[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 45 (Monday, March 22, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3050-S3056]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of S. 
544, which the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 544) making emergency supplemental 
     appropriations and rescissions for recovery from natural 
     disasters, and foreign assistance, for the fiscal year ending 
     September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Pending:

       Hutchison amendment No. 81, to set forth restrictions on 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo.
       Lott amendment No. 124 (to amendment No. 81), to prohibit 
     the use of funds for military operations in the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless 
     Congress enacts specific authorization in law for the conduct 
     of those operations.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.


                           Amendment No. 124

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The present business is amendment No. 124 
offered by the majority leader.
  Mr. STEVENS. The amendment to the Hutchison amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Kosovo question is the pending issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have listened with interest at the 
statements made by the distinguished Senator from Delaware. And he has 
some very good points. My memory of the conversations that were held at 
the time President Bush made the statement that the Senator from 
Delaware referred to was that the President was talking about racial 
cleansing, or genocide, on the part of the Serbs versus the Kosovo 
population--not just a military incident, but an act of genocide, but 
an act of racial cleansing in the magnitude of a national aspect.
  There is no question that there is a dispute here. And the Senator 
from Delaware has heard my comments that I made to the President. I 
believe that article V of the NATO agreement does not authorize bombing 
in Serbia.
  I was very interested over the weekend to listen to people talk on 
the radio and television about Yugoslavia. It seems that we are 
slipping back now, that it is a Yugoslav question, not just a Serb-
Kosovo question, that is being raised now by the media. But in any 
event, I think this would be the first time in the history of NATO that 
NATO has taken offensive action against a nation that has a dispute 
within its borders. I think it is a horrendous proposition that the 
Serbs are presenting to Kosovo. ``Either leave, or be exterminated.''
  But the question really is, What is the proper justification for this 
action

[[Page S3051]]

at the present time? If it is genocide, then I think we have really 
ample cause to be involved. If it is a matter of relocation of people 
within a nation, based upon whatever power the nation claims to 
relocate people within their boundaries, it is a different issue.
  I must admit to being torn, as one who has attended the NATO meetings 
many, many times in the past, of what will be the future of NATO, if 
this action is taken.
  I think the threat that President Bush made is the threat that all 
Americans would support; that is, that we would use military force to 
retaliate against a nation that instituted a process of racial 
cleansing, racial extermination within its borders, to the extent that 
it was contemplated at the time.
  But I have to also raise the question: Where were we in Cambodia? 
Where were we in Ethiopia? Where are we going to be as this type of 
process continues in Africa? And we are reading more and more about 
that. Even this last weekend, juxtaposed to the story about Kosovo, is 
the story about the new racial cleansing commencing once again in 
Ethiopia.
  It is not an easy issue. And I think it is one that we ought to 
pursue, because, from the point of view of this Senator, I do not like 
to set the precedent that an administration informs a foreign nation to 
sign an agreement, or, if you do not sign the agreement, we are going 
to bomb until you do. That to me is a precedent of which I don't want 
to be a part.
  If we make a statement, as President Bush made, that if you engage in 
a process that is really against a whole concept of humanity, we are 
going to be first in line to punish you for doing it. Somehow or other, 
there is a place here where we can find a common position and support 
taking action as a nation. But, for myself, I just revolt at the 
concept that we are going to send people out to negotiate peace 
agreements, or whatever other kind of agreement it is, and authorize 
them to say, ``Unless you agree with us, we are going to bomb you, and 
we are going to bomb you until you change your mind, and, if you do not 
change your mind, within our period of time, we are going to bomb you 
again.'' In this instance, the process would require taking down the 
air defenses of another nation in order that we might attack the forces 
that are on the ground.

