[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 59 (Wednesday, April 28, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2414-H2427]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
                               YUGOSLAVIA

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up 
the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 82) directing the President, 
pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United 
States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present 
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and ask for its 
immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
  The text of H. Con. Res. 82 is as follows:

                            H. Con. Res. 82

       Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring), 

     SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE 
                   FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA.

       Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 
     U.S.C. 1544(c)), the Congress hereby directs the President to 
     remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in 
     connection with the present operations against the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia within 30 days after the passage of 
     this resolution or within such longer period as may be 
     necessary to effectuate their safe withdrawal.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 
151, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.Con.Res. 82.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. Gilman asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, let me begin by saying to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Campbell) that I fully respect and appreciate his 
diligent efforts to ensure that the Congress is appropriately involved 
in any decisions on war and peace, and we highly commend him for his 
efforts in that respect.
  As I stated to Secretary Albright at our Committee on International 
Relations hearing last week, I believe that the administration had made 
a serious mistake in trying to prosecute a war against Yugoslavia 
without full involvement of the Congress.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) is earnestly trying to 
rectify that situation, and I believe he should be commended for taking 
pains to ensure that the prerogatives of the Congress are respected.
  At the same time, however, I cannot support this measure that the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) introduced in April and which 
is before us today, House Concurrent Resolution 82. This is a 
concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) 
of the War Powers Resolution, to remove our armed forces from 
Yugoslavia.

                              {time}  1530

  With regard to the merits of the Campbell resolution, we all know 
that Operation Allied Force has not been as successful as we would have 
liked, but now is certainly not the time to suspend our military 
operations in Yugoslavia. Doing that would only compound the 
humanitarian tragedy that has been unfolding before our eyes. It would 
reward President Milosevic for his murderous strategy of depopulating 
Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian majority and remove all pressure on him 
to agree to any diplomatic settlement that would protect the rights of 
the people of Kosovo.
  The NATO military air operation now taking place over Serbia is a 
response, belatedly in my opinion, to more than a year of the most 
callous and brutal acts of repression aimed at innocent men, women and 
children in Kosovo whose only crime has been that they are Albanians.
  The architect of these policies is Slobodan Milosevic, a man who has 
already accumulated a horrendous record in the former Yugoslavia and 
who should be indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.
  The cost of Milosevic's aggressive nationalism has been the uprooting 
of hundreds of thousands of people. While the Serbs have used NATO 
bombing as a pretext to escalate their hideous policy of ethnic 
cleansing, it is clear that they had prepared to embark on this course 
for Kosovo when the spring weather permitted better conditions for 
their military operations. There are alarming reports that in addition 
to the mass expulsions that we see on our television, there have been 
numerous atrocities and even mass killings perpetrated by the Serb 
forces, including civilian paramilitary groups notorious for their 
crimes that were committed in Bosnia and in Croatia.
  In addition to these compelling humanitarian concerns that have led 
to our involvement, there is a threat to neighboring countries like 
Albania and Macedonia that could create a much wider conflict in Europe 
that could even result in the involvement of our NATO allies Greece and 
Turkey on opposite sides.
  To prevent that kind of destabilization and escalation, our Nation 
has decided to act now. We have learned in two previous occasions this 
century that wars in Europe inevitably involve our own national 
interest, and that we pay a higher price by pretending that they do not 
and by delaying our involvement.
  For these reasons, I strongly urge my colleagues in the House to 
oppose this resolution, H. Con. Res. 82, and indicate to the government 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that we will not cut and run when 
the going gets tough.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I find considerable irony in the question of what is our 
national interest in Kosovo, for I thought we unequivocally answered 
that question with American blood and American tax dollars.
  If we have no national interest in Kosovo, why did we lose so many 
lives in Europe in two World Wars? If we have no national interest in 
Kosovo, why did we spend billions of tax dollars

[[Page H2415]]

on the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan in the 
aftermath of World War II? It seems that we have forgotten that the 
Balkans are an integral part of Europe, and that Kosovo, as President 
Bush first enunciated, is critical to the peace and stability in the 
Balkans.
  Senator Dole got it right when he testified before the Committee on 
International Relations advocating our engagement and involvement in 
Kosovo. I am quoting Senator Dole: ``It is in America's interest to 
have a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe.''
  As did Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served so well as our U.N. 
Ambassador under President Reagan. She stated at that same hearing, and 
again I am quoting: ``I think that peace and security and the human 
rights of the people in the region and the future of NATO and a 
democratic, peaceful, prosperous Europe are all in the balance in 
Kosovo.''
  We should be proud that it was the United States that helped nurture 
prosperity and democratic institutions in Europe in the latter part of 
this century, for that investment truly changed the course of history 
and has not just benefited Europe, but our Nation and our people.
  The prosperity that we have enjoyed in this decade can be partially 
traced to the reality of a Europe increasingly democratic in terms of 
its political institutions, with economies based on free market 
principles. We are joined at the hip, let us be clear about that, but 
it is to our mutual advantage. An expanded European Union represents a 
future of unprecedented peace and prosperity for a continent that has 
been ravaged by war throughout recorded history, and the genocidal 
ethnic cleansing of Milosevic is perhaps the final challenge, 
hopefully, to achieving that vision.
  So when we ask what our national interest is in Kosovo, it is not 
simply Kosovo, it is more, much more. It is about Europe and beyond 
Europe.
  In the so-called Christmas warning of 1992, it was President Bush 
that warned Milosevic if he attacked Kosovo, that the U.S. would 
support a military intervention, if necessary. Early in his 
administration, President Clinton confirmed the Bush warning. It was 
the conclusion of both administrations that conflict in Kosovo would 
destabilize the entire region and potentially threaten all of Europe.
  It would indeed be tragic at this point in time to have defeated 
fascism in the 1930s and the 1940s, to have prevailed over communism in 
the 1980s, only to lose the peace at the end of the century. We may do 
just that by a unilateral withdrawal at this point in time.
  I submit that the action would be irresponsible. Dictators worldwide 
would cheer. Milosevic would have won. We will have crafted a much more 
frightening and troubled future. The Kosovar Albanians would be 
condemned to permanent exile or death and genocide.
  Again, Senator Dole was particularly eloquent when he spoke to what 
was occurring in Kosovo and to the evils of genocide. Again, let me 
quote the Senator: ``Now I don't know how many people it takes before 
you call it genocide. And I'm reminded of the book, `The Greatest 
Generation,' by Tom Brokaw, and I'm proud to be a part of that 
generation, and one of the things we failed to do in that generation 
was to nip genocide in the bud. It happened, we let it happen, and we 
stood back and we did nothing.''
  Let us not sometime in the future reflect back on this day with the 
same regrets expressed so eloquently by Senator Dole. An earlier 
speaker, my friend from Ohio, on the floor stated, ``Let's give peace a 
chance.'' I respect him. I respect that sentiment. However, let me 
conclude by saying, let us not give genocide a chance. Let us not give 
genocide a chance.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), our distinguished whip.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, this is a very difficult speech for me to 
give, because I normally, and I still do, support our military and the 
fine work that they are doing. But I cannot support a failed foreign 
policy. History teaches us that it is often easier to make war than 
peace. This administration is just learning that lesson right now.
  But before we get deeper embroiled into this Balkan quagmire, I think 
that an assessment has to be made of the Kosovo policy so far. 
President Clinton has never explained to the American people why he was 
involving the U.S. military in a civil war in a sovereign nation, other 
than to say it is for humanitarian reasons, a new military/foreign 
policy precedent.
  The President began this mission with very vague objectives and lots 
of unanswered questions. A month later, these questions are still 
unanswered. There are no clarified rules of engagement. There is no 
timetable. There is no legitimate definition of victory. There is no 
contingency plan for mission creep. There is no clear funding program. 
There is no agenda to bolster our overextended military. There is no 
explanation defining what vital national interests are at stake. There 
was no strategic plan for war when the President started this thing, 
and there still is no plan today.
  Instead of sending in ground troops, we should pull out the forces we 
now have in the region. Many who argue we cannot pull out say we should 
stay to save face, if for no other reason. I would like to ask these 
people, was it worth to stay in Vietnam just to save face?
  The root of this crisis is centuries old, and no occupation by 
foreigners can craft a peace where no desire for it exists. Unless you 
are willing to commit your sons and daughters into a war indefinitely, 
you should not vote to keep troops overseas simply because we do not 
know what else to do.
  The President said that if we did nothing, there would be instability 
in the region, there would be a flood of refugees, Kosovars would die 
and the credibility of NATO would be undermined. Well, Clinton's 
bombing campaign has caused all of these problems to explode; in 
addition, has made the Russians jittery, and has harmed NATO's standing 
in the world.
  In Lebanon, Ronald Reagan cut his losses and withdrew our troops. We 
should do the same thing before the body bags start coming home. After 
all, what good has been accomplished so far? Absolutely nothing. What 
long-term good will be accomplished by keeping our troops there? None, 
unless you are willing to occupy all of Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not think we should send ground troops to Kosovo, 
and I do not think we should be bombing in the Balkans, and I do not 
think that NATO should be destroyed by changing its mission into a 
humanitarian invasion force. I support the Campbell resolution.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
Let me be really clear. This is not a civil war that has been raging. 
This is nothing more than state violence and state terrorism against a 
class of citizens who are unarmed, for the purpose of forming a pure 
enclave, a mini-state, if you will. I daresay the statement that this 
is a civil war does a disservice to what occurred before the ascendancy 
of Milosevic. There were 1.9 million Albanians and about 200,000 Serbs. 
As again Senator Dole testified before the House Committee on 
International Relations, they had been living peacefully together until 
Milosevic stirred things up.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel), a respected member of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. 
Speaker, I oppose the unilateral withdrawal of American forces from 
Yugoslavia. This is a wrong idea at a wrong time. This effort 
represents a modern day isolationism that would be wrong for America, 
just as wrong as isolationism was at the First World War and the time 
of the Second World War.
  A unilateral withdrawal of our troops would devastate NATO just at a 
time when it is showing great resolve and great unity. The role for 
NATO in the future is to keep the peace in Europe. No one else will be 
able to do that. This is not the time to destroy NATO's resolve.

[[Page H2416]]

  A unilateral withdrawal would also reward Milosevic for his barbaric 
activity. It would allow him to win this conflict. He is engaging in 
genocide. Genocide is systematic barbarity and murder of innocent, 
defenseless civilians because of ethnic and religious differences. That 
is what is happening in Yugoslavia and Kosovo today. That is what we 
must stop. To withdraw our troops today would undercut everything this 
country stands for and would remove America as one of the leaders, 
perhaps the only great leader, in this world today. We should oppose 
this resolution.

