three very important
reasons. Number one, I believed that there were no national security
interests at risk, there was no clear objective, and finally, there was
no clearly delineated exit strategy. While I do believe that the
intentions are good, to stop the ethnic cleansing or to try to stop the
ethnic cleansing, to try to stop war crimes from occurring in that
region of the world, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
When the President stood up the day before the bombing campaign
began, he said one of the goals was to stop Milosevic's ability to
prosecute atrocities against the ethnic Albanians, and another goal was
that every ethnic Albanian be allowed to return to their home. What we
have seen since the bombing began painfully shows us that the
objectives have not been met. In fact they have been exacerbated. While
there were 1.6 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo before the bombing,
now there are somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000. Anywhere from
100,000 to 500,000 are missing and may be dead. We have not achieved
these goals by any stretch of the imagination.
I have to look at this from a father's perspective. I have a son who
is 17. If I am not comfortable sending my son over there with such an
ill-defined mission, how could I be comfortable sending other sons and
other daughters of my constituents into harm's way?
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume. I rise to speak out against House Joint Resolution 44 to
declare war on Yugoslavia. The U.S. and our NATO allies do not consider
themselves at war with Yugoslavia or its people. NATO is acting to
deter unlawful violence in Kosovo that endangers the stability of the
Balkans and threatens wider conflict in Europe.
Yesterday, the Committee on International Relations reported this
resolution with a negative recommendation by a unanimous vote. This was
a right vote. Today, I hope my colleagues will follow suit and vote
unanimously against this resolution.
Mr. Speaker, in my opinion a declaration of war is a very serious
step. Congress has declared war in only five conflicts: the War of
1812; the war with Mexico in 1846; the war with Spain in 1898; and the
first and Second World Wars. In the 20th century, without exception,
presidential requests for a formal declaration of war by Congress have
been on findings by the President that U.S. territory or sovereign
rights had been attacked or threatened by foreign nations.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the distinguished chairman of
the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights.
(Mr. SMITH of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the distinguished gentleman for
yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, the votes today are extraordinarily
difficult ones for each of us. The difficulty arises not because we are
afraid to face up to these decisions, but because we must find a way to
support freedom and democracy for the people of Kosovo and for the
people of Serbia without writing a blank check for more fatal blunders
on the part of the Clinton administration.
I do not agree with our bombing campaign, but the present ``bombing
only'' policy appears to have been based on the tragic miscalculation
by President Clinton that Milosevic would back down if we bombed Serbia
for a week or maybe two. This seems to have been based on an even more
fundamental miscalculation, that Milosevic cares more about Serbia than
he does for Milosevic.
Former Governor George Allen of Virginia pointed out recently, and it
was a very good and apt analogy when he said it was the equivalent of
being in a football game and you say you are going to pass on every
play. You have really given away your options. We did the same thing
when we told Milosevic there would be no ground troops. That permitted
him to anticipate and adjust to NATO moves. Another miscalculation.
Whatever happened to ``loose lips sink ships''? U.S. and NATO
spokesmen--including the President, babble on and on. Such carelessness
puts the lives of our servicemen at risk and its wrong.
Mr. Speaker, let me just say a couple of things. I have had more than
a dozen hearings on the Baltics in my subcommittee, the International
Operations and Human Rights Committee and in the Helsinki Commission. I
chair them both. We have looked again
[[Page H2429]]
and again at the problems, first with Bosnia and Croatia and now with
Kosovo and sought to understand and react prudently to mitigate the
suffering. We've looked at the war crimes that have been committed by
Slobodan Milosevic's military, police and hoods.
I find it incredible that the Clinton administration for the last 6
or more years has not sought to bring action against Slobodan Milosevic
at the War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague. In public and private I have
asked repeatedly, where is the dossier, the documents, the evidence,
why are we not trying to bring this war criminal to trial. To my shock,
I am informed that the administration has collected nothing on this
tyrant. Thus, last year virtually every Member of this Chamber voted in
favor of my resolution that petitioned, admonished, and encouraged the
administration to begin the effort to bring Milosevic to justice.
Mr. Speaker, just let me also say that I do not believe voting for
this declaration of war is the right thing to do. Our fight is not with
the Serbian or Yugoslav people. It is with a cunning madman, and a very
small number of very dedicated terrorists who surround him.
I ask for a ``no'' vote on the declaration of war.
Mr. Speaker, the votes today will be extraordinarily difficult ones
for many Members of Congress. The difficulty arises not because we are
afraid to face up to these decisions, but because we must find a way to
support freedom and democracy for the people of Kosovo--and for the
people of Serbia--without writing a blank check for more fatal blunders
on the part of the Clinton Administration.
I don't agree with NATO's bombing campaign but the present ``bombing
only'' policy appears to have been based on the tragic miscalculation,
by President Clinton and his top advisors that Slobodan Milosevic would
back down if we bombed Serbia for a week or so. This seems to have been
based on an even more fundamental miscalculation--that Milosevic cares
more about Serbia than he does about Milosevic.
Former Governor George Allen of Virginia has pointed out that to
announce in advance that we would only use bombs and missiles and never
use ground troops is the equivalent of announcing at the beginning of a
football game that you intend to pass on every play. Even if we had no
intention of using ground troops, it was yet another miscalculation to
tell Milosevic about this plan. In war, you don't put your plan on CNN.
In effect, we were telling him that we would punish the Serbian people
for his regime's crimes, but that we would do nothing to prevent them.
The campaign of murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was
already under way--there were over 150,000 displaced persons there even
before Rambouillet, and as early as June of last year Physicians for
Human Rights issued a report that found ``intensive, systematic
destruction and ethnic cleansing''--but when we announced that we would
bomb and do nothing else, Milosevic knew he could get away with
intensifying this campaign, and that is exactly what he did.
So our options now are stark indeed:
We cannot turn the clock back to a time when it might have been
possible to persuade the people of Kosovo to accept some kind of
autonomy within Serbia. The mass rapes and mass murders, the beatings
and tortures, the burning of villages and clearing of cities, have made
this next to impossible. Nor can the Muslim population of Kosovo forget
the Dayton agreement, in which the Clinton Administration brokered the
dismemberment of Bosnia. Instead of arresting Milosevic on the spot and
bringing him before the War Crimes Tribunal, our diplomats exchanged
toasts and compliments with him and turned over half of Bosnia to his
murderous cronies.
Speaking of the War Crimes Tribunal, I have tried for years, Mr.
Speaker, to get this Administration to turn over all relevant evidence
of Milosevic's responsibility for crimes against humanity. Last
September, the House passed my resolution admonishing the Clinton
Administration to work to bring Milosevic to justice at the Hague,
sadly, nothing was done. This begs the question as to why the Clinton
Administration has, in essence, given one of the most brutal dictators
on the face of the earth defacto immunity from prosecution.
Mr. Speaker, we cannot simply continue the bombing forever, in the
face of mounting collateral deaths and injuries of men, women, and
children--Serbs, Montenegrins, and Kosovars alike--and mounting
evidence that the campaign is not likely to succeed in bringing down
the Milosevic regime or in bringing peace and freedom to Kosovo.
Nor can we simply consign the Kosovars to their fate. For the
hundreds of thousands outside Kosovo, this would mean being refugees
forever. For those still inside, it would mean more murders, more
rapes, more tortures. for those of us who are lucky enough to live in
safety and freedom, it would almost certainly mean in the last analysis
that we stood by and watched yet another genocide.
So our only real choice is to come up with a plan--perhaps a new
diplomatic initiative along the lines suggested by Curt Weldon of
Pennsylvania.
Unfortunately, there is no sign that the Administration has such a
plan or is trying very hard to come up with one. So Congress today must
vote in a way that signals clear support for a just solution to the
crisis in Kosovo, without inviting the Administration to blunder its
way into further non-solutions.
Mr. Speaker, I will not vote for the declaration of war, because our
fight is not with Yugoslavia--and our fight is most certainly not with
the peoples whose governments might come in on the side of Yugoslavia
in an all out war. Our fight is with Milosevic.
Mr. Speaker, I also will not vote for an absolute and inflexible
legal requirement that all U.S. forces be removed from the zone of
hostilities within 30 days, because this would be yet another
gratuitous decision to tie our own hands in advance, without knowing
what may happen in the next day or week or month. To announce in
advance that we will withdraw our forces no matter what Milosevic does
would be eerily reminiscent of President Clinton's decision to announce
in advance that we would use only bombs and never ground troops. Its
most likely effect would be to spur Milosevic on to further atrocities.
It would also probably have the effect of depriving the humanitarian
campaign on behalf of the refugees in Albania and Macedonia of the
invaluable assistance of the U.S. military. I want to make clear that
my criticisms of the Administration's military policy are not intended
to reflect on the humanitarian campaign. All indications are that
everyone involved--UNHCR, the non-governmental organizations, and
government agencies emphatically including our armed forces--are doing
the Lord's work and doing it as well as can be expected under the
circumstances. My only suggestion is that we urgently need even more
resources for this humanitarian campaign.
Mr. Speaker, I will vote for the Goodling bill, which will require
Congressional authorization for the use of ground troops.
At the beginning of the decade, President Bush persuasively made his
case--to Congress and the American people--for ground troops for the
Persian Gulf War.
Mr. Clinton, it seems to me, has no less of a responsibility to
explain why he might be willing to risk the lives of Americans in a
ground action.
It's bad enough the President initiated the misguided bombing with
its disastrous consequences to Kosovar Albanians without prior
Congressional approval. Any potential, new, escalation must include
clear authorization from the Congress.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from
California (Mr. Campbell) for bringing this issue to a head. We have
cast and will cast momentous votes for today.
I think it is important that we clarify the record. We voted for the
Goodling-Fowler bill. I should point out that distributed to virtually
every Member of this House by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs.
