[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 55 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3981-S3984]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as we approach the 50th anniversary Summit

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of NATO this weekend, I rise today to share with my colleagues my 
concerns about a key document that will be considered at this summit. 
It is entitled ``Strategic Concept for NATO.''
  Mr. President, I have been privileged to be in the Senate 21 years. 
Throughout those years of time, there has often been a need to speak on 
behalf of NATO in this Senate. I say humbly and most respectfully that 
I have been at the forefront of Senate support for NATO. I can remember 
the early years of my time in the Senate. There was Member after Member 
that assaulted the need for the United States to remain in NATO. 
``Let's cut back. Let's save the money. Let's bring our men and women 
home. We have done our job.'' I was among that group that had the long-
range vision for NATO. It must remain. It must be strong, and U.S. 
leadership in NATO is absolutely essential.
  So the remarks that I contribute today, here on the floor, are the 
result of a series of consultations I have had with the administration, 
and I hope will be taken in a constructive light and not as an 
expression in any way of criticism of this great organization, NATO.
  With that in mind, I wrote to the President of the United States on 
April 7 to urge him to initiate, among the other 18 nations and the 
heads of state and government of NATO, the thought that at this 50th 
summit we should not try and write the final draft of the ``Strategic 
Concept.'' I repeat, ``the final draft.'' Certainly at this important 
gathering, a draft should be considered. Maybe several drafts should be 
considered, but we should not etch in stone the final draft of the 
``Strategic Concept.'' That document spells out the future strategy and 
mission of the alliance. It states the parameters by which the alliance 
decides whether it should or should not send forward military units to 
engage in operations, possibly combat operations.
  Why do I take this position? Because the old ``Strategic Concept,'' 
enacted in 1991, was largely oriented towards the Soviet Union and the 
threats from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. So obviously it is 
time to change it. But it can remain in effect for an additional, brief 
period of perhaps 6 months so that we can evaluate the lessons learned 
from the Kosovo operation.
  Periodically in the 50-year history of NATO, NATO has changed its 
mission statement, or ``Strategic Concept.'' But that can remain in 
effect for 8, 9 sometimes 10 years.
  So this document to be revised at this summit could well control NATO 
operations for the next decade.
  I do not see the urgency to put it, as I say, in stone at this time. 
The urgency is to consider it, to put out a draft, and let the nations 
of NATO and their respective legislators and the Congress of the United 
States consider those drafts and consider them--this is the key reason 
that I rise--``consider'' them in the light of the lessons learned in 
Kosovo.
  This 50th anniversary Summit is taking place against the background 
of perhaps the most serious conflict we have seen on the European 
continent--indeed, the most serious, in my judgment, since the 
conclusion of World War II. It is the first actual combat of a great 
magnitude in which NATO has been involved.
  We are operating on what is known as the ``consensus'' of the 19 
nations--any one of which has a veto power--directing the military 
operations, which are under the command of General Clark, the Supreme 
Allied Commander.
  I am not here to in any way criticize these operations. But I will 
simply say, Mr. President, that there will be many, many lessons 
learned at such time as this operation--and the sooner the better--is 
concluded with NATO having succeeded in reaching the objectives that 
have been made very clear by the NATO alliance and addressed many times 
by our President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Chancellor 
of Germany, and others.
  Mr. President, the alliance must have time to evaluate the lessons 
learned from the Kosovo operations before, again I say, setting in 
stone for possibly the next decade documents which will guide future 
NATO military operations.
  While everyone recognizes the ``Strategic Concept'' of 1991 must be 
updated, it has not impeded the current Kosovo operation. Indeed, this 
operation is going forward with that ``Strategic Concept'' still in 
place. So it could stay in place another 6 months.
  That is the only period of time I am asking for--an additional 6 
months before the ``Strategic Concept'' is finalized. A short delay has 
advantages, if for no other reason than to show respect for the 
Congress of the United States and the people of this country will have 
their own evaluation of how well the Kosovo operation went, what was 
done right and what could have been improved.
  The Secretary of Defense, when he was before the Armed Services 
Committee last week, said in response to questioning, ``We are guided 
by the consensus of the alliance.'' We need all 19 voices to say yes. 
And then he made a very important addition, ``Had we been there alone 
or with a coalition similar to what we had in 1991 in the Persian Gulf 
we might have done it another way.''
  This is a lesson learned. We should not be allowed to deny to the 
Congress and to other legislatures the opportunity to study lessons 
learned and to make our contribution as a member nation to the future 
``Strategic Concept for NATO.''
  As I speak today, the draft of the ``Strategic Concept'' continues to 
be reworked, during this very hour, by the staffs of the 19 nations 
before it will be submitted to the NATO heads of state this weekend at 
the summit. There are press reports today that key elements of the 
``Strategic Concept'' might not be completed by the summit--due to be 
continued--because of disagreement among the allies. The key element 
there is the relationship between NATO and the United Nations--a very, 
very important relationship. At no time should the United Nations have 
a veto over a decision by the NATO powers to use force. That is this 
Senator's view.
  My main concern is, to what extent does the draft ``Strategic 
Concept'' reflect the views expressed in a May 15, 1998, speech in 
Berlin that President Clinton made? I am addressing the draft being 
reworked against a background of a statement by the President of the 
United States a year ago. President Clinton stated:

       Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct 
     military invasion. Tomorrow's Alliance must continue to 
     defend enlarged borders and defend against the threats to our 
     security from beyond them [meaning borders]--the spread of 
     weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, regional 
     conflict.

  That thought expresses a desire to broaden and go beyond the 1991 
concept. Is that being worked in this final draft? I know not; 
collectively, we in this Chamber do not know.
  Other administration officials, most notably the Secretary of State, 
Ms. Albright, have been outspoken in the belief that the revised 
``Strategic Concept'' should place increased emphasis on NATO's future 
role in non-Article 5--she said ``out of area''--threats to our 
``common interests,'' threats such as Kosovo. The definition of these 
common interests and the various military missions NATO is prepared to 
undertake in defense of these interests will establish the foundation 
for NATO military operations, possibly for the next decade.
  Against the backdrop of the uncertainties in Kosovo, NATO should 
pause, in this Senator's judgment--I repeat, take a breath, a long deep 
breath and pause--before rendering judgment on these important issues. 
Let us review, over the next 6 months, the lessons learned as a 
consequence of the Kosovo operation.
  Unfortunately, the NATO summit will take place against the background 
of continuing, unfolding events relating to Kosovo which we cannot 
predict at this moment. The United States and our allies may have many 
lessons to be learned from Kosovo to assess as we look to NATO's future 
for the next decade and its military missions. That assessment must be 
a pivotal part of any new strategic concept. NATO is simply too 
important to the United States, to our allies in Europe, and indeed to 
those nations who seek admission to NATO. NATO is essential for the 
future of the European continent and our relationships with that 
continent.
  We are just beginning to learn important lessons now in the Kosovo 
situation. For example, it is obvious to all that the U.S. military is 
the primary source of attack aircraft. We are flying 60 percent of the 
missions of the high-

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performance aircraft. Most of the ordnance being used is high-tech, 
precision-guided ordnance, an arsenal of which the United States 
possesses in far greater numbers than the other nations of NATO. They 
simply do not have in their military inventories this equipment.

