[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 55 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2264-H2268]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COMMEMORATION OF THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bass). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman)
is recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I know I am the last Speaker before the
staff goes home, and they will be gratified to know that I will use
roughly half the allotted time. Even with half the allotted time, 30
minutes is quite long, perhaps too long to devote to a single subject,
and that is why I wish to give, in effect, three separate speeches.
The first speech I would like to give is in commemoration of the
remembrance of the Armenian Genocide. April 24 is the day when
Armenians and those of good conscience around the world remember the
genocide that took place at the beginning of this century. Because it
was on April 24 that 200 Armenian religious, political, intellectual
leaders were rounded up in Constantinople, taken into the interior and
executed.
This was a seminal day in a pattern of oppression that began in the
1890s, and at a level of oppression which between 1915 and 1923 caused
the death of 1.5 million Armenians in mass executions in forced
marches, through disease, and through starvation, thus eliminating
virtually the entire Armenian population of Anatolia and Western
Armenia.
There were many contemporaries who were there to see this first
genocide. Perhaps no one speaks with the authority of our own
ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Ambassador Henry Morgantheau. I will
probably mispronounce our ambassador's name, so I will simply refer to
him as our ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. He recounts in his
statement, ``When the Turkish authorities gave orders for these
deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole
race. They understood this well, and in their conversations with me
made no particular attempt to conceal this fact.''
In the poignant passage in his book, Black Dog of Faith, Peter
Balakian relates the story of a genocide survivor. After seeing the
massacre of Armenians in her own village, her father beheaded and
crucified on the door of their home on one morning, the Armenian woman
was forced to dance in the village square while being brutalized and
set on fire, as their children clapped, and other images too horrific
to describe. The death march and the Euphrates so filled with blood and
corpses that no reasonable person could see it and not be sick.
The first genocide of this century laid the foundation for the
Holocaust, the largest genocide and the most horrific of this or any
century. It was interesting that our ambassador to the Ottoman Empire
happened to be an American Jew who was told by Turkish authorities,
``These people, these Armenians, are Christians. Since you are a Jew,
why don't you let us do with the Christians as we please?''
Well, whether it is in Anatolia or in Europe or anywhere in the
world, we cannot countenance genocide simply by saying the victims are
not of our religion or ethnic group. No wonder 30 years later Adolf
Hitler uttered his infamous statement about the Armenian Genocide.
Eight days before the invasion of Poland, which would place 3 million
Jews under his control and which allowed Hitler to send them to their
deaths, he told those in his inner circle who thought that the world
might question this policy, ``Who today remembers the extermination of
the Armenians?'' Clearly, the impunity that the Turkish government felt
that they had in annihilating the Armenians emboldened Hitler before
the worst of the Holocaust.
{time} 1800
And that is why those of us of Jewish faith, Armenians, and everyone
of good conscience must say, ``never again.''
The last act of a genocide is genocide denial. Because those who have
committed it wish to blot out even the memory of those who they have
killed. And it is, in fact, unfortunate that the Turkish Government
continues its genocide denial, a genocide denial that is not just
passive, not just intransigent, but takes the form of trying to erase
from the history books of others that which happened at the beginning
of this century.
Today I was honored to meet with the new chancellor of UCLA, my alma
mater. And I am proud of UCLA. I was a Bruin when Walton was on the
basketball court. And I was proud to meet our new chancellor, who
described what is happening at UCLA. But the proudest day for UCLA was
when it rejected a gift of over a million dollars from the Turkish
Government, rejected a gift of over a million dollars.
It is not in the nature of universities to reject gifts, but this
gift came with strings attached. It was to fund a chair in Ottoman
history with various strings and provisos that virtually ensured that
the Turkish Government would control who sat in that chair. It would
not have been a chair for legitimate inquiry into historical facts but
rather a chair in genocide denial. And UCLA stood firm and rejected
that gift and said that the academic integrity of my alma mater and the
academic integrity of all American universities is not for sale.
It is time for the American State Department to show this same level
of courage and determination. It is time for the State Department and
the U.S. executive branch of Government not just to remember the day
April 24 but to use the word that describes what that day remembers.
The word is ``genocide.'' And it is time for the State Department to
recognize what happened.