                              {time}  1545

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Hansen).
  (Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the resolution.
  When American troops are deployed on the field of battle it is the 
duty of every American offer them our clear support and prayers for 
their safe return home. That is why I will vote for a supplemental 
appropriations bill that not only pays today's bills in Kosovo, but 
also begins to meet the national security emergency caused by 7 years 
of neglect of our military forces by this administration.
  It is an emergency that we have troops fighting in Bosnia whose 
families are asked to survive on food stamps. It is an emergency the 
Air Force now has less cruise missiles than they have bombers to fire 
them. It is an emergency that as we call up 2,000 Air Force reservists 
for Kosovo, the Air Force still faces a shortage of over 2,000 pilots. 
And it is a grave emergency, that while we have gotten bogged down in a 
tiny country on the periphery of our vital interests, the Joints Chiefs 
of Staff have now confirmed that we face a ``very high risk'' of not 
being able to respond to our vital national interests in major theaters 
such as the Persian Gulf or the Korean Peninsula.
  Support for our troops means more than a ``photo op'' for the 
Commander-in-Chief. It means providing them all of the resources they 
need to safely and successfully complete their mission.
  Support for our troops also means not putting them in harm's way 
without a clear goal, which can be achieved by military means, and 
which supports our vital national interests.
  While all of our hearts and prayers go out to the innocent Kosovar 
civilians, it is painfully clear that 6 weeks of bombings have not 
prevented a single Kosovar from being raped, murdered or expelled from 
their home. Simply put, our military strategy of degrading and 
diminishing the Serbian military infrastructure can never achieve our 
stated political goal of peacefully reintegrating the Kosovar Albanians 
into Serbia.
  Replacing Vietnam era ``body counts'' with high technology ``bomb 
damage assessments'' of empty Serbian barracks will not make this war a 
success.
  If this tiny and troubled region truly were a threat to our vital 
interests, the only proper strategy would be full scale invasion of 
Kosovo, defeat of the Yugoslav Army, unconditional surrender of the war 
criminal, Slobodon Milosovic, and the occupation of Kosovo for the 
decades it will likely take to rebuild this region. This strategy, of 
full scale war, and the deployment of thousands of U.S. ground troops, 
surely must have the support of the American people as expressed 
through the approval of the Congress. For this reason, I support the 
resolution by the gentlewoman from Florida.
  But if our security interests are not at stake, however deep the 
humanitarian crisis, we must consider more appropriate means of 
response than our current round of ``therapeutic airstrikes.''
  When American service men and women know that what they are fighting 
for is important to their fellow Americans, and achievable through 
military means, they would do it for free.
  We owe them an answer to these fundamental questions. Are we fighting 
for the independence of Kosovo? Not according to the President. Are we 
fighting to defeat Milosovic and bring him to justice as a war 
criminal? Not according to the Secretary of State. Are we fighting to 
defeat the Yugoslav army? Not according to the Secretary of Defense. So 
far it appears we are fighting because we can. We have replaced ``power 
projection'' with ``sympathy projection.'' Blind support for this non-
policy of wishful thinking must never become the measure of our support 
for American troops.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, there is a strange dichotomy at play in 
this event. Those from the left attempt to use a vehicle they neither 
support, understand or even loathe at times. They attempt to spin the 
White House language that we attempt to stop ethnic cleansing, when the 
issue has actually exacerbated the problem that the Pentagon predicted, 
and warned and told the President not to get involved in.
  The actual killing and removal of over 1 million refugees would not 
have happened, not to the degree if NATO had not intervened.
  The Jane Fondas, the Ramsey Clarks, the Strobe Talbotts of this world 
find themselves inept in attempting to conduct military operations or 
even foreign policy.
  Take a look at NATO today: France, Socialist/Communist coalition; 
Italy, former Communist.
  It is not somebody that we trust.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Meeks), a member of the House Committee on International 
Relations.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, during the past few days I have 
asked myself, because I was against the conflict in Kosovo, I asked 
myself why, and I kept coming up with the answer that I was upset with 
the administration because it did not do the right thing in regards to 
the genocide that took place in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone and the 
Sudan. And then I thought again, and I said, and came to the conclusion 
that 1, 2, 3 or even 4 wrongs do not equal a right. Therefore, I 
changed my opinion and said we should stay the course in Kosovo and 
correct our policy in Africa, for genocide is, indeed, genocide 
wherever we may find it.
  I believe we should follow the lead of the administration and NATO in 
preserving humanity, for we cannot sit idly by as thousands of innocent 
people are raped, murdered, stripped of their identities and forced 
from their homelands like what occurred in Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone 
and the Sudan.
  We must not allow evil to take over, and ethnic cleansing is indeed 
an evil. We should not sit on the fence between right and wrong. We 
should be firmly on the side of the fence that is right.
  Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once said war can never be a positive or 
absolute good, but it could serve as a negative good in the sense of 
preventing the growth of an evil force. I believe that Mr. Milosevic is 
an evil force that must be stopped.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum).
  (Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, there is a tragic war unfolding in the 
Balkans. The United States military has been playing a significant role 
in this war for several weeks. There is every indication that the war 
will expand and so will the United States' role. And yet, it is an 
undeclared war bearing an eerie resemblance to the beginning of the 
Vietnam War albeit that this one involves our NATO allies.

  As a part of a NATO policy, the United States military began bombing 
in Yugoslavia in response to that government's refusal to go along with 
a plan for NATO ``peacekeeping'' forces to occupy the Yugoslav province 
of Kosovo in an effort to stop a civil war and ``ethnic cleansing.'' It 
appears that President Clinton and other NATO leaders mistakenly 
thought that bombing specified military targets in Serbia and Kosovo 
would send a message to Yugoslav President Milosevic that would cause 
him to quickly embrace the NATO peace plan. It is obvious this was a 
gross miscalculation. Instead, Serbian forces immediately swept through 
Kosovo burning homes and driving out thousands and thousands of 
Kosovars who have become refugees in neighboring states. In the 
process, many human rights atrocities against the Kosovars in Kosovo 
have been reported.
  The response of the United States and its allies has been to step up 
the bombing program. This has united the Serbian population behind 
President Milosevic, steeled their determination to prevail no matter 
what and alienated the general public in Russia who have a strong 
historical relationship with the Serbs. So far there is no sign that 
absent the introduction of ground forces, the intensified bombing 
campaign will cause President Milosevic and the Serbs to agree to the 
terms regarding Kosovo, demanded by NATO.
  It is well known that the Yugoslav army has long prepared for a 
defensive struggle against any invading force by constructing 
underground facilities in rugged territory, by storing

[[Page H2417]]

weapons and other supplies in these facilities and by training its 
military to engage in guerrilla tactics. While the extent of damage 
done by the bombing to date has been significant, it is probable that 
no amount of bombing will degrade the Yugoslav military sufficiently 
enough to prevent large numbers of casualties if U.S. ground troops are 
inserted or even if attack helicopters and other low flying aircraft 
are utilized to destroy Yugoslav ground forces because of the passion 
of the Serbian people to drive the Albanian Kosovars out of Kosovo and 
regain this territory which historically, several hundred years ago, 
was part of greater Serbia. It is unrealistic to expect the government 
of Yugoslavia to yield to NATO and its demands short of a total 
military defeat, and even then it appears likely that guerrilla warfare 
would continue to exist for a long, long time against any occupying 
force.
  President Clinton has never asked Congress to declare war on 
Yugoslavia or Serbia. He has never even requested the type of 
resolution President Bush requested and was granted in advance of 
Desert Storm. Instead, he has made statements to the general public and 
conferred behind closed doors with congressional ``leaders'' putting 
forth a rationale for the bombings without a full explanation of what 
will likely be required to achieve the presumed NATO foreign policy 
objectives. At no time has he spelled out to the American public, let 
alone Congress, a consistent, coherent foreign policy that demonstrates 
a compelling United States national security interest in waging war 
against the forces of the government of Yugoslavia. Has the United 
States embraced a new NATO policy as described by British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair that NATO will not permit ever in the future human 
rights atrocities and ``ethnic cleansing'' or a dictatorship anywhere 
on the continent of Europe? If President Clinton embraces this policy, 
does this mean he is committing United States military forces to 
enforce such a policy not just in this instance in Yugoslavia, but at 
any point in what the world defines as Europe? Does this mean that 
whatever force is necessary, including the use of ground troops of the 
United States military, will be engaged to ensure this policy? And if 
indeed this is a new policy of NATO to which the United States is in 
agreement, what is the national security interest rationale to support 
such a policy, and why specifically would we engage in such a policy 
with regard to Europe and nowhere else in the world? If it is not the 
United States policy, then the President needs to say so and come 
before Congress requesting some authority for engaging in the war that 
we're now undertaking together with a detailed rationale for it and an 
explanation of what we're prepared to do to win it. If it is a new 
policy, then that too must be explained together with a request for 
Congress to formally support the ongoing war as well as whatever treaty 
alterations within NATO need to be made and approved by the U.S. 
Senate.

