[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 55 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4028-S4032]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. McCONNELL (for himself and Mr. Lieberman):
  S. 846. A bill to make available funds for a security assistance 
training and support program for the self-defense of Kosova; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.


                      the kosovo self-defense act

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Kosovo 
Self-Defense Act. I am pleased to be joined by my good friend from 
Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, in offering this bill. Our proposal 
would provide $25 million to arm and train members of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, or KLA. This would equip 10,000 men or 10 battalions 
with small arms, antitank weapons, for up to 18 months. Let me repeat 
that: For less than the cost of one evening's air raids, we can provide 
significant defensive capabilities to those most willing to fight Serb 
aggression inside Kosovo.
  I know the administration questions why the United States should take 
this bold step. My question is, Why haven't we already made the 
decision to arm and train the Kosovar Albanians who are on the ground 
fighting for their homes, their loved ones, and their rights? It seems 
to me that the question is not why, but why not? It took 4 years of 
bloodshed to recognize we should arm the Bosnians. How many lives will 
be lost before we do the right thing in Kosovo?
  There is widespread agreement that President Clinton and his National 
Security Advisers have made a grave tactical error in removing even the 
threat of U.S. ground troops. With this declaration seemingly repeated 
hourly by top Clinton officials, the United States has signaled to 
Milosevic that, regardless of his actions--including genocide--America 
does not have the determination to stop this outrageous behavior. After 
months of hollow American threats, we are now crippling our prospects 
for success by signaling to Milosevic just how far we are willing to 
go. No option should have been taken off the table.
  Just last October, with great fanfare, the President announced a 
cease-fire, but it was a farce. The Serbs continued their brutal war 
against the Kosovars. In Pristina, cynics were heard to say, ``If they 
only burn a village a day it keeps NATO away.'' The Serb campaign to 
exterminate all semblance of Albanian society raged daily--just not on 
a massive, headline-grabbing scale.
  Unless faced with serious and sustained military pressure on the 
ground, this war will go on until Kosovo is empty of all Albanians. 
Given administration and public reluctance to deploy U.S. troops, there 
is only one option: The KLA must be given the means to defend their 
homeland. All reports indicate that the KLA is growing in number and 
remains willing to fight Serb aggression. Given the right equipment and 
limited training, the KLA could offer a significant deterrent to 
Milosevic's murderous thugs.
  If the administration had armed the Kosovar Albanians in January when 
I first suggested that approach, I believe the daily tragic exodus of 
refugees could have been avoided.
  I ask unanimous consent the op-ed I wrote which appeared in the 
Washington Post back in January advocating this course of action be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1999]

                        Independence for Kosovo

                          (By Mitch McConnell)

       Once again, NATO ambassadors have condemned barbaric 
     atrocities deliberately inflicted by Serb forces on cold, 
     hungry, exhausted civilians. Top generals have been 
     dispatched to warn that Western patience has been strained by 
     Belgrade's slaughter of 45 villagers in Racak. The Serbs have 
     retaliated by evicting the American chief of the observer 
     mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
     Europe (OSCE)--leaving a more sympathetic French official in 
     place.
       It is time for the United States to accept reality, 
     recognize Kosovo's independence and provide Pristina's 
     leadership with the political and security assistance 
     necessary to halt Serbia's genocidal war.
       Kosovo's humanitarian disaster continues today. Although it 
     is true that some 300,000 refugees have left the mountains 
     where they fled from Serb ethnic cleansing last summer, the 
     catastrophe has simply moved behind closed doors. 
     International relief agencies support a program of one warm 
     room per household, but this effort is barely meeting the 
     basic human needs of the extended or expanded families 
     created by the war. Families

