[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 55 (Wednesday, April 21, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H2245-H2246]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   WE MUST EXAMINE THE KOSOVO CRISIS IN LIGHT OF OUR VITAL NATIONAL 
                               INTERESTS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, as we approach the NATO summit in Washington 
this weekend, I would hope that this will be a somber occasion for 
serious reflection about the issues of war and peace that confront us.
  It seems clear that the crisis in Kosovo is nearing a decision point. 
There are reportedly some in the administration and in other NATO 
governments who are contemplating the commitment of ground forces to 
secure Kosovo. Before we consider such a step, and before our country 
even thinks of putting more Americans in harm's way, it is essential 
that we stop, pause for reflection and examine the Kosovo crisis in 
light of our vital national interests, our humanitarian obligations and 
our enduring need for a more peaceful and stable world.
  It would be a grave error to replace no long-term policy, which is 
what I believe the administration has executed thus far, with the wrong 
long-term policy. We need to carefully draw up a strategic road map of 
the Balkans, a road map that gets us as quickly as possible to our 
desired outcome.
  The fundamental question we must answer is whether our military 
intervention in a centuries-old civil war in the Balkans is likely to 
be either resolved on our terms or be successful over the long term. 
Make no mistake about it, this is a centuries-old conflict dating to 
1389. If it could be accomplished, intervention on the ground might be 
worth doing, assuming casualties could be minimized, but I have come to 
the conclusion that military escalation is neither in the national 
interest nor can it achieve a stable long-term peace in the region.
  Those who have called for ground troops have not specified the goal. 
Is it to take Kosovo, fortify it and occupy it for years, perhaps 
decades, against the threat of Serbian guerilla warfare? Or should the 
goal be to conquer all of Serbia, with incalculable consequences to 
wider Balkan stability, our relationship with Russia and our ability to 
respond on short notice to other regional flash points around the 
world?
  Do those who advocate such a course understand that it may take 
months to properly build up such an invasion force? How much more 
misery and devastation will have occurred by then? In this particular 
conflict, does ratcheting up the violence serve our national interests 
or, for that matter, the interests of refugees and innocent civilians?
  Those who say we should pursue victory by any means necessary and at 
all costs fail to answer the question, what would victory be if in the 
process it brought us a bitterly hostile Russia, made even more 
dangerous than the old Soviet Union by the volatile combination of 
loose nukes and a restive military? Do we strengthen our national 
security by potentially undoing all the good work that we have done 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall in getting Russia to be a responsible 
power?
  The issue of the refugees is, of course, a terribly, terribly 
important issue and cannot be dodged by anyone in the debate on Kosovo. 
I am deeply moved by their plight. The United States has a moral 
obligation to get Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo, help 
return the refugees in an orderly manner and generally assist in 
reconstruction.
  Just as surely, we need to help Albania and Macedonia get up on their 
feet economically, but we must ask ourselves whether military 
escalation is the best way to achieve those goals in light of our moral 
reasoning, which teaches us to preserve human life and limit material 
destruction as best we can.
  The problem is now bigger than Kosovo, and America should actively 
encourage the mediation of a settlement before this crisis flashes over 
into a wider conflict. Rambouillet was almost destined to fail because 
it required the acceptance by both parties of a draft document with no 
substantive changes allowed. The administration's absolute requirement 
for a NATO implementation force and the probability of independence for 
Kosovo after 3 years were conditions of Rambouillet that neither 
Yugoslavia or any other sovereign country was likely to accept.
  A realistic mediation needs the efforts of neutral parties to develop 
a flexible framework to get the parties to say yes. To the objection 
that mediation will never work, I say that judgment is overly 
pessimistic. We will never know unless we try. Rather than seeking 
opportunities to escalate the military campaign, we should be seeking 
opportunities for peace. It is strategically wise to involve the 
Russians, not only because of their influence with Serbia but because 
we must tangibly show Boris Yeltsin and other democratic forces in 
Russia that they will be rewarded, not spurned, for their efforts on 
behalf of peace.
  A too rigid rejection of Russian peace overtures, by contrast, would 
simply strengthen extremists in Russia. Other countries such as Sweden 
and the Ukraine should be encouraged to take part, and we must consult 
actively with countries in the region. From Italy and Bulgaria to 
Greece and to Turkey, they will have to live with any settlement in the 
Balkans for decades to come.
  I do not underestimate the difficulties involved, but should 
Milosevic

[[Page H2246]]

balk, we will retain the ability to apply military pressure and 
continue to apply military pressure from the air. Once a settlement is 
reached, an international force may be necessary to assist the refugee 
return and to oversee reconstruction. We should be more flexible about 
the makeup of this force than we have been in the past. Rather than 
making its composition a nonnegotiable end in itself, we should bear in 
mind that the international force is the means to an end. That means to 
an end is peace and stability in Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians can 
live in safety and with autonomy.

                              {time}  1515

  World War I began in the Balkans because a great power, Austria-
Hungary, scoffed at the idea that Russia would intervene on the behalf 
of its Serbian ally. The world has turned over many times since 1914, 
but it could be an equally grave mistake to assume that the Russians 
will remain passive indefinitely. They have already sent truck columns 
carrying relief supplies to Yugoslavia, and there is public agitation 
in Russia to send military equipment.
  This situation is far too dangerous for the U.S. public debate to get 
carried away by amateur generals in and out of public office. Many of 
these people insist that the Russians are too weak to do anything about 
it, precisely the error the Austrians made in 1914. There is a better 
way. Who doubts that Theodore Roosevelt, one of our greatest 
Presidents, knew the national interests and acted vigorously in its 
behalf. Of course he did. But he also knew when military action brought 
no advantage and actually weakened a Nation, when a source of regional 
instability arose, such as the war between Russia and Japan, his every 
instinct was to be an honest broker and mediate peace. His efforts were 
rewarded with the Nobel Prize.
  While we are now a party to the Kosovo dispute, we should be seen as 
a supportive element in such a solution. Americans need the moral 
courage to lead in peace as well as war. I have urged the President to 
use the occasion of NATO's 50th anniversary summit to call for a 
special meeting of the group of eight nations, the so-called G-8, to 
begin a formal effort to achieve a peaceful settlement. This G-8 
meeting should help initiate a framework for a diplomatic solution of 
the crisis, and begin to put into place the foundation for economic 
assistance to this region. Delegations from Ukraine and other affected 
regional countries should also be invited to participate in the G-8 
session.
  I emphasize that this is not a panacea. It is only the beginning of a 
long and difficult process, but it is a step our country should not be 
afraid to take. The fact that negotiation is a long-term process should 
be no obstacle to our trying to achieve it.
  The United States can and should remain strongly engaged 
internationally, because regional instability will not solve itself. 
But we must choose our tools very carefully, for the stakes do not 
allow failure. Power is a finite quantity. If we wantonly expend it all 
over the world for every thinkable cause, we diminish ourselves. 
America should carefully husband its military power. We should act 
militarily only in the cases of clear national interests and always 
keep an eye on the strategic end game: Protecting the American people 
and using our power effectively where it will provide greater stability 
and security for the world.
  A mediated settlement of the Kosovo crisis may not be politically 
popular at the moment, but it may look considerably wiser to us and our 
children in the future.

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