  I'm just as moved as anyone else by the atrocities being reported in 
Kosovo. There is no doubt in my mind that Albanian Kosovars have been 
brutally mistreated. No doubt, an appropriate response by the United 
States and its NATO allies to this action is justified. But I am deeply 
troubled by our engagement in an undeclared war that appears to be 
incrementally deepening with each passing day. It reminds me a great 
deal of how we got engaged in Vietnam and allowed that engagement to 
progress to a major war with a no-win policy that lost the support of 
the American public and cost thousands of American lives. If the United 
States is going to engage in war, the commitment must be made to let 
the military use the force necessary to win the war which means paying 
whatever price in lives of American soldiers is required to do this. 
And if America's national security interests are not great enough to 
justify such a price, then there should be no war.
  To date, President Clinton has not demonstrated to my satisfaction 
that America's national security interest in the Kosovo matter is great 
enough to justify paying the price that I foresee will be necessary to 
win the undeclared war in which we are now engaged. For this reason, I 
am voting today for Mr. Campbell's resolution to withdraw American 
forces from this war effort and for the Fowler/Goodling bill which 
would require a vote of Congress before the introduction of United 
States ground forces in Kosovo or Serbia. In doing so I keep an open 
mind to any presentation the President may make in the future to 
Congress seeking a declaration of war for this cause or a resolution 
similar to the one that was sought and given to President Bush. 
However, I will not be a party to sending American men and women in 
uniform to die in an ill conceived, ill planned and undeclared war.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Utah 
(Mr. Cannon).
  Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I am a hawk. I believe in a military so 
strong that we never have to use it. When we use our military might, it 
should be with clear objectives after considering our national 
interests and the limits of our influence.
  Mr. Speaker, imagine Serbia before we started bombing. The threat of 
ethnic cleansing clearly existed. About 2,000 innocent people have been 
killed, and more ominously, 40,000, a manned force, has been built up 
in Kosovo. Imagine again the White House seeing this threat, recalling 
the glory of the 1-day wars in Grenada and Panama and, without 
considering the ramifications, decided to go to war against Yugoslavia.
  But Mr. Milosevic does not play by our rules. He does not turn on his 
antiaircraft radar so that we can detect it and destroy it. He uses the 
bombings as a cover to really do ethnic cleansing and to suppress local 
domestic opposition.
  The war drags on. The President and his advisers plead for patience, 
all the while hoping a cruel, cold winter without electricity and fuel 
oil will force guilty and innocent Serbs to their knees.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Crowley), another Member of the House Committee on 
International Relations.
  (Mr. CROWLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to H. 
Con. Res. 82 which would direct the President to remove our armed 
forces from their positions in connection with the present operations 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Speaker, a congressional vote to withdraw U.S. forces from the 
mission in Kosovo would severely undermine the entire NATO effort to 
stem President Milosevic's brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against 
the Kosovar Albanian population.
  Mr. Speaker, the withdrawal of U.S. troops right now would also 
undermine our other stated objectives in the conflict.
  One of the reasons we decided to act in the first place was to 
prevent a wider conflict in the region from erupting. That was and 
still remains our goal. A withdrawal right now would greatly undermine 
that objective by putting the stability of the Balkans in grave 
jeopardy and, more broadly, the security of southern Europe.
  We would also leave hundreds of thousands of refugees homeless and 
over 1.2 million displaced persons exposed to continued ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo, a situation we will not tolerate. Just last 
weekend, leaders of the NATO alliance meeting here in Washington 
reaffirmed their commitment and resolve to maintain the air campaign 
against Yugoslavia until several key conditions were met. A vote now 
for unilateral U.S. withdrawal flies in the face of the NATO show of 
resolve.
  Mr. Speaker, over the years many voices in this Chamber have called 
for greater burden-sharing by our allies. Our allies now are 
shouldering a great deal of the responsibility in this conflict. A 
unilateral troop withdrawal at this time would send the wrong signal to 
them that we are not willing to hold up our fair share of the burden. 
Mr. Milosevic must not doubt our resolve to achieve the objective of a 
multi-ethnic, democratic Kosovo in which all can live in peace and 
security. Mr. Milosevic alone has the power to end this conflict by 
immediately stopping the violence and bloodshed, withdrawing his 
military police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and allowing all 
refugees to return under an international security presence.
  Mr. Speaker, make no mistake. A vote withdrawing our troops is a vote 
against our troops and the vital mission they are currently 
undertaking. I strongly urge my colleagues to vote against this 
resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Ganske).
  (Mr. GANSKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, I urge a yes vote on H. Con. Res. 82.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Mrs. Biggert).
  Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution. 
Almost 7 weeks ago I voted to authorize the

[[Page H2418]]

President to deploy American military forces as part of a peacekeeping 
force in Kosovo if the peace talks then underway produced a settlement.
  Mr. Speaker, no peace agreement was reached, no vital U.S. interest 
in Kosovo was articulated, no mission defined, no exit strategy put 
forward. Without a vote of this House, the planes were launched and air 
strikes began. Never before have I been as concerned about the lack of 
definition and direction in our Nation's foreign policy. We are in 
where we should not be, and no one seems to know the way out.
  It appears that the President hoped that the threat of air strikes 
would force a peace agreement. It did not. He hoped that the air 
strikes alone would detour Mr. Milosevic from continuing his attacks on 
Kosovo. They did not. He hopes that the American people are willing to 
risk the lives of their sons and daughters in Kosovo. They are not.
  Mr. Speaker, hope is not a method. The President has yet to make a 
case for our involvement in Kosovo.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, the Constitution is very clear. It is the United States 
Congress which has the power to determine issues of war and peace and 
to decide whether our young men and women are put in harm's way. It is 
the President who is the Commander in Chief of the military; it is the 
Congress which determines whether we use that military.
  I have heard today that some people think that the U.S. participation 
in Kosovo now is unconstitutional. They are right. But the U.S. 
participation in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama and many other conflicts 
which took place without congressional authorization were also 
unconstitutional.
  The time is now for this Congress to stop abrogating its 
constitutional responsibility to the White House and to start seriously 
addressing the issues of war and peace.
  Frankly, I am extremely concerned about the process that has taken 
place today on an issue of such enormous consequence and at a time when 
Congress has an inactive schedule. It is an outrage that we only have a 
few hours to discuss the issues of war, the expenditure of billions, 
and the potential loss of life of American military personnel, and I 
hope we rectify this situation in the coming days and weeks. This 
should not be the last debate on this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, my assessment of this situation at the present moment is 
that Mr. Milosevic is a war criminal and that ethnic cleansing, mass 
murder, rape and the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of 
innocent people from their homes is unacceptable and cannot be ignored. 
Sadly, because Mr. Milosevic has negotiated agreements which he has 
then ignored, I have supported the NATO bombings of military targets. I 
believe that the Serb military and police must be withdrawn from 
Kosovo, that the hundreds of thousands of people uprooted from their 
homes must be allowed to return, that Kosovo must be given some kind of 
self-rule and that an international peacekeeping force should be 
established to maintain order.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that we must strive as hard as we possibly can 
to find an alternative between doing nothing and allowing ethnic 
cleansing and mass murder to continue and the continuation of a war 
which will certainly result in terrible destruction, large numbers of 
casualties and the expenditure of great sums of money. I believe that 
the United States must be as active as we possibly can in finding a 
road to peace.
  I believe that Germany and the United Nations have brought forth 
proposals which might be able to form the basis of a negotiated peace. 
I believe that Russia, a long-term ally of Serbia, should be asked to 
play a more active role in the process and to supply troops for an 
international peacekeeping force.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Chabot), a member of our committee.
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I have believed from the outset that our 
involvement in this European conflict is wrong. It has become painfully 
apparent that the Clinton administration committed American air power 
without a clearly-defined mission and without a credible exit strategy.
  Make no mistake about it. Slobodan Milosevic is a war criminal. His 
treatment of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has been deplorable, and 
his prosecution as a international war criminal could not come fast 
enough. But I do not believe that the commitment of American military 
forces to a potentially long, expensive and perhaps tragic effort can 
be the proper means to achieve that end.
  Mr. Speaker, our military involvement in the Balkans is unwise. This 
administration's miscues have led to a disjointed strategy of gradual 
escalation that puts the lives of American men and women at risk.
  Let us work for peace. Let us help the Kosovar refugees with 
humanitarian aid. But let us take our service men and women out of 
harm's way.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Coyne).
  Mr. COYNE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the difficult issues 
that are before us relative to U.S. involvement in the ongoing NATO 
military action in Yugoslavia. The United States, in consultation with 
its NATO allies, has determined that the instability caused by the 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is a threat to the security of Europe.

                              {time}  1600

  Governments of NATO agreed unanimously on joint military action over 
a month ago, with the intention of forcing the government of Slobodan 
Milosevic to end its policy of ethnic cleansing and to allow safe 
restoration of the refugees to their homes. The one thing that I think 
Americans have learned is that it is wrong to stand idly by while such 
atrocities take place before our eyes. History.
  Has also taught us that it is better to head off a problem than to 
wait until the problem has spread. Today NATO remains committed to 
continuing its military operations until its three objectives, safe 
return and self-government of the refugees, withdrawal of the 
Yugoslavian troops from Kosovo and the insertion of peacekeeping troops 
to protect the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are met. I support these 
objectives, and I support U.S. military action in order to achieve 
them.
  How long this action will last, I do not know, but I do know two 
things: First, the power to end hostilities lies today with Slobodan 
Milosevic. All he has to do is stop the killing and pull his troops 
back.
  Second, the chances that Mr. Milosevic will meet NATO's demand are 
dramatically reduced if Congress enacts legislation that requires the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces or ties the administration's hands regarding 
NATO's military options.
  This is no time to go weak-kneed on our troops in Europe.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Manzullo), a member of our committee.
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, I have four questions to ask my colleagues 
and the American public: Is a ground war in Kosovo imminent? We are 
being pushed towards a ground war that is not in our national 
interests. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of Britain, the Secretary 
General of NATO, Javier Solana, and our own President with his recent 
headlines, ``Clinton edges closer to backing the use of ground 
troops,'' and the President has called up 33,000 reservists.
  The second question, what does a ground war mean? It means between 
150,000 and 300,000 troops, with American forces making up 65 percent 
of the troops in rugged terrain that 25 German divisions in World War 
II could barely occupy, with expected casualties of between 7 and 12 
percent, thousands of Americans wounded and killed.
  Three, is it worth it? Every Member of Congress must ask himself or 
herself this question: Is it worth the life of my child, and, if you 
cannot answer that in the affirmative, then why should you force 
others' children to go to war, while the Clinton Administration refuses 
to allow the Kosovars to arm themselves and fight their own civil war.

[[Page H2419]]