[[Page S4029]]

     ranging in size from 12 to 18 people, half of whom are 
     children, are crammed into the only standing room left in a 
     house, usually no larger than 12 by 20 feet. With freezing 
     temperatures and heavy snow, shortages of mattresses, 
     blankets, warm clothing and food are evident throughout 
     Kosovo. Schools and clinics are shuttered or shattered.
       Nongovernmental organizations and the U.S. Disaster Team 
     have performed heroically in hostile conditions. 
     Unfortunately, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the 
     World Food Program and Agency for International Development 
     headquarters have become bureaucratic bottlenecks slowing the 
     availability of relief supplies to these able partners.
       The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement for Kosovo has failed. 
     There is no cease-fire. The massacre in Racak is only the 
     latest example of weekly Serbian violence. Invariably, the 
     victims are civilians. Each time the Serbs offer the same 
     explanation: Violence resulted from their search for the 
     perpetrators of a crime. The Serb military response is always 
     brutally disproportionate to the needs of any legitimate law 
     enforcement effort. As one little girl cried after her 
     village was shelled, ``I would understand if they killed 
     soldiers, but they killed my home. Why?''
       In addition to violating the cease-fire, the Serbs have 
     failed to comply with another key aspect of the agreement. 
     Belgrade was required to substantially reduce its Kosovo 
     force level. In fact, a senior American official acknowledged 
     the effort to verify the troop withdrawal was a farce. No one 
     knows how many Serbs are still deployed in Kosovo.
       Hopeful of replacing this menacing presence, the 
     administration is developing an ill-advised plan to create a 
     new civilian police force. Unarmed and with the benefit of 
     only a few weeks training, this force is destined to fail or, 
     far worse, become hostages. An American diplomat summed up 
     the situation: ``The Serbs will continue to go where they 
     want, do anything they want, whenever they want.'' Neither 
     OSCE nor a civilian police force will change that outcome.
       The primary reason the agreement has collapsed is that the 
     use of force has been abandoned as an option. A senior OSCE 
     French official observed, ``In October, Milosevic was 
     presented with two options--to be bombed or to accept 
     verifiers. He agreed to the OSCE mission. We now stand in 
     lieu of any military option. . . . Our political intervention 
     is incompatible with military action. No nation will be 
     willing to take military action and risk retribution against 
     its citizen verifiers.'' In short, 2,000 potential hostages 
     prevent any meaningful debate about force.
       The use of force has been further undermined by the 
     withdrawal of virtually all 300 aircraft deployed in the 
     fall, and by members' statements that any effort to implement 
     the Activation Order for airstrikes will require more votes 
     by NATO. Challenge inspections of potential Serb military 
     violations were forfeited in a Belgrade-NATO document 
     guaranteeing prior notice of all air verification flights. 
     Finally, the Serbs know from daily testing that aggression 
     will produce little more than a rhetorical rebuke and renewed 
     talks.
       George Mitchell is said to have produced Ireland's Good 
     Friday Agreement by shuttling between 12 factions, few of 
     which were ever in the same room at the same time. The case 
     in Kosovo has been much simpler, with only two real points of 
     view, one seeking independence, one an interim autonomy 
     settlement. Since the summer ethnic cleansing campaign there 
     has been only one view: independence.
       American negotiators, constrained by European anxiety and 
     inertia, have failed to accept the inevitability of this 
     objective. The administration clings to the idea that this 
     goal is unachievable politically and unwinnable through 
     combat. This is no longer the case.
       The United States should have learned several pertinent 
     lessons in Vietnam. To win, the Kosovo Liberation Army does 
     not need to control territory. It must be able to maneuver at 
     will, be well trained, equipped and financed and enjoy 
     popular support. Last year's Serb offensive energized 
     universal popular support for the Kosovo Liberation Army 
     (KLA), and military analysts now point to substantial 
     improvements in the KLA's tactics, command and control, 
     financing and arsenal.
       Our policies must recognize the essential goal: 
     independence for Kosovo. To achieve it, we must take several 
     steps:
       Expand direct U.S. aid to nongovernmental humanitarian 
     organizations and improve the management of international 
     organization relief efforts.
       Suspend U.S. funds for the OSCE observers.
       Demand a NATO vote to implement the Activation Order for 
     airstrikes.
       Recognize Kosovo's independence and implement plans to arm 
     the KLA.
       Facing hard realities has always been America's best 
     course. It is the only course to follow in Kosovo.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Rather than choosing this course, the U.S. and NATO 
have relied solely on the use of controlled airstrikes. Now, I 
supported this use of force and believe we should come to the defense 
of the Kosovar Albanians, the victims of genocide. However, the nightly 
strikes on Milosevic's terror machine have not stopped the massive 
killing. In fact, the atrocities have dramatically increased since NATO 
action began. Our halfhearted effort has allowed Milosevic the freedom 
to feed the most evil of instincts. Police, paramilitary, and army 
units are engaged in an effort to deport or exterminate 2 million 
Albanians.
  Air power alone cannot stop this slaughter. This week the Albanian 
Government recognized this fact and called on the United States 
Government to arm the KLA. That was a shift in position of the Albanian 
Government. Recognizing the growing strength and tenacity of the KLA, 
the Albanian Government has switched positions and said we ought to arm 
the KLA.
  I ask unanimous consent the article concerning that matter in the 
Washington Post be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Apr. 20, 1999]

