[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 49 (Monday, April 12, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H1855-H1858]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ONGOING KOSOVO CRISIS

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
is recognized for half of the time remaining before midnight.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight in what I 
hope will be a nightly discussion in this body on what I think is one 
of the most dangerous involvements of our military in recent time; that 
is the ongoing situation in Kosovo.
  It is my hope that Members on both sides of the aisle will rise on 
the House floor at the end of each day's session, as we saw to some 
extent in the 5-minute special orders today, to discuss the current 
situation, what our plans are, to interact and engage with the 
administration, not necessarily in a partisan way, but in a way to look 
for solutions that bring dignity to the people of Kosovo, that bring 
stability and sense back to the Balkans, and that provide the best 
possible course of action for the safety of American soldiers and those 
who are currently involved and those who might be involved in the 
Balkan Theater.
  Let me first of all say that this should be constructive discussion, 
again, and should not be based on partisan rhetoric or name calling. 
Now, with our troops deployed in the air assault, should not be the 
time for us to tear down past actions even though we may disagree with 
them. But I think two things are certainly clear that we should make at 
the beginning of each of our discussions, so that no one can 
misinterpret the debate or the discussion in this country about 
America's position in Kosovo.
  The first is that no one, including Milosevic, should underestimate 
America's resolve to stop the torture, the ethnic cleansing and the 
bloodshed that he has perpetrated on the people of his nation and 
especially the people of Kosovo. He should understand that Republicans 
and Democrats are united in their resolve to make sure that he is held 
accountable for the atrocities that he has perpetrated on innocent 
people. No one should underestimate our resolve in that area.
  The second point that we should make clear at the outset is a simple 
one and one that we all agree on, and that is that we unequivocally 
support our troops. They are in harm's way right now. They have our 
full prayers

[[Page H1856]]

and blessings. Each and every one of our colleagues in this body and 
the other body are doing everything possible to give our men and women 
serving on behalf of this Nation all the support, the resources, the 
tools, and the equipment and protection they need to carry out their 
mission.
  Those two things are unmistakable. Those two things are not in the 
debate. We are committed to deal with Milosevic as a Congress and as a 
country, and we are behind the President in that. We are committed to 
support our troops in their deployment that they are currently 
pursuing.
  But, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned with some of the rhetoric that I am 
hearing on the talk shows. I have done appearances on the networks and 
today with CNN. I am listening to some of my colleagues and some of the 
discussion from the think tank experts inside the beltway here who are 
moving very rapidly toward the notion that we should prepare or, if not 
prepare, that we should actually deploy American troops on the ground.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a very dangerous decision that we must consider 
carefully, completely, and thoroughly. Even though I did not agree with 
the President's initial position to get us involved in a NATO-sponsored 
air campaign, I do think that we need to have a discussion about where 
we go from here.
  I think all of us listened to the White House tell us that perhaps a 
short period of time would transpire, when we started the aerial 
assault, and then Milosevic would in fact give in. Unfortunately, we 
are now into weeks instead of days, and there does not seem to appear 
to be a lessening of Milosevic's resolve.
  But before we move into the next phase and prepare or actually send 
in American ground troops, we in this body had better have some very 
serious discussion and debate about what our policy is and what it 
should be, because committing ground troops carries heavy burdens.
  I think we still have some other options. The ground troops from 
America should only be committed as a final resort, as a last resort 
when we have depleted and used up all other options that are available 
to us. I am convinced that we have not yet reached that point. In fact, 
I think we have some very serious things that we could be doing, which 
I will outline in a few moments.
  I also want to make the point very clearly, Mr. Speaker, that when 
our colleagues and when the pundits inside the beltway talk about 
deploying our troops, they need to understand what that means. It is 
too easy for Members of Congress to say ``send in the troops.'' These 
are not robots we are talking about. These are human beings. They are 
the sons and the daughters and the moms and dads of the American 
people.