Fowler) was a statement in writing that should be part of the record,
that says in part that this bill does not prevent the use of Apache
helicopters and does not preclude the introduction of small numbers of
personnel for intelligence or targeting functions.
I think that our adoption of that resolution, at least by this House,
made sense. I know there are those who argue that Congress should not
be involved in the momentous decision that lies ahead, but as I have
said before, those who say that our enemies should tremble in fear
because one man should be allowed to deploy 100,000 American soldiers,
should be answered that Americans should tremble in fear if one man
without congressional approval can deploy 100,000 men and women into
battle.
I should point out that the President of the United States
distributed to all Members of Congress today a letter stating, in part,
that he would ask for congressional support before introducing U.S.
ground forces into Kosovo, into a nonpermissive environment.
The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) will be bringing up a
matter later today. It has been interpreted by some as more than a mere
authorization of the air campaign but
[[Page H2430]]
it states, and I interpret it, as providing only support for the air
campaign and not a legal authorization for more.
I would hope that any wise court would look at the record today. A
letter from the President saying he will not put in ground troops, a
vote by this House not to put in ground troops. Under those
circumstances, a wise court should interpret the Gejdenson resolution
as nothing more than what it states.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford), a member of our committee.
Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the timing and
consideration of this bill because ultimately I think that this is a
constitutional question. It is one that the gentleman from California
(Mr. Campbell) has raised because he knows what our Founding Fathers
knew, and that is that when body bags come back from some foreign
deployment, they do not stop within the Beltway. They go across
America. They go to Charleston, South Carolina; they go to Knoxville,
Tennessee; they go to Los Angeles, California.
It is for this reason, and it came up yesterday in debate, that in
contrast to the English system, the Framers did not want the wealth and
blood of the Nation committed by the decision of a single individual,
which was just pointed out by my colleague from California.
So, one, I rise in support of the timing of this because of the
constitutional element. I will ultimately vote ``no'' because of the
foreign policy element of this decision.
Now, all of us would like to solve every ill in this world, but both
individually and collectively it is something we do not have the
resources to do, so for foreign policy to be effective, it has got to
be limited and it has got to be focused. Part of focus means
consistency. If we stay in Kosovo, we are going to create a very
inconsistent foreign policy.
In fact, I do not even want to be part of a government that would
ever signal to people around the world that if you are of European
ancestry, we care about your human rights, but if you happen to be
unlucky enough to be born in Africa, well, then, good luck. Because in
January 3,000 people were killed in Sierra Leone, and if we are going
to stay in Kosovo, we owe it to them to go to Sierra Leone. 300,000
people were killed in Angola since 1992. 500,000 people were killed in
Rwanda in the genocide there. 1.9 million people have been killed in
the south of Sudan basically over the last 15 years. It is important
for our foreign policy to be effective that we be consistent and that,
I think, is what this bill is all about.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to this
resolution because I believe that a declaration of war will only
increase instability in the region and exacerbate the atrocities
against ethnic Albanians. My support and prayers go out to the brave
men and women of the United States Armed Forces who have been
dispatched to Yugoslavia. We must take every measure to ensure their
safe and expeditious return home.
While I will vote against this resolution, it is my belief that this
debate and these votes should have been taken before a single bomb was
dropped and before any U.S. troops were sent. Our inaction prior to
military strikes abdicated our constitutional responsibility and,
furthermore, prevented the voice of the people I represent, who are
overwhelmingly against air strikes, from being heard. I agree that we
have a moral imperative to bring an end to the horrific genocide and
suffering in the Balkans. However, violent means have only and will
only escalate the crisis.
As a person who strongly believes in the teachings and the work of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. I profoundly subscribe to the principles of
nonviolence. If peace is our objective, then I implore us to consider
the words of Dr. King, not only on his birthday but each and every day
of the year. In his last book, ``The Trumpet of Conscience,'' he wrote
about United States policy in North Vietnam. He said, ``They are
talking about peace as a distant goal, as an end we seek. But one day
we must come to see that peace is not merely a distant goal we seek,
but that it is a means by which we arrive at that goal; destructive
means cannot bring about constructive ends.''
I am convinced that our best hope for peace and stability is the
negotiation of an immediate cease-fire, and a strong belief that the
United States and NATO must reach out to Russia, the United Nations,
China and others to develop an internationally negotiated political
settlement. Our actions must set an example for our young people that
violence should never be an option. I ask for a ``no'' vote.
I rise today in opposition to H.J. Res. 44, which would declare a
state of war between the United States and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. I oppose this resolution because I believe that a
declaration of war, like the NATO air strikes, will only increase
instability in the region and exacerbate the atrocities against ethnic
Albanians.
At this very volatile time, my support and prayers go out to the
brave men and women of the United States Armed Forces who have been
dispatched to Yugoslavia. We must take every measure possible to bring
an end to this crisis to ensure their safe and expeditious return home.
While I will vote against the declaration of war, I would like to
commend my colleague from California, Congressman Campbell, for
introducing this resolution into the House of Representatives and
bringing forward Congressional action on the US involvement in Kosovo.
It is my belief that these debates should have taken place six weeks
ago, before a single bomb was dropped and before any US troops were
sent into the hostile situation in the Balkans.
By failing to vote on the air strikes before their commencement, and
instead debating authorization now, when we are already heavily
involved, the Administration is conducting a war without Congressional
consent as required by the Constitution. A vote to authorize the
President to conduct military air strikes at this juncture is nothing
more than a rubber stamp from Congress for an action that has already
begun. I my opinion, our inaction prior to military strikes abdicated
our Constitutional responsibility and furthermore, prevented the voice
of the people I represent, who are overwhelmingly against the air
strikes, from being heard.
There are those who rise today in support of the Administration's
action in order to end the genocide of the ethnic Albanians. I agree,
in the strongest terms possible, that we have a moral imperative to
intervene and to bring an end to the horrific suffering. However,
whether air strikes, ground forces, or a declaration of war--these
violent means as a method to bring peace and stability to the Balkans
have only, and will only escalate the crisis.
As a person who strongly believes in the teachings and work of Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr., not just on his birthday, but throughout the
year, I profoundly subscribe to the principles of nonviolence. Our
policies, and our actions, must set an example for our young people
that violence should never be an option. If peace is our objective, and
I am certain that this is a goal upon which all in this chamber can
agree, then I implore us to consider the words of Dr. King. In his last
book, The Trumpet of Conscience, A Christmas Sermon on Peace, Dr. King
discusses bombing in North Vietnam, and the rhetoric of peace that was
connected to those war making acts.
He wrote, ``What is the problem? They are talking about peace as a
distant goal, as an end we seek. But one day we must come to see that
peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, but that it is a means by
which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue peaceful ends through
peaceful means. All of this is saying that, in the final analysis,
means and ends must cohere because the end is pre-existent in the means
and ultimately destructive means cannot bring about constructive
ends.''
The Administration's policy and the NATO campaign in Kosovo to date
have produced only counterproductive and destructive results: a mass
exodus of over half a million ethnic Albanians, significant civilian
deaths, an escalation of Milosevic's campaign of racial hatred and
terror, and greater instability in the region. The results are just the
opposite of what we want to achieve. Our goal is to prevent innocent
people from being killed. In the name of saving Kosovars, we are
destroying Kosovo.
At this juncture, I am convinced that our best hope for peace and
stability in the region is the negotiation of an immediate cease fire.
It is my strong belief that the United States and NATO must reach out
to the United Nations, Russia China, and others to work together to
develop a new, internationally negotiated peace agreement and to secure
Serbian compliance to its terms. In order to end the suffering in the
Balkans and to achieve long term stability, support of a diplomatic
political settlement is the only action we can employ.
[[Page H2431]]
As we today speak of a policy to end genocide in the Balkans, I am
also greatly disturbed to think of the people in many countries in
Africa and all over the world, who have also suffered unthinkable
atrocities, beyond our worst nightmare. As a result of ethnic conflict
in Africa, over 150,000 have been killed in Burundi; 800,000 in Rwanda;
and 1.5 million in Sudan. More than 200,000 Kurds have died in Iraq and
Turkey, and hundreds of thousands in Burma, and over 1 million in
Cambodia.
It is my hope that our nation can develop a foreign policy framework
to address suffering and killing all over the world, without the use of
force, ground troops, air strikes and other violent means.
I urge a ``no'' vote on the declaration of war.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
Mr. JONES of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues who
express grave doubts about the conduct of Operation Allied Force in
Yugoslavia. I am deeply troubled that the administration has started
our country down the path of only bad options.
The debate before us illustrates the inability of the War Powers
Resolution to effectively deal with post-Cold War realities. In many
respects, the War Powers Resolution is a tool of a bygone era.
Mr. Speaker, there are numerous Kosovo type operations in this
country's future. These operations require significant military
resources and challenge our country's ability to meet the primary
objective of our national security strategy. This is nothing new.
Congress has not formally declared war since World War II, and yet
American troops have since fought and died around the world in numerous
hostilities. The framework of the War Powers Resolution has not allowed
Congress a voice in the commitment of troops in these engagements.
While the United States may be the world's superpower, we cannot be
the world's police force. Our military is simply not prepared to do so.
If anything, this fumbling foreign policy escapade should alert this
body that we must reflect upon the failings of the current process by
which we are forced to deal with these types of military operations. In
the near future Congress should work to improve the process by which we
consider and debate these critical issues to our national security.
Today, I would ask my colleagues to pay close attention to this
debate and to keep in mind the state of our military. Congress's role
is not limited simply to the declaration of war. It is imperative that
we look closely at where we commit our troops and ensure that our
military is prepared for such commitments.
I do not believe that Kosovo is the kind of conflict where we should
be committing our troops. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose the
resolution to declare war.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega).
(Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
{time} 1730
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to House
Joint Resolution 44 which asks our colleagues for a declaration of war
by the United States against the Government of the Republic of
Yugoslavia. Although I have the greatest respect for the author of the
resolution, the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) and certainly
a dear friend, I must respectfully oppose the resolution.
Mr. Speaker, America's Founding Fathers, in their wisdom,
deliberately drafted the Constitution to provide flexibility in the use
of U.S. armed forces abroad. The President, as Commander in Chief,
clearly has the authority to send our forces into potentially hostile
situations without a declaration of war. In fact, since 1798 in our
conflict with France over the Dominican Republic, to our air strikes in
Afghanistan and Sudan against Bin Laden in 1998, CRS, the Congressional
Research Service, has documented over 270 instances where America's
Presidents have sent U.S. armed forces abroad into hostile situations.
Over two centuries, and only five of these instances has the Congress
actually declared war.
Mr. Speaker, a declaration of war is neither necessary nor
appropriate for our actions in Kosovo and Serbia. Our Nation and NATO
are not at war with Yugoslavia. We are there to stop a sociopathic
criminal from committing genocide against his Albanian citizens,
actions which threatened to destabilize the Balkan nations, as well as
Europe. A unilateral U.S. declaration of war would irresponsibly
escalate the conflict, undermine our alliance with our NATO partners,
and needlessly jeopardize our already tense relations with Russia.
As a Vietnam veteran, Mr. Speaker, I have seen the violence of
conflict, and it is not pretty. However, there are certain times when
America must act because no other country can provide the leadership
that we can. Almost a quarter of a million innocent people died from
Milosevic's handiwork in Bosnia which Europe could not stop alone.
Mr. Speaker, the call to action has come again, and America cannot
stand idly by and let this madman continue with his genocidal campaign
in Kosovo. The stakes are too high to play political games. I strongly
urge our colleagues to defeat the resolution before us and support our
armed forces in Kosovo and Serbia that are fighting to protect against
these evil forces that Milosevic provides.
Mr. Speaker, are we willing to allow China and Russia perhaps to take
the lead in providing the leadership in global issues that affect all
human beings on this planet? I dare not say, Mr. Speaker. Let America
become the leader of the world as it should be in this issue affecting
the Balkan area.
Mr. Speaker, there have been only five instances in our nation's
history that formal declarations of war were made by the Congress--the
War of 1812 against England; the War of 1846 against Mexico; the War of
1898 against Spain; World War I and World War II. Mr. Speaker, there
are ample precedents set not only by this President but by previous
administrations as well, whereby acts of war have been always been part
and parcel of U.S. foreign policies and security interests--I believe
the Founding Fathers of this nation purposely placed the critical
issues of war as a political and public policy matter rightfully as a
matter to be decided by both the Administration and the Congress.
Mr. Speaker, the crisis in Yugoslavia is not an American issue--it is
a serious matter taken collectively with our Nation Allies. It is a
matter that history has given all those European countries to seriously
consider the alternative, if Milosevic is allowed to continue his
policy of ethnic cleansing and atrocities by murdering and killing well
over 300,000 human beings in that country, and the displacement of some
3.5 million persons now as refugees because of Milosevic's military
activities in Yugoslavia.
Mr. Speaker, am I to believe now that the most powerful nation on
this planet is telling the world that the crisis in Yugoslavia is not
in our national interest? If so, then why did the Congress allow our
President to intervene and for which he provided a negotiated
settlement on the Bosnia matter? Our President did his best to
negotiate a settlement with Milosevic, but Milosevic refused and the
bombing of Milosevic's military resources and related facilities was
the only option left--simply to prevent more reckless killings and
atrocities committed by Milosevic and his military forces.
Mr. Speaker, this is not the time to tell the world and our NATO
allies that we have now Americanized this conflict by officially
declaring a war against Yugoslavia. Vote this resolution down.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum).
(Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, there is a tragic war in the Balkans.
There is every indication that this war will expand, and so will the
role of the United States. So far, there is no sign that absent the
introduction of ground forces the intensified bombing campaign will
cause President Milosevic and the Serbs to agree to the terms regarding
Kosovo demanded by NATO. President Clinton has never asked Congress to
declare war on Yugoslavia or Serbia. He has never even requested the
type of resolution President Bush requested and was granted in advance
of Desert Storm. At no time has he spelled out to the American public,
let alone Congress, a consistent, coherent foreign policy that
demonstrates a compelling United States' national security interest in
waging war against the forces of the Government of Yugoslavia.
I am just as moved as anyone else by the atrocities reported in
Kosovo, but I
[[Page H2432]]
am deeply troubled by our continued engagement. If the United States is
going to engage in war, the commitment must be made to let the military
use whatever force is necessary, which means paying whatever price in
lives of American soldiers is required, and if the American national
security interests are not great enough to justify such a price, then
there should be no war.
To date, President Clinton has not demonstrated to my satisfaction
America's national security interest in the Kosovo matter is great
enough to justify paying such a price. For this reason I voted for the
resolution offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) to
withdraw American forces, and it is for this reason that I will not be
a party to sending American men and women in uniform to die in an ill-
conceived, ill-planned war and I am strongly against this resolution
declaring war.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), a senior member of the
Committee on International Relations.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, it is important to put this resolution by my
good friend from California in proper perspective.
When yesterday a deeply divided Committee on International Relations
debated and then voted on this matter, we voted unanimously to reject
this proposal.
As a matter of fact, my good friend, the gentleman from California
(Mr. Campbell), himself voted against his own resolution.
So I think it is sort of important to realize that what we are
dealing with here is an academic legalistic exercise, the purpose of
which is to take this issue to the courts. No one seriously believes,
fortunately, that the United States should declare war against
Yugoslavia.
Now there are many reasons why we should not do that. The first and
perhaps the most important is that this is not an American engagement,
this is a NATO engagement, and not one of the other of the 18 NATO
countries has declared war on Yugoslavia. Were we to do so, this would
be an Americanization of a war with all the negative consequence that
implies. It would divide the alliance. It would indicate that we are
determined, as we were during the Second World War, to move on until
there is an unconditional surrender.
Those are not our goals. Our goals are limited, clearly defined and
specific. We wish to see the 700,000 individuals who were driven out of
Kosovo to return there in peace and security. That is the goal we seek.
Therefore, a declaration of war under these circumstances would be ill-
advised, ill-timed and clearly contrary to U.S. national interests.
I urge all of my colleagues to reject this resolution.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, the United States has been blessed in
so many ways, and not the least of which is the good sense that our
Founding Fathers had in keeping us out of foreign entanglements and
military engagements overseas. George Washington threatened us of these
foreign entanglements that would drain our Treasury and drain our
national will. So it has been written into our Constitution that we
have such limitations on foreign commitments. We have not obviously
declared war. This administration is unwilling to declare war even
though it is clearly written into our Constitution that we need to come
to Congress.
Now, realizing that during the Cold War we gave certain powers to the
executive branch for the security of our country and during this four
decades of Cold War we felt we needed to centralize this power and give
the President a little more authority. The Cold War is over. What we
are engaging in now is a process of evolving back. That is what we are
doing this very moment, evolving back the power as defined in our
Constitution, what our Founding Fathers wanted us to have, and that is
the legislative branch must have a check and a balance to the decisions
of the Federal branch when it comes to foreign commitments and military
operations, and this is something that is part of our Constitution. We
are demanding that the Constitution be followed. We are demanding that
the War Powers Act, which of course came about after the Vietnam
debacle, the War Powers Act is still part of our law, we demand that
that part of the law be followed.
Obviously the President of the United States and those people in this
body that agree with him do not believe that that part of our law and
that part of our Constitution need to be followed. Well, this is what
the debate is about. The American people should understand that no one
person, as our Founding Fathers so demanded it in writing the
Constitution, no one person, whether he be or she be the President of
the United States or any other officeholder, should be able to get us
into war and cause the deaths of tens of thousands of people. We all
must be part of that process.
That is what our Constitution is about. That is why I support the
efforts of the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) to ensure this
type of congressional participation.
I rise in support of Mr. Campbell's position on this resolution.
Seriously, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Campbell for
giving us this opportunity to discuss, through this declaration of war
resolution, the legal ramifications of the Balkan conflict.
Here in the United States we have been blessed in so many ways, not
the least of which was a product of the good sense of our founding
fathers and mothers in keeping us out of foreign conflicts and
entanglements.
George Washington warned of the threat of military alliances that
would lead to foreign adventures that would drain our treasury and
undermine our national will to meet the serious challenges to our own
security. Written into our Constitution are limitations on power and
hurdles that must be dealt with in order to engage the United States in
war.
In World War One and the Second World War we followed those
constitutional requirements. During that second great conflagration
that engulfed this planet we permitted, for the safety of our country
and the cause of peace, power to be centralized in the hands of the
executive branch as never before. Then, during the decades of, what
John Kennedy described as the twilight struggle, Congress acquiesced
and endorsed the policy of a strong executive in order to deal with the
dangers of the cold war.
My friends and colleagues, the cold war is over. What we do today is
part of the process in evolving back to the constitutional system that
served our country so well in the past. First and foremost we must
reestablish the checks and balances in our federal system, checks and
balances that apply to foreign and military commitments as well as
domestic policy.
There is no doubt that the intent of our Constitution was to assure
that one person, whatever his or her office, could not get our country
into war. We had revolted against the power of a king to rule. Congress
must declare war, or it is illegal for our President or military
commanders to spend our treasure and spill the blood of our defenders
in fighting a war.
Yes, during the cold war, which was an uncommon and unique period in
our history, the legal necessity of such declarations of war was
intentionally by consensus, overlooked. The frustrations of Korea and
Vietnam, perhaps, call into question that strategy. And in the
aftermath of Vietnam, the War Powers Act was enacted into law to
prevent the very kind of questionable foreign military commitments that
we debate today.