  I add to that, the airlift; that is, the cargo planes that must put 
in place the necessary resupply, the necessary equipment; for example, 
the helicopters, the Apaches which are moving in at this very moment, 
to be positioned in Albania for future use in the Kosovo operation. The 
other nations simply do not have that airlift. They do not have the 
tanker aircraft. Airplanes going into Kosovo now take off from Italy or 
other places. They move in, they have to get refueled in most instances 
before the strikes, they are refueled coming out of the strikes, and 
indeed refueled over the area so they can remain over the target area. 
It is the U.S. tanker aircraft that are carrying on the greater 
proportion of that essential part of this mission. The other nations of 
NATO do not have in their inventories that equipment.
  Until other nations do acquire or at least have in place firm 
contractual commitments to acquire such equipment, the United States 
will likely be the only source of that equipment for any future 
operation other than Kosovo. It is our taxpayers, it is our men and 
women of the Armed Forces, who support and maintain this equipment. As 
we write the future concept for operations in NATO, we have to 
recognize that much of the equipment for modern warfare is possessed by 
the United States. Are we ready to sign that in stone now, recognizing 
particularly that the new nations do not have that equipment? A lesson 
to be learned, a lesson to be thought through very carefully.
  The American people will soon be asked to support an emergency 
supplemental budget request to pay for the costs of the Kosovo 
operation. Are Americans ready to sign up to a new strategic concept 
that could well commit the U.S. military to other such operations 
requiring the same type of weaponry?
  There are other lessons to be learned. It is now becoming apparent 
that our military planners are being subjected to many levels of 
review--this is a consensus military operation by 19 nations--for it is 
a fact that NATO can only operate by consensus; 19 nations must agree 
before a military action can be taken. A single nation can stop the 
planners--indeed, even stop the operation.
  The result can be a military planning operation of the ``lowest 
common denominator.'' Are we now making military decisions not on the 
basis of the professional military judgment or on the basis of what 
will be most effectively done to achieve our objectives on the 
battlefield but, rather, on what agreement we can get among the 19 
nations to carry out the recommendations of the professional military? 
These are issues which are to be examined as lessons learned in the 
future of Kosovo.
  On April 7 I wrote the President a letter expressing the various 
concerns that I have related here on the floor. The President responded 
to my letter, on April 14, indicating his position that, ``the right 
course is to proceed with a revised `Strategic Concept' '' at this 
conference, and sign it into stone.
  Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the 
exchange of letters; my letter sent to the President and his response.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                    Washington, DC, April 7, 1999.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: The Administration, in consultation 
     with our NATO allies, is now finalizing various documents to 
     be submitted to the Heads of State for ratification at the 
     upcoming 50th anniversary NATO Summit to be held in 
     Washington later this month. A key decision, in my view the 
     most important one, is the revision of the Strategic Concept 
     for the future--perhaps a decade--that will guide NATO in its 
     decision making process regarding the deployment of military 
     forces.
       I am recommending, Mr. President, that a draft form of this 
     document be reviewed by the principals, but not finalized, at 
     this 50th anniversary Summit. Given the events in Kosovo, a 
     new Strategic Concept for NATO--the document that spells out 
     the future strategy and mission of the Alliance--should not 
     be written ``in stone'' at this time. Instead, NATO leaders 
     should issue a draft Strategic Concept at the Summit, which 
     would be subject to further comment and study for a period of 
     approximately six months. Thereafter, a final document should 
     be adopted.
       NATO is by far the most successful military alliance in 
     contemporary history. It was the deciding factor in avoiding 
     widespread conflict in Europe throughout the Cold War. 
     Subsequent to that tense period of history, NATO was, again, 
     the deciding factor in bringing about an end to hostilities 
     in Bosnia, and thereafter providing the security essential to 
     allow Bosnia to achieve the modest gains we have seen in the 
     reconstruction of the economic, political and security base 
     of that nation.
       Now NATO is engaged in combating the widespread evils of 
     Milosevic and his Serbian followers in Kosovo.
       I visited Kosovo and Macedonia last September and witnessed 
     Milosevic's repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Thereafter, 
     I spoke in the Senate on the essential need for a stabilizing 
     military force in Kosovo to allow the various international 
     humanitarian organizations to assist the people of Kosovo--
     many then refugees in their own land, forced into the hills 
     and mountains by brutal Serb attacks. Since then, I have 
     consistently been supportive of NATO military action against 
     Milosevic.
       Unfortunately, it is now likely that the NATO Summit will 
     take place against the background of continuing, unfolding 
     events relating to Kosovo. At this time, no predictions can 
     be made as to a resolution.
       We are just beginning to learn important lessons from the 
     Kosovo conflict. Each day is a new chapter. For example, NATO 
     planners and many in the Administration, and in Congress, 
     have long been aware of the disparities in military 
     capabilities and equipment between the United States and our 
     allies. Now, the military operation against Yugoslavia has 
     made the American people equally aware and concerned about 
     these disparities. The U.S. has been providing the greatest 
     proportion of attack aircraft capable of delivering 
     precision-guided munitions. Further, the United States is 
     providing the preponderance of airlift to deliver both 
     military assets (such as the critically needed Apache 
     helicopters and support equipment) and humanitarian relief 
     supplies, the delivery of which are now in competition with 
     each other.
       Until other NATO nations acquire, or at least have in place 
     firm commitments to acquire, comparable military 
     capabilities, the United States will continually be called on 
     to carry the greatest share of the military responsibilities 
     for such ``out of area'' operations in the future. This issue 
     must be addressed, and the Congress consulted and the 
     American people informed.
       It is my understanding that the draft Strategic Concept 
     currently under consideration by NATO specifically addresses 
     NATO strategy for non-Article 5, ``out of area'' threats to 
     our common interests--threats such as Bosnia and Kosovo. 
     According to Secretary Albright in a December 8, 1998 
     statement to the North Atlantic Council, ``The new Strategic 
     Concept must find the right balance between affirming the 
     centrality of Article V collective defense missions and 
     ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are 
     intimately related to the broader defense of our common 
     interests.'' Is this the type of broad commitment to be 
     accepted in final form, just weeks away at the 50th 
     anniversary Summit?
       During the Senate's debate on the Resolution of 
     Ratification regarding NATO expansion, the Senate addressed 
     this issue by adopting a very important amendment put forth 
     by Senator Kyl. But this was before the events in Kosovo. The 
     lessons of Kosovo could even change this position.
       The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view 
     that a ``final'' decision by NATO on the Strategic concept 
     should not be taken--risked--against the uncertainties 
     emanating from the Kosovo situation.
       The U.S. and our allies will have many ``lessons learned'' 
     to assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept. 
     Bosnia and Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into 
     aggressive military operations. As of this writing, the 
     Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect of the few 
     gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation must be 
     carefully assessed and evaluated before the U.S. and our 
     allies sign on a new Strategic Concept for the next decade of 
     NATO.
       A brief period for study and reflection by ourselves as 
     well as our Allies would be prudent. NATO is too vital for 
     the future of Europe and American leadership.
       With kind regards, I am
           Respectfully,
                                                      John Warner,
     Chairman.
                                  ____



                                              The White House,

                                   Washington, DC, April 14, 1999.
     Hon. John W. Warner,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your thoughtful letter on 
     the upcoming NATO summit and the revised Strategic Concept. I 
     appreciate your attention to these important issues, and I 
     agree strongly with your view that NATO's continued vitality 
     is essential to safeguarding American and European security.

