[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 46 (Tuesday, March 23, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3125-S3126]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. GRAMS:
  S. 679. A bill to authorize appropriations to the Department of State 
for construction and security of United States diplomatic facilities, 
and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


      SECURE EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACT OF 1999

  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise this morning to introduce a bill 
dealing with the security of our embassies around the world.
  Mr. President, we all remember the horrible day of August 17, 1998, 
when U.S. embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya were 
destroyed by car bombs. We all mourn the passing of the 220 people who 
lost their lives to these heinous terrorist acts. But it is not enough 
to mourn. We in Congress have a separate responsibility--to conduct 
proper oversight to expose weaknesses in our embassy security 
requirements and to ensure the resources given to this Administration 
are being allocated in ways to maximize their effectiveness.
  In reviewing the conclusions of the State Department Accountability 
Review Boards chaired by Admiral William J. Crowe, I was disturbed to 
find that they are strikingly similar to those reached by the Inman 
Commission which issued an extensive embassy security report 14 years 
ago. Clearly, the United States has devoted inadequate resources and 
placed too low a priority on security concerns.
  And I regret to say, the President's response to the Crowe Report 
simply is not adequate. The Administration has asked the Congress to 
provide for an advance appropriation of $3 billion with no strings 
attached. That funding does not start next year, it starts in 2001. And 
the bulk of the money is proposed in the out years. Those kind of 
budget games shouldn't be played when the lives of U.S. government 
workers are at stake. It's wrong to state that embassy construction is 
a priority, while refusing to make funds available for that purpose.
  As Chairman of the International Operations Subcommittee, which has 
oversight responsibilities for embassy security issues, I have looked 
into the mistakes that we made in the past, and I am committed to 
making sure they do not happen in the future. Our embassies are not 
vulnerable because we lack security requirements. They are vulnerable 
because over three-quarters of our embassies have those requirements 
waived. Now, I understand that when the Inman security standards were 
put forward in the 1980's, a number of existing embassies did not meet 
the criteria. But I was surprised to find many of the embassies built 
and purchased since that time do not meet the Inman standards either. 
While I do not want to micromanage the State Department's construction 
program, given State's record in this area, certain external 
constraints are warranted.

[[Page S3126]]

  Unfortunately, under the Administration's plan, we are doomed to 
repeat some of the same mistakes that were made following the Inman 
recommendations. The funding structure makes it impossible to achieve 
efficiencies in embassy construction. There is just not enough funding 
in the next three years to permit a single contract to design and build 
an embassy or a single contract to build multiple embassies in a 
region. Furthermore, the back loading of the funding means it could be 
a decade before secure embassies are up and running. Clearly, that is 
not acceptable.
  Mr. President, I am introducing a 5-year authorization bill that 
makes sure the money set aside for embassy construction and security is 
not used for other purposes. It provides $600 million a year, starting 
in fiscal year 2000. And the Secretary of State is going to have to 
certify these funds are being used to bring these embassies into 
compliance with specific security standards, because 14 years from now, 
I don't want any finger pointing. I don't want the Congress to revisit 
this matter and find that funds were diverted and U.S. personnel put at 
risk.
  The security requirements in my bill reflect some of the lessons that 
we learned from Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. While these requirements may 
not have prevented lives being lost in the bombings, they could prevent 
the loss of life in the future. For example, under my bill, the 
Emergency Action Plan for each mission will address threats from large 
vehicular bombs and transnational terrorism. And the ``Composite Threat 
List'' will have a section which emphasizes transnational terrorism and 
considers criteria such as the physical security environment, host 
government support, and cultural realities.

  Furthermore, in selecting sites for new U.S. diplomatic facilities 
abroad, there will be a set back requirement of 100 feet and all U.S. 
government agencies will have be located on the same compound. State 
Department guidelines currently state that ``[a]ll U.S. Government 
offices and activities, subject to the authority of the chief of 
mission, are required to be collocated in chancery office buildings or 
on a chancery/consulate compound.'' Unfortunately, these guidelines are 
often ignored. Indeed, after the August terrorist bombings, in 
violation of State Department guidelines, A.I.D. headquarters decided 
not to move its missions in Kenya and Tanzania into the more secure 
embassy compounds that are going to be built. A.I.D. only reversed 
itself after hearing from the Congress and U.S. officials in Kenya and 
Tanzania.
  Working abroad will never be risk free. But we can take a number of 
measures, like these, to make sure that safety is increased for U.S. 
government workers overseas. We can also put forward requirements to 
ensure we have an effective emergency response network in place to 
respond to a crisis should one arise. My bill requires crisis 
management training for State Department personnel; support for the 
Foreign Emergency Support Team; rapid response procedure for assistance 
from the Department of Defense; and off-site storage of 
emergency equipment and records. These are prudent steps which should 
be taken to ensure we have an effective crisis management system in 
place if our embassies are attacked in the future.

  My bill also calls for the Secretary of State to submit three reports 
to Congress. The first report would be a classified report rating our 
diplomatic facilities in terms of their vulnerablity to terrorist 
attack. The second report would be a classified review of the findings 
of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel which would recommend whether 
any U.S. missions should be closed due to high vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks and ways to maintain a U.S. presence if warranted. 
The third report would be submitted in classified and unclassified form 
on the projected role and function of each U.S. diplomatic facility 
through 2010. It would explore the potential of technology to decrease 
the number of U.S. personnel abroad; the balance between the cost of 
providing secure buildings and the benefit of a U.S. presence; the 
potential of regional facilities; and the upgrades necessary.
  Finally, my bill enables the President to award the Overseas Service 
Star to any member of the Foreign Service or any civilian employee of 
thegovernment of the United States who--after August 1, 1998--was 
killed or wounded while performing official duties, while on the 
premises of a U.S. mission abroad, or as a result of such employee's 
status as a U.S. government employee. These sacrifices for our nation 
by U.S. government workers abroad no longer should go unrecognized.
  Mr. President, I believe with the approach outlined in my bill we can 
better ensure that we are providing a safe environment for U.S. 
government workers abroad. We can also be confident that should another 
terrorist attack occur, we will be ready for the aftermath. I 
understand that there is a trade-off between security and 
accessibility. But there are obvious steps that we should be taking to 
provide a higher level of security in this age of transnational 
terrorist threats. I hope this bill will not just provide a blueprint 
for the steps we must take now, but guidance on how we should proceed 
in the future. We must acknowledge the world is changing and doing 
business as usual is not going to work. We need to think outside the 
box and explore new ways to confront new challenges. I hope the State 
Department sees my bill as an opportunity rather than a burden. I am 
committed to making sure that embassy security is treated as a 
priority, and this bill is a good first step.
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