  The fourth question, why vote for the Campbell bill to halt U.S. 
combat mission in Yugoslavia? Because this is the only way to keep 
ground troops from savage guerrilla warfare, and this is the only way 
to stop thousands of U.S. soldiers from being killed in battle.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Davis).
  (Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the 
Campbell resolution. As I stand here today, it pains me deeply to know 
that right now there are over 500,000 innocent victims from Kosovo who 
are running for their lives. These men, women and children have been 
driven out of their homes and villages, have been subjected to 
organized assaults, brutal rapes, and even assassinations. Some are 
living in makeshift camps, sheltered only by blankets and plastic 
covering. Some even hide and wait in the forests. Many of their 
villages have been burned.
  These victims have been terrorized and seen death in the worst 
extreme. They are experiencing hunger, sickness, cold temperatures and 
terror on many fronts. Some have seen their loved ones viciously 
executed. We cannot allow this horror to continue for these innocent 
people, without trying to stop it.
  Let me be clear: I strongly believe that any kind of physical 
confrontation is troublesome and undesirable. However, to simply stand 
by, after one has exhausted diplomatic solutions, is even more 
unbearable. We have been as reasonable as we can possibly be with the 
Milosevic regime, yet he continues these atrocities and continues to 
launch a well-executed ethnic cleansing campaign and continues to 
commit genocide upon the men and women and children of Kosovo.
  I have been told that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere, and there can be no justice in America as long as there is 
injustice in Kosovo.
  We have no alternative, we have no recourse, we have no choice, 
except to demonstrate that we believe in peace, and, not only do we 
believe in it, but we will work for it.
  Therefore, I oppose the Campbell resolution, and urge that we vote 
against it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Istook).
  Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Speaker, I rise not to declare war, but to support 
our Constitution.
  Right now President Clinton is prosecuting a war he was never 
authorized to start. President Clinton asked many nations to agree to 
attack Yugoslavia, but he failed to get permission from one crucial 
country, America. Our Constitution requires that Congress must declare 
war, not the President. It also states that Congress, not the 
President, defines and punishes offenses against the law of nations. 
And the NATO treaty, approved 50 years ago, says nothing about 
launching an attack.
  It is not the American way to let one man drag us into a bloody 
quagmire. I took an oath to honor our Constitution, and I will not 
stand idle while the President, again, runs rough-shod over that 
Constitution.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Olver), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 
Military Construction of the Committee on Appropriations.
  (Mr. OLVER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Speaker, I come to the floor with an overwhelming 
sense of sadness that we be debating constraints on America's ability 
to lead in this world on a most profound issue of human rights. We are 
a people and a Nation whose very creation was to protect life and 
liberty against imperial sovereignty.
  In my view, whatever constrains the 19 nations that comprise NATO 
from successfully prosecuting this war and successfully degrading the 
military capacity of the Milosevic regime to conduct ethnic cleansing 
and successfully returning ethnic Albanian citizens of Kosova to the 
homes they've lived in for generations is bad policy. It is tough 
enough to achieve consensus among those 19 nations, from France, 
Britain, and Italy to Hungary, Luxemburg and Iceland. But a broad 
consensus exists, a remarkable agreement, that the consummate evil in 
Europe today is represented by the Milosevic regime's execution of his 
belief that it has every right to repress, to terrorize, to intimidate, 
to expel, and, if those fail, to massacre whoever is left, of nearly 2 
million citizens of Kosovo, whose only crime is that their religion is 
Islam.
  I believe that if NATO had said ``no'' when Milosevic attacked 
eastern Croatia in 1991, an attack that ended when the defenses of 
Vukovar were overrun and the people remaining in the hospital were 
taken from their beds and slaughtered, we would not have witnessed the 
agony of Bosnia with 200,000 killed and 2 million--fully 50% of the 
population--displaced from their homes. That agony culminated at 
Srebrenica where 8,000 men and boys were separated out and slaughtered. 
And if NATO had said ``no'' when the Milosevic regime killed 200,000 
Bosnians and sent 2 million more into exile and into displacement from 
their homes, then the agony of Kosovo would not have occurred.
  I believe equally fervently that if NATO is not equally successful in 
its resolve on Kosovo, that the anti-Milosevic freely-elected 
government, and, in fact, the very republic status of Montenegro within 
the rump of federal Yugoslavia, is as good as dead, and that the 
Milosevic regime will then adopt the destabilization of Macedonia as 
its next expansionist project.
  NATO must succeed in this effort, before all the Kosovar males 
between the ages of 15 and 50 are murdered by the Milosevic regime.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson).
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, war is a serious undertaking. 
It should not be used for political reasons, ever. War is a last resort 
and only used to protect America, her citizens and our vital interests.
  Despite the humanitarian atrocities in Kosovo, the loss of even one 
life for a cause that has yet to be articulated or defined for the 
people of the United States is one too many. The plight of the refugees 
is tragic, and America should help them. We are a country that can 
provide relief and direction, ease pain and suffering, and we should 
provide help.
  Mr. Speaker, I fought in a war where politicians were afraid to win 
because of the political fallout. That fear caused me to spend nearly 7 
years of my life as a prisoner of war. I would fight again tomorrow for 
America's vital interests, but the answer in Kosovo is not to waste 
American lives. The answer is stop the bombing and provide relief for 
the refugees.
  Mr. Speaker, there is a wall among the trees near the Lincoln 
Memorial that is engraved with the names of many brave soldiers, many 
of whom were my friends. Families go there to grieve and remember their 
fathers, their mothers, their sons and daughters. Stop the bombing. We 
do not need another wall.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Hawaii (Mrs. Mink).
  (Mrs. MINK of Hawaii asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, there is no doubt in my mind that 
Congress has the duty and responsibility to decide the question whether 
the United States of America uses its military power against another 
country. No matter how this Congress feels about the evil actions of 
the leaders of Yugoslavia against its own people, words of revulsion 
and opposition do not justify bombing without a declaration of war.
  If the majority of this Congress feels that the air bombardment is 
justified, then it must vote to declare war. An explanation of why we 
are bombing Yugoslavia is not enough. We need to explicitly state that 
we do so in an act of war. Without that declaration of war, we make a 
mockery of the Constitution and of the War Powers Act.
  Just because we are not acting alone and because the countries of 
NATO are in full support of the air attack does not absolve us of our 
responsibility to abide by our Constitution. If we believe that the 
President is correct in sending

[[Page H2420]]

our military forces to bomb Yugoslavia, then it follows that we must 
vote to declare war.
  I voted to allow troops into Yugoslavia to enforce the peace 
agreement. I did not vote to allow military intervention to force an 
agreement. I do not support the use of military power to beat the 
Yugoslavian government into submission to our will.
  I fervently believe we should be debating a resolution to urge the 
President to declare a moratorium on the bombing while an all-out 
effort is made to reach a settlement. There are various proposals on 
the table. We could discuss the Russian proposal, the UN proposal, the 
German proposal. The Kosovar people have fled from their homes. Dangers 
to them now of a moratorium are very small compared to what has already 
been heaped upon them, so why not declare a halt on the bombing and let 
Russia, Germany and the UN broker a settlement? I want an end to the 
bombing. I want the Constitution of the United States to prevail.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo), a member of our committee.
  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, there are many murky things about the 
situation we now face in Kosovo. One, however, is not murky. What is 
not even remotely unclear is the fact that we are not there for the 
often heard cause of stopping ethnic cleansing. That is the one thing 
about which I am absolutely sure. That is not the reason we are there.
  We can debate, and we will debate at length, the variety of reasons 
we may be there. It may have something to do with legacies and all the 
rest of that, but it has nothing to do with ethnic cleansing, else we 
would be in at least a dozen countries around this world where the 
situation is 10 times worse. Certainly we can start naming them now. At 
the top of the list is the Sudan.

                              {time}  1615

  There were 2,000 people dead when we went into Kosovo to begin with, 
a third of them Serbs. We have already ruined too many lives there in 
Kosovo, we have done too much damage; too many people are dead as a 
result of the actions we have taken. It is time to withdraw our forces. 
When we have dug ourselves a pit, the best thing to do now is stop 
digging and get out.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I would remind my colleagues that as a 
result of the atrocities and the crimes against humanity committed by 
Slobodan Milosevic, there are over 300,000 men, women and children that 
are dead in the former Yugoslavia now.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich), my friend and colleague.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I believe we should withdraw our troops 
and resubmit this matter to the United Nations Security Council and 
make this tragedy the entire world's burden and not primarily that of 
the people of the United States of America.
  It is understandable that this House should be conflicted here, 
because this mission is itself at conflict between the U.N. charter, 
which bans force, violating State sovereignty and the universal 
declaration of human rights, which guarantees the rights of individuals 
against oppressive States. NATO's action fails the test of humanitarian 
intervention, if only because of the damage NATO has inflicted on 
civilian populations. Humanitarian bombing is an Orwellian attack on 
logic.
  If the United States continues as the chief sponsor of this war, we 
have, in effect, decided that the United Nations is no longer relevant. 
This places upon America the awesome responsibility of policing the 
entire world.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins).
  (Mr. COLLINS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support for this resolution.
  I share the concerns of many Third District residents regarding 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and current North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY). Having recently traveled to Tirana, Albania, and Skopje, 
Macedonia, I have witnessed firsthand the humanitarian crisis facing 
Europe--a crisis that has intensified since the beginning of the allied 
bombing campaign. There is no question that the situation is grim.
  Slobodan Milosevic is a shrewd and experienced military commander who 
has used military power to expel Kosovar Albanians from their homes and 
to put extensive defenses in place in Kosovo, significantly enhancing 
his military position on the ground.
  The President and the other 18 NATO leaders have, on the other hand, 
allowed political considerations to govern military decisions, 
resulting in NATO's failure to accomplish the goals established by the 
President at the outset of the air war. Ethnic cleansing has 
accelerated and the FRY military has now fortified its southern 
defenses, presenting a greater threat to a potential invasion force 
today than was present when NATO bombing began.
  Because NATO air strikes have little chance of accomplishing their 
stated goals, and because the human and economic costs of launching a 
ground campaign far outweigh the potential benefits of such an action, 
I believe that the NATO air campaign must stop immediately. It is time 
for NATO to seek a negotiated settlement that will stop this expensive 
and counterproductive bombing campaign and allow the Kosovar Albanians 
to begin to rebuild their lives.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos), a most distinguished member of the House 
Committee on International Relations and a long-term Member of this 
body.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, the voices of appeasement and isolationism 
are reverberating in these halls. For 40 years NATO stood against the 
Soviet Union, the mighty superpower, and NATO apparently, in the view 
of some of our colleagues, cannot stand up to Slobodan Milosevic.
  This past weekend at the NATO summit, 19 nations stood together 
determined and united to see to it that the ethnic cleansing comes to 
an end, that the persecution, mass rape, mass murder of the Kosovars 
comes to a halt. And it is painful indeed to listen to some of my 
colleagues who forget that for the whole period since the end of the 
Second World War, NATO provided a shield behind which Europe could be 
safe and free and secure and prosperous.
  This is a historic moment. For the first time, Hitler's first 
victims, the Czechs, the Poles, the Danes, the Norweigans, the Dutch 
and the Belgians stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the newly democratic 
Germany and 11 other nations, including Canada and ourselves, in saying 
``no'' to the perpetrators of genocide. This is not the time to cut and 
run.
  It is important for all of us to realize that when the dust settles, 
this will prove to be NATO's finest hour. We are in it not for oil, not 
for glory, not for territory, but for the principles on which this 
country was founded, the principles that NATO has succeeded in taking 
root throughout western Europe and now throughout central Europe.
  If anybody really believes that behind a new Iron Curtain in 
Yugoslavia there can be a dictatorship while the rest of Europe will be 
safe, stable and secure, it better wake up. We need to understand that 
if we allow Slobodan Milosevic to continue his evil deeds, he started 
the war against Slovenia, he lost it. He started the war against 
Croatia, he lost it. He started the war against Bosnia Herzegovina, he 
lost it. The last war he now starts, it is against the people of 
Kosovo. These people have done nothing, nothing to hurt the Yugoslav 
nation. They just want to live in peace and decency, and it is the 
responsibility of NATO to stand up as it has for half a century.
  I strongly urge rejection of the resolution.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Callahan).
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, 
especially with the advances knowledge that I intend to vote against 
his resolution.
  I must warn my colleagues that we should be very cautious about what 
we do and what we say here and the messages that we send. Just last 
weekend, the NATO nations were here; they were unanimous in every 
respect in saying that they are going to stop the atrocities that have 
been taking place in Yugoslavia.
  At this time and place in history, when we are involved, whether we 
like it or not, in Kosovo and debating