Clearly, at a time when the State Department is trying to rally our
support to prevent mass murders in the Balkans, they should be honest
as to what happened in Anatolia some 80-plus years ago.
Plan Needed to Provide Directional Signs at U.S. Capitol Complex
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would now like to address a completely
different subject and one that is not nearly so grave.
I had a chance to meet with the Architect of the United States
Capitol, the man who keeps the facilities here running, to talk to him
about some of the ways we could make this institution work better as a
physical plant.
Mr. Speaker, we get four to five million tourists every year. Now,
that does not cause us to rival Disneyland, although there are those
who assert that the U.S. Congress rivals Disneyland in other respects,
but it is indeed a large number of people to accommodate. And yet, I
will just illustrate the problem with a story that happened last year.
Some constituents of mine came and visited the gallery, right up
there. And
[[Page H2265]]
after watching their fill of Congressional pontificating, they decided
to walk back to my office in the Longworth building through the
tunnels. For it was winter and the tunnels were warm. And, as everyone
knows, there are a network of tunnels that connect the Capitol with the
House office buildings. Well, they walked down into the tunnels and
they have not been heard from since. For that labyrinth, that maze,
lacks almost any sign to tell them where they are going.
Now, as a serious matter, the absence of signage so far has not been
responsible for somebody being lost to the point where they were never
heard from again, but it does imperil the efficiency not only of this
House's business, the efficiency of those who come here to persuade us
on various issues, but it also impairs the efficiency of the Capitol
Police that are here to protect us. And last year the importance of
that protection was illustrated.
If we talk to any Capitol policeman or Capitol police woman, if we
talk to them for a while and ask them to let down their guard a little
bit, they will tell us they spend less than a third but close to a
third of their time giving directions.
Well, that is not surprising. There are four to five million tourists
here each year not to mention a few freshmen and sophomore Members of
Congress who ourselves do not always know the best way to get from one
place to another. We need a plan to provide signs throughout the
Capitol complex.
I am happy to report to the House that the architect has already
signed a consulting contract, half of that contract is completed, for a
plan to put signs virtually everywhere, literally thousands of new
directional signs so that people who visit us will know where they are
and how to get to where they are going.
I was told once, if we want to influence what happens in Washington,
we need to hire an expensive lobbyist who knows his way around the
Capitol. I thought that meant understanding parliamentary procedure.
But parliamentary procedure is simple compared to the labyrinth of
tunnels underneath this building, and knowing our way around Washington
may very well mean simply knowing how to get from one building to the
other.
Thousands of directional signs throughout the buildings and tunnels
will make it easier for people to do business whether they are here for
a day or whether they are just coming to Congress as freshmen or new
staffers. I will simply point out that the way they test the
intelligence of rodents is they put them in a maze of tunnels and see
how quickly they can figure out their way around.
I personally am not going to go one-on-one against the more
intelligence white rats because, if my own experience in the tunnels is
any indication, I am not certain that I would prevail. We need these
directional signs.
And I am also happy to report to those who protect the entrance at
the southeast corner of the Longworth building that I have the
assurance of the Architect that a new series of signs will be put up
there very soon so that they can do their job instead of telling people
that they are in the Longworth Building and where the Rayburn Building
is and where the Cannon Building is.
There is one other step that we could take. It has been analyzed by
the consultants. I believe the consultants have not embraced it, but it
deserves some additional attention. And that is the idea of putting
colored striping not in the beautiful buildings but in the I will use
the term ``ugly'' tunnels that are underneath this building.
I think my colleagues are well aware that those tunnels are not in
any way aesthetic. They have open pipes and dangling wires, and
certainly colored stripes on the ground would do nothing to decrease
their aesthetic appeal. But those colored lines could direct people
from one building to the other effectively and direct them to the
Capitol building effectively.
There is perhaps a plan to make those tunnels a little bit more
aesthetically consistent with the rest of the Capitol; and if that is
the case, I would well understand why colored lines on the ground are
inconsistent with that. But if the tunnels are going to remain the
functional-only tunnels that they are today, then nothing should be
ruled out as far as making them more usable and providing some
direction to those who use them.
