[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 55 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3981-S3984]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as we approach the 50th anniversary Summit
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of NATO this weekend, I rise today to share with my colleagues my
concerns about a key document that will be considered at this summit.
It is entitled ``Strategic Concept for NATO.''
Mr. President, I have been privileged to be in the Senate 21 years.
Throughout those years of time, there has often been a need to speak on
behalf of NATO in this Senate. I say humbly and most respectfully that
I have been at the forefront of Senate support for NATO. I can remember
the early years of my time in the Senate. There was Member after Member
that assaulted the need for the United States to remain in NATO.
``Let's cut back. Let's save the money. Let's bring our men and women
home. We have done our job.'' I was among that group that had the long-
range vision for NATO. It must remain. It must be strong, and U.S.
leadership in NATO is absolutely essential.
So the remarks that I contribute today, here on the floor, are the
result of a series of consultations I have had with the administration,
and I hope will be taken in a constructive light and not as an
expression in any way of criticism of this great organization, NATO.
With that in mind, I wrote to the President of the United States on
April 7 to urge him to initiate, among the other 18 nations and the
heads of state and government of NATO, the thought that at this 50th
summit we should not try and write the final draft of the ``Strategic
Concept.'' I repeat, ``the final draft.'' Certainly at this important
gathering, a draft should be considered. Maybe several drafts should be
considered, but we should not etch in stone the final draft of the
``Strategic Concept.'' That document spells out the future strategy and
mission of the alliance. It states the parameters by which the alliance
decides whether it should or should not send forward military units to
engage in operations, possibly combat operations.
Why do I take this position? Because the old ``Strategic Concept,''
enacted in 1991, was largely oriented towards the Soviet Union and the
threats from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. So obviously it is
time to change it. But it can remain in effect for an additional, brief
period of perhaps 6 months so that we can evaluate the lessons learned
from the Kosovo operation.
Periodically in the 50-year history of NATO, NATO has changed its
mission statement, or ``Strategic Concept.'' But that can remain in
effect for 8, 9 sometimes 10 years.
So this document to be revised at this summit could well control NATO
operations for the next decade.
I do not see the urgency to put it, as I say, in stone at this time.
The urgency is to consider it, to put out a draft, and let the nations
of NATO and their respective legislators and the Congress of the United
States consider those drafts and consider them--this is the key reason
that I rise--``consider'' them in the light of the lessons learned in
Kosovo.
This 50th anniversary Summit is taking place against the background
of perhaps the most serious conflict we have seen on the European
continent--indeed, the most serious, in my judgment, since the
conclusion of World War II. It is the first actual combat of a great
magnitude in which NATO has been involved.
We are operating on what is known as the ``consensus'' of the 19
nations--any one of which has a veto power--directing the military
operations, which are under the command of General Clark, the Supreme
Allied Commander.
I am not here to in any way criticize these operations. But I will
simply say, Mr. President, that there will be many, many lessons
learned at such time as this operation--and the sooner the better--is
concluded with NATO having succeeded in reaching the objectives that
have been made very clear by the NATO alliance and addressed many times
by our President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Chancellor
of Germany, and others.
Mr. President, the alliance must have time to evaluate the lessons
learned from the Kosovo operations before, again I say, setting in
stone for possibly the next decade documents which will guide future
NATO military operations.
While everyone recognizes the ``Strategic Concept'' of 1991 must be
updated, it has not impeded the current Kosovo operation. Indeed, this
operation is going forward with that ``Strategic Concept'' still in
place. So it could stay in place another 6 months.
That is the only period of time I am asking for--an additional 6
months before the ``Strategic Concept'' is finalized. A short delay has
advantages, if for no other reason than to show respect for the
Congress of the United States and the people of this country will have
their own evaluation of how well the Kosovo operation went, what was
done right and what could have been improved.
The Secretary of Defense, when he was before the Armed Services
Committee last week, said in response to questioning, ``We are guided
by the consensus of the alliance.'' We need all 19 voices to say yes.
And then he made a very important addition, ``Had we been there alone
or with a coalition similar to what we had in 1991 in the Persian Gulf
we might have done it another way.''
This is a lesson learned. We should not be allowed to deny to the
Congress and to other legislatures the opportunity to study lessons
learned and to make our contribution as a member nation to the future
``Strategic Concept for NATO.''