[[Page H2421]]

whether or not we should send American land troops, I think that the 
message of passing a resolution soon as this would be a serious mistake 
on the part of this Congress.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  To my colleagues on the other side, I just want to provide a 
statement made by the former Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, who 
testified and expressed his reservations about this policy. But now 
that we have initiated this policy, let me quote from Mr. Kissinger who 
made this statement this past Thursday:
  ``What we need to do now is maintain the principle that ethnic 
cleansing does not pay, and therefore, those refugees must be given the 
right to return. Secondly, if all of NATO is defeated by Serbia, and 
that is what occurs if you have unilateral withdrawal, what will this 
mean for the Gulf, for North Korea, and for any other area where rogue 
States are held in check by American and, in some cases, NATO military 
power? That is the issue now.''
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), the chairman of the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services.
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I am rising in support of this resolution, although I do it with 
great reluctance, because it is always difficult not to give the 
benefit of the doubt to the executive in foreign policy. But 7 weeks 
ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia 
because I could discern no national interest in taking sides in a civil 
war, no approach that would lead to a diminution of violence, and no 
credible exit strategy.
  I would like to stress, above all, one thing. Historical analogies 
are extremely difficult to derive. I personally believe there are a 
whole lot that apply in the Balkans, but many of them are 
contradictory. One that the majority side in support of the war falls 
back on is the Holocaust. I believe that there are Holocaustal 
analogies. But I also believe that Milosevic is a sui generis war 
criminal, one for whom Holocaustal acts are not unknown, but one where 
leadership is more analogous to, say, a Ho Chi Minh or possibly even a 
Pol Pot than to a Hitler.
  I raise this because if we exclusively make Hitlerite analogies, we 
have no choice whatsoever than to follow a kind strategy that could 
lead in and of itself to greater losses of life to innocents than a 
negotiated settlement.
  With each decision, it appears that this administration and NATO are 
moving into a circumstance where the problems are more difficult, not 
less; more likely to lead to outrageously violent results. Now is the 
time to stress negotiations, the time to recognize that we are not 
likely to have a great victory.
  Senator Aiken once suggested in Vietnam in the late 1960s that we 
should declare victory and get out. That prescription does not fit the 
Balkans, but I would urge that we put in place a process of 
negotiations, and with that process recognize we have a greater chance 
for a successful resolution than any other possibility.
  Little is more difficult than to apply perspective to the events of 
the day.
  The Administration's Kosovo policy is open to question from two 
contrasting perspectives: should we militarily engage the government of 
Yugoslavia and, if so, what form should this engagement take? The first 
question involves fundamental Constitutional issues on war powers and 
the role of Congress in legitimizing military action and enhancing the 
participation of the American people in decisions related to war and 
peace. The second involves the unchallenged role of the President as 
commander-in-chief and doctrines of warfare.
  Seven weeks ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in 
Yugoslavia because I could discern no national interest in taking sides 
in a civil war in the Balkans, no approach that would lead to a 
diminution of violence and no credible exit strategy.
  The Administration, through its acts and statements, has broken with 
the military doctrine of the last several Administrations, particularly 
the Reaganite reliance on peace-time military preparedness and the Bush 
espousal of the Powell Doctrine, which calls for the establishment and 
enunciation of clear objectives with the use of overwhelming force to 
achieve these objectives.
  In this context, I recently reviewed a 1984 speech of the former 
Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger. Weinberger suggested that six 
major tests should be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. 
combat forces abroad:

       (1) First, the United States should not commit forces to 
     combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion 
     is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our 
     allies. . . .
       (2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat 
     troops into a given situation, we should do so 
     wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If 
     we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary 
     to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. 
     . . .
       (3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat 
     overseas, we should have clearly defined political and 
     military objectives. And we should know precisely how our 
     forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And 
     we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As 
     Clausewitz wrote, ``No one starts a war--or rather, no one in 
     his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his 
     mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he 
     intends to conduct it.'' . . .
       (4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the 
     forces we have committed--their size, composition and 
     disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if 
     necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during 
     the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must 
     our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a 
     beacon light before us the basic questions: ``Is this 
     conflict in our national interest? '' ``Does our national 
     interest require us to fight, to use force of arms? '' If the 
     answers are ``Yes'', then we must win. If the answers are 
     ``No'', then we should not be in combat.
       (5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, 
     there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the 
     support of the American people and their elected 
     representatives in Congress. . . .
       (6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should 
     be a last resort.

  Americans are obligated to assess whether U.S. policy in Kosovo today 
meet the above tests.
  In terms of implementation the Grenada intervention--as minor an 
issue as it may have been--and the Gulf War, which involved far greater 
geo-economic stakes than the Kosovo conflict, stand in stark contrast 
with the new Clinton military doctrine, which can be described as:
  (1) Reliance on aircraft and missiles to rain destruction from 
thousands of feet and in some cases hundreds of miles in such far-flung 
parts of the globe as East Africa, Afghanistan and now Serbia. From an 
American perspective this use of air power is star-wars like, but from 
the perspective of targeted populations such as in Belgrade the effect 
bears more resemblance to the bombings of World War II.
  (2) The declared renunciation of the use of ground troops amounts to 
the articulation that the United States intends to engage in Kosovo 
with one hand tied behind its back.
  (3) The determination that murderous potentates should be held in 
check through the destruction of significant civilian as well as 
military targets, including electric utilities, water systems, 
political headquarters, TV stations and residencies of heads of states.
  (4) The use of a defensive alliance for intervention in a civil war.
  (5) Placing the prestige and might of the United States on the line 
through the commitment of air power while multi-lateralizing the 
decision-making and control in the NATO structure, which functions by 
consensus.
  The lessons of history have been widely invoked both to justify and 
to decry our military intervention in Kosovo. Unfortunately history 
does not provide easy answers, either with regard to the meaning of 
contemporary events or to what actions should be taken in response to 
them.
  For instance, in the wake of World War I historians and political 
scientists rightly concluded the European system had been too 
inflexible in 1914. A misapplication of this lesson, however, led a 
generation later to Munich. Too much rigidity precipitated the First 
World War; too little backbone encouraged Hitler's aggression in the 
Second.
  World War II involved a conflagration between nation states; it also 
involved a conflagration within--the Holocaust--and challenged 
civilized society not to allow a replication of such inhumanity to man.
  The background of both World Wars bears on American decision-making 
today.
  Clearly, the onslaught against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo that 
Milosevic has unleashed has Holocaust parallels. On the other hand, the 
ethnic cleansing the Serbs have undertaken also has analogs with what 
Croats, Bosnians and, to a much lesser extent, Kosovars have attempted 
in the region. Milosevic's barbarity would appear to lie somewhere 
between Ho Chi Minh's assault on South Vietnamese Catholics and Pol 
Pot's attempt to exterminate intellectuals.

[[Page H2422]]

  The problem with equating Milosevic exclusively with Hitler, instead 
of recognizing him as a sui generis war criminal, is that it makes a 
negotiated settlement morally untenable and renders it impossible for 
the U.S. to consider anything less than unconditional victory. This is 
particularly dangerous when it is self-evident that a negotiated 
settlement is preferable to all sides over a protracted conflict. 
Hence, it is key to understand that at this point Kosovo is more a 
civil war with holocaustal elements than vice-versa. But if the war 
continues, a complicating factor for maintaining NATO unity in the face 
of Serbian atrocities will in all likelihood be the West's ability to 
stomach Kosovar counter-measures and the implications of ratcheting up 
air power. The line between a terrorist and a nationalist freedom 
fighter is narrow, as is the line between using force to stand up to 
atrocity and applying force in such a way that greater violence is 
precipitated.
  Yet another lesson of history regards the effectiveness of air power 
and strategic bombing. As John Kenneth Galbraith, who led a team that 
assessed the impact of allied air power in World War II, has noted, 
bombing in coordination with the use of ground troops has generally 
proved effective, but strategic bombing of cities often causes 
populaces to rally to domestic leadership, no matter how malevolent.
  Here it must be noted that air power is different from what it was 
earlier in the century. Our arsenal now includes nuclear weapons of 
enormous destructive power as well as so-called smart bombs and 
missiles that can strike with surgical accuracy, which greatly enhances 
our ability to limit danger to our armed forces and collateral damage 
to civilian areas.
  The development of smart weapons, however, may have caused political 
leaders to be too tempted to use them without recognizing that the use 
of force anywhere at any time has ramifications which are not easily 
predictable and which not infrequently are counter-productive.
  For instance, our goal in using force against Milosevic may be to 
undermine his political support, but it would appear that, to date, we 
have ensconced his political strength while weakening the democracy 
movement, which was profoundly pro-American in Serbia and damaging the 
lives and livelihoods of ordinary Serbs.
  Much of the world is not enamored of America's ability to rain 
destruction from afar. We simply have no idea how deep and how long the 
effects of our air strikes and the targets we have chosen will last. 
What we do know is that Serbs point to a 14th century defeat as a 
rallying cry for their actions today. What we do know is that the 
Armenians believe that in 1919 they suffered the first holocaust of the 
century and Turkish embassies to this day are susceptible to terrorist 
attacks because of the atrocities of the now defunct Ottoman Empire.
  In the background of the predicament we are in is failed diplomacy. 
Where Theodore Roosevelt invoked a doctrine of ``speak softly, but 
carry a big stick,'' this Administration has propounded a policy of 
threatening vigorously while refusing to make timely military 
deployments that might have averted conflict. We have been backed into 
using air power, not out of considerations of national interest but to 
ensure that the credibility of U.S. political leadership was kept in 
tact. We told Milosevic we would use it if he did not agree to our 
preferred negotiating plan and he in effect called our hand.
  In the background was a peace agreement which had the doubtful 
support of one side and no support from the more powerful party.
  While the Rambouillet accord might have met standards of American 
sensibility, it clearly proved untenable for the activist parties in 
the region. This fact should give pause to NATO, America in particular.
  In this regard I have become increasingly Frostian in my geopolitics. 
Good fences sometimes make good, or at least better, neighbors. It 
would appear that, despite the multi-heritage example of Sarajevo, the 
people of the Balkans will have to learn to live apart without war 
before they can live together in peace.
  A century and three-quarters ago, an American President, James 
Monroe, asserted a doctrine that carries his name which established 
that the United States would object to further European colonization in 
this hemisphere and give succor to independence movements in Latin 
America. Implicit in the Monroe Doctrine was the assumption, growing 
from the concerns of our first President, George Washington, a military 
man, that the United States should not become entangled in the quarrels 
of Europe.
  With the exception of two World Wars in this century and a commitment 
made in the context of the Cold War of a defensive alliance, historical 
U.S. foreign policy has been governed by the precept that we would give 
umbrella protection to independence movements in the Americas but 
refrain from military intervention in the internal affairs of nation 
states on the continent. Our country was formed by dissidents and 
opportunity seekers reacting to the repression and civil wars in 
Europe. It now appears that our fore fathers better understood the 
Balkans and like European problems than the State Department does 
today.
  At this point we are being asked to support NATO action for the sake 
of the viability and credibility of the alliance, rather than for the 
purposes for which the alliance was formed. We appear to be putting the 
alliance ahead of our objectives and allowing our mutual strategy to 
test the alliance itself, which it is doing. One poll has found that 95 
percent of Greeks object to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and there 
are significant percentages, albeit smaller, opposed in every country 
of the alliance, including the United States.