  I assume that most Members of the Senate have been there now and know 
what they are talking about. This is the most mountainous country of 
Europe. It is a place where, as I recall, some 20-odd divisions under 
the command of Adolf Hitler got just absolutely tied down by the 
actions of the people there on the ground. Of course, they didn't have 
the precision bombing we have now. They didn't have the automated 
systems that we have now and unmanned systems that can wreck havoc on 
any nation.
  The question, really, to me is, ``Are we to offer the use of military 
power to carry out a threat of a negotiating team based upon their 
interpretation of the reasons behind a foreign nation's unwillingness 
to enter into an agreement that we sponsor?'' Or, are we going to take 
action, as I said, on behalf of humanity to prevent the extermination 
of a race? To me, there is a great gulf between those two positions.
  I intend to continue to raise the question with the President and his 
representatives about the constitutional power to make these threats, 
and then carry them out as threats as opposed to making a national 
statement--as President Bush did, as I understand it--that if there is 
a process of extermination going on, or racial cleansing going on, we 
will not stand idly by and watch that process, and we will use our 
military power.
  I don't know whether the Senator from Delaware sees the difference in 
the two circumstances. But, as far as I am concerned, we are still on 
the first base. And that is we are asked to support the concept of 
using force--our force, mainly unmanned--to coerce the Serbs into 
signing an agreement. They have refused to sign that. As a sovereign 
nation, they have that right. If they take the action that is 
contemplated, and that many people feel they are going to take--that 
is, to enter into a process of racial extermination--then it is an 
entirely different question. I do hope that the Senate will remember 
that as we are considering the majority leader's amendment tomorrow.
  It does seem to me that we are still on the question of should we use 
force to coerce the Serbs into signing the agreement that they do not 
want to sign. It is perhaps a distinction without a difference to some 
people. But it is a great difference to me.
  Mr. BIDEN. May I respond, Mr. President?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think the way that the Senator phrased it, I can 
understand how he arrives at this issue as he does. I would argue that 
it is a distinction without much of a difference.
  For example, the distinguished chairman talks about extermination 
justifying our action but relocation not. Historically, that is a 
distinction without a difference in terms of genocide. Historically, 
that is a distinction without a difference. In Bosnia, it was a 
distinction without a difference. This guy has a track record. The 
track record is clear. The track record is documented. The track record 
is obvious. So it is not a significant leap from President Bush's 
letter, which said: If they move against the Kosovars. We could argue, 
and President Bush could enlighten us what he meant by that, but the 
truth of the matter is he has moved against the Kosovars, and he is 
moving as we speak against the Kosovars. And a half-million people up 
in the mountains is a pretty big deal.

  Second, with regard to this notion of forcing a peace agreement on 
someone by saying, ``If you don't sign, we will in fact bomb,'' that 
would make sense, I would argue, if in fact we were arguing about a 
border dispute, if we are arguing about whether or not they were to pay 
reparations, if we were arguing about whether or not they are going to 
sell oil or whatever. It is not about that. It is about genocide and 
ethnic cleansing. The whole purpose of the agreement, the only reason 
why the rest of Europe--of NATO--agrees with us that there is a need 
for force on the ground in Kosovo, is to prevent--prevent--prevent 
ethnic cleansing; prevent the systematic isolation of Albanians, Moslem 
Kosovars, Moslem Serbs.
  So I understand the technical point the chairman is making. I do not 
understand the practical difference. This agreement that was signed 
onto relates to a framework that will assure the international 
community that this thug is not going to engage in the genocide he 
already has, the ethnic cleansing he has been promoting since 1989, and 
the thing for which we have a tribunal in the Hague. His military 
leadership, his puppets, are on the indictment list of the people 
engaged in this.
  I acknowledge that it has not reached the proportions it did in 
Bosnia. I acknowledge that 43 men and women forced to kneel down and 
have guns pointed to the backs of their heads and have their brains 
blown out is not enough to say it is genocide countrywide. But it sure 
is enough, in my view anyway, to get the tickler file moving a little 
bit and saying: Wait a minute, what happened after that when they did 
that in Bosnia? What happened after that when the intercepted 
communications we have between Milosevic and Karadzic and others in 
Bosnia said, ``Go get them, boys.'' Do we wait for Srebrenica to recur 
in Pristina? Do we wait for that?
  What the international community said, I say to my friend from 
Alaska--international? Let me be more precise. The contact group in 
NATO--they said, ``We do not. We learned a lesson here. We are not 
going to wait until he does that in Kosovo. We are going to work out an 
agreement.'' So they went outside Paris in some fancy old castle and 
they sat down and negotiated. And the idiot KLA, like the IRA, scuttled 
it initially because they threatened the Kosovar negotiators who were 
up there negotiating this agreement.
  But keep in mind the purpose of the negotiation. The only reason to 
put international forces on the ground in Kosovo--the only reason, none 
other--is to guarantee personnel and institutions that will prevent 
Milosevic from being able to do what President Bush was worried he 
would do and threatened him that, if he did do it, he would use force. 
So there is a distinction, I acknowledge, between preemptively making 
this case based upon recent historical record and waiting until it 
happens.