So in this debate let us as law makers admit that the law is not
being followed and that it should be. The Constitutional requirements
for conducting war have not been met because the majority of this
Congress and more importantly, the President, are unwilling to declare
war.
The legal requirements to an extended military operation, as mandated
by the War Powers Act, have not been met, because this President and
his allies, who represent a majority in this Congress, are not
concerned with this law.
Mr. Speaker, the crisis of the cold war is over and the Constitution
and the law, as reflected in the body of the Constitution and in the
War Powers Act, should be obeyed. If it cannot be obeyed, it should be
changed. As it stands, we are making a mockery of the law, which is
evident when the Secretary of State testified at the International
Relations Committee. Secretary Albright has to speak in convoluted
rhetoric, twisting and turning like a semantical acrobat, in order to
prevent a legal case that can be easily made against her. There is
something wrong if a Secretary of State cannot speak directly to the
congressional body which has the constitutional mandate of overseeing
American foreign policy.
[[Page H2433]]
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this
time to me.
We in Congress are in a position we should never be in. We are
confronted with a failed law, failed leadership and a military action
that failed to meet its initially stated objectives. Here we are,
finally having a belated and truncated debate because of the War Powers
Act, but a War Powers Act which is totally defective, and for 8 years I
have been introducing legislation to fix the War Powers Act. We need to
reclaim our constitutional authority and require prior authorization
before Presidents engage in wars or warlike activities using our armed
forces.
This is not unique to President Clinton. President Reagan, President
Bush went down the same path, as did Presidents before them and as they
will continue to do until this body has the guts to change the law and
require that not a penny be spent except in defense of our country
against immediate attack or armed forces overseas or as a citizen
without the authority of Congress in a war or warlike action.
We have a failed congressional leadership. They were engaged in duck-
and-cover and get everybody out of town before the bombing began. They
did not allow us to have a debate. Even with the defective law, we
could have had a vigorous debate here, and if we had that debate, I
believe we could have had a better policy.
Did not everybody know that it rained in that area at this time of
year? Did not our intelligence forces perhaps know that bombing and
removal of the OSCE observers would lead to increased, accelerated
ethnic cleansing and slaughter? And what if, what if Slobodan was not
going to come to the bargaining table after a few bombs fell? Those
questions were not asked by this Congress, and they were not answered
by this administration, and now we are in the midst of a failed policy.
I believe we need to go forward from here with productive ideas, but
this debate is not going to allow us to talk about productive ideas.
What about the idea of a temporary cease-fire, working with our allies
to try and force productive negotiations? What about having enough time
to talk about this issue? It is not allowed under this absurd rule.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, probably in 8 years this is the first
time I have agreed with the gentleman from Oregon, or second time.
If not, what? I am trying to do everything I can to keep us out of
war. Then what? First of all, the Pentagon said not to bomb.
Rambouillet, according to Kissinger and Larry Eagleburger, said it was
to fail. NATO and General Clark told me, face to face, that NATO only
wanted to bomb 1 day and quit. The President called Mr. Blair and the
German Chancellor and forced this. So what? Halt the bombing, get our
POWs back.
Seventy percent of the Russians support the overthrow of Yeltsin.
That is why they are so squirrelly on us. Let us use Russian, let us
Greek troops that are petrified about the Albanian expansion. Instead
of having Russia be the problem, let us make them part of the solution.
The President has got to look the President of Albania in the face and
say we want the Mujaheddin and Hamas out of the KLA and deported within
30 days. He has got to do the same thing with Izetbegovic.
Kosovo can be cantonized, but it has got to go off the table, that
resolve.
The gentleman from Oregon is right. There is not enough time to talk
about a very important issue.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, the truth is war is being waged and will
continue to be waged without declaration. But such violence is neither
redemptive nor justified in law or morality. Hope is redemptive, love
is redemptive, peace is redemptive, but the violence of this conflict
stirs our most primitive instincts. When we respond to such instincts,
we enact the law of an eye for an eye, and we at last become blind and
spend our remaining days groping to regain that light we had once
enjoyed.
He only understands force, it is said of Mr. Milosevic, but we must
understand more than force.
{time} 1745
Otherwise, war is inescapable. We must make peace as inexorable as
the instinct to breed, as inevitable as the sunrise, as predictable as
the next day. With this vote, let us release ourselves from the logic
of war and energize a consciousness of peace, peace through implied
strength, peace through express diplomacy, peace through a belief that
through nonviolent human interaction, we can still control our destiny.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Metcalf).
Mr. METCALF. Mr. Speaker, I have opposed U.S. military action in the
Balkans without a declaration of war. There are no vital U.S. interests
now being threatened anywhere in Europe, certainly not in the Balkans,
worthy of a declaration of war. We really have no business there
militarily. We should not be committing acts of war there. Yes, bombing
is an act of war.
This whole military intervention is truly illegal under international
law, and I urge a no vote on this resolution. We do need to revise our
War Powers Act. Congress should reclaim the power to decide to take
this Nation to war.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New
York for his leadership, and I thank my colleague from California for
giving us the opportunity to discuss a very important issue as to
whether or not we stand for war or peace. I must acknowledge that the
gentleman who proposed this particular resolution himself voted against
it.
I grappled today and struggled with the vote on the Goodling
amendment, because I have concern about whether or not we are forcing
ourselves into war, or looking for ways of peace.
I want peace. I have indicated over and over again that we must have
peace, but we must have peace with justice. We must have peace for the
37,000 refugees in Montenegro, the 260,000 refugees in Albania and the
120,000 in Macedonia. We must have peace for those in the former
Yugoslavia.
So a declaration of war is not, I believe, in the best interests of
the United States of America, the best interests of those refugees who
are looking to go home, and the best interests of us trying to force or
bring about a real peace.
We have only declared war in not more than 5 conflicts in our
history: The War of 1812, the war with Mexico in 1846, the war with
Spain in 1898, the First World War and the Second World War.
I do believe that the President's hands must not be tied. We must
have the ability to send peacekeeping troops in. We must get back our
POWs, two of whom are from the State of Texas, but all of them are
Americans. We must not be weak in the eyes of the former Yugoslavia and
Mr. Milosevic. We must stand united.
And to my friends who have mentioned where were we in Rwanda, and
maybe where were we in Ireland, we must not stand while there is ethnic
cleansing and killing and murdering in any part of the world.
I want to stand with an America that has principles. I want to stand
with an America that believes in human life and human dignity, against
the murder of children and women and raping.
I hope we will never stand by against a Rwanda. I hope no matter what
race of people are in trouble, or being attacked or being murdered, we
will stand up against it. Declaring war, however, is not the way that
we should go.
I want us to have a sustained air strike, but, most of all, I want
Mr. Milosevic to come to the peace table. I want a negotiated
settlement. And for us to declare war today, we will not get that.
So I would say, Mr. Speaker, I want to stand on behalf of the
refugees returning to their home, I want peace to come in the Balkans,
and I stand by the vote that I took some years ago for
[[Page H2434]]
the Dayton peace treaty. Yes, our troops are still in Bosnia, but there
is peace there, there is a united peace there, the United Nations
peacekeeping troops, and I do not see why America has to step away from
providing for peace around the world.
We are not police officers, no, but we have a conscience and we
believe in humanity and dignity.
So I would offer to my colleagues as they vote against this
declaration to declare war, that we should vote for the sustained air
strikes, we should make sure that we force or encourage or demand that
those who have the power, including our NATO allies, come to the peace
table, and that we remember that the greatest of all those that we can
give to the world is love and charity. I hope that we will stand for
what is right.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan), the distinguished chairman of
the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs of the Committee on Appropriations.
(Mr. CALLAHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I think this is unprecedented. Maybe some of you who are
more historically informed and more constitutionally informed can
correct me, but I think this is the first time in the history of this
Congress where Congress has initiated a declaration of war.
Generally, as I understand it, the President comes to the Congress
when he finds situations such as required and requests that Congress
declare war. Conceivably I am erroneous on that, but I do not recall.
Maybe some of my more learned colleagues can recall a time when the
Congress initiated a declaration of war.
I think this is ill-conceived. A declaration of war I think would be
divisive within NATO. It would put restrictions on the front line
states. It would make them unable to assist us in the efforts they are
giving us in providing landing operations and staging operations in
those countries, and I think it would be a very dangerous precedent for
this Congress to tell the commander-in-chief that he must go to war if
he does not want to. I know that is not necessarily the case as we see
it today, but I think to start this in this Congress at this time, with
the Congress initiating a declaration of war, is ill-advised, and I
urge Members to vote ``no''.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hayes).
Mr. HAYES. Mr. Speaker, I oppose a declaration of war, having just
returned from the Balkans more firmly convinced, no ground troops.
I know you cannot see it, but this is a picture of a young Apache
pilot in the Balkans who graduated with my son. He said, ``No ground
troops. The cost in human life would be too high.''
We need a negotiated settlement, not a declaration of war. I am
working to provide momentum, leverage and direction to the
administration to settle this conflict.
My colleagues on the other side are dissatisfied because of a lack of
leadership by the administration. We are dissatisfied with a lack of
leadership and failed foreign policy.
Do not declare war. Do not lose lives of our military. Focus our
attention on rebuilding the military, helping the refugees, and
negotiating a settlement that returns the refugees to their homes in
safety and brings our POWs and our troops home.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Capuano).
Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this particular proposal
and to urge my colleagues to keep our eyes open.
This conflict today, we may not like the cards we are dealt, but they
are dealt. We may not like how we got there, but we are there. There
are millions of people in Europe whose lives are at stake, whose
happiness and soundness are at stake, and, if we walk away, if we walk
away, we will have done the wrong thing, and you will know that today
and you will know that 20 years from now.
