[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 54 (Tuesday, April 20, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3915-S3916]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. CAMPBELL (for himself and Mr. Sessions):
  S. 834. A bill to withhold voluntary proportional assistance for 
programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
relating to the development and completion of the Bushehr nuclear power 
plant in Iran, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations.


             the iran nuclear nonproliferation act of 1999

  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I address an issue that is of 
vital importance to the national security of our country and the 
stability of the Middle East. While Iran's development of nuclear 
technologies has been a growing concern for the last few years, recent 
developments demand a response to this serious situation.
  Last November, Iran signed an accord with Russia to speed up 
completion of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, calling for an expansion 
of the current design and construction of the $800 million, 1,000 
megawatt light-water reactor in southern Iran. Despite serious United 
States objections and concerns about the project, Russia maintains its 
longstanding support for the project and the development of Iran's 
nuclear program. Though Russian and Iranian governments insist that the 
reactor will be used for civilian energy purposes, the United States 
national security community believes that the project is too easy a 
cover for Iran to obtain vital Russian nuclear weapons technology. 
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu condemned the Iranian-Russian 
nuclear cooperation accord as a threat to the entire region, stating:

       The building of a nuclear reactor in Iran only makes it 
     likelier that Iran will equip its ballistic missiles with 
     nuclear warheads. . . . Such a development threatens peace, 
     the whole region and in the end, the Russians themselves.

  On January 13 of this year, the administration underscored the 
gravity of this situation and imposed economic sanctions against three 
Russian institutes for supplying Iran with nuclear technology. But, I 
believe more needs to be done.
  While the Khatami government in Iran has made some reform efforts 
since it was elected in 1997, Iran continues to oppose the Middle East 
peace process, has broadened its efforts to increase its weapons of 
mass destruction, and remains subject to the influences of its hard-
line defense establishment. As reports of Iran's human rights 
violations continue, State Department reports on international 
terrorism indicate Iran's continued assistance to terrorist forces such 
as Hamas, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This clear and 
consistent record of behavior seriously calls to question Iran's active 
pursuit to enhance its nuclear facilities.
  Though Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction have 
been a growing global concern for several years, international fears 
were confirmed when in July of last year, Iran demonstrated the 
strength of its offensive muscle by test-firing its latest Shahab-3 
missle. Capable of propelling a 2,200-pound warhead for a range of 800 
miles, this missile now allows Iran to pose a significant threat to our 
allies in the Middle East.
  The potential results of Iran's successful development of effective 
nuclear technologies hold horrific implications for the stability of 
the Middle East. As an original cosponsor of the Iran Missile 
Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997, and signatory of two letters in 
the 105th Congress to the administration to raise this issue with the 
Russian leadership, I believe the Senate must continue the effort in 
light of this growing threat.
  Today I am joined by Senator Sessions in introducing the Iran Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999 as a means to hinder the 
development of Iran's nuclear weapons program. The House version of 
this legislation is also being introduced today by Congressman Menendez 
of New Jersey. This bill requires the withholding of proportional 
voluntary United States assistance to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) for programs and projects supported by the Agency in 
Iran. This legislation specifically aims to limit the Agency's 
assistance of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.
  Last October, this legislation was passed in the House by a recorded 
vote of 405 to 13, but was not considered by the Senate before the 
adjournment of the 105th Congress. In the interest of United States 
national security and for that of our allies, it is vital we ensure 
that United States funds are not promoting the development of Iran's 
nuclear capabilities.
  I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record 
following my remarks and I urge my colleagues to support passage of 
this bill.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 834

