[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 59 (Wednesday, April 28, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2414-H2427]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up
the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 82) directing the President,
pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United
States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and ask for its
immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
The text of H. Con. Res. 82 is as follows:
H. Con. Res. 82
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring),
SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.
Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50
U.S.C. 1544(c)), the Congress hereby directs the President to
remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in
connection with the present operations against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia within 30 days after the passage of
this resolution or within such longer period as may be
necessary to effectuate their safe withdrawal.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution
151, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
General Leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on H.Con.Res. 82.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. Gilman asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, let me begin by saying to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Campbell) that I fully respect and appreciate his
diligent efforts to ensure that the Congress is appropriately involved
in any decisions on war and peace, and we highly commend him for his
efforts in that respect.
As I stated to Secretary Albright at our Committee on International
Relations hearing last week, I believe that the administration had made
a serious mistake in trying to prosecute a war against Yugoslavia
without full involvement of the Congress.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) is earnestly trying to
rectify that situation, and I believe he should be commended for taking
pains to ensure that the prerogatives of the Congress are respected.
At the same time, however, I cannot support this measure that the
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) introduced in April and which
is before us today, House Concurrent Resolution 82. This is a
concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c)
of the War Powers Resolution, to remove our armed forces from
Yugoslavia.
{time} 1530
With regard to the merits of the Campbell resolution, we all know
that Operation Allied Force has not been as successful as we would have
liked, but now is certainly not the time to suspend our military
operations in Yugoslavia. Doing that would only compound the
humanitarian tragedy that has been unfolding before our eyes. It would
reward President Milosevic for his murderous strategy of depopulating
Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian majority and remove all pressure on him
to agree to any diplomatic settlement that would protect the rights of
the people of Kosovo.
The NATO military air operation now taking place over Serbia is a
response, belatedly in my opinion, to more than a year of the most
callous and brutal acts of repression aimed at innocent men, women and
children in Kosovo whose only crime has been that they are Albanians.
The architect of these policies is Slobodan Milosevic, a man who has
already accumulated a horrendous record in the former Yugoslavia and
who should be indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.
The cost of Milosevic's aggressive nationalism has been the uprooting
of hundreds of thousands of people. While the Serbs have used NATO
bombing as a pretext to escalate their hideous policy of ethnic
cleansing, it is clear that they had prepared to embark on this course
for Kosovo when the spring weather permitted better conditions for
their military operations. There are alarming reports that in addition
to the mass expulsions that we see on our television, there have been
numerous atrocities and even mass killings perpetrated by the Serb
forces, including civilian paramilitary groups notorious for their
crimes that were committed in Bosnia and in Croatia.
In addition to these compelling humanitarian concerns that have led
to our involvement, there is a threat to neighboring countries like
Albania and Macedonia that could create a much wider conflict in Europe
that could even result in the involvement of our NATO allies Greece and
Turkey on opposite sides.
To prevent that kind of destabilization and escalation, our Nation
has decided to act now. We have learned in two previous occasions this
century that wars in Europe inevitably involve our own national
interest, and that we pay a higher price by pretending that they do not
and by delaying our involvement.
For these reasons, I strongly urge my colleagues in the House to
oppose this resolution, H. Con. Res. 82, and indicate to the government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that we will not cut and run when
the going gets tough.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I find considerable irony in the question of what is our
national interest in Kosovo, for I thought we unequivocally answered
that question with American blood and American tax dollars.
If we have no national interest in Kosovo, why did we lose so many
lives in Europe in two World Wars? If we have no national interest in
Kosovo, why did we spend billions of tax dollars
[[Page H2415]]
on the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan in the
aftermath of World War II? It seems that we have forgotten that the
Balkans are an integral part of Europe, and that Kosovo, as President
Bush first enunciated, is critical to the peace and stability in the
Balkans.
Senator Dole got it right when he testified before the Committee on
International Relations advocating our engagement and involvement in
Kosovo. I am quoting Senator Dole: ``It is in America's interest to
have a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe.''
As did Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served so well as our U.N.
Ambassador under President Reagan. She stated at that same hearing, and
again I am quoting: ``I think that peace and security and the human
rights of the people in the region and the future of NATO and a
democratic, peaceful, prosperous Europe are all in the balance in
Kosovo.''
We should be proud that it was the United States that helped nurture
prosperity and democratic institutions in Europe in the latter part of
this century, for that investment truly changed the course of history
and has not just benefited Europe, but our Nation and our people.
The prosperity that we have enjoyed in this decade can be partially
traced to the reality of a Europe increasingly democratic in terms of
its political institutions, with economies based on free market
principles. We are joined at the hip, let us be clear about that, but
it is to our mutual advantage. An expanded European Union represents a
future of unprecedented peace and prosperity for a continent that has
been ravaged by war throughout recorded history, and the genocidal
ethnic cleansing of Milosevic is perhaps the final challenge,
hopefully, to achieving that vision.
So when we ask what our national interest is in Kosovo, it is not
simply Kosovo, it is more, much more. It is about Europe and beyond
Europe.
In the so-called Christmas warning of 1992, it was President Bush
that warned Milosevic if he attacked Kosovo, that the U.S. would
support a military intervention, if necessary. Early in his
administration, President Clinton confirmed the Bush warning. It was
the conclusion of both administrations that conflict in Kosovo would
destabilize the entire region and potentially threaten all of Europe.
It would indeed be tragic at this point in time to have defeated
fascism in the 1930s and the 1940s, to have prevailed over communism in
the 1980s, only to lose the peace at the end of the century. We may do
just that by a unilateral withdrawal at this point in time.
I submit that the action would be irresponsible. Dictators worldwide
would cheer. Milosevic would have won. We will have crafted a much more
frightening and troubled future. The Kosovar Albanians would be
condemned to permanent exile or death and genocide.
Again, Senator Dole was particularly eloquent when he spoke to what
was occurring in Kosovo and to the evils of genocide. Again, let me
quote the Senator: ``Now I don't know how many people it takes before
you call it genocide. And I'm reminded of the book, `The Greatest
Generation,' by Tom Brokaw, and I'm proud to be a part of that
generation, and one of the things we failed to do in that generation
was to nip genocide in the bud. It happened, we let it happen, and we
stood back and we did nothing.''
Let us not sometime in the future reflect back on this day with the
same regrets expressed so eloquently by Senator Dole. An earlier
speaker, my friend from Ohio, on the floor stated, ``Let's give peace a
chance.'' I respect him. I respect that sentiment. However, let me
conclude by saying, let us not give genocide a chance. Let us not give
genocide a chance.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), our distinguished whip.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, this is a very difficult speech for me to
give, because I normally, and I still do, support our military and the
fine work that they are doing. But I cannot support a failed foreign
policy. History teaches us that it is often easier to make war than
peace. This administration is just learning that lesson right now.
But before we get deeper embroiled into this Balkan quagmire, I think
that an assessment has to be made of the Kosovo policy so far.
President Clinton has never explained to the American people why he was
involving the U.S. military in a civil war in a sovereign nation, other
than to say it is for humanitarian reasons, a new military/foreign
policy precedent.
The President began this mission with very vague objectives and lots
of unanswered questions. A month later, these questions are still
unanswered. There are no clarified rules of engagement. There is no
timetable. There is no legitimate definition of victory. There is no
contingency plan for mission creep. There is no clear funding program.
There is no agenda to bolster our overextended military. There is no
explanation defining what vital national interests are at stake. There
was no strategic plan for war when the President started this thing,
and there still is no plan today.
Instead of sending in ground troops, we should pull out the forces we
now have in the region. Many who argue we cannot pull out say we should
stay to save face, if for no other reason. I would like to ask these
people, was it worth to stay in Vietnam just to save face?
The root of this crisis is centuries old, and no occupation by
foreigners can craft a peace where no desire for it exists. Unless you
are willing to commit your sons and daughters into a war indefinitely,
you should not vote to keep troops overseas simply because we do not
know what else to do.
The President said that if we did nothing, there would be instability
in the region, there would be a flood of refugees, Kosovars would die
and the credibility of NATO would be undermined. Well, Clinton's
bombing campaign has caused all of these problems to explode; in
addition, has made the Russians jittery, and has harmed NATO's standing
in the world.
In Lebanon, Ronald Reagan cut his losses and withdrew our troops. We
should do the same thing before the body bags start coming home. After
all, what good has been accomplished so far? Absolutely nothing. What
long-term good will be accomplished by keeping our troops there? None,
unless you are willing to occupy all of Yugoslavia.
Mr. Speaker, I do not think we should send ground troops to Kosovo,
and I do not think we should be bombing in the Balkans, and I do not
think that NATO should be destroyed by changing its mission into a
humanitarian invasion force. I support the Campbell resolution.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me be really clear. This is not a civil war that has been raging.
This is nothing more than state violence and state terrorism against a
class of citizens who are unarmed, for the purpose of forming a pure
enclave, a mini-state, if you will. I daresay the statement that this
is a civil war does a disservice to what occurred before the ascendancy
of Milosevic. There were 1.9 million Albanians and about 200,000 Serbs.
As again Senator Dole testified before the House Committee on
International Relations, they had been living peacefully together until
Milosevic stirred things up.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel), a respected member of the Committee on
International Relations.
Mr. HOEFFEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr.
Speaker, I oppose the unilateral withdrawal of American forces from
Yugoslavia. This is a wrong idea at a wrong time. This effort
represents a modern day isolationism that would be wrong for America,
just as wrong as isolationism was at the First World War and the time
of the Second World War.
A unilateral withdrawal of our troops would devastate NATO just at a
time when it is showing great resolve and great unity. The role for
NATO in the future is to keep the peace in Europe. No one else will be
able to do that. This is not the time to destroy NATO's resolve.
[[Page H2416]]
A unilateral withdrawal would also reward Milosevic for his barbaric
activity. It would allow him to win this conflict. He is engaging in
genocide. Genocide is systematic barbarity and murder of innocent,
defenseless civilians because of ethnic and religious differences. That
is what is happening in Yugoslavia and Kosovo today. That is what we
must stop. To withdraw our troops today would undercut everything this
country stands for and would remove America as one of the leaders,
perhaps the only great leader, in this world today. We should oppose
this resolution.
{time} 1545
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Hansen).
(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the resolution.