  A decade or so ago, I participated in a forum at the Library of 
Congress with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at which I 
asked him about an observation he made in one of his autobiographical 
works. Kissinger had written that between the 1968 election and the 
inauguration, he had sat down with President-elect Nixon and the two of 
them had decided to get the United States out of Vietnam. I asked why 
they had not just gone ahead and done that immediately upon taking 
office and Kissinger responded, ``Congressman, we meant we would get 
out with honor.'' Asked if that meant further escalation of troop 
numbers and bombing, Kissinger responded, ``Absolutely.''
  It is my sense that NATO is in a similar position today with regard 
to Belgrade. For the honor of NATO, it appears that we are about to 
escalate the war. The question is whether we are not better off seeking 
the earliest possible settlement.
  History is a source of lessons and perspectives, but issues of the 
moment must also be approached in a manner which calculates their 
future implications.
  NATO's strategic rationale appears to have broken down on the issue 
of numbers. There are 19 states versus one with that one being much 
smaller than most of the 19. But another way of looking at this 
strategic conundrum is that 19 countries are allied against the forces 
of nationalism and sub-nationalism in a part of the world where 
historical and ethnic tensions provide little basis for compromise.
  Nationalism led to dramatic changes in the world's map in the 19th 
century and has been repeatedly underestimated as a force in the 20th 
century. The question is will NATO, despite its might, find itself in 
the same position in the Balkans as the United States did in Vietnam 
and as the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan?
  Returning to history, the first great chronicle of the Western World 
relates to a land mass adjoining the Balkans, ancient Greece. 
Thucydides wrote that early in the Peloponnesian Wars which pitted the 
quasi-democratic and enormously uplifting culture of ancient Athens 
against the more militaristic Sparta, the Athenian Assembly voted to 
send a naval fleet to conquer the neutral island of Melos. Several days 
later the decision was reconsidered and a faster ship was sent to 
overtake the fleet and call off the invasion.
  Later in the war, however, the Athenian Assembly again decided to 
invade Melos and sent out a force which killed all the men and enslaved 
the women on the island. Thucydides' chronicles were intended to show 
how the world's most civilized city-state at the time had lost its way, 
and indeed from that point on Athens never again recovered its prior 
status.
  An aspect of the bombing today is what targets are left in Serbia 
after so much damage has already been inflicted. Clearly at this point, 
the Serbs have lost virtually everything except the war, while the West 
has won nothing, particularly a peace.
  A case can be made that whatever mistakes have been made to date, it 
is morally questionable to stand by and do nothing and an even greater 
mistake to pull the rug out from under the executive branch. The reason 
I cannot support America's continuing military role is that each of the 
choices for NATO in the future gets more untenable. There is the 
prospect of sending in troops with losses potentially equivalent to or 
greater than Vietnam. There is also the prospect of ratcheting up the 
air war. One can always strike again at military sites, but it appears 
that on the civilian side, Yugoslavia has already been bombed back to 
the 18th century.

  Military historians counsel two principles when devising strategic 
doctrine: put on the shoes of opponents and do not back them hopelessly 
into a corner. In the case of Kosovo, we clearly have not put on the 
shoes of the Serbs and we have done everything to back Milosevic into a 
corner. We have made a martyr out of a murderer and allowed a war 
criminal to stand up to NATO, which includes Serbia's ancient enemy, 
Turkey. Milosevic's martyrdom increases with each degree of the 
suffering of his people.
  Every society has an historian or philosopher who points out that the 
road to Hell is paved with good intentions. Despite the good intentions 
of the West, our policies appear to be counterproductive. Ratcheting up 
the war

[[Page H2423]]

could well signify a ratcheting-down of the moral high ground of NATO.
  The prerequisite of policy must always be good intentions, but good 
intentions are insufficient grounds for action. Policy must match 
intentions with practical capacities to carry out defined objectives. 
Just War doctrines, after all, require that responses be proportional 
and effective. The only alternatives to a bombs only policy are the 
introduction of ground troops or the isolation of Serbia, the reliance 
on a humanitarian response to a humanitarian crisis. In either case the 
legal and moral imperative to indict Serb leadership for war crimes is 
overwhelming.
  In the late 1960s Senator Aiken suggested we simply declare victory 
and get out of Vietnam. This prescription does not fit today's dilemma 
in the Balkans, but our first obligation should be to put in place a 
process of negotiations with the understanding that an imperfectly 
negotiated settlement may be the closest thing to victory that is 
likely to be possible without the loss of an incalculable number of 
innocents.
  Escalating the war, on the other hand, puts U.S. interests at risk, 
in the Balkans and in other parts of the world. The earlier we 
reconsider the better.
  The vote on this resolution and the others we will take today are 
necessitated by law. That law, the War Powers Resolution, may be 
unconstitutional and today's votes may serve as a basis for the courts 
to rule to this effect. Nonetheless, the War Powers Resolution is at 
this moment the law of the land. Ironically, we are finding, compliance 
may be more difficult for the legislative than, as has generally been 
perceived, for the executive branch because it forces congressional 
accountability for or against executive actions.
  More importantly, the timing as well as the fact of consideration of 
these resolutions is awkward for the national interest because 
legislative decision-making is required by dates certain--i.e., within 
a prescribed period from the time troops are deployed in hostile 
circumstances.
  The public interest may not be well served by such a review of 
executive action in such a timeframe, but it would be less well served 
if Congress avoided its legal and constitutional responsibilities. 
Hence, what in effect is a legislative/executive confrontation is 
legally, at this time, unavoidable, and as an individual Member of 
Congress I have no option except to take a stand. This stand is one of 
dissent to what I consider to be a foreign policy that lacks 
intellectual rigor and misserves the national interest.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is available 
on each side?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from 
California (Mr. Campbell) has 10\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce).
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, last week in the Committee on International 
Relations we listened to Secretary of State Albright explain the 
administration's policy. I expressed my concerns to the Secretary about 
the difficulty of our objectives, especially given the limited means we 
are committing.
  Looking back over time at our Nation's wars, and this is a war, we 
have been successful when we have had as an objective the destruction 
of a regime or when we have had clearly-defined territorial objectives 
such as expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In both of these scenarios, though, 
in order to accomplish our goals, we used rather massive force, 
including ground troops. But in Kosovo we are committing American 
resources and prestige and risking American lives, employing what must 
be called a very calibrated use of force in order to achieve a very 
complex objective: restructuring Kosovo's society.
  Given that, my question to the Secretary was: What precedent for 
success in our history are we looking at? Are we practicing a theory 
here in Kosovo without an historical basis for success? The response 
from her: no cases were cited from the real world. Instead, we heard 
that the air war is working, when most observers do not believe it to 
be the case, and that we need to be patient. Well, patience is what we 
had in Vietnam.
  Another thing that struck me while listening to the Secretary was 
that when there was a difficult question, when our strategy was being 
challenged, we'd hear that she'd rather be answering such difficult 
questions then answering why we're doing nothing. This response is 
backwards. The Secretary of State and the President she works for are 
responsible for the resources of the United States of America, and the 
lives of our servicemen. I'd rather have the Administration struggle 
with answering questions about the tragedy in Kosovo than struggle, and 
that is what it's doing, with explaining why we're committing America's 
treasure and risking American lives there. Yesterday, and throughout 
this crisis, I've heard too much struggling with our basic strategy.
  So, faced with this decision today, I cannot sanction the current 
policy. Good intentions, and the tragedy in Kosovo is great, cannot 
mask flawed policy.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Hampshire (Mr. Bass).
  Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution that is 
before us today. It is not an easy vote for me, but it is one that I 
must cast. I do so because failure to support this resolution, by 
failing to vote for this resolution, we are in effect saying that what 
has happened over the last 30 days in the Balkans is okay; that the 
administration's failure to define what we are trying to accomplish or 
to change that definition practically on a day-to-day basis, that that 
activity is okay; that the administration's failure to define the 
military means that we should use to achieve that as-of-yet undefined 
objective is okay.
  We started in the air. We then went to close-in air. Now we are 
bombing civilian infrastructure, and unfortunately, I think that we are 
going to be looking at the introduction of ground troops in the near 
future.
  Mr. Speaker, absent some control of Congress, I am certain that this 
war will escalate to a point where we will no longer be dealing with $4 
billion, $6 billion or $8 billion, but $10 billion, $20 billion, $30 
billion, $40 billion or $50 billion.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the pending resolution.

                              {time}  1630

  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Canady).
  (Mr. CANADY of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me, and for his leadership on this important issue.
  I do rise in support of the removal of the armed forces of the United 
States from the present hostilities against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Our forces should be removed from these hostilities because 
the vital national interests of the United States are not at stake in 
the Balkans.
  I also want to state my great concern about the commencement of this 
war without the authorization of the Congress. The President does not 
have the constitutional authority unilaterally to decide that the 
United States will wage war on a sovereign Nation which has not 
attacked or threatened the United States. Absent truly exigent 
circumstances, the armed forces of the United States should be sent 
into conflict only when duly authorized by this Congress.
  I would like to quote what James Wilson said in the debate over 
ratification of our constitution. He said, ``This new system will not 
hurry us into war. It is calculated to guard against it. It will not be 
in the power of a single man or a single body of men to involve us in 
such distress, for the important power of declaring war is vested in 
the legislature at large.'' That power should be exercised as intended 
by the Constitution and not usurped by the President.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the removal of the Armed 
Forces of the United States from the present hostilities against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Our forces should be removed from these 
hostilities because the vital national interests of the United States 
are not at stake in the Balkans. Although our interests are not 
threatened by Yugoslavia, we are waging war against Yugoslavia in a 
conflict that is but the prelude to a protracted, costly, and dangerous 
entanglement in the Balkans.
  Events to date sadly demonstrate that the Administration has not 
adequately assessed the consequences of its present policy and the 
costs of the course on which it has embarked. From the start, the 
policy has been ill-conceived. Stating the obvious, to persist in folly 
is not wisdom. The longer we follow the misguided and dangerous course 
set by the Administration, the greater the risk of serious harm to the 
real interests of the United States.
  I also want to state my great concern about the commencement of this 
war without authorization by the Congress. As Commander-in-

[[Page H2424]]