                    Albania Asks West To Arm Rebels

                            (By Peter Finn)

       TIRANA, Albania, April 19--The Albanian government has 
     asked the United States and other NATO countries to arm the 
     Kosovo Liberation Army and Albanian President Rexhep Mejdani 
     is prepared to raise the subject when he meets with President 
     Clinton during the NATO summit in Washington this week, a 
     senior adviser to the Albanian leader said today.
       The decision is a significant policy shift for Albania, 
     which until NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia began last 
     month had maintained an official policy of neutrality toward 
     the different Kosovo Albanian political movements, including 
     the KLA, which has been fighting to win the province's 
     independence.
       But Prec Zogaj, a senior adviser to the Albanian president, 
     said today that one of the effects of the mass expulsion of 
     ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, as well as reports of Serbian 
     massacres of civilians, has been to transform the rebel army 
     into the single voice of Kosovo Albanians, sidelining 
     provincial leaders who advocate nonviolence.
       Albania, in response, is now willing to throw its 
     diplomatic weight behind the guerrillas' appeals for arms 
     from the West, Zogaj said in an interview. ``We have to find 
     ways to send military aid to Kosovo,'' Zogaj said. ``In 
     Kosovo, the only force that protects civilians is the KLA, 
     but they do not have enough arms.''
       The change of policy threatens to deepen the strains in 
     relations between Albania and the Serb-led government of 
     Yugoslavia, which broke off diplomatic ties with Tirana on 
     Sunday and whose armed forces have fired shells into northern 
     Albania in the past week. Although the Albanian army is in 
     disarray, the West has long been concerned that it would be 
     drawn directly into the Kosovo conflict and ignite a broader 
     war.
       The rebels set up training camps in mountainous northern 
     Albania and smuggled arms into Kosovo from there. But the 
     Albanian government has not officially sanctioned their 
     activities on its soil, and argued that it was unable to 
     control the rebels' movements in the north because the region 
     was so lawless.
       ``The KLA was [previously] a military segment of the Kosovo 
     liberation movement,'' Zogaj said. ``Today, now, the KLA is 
     the movement itself. There is no other option.''
       In Washington, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin 
     said he was not aware of a formal request from Albania to arm 
     the rebels, but he said Albania has informally communicated 
     its desire to do so. The United States has made clear it 
     continues to oppose arming or training the rebels, Rubin 
     said.
       The Clinton administration does not support the rebels' 
     objective of a Kosovo independent of Serbia, Yugoslavia's 
     dominant republic. However, administration officials have 
     warned that the longer NATO's air war continues, the greater 
     the chances are that the guerrilla army will fill a power 
     vacuum in Kosovo.
       Zogaj said Albanian officials raised the question of arming 
     the Kosovo rebels with U.S. Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, NATO's 
     supreme commander, when he visited Tirana Saturday. Zogaj 
     said officials have made the same request repeatedly to U.S. 
     officials in the past three weeks. Zogaj said Clark refused, 
     adding that the general cited the arms embargo placed on 
     Yugoslavia as a barrier to such a move.
       But Zogaj said that Albanian officials inferred from their 
     conversations with Clark that he really feared that if NATO 
     armed the rebels, Russia would arm the Serbs. Zogaj said the 
     KLA was obtaining new arms on the international black market 
     and continued to buy weapons from Serbian arms merchants 
     despite the war. Zogaj also estimated that 8,000 new rebel 
     recruits from other countries have arrived in Albania in the 
     past four weeks. If true, that could nearly double the size 
     of the rebel fighting force.
       Albania is one of more than two dozen European countries 
     that will join NATO's 19 members in Washington, for a three-
     day summit that begins Friday.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Milosevic's storm troopers must face operations in the 
air and on the ground. The KLA is willing to wage this war on the 
ground. It is their homes that are being burned,