When American troops are deployed on the field of battle it is the
duty of every American offer them our clear support and prayers for
their safe return home. That is why I will vote for a supplemental
appropriations bill that not only pays today's bills in Kosovo, but
also begins to meet the national security emergency caused by 7 years
of neglect of our military forces by this administration.
It is an emergency that we have troops fighting in Bosnia whose
families are asked to survive on food stamps. It is an emergency the
Air Force now has less cruise missiles than they have bombers to fire
them. It is an emergency that as we call up 2,000 Air Force reservists
for Kosovo, the Air Force still faces a shortage of over 2,000 pilots.
And it is a grave emergency, that while we have gotten bogged down in a
tiny country on the periphery of our vital interests, the Joints Chiefs
of Staff have now confirmed that we face a ``very high risk'' of not
being able to respond to our vital national interests in major theaters
such as the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula.
Support for our troops means more than a ``photo op'' for the
Commander-in-Chief. It means providing them all of the resources they
need to safely and successfully complete their mission.
Support for our troops also means not putting them in harm's way
without a clear goal, which can be achieved by military means, and
which supports our vital national interests.
While all of our hearts and prayers go out to the innocent Kosovar
civilians, it is painfully clear that 6 weeks of bombings have not
prevented a single Kosovar from being raped, murdered or expelled from
their home. Simply put, our military strategy of degrading and
diminishing the Serbian military infrastructure can never achieve our
stated political goal of peacefully reintegrating the Kosovar Albanians
into Serbia.
Replacing Vietnam era ``body counts'' with high technology ``bomb
damage assessments'' of empty Serbian barracks will not make this war a
success.
If this tiny and troubled region truly were a threat to our vital
interests, the only proper strategy would be full scale invasion of
Kosovo, defeat of the Yugoslav Army, unconditional surrender of the war
criminal, Slobodon Milosovic, and the occupation of Kosovo for the
decades it will likely take to rebuild this region. This strategy, of
full scale war, and the deployment of thousands of U.S. ground troops,
surely must have the support of the American people as expressed
through the approval of the Congress. For this reason, I support the
resolution by the gentlewoman from Florida.
But if our security interests are not at stake, however deep the
humanitarian crisis, we must consider more appropriate means of
response than our current round of ``therapeutic airstrikes.''
When American service men and women know that what they are fighting
for is important to their fellow Americans, and achievable through
military means, they would do it for free.
We owe them an answer to these fundamental questions. Are we fighting
for the independence of Kosovo? Not according to the President. Are we
fighting to defeat Milosovic and bring him to justice as a war
criminal? Not according to the Secretary of State. Are we fighting to
defeat the Yugoslav army? Not according to the Secretary of Defense. So
far it appears we are fighting because we can. We have replaced ``power
projection'' with ``sympathy projection.'' Blind support for this non-
policy of wishful thinking must never become the measure of our support
for American troops.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, there is a strange dichotomy at play in
this event. Those from the left attempt to use a vehicle they neither
support, understand or even loathe at times. They attempt to spin the
White House language that we attempt to stop ethnic cleansing, when the
issue has actually exacerbated the problem that the Pentagon predicted,
and warned and told the President not to get involved in.
The actual killing and removal of over 1 million refugees would not
have happened, not to the degree if NATO had not intervened.
The Jane Fondas, the Ramsey Clarks, the Strobe Talbotts of this world
find themselves inept in attempting to conduct military operations or
even foreign policy.
Take a look at NATO today: France, Socialist/Communist coalition;
Italy, former Communist.
It is not somebody that we trust.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Meeks), a member of the House Committee on International
Relations.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, during the past few days I have
asked myself, because I was against the conflict in Kosovo, I asked
myself why, and I kept coming up with the answer that I was upset with
the administration because it did not do the right thing in regards to
the genocide that took place in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone and the
Sudan. And then I thought again, and I said, and came to the conclusion
that 1, 2, 3 or even 4 wrongs do not equal a right. Therefore, I
changed my opinion and said we should stay the course in Kosovo and
correct our policy in Africa, for genocide is, indeed, genocide
wherever we may find it.
I believe we should follow the lead of the administration and NATO in
preserving humanity, for we cannot sit idly by as thousands of innocent
people are raped, murdered, stripped of their identities and forced
from their homelands like what occurred in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone
and the Sudan.
We must not allow evil to take over, and ethnic cleansing is indeed
an evil. We should not sit on the fence between right and wrong. We
should be firmly on the side of the fence that is right.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said war can never be a positive or
absolute good, but it could serve as a negative good in the sense of
preventing the growth of an evil force. I believe that Mr. Milosevic is
an evil force that must be stopped.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum).
(Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, there is a tragic war unfolding in the
Balkans. The United States military has been playing a significant role
in this war for several weeks. There is every indication that the war
will expand and so will the United States' role. And yet, it is an
undeclared war bearing an eerie resemblance to the beginning of the
Vietnam War albeit that this one involves our NATO allies.
As a part of a NATO policy, the United States military began bombing
in Yugoslavia in response to that government's refusal to go along with
a plan for NATO ``peacekeeping'' forces to occupy the Yugoslav province
of Kosovo in an effort to stop a civil war and ``ethnic cleansing.'' It
appears that President Clinton and other NATO leaders mistakenly
thought that bombing specified military targets in Serbia and Kosovo
would send a message to Yugoslav President Milosevic that would cause
him to quickly embrace the NATO peace plan. It is obvious this was a
gross miscalculation. Instead, Serbian forces immediately swept through
Kosovo burning homes and driving out thousands and thousands of
Kosovars who have become refugees in neighboring states. In the
process, many human rights atrocities against the Kosovars in Kosovo
have been reported.
The response of the United States and its allies has been to step up
the bombing program. This has united the Serbian population behind
President Milosevic, steeled their determination to prevail no matter
what and alienated the general public in Russia who have a strong
historical relationship with the Serbs. So far there is no sign that
absent the introduction of ground forces, the intensified bombing
campaign will cause President Milosevic and the Serbs to agree to the
terms regarding Kosovo, demanded by NATO.
It is well known that the Yugoslav army has long prepared for a
defensive struggle against any invading force by constructing
underground facilities in rugged territory, by storing
[[Page H2417]]
weapons and other supplies in these facilities and by training its
military to engage in guerrilla tactics. While the extent of damage
done by the bombing to date has been significant, it is probable that
no amount of bombing will degrade the Yugoslav military sufficiently
enough to prevent large numbers of casualties if U.S. ground troops are
inserted or even if attack helicopters and other low flying aircraft
are utilized to destroy Yugoslav ground forces because of the passion
of the Serbian people to drive the Albanian Kosovars out of Kosovo and
regain this territory which historically, several hundred years ago,
was part of greater Serbia. It is unrealistic to expect the government
of Yugoslavia to yield to NATO and its demands short of a total
military defeat, and even then it appears likely that guerrilla warfare
would continue to exist for a long, long time against any occupying
force.
President Clinton has never asked Congress to declare war on
Yugoslavia or Serbia. He has never even requested the type of
resolution President Bush requested and was granted in advance of
Desert Storm. Instead, he has made statements to the general public and
conferred behind closed doors with congressional ``leaders'' putting
forth a rationale for the bombings without a full explanation of what
will likely be required to achieve the presumed NATO foreign policy
objectives. At no time has he spelled out to the American public, let
alone Congress, a consistent, coherent foreign policy that demonstrates
a compelling United States national security interest in waging war
against the forces of the government of Yugoslavia. Has the United
States embraced a new NATO policy as described by British Prime
Minister Tony Blair that NATO will not permit ever in the future human
rights atrocities and ``ethnic cleansing'' or a dictatorship anywhere
on the continent of Europe? If President Clinton embraces this policy,
does this mean he is committing United States military forces to
enforce such a policy not just in this instance in Yugoslavia, but at
any point in what the world defines as Europe? Does this mean that
whatever force is necessary, including the use of ground troops of the
United States military, will be engaged to ensure this policy? And if
indeed this is a new policy of NATO to which the United States is in
agreement, what is the national security interest rationale to support
such a policy, and why specifically would we engage in such a policy
with regard to Europe and nowhere else in the world? If it is not the
United States policy, then the President needs to say so and come
before Congress requesting some authority for engaging in the war that
we're now undertaking together with a detailed rationale for it and an
explanation of what we're prepared to do to win it. If it is a new
policy, then that too must be explained together with a request for
Congress to formally support the ongoing war as well as whatever treaty
alterations within NATO need to be made and approved by the U.S.
Senate.
I'm just as moved as anyone else by the atrocities being reported in
Kosovo. There is no doubt in my mind that Albanian Kosovars have been
brutally mistreated. No doubt, an appropriate response by the United
States and its NATO allies to this action is justified. But I am deeply
troubled by our engagement in an undeclared war that appears to be
incrementally deepening with each passing day. It reminds me a great
deal of how we got engaged in Vietnam and allowed that engagement to
progress to a major war with a no-win policy that lost the support of
the American public and cost thousands of American lives. If the United
States is going to engage in war, the commitment must be made to let
the military use the force necessary to win the war which means paying
whatever price in lives of American soldiers is required to do this.
And if America's national security interests are not great enough to
justify such a price, then there should be no war.
To date, President Clinton has not demonstrated to my satisfaction
that America's national security interest in the Kosovo matter is great
enough to justify paying the price that I foresee will be necessary to
win the undeclared war in which we are now engaged. For this reason, I
am voting today for Mr. Campbell's resolution to withdraw American
forces from this war effort and for the Fowler/Goodling bill which
would require a vote of Congress before the introduction of United
States ground forces in Kosovo or Serbia. In doing so I keep an open
mind to any presentation the President may make in the future to
Congress seeking a declaration of war for this cause or a resolution
similar to the one that was sought and given to President Bush.
However, I will not be a party to sending American men and women in
uniform to die in an ill conceived, ill planned and undeclared war.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Utah
(Mr. Cannon).
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I am a hawk. I believe in a military so
strong that we never have to use it. When we use our military might, it
should be with clear objectives after considering our national
interests and the limits of our influence.
Mr. Speaker, imagine Serbia before we started bombing. The threat of
ethnic cleansing clearly existed. About 2,000 innocent people have been
killed, and more ominously, 40,000, a manned force, has been built up
in Kosovo. Imagine again the White House seeing this threat, recalling
the glory of the 1-day wars in Grenada and Panama and, without
considering the ramifications, decided to go to war against Yugoslavia.