  When we commit our young people and our military personnel to go into 
harm's way, we had better have thought through the actual activity for 
which they are going to be involved. We better think about the 
objectives. We better think about the danger to their lives.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, my concern is that some of the people inside of 
this beltway want to commit our troops too quickly, and that has 
resulted in a terrible problem that we are not now trying to deal with 
within the military.
  In fact, let me show a chart here, Mr. Speaker, which I think sums up 
the situation very well. In the years from World War II until 1990 and 
1991, all of the commanders in chief during that time period that 
started with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry Truman and then went on to 
John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan and 
George Bush, in all of those years, under all of those Presidents, 
Republicans and Democrats alike, they committed our troops just 10 
times, 10 deployments in 40 years, only where it was absolutely 
essential to put our troops in harm's way.
  From 1991 until today with the Kosovo deployment, we have seen our 
troops deployed 33 times. Ten times in 40 years, 33 times in the last 8 
years.
  Mr. Speaker, none of these 33 deployments were budgeted for or paid 
for in advance. The cost for all of these deployments came out of an 
already decreasing defense budget. Bosnia up until now has cost the 
American taxpayers $10 billion. All of that had to be eaten out of 
other defense requirements and priorities or had to be funded through 
special supplemental appropriations.
  Kosovo, in the short period of time we have been deployed there, has 
cost the American taxpayer $2 billion, and the daily price tag for 
Kosovo is increasing exponentially.
  Members of Congress and pundits in Washington who are quick to want 
to commit our troops to this 33rd ground deployment need to understand 
that we have not identified, first of all, a way to pay for this 
operation.
  But that is not the largest issue involved here, Mr. Speaker. Because 
we have deployed our troops 33 times in 8 years, because we have sent 
our troops from Macedonia, to Bosnia, to Somalia, to Haiti, to domestic 
situations, from Kuwait to now the deployment in Kosovo, the morale 
among our young people in the military is starting to suffer.
  Today, Mr. Speaker, the retention rate for pilots in the Navy and the 
Air Force is the lowest it has been since World War II. The Army is 
having such a difficult time recruiting young people to go into the 
Army that they are now resorting to lowering the threshold. Secretary 
Caldera has suggested that we should now allow non-high school 
graduates to sign up for Army service. In fact, we have Navy ships at 
sea today who are 600 and 700 sailors short from the required optimum 
strength that they should be carrying in the deployments that they are 
completing.
  These situations are not happening in a vacuum, Mr. Speaker. They are 
happening because of this deployment rate of committing our troops 
month after month around the world in a number of situations which 
requires these young people to be away from their families and children 
for much longer periods of time.
  In addition to morale problems, the cutbacks in our funding necessary 
to pay for these deployments are causing us to stretch out programs so 
that we are not modernizing our military the way we should.
  I understand that President Clinton will be, or maybe he did today 
deliver a speech to our B-52 pilots. I am glad he did that. It is 
important to let them know that we are behind them. But I wish the 
President would address to them the fact that those B-52s are going to 
be flying when they are 75 years old because we have not provided the 
funding to replace those aircraft in a more timely manner.
  That is the real tragedy of what we are doing with our rapid 
deployment, with our increased OPTEMPO rate, and yet not providing the 
support to maintain the readiness of our troops that they so 
desperately need.
  All of those factors must be considered in the equation of whether or 
not America should put ground troops into Kosovo. I think it is a very 
serious challenge that we have ahead of us, Mr. Speaker, in considering 
whether or not we should support the administration's efforts to move 
forward with a multinational ground force, especially one that involves 
U.S. troops.
  We need to understand that unless this Congress is prepared to 
address the issues that are causing morale problems in the services 
today, that are causing retention rates to be at the lowest point ever, 
to cause young military personnel to want to leave the service instead 
of reenlisting, then we have got a major problem.

                              {time}  2245

  I would challenge our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, that are so adamant 
today about committing ground troops. Are they prepared to support the 
reinstatement of the draft if we continue to have problems with young 
people not signing up for the military? Are they willing to vote to 
reinstate the draft, as we did during the Vietnam War, to suck young 
people in, to force them to go into combat?
  That could be the need if we continue to have the problems that we 
are having because of the deployment of troops today around the world, 
troops that continue to provide cover in Haiti, continue to be in 
Bosnia, continue to be in Somalia, continue to be in Kuwait, continue 
to be in Macedonia, and now may be expected to go into Kosovo perhaps 
even in large numbers.
  Mr. Speaker, I think the Kosovo deployment that is being talked about