Many of us can debate how we got here, how we should do it the next
time. I think those are good debates. I think we should discuss what
should happen the next time, because there will be a next time.
For those of you who did not have the opportunity today to read the
papers, look at what is happening in Indonesia. We are about to send
what they call ``police advisers'' from the United Nations to
Indonesia. It is happening elsewhere across this globe, and I do think
we need to discuss that.
At the same time, we do not have the luxury to always deal the cards.
We are sitting here today, we have to deal with it today. We have to
support the efforts to bring those people home, to bring our men and
women home, and to do the right thing by humanity, today, tomorrow, and
every time we have to do it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Horn).
(Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks and include extraneous material.)
Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, I am against this declaration of war, as I am
sure practically everyone in this Chamber is.
The origin of many European parliaments was when the leaders of a
country got together, formed an organized body and reined in the king
who was engaged on various adventures. That is, in a sense, what we are
trying to do here today.
If the Europeans have a European problem, they ought to be making the
decision and they ought to be sending their own ground troops.
Russia should be deeply involved. It has not been included. There is
only one other superpower in the world; that is Russia. They should be
tied to the West, and they should be helpful in this particular matter.
If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] is to keep Europe at
peace, then Russia should be a member.
The Serbs cannot move north, that is NATO territory; and if they move
south toward Greece, that is NATO territory, and that would be one
sovereign nation invading another, and that would be appropriate for
NATO to take action and defend Greece.
I include for the Record, Mr. Speaker, portions of the speech
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made back in 1984. He was an
outstanding Secretary and a very wise man. He developed six major
criteria which should be met when we use U.S. combat forces abroad.
The Uses of Military Power
Thank you for inviting me to be here today with the members
of the National Press Club, a group most important to our
national security. I say that because a major point I intend
to make in my remarks today is that the single most critical
element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of
support and agreement for our basic purposes. Policies formed
without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve will
never work. And you help to build that understanding among
our citizens.
Of all the many policies our citizens deserve--and need--to
understand, none is so important as those related to our
topic today--the uses of military power. Deterrence will work
only if the Soviets understand our firm commitment to keeping
the peace . . . and only from a well-informed public can we
expect to have that national will and commitment.
So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps that most
important question concerning keeping the peace. Under what
circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such
as our reach that painful decision that the use of military
force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out
our national policy?
National power has many components, some tangible--like
economic wealth, technical pre-eminence. Other components are
intangible--such as moral force, or strong national will.
Military forces, when they are strong, and ready and modern,
are a credible--and tangible--addition to a nation's power.
When both the intangible national will and those forces are
forced into one instrument, national power becomes effective.
In today's world, the line between peace and war is less
clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George
Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new
democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then Lay 2-
3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States was
protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear
age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.
Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of
the precious worth of the
[[Page H2435]]
freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid conflict, whiled
maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has always been to
work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war comes. Yet, so
blurred have the lines become between open conflict and half-
hidden hostile acts that we cannot confidently predict where,
or when, or how, or from what direction aggression may
arrive. We must be prepared, at any moment, to meet threats
ranging in intensity from isolated terrorist acts, to
guerrilla action, to full-scale military confrontation.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, said
that ``It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent
and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them.'' If it was true then, how much more true it is today,
when we must remain ready to consider the means to meet such
serious indirect challenges to the peace as proxy wars and
individual terrorist action. And how much more important is
it now, considering the consequences of failing to deter
conflict at the lowest level possible. While the use of
military force to defend territory has never been questioned
when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival
threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral
aggressive use of force to invade, conquer or subjugate other
nations. The extent to which the use of force is acceptable
remains unresolved for the host of other situations which
fall between these extremes of defensive and aggressive use
of force.
We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern
paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace--the gray
area conflicts--are precisely the most difficult challenges
to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and
nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our response must
be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force
is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to
apply the resources needed.
Because we face a spectrum of threats--from covert
aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation,
to use of brute force--choosing the appropriate level of our
response is difficult. Flexible response does not mean just
any response is appropriate. But once a decision to employ
some degree of force has been made, and the purpose
clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to
carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the
purpose has been achieved. That, to, has been difficult to
accomplish.
The issue of which branch of government has authority to
define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now
being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s Congress
demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in the making
of foreign policy and in the decisionmaking process for the
employment of military forces abroad than had been thought
appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality
of decision-making authority in the executive branch has been
compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that
actively interferes with that process. At the same time,
there has not been a corresponding acceptance of
responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions
concerning the employment of military forces.
Yet the outcome of decisions on whether--and when--and to
what degress--to use combat forces abroad has never been more
important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or
settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as
a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of
such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to
ignore. So we must be prepared to deal with a range of
possibilities, a spectrum of crises, from local insurgency to
global conflict. We prefer, of course, to limit any conflict
in its early stages, to contain and control it--but to do
that our military forces must be deployed in a timely manner,
and be fully supported and prepared before they are engaged,
because many of those difficult decisions must be made
extremely quickly.
Some on the national scene think they can always avoid
making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question of
whether any force can ever be used abroad. They want to avoid
grappling with a complex issue because, despite clever
rhetoric disguising their purpose, these people are in fact
advocating a return to post-World War I isolationism. While
they may maintain in principle that military force has a role
in foreign policy, they are never willing to name the
circumstance or the place where it would apply.
On the other side, some theorists argue that military force
can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these
proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in
limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are
American forces of any size present they will somehow solve
the problem.
Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or
satisfactory solutions. The first--undue reserve--would lead
us ultimately to withdraw from international events that
require free nations to defend their interests from the
aggressive use of force. We would be abdicating our
responsibilities as the leader of the free world--
responsibilities more or less thrust upon us in the aftermath
of World War II--a war incidentially that isolationism did
nothing to deter. These are responsibilities we must fulfill
unless we desire the Soviet Union to keep expanding its
influence unchecked throughout the world. In an international
system based on mutual interdependence among nations, and
alliances between friends, stark isolationism quickly would
lead to a far more dangerous situation for the United States:
we would be without allies and faced by many hostile or
indifferent nations.
The second alternative--employing our forces almost
indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our
diplomatic efforts--would surely plunge us head-long into the
sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam
war, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed
our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric
of our socieity, endangering the single most critical element
of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and
agreement for our basic purposes.
Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we
hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops,
who would have an understandable opposition to being used--in
every sense of the word--casually and without intent to
support them fully. Ultimately this course would reduce their
morale and their effectiveness for engagements we must win.
And if the military were to distrust its civilian leadership,
recruitment would fall off and I fear an end to the all-
volunteer system would be upon us, requiring a return to a
draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent that so
wracked the country in the '60s.
We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform
throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is working
spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit what we have
fought so hard to regain?
In maintaining our progress in strengthening America's
military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For we have
entered an era where the dividing lines between peace and war
are less clearly drawn, the identity of the foe is much less
clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our
enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of why the
principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.
Since these two wars threatened our very survival as a free
nation and the survival of our allies, they were total wars,
involving every aspect of our society. All our means of
production, all our resources were devoted to winning. Our
policies had the unqualified support of the great majority of
our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II ended with the
unconditional surrender of our enemies . . . the only
acceptable ending when the alternative was the loss of our
freedom.
But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we
encountered a more subtle form of warfare--warfare in which,
more often than not, the face of the enemy was masked.
Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by
proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from
afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of ``national
liberation,'' but far more frequently ideology or religion
provided the spark to the tinder.
Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open
society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use
alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt
our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow
such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to exploit
ours by conducting simultaneous military and propaganda
campaigns to achieve their ends.
They realize that if they can divide our national will at
home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces abroad.
So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they aim to
intimidate western leaders and citizens, encouraging us to
adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. Meanwhile
they remain sheltered from the force of public opinion in
their countries, because public opinion there is simply
prohibited and does not exist.
Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity.
It is true that until democratic nations have the support of
the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage in a
conflict. But when they do have that support they cannot be
defeated. For democracies have the power to send a compelling
message to friend and fore alike by the vote of their
citizens. And the American people have sent such a signal by
re-electing a strong chief executive. They know that
President Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for
his actions and is able to lead us through these complex
times by insisting that we regain both our military and our
economic strength.
In today's world where minutes count, such decisive
leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless of
whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill-defined, we
must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and
conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of
the United States and our allies . . . and then responding
appropriately.
Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack on
our territory, and our response may not necessarily require
the immediate or direct defense of our homeland. But when our
vital national interests and those of our allies are at
stake, we cannot ignore our safety, or forsake our allies.
At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot
assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have
learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and
blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our
responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and
should offer substantial amounts of economic and military
assistance to our allies in their time of need, and help them
maintain forces to deter attacks against them--
[[Page H2436]]
usually we cannot substitute our troops or our will for
theirs.
We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a
matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume
for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend
their territory--without their strong invitation--when our
own freedom is not threatened.
On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the
United States has seen the need to join forces with other
nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with
negotiations, and by separating warring parties, and thus
enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities
safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict
for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years both
to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a peacekeeping
mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for
combat--they were armed only for their self-defense. Their
mission required them to be--and to be recognized as--
peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions deteriorated so they
were in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring
nations, their peace keeping mission could not be realized,
then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to
the number and arms of our troops--in short to equip them
for combat, or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when
we faced just such a choice, because the warring nations
did not enter into withdrawal or peace agreements, the
President properly withdrew forces equipped only for
peacekeeping.
In those cases where our national interests require us to
commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our
resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be
committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient
numbers and we must support them, as effectively and
resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops
to combat we must do so with the sole object of winning.
Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital
interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national
resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win
the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just
that.
