[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 46 (Tuesday, March 23, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3156-S3157]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 KOSOVO

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have remained after the conclusion of 
the vote to comment about the vote and about a very significant 
historical precedent which was established tonight. The Senate of the 
United States took up its constitutional responsibility to make a 
decision as to whether Congressional authority would be given for the 
United States to commit an act of war in Kosovo following a request by 
the President of the United States for such a vote.
  In modern times, we have seen the erosion of the congressional 
authority to declare war. Tonight in the Senate, we reaffirmed the 
basic constitutional responsibility and authority of the Congress on 
that very subject, after the President had made a significant request 
for authorization to use force.
  This action tonight follows the situation in January of 1991 when the 
Congress of the United States authorized the use of force in the 
Persian Gulf following a similar request by President Bush. I believe 
that this is of great importance historically as a precedent, to guide 
the future Presidents, that their authority as Commander in Chief does 
not extend to involving the United States in war. Where acts of war are 
involved, it is a matter for the Congress of the United States and not 
the unilateral action of the President of the United States.
  On the merits of this evening's vote, it was a very difficult vote. 
It was the choice of two very undesirable alternatives. In voting aye 
and supporting the use of force, I chose what I considered to be the 
lesser of the undesirable alternatives.
  The President in his letter today said that the United States 
national interests are clear and significant. I disagree with that 
conclusion by the President.
  The President then went on in his letter to amplify those national 
interests. Yet the absence of a very strong purpose and reason 
underscores my conclusion that this is an extremely difficult question 
on U.S. national interests. The President's letter continues, the first 
line of the second paragraph says, ``The United States national 
interests are clear and significant.'' The second line says, ``The 
ongoing effort by President Milosevic to attack and repress the people 
of Kosovo could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences 
to the United States. This is a conflict with no natural boundaries. If 
it continues it will push refugees across borders and draw into 
neighboring countries.''
  That is a statement of possibility, but we know that this is 
intervention by NATO, including the United States, in what is 
essentially a civil war. The President then went on in the second 
paragraph to say, ``NATO has authorized airstrikes against the former 
Yugoslavia to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to address the 
threat to peace and security of the Balkan region and Europe.''
  The President relies quite substantially upon the ``humanitarian 
catastrophe'', he may really be saying the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes, and it may be that this standard is a one which 
ought to be adopted. But I do suggest that this may be a departure from 
what has previously been recognized as U.S. policy to use force where 
there is a vital United States national security interest. If we look 
for humanitarian catastrophes, we can find them all around the world, 
and we have been criticized for not doing more at an earlier stage in 
Bosnia. We have been criticized for not doing more in Rwanda. There 
have been many criticisms leveled against the United States and the 
civilized world for not intervening on prior occasions. It may be that 
with such a thin statement of vital national interests, the 
authorization to use force in Kosovo really reflects a shifting 
standard. As the President articulates, ``to prevent a human 
catastrophe.''
  (Mr. BROWNBACK assumed the Chair.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, several weeks ago, I filed a resolution 
for the use of airstrikes in Kosovo. This was essentially a vehicle to 
move the Senate of the United States to take up the issue of the use of 
force, to debate it and to decide the question. It has always been my 
view, as expressed in 1991 in the debate on the use of force in the 
Persian Gulf and, before that in 1983, where we debated the War Powers 
Act with respect to deployment of marines in Lebanon, that the 
constitutional issue of Congress' sole authority to declare war is of 
paramount importance.
  I congratulate our leadership today for moving through a procedural 
morass, where we had a cloture vote--that is, a vote to cut off 
debate--on the resolution pending by the Senator from

[[Page S3157]]

New Hampshire, Senator Smith. Afterwards, in consultation, this 
resolution was crafted so the Senate could vote yes or no on this 
important issue. As noted by others, we did have a bipartisan vote of 
58-41 in favor of the use of force, with some 17 Republicans joining 41 
Democrats, making a total of 58, and 38 Republicans and 4 Democrats 
voting in the negative. There is a strong bipartisan showing by these 
figures.
  It would have been vastly preferable, Mr. President, had President 
Clinton taken this issue to the American people at a much earlier stage 
so the American people could be aware of the consequences of this very, 
very important decision. The President did address the matter in the 
opening remarks on his press conference on Friday.
  I concurred with what the Senator from Delaware said yesterday--when 
he and I debated or discussed the subject for about a half hour--this 
was most appropriately a subject for a 30-minute Presidential speech. 
The president should lay out the issue in great detail. There is a 
large concern on my part, and on the part of many others, that the 
American people are not really prepared for the consequences as to what 
may occur in Kosovo. There have been forceful statements that the risks 
are very, very high, and that the air defenses in Serbia are very 
strong.
  It is important that the American people understand the substantial 
risks involved so we do not retreat as we did in Somalia. The way to 
guard against that is to build up a public understanding as to what the 
scenario is in Kosovo with as forceful an articulation as possible, and 
I repeat, much more forceful than the President's letter today. The 
President should articulate in great detail about the savagery of the 
assaults on people and the brutality and the ethnic cleansing which has 
gone on in Kosovo. Those details, I think, are a concern to the 
American people but they have not been stated in a way which really 
brings forth the magnitude of the human catastrophe in Kosovo so the 
American people would be willing to accept and undertake the risks that 
are involved in this matter.
  But all of that is prologue. Now we have the authorization by the 
Senate for the use of force. On a very difficult question, I think it 
is the lesser of the undesirable alternatives, and featuring 
prominently is the desire of keeping NATO intact. We seem to have more 
support from our European allies on this matter than at any time in the 
past. Our precarious position on NATO has occurred because the 
administration has moved us into a position without congressional 
authorization to an executive commitment really, in effect, to support 
the NATO decision to use force in Kosovo.
  To that extent, so that we do not have a breach of making NATO look 
bad and do not have a breach of making the United States look bad, 
which would in effect be a backdown, we are in a sense backing into the 
issue. But the more important aspect is the fact that the President did 
come to the Senate.
  I was interested in the discussion with our distinguished senior 
Senator from West Virginia and to hear his comment where he had 
expressed to the President today the view that the President should not 
lean so heavily on Presidential prerogatives but should ask the 
Congress of the United States for authority to use force. The President 
has done so.
  Now we have a very significant precedent which should be a clarion 
call to future Presidents not to exercise their authority as Commander 
in Chief and unilaterally engage the United States in war. The 
President should take this issue to the Congress of the United States 
and to the American people. The President should do this at an early 
time so the issue can be fully debated, not on a short time limit, as 
we had this evening.
  It must be a source of some wonderment to people who were watching on 
C-SPAN II to see such an important issue debated in such a brief period 
of time with 2 minutes allotted to Senators to speak on the subject and 
1 minute taken by the manager, the Senator from Delaware. There had 
been extensive debate yesterday, but we could have used even more time. 
Unfortunately, we were caught in the press with the budget resolution, 
which is first on the docket for tomorrow.
  I thank the Chair for setting this extra overtime.
  I yield the floor.

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