[[Page S3052]]

  But I will just say only one thing to my friend, who has forgotten 
more--and I mean this sincerely--he has forgotten more about our 
national defenses, has forgotten more about the conduct of war and the 
way to pursue it, than I am going to learn; and I acknowledge that. I 
mean that sincerely. But the one thing I am prepared to bet--prepared 
to bet my career on it --is if we do not act, I will bet my colleagues 
anything they wish to, within two years--within I think eight months, 
by the time the snows fall next winter--there will be genocide, 
documented, on a large scale, in Kosovo.
  My only argument is I think NATO is correct and the President is 
correct. I believe President Bush was correct in saying that we are 
going to stop you from doing that.

  The mechanism picked by the community, by NATO, was this peace 
agreement. That is the purpose of it. It was not to extract from 
Milosevic money, commitment, borders--anything else. It was to say: We 
are setting these folks in place to guarantee that you keep your 
promise that you are not going to eliminate these folks.
  I understand the difference. I have enormous respect for my friend 
from Alaska, but that is the basis upon which the Senator from Delaware 
believes we should act, knowing full well what he says. I do not say it 
lightly, and never having been in combat myself, as my friend from 
Alaska has been, I want him to know I do not say lightly risk these 
young women and men. Because it is a risk. He was there in the room. We 
were both there with the President. I indicated that I thought the 
President, based on the intelligence community reports and also based 
upon the briefings I have received from the military, that it is 
probable--not possible, probable--that some American flier is going to 
lose his or her life. So I do not say it lightly, but I think it is 
balanced off against whether or not we set a chain reaction in place, 
again, where we watch genocide. Either we have to act at a higher price 
or don't act and see it spread.
  I thank my colleague for his time. I know he has other business he 
wants to get to.
  Mr. STEVENS. No, Mr. President, this is the pending business. If the 
Senator is finished?
  Mr. BIDEN. I am. I yield the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS. I will go on a little bit and let him know my fears, as 
I expressed to the President, if we go after those air defenses. I hope 
Serbia knows if we go after them we will get them. There is no question 
in my mind we have absolute capability to totally destroy the air 
defenses of Serbia. After having done so, though, I wonder how are we 
going to get him to sign the agreement. If he doesn't sign the 
agreement, then I assume we are going to carry out the threat, and we 
are going to bomb his tanks. And we can do that, too. And then, if he 
doesn't sign the agreement, we can start bombing his people. And we can 
do that, too. All without involving our airmen yet. We can do all that 
without involving our airmen.
  But the time is going to come when we are going to have to use 
manpower in the air or on the ground, and that is war. We ought to make 
up our mind. What the President is deciding is to commit an act of war. 
It is not covered by article V. I do not think there would be any 
hesitancy in President Bush, that he was threatening war. If you are 
threatening war in this country, that means you get a resolution, you 
get approval of the Congress. Only Congress can declare war.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, I agree with you.
  Mr. STEVENS. I hope you do. But what is more, as I see it, once you 
do that, once you lay down the air defenses of a country, once you 
cripple their military--remember who is around them, a bunch of people 
who would like to find them crippled. Pretty soon you are going to have 
other people coming in there. We will be protecting the Serbs, before 
this is over.
  People just do not understand. We are finally going to have to put 
people on the ground and when we get people on the ground--how long 
have they been in Germany since we conquered Germany? We still have men 
and women in uniform in Germany pursuant to a peace agreement that was 
entered into 50 or more years ago. That is what I told the President. 
Mr. President, these people are going to be there 50 years if you do 
this. If you are going to do it, you better have the support of the 
American people before you do it. And the way you get the support of 
the American people is to have their Representatives here in Congress 
stand up and say yes, I am ready to vote for a declaration of war.
  I told the President, if he can show me that there is a concept of 
inhumanity, of absolutely racial cleansing, ethnic extermination, I 
will introduce his resolution of war. I told him that. But short of 
that, I do not see we should authorize a negotiator to go over to a 
foreign conference and say: Tell them if they don't agree with what you 
tell them to do, we will bomb them. If they do not agree after that, we 
will bomb them again. That is using our Armed Forces as a process of 
negotiation, not for the purpose that we maintain our military. We 
maintain our military to defend this Nation and to carry out our 
national interests abroad, not as an arm of negotiators and not to give 
the Presidency a feeling that all they have to do is enter into a 
series of negotiations, and if they fail, then use the military and 
bomb away. There is more to it than just bombing. There is more to it 
than just using Tomahawks or unmanned weapons. There is the concept of 
what is the followup. I say if we do that, if we take out their air 
defenses, we will be involved in trying to manage the Serbian military 
for the rest of my lifetime. I think I am going to live a little while, 
Mr. President. It does seem to me that it is wrong the way we are 
approaching this.