A second issue I would like to raise would perhaps make it easier on
Americans by not requiring them to even come to Washington at all,
although it is beautiful and I urge Americans to come here to see their
Government in action, and that is an idea that has been used in the
California capitol in Sacramento for over 20 years.
Each of the hearing rooms for each of the committees here in Congress
has a microphone system and anywhere in that room we can hear whoever
is speaking, and that means their voice is going through a wire to the
loudspeakers. But, unfortunately, that wire only goes to loudspeakers
in that hearing room.
As has been remarked on many occasions, Congress in committee is
Congress at work. What goes on in committee is every bit as important
as what goes on on this floor. And if my speech lasts as long as it
might, perhaps many would argue that what goes on in committee is far
more interesting than what is going on on the floor.
But, in any case, what goes on in committee, whether it is a
subcommittee or full committee, is of critical importance. And yet in
Sacramento, if we are anywhere in the capitol complex, they have at
their desk a box and they can simply turn a 1970s technology dial on
that box and listen through a speaker to what is happening in committee
hearing room number 1 or number 2 or number 15 or number 22, so that
every legislative assistant in Sacramento can hear what is going on in
their Ways and Means Committee while at the same time being able to
prepare their member for what is going to go on in their Appropriations
Committee.
Just as C-SPAN plays what is going on on the House floor, which is of
occasional interest to the legislative assistants, they could instead
listen to what is going on in an appropriations subcommittee of direct
relevance to the district that their Member represents.
So I think that we can also rig up a system at virtually minimal cost
so that each of us in each office here in the Capitol could listen on a
box to what is going on in the committee hearing room of our choice,
listening perhaps on one hour to what is going on in the International
Relations hearing room and then turning a dial to listen to what is
going on in Ways and Means.
But we do not have to stop at 1970s technology. We could work our way
up to 1980s technology. We could take those same 20 or 30 audio choices
and put them on an 800 number. Or if we wanted to be cheap, we could
put them on a 900 number. But either way, we can allow people all over
the country to dial in and hear what is going on in this or that
committee of the House of Representatives.
Today there their only alternative is to hire some expensive lobbyist
to come monitor a committee or, alternatively, to fly to Washington so
that they could be there for a committee hearing.
Now, I know that C-SPAN covers what seems to be an interminable
number of committee hearings. But, in fact, only two or three percent
of the committee hearings are carried live and those interested in what
is going on in committee and subcommittee have to be physically in the
room to hear what is going on. We could, through 1980s technology,
provide that to every American everywhere in the country. And I know
there are people who watch this floor on C-SPAN who would prefer to
know what is going on in the committee that is relevant to them.
But we do not even have to stop at 1980s technology. As we approach
the new century, we could even think of 1990s technology. At virtually
no cost, we could put that same audio signal on the Internet and anyone
with a computer and a modem and 10 or 20 bucks to provide their
Internet service provider could listen anywhere in the country to what
is going on in any committee room here in the House of Representatives.
This is the people's House, but the people should not have to fly to
Washington to hear what is going on.
Now, I realize that the system will not be perfect. They will not
necessarily be certain who is speaking when listening on a squawk box
or listening on the Internet. But certainly
[[Page H2266]]
this is an option that we should provide. And those who listen
carefully will hear who the chairman or chair woman of a committee has
recognized and will be able to remember who is speaking.
Mr. Speaker, I would now like to give my third speech. And while I
said that I would use only half of the allotted hour, I fear that I may
use perhaps two-thirds of it. And I apologize to those staff members
who are extremely anxious to leave.
{time} 1815
The Conflict in the Balkans
But the third issue that I would like to address is the one that is
on all of our minds, and that is the conflict in the Balkans, and I
have a few basic observations before I would like to give a more
organized and cogent presentation.
The first observation is that we are about to play host to the NATO
ministers. They are coming here to celebrate 50 years of NATO, but I
fear that what they are here to celebrate is 50 years of us spending on
our defense budget enough money to protect them and the peace of their
continent while Europe fails to spend enough on its own defense.
Now when NATO was born 50 years ago, the European economies were in
shambles, and the concept of burden sharing was perhaps not applicable.
But today, as the alliance engages in military affairs in the Balkans,
the most that can be said is the Europeans are helping us.