As I speak today, the draft of the ``Strategic Concept'' continues to
be reworked, during this very hour, by the staffs of the 19 nations
before it will be submitted to the NATO heads of state this weekend at
the summit. There are press reports today that key elements of the
``Strategic Concept'' might not be completed by the summit--due to be
continued--because of disagreement among the allies. The key element
there is the relationship between NATO and the United Nations--a very,
very important relationship. At no time should the United Nations have
a veto over a decision by the NATO powers to use force. That is this
Senator's view.
My main concern is, to what extent does the draft ``Strategic
Concept'' reflect the views expressed in a May 15, 1998, speech in
Berlin that President Clinton made? I am addressing the draft being
reworked against a background of a statement by the President of the
United States a year ago. President Clinton stated:
Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct
military invasion. Tomorrow's Alliance must continue to
defend enlarged borders and defend against the threats to our
security from beyond them [meaning borders]--the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, regional
conflict.
That thought expresses a desire to broaden and go beyond the 1991
concept. Is that being worked in this final draft? I know not;
collectively, we in this Chamber do not know.
Other administration officials, most notably the Secretary of State,
Ms. Albright, have been outspoken in the belief that the revised
``Strategic Concept'' should place increased emphasis on NATO's future
role in non-Article 5--she said ``out of area''--threats to our
``common interests,'' threats such as Kosovo. The definition of these
common interests and the various military missions NATO is prepared to
undertake in defense of these interests will establish the foundation
for NATO military operations, possibly for the next decade.
Against the backdrop of the uncertainties in Kosovo, NATO should
pause, in this Senator's judgment--I repeat, take a breath, a long deep
breath and pause--before rendering judgment on these important issues.
Let us review, over the next 6 months, the lessons learned as a
consequence of the Kosovo operation.
Unfortunately, the NATO summit will take place against the background
of continuing, unfolding events relating to Kosovo which we cannot
predict at this moment. The United States and our allies may have many
lessons to be learned from Kosovo to assess as we look to NATO's future
for the next decade and its military missions. That assessment must be
a pivotal part of any new strategic concept. NATO is simply too
important to the United States, to our allies in Europe, and indeed to
those nations who seek admission to NATO. NATO is essential for the
future of the European continent and our relationships with that
continent.
We are just beginning to learn important lessons now in the Kosovo
situation. For example, it is obvious to all that the U.S. military is
the primary source of attack aircraft. We are flying 60 percent of the
missions of the high-
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performance aircraft. Most of the ordnance being used is high-tech,
precision-guided ordnance, an arsenal of which the United States
possesses in far greater numbers than the other nations of NATO. They
simply do not have in their military inventories this equipment.
I add to that, the airlift; that is, the cargo planes that must put
in place the necessary resupply, the necessary equipment; for example,
the helicopters, the Apaches which are moving in at this very moment,
to be positioned in Albania for future use in the Kosovo operation. The
other nations simply do not have that airlift. They do not have the
tanker aircraft. Airplanes going into Kosovo now take off from Italy or
other places. They move in, they have to get refueled in most instances
before the strikes, they are refueled coming out of the strikes, and
indeed refueled over the area so they can remain over the target area.
It is the U.S. tanker aircraft that are carrying on the greater
proportion of that essential part of this mission. The other nations of
NATO do not have in their inventories that equipment.
Until other nations do acquire or at least have in place firm
contractual commitments to acquire such equipment, the United States
will likely be the only source of that equipment for any future
operation other than Kosovo. It is our taxpayers, it is our men and
women of the Armed Forces, who support and maintain this equipment. As
we write the future concept for operations in NATO, we have to
recognize that much of the equipment for modern warfare is possessed by
the United States. Are we ready to sign that in stone now, recognizing
particularly that the new nations do not have that equipment? A lesson
to be learned, a lesson to be thought through very carefully.
The American people will soon be asked to support an emergency
supplemental budget request to pay for the costs of the Kosovo
operation. Are Americans ready to sign up to a new strategic concept
that could well commit the U.S. military to other such operations
requiring the same type of weaponry?
There are other lessons to be learned. It is now becoming apparent
that our military planners are being subjected to many levels of
review--this is a consensus military operation by 19 nations--for it is
a fact that NATO can only operate by consensus; 19 nations must agree
before a military action can be taken. A single nation can stop the
planners--indeed, even stop the operation.
The result can be a military planning operation of the ``lowest
common denominator.'' Are we now making military decisions not on the
basis of the professional military judgment or on the basis of what
will be most effectively done to achieve our objectives on the
battlefield but, rather, on what agreement we can get among the 19
nations to carry out the recommendations of the professional military?