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       I have thought carefully about your proposal to delay 
     agreement on the revised Strategic Concept in light of NATO's 
     military operations in Kosovo. While I share your deep 
     concern about the situation in Kosovo and the devastating 
     effects of Serb atrocities, I am convinced that the right 
     course is to proceed with a revised Strategic Concept that 
     will make NATO even more effective in addressing regional and 
     ethnic conflict of this very sort. Our operations in Kosovo 
     have demonstrated the crucial importance of NATO being 
     prepared for the full spectrum of military operations--a 
     preparedness the revised Strategic Concept will help ensure.
       The Strategic Concept will reaffirm NATO's core mission of 
     collective defense, while also making the adaptations needed 
     to deal with threats such as the regional conflicts we have 
     seen in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the evolving risks posed 
     by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will 
     also help ensure greater interoperability among allied forces 
     and an increased European contribution to our shared 
     security. The Strategic Concept will not contain new 
     commitments or obligations for the United States but rather 
     will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1949 
     North Atlantic Treaty. It will also recognize the need for 
     adapted capabilities in the face of changed circumstances. 
     This approach is fully consistent with the Kyl Amendment, 
     which called for a strong reaffirmation of collective defense 
     as well as a recognition of new security challenges.
       The upcoming summit offers a historic opportunity to 
     strengthen the NATO Alliance and ensure that it remains as 
     effective in the future as it has been over the past fifty 
     years. While the situation in Kosovo has presented difficult 
     challenges, I am confident that NATO resolve in the face of 
     this tyranny will bring a successful conclusion.
       Your support for the NATO Alliance and for our policy in 
     Kosovo has been indispensable. I look forward to working 
     closely with you in the coming days to ensure that the summit 
     is an overwhelming success.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I address the Senate today because I have 
done my very best as one Senator to bring this to the attention of our 
President, and hopefully, through this floor speech, to the attention 
of the other heads of state and government who will come to Washington. 
Again, I continue to urge my plea not to put this ``Strategic Concept'' 
in final form in this forthcoming Summit. I encourage my colleagues who 
may share my views on this critical issue to likewise speak out before 
it is too late, in an effort to prevent a rush to judgment on NATO's 
future. NATO is simply too important to our national security to do any 
less.
  On a related issue, I am distressed to hear statements by my 
colleagues, and some in the administration, which tie NATO's future to 
a successful--I repeat successful--outcome in Kosovo. I personally 
support the objectives that have been stated time and time again by the 
NATO ministers, and indeed our President, our Secretaries of State and 
Defense. We all know we have to create a situation so the refugees can 
be returned. We know we have to have in place a military force, the 
composition of which I think should be flexible. It does not have to be 
all United States--absolutely not. Maybe other nations not in NATO will 
join. We need flexibility there to allow these people to return in a 
secure environment and to have a measure of self-government, of 
autonomy. They deserve no less. Those are the basics.
  But to say unless everything we lay down today has succeeded, we have 
success and we have victory, and if we do not achieve it, it is the end 
of NATO--I urge my colleagues not to make such a statement. NATO must 
go on. NATO must go on and survive the Kosovo operation. It is the 
responsibility of those of us here in the Senate, of the President of 
the United States, and the other heads of state and government to make 
certain that is achieved, because we know not at this moment what the 
outcome will be in Kosovo. Yes, we have to achieve the basic goals, but 
in my humble judgment, diplomacy will reenter at some point. So I 
suggest we pledge ourselves to the future of NATO and be more cautious 
in our statements.
  Kosovo-like operations are not NATO's reason for being. They are 
``out-of-area'' operations that NATO does if it can. We should not be 
making pronouncements on NATO's future based on the outcome of these 
``out-of-area'' operations.
  This alliance has withstood the test of time for 50 years. It has 
exceeded the expectations of those minds that gathered 50 years ago to 
conceive it. It is the most significant military alliance in the 
history of mankind, and it has to continue to be for the future.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their patience in allowing 
me to deliver these remarks, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in morning business.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I believe under the special order, the 
conference report on the Ed-Flex bill should be brought forward at this 
time.

                          ____________________