[[Page S4030]]

their businesses destroyed; and, worse, their wives and sisters being 
raped, their families being slaughtered. They don't need convincing to 
summon the will to fight. What they need is international support.
  Senator Lieberman and I have a proposal which will begin this effort. 
If the only people willing to fight are the KLA, we should do what we 
can to see that they have the ability to do so. Who else will provide 
the necessary deterrent to Milosevic and his army? The administration 
has made it clear that it will not be America's sons and daughters. I 
don't want to see United States soldiers fighting this war, but I also 
cannot abide the continued extermination of the people of Kosovo. They 
are entitled to defend themselves. We should not delay any further in 
our commitment to their legitimate cause.
  Let me sum this up as I see my friend from Connecticut is here. What 
we have is a situation with the KLA where their leaders are in 
communication with the State Department and our military on a daily 
basis. We have an organization which, by telephone, is identifying 
military targets inside Kosovo for our planes. We are dealing with the 
KLA multiple times a day, both diplomatically and militarily. We are 
obviously pulling for them. We are egging them on. We are saying, ``Go 
out there and do it.'' But when they request an opportunity to be 
adequately armed, we say no. It is an utterly absurd position.
  We have heard the rumors around town. We heard these in the 1980s, 
when the issue was supporting the contras, that there are some bad 
characters in the KLA. I don't think we have time to run a background 
check on everybody involved in this effort. The question is simply 
this: Who else is willing to fight the fight on the ground inside 
Kosovo on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians? There is nobody else willing 
to fight this war on the turf. We are already cooperating with them. We 
already deal with them on a daily basis. We are encouraging them. They 
are our allies. Why not give them the opportunity to engage in a fair 
fight on the ground inside Kosovo where the atrocities are occurring?
  The growing suspicion of all of us is that this air war can go on 
forever and not have an impact on the real problem, which is inside 
Kosovo. The Senator from Connecticut and I believe we are advocating 
here a proposal that is in the best interests of the United States of 
America and of NATO. We have obviously picked a side. We are on their 
side. The question is whether we should fight this war entirely on 
their behalf or whether we should give them an opportunity to help us 
fight it--since it is their land, their family, and their principal 
concern. We think we have a proposal here that makes sense.
  Finally, for a mere $25 million--which is less than we are spending 
on these air raids per night--we could arm the KLA for up to 18 months 
to give them a chance to defend their wives, their homes, and their 
families.
  So I thank the Senator from Connecticut for joining with me on this 
proposal. I see he is here now to speak on its behalf.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 846

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Kosova Self-Defense Act of 
     1999''.

     SEC. 2. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

       It shall be the policy of the United States to provide the 
     interim government of Kosova with the capability to defend 
     and protect the civilian population of Kosova against armed 
     aggression.

     SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SECURITY 
                   ASSISTANCE.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to funds 
     otherwise available to carry out section 23 of the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763), there are authorized to 
     be appropriated to the President to carry out the provisions 
     of such section, $25,000,000, which amount shall be made 
     available only for grants to the interim government of Kosova 
     to be used for training and support for the established self-
     defense forces to carry out the policy of section 2.
       (b) Availability of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.

     SEC. 4. RELATION TO EXISTING AUTHORITIES IN LAW.

       Assistance provided under section 3 may be made available 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any 
     executive order or directive or any rule or regulation).