Europe is the richest continent on the planet. Its gross domestic
product exceeds that of the United States. We are told that the reason
we are focusing on Kosovo is that this is destabilizing to the most
powerful continent on the planet, Europe, and yet somehow the most this
great colossus can provide is some assistance while a North American
country is required to do the work. And we are even told that we should
be grateful that they are assisting our efforts to protect their
continent.
Now is not the time for restructuring the military relationships, but
clearly the time has come to end American acquiescence as the Europeans
slash their own defense budgets far below what they proved they could
afford during the 1980's. If there is a peace dividend, it should be
paid to the American taxpayers who bore the lion's share of the
economic burden of winning the Cold War. It should not be reaped by a
European continent which demanded through its own inaction American
protection.
If we look at what is happening in the Balkans, we see that America
is now required to mobilize its reserves. Certainly all of the European
air forces should have mobilized all of their reserves before Europe
asked us or NATO asked us to mobilize ours, and the importance of
stopping the mass murder in the Balkans may exceed these concerns for
now. But 6 months from now, a year from now, we must make it clear to
the Europeans that dialing 911 and reaching the Pentagon is not a
substitute for spending their own money for their own defense forces.
The second observation I would like to make is that the vilification
of Slobodan Milosevic is justified but may impede our efforts because I
do not think, and I will get to this later, that we can be certain of
such total battlefield dominance that we can just send a telegram or a
fax to Belgrade instructing them what to do. Instead, I suspect that we
will have to negotiate a compromise or a settlement with Mr. Milosevic,
and while he is a mass murderer, the people of this country must be
aware that Saddam Hussein is an even worse mass murderer and we had to
negotiate with Saddam, and the government in Beijing has killed
millions of Chinese, and we just welcomed their prime minister.
Why must America do this? Why does America do this? Why do we deal
with mass murderers? Why must we deal with Milosevic?
I would put forward that if we want to hide from the truth, we could
try to convince ourselves that Milosevic is the only malignancy on this
planet and that everywhere else governments are free, people are safe,
yet nothing could be further from the truth. Half of the people of this
world are ruled by governments that have committed mass murder, and as
long as the world is as it is rather than as we would like to pretend
it is, like to deceive our children and even our voting age citizens
into believing it is, as long as half the world is governed by
governments guilty of mass murder, we will have to deal with those
governments.
Third, I would like to observe an unfortunate tendency in the
rhetoric surrounding Kosovo, both rhetoric of our own State Department
and rhetoric in London and in other European capitals. That rhetoric is
to increase the objectives that we demand that we reach in Kosovo while
at the same time, frankly, our military campaign is not working out as
we planned. To increase the objective while not achieving any of your
objectives on the battlefield, or any of your major objectives, is
folly and sets us up for defeat. We must instead recognize that we did
not begin these hostilities for the purpose of sending American troops
into Belgrade with an arrest warrant for Slobodan Milosevic and the
British did not begin their effort alongside us for that purpose
either, and while those who are watching action thrillers out of
Hollywood may believe that you can land one Jean Claude Van Dam and
maybe a Schwartzenegger or two, and rush into the Presidential Palace
in Belgrade, extract Milosevic and fly him to the Hague for trial, in
fact the overthrow of Milosevic is probably not going to occur, and to
enter Belgrade means either you enter us with a small force, which
would probably be completely extinguished, and I will point to our lack
of success in sending a small force into Tehran to rescue our hostages.
Perhaps we should thank God that that force never actually reached
Tehran because I am not sure that it would have been successful had it
reached that city. In fact, it was not successful in even reaching the
capital of Iran.
So, sending in a small force risks the annihilation of that force.
Sending into Belgrade, that means all the way through Serbia, a force
capable of exercising dominion over that city would probably involve a
military campaign involving thousands and thousands of American
casualties. So while it is glorious to beat our chests and to say that
the world must rid itself of Milosevic, and perhaps some day that will
come, to make that an objective of our current campaign is to doom that
campaign to failure and perhaps to ensnarl us in a ground campaign that
would have very high casualties.