But Mr. Milosevic does not play by our rules. He does not turn on his
antiaircraft radar so that we can detect it and destroy it. He uses the
bombings as a cover to really do ethnic cleansing and to suppress local
domestic opposition.
The war drags on. The President and his advisers plead for patience,
all the while hoping a cruel, cold winter without electricity and fuel
oil will force guilty and innocent Serbs to their knees.
Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Crowley), another Member of the House Committee on
International Relations.
(Mr. CROWLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to H.
Con. Res. 82 which would direct the President to remove our armed
forces from their positions in connection with the present operations
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Mr. Speaker, a congressional vote to withdraw U.S. forces from the
mission in Kosovo would severely undermine the entire NATO effort to
stem President Milosevic's brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against
the Kosovar Albanian population.
Mr. Speaker, the withdrawal of U.S. troops right now would also
undermine our other stated objectives in the conflict.
One of the reasons we decided to act in the first place was to
prevent a wider conflict in the region from erupting. That was and
still remains our goal. A withdrawal right now would greatly undermine
that objective by putting the stability of the Balkans in grave
jeopardy and, more broadly, the security of southern Europe.
We would also leave hundreds of thousands of refugees homeless and
over 1.2 million displaced persons exposed to continued ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, a situation we will not tolerate. Just last
weekend, leaders of the NATO alliance meeting here in Washington
reaffirmed their commitment and resolve to maintain the air campaign
against Yugoslavia until several key conditions were met. A vote now
for unilateral U.S. withdrawal flies in the face of the NATO show of
resolve.
Mr. Speaker, over the years many voices in this Chamber have called
for greater burden-sharing by our allies. Our allies now are
shouldering a great deal of the responsibility in this conflict. A
unilateral troop withdrawal at this time would send the wrong signal to
them that we are not willing to hold up our fair share of the burden.
Mr. Milosevic must not doubt our resolve to achieve the objective of a
multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo in which all can live in peace and
security. Mr. Milosevic alone has the power to end this conflict by
immediately stopping the violence and bloodshed, withdrawing his
military police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and allowing all
refugees to return under an international security presence.
Mr. Speaker, make no mistake. A vote withdrawing our troops is a vote
against our troops and the vital mission they are currently
undertaking. I strongly urge my colleagues to vote against this
resolution.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Ganske).
(Mr. GANSKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, I urge a yes vote on H. Con. Res. 82.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Illinois (Mrs. Biggert).
Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution.
Almost 7 weeks ago I voted to authorize the
[[Page H2418]]
President to deploy American military forces as part of a peacekeeping
force in Kosovo if the peace talks then underway produced a settlement.
Mr. Speaker, no peace agreement was reached, no vital U.S. interest
in Kosovo was articulated, no mission defined, no exit strategy put
forward. Without a vote of this House, the planes were launched and air
strikes began. Never before have I been as concerned about the lack of
definition and direction in our Nation's foreign policy. We are in
where we should not be, and no one seems to know the way out.
It appears that the President hoped that the threat of air strikes
would force a peace agreement. It did not. He hoped that the air
strikes alone would detour Mr. Milosevic from continuing his attacks on
Kosovo. They did not. He hopes that the American people are willing to
risk the lives of their sons and daughters in Kosovo. They are not.
Mr. Speaker, hope is not a method. The President has yet to make a
case for our involvement in Kosovo.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman
from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this
time to me.
Mr. Speaker, the Constitution is very clear. It is the United States
Congress which has the power to determine issues of war and peace and
to decide whether our young men and women are put in harm's way. It is
the President who is the Commander in Chief of the military; it is the
Congress which determines whether we use that military.
I have heard today that some people think that the U.S. participation
in Kosovo now is unconstitutional. They are right. But the U.S.
participation in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama and many other conflicts
which took place without congressional authorization were also
unconstitutional.
The time is now for this Congress to stop abrogating its
constitutional responsibility to the White House and to start seriously
addressing the issues of war and peace.
Frankly, I am extremely concerned about the process that has taken
place today on an issue of such enormous consequence and at a time when
Congress has an inactive schedule. It is an outrage that we only have a
few hours to discuss the issues of war, the expenditure of billions,
and the potential loss of life of American military personnel, and I
hope we rectify this situation in the coming days and weeks. This
should not be the last debate on this issue.
Mr. Speaker, my assessment of this situation at the present moment is
that Mr. Milosevic is a war criminal and that ethnic cleansing, mass
murder, rape and the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of
innocent people from their homes is unacceptable and cannot be ignored.
Sadly, because Mr. Milosevic has negotiated agreements which he has
then ignored, I have supported the NATO bombings of military targets. I
believe that the Serb military and police must be withdrawn from
Kosovo, that the hundreds of thousands of people uprooted from their
homes must be allowed to return, that Kosovo must be given some kind of
self-rule and that an international peacekeeping force should be
established to maintain order.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that we must strive as hard as we possibly can
to find an alternative between doing nothing and allowing ethnic
cleansing and mass murder to continue and the continuation of a war
which will certainly result in terrible destruction, large numbers of
casualties and the expenditure of great sums of money. I believe that
the United States must be as active as we possibly can in finding a
road to peace.
I believe that Germany and the United Nations have brought forth
proposals which might be able to form the basis of a negotiated peace.
I believe that Russia, a long-term ally of Serbia, should be asked to
play a more active role in the process and to supply troops for an
international peacekeeping force.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Chabot), a member of our committee.
Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I have believed from the outset that our
involvement in this European conflict is wrong. It has become painfully
apparent that the Clinton administration committed American air power
without a clearly-defined mission and without a credible exit strategy.
Make no mistake about it. Slobodan Milosevic is a war criminal. His
treatment of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has been deplorable, and
his prosecution as a international war criminal could not come fast
enough. But I do not believe that the commitment of American military
forces to a potentially long, expensive and perhaps tragic effort can
be the proper means to achieve that end.
Mr. Speaker, our military involvement in the Balkans is unwise. This
administration's miscues have led to a disjointed strategy of gradual
escalation that puts the lives of American men and women at risk.
Let us work for peace. Let us help the Kosovar refugees with
humanitarian aid. But let us take our service men and women out of
harm's way.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Coyne).
Mr. COYNE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the difficult issues
that are before us relative to U.S. involvement in the ongoing NATO
military action in Yugoslavia. The United States, in consultation with
its NATO allies, has determined that the instability caused by the
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is a threat to the security of Europe.
{time} 1600
Governments of NATO agreed unanimously on joint military action over
a month ago, with the intention of forcing the government of Slobodan
Milosevic to end its policy of ethnic cleansing and to allow safe
restoration of the refugees to their homes. The one thing that I think
Americans have learned is that it is wrong to stand idly by while such
atrocities take place before our eyes. History.
Has also taught us that it is better to head off a problem than to
wait until the problem has spread. Today NATO remains committed to
continuing its military operations until its three objectives, safe
return and self-government of the refugees, withdrawal of the
Yugoslavian troops from Kosovo and the insertion of peacekeeping troops
to protect the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are met. I support these
objectives, and I support U.S. military action in order to achieve
them.
How long this action will last, I do not know, but I do know two
things: First, the power to end hostilities lies today with Slobodan
Milosevic. All he has to do is stop the killing and pull his troops
back.
Second, the chances that Mr. Milosevic will meet NATO's demand are
dramatically reduced if Congress enacts legislation that requires the
withdrawal of U.S. forces or ties the administration's hands regarding
NATO's military options.
This is no time to go weak-kneed on our troops in Europe.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Manzullo), a member of our committee.
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, I have four questions to ask my colleagues
and the American public: Is a ground war in Kosovo imminent? We are
being pushed towards a ground war that is not in our national
interests. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of Britain, the Secretary
General of NATO, Javier Solana, and our own President with his recent
headlines, ``Clinton edges closer to backing the use of ground
troops,'' and the President has called up 33,000 reservists.
The second question, what does a ground war mean? It means between
150,000 and 300,000 troops, with American forces making up 65 percent
of the troops in rugged terrain that 25 German divisions in World War
II could barely occupy, with expected casualties of between 7 and 12
percent, thousands of Americans wounded and killed.
Three, is it worth it? Every Member of Congress must ask himself or
herself this question: Is it worth the life of my child, and, if you
cannot answer that in the affirmative, then why should you force
others' children to go to war, while the Clinton Administration refuses
to allow the Kosovars to arm themselves and fight their own civil war.
[[Page H2419]]
The fourth question, why vote for the Campbell bill to halt U.S.
combat mission in Yugoslavia? Because this is the only way to keep
ground troops from savage guerrilla warfare, and this is the only way
to stop thousands of U.S. soldiers from being killed in battle.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Davis).
(Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the
Campbell resolution. As I stand here today, it pains me deeply to know
that right now there are over 500,000 innocent victims from Kosovo who
are running for their lives. These men, women and children have been
driven out of their homes and villages, have been subjected to
organized assaults, brutal rapes, and even assassinations. Some are
living in makeshift camps, sheltered only by blankets and plastic
covering. Some even hide and wait in the forests. Many of their
villages have been burned.
These victims have been terrorized and seen death in the worst
extreme. They are experiencing hunger, sickness, cold temperatures and
terror on many fronts. Some have seen their loved ones viciously
executed. We cannot allow this horror to continue for these innocent
people, without trying to stop it.
Let me be clear: I strongly believe that any kind of physical
confrontation is troublesome and undesirable. However, to simply stand
by, after one has exhausted diplomatic solutions, is even more
unbearable. We have been as reasonable as we can possibly be with the
Milosevic regime, yet he continues these atrocities and continues to
launch a well-executed ethnic cleansing campaign and continues to
commit genocide upon the men and women and children of Kosovo.
I have been told that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere, and there can be no justice in America as long as there is
injustice in Kosovo.
We have no alternative, we have no recourse, we have no choice,
except to demonstrate that we believe in peace, and, not only do we
believe in it, but we will work for it.
Therefore, I oppose the Campbell resolution, and urge that we vote
against it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Istook).
Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I rise not to declare war, but to support
our Constitution.
Right now President Clinton is prosecuting a war he was never
authorized to start. President Clinton asked many nations to agree to
attack Yugoslavia, but he failed to get permission from one crucial
country, America. Our Constitution requires that Congress must declare
war, not the President. It also states that Congress, not the
President, defines and punishes offenses against the law of nations.
And the NATO treaty, approved 50 years ago, says nothing about
launching an attack.