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from 
Kentucky, with whom I am proud to join in this effort, and I thank him, 
really, for his initiative and leadership in this regard. He was the 
first, that I am aware of, to make this proposal. It made a lot of 
sense to me when we talked about it.
  I must say, from the time we introduced it--which must be 4 weeks 
ago, now, when the NATO air campaign began--to today, it seems to me 
the logic and the morality that was behind the original proposal has 
grown greater. In fact, the support has grown for this proposal from 
those whom I respect, who think deeply about this matter. Some at the 
high levels of our Government, while not supporting our proposal to arm 
the Kosovars, nonetheless have increasingly spoken of the Kosovar 
Liberation Army positively, as the Senator from Kentucky indicated, 
referring to its members as our allies, and even defended them against 
some of the criticisms that have been heard against them.
  Yesterday I came to the floor to join with several colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle to introduce a resolution which would authorize the 
President, as Commander in Chief, to take all actions necessary to 
achieve the objectives that NATO has stated for our action in the 
Balkans: To remove the Serbian military and paramilitary from Kosovo, 
to allow the Kosovars to return to their homes to live in peace, and to 
provide for an international peacekeeping force. It seems to me one of 
the steps that might be taken--and taken as soon as humanly possible--
which supports the three NATO objectives, is exactly the proposal that 
Senator McConnell and I are making, which is to offer some truly 
minimal support to help arm and hopefully, at some point, better train 
the Kosovars who are fighting to defend their own communities, their 
own families, their own freedom, their own lives.
  I think there are compelling strategic and moral reasons that argue 
for this legislation. The fact is, we are engaged in a battle, and it 
is a difficult battle. I am one who believes the NATO aerial 
bombardments, which will probably continue for weeks, are hurting the 
Serbs. Hopefully this bombardment will bring the leadership in Belgrade 
to their senses so they will order the Serbian troops out of Kosovo, 
which is one of our objectives. But let's speak truthfully about this. 
There is no indication of any breaking of will in Belgrade at the 
current time. There simply is none. If, after weeks and perhaps months 
of bombardment and still Milosevic does not yield we will not have 
achieved our objectives. Then we will face a stark choice. What my 
friend from Kentucky and I are saying is, at that point we will ask 
ourselves, how can we alter the status quo on the ground, since the air 
campaign has not done it? And the only way to do that, of course, is 
with forces on the ground. Then we will face a very difficult choice, 
which I have said I believe we have to at least begin to think about 
and consider and plan for, if that is necessary. That is whether to 
introduce NATO ground forces, including American soldiers into conflict 
in the Balkans.
  But the fact is, as the Senator from Kentucky said, there are forces 
on the ground now fighting the Serbian invaders. They are the Kosovars 
themselves. They have by far the deepest and most genuine reason to 
fight, and they have the will to do so. They are fighting to defend 
themselves and their neighbors, their communities. They are fighting 
with remarkable resilience. The fact is, Milosevic had two aims in 
invading Kosovo. One was obviously to eliminate the Kosovars, to 
slaughter some of them, to torture and rape others, and expel the rest. 
A critical part of that strategy, the other aim was to defeat, totally 
defeat, the force on the ground, the indigenous force that is fighting 
Milosevic and frustrating his desires. That is the KLA, the Kosovar 
Liberation Army. Remarkably, He has failed totally at that.
  Of course many people who have worn the uniform and carried the flag 
of the KLA have lost their lives already, but the numbers in uniform

[[Page S4031]]