  We ought to look at what is in our national interest. If our national 
interest requires us to use military power, Congress should authorize 
them to use it. But the Presidency should not use our military power to 
carry out negotiations. That is wrong. I still maintain that the way it 
is being approached this time is wrong.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to compliment Senator Stevens for 
the statement he just made. I think he is exactly right.
  I want to follow those comments and read from the paper what the 
purpose of this proposed bombing strike is. This is the front page of 
the New York Times quoting Secretary Albright. She says:

       Mr. Milosevic has a stark choice. That choice was for him 
     to agree to the settlement signed in Paris last week by the 
     ethnic Albanians who make up most of Kosovo's population or 
     face NATO air strikes.

  In other words, Mr. Milosevic has to agree to the peace settlement, 
and he never has agreed to it, but if he doesn't agree to it, he is 
going to be bombed.
  Bombing is an act of war. So our Secretary of State and our President 
on Friday have said they support this agreement. The Serbs agree to 
this settlement that NATO has negotiated and that the Kosovars have now 
signed, or else they are going to be bombed.
  I made the comment Sunday, I said that is a crummy way to start a 
war. I look at that as us starting the war. Are the Serbians right now 
at war against Kosovo? No, Kosovo is actually part of Serbia. It has 
been for hundreds of years. Is there a lot of fighting, a lot of 
tension? Yes. The Kosovo Liberation Army, for a little over a year, has 
been attacking Serbian forces for the purpose of independence for 
Kosovo. As a matter of fact, there was a celebration in one of the 
towns that was attacked in the last 2 days, a celebration recognizing 
the fact that about a year ago in February was the first martyr for the 
KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army.
  The goal of the Kosovo Liberation Army isn't autonomy. The goal of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army is independence. They have been fighting for 
independence. They have been attacking Serbian police in the process, 
and they have been killing some. Then Serbia usually responds with a 
lot more force. They have a lot more force. They have a bigger army. 
They have tanks, and they have killed a lot of people. I am not saying 
any of this is right. I am just saying this shouldn't be a purpose for 
the United States to go to war, to initiate bombing, because Serbia has 
not yet signed on to a peace accord that we think is the right thing to 
do.

[[Page S3053]]

  I, for one, have serious reservations about it. What is the peace 
agreement that we have decided they have to accept? It is autonomy for 
Kosovo, and the second part of it is stationing 28,000 foreign troops 
in Kosovo.

  Again, Kosovo is part of Serbia. We are telling them, you must agree 
to this or you are going to be bombed. I think that is using NATO's air 
force as a bargaining tool to try to bomb them into submission to a 
peace accord that they do not want to sign. Most sovereign nations 
wouldn't want to sign onto a deal that would put 28,000 foreign troops 
on its soil.
  I think the administration is wrong in this area. Don't get me wrong. 
I think Milosevic is a tyrant. I think he is guilty of a lot of bad 
things. That still doesn't mean that I think we should go to war with 
Serbia. If we start a massive bombing campaign, we are going to war.
  I think Senator Stevens is right. The Constitution says Congress 
shall declare war. Our forefathers showed great wisdom. They did not 
want to get involved in a lot of wars. They knew that the elected 
representatives--the Congress, House Members and Senate Members--would 
be very reluctant to do so because we would be sending our constituents 
that we represent into war, so we wouldn't do it lightly. Granted, we 
also say in the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief, and 
he has the authority, and we give him that authority, to respond if 
U.S. lives, U.S. interests are at stake, but that is not the case. And 
something has to happen before Congress has a chance to convene and 
pass a declaration of war. We have all kind of assumed that.
  Frankly, this President has tried to expand that power and I think 
even abused that power in saying he has the right to agree to an 
international force that is going to conduct a war.
  NATO has never done that. Senator Stevens is exactly right. NATO is a 
defensive alliance, and it has been successful. It was formed to make 
sure that if Soviet aggression against our European allies would 
happen, that we would all work together to repel that aggression. The 
very fact that we had significant forces in training and integrated 
training, demonstrates it has been a successful alliance. Never has 
NATO gone in to say we are going to go into another country that is not 
threatening neighboring countries, not threatening part of the 
alliance, and conduct military affairs to quell a civil war.
  If we conduct bombing, if NATO conducts bombing into Serbia, we are 
going to be on the side of the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army. I said 
before, their goal is not autonomy; their goal is independence.
  I will tell my colleagues, there are some of our allies who have very 
serious problems about that happening. The Greeks primarily have 
serious reservations about the wisdom of that. I just wonder how well 
thought out this has been, or if we conduct the bombing, what happens?
  I have heard President Clinton say we want to restore stability in 
the Balkans. It may be just the opposite result. We may start bombing 
and the Serbs may really escalate their attacks. I will read a comment 
from an article in today's New York Times:

       The Yugoslav foreign minister told CNN, ``We are not 
     looking for confrontation,'' but his country considers any 
     NATO force dispatched to Kosovo to be an aggression against 
     sovereign territory, Yugoslavia.

  Other reports were that if the NATO forces would strike into Serbia, 
they would use that as an excuse to be more aggressive against the KLA. 
They might try to strike against the United States, but they hopefully 
won't have very much success against our airplanes. U.S. planes are 
going to be too high and too fast, too sophisticated to attack. They 
will see the United States is now taking sides with the Kosovars and so 
instead of attacking the United States, where they can't really be 
successful, they will be attacking the Kosovars. Instead of stopping 
violence and bringing stability and peace to the region, we might be 
escalating the war. We might be starting the war.

  I mentioned that to President Clinton. I do not want to see us start 
the war, but if we start bombing we may turn a guerrilla effort, that 
is going on right now between the KLA and Serbs, into a full-fledged 
war between the Serbs and Kosovo and see the loss of life greatly 
escalate, yet still not be successful. Just because we bomb does not 
mean that Serbia is going to say, OK, fine, you can bring the 28,000 
troops in and station them in Kosovo. They may not agree with that. 
They may escalate their warfare. You may have a greater loss of life.
  Then we are going to have another decision. Are we going to go after 
that 40,000 Serbian military force that is in Kosovo? Are we going to 
be attacking those tanks? Are we going to be attacking the platoons? 
Are we going to be going after those people? You can do only so much, 
as we all know, with airpower. How deeply engaged in this civil war are 
we going to become? Again, if our purpose was to bring about peace and 
stability, can that really happen, if we ignite that type of warfare 
throughout Kosovo and into Serbia?
  I am afraid we may be starting something we can't get out of; I am 
afraid we might be there for years and years and years.
  I have heard some of my colleagues say, wait a minute, President Bush 
was for this. I haven't heard President Bush say that he was for this. 
In December of 1992, President Bush issued a warning to Mr. Milosevic: 
Don't you dare go in and start genocide against the Kosovars or there 
will be a price to be paid.
  Frankly, I supported that. It worked. It worked for one reason--
because I think Mr. Milosevic respected President Bush, which is more 
than what I can say at the present time on U.S. leadership, or even 
NATO leadership. That is regrettable. But also I didn't hear President 
Bush, in December of 1992, saying he wanted to have a multinational 
peacekeeping force stationed in Kosovo, occupying Kosovo. He didn't say 
that.
  He just let him know that if he started a very significant genocide 
in Kosovo, there would be a price to be paid. I do not mind if this 
President lets Mr. Milosevic know that. If he started slaughtering a 
large number of people, yes, there would be a military action against 
him. It does not mean we are going to be occupying Kosovo with 28,000 
troops. I think that signal can be sent.
  That is not what I am reading in the paper. Today I read in the paper 
that Mr. Milosevic must agree to the settlement signed in Paris last 
week by ethnic Albanians that make up most of Kosovo's population or 
face NATO airstrikes. In other words, we are going to be striking if 
they do not agree to a peace agreement, and that calls for autonomy for 
Kosovo and calls for stationing 28,000 troops in their country.
  I believe that is unrealistic. I do not think that is the right 
negotiation. I do not think you can bomb another country into 
submitting to a peace plan. If they did, we would be putting 28,000 
troops, in my opinion, into very hostile territory. They would be 
vulnerable to sniper fire, and that is not a very good situation 
either.
  I have very, very strong reservations about deploying U.S. ground 
forces into Kosovo. I have told that to the President. I think that is 
a serious mistake. I hope we will not do it. That is part of the peace 
plan.
  A lot of people are not aware of it. They seem to think we are trying 
to bring Milosevic to the peace table. I want him to come to the peace 
table. I want him to sign a peace agreement. I want him to have peace 
in Kosovo. But what this administration is saying is, unless he agrees 
to the plan that has already been agreed to by NATO and the Kosovars, 
including the deployment of 28,000 troops, we are going to begin 
bombing him.
  Are we going to keep on bombing him until he agrees to the stationing 
of 28,000 troops in Kosovo? I do not think that is realistic. Then if 
we station 28,000 troops there, one, they are vulnerable to attack 
because it is a hostile area and, two, they will have to be there for a 
long, long time.
  This area does have a history of fighting that goes back for many, 
many centuries. The Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, 1389, the war 
in Kosovo--they have been fighting for centuries. There is real ethnic 
violence there. There are real problems, and I understand that.
  I do not think you can station U.S. peacekeeping forces everywhere in 
the world where there is violence. There are reports that 80-some-odd 
people