It is not the American way to let one man drag us into a bloody
quagmire. I took an oath to honor our Constitution, and I will not
stand idle while the President, again, runs rough-shod over that
Constitution.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Olver), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on
Military Construction of the Committee on Appropriations.
(Mr. OLVER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. OLVER. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor with an overwhelming
sense of sadness that we be debating constraints on America's ability
to lead in this world on a most profound issue of human rights. We are
a people and a Nation whose very creation was to protect life and
liberty against imperial sovereignty.
In my view, whatever constrains the 19 nations that comprise NATO
from successfully prosecuting this war and successfully degrading the
military capacity of the Milosevic regime to conduct ethnic cleansing
and successfully returning ethnic Albanian citizens of Kosova to the
homes they've lived in for generations is bad policy. It is tough
enough to achieve consensus among those 19 nations, from France,
Britain, and Italy to Hungary, Luxemburg and Iceland. But a broad
consensus exists, a remarkable agreement, that the consummate evil in
Europe today is represented by the Milosevic regime's execution of his
belief that it has every right to repress, to terrorize, to intimidate,
to expel, and, if those fail, to massacre whoever is left, of nearly 2
million citizens of Kosovo, whose only crime is that their religion is
Islam.
I believe that if NATO had said ``no'' when Milosevic attacked
eastern Croatia in 1991, an attack that ended when the defenses of
Vukovar were overrun and the people remaining in the hospital were
taken from their beds and slaughtered, we would not have witnessed the
agony of Bosnia with 200,000 killed and 2 million--fully 50% of the
population--displaced from their homes. That agony culminated at
Srebrenica where 8,000 men and boys were separated out and slaughtered.
And if NATO had said ``no'' when the Milosevic regime killed 200,000
Bosnians and sent 2 million more into exile and into displacement from
their homes, then the agony of Kosovo would not have occurred.
I believe equally fervently that if NATO is not equally successful in
its resolve on Kosovo, that the anti-Milosevic freely-elected
government, and, in fact, the very republic status of Montenegro within
the rump of federal Yugoslavia, is as good as dead, and that the
Milosevic regime will then adopt the destabilization of Macedonia as
its next expansionist project.
NATO must succeed in this effort, before all the Kosovar males
between the ages of 15 and 50 are murdered by the Milosevic regime.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson).
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, war is a serious undertaking.
It should not be used for political reasons, ever. War is a last resort
and only used to protect America, her citizens and our vital interests.
Despite the humanitarian atrocities in Kosovo, the loss of even one
life for a cause that has yet to be articulated or defined for the
people of the United States is one too many. The plight of the refugees
is tragic, and America should help them. We are a country that can
provide relief and direction, ease pain and suffering, and we should
provide help.
Mr. Speaker, I fought in a war where politicians were afraid to win
because of the political fallout. That fear caused me to spend nearly 7
years of my life as a prisoner of war. I would fight again tomorrow for
America's vital interests, but the answer in Kosovo is not to waste
American lives. The answer is stop the bombing and provide relief for
the refugees.
Mr. Speaker, there is a wall among the trees near the Lincoln
Memorial that is engraved with the names of many brave soldiers, many
of whom were my friends. Families go there to grieve and remember their
fathers, their mothers, their sons and daughters. Stop the bombing. We
do not need another wall.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Hawaii (Mrs. Mink).
(Mrs. MINK of Hawaii asked and was given permission to revise and
extend her remarks.)
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, there is no doubt in my mind that
Congress has the duty and responsibility to decide the question whether
the United States of America uses its military power against another
country. No matter how this Congress feels about the evil actions of
the leaders of Yugoslavia against its own people, words of revulsion
and opposition do not justify bombing without a declaration of war.
If the majority of this Congress feels that the air bombardment is
justified, then it must vote to declare war. An explanation of why we
are bombing Yugoslavia is not enough. We need to explicitly state that
we do so in an act of war. Without that declaration of war, we make a
mockery of the Constitution and of the War Powers Act.
Just because we are not acting alone and because the countries of
NATO are in full support of the air attack does not absolve us of our
responsibility to abide by our Constitution. If we believe that the
President is correct in sending
[[Page H2420]]
our military forces to bomb Yugoslavia, then it follows that we must
vote to declare war.
I voted to allow troops into Yugoslavia to enforce the peace
agreement. I did not vote to allow military intervention to force an
agreement. I do not support the use of military power to beat the
Yugoslavian government into submission to our will.
I fervently believe we should be debating a resolution to urge the
President to declare a moratorium on the bombing while an all-out
effort is made to reach a settlement. There are various proposals on
the table. We could discuss the Russian proposal, the UN proposal, the
German proposal. The Kosovar people have fled from their homes. Dangers
to them now of a moratorium are very small compared to what has already
been heaped upon them, so why not declare a halt on the bombing and let
Russia, Germany and the UN broker a settlement? I want an end to the
bombing. I want the Constitution of the United States to prevail.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo), a member of our committee.
Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, there are many murky things about the
situation we now face in Kosovo. One, however, is not murky. What is
not even remotely unclear is the fact that we are not there for the
often heard cause of stopping ethnic cleansing. That is the one thing
about which I am absolutely sure. That is not the reason we are there.
We can debate, and we will debate at length, the variety of reasons
we may be there. It may have something to do with legacies and all the
rest of that, but it has nothing to do with ethnic cleansing, else we
would be in at least a dozen countries around this world where the
situation is 10 times worse. Certainly we can start naming them now. At
the top of the list is the Sudan.
{time} 1615
There were 2,000 people dead when we went into Kosovo to begin with,
a third of them Serbs. We have already ruined too many lives there in
Kosovo, we have done too much damage; too many people are dead as a
result of the actions we have taken. It is time to withdraw our forces.
When we have dug ourselves a pit, the best thing to do now is stop
digging and get out.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I would remind my colleagues that as a
result of the atrocities and the crimes against humanity committed by
Slobodan Milosevic, there are over 300,000 men, women and children that
are dead in the former Yugoslavia now.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Kucinich), my friend and colleague.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I believe we should withdraw our troops
and resubmit this matter to the United Nations Security Council and
make this tragedy the entire world's burden and not primarily that of
the people of the United States of America.
It is understandable that this House should be conflicted here,
because this mission is itself at conflict between the U.N. charter,
which bans force, violating State sovereignty and the universal
declaration of human rights, which guarantees the rights of individuals
against oppressive States. NATO's action fails the test of humanitarian
intervention, if only because of the damage NATO has inflicted on
civilian populations. Humanitarian bombing is an Orwellian attack on
logic.
If the United States continues as the chief sponsor of this war, we
have, in effect, decided that the United Nations is no longer relevant.
This places upon America the awesome responsibility of policing the
entire world.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins).
(Mr. COLLINS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support for this resolution.
I share the concerns of many Third District residents regarding
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and current North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY). Having recently traveled to Tirana, Albania, and Skopje,
Macedonia, I have witnessed firsthand the humanitarian crisis facing
Europe--a crisis that has intensified since the beginning of the allied
bombing campaign. There is no question that the situation is grim.
Slobodan Milosevic is a shrewd and experienced military commander who
has used military power to expel Kosovar Albanians from their homes and
to put extensive defenses in place in Kosovo, significantly enhancing
his military position on the ground.
The President and the other 18 NATO leaders have, on the other hand,
allowed political considerations to govern military decisions,
resulting in NATO's failure to accomplish the goals established by the
President at the outset of the air war. Ethnic cleansing has
accelerated and the FRY military has now fortified its southern
defenses, presenting a greater threat to a potential invasion force
today than was present when NATO bombing began.
Because NATO air strikes have little chance of accomplishing their
stated goals, and because the human and economic costs of launching a
ground campaign far outweigh the potential benefits of such an action,
I believe that the NATO air campaign must stop immediately. It is time
for NATO to seek a negotiated settlement that will stop this expensive
and counterproductive bombing campaign and allow the Kosovar Albanians
to begin to rebuild their lives.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos), a most distinguished member of the House
Committee on International Relations and a long-term Member of this
body.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, the voices of appeasement and isolationism
are reverberating in these halls. For 40 years NATO stood against the
Soviet Union, the mighty superpower, and NATO apparently, in the view
of some of our colleagues, cannot stand up to Slobodan Milosevic.
This past weekend at the NATO summit, 19 nations stood together
determined and united to see to it that the ethnic cleansing comes to
an end, that the persecution, mass rape, mass murder of the Kosovars
comes to a halt. And it is painful indeed to listen to some of my
colleagues who forget that for the whole period since the end of the
Second World War, NATO provided a shield behind which Europe could be
safe and free and secure and prosperous.
This is a historic moment. For the first time, Hitler's first
victims, the Czechs, the Poles, the Danes, the Norweigans, the Dutch
and the Belgians stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the newly democratic
Germany and 11 other nations, including Canada and ourselves, in saying
``no'' to the perpetrators of genocide. This is not the time to cut and
run.
It is important for all of us to realize that when the dust settles,
this will prove to be NATO's finest hour. We are in it not for oil, not
for glory, not for territory, but for the principles on which this
country was founded, the principles that NATO has succeeded in taking
root throughout western Europe and now throughout central Europe.
If anybody really believes that behind a new Iron Curtain in
Yugoslavia there can be a dictatorship while the rest of Europe will be
safe, stable and secure, it better wake up. We need to understand that
if we allow Slobodan Milosevic to continue his evil deeds, he started
the war against Slovenia, he lost it. He started the war against
Croatia, he lost it. He started the war against Bosnia Herzegovina, he
lost it. The last war he now starts, it is against the people of
Kosovo. These people have done nothing, nothing to hurt the Yugoslav
nation. They just want to live in peace and decency, and it is the
responsibility of NATO to stand up as it has for half a century.
I strongly urge rejection of the resolution.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Alabama (Mr. Callahan).
Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding,
especially with the advances knowledge that I intend to vote against
his resolution.
I must warn my colleagues that we should be very cautious about what
we do and what we say here and the messages that we send. Just last
weekend, the NATO nations were here; they were unanimous in every
respect in saying that they are going to stop the atrocities that have
been taking place in Yugoslavia.