Chief, the President does, in my view, have the inherent Constitutional 
authority to use military force to respond to attacks on United States 
territory and interests. The President does not, however, have the 
Constitutional authority unilaterally to decide that the United States 
will wage war on a sovereign nation which has not attacked or 
threatened the United States. Absent truly exigent circumstances, the 
Armed Forces of the United States should be sent into conflict only 
when duly authorized by the Congress. Otherwise, the power to declare 
war vested by the Constitution in the Congress is rendered meaningless.
  In the debate over ratification of the Constitution, James Wilson 
summed up the meaning of the pertinent Constitutional provisions. 
Wilson said: This [new] system will not hurry us into war; it is 
calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single 
man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the 
important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large; 
. . . from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that 
nothing but our national interests can draw us into war.
  The decision of a single man has taken the United States into this 
war against Yugoslavia. That decision was neither wise nor 
constitutional.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Ose).
  Mr. OSE. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution today. In March the 
House passed a resolution that authorized the deployment of 
peacekeeping troops in Kosovo.
  In that resolution we asked some very reasonable things of the 
President. We asked him to clarify the national security interests in 
Kosovo, to state the goal of the mission, to estimate its costs, to 
develop an exit strategy, and to report on the mission's impact on our 
ability elsewhere in the world to respond to threats to our national 
security. To date we have not received a satisfactory response on any 
of these. Yet, they remain precisely the questions we are dealing with 
today.
  The mission in Kosovo is draining valuable military resources and 
limiting our ability to deal with rogue states elsewhere in the world. 
Kosovo detracts from our ability to be a superpower. I support this 
resolution because Kosovo is no more in our national interest than was 
Rwanda, Algeria, Congo, East Timor, or a host of other places.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Johnson), our distinguished colleague who spent almost 7 
years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam.
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I opposed the President when 
he pushed NATO to attack the sovereign Nation of Yugoslavia, and I 
oppose the deployment of ground troops in that region. The atrocities 
that Slobodan Milosevic has committed are heinous, but the President's 
decision to use military force was hastily decided and has been poorly 
implemented.
  This war brings back strong and painful memories of another war, 
Vietnam, in which I was called to fight in and where I spent nearly 7 
years as a prisoner of war. We might have succeeded in Vietnam except 
that what we did there we are doing here, we are allowing the 
politicians instead of the seasoned military officers to fight the war.
  The President has never established a defined military objective. No 
one can tell us why we are there, what are we fighting for, and what is 
our end objective. Simply put, there is no defined mission. We must end 
this devastation. It is up to this Congress to save lives, not take 
them.
  Mr. Speaker, I opposed the President when he pushed NATO to attack 
the sovereign nation of Yugoslavia. I also oppose the deployment of any 
U.S. ground troops in this region.
  The atrocities that Slobodan Milosevic has committed are heinous. But 
the President's decision to use military force was hastily decided and 
has been poorly implemented.
  This war brings back strong and painful memories of another war--
Vietnam, which I was called to fight in and where I spent nearly 7 
years of my life as a prisoner of war. There was a reason for fighting 
in Vietnam. It was to prevent the spread of communism. We might have 
succeeded, except that we did there, what we are doing here. We are 
allowing politicians instead of seasoned military officers, to fight 
the war.
  The President has never established a defined military objective in 
Kosovo. No one can tell us why we are there, what we are fighting for, 
and what our end objective is. Simply put, there is no defined mission. 
We must end this devastation and save lives, not take them.
  When waging war, the President should ask several questions--are you 
willing to win at any cost? Is this in America's best interest? Is 
there a goal, and is there a plan to achieve that goal? To all of these 
questions, the answer is a resounding no.
  And what about NATO? We have seen over and over again, the President 
and his aides scrambling to defend NATO and NATO's credibility. What 
about our fighting men and women, who will be the ones to give their 
lives? Are their lives worth the credibility of NATO?
  When I was flying bombing missions over North Vietnam, the 
politicians were picking my targets. Twenty-five years later, here we 
go again, we're in the same situation.
  When our allied commander must submit every target to 18 other 
countries for permission to bomb, the only result is chaos. And what 
will we say if American soldiers start coming home in flag-draped 
coffins?
  I have listened to the reasons the President, his administration, and 
Members of both houses of Congress have given for supporting this war.
  But I keep asking the same question. Is this war worth the death of 
one single U.S. soldier? The answer keeps coming up no.
  Let me tell you something, as an Air Force veteran, I can tell you 
that air power alone cannot win a war. And history confirms it.
  Our pilots face many difficulties in the former Yogoslavia--difficult 
terrain, constant bad weather, and a quickly disappearing arsenal of 
our own weapons.
  Furthermore, we are pulling ships and planes from other spots around 
the globe to fight this war. We are even stripping our aircraft for 
spare parts to keep our combat planes in the air.
  And, today, the President called up 33,000 reservists to help meet 
our current shortfalls.
  War is a serious undertaking. It should not be used for political 
reasons--ever. War is a last resort and should only be used to protect 
America, her citizens and our vital interests.
  Despite the humanitarian atrocities in Kosovo, the loss of even one 
life for a cause that has yet to be articulated or defined for the 
people of the United States, is one too many.
  Everyone of you must ask yourselves this question--would you send 
your own son or your own daughter to die to resolve a centuries old 
civil war between two peoples in a sovereign nation? Would you send 
them to die when you yourself could not answer the question ``why''?
  The plight of the refugees is tragic and America should help them. We 
are a country that can provide relief and direction, ease pain and 
suffering. We should provide help to end the refugee crisis.
  I fought in a war where politicians were afraid to win because of the 
political fallout. That fear caused me to spend nearly 7 years of my 
life in a prisoner of war camp. I would fight again tomorrow for 
America's vital interests, but the answer in Kosovo is not to waste 
American lives.
  The answer is--stop the bombing and provide relief to the refugees.
  Please think about your vote today.
  You know, there is a wall among the trees near the Lincoln Memorial 
that is engraved with the names of brave soldiers. Many, of whom, were 
my friends. Families go there to grieve and remember their fathers, 
their mothers, their sons and daughters, sisters and brothers.
  Stop the bombing today. America does not need another wall.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield one-half minute to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support. We are all repelled by 
the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, at the crimes against humanity. That is 
why we should take this crisis to the U.N. Security Council, instead of 
taking international law into our own hands and bombing without a 
declaration of war.
  We should take the opportunity to go to the Russians, our brothers 
and sisters struggling to hold onto a democracy, and ask them to help 
negotiate peace. This would be true internationalism in search of 
peace, and a fitting beginning to a new millennium.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the ranking member.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I am frankly somewhat astounded by the 
debate today.
  One, Members may differ with the President's goals. Do not continue 
to fabricate that there are no defined goals. The goals are simple: 
Stop Mr. Milosevic from murdering civilians. It

[[Page H2425]]

is not much more complicated than that.
  We have just passed a proposal to pull the President's ability to 
engage ground forces. Half of the members on this side of the aisle in 
the last several weeks criticized the President for not leaving ground 
forces on the table. Now they are trying to put that in statute. Then 
we come here.
  This is not academic discussion. If we pass this proposal, Mr. 
Milosevic will see a bright green light to continue the work of his 
role models, Hitler and Stalin. We can dream about lots of other 
options. The option before us is whether NATO, all 19 countries, 
continue on this campaign, or we sit back and wring our hands about 
victims of crime.
  Mr. Milosevic knows his role models in history, Hitler and Stalin, 
did it bigger and better, but Mr. Milosevic has the same goal. He is 
not going to stop in Kosovo.
  I do not know if this military program works. I do not know what 
works. I know that while we risk our young every day, we have been 
incredibly blessed, lucky, and well-trained that we have no casualties.
  Do not pass this proposal. Do not send a message to a murderer that 
America will sit by as children are being murdered and people are 
chased from their homes. This is no place for academic discussions. We 
are here on a matter of life and death. Join with me, reject this 
proposal.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from 
California on his resolution, and I am proud to be a cosponsor.
  Mr. Speaker, we can go back even further than the several hundred 
years that these ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia go for guidance here. 
We can go back 2,500 years to Sun Tzu, who said 2,500 years ago that 
victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated 
warriors go to war first and then seek to win.
  George Bush in Desert Storm understood it: First you prepare for 
victory, you win first, and then you go to war. Winston Churchill 
understood that in World War II: You prepare first, you win first, and 
then you defeat your enemy.
  The philosophy, though, of the Clinton administration, which we must 
assert our responsibility and rectify as leaders of this country, is 
that defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win; or 
perhaps, as the Secretary of State might put it in her eloquence, let 
us mix it up and then see what happens.
  That is a recipe for disaster, it is irresponsible, and I urge the 
adoption of this important constitutional resolution.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of our time.
  Mr. Speaker, the moment we never had in Vietnam we now have. This is 
a remarkable moment for the history of our country and for the history 
of our Congress. We have the chance to say no. We have the chance to 
stop it before we get in too deep. We have a chance to say that we can 
do more good for those refugees who are at risk by helping them where 
they are now than by commencing a ground war.
  Mr. Speaker, think about this, pause, reflect, I say to my 
colleagues. We do not have to do this war. We do not have to commit the 
United States to this war. How many of us wished we had some 
opportunity through some courage on the part of our colleagues who 
preceded us when Vietnam was the war!
  Instead, we went in step-by-step, gradually, and then a number of us 
asked, how did we get here? Did no one have the courage to stand up and 
say, this is not a war in which we should be involved; this is a civil 
war in which we will be drawn deeper and deeper until, in that case, 
58,000 Americans were dead?
  This is the moment. We did not have it before. Seize this moment now.
  As to the concern which motivated our entry into this war, I 
recognize the importance and the depth of feeling of compassion for 
those who have suffered so much in Kosovo and in Serbia. If we are 
concerned, we should show that concern by helping them where they are, 
in those refugee camps.
  The alternative is a ground war, it is not simply bombing. The 
bombing will soon lead to a ground war. In that ground war, as United 
States and NATO troops go in, the Serbian forces will be resisting. It 
is the Albanian Kosovars who will be used as human shields, and what 
few are left who are not, will be driven out of Kosovo into the refugee 
camps so many of their brothers and sisters already populate. The 
choice really is a ground war or stopping the involvement now.
  The President of the United States this day sent us a letter. He 
assures us that, indeed, he would ask for congressional support before 
introducing U.S. ground forces into Kosovo into a ``nonpermissive 
environment.'' That is not saying he will not introduce ground troops. 
He is saying he will not introduce them into a nonpermissive 
environment, without asking some members of Congress. He does not say 
he will ask for a vote.
  By ``permissive environment,'' he might mean if we have bombed enough 
so that he believes it is no longer a nonpermissive environment, he 
will then put ground troops in. Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen 
said on this same day, in their letter, that the President has 
authority to authorize the use of force in the national interest, 
without the approval of Congress.
  So those are our choices: Shall we commence a ground war, at risk of 
the very people we are attempting to save, or shall we stop the war? 
This is our moment. Let us not let it pass.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to 
this concurrent resolution. This resolution would direct the President, 
pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United 
States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present 
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Adopting this 
resolution, Mr. Speaker, would certainly not be in America's best 
interest.
  My opposition to this resolution is threefold. First, I understand 
that several of my colleagues oppose the use of United States Armed 
Forces in the Balkans. My colleagues refer to terms like mission creep 
and quagmire when discussing this region and our current involvement. I 
understand their reluctance for we all can remember Vietnam and the 
pain that our nation endured. In fact it was in part because of Korea 
and Vietnam that in 1973 Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution.
  The War Powers Resolution is a remnant of the Vietnam War and of the 
cold war era. This resolution is not suited for the new-world situation 
in which U.S. involvement in hostilities may often be part of a 
multilateral effort. As examples of the post cold war era, we saw in 
the Persian Gulf War and now in Yugoslavia the need for greater 
flexibility. The time in which we now live the President must have the 
ability to make rapid decisions that may entail the use of force in new 
and varied ways.
  Secondly, I object to this resolution because I am wary of beginning 
a constitutional struggle between the Office of the President and 
Congress when our troops are currently involved in an armed conflict. 
With military operations underway we cannot afford to send mixed 
signals about our commitment to the region. We cannot afford to risk 
that one American soldier, sailor, or airman would doubt that this 
nation fully supports their mission nor can we risk that Slobodan 
Milosevic or any future adversary doubts our resolve.
  I am mindful that the Constitution, the lifeline of our Republic, 
grants Congress the power to declare war and to make all laws necessary 
for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in 
the Government. However, I am also mindful that the War Powers 
Resolution as well as H. Con. Res 82 take from the President authority 
that the President has exercised for nearly 200 years. This resolution 
would remove from the President's arsenal flexibility and decisiveness 
in times of crisis.
  If this resolution were to pass today, it would certainly begin a 
constitutional struggle. The constitutionality of the War Powers Act 
has been debated since 1973. As a concurrent resolution does not 
require presentation to the President for his signature, then it is 
almost certain that this legislative veto will trigger a quagmire of 
its own. In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court declared legislative 
vetoes to be unconstitutional.
  American foreign policy cannot be micro-managed by this body nor 
dictated by the President, it instead requires a balance based on 
consultation and cooperation. If we are to establish NATO's goal for 
the Balkans, of a durable peace that prevents further repression and 
provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people, then 
this Body must work with the President.
  Finally, I oppose this resolution because in my judgment America has 
an important interest in the stability of Europe. I would hope that if 
nothing else we would have learned that to