These are issues which are to be examined as lessons learned in the
future of Kosovo.
On April 7 I wrote the President a letter expressing the various
concerns that I have related here on the floor. The President responded
to my letter, on April 14, indicating his position that, ``the right
course is to proceed with a revised `Strategic Concept' '' at this
conference, and sign it into stone.
Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the
exchange of letters; my letter sent to the President and his response.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, April 7, 1999.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: The Administration, in consultation
with our NATO allies, is now finalizing various documents to
be submitted to the Heads of State for ratification at the
upcoming 50th anniversary NATO Summit to be held in
Washington later this month. A key decision, in my view the
most important one, is the revision of the Strategic Concept
for the future--perhaps a decade--that will guide NATO in its
decision making process regarding the deployment of military
forces.
I am recommending, Mr. President, that a draft form of this
document be reviewed by the principals, but not finalized, at
this 50th anniversary Summit. Given the events in Kosovo, a
new Strategic Concept for NATO--the document that spells out
the future strategy and mission of the Alliance--should not
be written ``in stone'' at this time. Instead, NATO leaders
should issue a draft Strategic Concept at the Summit, which
would be subject to further comment and study for a period of
approximately six months. Thereafter, a final document should
be adopted.
NATO is by far the most successful military alliance in
contemporary history. It was the deciding factor in avoiding
widespread conflict in Europe throughout the Cold War.
Subsequent to that tense period of history, NATO was, again,
the deciding factor in bringing about an end to hostilities
in Bosnia, and thereafter providing the security essential to
allow Bosnia to achieve the modest gains we have seen in the
reconstruction of the economic, political and security base
of that nation.
Now NATO is engaged in combating the widespread evils of
Milosevic and his Serbian followers in Kosovo.
I visited Kosovo and Macedonia last September and witnessed
Milosevic's repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Thereafter,
I spoke in the Senate on the essential need for a stabilizing
military force in Kosovo to allow the various international
humanitarian organizations to assist the people of Kosovo--
many then refugees in their own land, forced into the hills
and mountains by brutal Serb attacks. Since then, I have
consistently been supportive of NATO military action against
Milosevic.
Unfortunately, it is now likely that the NATO Summit will
take place against the background of continuing, unfolding
events relating to Kosovo. At this time, no predictions can
be made as to a resolution.
We are just beginning to learn important lessons from the
Kosovo conflict. Each day is a new chapter. For example, NATO
planners and many in the Administration, and in Congress,
have long been aware of the disparities in military
capabilities and equipment between the United States and our
allies. Now, the military operation against Yugoslavia has
made the American people equally aware and concerned about
these disparities. The U.S. has been providing the greatest
proportion of attack aircraft capable of delivering
precision-guided munitions. Further, the United States is
providing the preponderance of airlift to deliver both
military assets (such as the critically needed Apache
helicopters and support equipment) and humanitarian relief
supplies, the delivery of which are now in competition with
each other.
Until other NATO nations acquire, or at least have in place
firm commitments to acquire, comparable military
capabilities, the United States will continually be called on
to carry the greatest share of the military responsibilities
for such ``out of area'' operations in the future. This issue
must be addressed, and the Congress consulted and the
American people informed.
It is my understanding that the draft Strategic Concept
currently under consideration by NATO specifically addresses
NATO strategy for non-Article 5, ``out of area'' threats to
our common interests--threats such as Bosnia and Kosovo.
According to Secretary Albright in a December 8, 1998
statement to the North Atlantic Council, ``The new Strategic
Concept must find the right balance between affirming the
centrality of Article V collective defense missions and
ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are
intimately related to the broader defense of our common
interests.'' Is this the type of broad commitment to be
accepted in final form, just weeks away at the 50th
anniversary Summit?
During the Senate's debate on the Resolution of
Ratification regarding NATO expansion, the Senate addressed
this issue by adopting a very important amendment put forth
by Senator Kyl. But this was before the events in Kosovo. The
lessons of Kosovo could even change this position.
The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view
that a ``final'' decision by NATO on the Strategic concept
should not be taken--risked--against the uncertainties
emanating from the Kosovo situation.
The U.S. and our allies will have many ``lessons learned''
to assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept.