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Iran remains the world's leading sponsor of 
     international terrorism and is on the Department of State's 
     list of countries that provide support for acts of 
     international terrorism.
       (2) Iran has repeatedly called for the destruction of 
     Israel and Iran supports organizations, such as Hizballah, 
     Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, which are responsible 
     for terrorist attacks against Israel.
       (3) Iranian officials have stated their intent to complete 
     at least three nuclear power plants by 2015 and are currently 
     working to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant located 
     on the Persian Gulf coast.
       (4) The United States has publicly opposed the completion 
     of reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant because the 
     transfer of civilian nuclear technology and training could 
     help to advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.
       (5) In an April 1997 hearing before the Subcommittee on 
     Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate, the former Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, stated that 
     through the operation of the nuclear power reactor at the 
     Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran will develop substantial 
     expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
       (6) Construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was 
     halted following the 1979 revolution in Iran because the 
     former West Germany refused to assist in the completion of 
     the plant due to concerns that completion of the plant could 
     provide Iran with expertise and technology which could 
     advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.
       (7) In January 1995, Iran signed a $780,000,000 contract 
     with the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to 
     complete a VVER-1000 pressurized-light water reactor at the 
     Bushehr nuclear power plant and in November 1998, Iran and 
     Russia signed a protocol to expedite the construction of the 
     nuclear reactor, setting a new timeframe of 52 months for its 
     completion.
       (8) In November 1998, Iran asked Russia to prepare a 
     feasibility study to build 3 more nuclear reactors at the 
     Bushehr site.
       (9) Iran is building up its offensive military capacity in 
     other areas as evidenced by its recent testing of engines for 
     ballistic missiles capable of carrying 2,200 pound warheads 
     more than 800 miles, within range of strategic targets in 
     Israel.
       (10) Iran ranks tenth among the 105 nations receiving 
     assistance from the technical cooperation program of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (11) Between 1995 and 1999, the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency has provided and is expected to provide a total of 
     $1,550,000 through its Technical Assistance and Cooperation 
     Fund for the Iranian nuclear power program, including 
     reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
       (12) In 1999 the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     initiated a program to assist Iran in the area of uranium 
     exploration. At the same time it is believed that Iran is 
     seeking to acquire the requisite technology to enrich uranium 
     to weapons-grade levels.

[[Page S3916]]

       (13) The United States provides annual contributions to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency which total more than 25 
     percent of the annual assessed budget of the Agency, and the 
     United States also provides annual voluntary contributions to 
     the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of the Agency 
     which total approximately 32 percent ($18,250,000 in 1999) of 
     the annual budget of the program.
       (14) The United States should not voluntarily provide 
     funding for the completion of nuclear power reactors which 
     could provide Iran with substantial expertise to advance its 
     nuclear weapons program and potentially pose a threat to the 
     United States or its allies.
       (15) Iran has no need for nuclear energy because of its 
     immense oil and natural gas reserves which are equivalent to 
     9.3 percent of the world's reserves, and Iran has 
     73,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas, an amount second 
     only to the natural gas reserves of Russia.

     SEC. 3. WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
                   INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR PROGRAMS 
                   AND PROJECTS IN IRAN.

       Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2227) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c), the limitations of 
     subsection (a) shall apply to programs and projects of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran, unless the 
     Secretary of State determines, and reports in writing to the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate, that such programs and projects are consistent with 
     United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will 
     not provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the 
     development of nuclear weapons, and are not being used as a 
     cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology. A 
     determination made by the Secretary of State under the 
     preceding sentence shall be effective for the 1-year period 
     beginning on the date of the determination.''.

     SEC. 4. ANNUAL REVIEW BY SECRETARY OF STATE OF PROGRAMS AND 
                   PROJECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
                   AGENCY; UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO PROGRAMS 
                   AND PROJECTS OF THE AGENCY IN IRAN.

       (a) Annual Review.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall undertake a 
     comprehensive annual review of all programs and projects of 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency in the countries 
     described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227(a)) to determine if such programs and 
     projects are consistent with United States nuclear 
     nonproliferation and safety goals.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act and on an annual basis thereafter for 5 
     years, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to Congress a 
     report containing the results of the review under paragraph 
     (1).
       (b) Opposition to Certain Programs and Projects of 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.--The Secretary of State 
     shall direct the United States representative to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency to oppose programs of the 
     Agency that are determined by the Secretary pursuant to the 
     review conducted under subsection (a)(1) to be inconsistent 
     with nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals of the United 
     States.

     SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act and on an annual basis thereafter for 5 
     years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     United States representative to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency, shall prepare and submit to Congress a report 
     that--
       (1) describes the total amount of annual assistance to Iran 
     provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a list of 
     Iranian officials in leadership positions at the Agency, the 
     expected timeframe for the completion of the nuclear power 
     reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and a summary of 
     the nuclear materials and technology transferred to Iran from 
     the Agency in the preceding year which could assist in the 
     development of Iran's nuclear weapons program; and
       (2) contains a description of all programs and projects of 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency in each country 
     described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227(a)) and any inconsistencies between the 
     technical cooperation and assistance programs and projects of 
     the Agency and United States nuclear nonproliferation and 
     safety goals in these countries.
       (b) Additional Requirement.--The report required to be 
     submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an 
     unclassified form, to the extent appropriate, but may include 
     a classified annex.

     SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States should 
     pursue internal reforms at the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency that will ensure that all programs and projects funded 
     under the Technical Cooperation and Assistance Fund of the 
     Agency are compatible with United States nuclear 
     nonproliferation policy and international nuclear 
     nonproliferation norms.
                                 ______