[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 55 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4005-S4006]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATO: THE NEXT GENERATION
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this weekend, the 19 member nations of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[[Page S4006]]
will gather in Washington to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the
establishment of NATO. Some may see the juxtaposition of this summit
against the images of NATO airstrikes over Yugoslavia as being ironic.
I see it differently. I see it as prophetic.
The world has changed in the past 50 years, but as the events in
Kosovo so graphically illustrate, the world has grown no less
dangerous. NATO, likewise, has undergone significant changes over the
years but remains no less important to the security of Europe. The key
challenge facing NATO today is the dramatic change in the nature of the
threat. The cold war is history; the Soviet Union is defunct; the
Berlin Wall is just a pile of rubble. Forces massed along the borders
have given way to flash points dotted around the globe. The tense but
symmetrical standoff in Europe between the East and the West has been
exchanged for the capriciousness of terrorists and tyrants.
Just as the nature of the threat has evolved, so must the structure
and mission of NATO metamorphose if it is to remain relevant into the
21st century.
In 1949, when the alliance was formed, the Soviet Union and its
satellites posed the only credible threat to Western security. It was
the chilly dawn of the cold war era, and NATO was precision-tuned to
meet the cold war challenge. In the ensuing decades, as NATO expanded
from the original 12 to 16 member nations, the alliance grew in
strength and stature to guard Western Europe against the formidable
forces of the Warsaw Pact nations.
Conflict in Korea and Vietnam, turbulence in the Middle East, the
growing influence of China--none of the cataclysmic events of the
second half of the 20th century deterred NATO from its focus on the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And, in the end, NATO's intensity and
single-mindedness paid off handsomely, with the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
Through the years, NATO has adjusted its strategy and its mission to
meet changing circumstances, but never has the challenge been as great
or as far reaching as it is today. Where once NATO contended with the
shifting fortunes of a cold war enemy massed along a single front,
today the alliance is confronted with brush fires in its backyard, the
threat of terrorism from geographically remote nations and
organizations, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in virtually
every direction.
To meet this shifting political and military landscape, NATO has
expanded on its primary focus of defending its members against the
threat of attack by reaching out to its former foes to promote European
stability and security. Only last month, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic were welcomed into the alliance. And nine other nations are
clamoring for membership.
It is in this context that the 19 members of the alliance will gather
in Washington to mark the anniversary of NATO and to discuss the future
of the alliance. And it is in this context that the conflict in Kosovo
can serve as a useful template for many of the challenges that the
alliance is likely to face in the early years of the 21st century.
The lessons learned in Kosovo, preliminary though they may be at this
point, should be brought to the summit table. The lessons that are
still to come, as NATO prosecutes the attack on Yugoslavia, must be
accommodated in any future strategy.
Several specific issues arising from the Kosovo conflict deserve
careful consideration by the members of the alliance. And these include
the following:
First, NATO should discuss the wisdom of establishing a more robust
forward operating presence in Europe beyond alliance headquarters.
Given their history, the Balkans are a logical choice. The time and
logistical constraints built into ferrying people and equipment from
the United States, Britain, France and elsewhere to the front are
formidable. The result is a potentially serious disconnect in the
ability of commanders in the field to respond rapidly and effectively
to changing circumstances. One example of the problems this remote
staging has caused is the agonizing wait for the U.S. Apache
helicopters to arrive in theater--a delay that has cost NATO in terms
of tactical flexibility and has given the Serbs in Kosovo a lethal
window of opportunity to carry forward their ethnic cleansing
activities.
Second, and in conjunction with a more aggressive NATO forward
operating presence, the allies must accelerate their efforts to field
common systems and increase interoperability. This does not mean that
the United States should become an open-ended pipeline for the transfer
of technology to our NATO allies, but there are basic military tools
that should be available to, and designated for, NATO operations.
Third, the Kosovo operation should be the genesis for a top-to-bottom
review of the NATO decisionmaking process. While the system seems to be
working reasonably well considering that it is a conflict being fought
by committee, there is no doubt in my mind that decisionmaking must be
streamlined. It is, for example, far too cumbersome to give each of the
member nations veto power over the list of military targets. It may be
well for NATO to consider establishing subgroups of responsibility
defined operationally and perhaps even geographically. At all costs,
NATO should not blunder into the decisionmaking no-man's-land that has
paralyzed the effectiveness of the United Nations.
And finally, NATO should continue to engage Russia as a vital partner
in its quest for stability and security, and redouble it efforts to
bring other former Soviet bloc nations into the alliance once they have
met NATO membership criteria. This is the time to reach out, not to
pull back. NATO's sphere of interest and influence no longer spans just
the Atlantic Ocean; it spans a vast and complex territory never
contemplated in 1949. In this new operating arena, a broader but still
solid base will mean a stronger, more vigorous alliance.
We would be foolhardy to believe that Kosovo is an anomaly, just as
we would be foolhardy to believe that Kosovo will be the only model of
future conflict. The threats that face the NATO alliance at the
beginning of the 21st century are many and varied, and they will
doubtless proliferate in the coming years. The threat of nuclear attack
from rogue nations, the possibility of so-called ``loose nukes''
falling into the hands of terrorists, the danger of chemical or
biological warfare, the prospect of cyber-attack, the reality of
increasing ethnic tensions amid shifting resources and contested
borders--these are some of the threats that the United States and its
NATO allies face in the coming years. And these are just the threats we
can predict today. Who knows, ten years or twenty years from now, what
perils the world will face and what shape our defenses will have to
take. But as the conflict in Kosovo so sharply indicates, we must be
prepared for the unexpected, even the unimaginable. If NATO has the
staying power to celebrate its centennial fifty years from now, it will
be in a world that few of us can image today.
NATO has served a worthy purpose since its inception in 1949. Its
role in the future security and stability, not only of Europe, but also
of the United States as well as far-flung corners of the world, is
equally essential. And so I salute NATO on its 50th anniversary, and I
urge its representatives to weigh carefully the future goals and
mission of the alliance. NATO is at a crossroads: it can remain a force
for security and stability in the world, or it can become just another
relic of the cold war. For the sake of us all, I hope that NATO charts
a course of action that will steer it safely through the turbulence of
today and into the 21st century.
Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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