At this time and place in history, when we are involved, whether we
like it or not, in Kosovo and debating
[[Page H2421]]
whether or not we should send American land troops, I think that the
message of passing a resolution soon as this would be a serious mistake
on the part of this Congress.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
To my colleagues on the other side, I just want to provide a
statement made by the former Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, who
testified and expressed his reservations about this policy. But now
that we have initiated this policy, let me quote from Mr. Kissinger who
made this statement this past Thursday:
``What we need to do now is maintain the principle that ethnic
cleansing does not pay, and therefore, those refugees must be given the
right to return. Secondly, if all of NATO is defeated by Serbia, and
that is what occurs if you have unilateral withdrawal, what will this
mean for the Gulf, for North Korea, and for any other area where rogue
States are held in check by American and, in some cases, NATO military
power? That is the issue now.''
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), the chairman of the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services.
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
I am rising in support of this resolution, although I do it with
great reluctance, because it is always difficult not to give the
benefit of the doubt to the executive in foreign policy. But 7 weeks
ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia
because I could discern no national interest in taking sides in a civil
war, no approach that would lead to a diminution of violence, and no
credible exit strategy.
I would like to stress, above all, one thing. Historical analogies
are extremely difficult to derive. I personally believe there are a
whole lot that apply in the Balkans, but many of them are
contradictory. One that the majority side in support of the war falls
back on is the Holocaust. I believe that there are Holocaustal
analogies. But I also believe that Milosevic is a sui generis war
criminal, one for whom Holocaustal acts are not unknown, but one where
leadership is more analogous to, say, a Ho Chi Minh or possibly even a
Pol Pot than to a Hitler.
I raise this because if we exclusively make Hitlerite analogies, we
have no choice whatsoever than to follow a kind strategy that could
lead in and of itself to greater losses of life to innocents than a
negotiated settlement.
With each decision, it appears that this administration and NATO are
moving into a circumstance where the problems are more difficult, not
less; more likely to lead to outrageously violent results. Now is the
time to stress negotiations, the time to recognize that we are not
likely to have a great victory.
Senator Aiken once suggested in Vietnam in the late 1960s that we
should declare victory and get out. That prescription does not fit the
Balkans, but I would urge that we put in place a process of
negotiations, and with that process recognize we have a greater chance
for a successful resolution than any other possibility.
Little is more difficult than to apply perspective to the events of
the day.
The Administration's Kosovo policy is open to question from two
contrasting perspectives: should we militarily engage the government of
Yugoslavia and, if so, what form should this engagement take? The first
question involves fundamental Constitutional issues on war powers and
the role of Congress in legitimizing military action and enhancing the
participation of the American people in decisions related to war and
peace. The second involves the unchallenged role of the President as
commander-in-chief and doctrines of warfare.
Seven weeks ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in
Yugoslavia because I could discern no national interest in taking sides
in a civil war in the Balkans, no approach that would lead to a
diminution of violence and no credible exit strategy.
The Administration, through its acts and statements, has broken with
the military doctrine of the last several Administrations, particularly
the Reaganite reliance on peace-time military preparedness and the Bush
espousal of the Powell Doctrine, which calls for the establishment and
enunciation of clear objectives with the use of overwhelming force to
achieve these objectives.
In this context, I recently reviewed a 1984 speech of the former
Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger. Weinberger suggested that six
major tests should be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S.
combat forces abroad:
(1) First, the United States should not commit forces to
combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion
is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our
allies. . . .
(2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat
troops into a given situation, we should do so
wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If
we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary
to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
. . .
(3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat
overseas, we should have clearly defined political and
military objectives. And we should know precisely how our
forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And
we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As
Clausewitz wrote, ``No one starts a war--or rather, no one in
his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his
mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he
intends to conduct it.'' . . .
(4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the
forces we have committed--their size, composition and
disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if
necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during
the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must
our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a
beacon light before us the basic questions: ``Is this
conflict in our national interest? '' ``Does our national
interest require us to fight, to use force of arms? '' If the
answers are ``Yes'', then we must win. If the answers are
``No'', then we should not be in combat.
(5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad,
there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the
support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress. . . .
(6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should
be a last resort.
Americans are obligated to assess whether U.S. policy in Kosovo today
meet the above tests.
In terms of implementation the Grenada intervention--as minor an
issue as it may have been--and the Gulf War, which involved far greater
geo-economic stakes than the Kosovo conflict, stand in stark contrast
with the new Clinton military doctrine, which can be described as:
(1) Reliance on aircraft and missiles to rain destruction from
thousands of feet and in some cases hundreds of miles in such far-flung
parts of the globe as East Africa, Afghanistan and now Serbia. From an
American perspective this use of air power is star-wars like, but from
the perspective of targeted populations such as in Belgrade the effect
bears more resemblance to the bombings of World War II.
(2) The declared renunciation of the use of ground troops amounts to
the articulation that the United States intends to engage in Kosovo
with one hand tied behind its back.
(3) The determination that murderous potentates should be held in
check through the destruction of significant civilian as well as
military targets, including electric utilities, water systems,
political headquarters, TV stations and residencies of heads of states.
(4) The use of a defensive alliance for intervention in a civil war.
(5) Placing the prestige and might of the United States on the line
through the commitment of air power while multi-lateralizing the
decision-making and control in the NATO structure, which functions by
consensus.
The lessons of history have been widely invoked both to justify and
to decry our military intervention in Kosovo. Unfortunately history
does not provide easy answers, either with regard to the meaning of
contemporary events or to what actions should be taken in response to
them.
For instance, in the wake of World War I historians and political
scientists rightly concluded the European system had been too
inflexible in 1914. A misapplication of this lesson, however, led a
generation later to Munich. Too much rigidity precipitated the First
World War; too little backbone encouraged Hitler's aggression in the
Second.
World War II involved a conflagration between nation states; it also
involved a conflagration within--the Holocaust--and challenged
civilized society not to allow a replication of such inhumanity to man.
The background of both World Wars bears on American decision-making
today.
Clearly, the onslaught against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo that
Milosevic has unleashed has Holocaust parallels. On the other hand, the
ethnic cleansing the Serbs have undertaken also has analogs with what
Croats, Bosnians and, to a much lesser extent, Kosovars have attempted
in the region. Milosevic's barbarity would appear to lie somewhere
between Ho Chi Minh's assault on South Vietnamese Catholics and Pol
Pot's attempt to exterminate intellectuals.
[[Page H2422]]
The problem with equating Milosevic exclusively with Hitler, instead
of recognizing him as a sui generis war criminal, is that it makes a
negotiated settlement morally untenable and renders it impossible for
the U.S. to consider anything less than unconditional victory. This is
particularly dangerous when it is self-evident that a negotiated
settlement is preferable to all sides over a protracted conflict.
Hence, it is key to understand that at this point Kosovo is more a
civil war with holocaustal elements than vice-versa. But if the war
continues, a complicating factor for maintaining NATO unity in the face
of Serbian atrocities will in all likelihood be the West's ability to
stomach Kosovar counter-measures and the implications of ratcheting up
air power. The line between a terrorist and a nationalist freedom
fighter is narrow, as is the line between using force to stand up to
atrocity and applying force in such a way that greater violence is
precipitated.
Yet another lesson of history regards the effectiveness of air power
and strategic bombing. As John Kenneth Galbraith, who led a team that
assessed the impact of allied air power in World War II, has noted,
bombing in coordination with the use of ground troops has generally
proved effective, but strategic bombing of cities often causes
populaces to rally to domestic leadership, no matter how malevolent.
Here it must be noted that air power is different from what it was
earlier in the century. Our arsenal now includes nuclear weapons of
enormous destructive power as well as so-called smart bombs and
missiles that can strike with surgical accuracy, which greatly enhances
our ability to limit danger to our armed forces and collateral damage
to civilian areas.
The development of smart weapons, however, may have caused political
leaders to be too tempted to use them without recognizing that the use
of force anywhere at any time has ramifications which are not easily
predictable and which not infrequently are counter-productive.
For instance, our goal in using force against Milosevic may be to
undermine his political support, but it would appear that, to date, we
have ensconced his political strength while weakening the democracy
movement, which was profoundly pro-American in Serbia and damaging the
lives and livelihoods of ordinary Serbs.
Much of the world is not enamored of America's ability to rain
destruction from afar. We simply have no idea how deep and how long the
effects of our air strikes and the targets we have chosen will last.
What we do know is that Serbs point to a 14th century defeat as a
rallying cry for their actions today. What we do know is that the
Armenians believe that in 1919 they suffered the first holocaust of the
century and Turkish embassies to this day are susceptible to terrorist
attacks because of the atrocities of the now defunct Ottoman Empire.
In the background of the predicament we are in is failed diplomacy.
Where Theodore Roosevelt invoked a doctrine of ``speak softly, but
carry a big stick,'' this Administration has propounded a policy of
threatening vigorously while refusing to make timely military
deployments that might have averted conflict. We have been backed into
using air power, not out of considerations of national interest but to
ensure that the credibility of U.S. political leadership was kept in
tact. We told Milosevic we would use it if he did not agree to our
preferred negotiating plan and he in effect called our hand.
In the background was a peace agreement which had the doubtful
support of one side and no support from the more powerful party.
While the Rambouillet accord might have met standards of American
sensibility, it clearly proved untenable for the activist parties in
the region. This fact should give pause to NATO, America in particular.
In this regard I have become increasingly Frostian in my geopolitics.
Good fences sometimes make good, or at least better, neighbors. It
would appear that, despite the multi-heritage example of Sarajevo, the
people of the Balkans will have to learn to live apart without war
before they can live together in peace.
A century and three-quarters ago, an American President, James
Monroe, asserted a doctrine that carries his name which established
that the United States would object to further European colonization in
this hemisphere and give succor to independence movements in Latin
America. Implicit in the Monroe Doctrine was the assumption, growing
from the concerns of our first President, George Washington, a military
man, that the United States should not become entangled in the quarrels
of Europe.
With the exception of two World Wars in this century and a commitment
made in the context of the Cold War of a defensive alliance, historical
U.S. foreign policy has been governed by the precept that we would give
umbrella protection to independence movements in the Americas but
refrain from military intervention in the internal affairs of nation
states on the continent. Our country was formed by dissidents and
opportunity seekers reacting to the repression and civil wars in
Europe. It now appears that our fore fathers better understood the
Balkans and like European problems than the State Department does
today.
At this point we are being asked to support NATO action for the sake
of the viability and credibility of the alliance, rather than for the
purposes for which the alliance was formed. We appear to be putting the
alliance ahead of our objectives and allowing our mutual strategy to
test the alliance itself, which it is doing. One poll has found that 95
percent of Greeks object to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and there
are significant percentages, albeit smaller, opposed in every country
of the alliance, including the United States.
