[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 47 (Wednesday, March 24, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3246-S3247]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. HELMS (for himself and Mr. Torricelli):
  S. 693. A bill to assist in the enhancement of the security of 
Taiwan, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations


                    TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, today on behalf of the distinguished 
Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Torricelli, and myself, I am sending to 
the desk a bill entitled ``The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  This bill is to do the best we can to ensure that the United States 
is fulfilling its obligations to the Republic of China as specified by 
the Taiwan Relations Act.
  Mr. President, this has been done reasonably well for about 20 years, 
but recent trends disclose the need for efforts by the United States to 
be stepped up, hence the introduction of this bill by Senator 
Torricelli and

[[Page S3247]]

me. There will undoubtedly be further additions to the sponsorship of 
this bill. In any case, as you know, the Pentagon, last month, 
delivered to the Congress a report entitled ``The Security Situation in 
the Taiwan Straits.'' Frankly, I found this report exceedingly 
disturbing.
  For openers, the report stated that Red China has been and will 
continue to deploy a large number of missiles directly across the 
strait from Taiwan. In fact, according to media reports, China already 
has more than 150 such missiles aimed at Taiwan and plans to increase 
the number to 650 during the next few years.
  Taiwan has virtually no defenses against such missiles. In 1995 and 
1996, Red China proved beyond a shadow of a doubt a willingness to use 
these missiles, at a minimum to intimidate Taiwan.
  I think Americans should also be concerned about Chinese missiles. In 
late November, the Chinese People's Liberation Army conducted exercises 
consisting of mock missile attacks on United States forces in South 
Korea and in Japan. The Pentagon report, to which I just referred, also 
makes clear that mainland China's vast quantitative edge over Taiwan in 
naval and air power, coupled with China's ongoing modernization drive, 
will prove overwhelming in any sort of military confrontation. The 
Pentagon report concluded that Taiwan's future success in deterring 
Chinese aggression will be--and I quote from the report--``dependent on 
its continued acquisition of modern arms, technology and equipment and 
its ability to deal with a number of systemic problems'' such as 
logistics.
  This is precisely where the United States had better step in, Mr. 
President, because the United States is the only power in the world 
that can assure that Taiwan can continue to acquire the weapons it 
needs and deal with its systemic problems.
  The question is, Will we do it? Communist China has coupled its 
military buildup and threats against Taiwan with increased pressure on 
the United States to limit or to cease our arms sales to Taiwan. This 
is reminiscent of 1982 when the Reagan administration yielded to 
Chinese pressure and mistakenly agreed to limit and gradually reduce 
our arms sales to Taiwan in the regrettable August communique.
  President Clinton, similarly, last summer caved in to Beijing's three 
noes--no, no, no. Will arms sales to Taiwan be sacrificed next? I put a 
question mark after it because I hope the administration will recover 
from its lack of foresight of last summer.
  In any event, if one listens to administration officials, who somehow 
seem incapable of commenting on arms sales to Taiwan without mentioning 
the 1982 communique, or the administration's refusal to sell submarines 
to Taiwan on the flimsy pretext that those submarines are offensive, I 
think one will get some idea of where the United States arms sales to 
Taiwan will be if we do not now stand steadfast.

  Let me explain. Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act 
compel us, oblige us, to provide defensive arms to Taiwan based solely 
upon the judgment of the United States regarding Taiwan's needs, 
meaning that Beijing's opinion doesn't count. Given China's threatening 
military buildup, it is unlikely that Taiwan's legitimate needs are 
going to go down soon. Nor should U.S. arms sales go down, Mr. 
President.
  Moreover, it is high time to begin a discussion of whether the United 
States ought to be doing more in the way of exchanges in training and 
planning with Taiwan's military. The Taiwan military has operated in 
virtual isolation for 20 years, and this has certainly contributed to 
some of the systemic problems alluded to in the Pentagon report, to 
which I referred just a moment ago.
  Taiwan's military does not exercise with us. They do not plan with 
us. When the Red Chinese missiles were flying over Taiwan in 1996 and 
our carriers went to the strait, the Taiwan military had no direct or 
secure way of communicating with the United States fleet, none 
whatsoever. The question is, Do we want to be stuck in that situation 
again? While the Secretary of Defense and other top officials can rub 
elbows in Beijing and possibly have champagne, the State Department 
prevents any other officer above the rank of colonel setting foot on 
Taiwan.
  In addition to being outrageous, this cannot help having a corrosive 
effect on our joint ability to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait over 
time.
  All of this is why I have introduced, with Senator Torricelli, the 
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which has three main thrusts. Let me 
briefly identify each of them.
  One, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act seeks to ensure that our 
friends in Taiwan will have the necessary equipment to maintain their 
self-defense capabilities as required by the Taiwan Relations Act. It 
does this by prohibiting any politically motivated reductions in arms 
sales to Taiwan pursuant to the 1982 communique and by authorizing the 
sale to Taiwan of a broad array of defense systems, including missile 
defense systems, satellite early warning data, diesel submarines, and 
advanced air-to-air missiles.
  Secondly, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which I have just 
introduced, seeks to bolster the process for defense sales to Taiwan. 
The bill does this in several ways. It requires an increase in staffing 
at the currently overworked technical section at the American Institute 
in Taiwan. It also requires the President to report to Congress 
annually on Taiwan's defense requests and to justify any rejection or 
postponement of arms sales to Taiwan.
  These actions are not currently taken and the President and the 
Congress need to get more involved in the process, precisely as the 
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which I just introduced, will require.
  Third, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act will redress some of the 
deficiencies in readiness resulting in part from the 20-year isolation 
of Taiwan's military. This will be achieved by supporting Taiwan's 
increased participation at United States defense colleges, requiring 
the enhancement of our military exchanges and joint training, and 
establishing direct communication between our respective militaries.
  All of this will merely implement section 2(b)(6) of what? It will 
implement the Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for the United States--
not Taiwan, but the United States--to maintain a capacity to resist any 
resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize Taiwan.
  How can we maintain that capacity over the long run if we can't even 
communicate with Taiwan's military--obviously, we can't--or if we do 
not do joint planning and training with Taiwan's military?
  I can hear it now. Some are going to say this is provocative. They 
will claim that doing these things will upset the United States 
relationship with China. This is true. The Red Chinese won't like this 
bill. But I think we all know, Mr. President, that many of the things 
called for in this legislation must be done at the earliest possible 
time.
  China's behavior--let me be clear--mainland China's behavior is a 
clear warning that it is time for the United States to be much more 
serious about maintaining a posture of deterrence in the western 
Pacific and in protecting our loyal, long-time friends in the Republic 
of China on Taiwan.
                                 ______