Bosnia and Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into
aggressive military operations. As of this writing, the
Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect of the few
gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation must be
carefully assessed and evaluated before the U.S. and our
allies sign on a new Strategic Concept for the next decade of
NATO.
A brief period for study and reflection by ourselves as
well as our Allies would be prudent. NATO is too vital for
the future of Europe and American leadership.
With kind regards, I am
Respectfully,
John Warner,
Chairman.
____
The White House,
Washington, DC, April 14, 1999.
Hon. John W. Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your thoughtful letter on
the upcoming NATO summit and the revised Strategic Concept. I
appreciate your attention to these important issues, and I
agree strongly with your view that NATO's continued vitality
is essential to safeguarding American and European security.
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I have thought carefully about your proposal to delay
agreement on the revised Strategic Concept in light of NATO's
military operations in Kosovo. While I share your deep
concern about the situation in Kosovo and the devastating
effects of Serb atrocities, I am convinced that the right
course is to proceed with a revised Strategic Concept that
will make NATO even more effective in addressing regional and
ethnic conflict of this very sort. Our operations in Kosovo
have demonstrated the crucial importance of NATO being
prepared for the full spectrum of military operations--a
preparedness the revised Strategic Concept will help ensure.
The Strategic Concept will reaffirm NATO's core mission of
collective defense, while also making the adaptations needed
to deal with threats such as the regional conflicts we have
seen in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the evolving risks posed
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will
also help ensure greater interoperability among allied forces
and an increased European contribution to our shared
security. The Strategic Concept will not contain new
commitments or obligations for the United States but rather
will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1949
North Atlantic Treaty. It will also recognize the need for
adapted capabilities in the face of changed circumstances.
This approach is fully consistent with the Kyl Amendment,
which called for a strong reaffirmation of collective defense
as well as a recognition of new security challenges.
The upcoming summit offers a historic opportunity to
strengthen the NATO Alliance and ensure that it remains as
effective in the future as it has been over the past fifty
years. While the situation in Kosovo has presented difficult
challenges, I am confident that NATO resolve in the face of
this tyranny will bring a successful conclusion.
Your support for the NATO Alliance and for our policy in
Kosovo has been indispensable. I look forward to working
closely with you in the coming days to ensure that the summit
is an overwhelming success.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I address the Senate today because I have
done my very best as one Senator to bring this to the attention of our
President, and hopefully, through this floor speech, to the attention
of the other heads of state and government who will come to Washington.
Again, I continue to urge my plea not to put this ``Strategic Concept''
in final form in this forthcoming Summit. I encourage my colleagues who
may share my views on this critical issue to likewise speak out before
it is too late, in an effort to prevent a rush to judgment on NATO's
future. NATO is simply too important to our national security to do any
less.
On a related issue, I am distressed to hear statements by my
colleagues, and some in the administration, which tie NATO's future to
a successful--I repeat successful--outcome in Kosovo. I personally
support the objectives that have been stated time and time again by the
NATO ministers, and indeed our President, our Secretaries of State and
Defense. We all know we have to create a situation so the refugees can
be returned. We know we have to have in place a military force, the
composition of which I think should be flexible. It does not have to be
all United States--absolutely not. Maybe other nations not in NATO will
join. We need flexibility there to allow these people to return in a
secure environment and to have a measure of self-government, of
autonomy. They deserve no less. Those are the basics.
But to say unless everything we lay down today has succeeded, we have
success and we have victory, and if we do not achieve it, it is the end
of NATO--I urge my colleagues not to make such a statement. NATO must
go on. NATO must go on and survive the Kosovo operation. It is the
responsibility of those of us here in the Senate, of the President of
the United States, and the other heads of state and government to make
certain that is achieved, because we know not at this moment what the
outcome will be in Kosovo. Yes, we have to achieve the basic goals, but
in my humble judgment, diplomacy will reenter at some point. So I
suggest we pledge ourselves to the future of NATO and be more cautious
in our statements.
Kosovo-like operations are not NATO's reason for being. They are
``out-of-area'' operations that NATO does if it can. We should not be
making pronouncements on NATO's future based on the outcome of these
``out-of-area'' operations.
This alliance has withstood the test of time for 50 years. It has
exceeded the expectations of those minds that gathered 50 years ago to
conceive it. It is the most significant military alliance in the
history of mankind, and it has to continue to be for the future.
Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their patience in allowing
me to deliver these remarks, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in morning business.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I believe under the special order, the
conference report on the Ed-Flex bill should be brought forward at this
time.
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