A decade or so ago, I participated in a forum at the Library of
Congress with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at which I
asked him about an observation he made in one of his autobiographical
works. Kissinger had written that between the 1968 election and the
inauguration, he had sat down with President-elect Nixon and the two of
them had decided to get the United States out of Vietnam. I asked why
they had not just gone ahead and done that immediately upon taking
office and Kissinger responded, ``Congressman, we meant we would get
out with honor.'' Asked if that meant further escalation of troop
numbers and bombing, Kissinger responded, ``Absolutely.''
It is my sense that NATO is in a similar position today with regard
to Belgrade. For the honor of NATO, it appears that we are about to
escalate the war. The question is whether we are not better off seeking
the earliest possible settlement.
History is a source of lessons and perspectives, but issues of the
moment must also be approached in a manner which calculates their
future implications.
NATO's strategic rationale appears to have broken down on the issue
of numbers. There are 19 states versus one with that one being much
smaller than most of the 19. But another way of looking at this
strategic conundrum is that 19 countries are allied against the forces
of nationalism and sub-nationalism in a part of the world where
historical and ethnic tensions provide little basis for compromise.
Nationalism led to dramatic changes in the world's map in the 19th
century and has been repeatedly underestimated as a force in the 20th
century. The question is will NATO, despite its might, find itself in
the same position in the Balkans as the United States did in Vietnam
and as the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan?
Returning to history, the first great chronicle of the Western World
relates to a land mass adjoining the Balkans, ancient Greece.
Thucydides wrote that early in the Peloponnesian Wars which pitted the
quasi-democratic and enormously uplifting culture of ancient Athens
against the more militaristic Sparta, the Athenian Assembly voted to
send a naval fleet to conquer the neutral island of Melos. Several days
later the decision was reconsidered and a faster ship was sent to
overtake the fleet and call off the invasion.
Later in the war, however, the Athenian Assembly again decided to
invade Melos and sent out a force which killed all the men and enslaved
the women on the island. Thucydides' chronicles were intended to show
how the world's most civilized city-state at the time had lost its way,
and indeed from that point on Athens never again recovered its prior
status.
An aspect of the bombing today is what targets are left in Serbia
after so much damage has already been inflicted. Clearly at this point,
the Serbs have lost virtually everything except the war, while the West
has won nothing, particularly a peace.
A case can be made that whatever mistakes have been made to date, it
is morally questionable to stand by and do nothing and an even greater
mistake to pull the rug out from under the executive branch. The reason
I cannot support America's continuing military role is that each of the
choices for NATO in the future gets more untenable. There is the
prospect of sending in troops with losses potentially equivalent to or
greater than Vietnam. There is also the prospect of ratcheting up the
air war. One can always strike again at military sites, but it appears
that on the civilian side, Yugoslavia has already been bombed back to
the 18th century.
Military historians counsel two principles when devising strategic
doctrine: put on the shoes of opponents and do not back them hopelessly
into a corner. In the case of Kosovo, we clearly have not put on the
shoes of the Serbs and we have done everything to back Milosevic into a
corner. We have made a martyr out of a murderer and allowed a war
criminal to stand up to NATO, which includes Serbia's ancient enemy,
Turkey. Milosevic's martyrdom increases with each degree of the
suffering of his people.
Every society has an historian or philosopher who points out that the
road to Hell is paved with good intentions. Despite the good intentions
of the West, our policies appear to be counterproductive. Ratcheting up
the war
[[Page H2423]]
could well signify a ratcheting-down of the moral high ground of NATO.
The prerequisite of policy must always be good intentions, but good
intentions are insufficient grounds for action. Policy must match
intentions with practical capacities to carry out defined objectives.
Just War doctrines, after all, require that responses be proportional
and effective. The only alternatives to a bombs only policy are the
introduction of ground troops or the isolation of Serbia, the reliance
on a humanitarian response to a humanitarian crisis. In either case the
legal and moral imperative to indict Serb leadership for war crimes is
overwhelming.
In the late 1960s Senator Aiken suggested we simply declare victory
and get out of Vietnam. This prescription does not fit today's dilemma
in the Balkans, but our first obligation should be to put in place a
process of negotiations with the understanding that an imperfectly
negotiated settlement may be the closest thing to victory that is
likely to be possible without the loss of an incalculable number of
innocents.
Escalating the war, on the other hand, puts U.S. interests at risk,
in the Balkans and in other parts of the world. The earlier we
reconsider the better.
The vote on this resolution and the others we will take today are
necessitated by law. That law, the War Powers Resolution, may be
unconstitutional and today's votes may serve as a basis for the courts
to rule to this effect. Nonetheless, the War Powers Resolution is at
this moment the law of the land. Ironically, we are finding, compliance
may be more difficult for the legislative than, as has generally been
perceived, for the executive branch because it forces congressional
accountability for or against executive actions.
More importantly, the timing as well as the fact of consideration of
these resolutions is awkward for the national interest because
legislative decision-making is required by dates certain--i.e., within
a prescribed period from the time troops are deployed in hostile
circumstances.
The public interest may not be well served by such a review of
executive action in such a timeframe, but it would be less well served
if Congress avoided its legal and constitutional responsibilities.
Hence, what in effect is a legislative/executive confrontation is
legally, at this time, unavoidable, and as an individual Member of
Congress I have no option except to take a stand. This stand is one of
dissent to what I consider to be a foreign policy that lacks
intellectual rigor and misserves the national interest.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is available
on each side?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from
California (Mr. Campbell) has 10\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce).
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, last week in the Committee on International
Relations we listened to Secretary of State Albright explain the
administration's policy. I expressed my concerns to the Secretary about
the difficulty of our objectives, especially given the limited means we
are committing.
Looking back over time at our Nation's wars, and this is a war, we
have been successful when we have had as an objective the destruction
of a regime or when we have had clearly-defined territorial objectives
such as expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In both of these scenarios, though,
in order to accomplish our goals, we used rather massive force,
including ground troops. But in Kosovo we are committing American
resources and prestige and risking American lives, employing what must
be called a very calibrated use of force in order to achieve a very
complex objective: restructuring Kosovo's society.
Given that, my question to the Secretary was: What precedent for
success in our history are we looking at? Are we practicing a theory
here in Kosovo without an historical basis for success? The response
from her: no cases were cited from the real world. Instead, we heard
that the air war is working, when most observers do not believe it to
be the case, and that we need to be patient. Well, patience is what we
had in Vietnam.
Another thing that struck me while listening to the Secretary was
that when there was a difficult question, when our strategy was being
challenged, we'd hear that she'd rather be answering such difficult
questions then answering why we're doing nothing. This response is
backwards. The Secretary of State and the President she works for are
responsible for the resources of the United States of America, and the
lives of our servicemen. I'd rather have the Administration struggle
with answering questions about the tragedy in Kosovo than struggle, and
that is what it's doing, with explaining why we're committing America's
treasure and risking American lives there. Yesterday, and throughout
this crisis, I've heard too much struggling with our basic strategy.
So, faced with this decision today, I cannot sanction the current
policy. Good intentions, and the tragedy in Kosovo is great, cannot
mask flawed policy.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Hampshire (Mr. Bass).
Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution that is
before us today. It is not an easy vote for me, but it is one that I
must cast. I do so because failure to support this resolution, by
failing to vote for this resolution, we are in effect saying that what
has happened over the last 30 days in the Balkans is okay; that the
administration's failure to define what we are trying to accomplish or
to change that definition practically on a day-to-day basis, that that
activity is okay; that the administration's failure to define the
military means that we should use to achieve that as-of-yet undefined
objective is okay.
We started in the air. We then went to close-in air. Now we are
bombing civilian infrastructure, and unfortunately, I think that we are
going to be looking at the introduction of ground troops in the near
future.
Mr. Speaker, absent some control of Congress, I am certain that this
war will escalate to a point where we will no longer be dealing with $4
billion, $6 billion or $8 billion, but $10 billion, $20 billion, $30
billion, $40 billion or $50 billion.
Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the pending resolution.
{time} 1630
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Canady).
(Mr. CANADY of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for
yielding time to me, and for his leadership on this important issue.
I do rise in support of the removal of the armed forces of the United
States from the present hostilities against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Our forces should be removed from these hostilities because
the vital national interests of the United States are not at stake in
the Balkans.
I also want to state my great concern about the commencement of this
war without the authorization of the Congress. The President does not
have the constitutional authority unilaterally to decide that the
United States will wage war on a sovereign Nation which has not
attacked or threatened the United States. Absent truly exigent
circumstances, the armed forces of the United States should be sent
into conflict only when duly authorized by this Congress.
I would like to quote what James Wilson said in the debate over
ratification of our constitution. He said, ``This new system will not
hurry us into war. It is calculated to guard against it. It will not be
in the power of a single man or a single body of men to involve us in
such distress, for the important power of declaring war is vested in
the legislature at large.'' That power should be exercised as intended
by the Constitution and not usurped by the President.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the removal of the Armed
Forces of the United States from the present hostilities against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Our forces should be removed from these
hostilities because the vital national interests of the United States
are not at stake in the Balkans. Although our interests are not
threatened by Yugoslavia, we are waging war against Yugoslavia in a
conflict that is but the prelude to a protracted, costly, and dangerous
entanglement in the Balkans.
Events to date sadly demonstrate that the Administration has not
adequately assessed the consequences of its present policy and the
costs of the course on which it has embarked. From the start, the
policy has been ill-conceived. Stating the obvious, to persist in folly
is not wisdom. The longer we follow the misguided and dangerous course
set by the Administration, the greater the risk of serious harm to the
real interests of the United States.
I also want to state my great concern about the commencement of this
war without authorization by the Congress. As Commander-in-
[[Page H2424]]
Chief, the President does, in my view, have the inherent Constitutional
authority to use military force to respond to attacks on United States
territory and interests. The President does not, however, have the
Constitutional authority unilaterally to decide that the United States
will wage war on a sovereign nation which has not attacked or
threatened the United States. Absent truly exigent circumstances, the
Armed Forces of the United States should be sent into conflict only
when duly authorized by the Congress. Otherwise, the power to declare
war vested by the Constitution in the Congress is rendered meaningless.
In the debate over ratification of the Constitution, James Wilson
summed up the meaning of the pertinent Constitutional provisions.