there have grown as people from all over the world, not just from 
within Kosovo--including hundreds, maybe thousands, from the United 
States, Albanian Americans--have gone over there to fight this just 
fight. So they are on the ground, ready to fight. But they do not have 
enough to fight with. They do not have a lot of ammunition. In some 
cases they do not even have a lot of food.
  But we have a common enemy here. Remember the old slogan, ``The enemy 
of my enemy is my friend.'' The enemy of our enemy, Milosevic, is now 
our ally in this fight. Senator McConnell said it. Our military is 
talking to them every day. They are providing us with valuable 
information from the ground that has helped us to target enemy 
locations in Kosovo. So we have crossed that bridge. Why not do the 
next logical step to advance our military purposes and to support them 
with arms?
  I make a moral argument here, too, as well as a strategic argument. 
No matter what else was happening, these poor people have been 
victimized in a way we hate to imagine. But we have to imagine it 
because we see it on TV every day. We read about it in the newspaper. 
The fortunate ones do not look very fortunate at all. They are the ones 
who have been expelled. I say that comparatively, of course, because 
the ones who are less fortunate are the ones who have been slaughtered, 
who have lost their lives, who have been separated from their families 
and may well be trapped in areas of Kosovo now where they are starving.
  So these people are exercising not just their legal right but their 
moral right to defend themselves. That right is at the heart of our own 
history and our own moral system. What was our Revolution about? It was 
about a valiant attempt by a band of patriots, freedom fighters, to 
break loose of the Crown and the suppression it was imposing on 
colonial America--fortunately, much less brutal and barbaric than that 
imposed on the people of Kosovo by the Serbs, and by Milosevic 
particularly.
  So I think we cannot stand by and watch this slaughter. That is why 
we got involved in the first place. But I also think we cannot stand by 
and watch these brave people, against superior forces, equipped with 
much more than they have, fight, and not want to come to their defense.
  I know there are critics of these people, as Senator McConnell has 
said. Some say the KLA is composed of extremists, Marxists; they may 
have connection with groups in the world which we oppose. Some even say 
some of them are drug runners. I cannot vouch for every one of the 
thousands of members of the Kosovar Liberation Army. I cannot speak to 
every place they are receiving funds, though I would say that a 
starving person does not ask the ideology or source of income of a 
person offering him or her food.
  In the same way, in ways that we may not like, people who are 
fighting for their freedom against very difficult odds may not always 
question the sources of help they need so desperately.
  Of course, the best way for us to overcome these questions is for 
ourselves and, hopefully, some of our NATO allies to become the sources 
of financial support for the Kosovar Liberation Army. I will share with 
you my impression, based on all that I have read and studied about the 
Kosovar Liberation Army--the UCK, as they are called in their native 
language--and all that I have heard about them from their friends and 
relatives in this country, fellow Americans.
  If I may, it reminds me of that old line about what is the definition 
of a conservative? A conservative is a liberal who has been mugged. 
That is from an earlier time. What is the definition of a member of the 
KLA? It is probably a citizen of Kosovo who has watched his house burn, 
his brother murdered and his daughter raped.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Connecticut has 
expired.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 more 
minutes for the Senator from Connecticut and myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Can I ask the Senator from Connecticut a question 
related to the point he just made?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, indeed.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Does the Senator from Connecticut not agree that if 
your house is being burned and your wife is being raped, you are not 
likely to ask the question: Who is this person who is offering to help 
me? And if our Government were truly offended or if our Government were 
truly convinced about all these rumors that have been spread around 
about the KLA, does not my friend from Connecticut agree we would not 
be taking their phone calls at the State Department and the military 
and we would not be accepting their advice about what military targets 
to hit? Is that a reasonable assumption?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator is correct. It is more than a reasonable 
assumption. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. We recently 
had a hearing on Kosovo with Secretary Cohen and General Shelton. I was 
quite struck by two things: First, to hear General Shelton say that one 
of our aims of our air campaign is to degrade the Serbian military in 
Kosovo so that the UCK--the KLA--can achieve a balance of power with 
the Serbian forces there. So we have the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs 
of Staff linking us with them. Of course, the better way, the easier 
way to achieve that balance of power is by arming the Kosovars.
  The second is, one of the members of the committee echoed some of the 
criticisms of the KLA--terrorists, extremists, drug merchants. And 
Secretary Cohen, our Defense Secretary, serving with remarkable skill 
in this crisis, came to the defense of the KLA and said, yes, he 
couldn't say that everyone there was an angel, but that the balance of 
equities of morality was clearly on the side of the KLA.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Does my friend from Connecticut also share my memory, 
since we have been in several of these meetings with the President on 
this subject, that the only piece of good news about what is going on 
inside Kosovo at the last meeting was a report that the KLA was growing 
in strength? It was the only piece of good news about the condition 
within Kosovo. Does my friend from Connecticut also share my memory of 
that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. May I ask, Mr. President, for an additional 5 minutes 
for the Senator from Kentucky and myself?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. The Senator from Kentucky is quite 
right. That is my recollection, that there was a very good report 
given, with some surprise, but admiration, I say, by the intelligence 
communities that the numbers fighting with the KLA have, in fact, 
grown. There is such a painful irony here. As we both said, while the 
air campaign goes on, the suffering, the expulsion, the murder 
nonetheless goes on in Kosovo on the ground, and the only force there 
that can stop it now is the KLA, and we are hesitating to support them.