[[Page H1857]]

now by the U.N., whether it is under the title of peacekeeping or a 
military force, is going to involve conflict, it is going to involve 
hostile actions, it is going to involve casualties, and it is going to 
involve loss of life. Before we make that commitment, this Congress 
needs to make sure that we have explored every other option.
  Mr. Speaker, I come to the House floor tonight because I do not think 
we have explored every other option. I want to present one and I want 
to challenge the administration tonight to follow through on my 
suggestion.
  Mr. Speaker, as many of our colleagues know, I focus a lot of my time 
on dealing with Russia. I formed and I chair the congressional 
initiative between our Congress and the Russian parliament, the State 
Duma. I have been to Russia a number of times. I host members of the 
Duma when they come to Washington, and I interact with Duma leaders on 
a regular basis. In fact, of the 450 members of the State Duma, I know 
over 150 members personally, including the leaders of all the seven 
main factions that lead the State Duma in their deliberations.
  In fact, I was supposed to speak at Harvard University before the end 
of April to the visiting class of Duma deputies that Harvard runs a 
training program for each year to give them the orientation of the way 
our Congress works in America so that the Russian Duma can learn from 
our experiences.
  Last week, the Russian Duma canceled the next visit that they were 
planning to make to Harvard. They canceled that visit because of the 
Kosovo situation. Last week, Mr. Speaker, I talked to my friend in the 
Duma on the phone, after having met with a couple of Russian leaders in 
person at a conference last week in Philadelphia.
  One of my friends who is a senior leader of the support of the 
Russian Duma told me that in the 7 years since the reforms in Russia he 
had never seen the hostile feelings toward America as he is seeing 
right now because of Kosovo. In fact, he told me that almost every Duma 
deputy from the radical fringe of the communist and the LDPR's 
Zhirinovsky faction to the moderate members of the Duma and Yabloko 
faction, every member of the Duma is expressing outrage, outrage not 
only at the continual bombing in Kosovo, the bombing of Serbia, but 
outrage that Russia was not brought into a fuller dialogue in trying to 
find a way to end this crisis.
  In fact, one of my friends told me that it is a dangerous situation 
in Russia right now. With President Yeltsin having illness problems 
and, I think, widely acknowledged as not being in total control of what 
is happening in Russia, there is more and more feeling that Russia may 
do things that create serious instability between the U.S. and Russia. 
That would be an international tragedy.
  If Russia were to start supplying military equipment to the Serbians 
or if Russia were to even think about providing support in terms of 
forces to the Serbs, we would have a very, very dangerous and volatile 
situation.
  We need to understand, Mr. Speaker, that there are some alternatives, 
and at least one that should be pursued. I understand that the 
President's initial action through NATO was to have the NATO countries, 
through a massive air campaign, bomb Milosevic into submission. Up 
until now, that has not worked. It may work in the future. And 
according to our President, we are in there for the long haul. That is 
going to be a terrible price we are going to pay both in terms of 
destruction to innocent people and buildings, also in terms of dollar 
investments on the part of the U.S.
  My concern is that if we do not think through this process, we could 
see a situation where Russia could enter this conflict on the other 
side. I have no doubt that we would be victorious and that we would win 
any such battle. But, Mr. Speaker, we do not want Kosovo to be the 
start of a world war or a major conflict involving two nations with 
very capable nuclear weapons.
  On Friday evening, Mr. Speaker, I received a telephone call from two 
of my friends in Russia who are involved in the State Duma. They had 
faxed to me earlier that day a memo asking if I would review a 
preliminary plan that they had put together that would perhaps provide 
a solution to end the hostilities in Kosovo. I read the document. I 
talked to the individuals on the telephone. I assessed their feelings 
about the Duma rallying behind this initiative. And then I called 
senior leaders in the administration to let them know that this had 
occurred and that I thought it was worthy of consideration.
  Over the weekend, I had additional discussions. Today I talked to 
Members on both sides of the aisle, senior leaders of both parties, 
about their thoughts on the ideas presented by the members of the 
Russian Duma for our consideration. The individuals who called me, Mr. 
Speaker, asked me to give them my response about whether or not their 
ideas are realistic to begin a discussion.
  Mr. Speaker, I think their ideas are worthy of consideration, and I 
encourage the administration to move in beginning negotiations which we 
could assist with in the Congress in terms of supporting, finding a new 
solution to the hostilities in Kosovo.
  First of all, Mr. Speaker, the Russian side proposed to me that 
Russia would guarantee to the international community that no more 
ethnic homicide or ethnic cleansing would be carried on in Kosovo. The 
Russian side would guarantee that to the international community.
  The second initiative that was proposed by the Russian side was that 
Russia would see that Milosevic agreed to the agreements reached at the 
contact working group of the NATO coalition in Rambouillet. So the 
Russians were proposing as their second condition that Milosevic come 
to the table agreeing to the Rambouillet accords, which the President 
has said are critical.
  The one caveat that they mentioned was that they thought that the 
international peacekeeping force that would be put into Kosovo to 
guarantee the security and the stability for the Kosovars to make sure 
that conflict ended and to guarantee the rights of those citizens would 
not involve the militaries of any of those nations that are today 
bombing Serbia, that those nations that would make up the ground forces 
to implement the agreement and the Rambouillet accord would come from 
nations that are not today involved in direct hostilities against the 
Serbs.