Just as clearly, there are other situations where United
States combat forces should not be used. I believe the
postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I
have developed six major tests to be applied when we are
weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me now
share them with you:
(1) First, the United States should not commit forces to
combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion
is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our
allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should
declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a
particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.
(2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat
troops into a given situation, we should do so
wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If
we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary
to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
Of course if the particular situation requires only limited
force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to
commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties
and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then
could perhaps have prevented the Holocaust of World War II.
(3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat
overseas, we should have clearly defined political and
military objectives. And we should know precisely how our
forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And
we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As
Clausewitz wrote, ``no one starts a war--or rather, no one in
his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his
mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he
intends to conduct it.''
War may be different than in Clausewitz's time, but the
need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is
still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has
become necessary for our vital national interests, then we
must send forces capable to do the job--and not assign a
combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.
(4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the
forces we have committed--their size, composition and
disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if
necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during
the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must
our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a
beacon light before us the basic questions: ``Is this
conflict in our national interest? '' ``Does our national
interest require us to fight, to use force of arms? '' If the
answers are ``Yes'', then we must win. If the answers are
``No'', then we should not be in combat.
(5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad,
there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the
support of the American people and their elected
Representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved
unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face: The
support cannot be sustained without continuing and close
consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at
home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in
the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win,
but just to be there.
(6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. Forces to combat should
be a last resort.
I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding
whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the
months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost
in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to
combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of
our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must
have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and
understood and supported by the widest possible number of our
citizens. And those objectives must be vital to our survival
as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our
responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted
enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to
apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that
may be required later. We must never forget those
isolationists in Europe who shrugged that ``Danzig is not
worth a war'', and ``Why should we fight to keep the
Rhineland demilitarized? ''
These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased
negatively for a purpose--they are intended to sound a note
of caution--caution that we must observe prior to committing
forces to combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to
risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution
is not only prudent, it is morally required.
In many situations we may apply these tests and conclude
that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should
interpret what I am saying here today as an abdication of
America's responsibilities--either to its own citizens or to
its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal
that this country, or this administration, is unwilling to
commit forces to combat overseas.
We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital
interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are ready
to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those
interests. Let no one entertain any illusions--if our vital
interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are
resolved that if we must fight, we must win.
So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have
learned from the past, they also can--and should--be applied
to the future. For example, the problems confronting us in
Central America today are difficult. The possibility of more
extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this
hemisphere in months ahead is something we should
recognize. If this happens we will clearly need more
economic and military assistance and training to help
those who want democracy.
The President will not allow our military forces to creep--
or be drawn gradually--into a combat role in Central America
or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is
designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement.
This means we will need sustained congressional support to
back and give confidence to our friends in the region.
I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today can,
if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist
incremental approach which almost always means the use of
insufficient force. These tests can help us to avoid being
drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where it is not
vital to our national interest to fight.
But policies and principles such as these require decisive
leadership in both the executive and legislative branches of
government--and they also require strong and sustained public
support. Most of all, these policies require national unity
of purpose. I believe the United States now possesses the
policies and leadership to gain that public support and
unity. And I believe that the future will show we have the
strength of character to protect peace with freedom.
In summary, we should all remember these are the policies--
indeed the only policies--that can preserve for ourselves,
our friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom.
I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union and
other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs
around the world. We can enable our friends in Central
America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to
nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge posed
by the unfolding complexity of the 1980's.
We will then be poised to begin the last decade of this
century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured by
firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will
enable all of us--ourselves at home, and our friends abroad--
to achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and
materially, far higher than man has even dared to dream.
In brief, there is no vital United States interest in what is going
on in Kosovo. What is going on in Kosovo is tragic, but it is not at
the level of defending vital interests of the United States by making
war in the area. Kosovo should receive humanitarian aid.
I think all of us abhor Milosevic. He should be tried as an
international war criminal, and, if convicted, a bounty ought to be
offered for him.
The Balkans are a quagmire of ethnic and religious rivalries that we
cannot solve alone. Let us remember Dien Bien Phu, when many of his key
advisers pressured President Eisenhower to send our armed forces to
bail out the French. He was a wise President; he turned them down.
There was not vital interest of the United States at stake.
[[Page H2437]]
Eisenhower had 800 advisers in Vietnam. He told them not to get
involved in the battle--simply train the soldiers. He was a wise
President.
John F. Kennedy was not a wise President when it came to Vietnam. He
put 16,000 people there and told them to get engaged and shoot. Lyndon
Baines Johnson was not a wise President when it came to foreign
affairs. LBJ upped the ante to 550,000 American troops. They were
heavily engaged. We lost that war. There was no vital interest for our
country.
During the Bush administration the United States put an arms embargo
on sending arms to Bosnia. That was the wrong decision. If the Bosnians
had weapons, they could have protected their country and its people.
The Albanians should have arms to protect their people.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor).
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, of the many books that have
been written about the failed American policy in Vietnam I think one of
the most damning was a book called ``Dereliction of Duty.'' It talks
about how the generals and admirals who comprised the Joint Chiefs of
Staff during the early Vietnam years knew that President Johnson was
intentionally lying to the American public about his plan, or lack of a
plan, in Vietnam, that there was no plan to win the war, there was no
plan as to how to win the war, and yet not one of these people who
claimed to be looking out for their troops was willing to step forward
and risk their career by saying, ``Mr. President, do it right, or do
not do it at all. If you are not willing to do it right, I will resign
my commission and go out and tell the American people the truth about
what is going on.''
Mr. Speaker, this Congress is doing the exact same thing. This
Congress is criticizing the American President for the way he is
handling this conflict. Yet the American President says he will not
introduce ground forces, and the Congress that is damning him today by
250 votes said, ``Do not introduce ground forces.''
We have a President who says, ``I am not going to stop the bombing.''
We have a Congress, 250-plus votes, said, ``Do not stop the bombing.''
We share in the responsibility for what is happening right now.
Tonight, brave young Americans will get in F-15s, F-16s, A-6s, and they
will put their lives on the line in what is for them a very real war.
{time} 1800
One cannot wish it away. We just voted not to end it. The choice we
have is to do it right or to repeat the mistakes of the Congresses and
the Presidents during Vietnam and to pretend that some half-hearted
policy is going to achieve American objectives, and to look the other
way as the casualties mount because we are not willing to put our necks
out, we are not willing to risk our careers, but we are going to let
those kids risk their lives.
Think about it. This is our constitutional obligation. The vote to
get the kids out failed. That leaves but one other alternative, and
that is to do it right for the sake of those kids who are putting their
lives on the line right now.
Now, if we want to revoke the last vote, if we have changed our
minds, then vote it. But if we are going to ask those kids to make the
ultimate sacrifice, then we as a Nation ought to commit this Nation to
the effort and not just a handful of pilots.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished
chairman for yielding time to me.
I rise in strong opposition to this particular resolution, and I
especially am concerned about the timing of these votes. I understand
the reasons why my friend and colleague from California did what he did
to maintain the integrity of the process and the responsibility that we
have as parliamentarians to engage in that process. I, however, went to
the leadership and asked if we could postpone these votes at least
until next week, as a group of Members of this body, in fact 10 of us,
travel to Austria, Vienna, Austria tomorrow evening to meet with the
senior leadership of the Russian Duma and their major factions to try
to find some common ground to provide leverage to convince Milosevic
that it is time to come to the table and end this conflict.
We have an opportunity, Mr. Speaker. We have not used that
opportunity before this debate and this vote, and that is extremely
unfortunate. We should not be locked into an artificial vote time frame
that tells us when to come forward and have Members in such disarray as
we are going to see today watch the results of this vote. And that will
tell us the problem that Members have in terms of what we are doing.
I understand the process is important, but I also understand the
substance of what we are about is even more important, because we are
talking about an issue and decisions and votes that could affect our
ability to bring Russia in in a way that helps us bring this to a
resolution peacefully. In my mind, Mr. Speaker, that is the top
priority. Keeping our ground troops, keeping NATO ground troops from
having to confront the Russian military, and from those Serbs in a
confrontational way that will lead to additional bloodshed.
It is unfortunate we are having these votes today. In my opinion, it
is not in our country's best interests that we have these votes. I wish
we could have avoided that. I think the vote results will show the
concern that Members have, not necessarily with just the issue of what
we are about, because anyone could argue that, in fact, we are in war
today with the things that are occurring. But rather, the timing, the
sequence, and the way this is being done without full consideration to
what I think is one very real opportunity.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
(Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I spoke to my dear
colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) regarding the
need for clarity with reference to the War Powers Act. On that I agree
with him thoroughly, and I indicated to him at that time that I would
be prepared to stand with him, and I am sure others will, once this
matter is litigated. I think the timing is poor, and I agree and
associate myself with the remarks of the previous speaker with
reference to the preserving of the process.
That said, the question is, why would we act unilaterally in
declaring war with Yugoslavia? Presently, we are not at war with
Yugoslavia; we are engaged in an international mission to bring about
peace in Yugoslavia. A unilateral declaration of war would signal that
the United States was intensifying the war, while others were fighting
for more limited objectives. OSCE and NATO this past week confirmed as
our partners the objectives that we have set forth. Why, then, would we
destroy our credibility with NATO and destroy NATO's credibility?
I suggest that we defeat this declaration.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is
remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman) has 7\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Meeks) has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus).
(Mr. BACHUS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, war is hell, but at times it is our most
dreaded necessity. At times it is unavoidable. At times it is a matter
of self-defense. None of this is the case in Kosovo. This war was not,
nor is it now unavoidable. It is neither a dreaded necessity, nor is it
fought in self-defense against an attacking enemy. All the good
intentions in the world do not justify continuing such a war. A war
that has every potential for disastrous consequences and catastrophe,
not only for the United States, but also for our
[[Page H2438]]
NATO allies, and for all of the people of Europe, both east and west.