[[Page H2426]]

ignore European instability is in fact a mistake. Within this century 
we have twice ignored instability in Europe, counting on their 
political savvy and experience to restore peace. And twice within this 
century we have sent young men and women to restore the peace that 
Europeans could not capture.
  Kosovo shows us that the Europeans by themselves are incapable of 
restoring this peace. However, we are fortunate that NATO provides us 
with a vehicle to restore peace to the Balkans. After fifty years of 
investment in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we are finally 
enjoying the rewards of our collective investment.
  Our commitment to NATO and to Kosovo is the best means to achieve a 
lasting peace. I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill and let us 
proceed together with the President and our NATO allies with the 
business of providing stability and peace in Europe.
  Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I support the resolution by 
Representative Campbell to remove our troops from action in the 
Balkans. I'm opposed to applying American military force on behalf of 
Kosovo because our goals are unclear and the risks are too great 
without any fundamental strategic American interest.
  Introduction of ground forces onto what we still recognize as 
Yugoslavian soil is a muddled policy. Are we joining a Kosovar war of 
liberation, or are we demanding the Yugoslavian national government 
delegate an arbitrary level of power to the provincial Kosovo 
government?
  It is difficult to imagine Kosovars and the Serbs reconciling and co-
existing peacefully and on equal terms after such massive intervention 
by the United States. Alternatively if Kosovo or a part of Kosovo were 
indeed to gain independence, we don't have any assurance that they 
wouldn't try to join a Greater Albania.
  I am wary of the side we picked in this Yugoslavian civil war. I do 
feel the United States should be a friend to freedom movements 
throughout the world. But our support for the Kosovars doesn't seem to 
be rooted in any affinity of theirs for freedom or for the United 
States. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has links to very suspect 
groups, among them heroin smugglers and Middle East terrorists. Should 
we be strengthening a group that is supported by Osama bin Laden and 
other very dangerous people who hate America?
  A strengthened radical Muslim presence in Europe would pose a serious 
threat to the interests of the United States and our allies. A 
predominately Muslim country is not always hostile to American 
interests. Turkey is a long-time and solid ally of the United States. 
Several other predominately Muslim countries have also been friends of 
the United States. And that is precisely because they have rejected 
radical anti-Western elements. The KLA hasn't done that to my 
satisfaction.
  For these reasons, I urge adoption of the Campbell resolution.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, the Constitution is very clear. It is the 
United States Congress, which has the power to determine issues of war 
and peace and to decide whether our young men and women are asked to 
put their lives in harms way. It is the President who is the Commander 
and Chief of the military. It is the Congress who determines whether we 
use the military. I have heard today that some people think that the 
U.S. participation in Kosovo is unconstitutional. They are right--but 
the U.S. participation in Vietnam, Granada, Panama, and many other 
conflicts which took place without congressional authorization were 
also unconstitutional.
  The time is now for this Congress, which represents the American 
people, to stop abrogating its Constitutional responsibility to the 
White House and start seriously addressing the issues of war and peace.
  Frankly, I am extremely concerned about the process that has taken 
place today. On an issue of such enormous consequence, and at a time 
when Congress has a very inactive schedule, it is an outrage that we 
have only a few hours to discuss the issue of war, the expenditure of 
billions, and the potential loss of life of American military 
personnel--and I hope we rectify this situation in the coming days and 
weeks. This should not be the last debate on this issue.
  Frankly, at a time when American pilots have been undertaking massive 
air attacks in Yugoslavia, when three members of the United States 
military are being held prisoner, and when we have spent billions of 
taxpayer dollars it is an outrage that the President of the United 
States has not come before the Congress to tell us and the nation what 
the goals of his policy are--and to ask this institution for support of 
those proposals.
  It is an outrage that a terrible rule passed this afternoon on an 
almost totally partisan basis limiting the time of debate, limiting 
amendments and severely limiting the role that Congress should be 
playing in determining this country's course of action. We should not 
be acting in a partisan way on issues like this.
  Mr. Speaker, my assessment of the situation at the present moment is 
that Mr. Milosevic is a war criminal, and that ethnic cleansing, mass 
murder, rape and the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of 
innocent people from their homes is unacceptable and cannot be ignored. 
Sadly, because Mr. Milosevic has negotiated agreements which he has 
then ignored, I have supported the NATO bombing of military targets--
not civilian targets. I believe that the Serb military and police must 
be withdrawn from Kosovo, that the hundreds of thousands of people 
uprooted from their homes must be allowed to return, that Kosovo must 
be given some kind of self-rule, and that an international peace 
keeping force should be established to maintain order.
  I believe that we must strive as hard as we possibly can to find an 
alternative between doing nothing, and allowing ethnic cleansing and 
mass murder to continue, and the continuation of a war which will 
certainly result in terrible destruction, large numbers of casualties, 
and the expenditure of great sums of money.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that the United States must be as active as we 
possibly can in finding a road to peace. I believe that Germany and the 
United Nations have brought forth proposals which might be able to form 
the basis of a negotiated peace. I believe that Russia, a long time 
ally of Serbia, should be asked to play a more active role in the 
process and to supply troops for an international peace keeping force.
  And finally, I believe that Congress must not duck its constitutional 
responsibilities--about developing a short and long policy with regard 
to Kosovo. Let's not just blame the President. That's too easy. Let us 
have the courage to seriously confront this issue.
  Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I am a hawk. I believe in a military so 
strong that we never have to use it. When we use our military might, it 
should be with clear objectives, after considering our national 
interests and the limits of our influence.
  Mr. Speaker, imagine Serbia before we started bombing. The threat of 
ethnic cleansing clearly existed. About 2,000 innocent people had been 
killed and, more ominously, a 40,000-man force had been built up in 
Kosovo. Again, imagine the White House, seeing this threat, recalling 
the glory of the one-day wars in Granada and Panama, and without 
considering the ramifications, decides to wage war against Yugoslavia.
  In the process, they demonize a man, Mr. Milosevic, who likely 
deserves the characterization, to give a face to the American people. 
But, Milosevic doesn't play by our rules. He doesn't turn on his anti-
aircraft radar so we can detect and destroy it; He uses the bombing as 
cover to really carry out ethnic cleansing and suppress his domestic 
opposition.
  The war drags on. The President and his advisors plead for patience 
all the while hoping that a cruel winter, without electricity and fuel-
oil, will force guilty and innocent Serbians to their knees. And we 
continue to deplete what remains of our military capability.
  We see the difficulty of integrating our moral sensibilities, the 
relations between nations, the use of military force and politics. The 
argument is made that our failure to support this sentimental adventure 
would undermine NATO and U.S. credibility. That is: Our enemies, petty 
dictators, and terrorists, will see our weakness and be tempted to 
exploit it. We have already made our weakness clear with indecisive 
leadership. Our enemies now see the limits of our strength which we 
have unwisely used. Their intelligence services have evaluated our 
actions. They will weigh their options. We must deter them from 
wrongful action by showing the strength our Constitutional system.
  This body should constrain the fatuous thinking and unconsidered 
actions by the Executive Branch, requiring the President to unleash the 
dogs of war only in extremity and without artificial political 
constraints. When we make war it should be quick, efficient, brutal, 
and to be avoided at all costs by the Milosevics of this world. This 
still leaves the President with wide latitude as he deals with new 
threats. In fact, eliminating this drain on our resources, will 
dramatically strengthen our ability to face our enemies.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). All time has expired.
  Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 151, the concurrent 
resolution is considered as read for amendment and the previous 
question is ordered.
  The question is on the concurrent resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 139, 
nays 290, not voting 4, as follows:

[[Page H2427]]

                             [Roll No. 101]

                               YEAS--139

     Archer
     Bachus
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Bonilla
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Duncan
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Foley
     Fowler
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gibbons
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kingston
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McKinney
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mink
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Rivers
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thune
     Upton
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Wilson
     Young (AK)

                               NAYS--290

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Armey
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Northup
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shows
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Aderholt
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Wynn

                              {time}  1703

  Messrs. KLINK, WALSH, CONDIT, and GARY MILLER of California changed 
their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the concurrent resolution was not agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________