  I take them to be much more in the spirit of partisans who fought 
during the Second World War against overwhelming odds, perhaps even the 
freedom fighters in Hungary during 1956 and later in Prague, during the 
Prague spring. We have not only a strategic tie with them, it is much 
more consistent with our own history and values and our belief in 
democracy that we try to support this group, which, as the Senator 
says, is not being vanquished.
  The truth is, if I were Milosevic, the one thing I would fear is the 
United States and the West arming the KLA because he knows their zeal, 
their purpose, the will they have to fight. They are brave. They will 
take losses because they are fighting for a greater purpose, and, in 
fact, if I were Milosevic, the one thing I would fear, and what I 
believe he will face in any case, is a long-term indigenous insurgency, 
which I predict he will never be able to stop. The sooner we help them, 
the sooner we bring them to the result that they and we want.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I say to my friend from Connecticut, what our bill is 
all about is really an effort to call on the President to change this 
policy. We should not have to offer the bill that we are offering. We 
are offering it, but we should not have to offer it because

[[Page S4032]]

it makes elementary good sense to give the people, on whose behalf we 
are fighting this war, a chance to participate themselves.
  I say to my friend from Connecticut, does he not agree, this is what 
this is about, to give the people, on whose behalf we are fighting this 
war, a chance to participate themselves?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator from Kentucky is absolutely right. That is 
the purpose. The purpose is to push this option, this act which will 
support our objectives, objectives for which we are spending billions 
of dollars and already risking American lives, to push us closer to 
achieving those objectives and also, if I may add, to hopefully force 
some discussion of this option among our NATO allies.
  One of the arguments we hear about why this is not being considered 
by the administration is that there is opposition to it among our NATO 
allies. But we also hear there is opposition among our NATO allies, 
which I understand at this point, to the introduction of NATO ground 
forces. If there is opposition in NATO, as there is in Congress and in 
the administration, as the Senator has said, to the introduction of 
ground forces, including Americans, then, again, isn't it both wise 
militarily and powerful morally for us to as soon as possible be 
helping the fighters on the ground, the KLA?
  Mr. McCONNELL. In fact, I say to my friend from Connecticut, isn't it 
reasonable to argue that the only reason these refugees have been 
created is because there was no effective fighting force on the ground 
inside Kosovo? No way to defend your home, no way to defend your 
family, and what do you do when you are afraid? You run. That is what 
has created the refugee problem, which is presumably what our European 
allies care about most--the spillover into their countries.
  The only effective way, the Senator from Connecticut and I are 
saying, to prevent a further accumulation of refugees is for there to 
be some fighting force on the ground in Kosovo adequately trained and 
equipped in order to fight this battle where it counts.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator from Kentucky is right, and there is a 
painful irony here. He is absolutely right both about our objectives on 
the ground and our objectives to maintain stability in the region which 
is being destabilized now by these large refugee flows.
  The victories, if one can call them that, that the tragic, brutal, 
barbaric victories that Milosevic's forces have had over the Kosovars 
are hollow. They are barbaric because this was an armed force fighting 
against unarmed, undefended people. It is a question that will hang in 
the air--and some later time we will come back to it--what might have 
been different if, in fact, the KLA had been better armed at the outset 
of this a month or two or three ago, because I think that might have 
deterred, certainly delayed the massive exodus and slaughter that has 
been carried out against this undefended indigenous population.
  Mr. McCONNELL. There is no question the Senator from Connecticut is 
correct. The good news is, it is not too late. The KLA is bigger and 
more committed today than it was 2 months ago when this policy also 
made sense.
  Mr. President, I encourage cosponsorship on behalf of our colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from Kentucky for his leadership. We 
intend to pursue this and urge our colleagues to consider it as quickly 
as possible so that we may do something concrete and tangible that 
really can alter the balance of power and the balance of morality and 
the balance militarily on the ground in Kosovo.
                                 ______