The deep divisions and misgivings expressed here in Congress over
continuing this war are heard throughout the Nation and among our NATO
allies. These divisions and misgivings are understandable, they are
justified, and they cannot be ignored. The administration has failed to
make a persuasive case to Congress or to the American people.
For these reasons, and consistent with my concern and support for our
troops, I voted to withdraw U.S. forces from the war in Kosovo, and I
will vote against ratifying this war with a declaration from Congress.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Rothman).
(Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that the conflict in Yugoslavia
requires this body to take the extraordinary step of declaring war
today, for the first time in the last 50 years of American history. To
declare war today could have dangerous consequences that nobody,
regardless of party, wants to have occur. If war is declared, then any
country that has a connection to Serbia becomes a potential enemy of
the United States and could be drawn into the conflict in the Balkans.
We could find ourselves at war technically with Russia or China, who
have a relationship with Serbia, two of the world's most potent nuclear
powers.
We did not declare war when we engaged in the conflict in Korea,
Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Panama, Haiti or Grenada. Why are some
forcing Congress, or trying to force Congress to declare war now? We
have not done so in 50 years, since World War II. Now is not the time
to escalate the conflict. We should not tie our military's hands with
the red tape and other legal obligations that flow from a declaration
of war. We should not engage in an action that might cause this
conflict to spread to other regions of Europe beyond our control.
This measure demands defeat, and I urge my colleagues to vote against
it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the ranking member of
the Committee on International Relations.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.
Gejdenson) is recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I am confident the House will reject this
unwarranted proposal for a declaration of war. What we should do when
we complete rejecting this constitutionally-propelled resolution by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), who wants to bring this to
court and test it, and he will apparently have his day in court, is
then to make sure we leave no confusion about where the Congress and
the American people are. We must pass the Senate language which I will
offer to authorize the activities we are under.
We have created sufficient confusion today by contradicting even our
own statements here on the floor. Many of those who argued against the
President unilaterally, saying he would not use ground troops, have now
passed what is potentially a statute that would prohibit the President
from using ground troops unless Congress comes together, meets and
passes it in both Houses.
So let us not leave this Chamber leaving confusion in Belgrade or
anywhere else. The bulk of the American people are with the President
on this action; the bulk of the American people are proud that we are
fighting to save human beings from murder. There is no second agenda
here. There is no oil, there is no Communist threat, there are simply
human beings who will then be murdered. Reject this amendment, reject
the proposal to declare war, and join us to simply state that we
support the actions that are being taken, so that Mr. Milosevic can
take no heart in the debate in this great, free and Democratic
institution that we speak clearly and honestly, that we want to set
Kosovo free.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), who is the proponent
of this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell)
is recognized for 5\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, we are at war. There is no question that
that is the truth. We are at war. And I believe that it is fair under
the Constitution for us to declare that war if we are at war, and if we
do not wish to engage in the war, to withdraw from that war. That is
why I offered these alternatives to this body.
I am going to go through evidence that is unmistakable that we are at
war, both quotations from the administration and just average facts
that would compel the conclusion to any fair observer that we are at
war.
Before I do so, though, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Cunningham), my colleague, my good friend, and a distinguished veteran
of the Vietnam war.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I would ask my colleagues to look. If
NATO and OSCE are unanimous, then why are Hungary and France still
shipping oil to Serbs? Why do we have Hungary and Poland and the Czechs
who say that if we go to war they will not support us, and we had to
fight for airspace.
Please look at other solutions to this problem besides ground troops
and bombing, and realize that there are many, many nationalists lined
up behind Milosevic to take his place. It is not just Milosevic. We
have caused the nationalism in many cases. But look at the Mujahedin
and Hamas who, in my opinion, will cause problems for the next 100
years unless the President looks at the Albanian President and
Izetbegovic and says, deport them within 30 days.
Have we looked into the children's eyes that are the refugees? They
do not have a clue as to why they are being uprooted from their homes.
And in my opinion, we have caused a lot of it. It is not just a single
focus. We have to reach out and look at all of the different factors
that are affecting Kosovo and Bosnia.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank my colleague.
To this day, we have flown 11,574 missions. We have 4,423 air
strikes, but this is not war, says the administration. Please, this is
war. Recognize it, say it, admit it.
The Secretary of Defense said in testimony in the Senate Committee on
National Security on April 15, ``We are certainly engaged in
hostilities. We are engaged in combat. Whether that measures up to a
classic definition of war I am not qualified to say.''
For heaven's sakes, Mr. Speaker, the Secretary of Defense of the
United States says he is not qualified to say whether we are at war
when he admits we are engaged in hostilities, we are engaged in combat.
The Secretary of State of the United States, in testimony before the
Committee on International Relations on April 21, refused to answer my
question whether we were in hostilities. It is shameful that the
Secretary of State of the United States did not answer a question put
by a member of the Committee on International Relations, the committee
of jurisdiction over international relations, as to whether we were in
hostilities.
{time} 1815
The reason she didn't, I believe, is because I explained in asking my
question to her that the word ``hostilities'' appears in the war powers
resolution, and she was afraid of confessing that hostilities were in
existence, because that might trigger the War Powers Resolution. She
did admit we were in conflict.
The next day, April 22, her spokesperson, the Assistant Secretary of
State, admitted we were in an armed conflict. The President's executive
order of April 13 accords extra pay to our soldiers who are in, and I
quote the word, ``combat.''
The Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Pickering on February 10 before
our committee answered my question, ``Would Serbia be within its rights
to consider the bombing of sovereign Serbian territory as an act of
[[Page H2439]]
war?,'' by saying ``Yes, they would be within their rights to consider
it an act of war.'' I asked him, ``Is Kosovo a part of sovereign
Serbia?'' He said, yes, it was.
We have prisoners of war, admitted by the President and called as
such by him and by the Assistant Secretary of State Jacobs. We had a
call-up yesterday of 33,102 troops from our Reserves.
We are at war. It is inconvenient, perhaps, to admit the truth, but
it is the truth. We are at war. I applaud two of our colleagues who
have spoken today, our colleague, the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs.
Mink) and our colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor),
who said, this is war. We should declare it to be war if we wish to be
at war.
But if we do not wish to be at war, then we must not permit the
incidents of war, the bombing and the troops. Why do we have this
distinction? Why do we say the bombing is okay but the troops are not?
Is bombing any less war? Is it less war to the people in Yugoslavia? It
is war.
The President needed the approval of Congress before he commenced the
bombing. It is no victory that today he sends us a letter saying that
he will come to Congress before commencing ground troops, because he
says ``before commencing ground troops in a nonpermissive
environment,'' he does not say ``before putting in ground troops to
fight.'' And he does not say he will wait for a Congressional vote.
If the Serbs are sufficiently diminished, ``degraded'' is the word
they use in the administration, so that entry will be quasi-permissive,
then I take it the President would put in ground troops.
Please, we are at war. The honest choice is this: If we are at war,
declare we are at war. If my colleagues do not wish us to be at war,
withdraw the troops. I ask my colleagues to stand up to their
constitutional obligation and to honesty on this resolution.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to
this joint resolution. This resolution would pursuant to section 5(b)
of the War Powers Resolution, declare a state of war between the United
States and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Again,
Mr. Speaker this joint resolution is not in the best interest of United
States of America.
Neither NATO nor the United States believes that a state of war
exists in the current conflict in the Balkan region. The President has
not requested that Congress issue a declaration of war. I believe that
a declaration of war would be entirely counterproductive as a matter of
policy and is unnecessary as a matter of law.
On only five occasions in the United States history and never since
the end of World War II has the Congress declared war, reflecting the
extraordinary nature of, and implications attendant on, such a
declaration. While we are not at war with either the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia or its people, Slobodan Milosevic should not doubt the
determination of NATO to see the stability of Europe reasserted. With
resolve NATO can attain a durable peace that prevents further
repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar
people.
Mr. Speaker, if this resolution is adopted this body would convey the
wrong message. The adoption of H. J. Res. 44 would indicate the
existence of a bilateral war between the United States and Yugoslavia.
A bilateral war between the United States and Yugoslavia has not been
declared and in my opinion should not be declared; rather our efforts
must remain in concert with the allied effort under the NATO umbrella.
As a matter of law, there is no need for a declaration of war. Mr.
Speaker, every use of U.S. Armed Forces since World War II has been
undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority. In
some cases like the Persian Gulf War, action was taken under
congressional authorization, but not since World War II has Congress
declared war.
Mr. Speaker, in the time in which we live, the President must have
the discretion and authority to use U.S. Armed Forces when there is a
clear and significant risk to our national security interests. I would
hope that if nothing else we would have learned that instability in
Europe does have an immediate impact on our own security interests.
In addition, a declaration of war could have serious
counterproductive effects on NATO cohesion and regional stability.
Russia, already agitated over NATO action, could be further alienated
from joining in diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting peace.
As NATO reaffirmed at its 50th Anniversary, it remains committed to
the stability of Europe. NATO is acting to deter unlawful violence in
Kosovo that endangers the fragile stability of the Balkans and
threatens a wider conflict in Europe. The NATO alliance is as united as
ever, and there is no sense in giving up now, and there is no better
prospect for getting a fair and lasting settlement.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution and let us proceed
with our NATO allies to bring about a peaceful settlement.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, as with all Americans I am greatly
distressed by the brutality and loss of freedom the Kosovars are
suffering at the hands of military forces of the Serbian regime in
Belgrade. However, NATO military policy, while inflicting heavy
penalties on the infrastructure of Yugoslavia, has done nothing to stop
the forced removal of the Albanian residents of Kosovo, the original
objective announced by President Clinton and our NATO allies. It may,
in fact, have aggravated the situation. And the effort of the honorable
Congressman from California, Tom Campbell, and his supporters, to move
for a congressional declaration of war is fraught with additional
danger with regard to both our domestic tranquility and the
possibilities of expanding the conflict.