[[Page S3054]]

were killed in the last few days in Borneo; 50-some were killed in 
Russia by 1 bomb. I heard my colleague from Delaware say in 1 village, 
40-some people were assassinated, murdered, or they were killed. I do 
not know that we have seen the autopsy reports. We do not know whether 
they were carrying guns or not. They were shot point blank. We heard 
that. I do not know that to be the case.
  There are lots of atrocities when you start fighting, and we know 
that. I know we had a civil war in this country 130 years ago, and we 
had hundreds of thousands of Americans who were killed. I am glad we 
did not have other countries intervening in our Civil War. I just think 
that would have been a mistake. I know both sides were trying to get 
the French and the British involved, but I am glad they did not get 
involved.
  I seriously question the wisdom of us getting involved in this war, 
or if we are going to get involved in this one, why we are not getting 
involved on behalf of some of the Kurds in Turkey, where the loss of 
life has been some 37,000 in the last several years. Or what about in 
Sudan, where there have been over a million people massacred in the 
last 10 years? What about in Burundi, where 200,000 people have been 
murdered? I could go on and on.

  We have to be very, very cautious when we start deploying U.S. forces 
around the world. In some cases, we have done it with very noble 
intentions, but it has not worked. It did not work in the early 
eighties in Lebanon. It did not work in Somalia. We had to bring our 
troops back and, unfortunately, we brought back a lot of our troops in 
body bags.
  Again, I urge my colleagues to think seriously about what we are 
doing. For crying out loud, let's not be threatening bombing because 
the Serbs have not signed on to a peace accord that we somewhat 
arrogantly say, ``This is what you have to do, and if you don't agree, 
you're going to be bombed.'' I do not think you can bomb a country into 
submission to sign a peace agreement, especially one that also says 
they have to agree to foreign troops stationed on their soil for an 
indefinite period of time. That is a mistake.
  I compliment my friend from Alaska for his statement. Also, Mr. 
President, I reiterate that Congress needs to assert its constitutional 
prerogative, and that is that Congress has the right under article I, 
section 8, of the Constitution to declare war. Our forefathers did not 
want to make it easy for us to be involved in foreign entanglements, 
and they wanted Congress, i.e., the support of the American people, to 
be involved before we would ever do so. I think they were exactly 
right.
  If President Clinton wants to initiate this effort, he should be 
asking Congress for a declaration of war. I think we, as leaders in 
Congress, should cooperate to bring that resolution to the floor and 
have a debate, a discussion, and have a vote.
  Right now we have been talking about an amendment: No funds will be 
used for this combat or airstrikes or stationing troops until or unless 
Congress authorizes it. That may be the most expedient way of getting 
this up for a vote.
  I personally would like to see a straight resolution, just like we 
had in the Persian Gulf war, which we voted on in January of 1991, 
which authorized the use of force in the Persian Gulf. We had a very 
significant debate. Most of my colleagues who were here at the time 
said that probably was the most important vote they ever cast.
  I would like for us to have that. That resolution, I say to my 
colleagues, passed by a vote of 52 to 47, but it was significant, it 
was intense. We knew what we were talking about. We had significant 
debate on it. It was a healthy debate, and Congress supported the 
resolution. Airstrikes, I tell my friends and colleagues, started 
shortly after that resolution.
  I do not think we are ready for that in this case in Kosovo today. 
The administration needs to make their case. They then should request a 
resolution of authorization--we should prepare one or they should 
prepare one--and we would vote on it. I hope we will do that before 
hostilities are initiated by NATO; i.e., the United States.
  Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from Alaska for his 
indulgence, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
following amendments be removed from the list at the desk: Senator 
Durbin's Medicaid recoupment amendment, Senator Kohl's bankruptcy 
technical correction amendment, and Senator Lott's rules amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside so that we may consider other amendments that 
are in order under the previous order.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The Senator from Alaska has the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I know Senator Feingold wishes to make a 