I do want to point out that our actions in Kosovo are motivated by
the highest level of idealism, that we are willing to spend our
treasure and, more importantly, to risk the lives of our men and women
to prevent atrocities and to assure the Albanian Kosovars of a chance
to live in peace, security and autonomy. Perhaps there is no more moral
statement that can be made about America than that we are willing to do
that. But in any such great idealistic undertaking there is a risk that
the idealism that motivates the action will cloud your judgment and
have idealism cloud the effort to develop a realistic strategy. Realism
requires us to remember some unpleasant facts.
The first of these is that Kosovo is not the only place of mass
murder, of tragedy and atrocity. It is not a place where we can spend
our entire willingness to work for humanitarian ideals, because in fact
there are other victims of mass murder, perhaps also that would be just
as just for us to try to help as the Kosovars.
I will point out that 800,000 members of the Tutsi tribe were killed
in Rwanda, but that is pretty much passed, but today there is massive
tragedy, death and atrocity in the Congo, in Myanmar, in East Timor,
and especially in southern Sudan where 2 million people have been
killed, and the killing goes on every year.
There are those that say we cannot stand by and watch atrocities in
the Balkans. We should not watch, but we have demonstrated our capacity
to watch atrocity because for 10 years we have ignored the atrocities
in southern Sudan where 2 million people have been killed and where
America has done almost nothing to help them.
I would hope that our actions in Kosovo are so successful that we are
emboldened to provide some limited level of assistance, and I am not
proposing sending American Armed Forces, but some limited level of
assistance to those in southern Sudan who are trying to protect their
lives
[[Page H2267]]
from a government more guilty of mass murder than the government in
Belgrade.
A second fact that we are perhaps unwilling or at least reluctant to
recognize is that our goal creating a multi-ethnic, autonomous Kosovo,
multiethnic and harmonious may be beyond reach. Realistically it is
unlikely that Albanians and Serbs will live in Kosovo in harmony and
peace in the absence of an outside force. We should remember that it is
not just the Serbs who have committed massive atrocities, but the KLA
that has committed atrocities on a smaller scale as they have killed
Serb civilians, and we may have to settle for a Kosovo in which part is
inhabited by Albanians, the lion's share, and part is inhabited by
Serbs. The goal of them living side by side is a noble and idealistic
goal, but one that a realist might say cannot be achieved any time
soon.
Finally, or another important fact to point out, one that we are
clouded in our judgment for not realizing, is that this is not a battle
between pure good and pure evil. Yes, in an idealistic melodrama there
is pure good and pure evil, yet that is not the case here. I have
already mentioned that the KLA has engaged in atrocities to try to
expel Serbs from Kosovo, far smaller in number, far less heinous a
policy, but murder is murder, and the KLA, who are fighting more or
less on our side, fighting for the Kosovars, is an organization with
some ties to Iran, an organization that Osama Bin Laden has tried to
assist and we are not certain of whether those entreaties and offers of
assistance have been honored and an organization with ties to drug
dealers. Until a few months ago, the official policy of our State
Department was to call the KLA a terrorist organization.
Likewise, the Serbs are not just victimizers, but also victims.
180,000 Serbs were ethnically cleansed from Croatia just a few years
ago, forced at the point of bayonet and gun to leave homes they had
lived in for centuries.
{time} 1830
I would point out that during that ethnic cleansing, where Serbs were
the victims, America did almost nothing.
It is true, while there were a few murders they did not reach the
level of mass murder that has been achieved in Kosovo, but still some
murders and 180,000 to 200,000 people ethnically cleansed, this was an
atrocity. Yet at the time, the Croatians who were committing this
atrocity were our allies with regard to bringing the Bosnian conflict
to a conclusion so America said virtually nothing and did absolutely
nothing.
Finally, blind idealism would say that we should be increasing our
objectives to reach pure justice for our cause, and I have mentioned
this earlier, adding on to our objectives the idea that not only Kosovo
but all of it would be liberated and under total NATO domination but
that Milosevic would be taken prisoner, et cetera, et cetera. In fact,
given the situation, militarily it would be wise for the United States
to define a more realistic objective.
We should not give up on the idea that the Albanian Kosovars need a
place to live in Kosovo where they are safe and where they can succeed
with our aid in building a prosperous homeland, but this does not
necessarily need to be 100 percent of Kosovo in multiethnic harmony,
which is our stated objective.