On the domestic front the President as Commander in Chief would be
empowered to call up the Reserves and federalize the National Guard.
All regular enlistments in the armed services would be extended until 6
months after the termination of the conflict. (10 U.S.C. 506, 671a)
Private property deemed necessary for military purposes could be
seized. (10 U.S.C. 2663-64) Under certain conditions, the President
could take over private manufacturing plants, transportation systems,
and regulate the transmission of electrical energy. (10 U.S.C. 4501-02,
9501,-02, 4742, 9742, 16 U.S.C. 824) Private vessels could be
requisitioned by the government (46 U.S.C. App1242-a), radio and
television transmission rules could be suspended (47 U.S.C. 606), and a
variety of controls could be established with regard to aliens,
particularly those from states considered enemies. While it is not
certain, it is highly probable that Congress would agree to pass other
legislation deemed necessary to achieve victory, which would curtail
other aspects of civil life we take for granted.
With regard to United States foreign policy, the negative costs could
be equally grave. Such a declaration could be divisive in NATO, with
some members (Greece, Italy) determining that the effects of such a war
declaration by the U.S. Congress would decrease the support among their
own citizens, thus ending their cooperation and producing a rupture in
the alliance. It would certainly increase the sense of hostility with
Russia, the Ukraine and possibly other former Soviet states.
While we are all agreed with the objective of bringing peace and
justice to the Balkan region, there needs to be further reflection and
discussion regarding the terms we wish to establish with the Yugoslav
government and the means by which we achieve this end. It may be
desirable to consider establishing an ad hoc group within the UN
General Assembly, beyond just the NATO members, to aid in the search
for an honorable and sensible end to this increasingly grave crisis.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.J. Res. 44,
which would declare a state of war between the United States and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I oppose this resolution because I
believe that a declaration of war, like the NATO air strikes, will only
increase instability in the region and exacerbate the atrocities
against ethnic Albanians.
At this very volatile time, my support and prayers go out to the
brave men and women of the United States Armed Forces who have been
dispatched to Yugoslavia. We must take every measure possible to bring
an end to this crisis to ensure their safe and expeditious return home.
While I will vote against the declaration of war, I would like to
commend my colleague from California, Congressman Campbell, for
introducing this resolution into the House of Representatives and
bringing forward Congressional action on the U.S. involvement in
Kosovo. It is my belief that these debates should have taken place six
weeks ago, before a single bomb was dropped and before any U.S. troops
were sent into the hostile situation in the Balkans.
By failing to vote on the air strikes before their commencement, and
instead debating authorization now, when we are already heavily
involved, the Administration is conducting a war without Congressional
consent as required by the Constitution. A vote to authorize the
President to conduct military air strikes at this juncture is nothing
more than a rubber stamp from Congress for an action that has already
begun. In my opinion, our inaction prior to military strikes abdicated
our Constitutional responsibility and furthermore, prevented the voice
of the people I represent, who are overwhelmingly against the air
strikes, from being heard.
There are those who rise today in support of the Administration's
action in order to end the
[[Page H2440]]
genocide of the ethnic Albanians. I agree, in the strongest terms
possible, that we have a moral imperative to intervene and to bring an
end to the horrific suffering. However, whether air strikes, ground
forces, or a declaration of war--these violent means as a method to
bring peace and stability to the Balkans have only, and will only
escalate the crisis.
As a person who strongly believes in the teachings and work of Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr., not just on his birthday, but throughout the
year, I profoundly subscribe to the principles of nonviolence. Our
policies, and our actions, must set an example for our young people
that violence should never be an option. If peace is our objective, and
I am certain that this is a goal upon which all in this chamber can
agree, then I implore us to consider the words of Dr. King. In his last
book, ``The Trumpet of Conscience, A Christmas Sermon on Peace,'' Dr.
King discusses bombing in North Vietnam, and the rhetoric of peace that
was connected to those war making acts.
He wrote,
What is the problem? They are talking about peace as a
distant goal, as an end we seek. But one day we must come to
see that peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, but that
it is a means by which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue
peaceful ends through peaceful means. All of this is saying
that, in the final analysis, means and ends must cohere
because the end is pre-existent in the means and ultimately
destructive means cannot bring about constructive ends.
The Administration's policy and the NATO campaign in Kosovo to date
have produced only counterproductive and destructive results: a mass
exodus of over half a million ethnic Albanians, significant civilian
deaths, an escalation of Milosevic's campaign of racial hatred and
terror, and greater instability in the region. The results are just the
opposite of what we want to achieve. Our goal is to prevent innocent
people from being killed. In the name of saving Kosovars, we are
destroying Kosovo.
At this juncture, I am convinced that our best hope for peace and
stability in the region is the negotiation of an immediate cease fire.
It is my strong belief that the United States and NATO must reach out
to the United Nations, Russia, China, and others to work together to
develop a new, internationally negotiated peace agreement and to secure
Serbian compliance to its terms. In order to end the suffering in the
Balkans and to achieve long term stability, support of a diplomatic
political settlement is the only action we can employ.
As we today speak of a policy to end genocide in the Balkans, I am
also greatly disturbed to think of the people in many countries in
Africa and all over the world, who have also suffered unthinkable
atrocities, beyond our worst nightmare. As a result of ethnic conflict
in Africa, over 150,000 have been killed in Burundi; 800,000 in Rwanda;
and 1.5 million in Sudan. More than 200,000 Kurds have died in Iraq and
Turkey, and hundreds of thousands in Burma, and over 1 million in
Cambodia.
It is my hope that our nation can develop a foreign policy framework
to address suffering and killing all over the world, without the use of
force, ground troops, air strikes and other violent means.
I urge a ``no'' vote on the declaration of war.
Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, last November, I asked Iowans to remember
the victims of Hurricane Mitch * * * and in America's generosity, we
responded with private and public philanthropy. I voted for federal
assistance not only for humanitarian reasons, but also because it is in
our own country's interest that the economics of our trading partners
to the South be salvaged.
Sharing our nation's treasure is a long tradition of United States
humanitarianism. Perhaps the best example was the Marshall Plan to
rebuild Europe after World War II and there are countless others.
We are now facing a man-made disaster with hundreds of thousands of
homeless in the Balkans. Our country is partially responsible for these
refugees, because without President Clinton's go ahead, there never
would have been NATO military action. We should give strong financial
support to Albania and Macedonia to help them clothe, feed and shelter
the displaced Kosovars.
However, there is a big difference between providing humanitarian
financial assistance to homeless victims whether in Guatemala or
Albania and spending the blood of our sons and daughters in a ground
war in the Balkans. One of the lessons we should have learned in
Vietnam is that the public will tolerate loss of life and limb only
when it is convinced that its vital national interest is at stake.
While the American public is rightly concerned about the human rights
violations in Kosovo, few believe that our own country's interests are
at risk.
Vietnam also taught us that military might is only one factor in
determining the outcome. We were much stronger militarily than the Viet
Cong, but they were much more committed. It was their country. We have
an analogous situation in Kosovo, a province of Yugoslavia, which the
Serbs consider the birthplace of their nation.
We are hearing arguments that the credibility of NATO is at stake.
For those of us who remember the Vietnam era only too clearly, these
were the same arguments that got us deeper into a Southeast Asia war.
The lesson we should have learned then was: Unless you are willing to
wade in a swampy pit, don't dig your hole deeper. The consequences of
failing to carry through later will be much worse than not getting more
deeply involved now.
So where do we go from here? First, Congress ought to assert its
Constitutional duty. The Framers assigned the power to enter wars to
Congress only, not the President. Congress should step up to the bar
and not let the President take the risks of war and then either cheer
or castigate depending on the outcome.
I support Congressman Tom Campbell's attempt to get Congress to vote
on a declaration of war. I will vote ``No,'' since our country has not
been attacked by Yugoslavia nor do we have such an overriding national
interest to justify going to war over their own civil war.
If Congress votes for war, then we will have upped the ante a
thousand fold. If Congress votes no, then I would support taking this
to the courts in order to get a cease and desist order on the
executive.
But what about Kosovo itself? Milosevic is indicating that he would
now accept non-NATO international observers in Kosovo. We should
suspend bombing, institute a full UN-sponsored economic boycott, and
resume negotiations. Probably the best that can be achieved is a
partition of Kosovo with the Serbs and their religious and historical
sites on one side and the Albanian Kosovars on the other. A UN
peacekeeping presence will be necessary for generations.
One thing, though, is clear to me. I just completed town hall
meetings in every county in my district. Iowans are very skeptical
about our military involvement in that part of the world. Of the nearly
one thousand people who attended, only a handful were for placing U.S.
ground troops in Kosovo under any circumstances.
Humanitarian aid, yes. U.S. ground forces, no.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to section 4 of House Resolution 151, the joint resolution
is considered as read for amendment, and the previous question is
ordered.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint
resolution.
The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third
time, and was read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the joint
resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 2, nays
427, not voting 5, as follows:
[Roll No. 102]
YEAS--2
Barton
Taylor (MS)
NAYS--427
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldacci
Baldwin
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
[[Page H2441]]
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (IN)
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
Kuykendall
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Larson
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Ose
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Reynolds
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaffer
Schakowsky
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simpson
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--5
Aderholt
Blagojevich
Slaughter
Tauzin
Wynn
{time} 1837
Messrs. McINTOSH, McINNIS, UPTON, HUTCHINSON, and NADLER, and Ms.
PRYCE of Ohio and Ms. KILPATRICK changed their vote from ``yea'' to
``nay.''
So the joint resolution was not passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________