Wilson said: This [new] system will not hurry us into war; it is
calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single
man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the
important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large;
. . . from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that
nothing but our national interests can draw us into war.
The decision of a single man has taken the United States into this
war against Yugoslavia. That decision was neither wise nor
constitutional.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Ose).
Mr. OSE. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution today. In March the
House passed a resolution that authorized the deployment of
peacekeeping troops in Kosovo.
In that resolution we asked some very reasonable things of the
President. We asked him to clarify the national security interests in
Kosovo, to state the goal of the mission, to estimate its costs, to
develop an exit strategy, and to report on the mission's impact on our
ability elsewhere in the world to respond to threats to our national
security. To date we have not received a satisfactory response on any
of these. Yet, they remain precisely the questions we are dealing with
today.
The mission in Kosovo is draining valuable military resources and
limiting our ability to deal with rogue states elsewhere in the world.
Kosovo detracts from our ability to be a superpower. I support this
resolution because Kosovo is no more in our national interest than was
Rwanda, Algeria, Congo, East Timor, or a host of other places.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Johnson), our distinguished colleague who spent almost 7
years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I opposed the President when
he pushed NATO to attack the sovereign Nation of Yugoslavia, and I
oppose the deployment of ground troops in that region. The atrocities
that Slobodan Milosevic has committed are heinous, but the President's
decision to use military force was hastily decided and has been poorly
implemented.
This war brings back strong and painful memories of another war,
Vietnam, in which I was called to fight in and where I spent nearly 7
years as a prisoner of war. We might have succeeded in Vietnam except
that what we did there we are doing here, we are allowing the
politicians instead of the seasoned military officers to fight the war.
The President has never established a defined military objective. No
one can tell us why we are there, what are we fighting for, and what is
our end objective. Simply put, there is no defined mission. We must end
this devastation. It is up to this Congress to save lives, not take
them.
Mr. Speaker, I opposed the President when he pushed NATO to attack
the sovereign nation of Yugoslavia. I also oppose the deployment of any
U.S. ground troops in this region.
The atrocities that Slobodan Milosevic has committed are heinous. But
the President's decision to use military force was hastily decided and
has been poorly implemented.
This war brings back strong and painful memories of another war--
Vietnam, which I was called to fight in and where I spent nearly 7
years of my life as a prisoner of war. There was a reason for fighting
in Vietnam. It was to prevent the spread of communism. We might have
succeeded, except that we did there, what we are doing here. We are
allowing politicians instead of seasoned military officers, to fight
the war.
The President has never established a defined military objective in
Kosovo. No one can tell us why we are there, what we are fighting for,
and what our end objective is. Simply put, there is no defined mission.
We must end this devastation and save lives, not take them.
When waging war, the President should ask several questions--are you
willing to win at any cost? Is this in America's best interest? Is
there a goal, and is there a plan to achieve that goal? To all of these
questions, the answer is a resounding no.
And what about NATO? We have seen over and over again, the President
and his aides scrambling to defend NATO and NATO's credibility. What
about our fighting men and women, who will be the ones to give their
lives? Are their lives worth the credibility of NATO?
When I was flying bombing missions over North Vietnam, the
politicians were picking my targets. Twenty-five years later, here we
go again, we're in the same situation.
When our allied commander must submit every target to 18 other
countries for permission to bomb, the only result is chaos. And what
will we say if American soldiers start coming home in flag-draped
coffins?
I have listened to the reasons the President, his administration, and
Members of both houses of Congress have given for supporting this war.
But I keep asking the same question. Is this war worth the death of
one single U.S. soldier? The answer keeps coming up no.
Let me tell you something, as an Air Force veteran, I can tell you
that air power alone cannot win a war. And history confirms it.
Our pilots face many difficulties in the former Yogoslavia--difficult
terrain, constant bad weather, and a quickly disappearing arsenal of
our own weapons.
Furthermore, we are pulling ships and planes from other spots around
the globe to fight this war. We are even stripping our aircraft for
spare parts to keep our combat planes in the air.
And, today, the President called up 33,000 reservists to help meet
our current shortfalls.
War is a serious undertaking. It should not be used for political
reasons--ever. War is a last resort and should only be used to protect
America, her citizens and our vital interests.
Despite the humanitarian atrocities in Kosovo, the loss of even one
life for a cause that has yet to be articulated or defined for the
people of the United States, is one too many.
Everyone of you must ask yourselves this question--would you send
your own son or your own daughter to die to resolve a centuries old
civil war between two peoples in a sovereign nation? Would you send
them to die when you yourself could not answer the question ``why''?
The plight of the refugees is tragic and America should help them. We
are a country that can provide relief and direction, ease pain and
suffering. We should provide help to end the refugee crisis.
I fought in a war where politicians were afraid to win because of the
political fallout. That fear caused me to spend nearly 7 years of my
life in a prisoner of war camp. I would fight again tomorrow for
America's vital interests, but the answer in Kosovo is not to waste
American lives.
The answer is--stop the bombing and provide relief to the refugees.
Please think about your vote today.
You know, there is a wall among the trees near the Lincoln Memorial
that is engraved with the names of brave soldiers. Many, of whom, were
my friends. Families go there to grieve and remember their fathers,
their mothers, their sons and daughters, sisters and brothers.
Stop the bombing today. America does not need another wall.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield one-half minute to the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support. We are all repelled by
the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, at the crimes against humanity. That is
why we should take this crisis to the U.N. Security Council, instead of
taking international law into our own hands and bombing without a
declaration of war.
We should take the opportunity to go to the Russians, our brothers
and sisters struggling to hold onto a democracy, and ask them to help
negotiate peace. This would be true internationalism in search of
peace, and a fitting beginning to a new millennium.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the ranking member.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I am frankly somewhat astounded by the
debate today.
One, Members may differ with the President's goals. Do not continue
to fabricate that there are no defined goals. The goals are simple:
Stop Mr. Milosevic from murdering civilians. It
[[Page H2425]]
is not much more complicated than that.
We have just passed a proposal to pull the President's ability to
engage ground forces. Half of the members on this side of the aisle in
the last several weeks criticized the President for not leaving ground
forces on the table. Now they are trying to put that in statute. Then
we come here.
This is not academic discussion. If we pass this proposal, Mr.
Milosevic will see a bright green light to continue the work of his
role models, Hitler and Stalin. We can dream about lots of other
options. The option before us is whether NATO, all 19 countries,
continue on this campaign, or we sit back and wring our hands about
victims of crime.
Mr. Milosevic knows his role models in history, Hitler and Stalin,
did it bigger and better, but Mr. Milosevic has the same goal. He is
not going to stop in Kosovo.
I do not know if this military program works. I do not know what
works. I know that while we risk our young every day, we have been
incredibly blessed, lucky, and well-trained that we have no casualties.
Do not pass this proposal. Do not send a message to a murderer that
America will sit by as children are being murdered and people are
chased from their homes. This is no place for academic discussions. We
are here on a matter of life and death. Join with me, reject this
proposal.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Barr).
Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from
California on his resolution, and I am proud to be a cosponsor.
Mr. Speaker, we can go back even further than the several hundred
years that these ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia go for guidance here.
We can go back 2,500 years to Sun Tzu, who said 2,500 years ago that
victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated
warriors go to war first and then seek to win.
George Bush in Desert Storm understood it: First you prepare for
victory, you win first, and then you go to war. Winston Churchill
understood that in World War II: You prepare first, you win first, and
then you defeat your enemy.
The philosophy, though, of the Clinton administration, which we must
assert our responsibility and rectify as leaders of this country, is
that defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win; or
perhaps, as the Secretary of State might put it in her eloquence, let
us mix it up and then see what happens.
That is a recipe for disaster, it is irresponsible, and I urge the
adoption of this important constitutional resolution.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.
Mr. Speaker, the moment we never had in Vietnam we now have. This is
a remarkable moment for the history of our country and for the history
of our Congress. We have the chance to say no. We have the chance to
stop it before we get in too deep. We have a chance to say that we can
do more good for those refugees who are at risk by helping them where
they are now than by commencing a ground war.
Mr. Speaker, think about this, pause, reflect, I say to my
colleagues. We do not have to do this war. We do not have to commit the
United States to this war. How many of us wished we had some
opportunity through some courage on the part of our colleagues who
preceded us when Vietnam was the war!
Instead, we went in step-by-step, gradually, and then a number of us
asked, how did we get here? Did no one have the courage to stand up and
say, this is not a war in which we should be involved; this is a civil
war in which we will be drawn deeper and deeper until, in that case,
58,000 Americans were dead?
This is the moment. We did not have it before. Seize this moment now.
As to the concern which motivated our entry into this war, I
recognize the importance and the depth of feeling of compassion for
those who have suffered so much in Kosovo and in Serbia. If we are
concerned, we should show that concern by helping them where they are,
in those refugee camps.
The alternative is a ground war, it is not simply bombing. The
bombing will soon lead to a ground war. In that ground war, as United
States and NATO troops go in, the Serbian forces will be resisting. It
is the Albanian Kosovars who will be used as human shields, and what
few are left who are not, will be driven out of Kosovo into the refugee
camps so many of their brothers and sisters already populate. The
choice really is a ground war or stopping the involvement now.
The President of the United States this day sent us a letter. He
assures us that, indeed, he would ask for congressional support before
introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a ``nonpermissive
environment.'' That is not saying he will not introduce ground troops.
He is saying he will not introduce them into a nonpermissive
environment, without asking some members of Congress. He does not say
he will ask for a vote.
By ``permissive environment,'' he might mean if we have bombed enough
so that he believes it is no longer a nonpermissive environment, he
will then put ground troops in. Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen
said on this same day, in their letter, that the President has
authority to authorize the use of force in the national interest,
without the approval of Congress.
So those are our choices: Shall we commence a ground war, at risk of
the very people we are attempting to save, or shall we stop the war?
This is our moment. Let us not let it pass.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to
this concurrent resolution. This resolution would direct the President,
pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United
States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Adopting this
resolution, Mr. Speaker, would certainly not be in America's best
interest.