Let me talk for a moment about some of the strategies that we should
at least explore to go along with those that we are using. Today I had
the opportunity in hearings to hear from and question our Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright.
Mr. Speaker, if anyone saw me running into this hall it was so that I
could make it here on time because we had a meeting, with several of my
colleagues, with Sandy Berger, who is the President's national security
advisor.
The administration remains welded to its existing policies. They are
optimistic that continued bombing will lead to a collapse of the
Milosevic capacity to resist. If they are right, we will find out
because nothing this Congress does, nothing the people of this country
do, will prevent a continued bombing campaign for at least several
weeks, perhaps a month, before there is even the possibility that
anyone other than the administration would cause in any way a change in
policy.
If during those weeks there are not signs and far greater signs than
we have seen so far of success, we do need to look at other strategies.
One of those strategies is being embraced by the administration but
only to a limited extent, and that is to involve Russia in the
peacemaking process. Russia is critical because Russia can persuade the
Milosevic government to do things and to make concessions they would
not make on their own. Russia is important because they can provide a
fig leaf or political cover so that Milosevic can make any concessions
that he decides are in his interest to make but he needs a political
excuse to make.
Finally, Russia is important to the Balkans because Russia could
provide an essential part of the peacekeeping force, and I will get to
some of the possibilities for a makeup of a peacekeeping force later.
Involving Russia in the Balkans may be more important than anything
that is happening in the Balkans.
Ten years from now Kosovo may be somewhat forgotten but Russia will
remain a critical nuclear arms state, and if we do not treat Russia
with respect now the Russian people and the Russian leadership will
remember that in the future.
By way of historical footnote, I should mention that 85 years ago
Russia mobilized its Army in support of Serbia, and that led directly
to World War I. It is not surprising that the Russians, mindful of
their own history, mindful of the sacrifices of World War I, believe
that they have a definite stake in what happens to Serbia.
So we can and should involve Russia, and if Russia gets the credit
for peace that is two good things. It is peace and it is a Russian
Government that can hold its head high against the ultranationalists in
Moscow and elsewhere.
Second, and this is controversial, we need to signal that we are not
demanding that Rambouillet, that the Rambouillet agreement, apply to
all of Kosovo's territory but, rather, that it apply to only the lion's
share of that territory.
No one doubts that the Serbs, like the Albanian Kosovars, have rights
in Kosovo. The Serbs represent 10 percent of the population, the
Kosovars a little over 80 percent. Kosovo has been part of Serbia for
hundreds of years, and Kosovo is the religious and cultural birthplace
of the Serbian nation. In fact, even the Rambouillet agreement
recognizes Serb rights in Kosovo by stating that Kosovo should remain
part of Serbia.
We should imagine an agreement that does not involve one peacekeeping
force but, rather, two geographically separate peacekeeping forces. One
of those forces should occupy 70, 80 percent of Kosovo and should be
led by NATO. This force will provide the security necessary so that
Albanian refugees feel free to return, and on that 80 percent of the
territory they will build lives more prosperous than the lives they had
before this conflict because they will enjoy not only American aid but,
with a little common sense, we will allocate to them all of the former
Yugoslavia's textile quota and other trade concessions, aid and trade.
This would leave another 20 percent of Kosovo that would be patrolled
exclusively by Russian peacekeepers.
The final status of Kosovo could wait, but in this area Serbia would
feel secure. In this area, the Serb population would feel very secure
and, frankly, in this area I am not certain that refugees would choose
to return. This would allow the Serbs to notice that their friends, the
Russians, were the force occupying the ancient site and origin of the
Serbian orthodox church, the important monastery lands, at least those
that are contiguous, and the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, where the
Serbs fought the Turks in the 14th century.
By letting the Serbs know that there will be no NATO occupation of
this section of Kosovo, we leave them with a reason to bargain.
Otherwise, they lose not one more square inch of territory by losing
this war than they would if they agreed to our bargaining position.
Giving them security in 20 percent of Kosovo gives them a reason to
make concessions other than ending the bombing, and clearly ending the
bombing has not imperiled them to reach a compromise with us so far.