  In fact, the Russians even proposed some example countries. They 
suggested perhaps that these troops could come from Poland, the 
Netherlands, Greece, Albania, even Russia itself, and other European 
nations who have not been involved in the bombing campaign against the 
Serbs.
  Mr. Speaker, I think that makes absolute sense to have a 
multinational force to enforce the accords that were reached in Kosovo 
to protect the Kosovars, overseen by troops from countries that are not 
involved in the hostilities today, who would then report to NATO as to 
the progress of enforcing the agreed-upon arrangements that were 
negotiated under NATO's leadership.
  The third recommendation that the Russians proposed to me, Mr. 
Speaker, was that we establish a bilateral commission, a bilateral 
commission that in fact would be assembled in an informal way to 
monitor the Albanian Government's compliance, the Serbian Government's 
compliance with the agreed-upon framework established by NATO so that 
the parliamentarians of both nations would be involved. Not to set 
foreign policy, not to overrule or supersede the authority of the one 
leader we have in America, and that is our President, but to make sure 
from a parliamentary standpoint that all aspects of both governments, 
both parties in this country and all seven factions in Russia were, on 
a daily basis, monitoring the compliance to the peace accords that had 
been reached, which Milosevic would have agreed to.
  Mr. Speaker, I think these initiatives are worthy of discussion. I 
think these initiatives are the direction that we should be going in 
terms of dialoguing with Russia about the situation in Kosovo and our 
relationship with Serbia. I am not saying it is the end-all or the 
cure-all or a perfect solution. But this is far better to talk about 
than to talk about preparing Americans to go into a ground war campaign 
and to look at killing more lives.
  Someone at some point in time is going to have to pay to rebuild 
Serbia

[[Page H1858]]

and Kosovo. We need to understand that it should be our top priority 
today to find a peaceful way out of this conflict that allows dignity 
and respect for NATO, that allows dignity and respect for the process 
that we use, that allows Russia to regain the dignity in their 
relationship in the past with Serbia, and that shows Milosevic that 
neither Russia nor the U.S. nor the allied nations will tolerate the 
kind of actions that he has perpetrated on the people of Kosovo.
  That is the opportunity, Mr. Speaker, that we have right now.
  I have offered to my Russian friends to engage them wherever that 
might take place. They have talked about coming here. If need be, we 
could go there. But we need to find a way to proactively engage Russia 
in this solution.
  I also think there is one other point that we should make, Mr. 
Speaker. The American taxpayers each year put approximately $600 
million to $1 billion of U.S. tax money into the Russian economy. We do 
it through the cooperative threat reduction. We do it through economic 
development assistance through the Department of Commerce. We do it 
through the Defense Department with joint military programs and 
exchanges. We do it through the Environmental Protection Agency through 
environmental initiatives. We do it through a multitude of agencies and 
operations of the Federal Government.
  Not only do I think it is in our interest to have Russia be more 
involved, I think Russia has a responsibility. America has been very 
helpful in securing additional funding for the replenishment of the IMF 
so that Russia can continue to work economically. America has been very 
aggressive in helping Russia deal with environmental problems, nuclear 
stabilization. In fact, the President just proposed this year an 
increase of $1.4 billion over 5 years to further help Russia stabilize 
its nuclear arsenal.
  It is time that we called Russia in, not just through a long distance 
phone call, but in a real and substantive way, with all factions 
involved, from the radical left to the radical right, in helping us 
solve the problem of Kosovo in a way that reduces the risk of losing 
more lives, of damaging more property, and in a way that could lead to 
a further escalation of conflict.

                              {time}  2300

  So, Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight and I challenge the administration to 
take up the challenge that was given to me by my Russian friends who 
want to see us find a peaceful way, a peaceful way out of what is 
becoming a terrible tragedy and yet a peaceful way that recognizes that 
Milosevic is dead wrong and must be dealt with in an aggressive, firm 
way. There is still that possibility. We must take up that effort. And 
we must stop the talking about a ground war operation, a ground 
campaign and subjecting young Americans in a way that is going to cost 
lives and cause serious hardship for American families.

                          ____________________