My opposition to this resolution is threefold. First, I understand
that several of my colleagues oppose the use of United States Armed
Forces in the Balkans. My colleagues refer to terms like mission creep
and quagmire when discussing this region and our current involvement. I
understand their reluctance for we all can remember Vietnam and the
pain that our nation endured. In fact it was in part because of Korea
and Vietnam that in 1973 Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution is a remnant of the Vietnam War and of the
cold war era. This resolution is not suited for the new-world situation
in which U.S. involvement in hostilities may often be part of a
multilateral effort. As examples of the post cold war era, we saw in
the Persian Gulf War and now in Yugoslavia the need for greater
flexibility. The time in which we now live the President must have the
ability to make rapid decisions that may entail the use of force in new
and varied ways.
Secondly, I object to this resolution because I am wary of beginning
a constitutional struggle between the Office of the President and
Congress when our troops are currently involved in an armed conflict.
With military operations underway we cannot afford to send mixed
signals about our commitment to the region. We cannot afford to risk
that one American soldier, sailor, or airman would doubt that this
nation fully supports their mission nor can we risk that Slobodan
Milosevic or any future adversary doubts our resolve.
I am mindful that the Constitution, the lifeline of our Republic,
grants Congress the power to declare war and to make all laws necessary
for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in
the Government. However, I am also mindful that the War Powers
Resolution as well as H. Con. Res 82 take from the President authority
that the President has exercised for nearly 200 years. This resolution
would remove from the President's arsenal flexibility and decisiveness
in times of crisis.
If this resolution were to pass today, it would certainly begin a
constitutional struggle. The constitutionality of the War Powers Act
has been debated since 1973. As a concurrent resolution does not
require presentation to the President for his signature, then it is
almost certain that this legislative veto will trigger a quagmire of
its own. In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court declared legislative
vetoes to be unconstitutional.
American foreign policy cannot be micro-managed by this body nor
dictated by the President, it instead requires a balance based on
consultation and cooperation. If we are to establish NATO's goal for
the Balkans, of a durable peace that prevents further repression and
provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people, then
this Body must work with the President.
Finally, I oppose this resolution because in my judgment America has
an important interest in the stability of Europe. I would hope that if
nothing else we would have learned that to
[[Page H2426]]
ignore European instability is in fact a mistake. Within this century
we have twice ignored instability in Europe, counting on their
political savvy and experience to restore peace. And twice within this
century we have sent young men and women to restore the peace that
Europeans could not capture.
Kosovo shows us that the Europeans by themselves are incapable of
restoring this peace. However, we are fortunate that NATO provides us
with a vehicle to restore peace to the Balkans. After fifty years of
investment in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we are finally
enjoying the rewards of our collective investment.
Our commitment to NATO and to Kosovo is the best means to achieve a
lasting peace. I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill and let us
proceed together with the President and our NATO allies with the
business of providing stability and peace in Europe.
Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I support the resolution by
Representative Campbell to remove our troops from action in the
Balkans. I'm opposed to applying American military force on behalf of
Kosovo because our goals are unclear and the risks are too great
without any fundamental strategic American interest.
Introduction of ground forces onto what we still recognize as
Yugoslavian soil is a muddled policy. Are we joining a Kosovar war of
liberation, or are we demanding the Yugoslavian national government
delegate an arbitrary level of power to the provincial Kosovo
government?
It is difficult to imagine Kosovars and the Serbs reconciling and co-
existing peacefully and on equal terms after such massive intervention
by the United States. Alternatively if Kosovo or a part of Kosovo were
indeed to gain independence, we don't have any assurance that they
wouldn't try to join a Greater Albania.
I am wary of the side we picked in this Yugoslavian civil war. I do
feel the United States should be a friend to freedom movements
throughout the world. But our support for the Kosovars doesn't seem to
be rooted in any affinity of theirs for freedom or for the United
States. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has links to very suspect
groups, among them heroin smugglers and Middle East terrorists. Should
we be strengthening a group that is supported by Osama bin Laden and
other very dangerous people who hate America?
A strengthened radical Muslim presence in Europe would pose a serious
threat to the interests of the United States and our allies. A
predominately Muslim country is not always hostile to American
interests. Turkey is a long-time and solid ally of the United States.
Several other predominately Muslim countries have also been friends of
the United States. And that is precisely because they have rejected
radical anti-Western elements. The KLA hasn't done that to my
satisfaction.
For these reasons, I urge adoption of the Campbell resolution.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, the Constitution is very clear. It is the
United States Congress, which has the power to determine issues of war
and peace and to decide whether our young men and women are asked to
put their lives in harms way. It is the President who is the Commander
and Chief of the military. It is the Congress who determines whether we
use the military. I have heard today that some people think that the
U.S. participation in Kosovo is unconstitutional. They are right--but
the U.S. participation in Vietnam, Granada, Panama, and many other
conflicts which took place without congressional authorization were
also unconstitutional.
The time is now for this Congress, which represents the American
people, to stop abrogating its Constitutional responsibility to the
White House and start seriously addressing the issues of war and peace.
Frankly, I am extremely concerned about the process that has taken
place today. On an issue of such enormous consequence, and at a time
when Congress has a very inactive schedule, it is an outrage that we
have only a few hours to discuss the issue of war, the expenditure of
billions, and the potential loss of life of American military
personnel--and I hope we rectify this situation in the coming days and
weeks. This should not be the last debate on this issue.
Frankly, at a time when American pilots have been undertaking massive
air attacks in Yugoslavia, when three members of the United States
military are being held prisoner, and when we have spent billions of
taxpayer dollars it is an outrage that the President of the United
States has not come before the Congress to tell us and the nation what
the goals of his policy are--and to ask this institution for support of
those proposals.
It is an outrage that a terrible rule passed this afternoon on an
almost totally partisan basis limiting the time of debate, limiting
amendments and severely limiting the role that Congress should be
playing in determining this country's course of action. We should not
be acting in a partisan way on issues like this.
Mr. Speaker, my assessment of the situation at the present moment is
that Mr. Milosevic is a war criminal, and that ethnic cleansing, mass
murder, rape and the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of
innocent people from their homes is unacceptable and cannot be ignored.
Sadly, because Mr. Milosevic has negotiated agreements which he has
then ignored, I have supported the NATO bombing of military targets--
not civilian targets. I believe that the Serb military and police must
be withdrawn from Kosovo, that the hundreds of thousands of people
uprooted from their homes must be allowed to return, that Kosovo must
be given some kind of self-rule, and that an international peace
keeping force should be established to maintain order.
I believe that we must strive as hard as we possibly can to find an
alternative between doing nothing, and allowing ethnic cleansing and
mass murder to continue, and the continuation of a war which will
certainly result in terrible destruction, large numbers of casualties,
and the expenditure of great sums of money.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that the United States must be as active as we
possibly can in finding a road to peace. I believe that Germany and the
United Nations have brought forth proposals which might be able to form
the basis of a negotiated peace. I believe that Russia, a long time
ally of Serbia, should be asked to play a more active role in the
process and to supply troops for an international peace keeping force.
And finally, I believe that Congress must not duck its constitutional
responsibilities--about developing a short and long policy with regard
to Kosovo. Let's not just blame the President. That's too easy. Let us
have the courage to seriously confront this issue.
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I am a hawk. I believe in a military so
strong that we never have to use it. When we use our military might, it
should be with clear objectives, after considering our national
interests and the limits of our influence.
Mr. Speaker, imagine Serbia before we started bombing. The threat of
ethnic cleansing clearly existed. About 2,000 innocent people had been
killed and, more ominously, a 40,000-man force had been built up in
Kosovo. Again, imagine the White House, seeing this threat, recalling
the glory of the one-day wars in Granada and Panama, and without
considering the ramifications, decides to wage war against Yugoslavia.
In the process, they demonize a man, Mr. Milosevic, who likely
deserves the characterization, to give a face to the American people.
But, Milosevic doesn't play by our rules. He doesn't turn on his anti-
aircraft radar so we can detect and destroy it; He uses the bombing as
cover to really carry out ethnic cleansing and suppress his domestic
opposition.
The war drags on. The President and his advisors plead for patience
all the while hoping that a cruel winter, without electricity and fuel-
oil, will force guilty and innocent Serbians to their knees. And we
continue to deplete what remains of our military capability.
We see the difficulty of integrating our moral sensibilities, the
relations between nations, the use of military force and politics. The
argument is made that our failure to support this sentimental adventure
would undermine NATO and U.S. credibility. That is: Our enemies, petty
dictators, and terrorists, will see our weakness and be tempted to
exploit it. We have already made our weakness clear with indecisive
leadership. Our enemies now see the limits of our strength which we
have unwisely used. Their intelligence services have evaluated our
actions. They will weigh their options. We must deter them from
wrongful action by showing the strength our Constitutional system.
This body should constrain the fatuous thinking and unconsidered
actions by the Executive Branch, requiring the President to unleash the
dogs of war only in extremity and without artificial political
constraints. When we make war it should be quick, efficient, brutal,
and to be avoided at all costs by the Milosevics of this world. This
still leaves the President with wide latitude as he deals with new
threats. In fact, eliminating this drain on our resources, will
dramatically strengthen our ability to face our enemies.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). All time has expired.
Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 151, the concurrent
resolution is considered as read for amendment and the previous
question is ordered.
The question is on the concurrent resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 139,
nays 290, not voting 4, as follows:
[[Page H2427]]
[Roll No. 101]
YEAS--139
Archer
Bachus
Baker
Baldwin
Barr
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blunt
Bonilla
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Chabot
Chenoweth
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Crane
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Dickey
Doolittle
Duncan
English
Everett
Ewing
Foley
Fowler
Gallegly
Ganske
Gibbons
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kingston
Kucinich
Kuykendall
LaHood
Largent
Latham
Leach
Lee
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McInnis
McKeon
McKinney
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mink
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Ose
Packard
Paul
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Radanovich
Ramstad
Rivers
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Scarborough
Schaffer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Skeen
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stark
Stearns
Stump
Sununu
Sweeney
Tancredo
Terry
Thomas
Thune
Upton
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Wilson
Young (AK)
NAYS--290
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Armey
Baird
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chambliss
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Fletcher
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hill (IN)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Larson
LaTourette
Lazio
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McIntosh
McIntyre
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Minge
Moakley
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Northup
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Phelps
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Reynolds
Riley
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Saxton
Schakowsky
Scott
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shows
Sisisky
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Walden
Walsh
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--4
Aderholt
Slaughter
Tauzin
Wynn
{time} 1703
Messrs. KLINK, WALSH, CONDIT, and GARY MILLER of California changed
their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the concurrent resolution was not agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________