[[Page H2268]]
It is true that the Serbs claim to have monasteries virtually all
over Kosovo, but I am confident that they would regard it as a
compromise rather than a total defeat if they were allowed to see the
Russians, rather than NATO, who is bombing them, occupy the most
important sites, particularly in the far west and the far east of
Kosovo.
Finally, we need to look at other mechanisms to either defeat the
Serbs or perhaps more importantly to let the Serbs know that they may
be defeated. Milosevic, I believe, is convinced that he can continue to
occupy Kosovo because we will never send in ground troops. His tanks
will be there as long as they hide among civilians or dig in so that
they cannot be destroyed by our Apache helicopters. What Apache
helicopter is going to fire at a tank if they put 10 or 20 unwilling
Albanians on top of it? So he can keep his tanks and his heavy armor
and his artillery in Kosovo unless a ground force, with tanks and with
heavy armor and willing to take casualties, can be deployed against
him.
When he sees us training an army of Albanians to use American tanks
and American artillery and American heavy weapons, then he will know
that such an Army may soon be deployed against him. At that point, a
Russian brokered compromise will begin to look far more appealing.
We do not have to let the Albanians take control of these weapons.
They can train on them during the day and American soldiers can retain
them at night. Therefore, we are not even technically violating any of
the rules against providing weapons to any of the residents or citizens
of the former Yugoslavia since we are not giving them any weapons; we
are just giving them training. If at some point in the future we decide
to unleash them, we can give them the custody of those weapons and
heavy armored divisions of Albanians with America's best armored
weapons can move in to Kosovo along with the lightly armed KLA. That is
what it would take to dislodge Milosevic, a ground army with both heavy
weapons and lightly armed mobile soldiers and an army willing to take
casualties.
I want to talk a little bit about the other alternative, and that is
sending in NATO ground troops. One alternative is to send in NATO
ground troops behind an Albanian Army, in support of it. Under those
circumstances, NATO might take only slight casualties, but if instead
NATO has to defeat by itself the Serbian Army deployed in Kosovo, then
NATO will take casualties and then the danger is this: What if those
casualties are too much for Americans to endure? What if those
casualties are too much for the French to endure or the British or the
Germans?
The first NATO nation that cries uncle and demands that its soldiers
be withdrawn or even moved to the rear will cause the other NATO
countries to demand the same level of safety for their soldiers. If all
of the NATO troops need to be put at the rear, then our efforts against
Milosevic will be over. If that happens, then every tyrant and mass
murderer in the world will feel that he can act with impunity. The
Vietnam syndrome and the Somalia syndrome will return.
That is why we need at our disposal not only the KLA, and they are
operating independently and they will get light weapons with or without
us, but also another well-armed Albanian force.
In conclusion, the American people have shown their willingness to
commit their treasure and more importantly the lives of our sons and
daughters to preventing atrocity, ameliorating tragedy. If we
realistically define our objectives and if we prepare to use all of the
tools at our disposal, we may secure a reasonable life for the
Kosovars, and just as important we may inspire the American people to
use limited realistic efforts to try to stop the ongoing atrocities in
Sudan and Myanmar, in the Congo and East Timor and elsewhere.
If instead we fail, if we devote inadequate resources to a pristine,
perfect, no-compromise objective and fail to achieve it, then this is
going to be a tragedy; first for those servicemen and women who die in
an unsuccessful American effort.
{time} 1845
More importantly perhaps even than that, it will be a tragedy for the
Kosovars who will be told that well, we tried, but we did not use all
of the options and we are too idealistic to make compromises, and so
you will live your life here in a refugee camp.
Finally, if we use inadequate resources to try to achieve the
absolute objective, it will be a tragedy for victims of atrocities
around the world, both today and whatever atrocities are committed in
the decades to come, by tyrants who at that time would know that
America had tried in Kosovo unsuccessfully.
It will be a while before the administration is looking for new
alternatives. They are convinced that the current strategy will be
successful, and I hope that whatever comes out, it is good enough so
that the administration can claim that it is a total victory and not a
compromise. But we must begin to look at other alternatives, and if, in
a few weeks, we recognize that the current strategy has not been
successful, we must have the courage to use them.
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