statement, and I wish to accord him that privilege.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to add my thoughts to this 
critical debate about the potential deployment of United States troops 
to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping mission. I commend the Senator 
from Texas, Senator Hutchison, for her commitment to ensuring that the 
Members of this body have the opportunity to fully debate this 
important issue.
  I also commend the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Smith, for his 
work on this issue, and I share his contention that the President 
should seek congressional authorization prior to ordering a deployment 
to Kosovo.
  Mr. President, like all of us, I am gravely concerned about the 
situation in Kosovo. More than 2,000 people, including women and 
children, have been killed since the fighting between ethnic Albanians 
and Serb security forces escalated just over a year ago. Hundreds of 
thousands of people have been forced to flee from their homes and hide 
in the woods during the cold winter months. Those that are able to 
return to their villages often find their possessions looted and their 
homes burned. Recent television news reports have shown Serb police 
shamelessly waiving to the cameras as they steal televisions and other 
valuables from the deserted homes of ethnic Albanians before setting 
the homes on fire.
  Even today, as peace talks have adjourned without an agreement, the 
violence continues in Kosovo. I am pleased that four representatives 
from the Kosovar Albanian delegation last week signed the so-called 
Rambouillet agreement. However, I am alarmed that the government in 
Belgrade continues to offer ultimatums and to deploy troops and tanks 
in Kosovo. The continued defiance of President Slobodan Milosevic and 
other Serb leaders is very troubling. Once again, NATO has threatened 
airstrikes against Belgrade if the Milosevic government does not comply 
with the will of the international community. Once agains, Belgrade has 
refused.
  Last week, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
evacuated its observers from Kosovo in anticipation of possible NATO 
airstrikes. The violence in Kosovo has continued, with the aggression 
from both sides of this conflict.
  As we debate this important issue, United States Special Envoy 
Richard Holbrooke is again in Belgrade attempting one last time to 
convince President Milosevic to cease his operations against the 
Kosovar Albanians and embark on a path to peace. Although I commend Mr. 
Holbrooke for his efforts, and hope, of course, that he is successful, 
I am skeptical.
  Mr. President, I firmly believe that it is critical for Congress to 
take an active role in the debate and decision to send our men and 
women in uniform into any potentially hostile situation. As our 
constituents' voices in matters of policy, we in Congress must fully 
debate this important issue and vote up or down on whether or not to 
authorize such a deployment.
  While I am pleased that the European members of NATO are taking the 
lead on the proposed deployment to Kosovo to implement the Rambouillet 
agreement, I have serious concerns about the United States 
participation in the form of U.S. troops in that mission.
  No matter how one feels about the conflict in Kosovo or about the 
future of that province, under current American policy Kosovo is 
considered part of

[[Page S3055]]

Serbia, comprising, along with Montenegro, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had made it 
abundantly clear that NATO troops are not welcome on what he refers to 
as ``Serb territory,'' and he has begun to amass troops along the 
border with Macedonia, where approximately 12,000 NATO troops are 
already currently deployed.
  In addition, for the moment, there is no peace to be kept by the 
peacekeeping force. While the Kosovar Albanian delegation in France has 
signed the Rambouillet agreement, the Serbs remain adamant that they 
will not sign the agreement unless the Kosovar Albanians and the 
Contact Group accept their latest demands. Many observers see this as a 
stalling tactic on the part of the Serbs, since they are demanding 
changes to text that already has been agreed upon.
  It is into this very uncertain situation and environment that the 
President has proposed to deploy 4,000 United States troops.
  Mr. President, with great regret, I have concluded that I must oppose 
the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo at this time. I am compelled to 
do so for several reasons.
  First, the potential for harm to our men and women in uniform is too 
great, and there is too much uncertainty surrounding the proposed 
deployment. The continuing violence in Kosovo, coupled with the 
mobilization of Serb troops in the area, fosters a volatile environment 
into which our troops should not be deployed. The fact that the Serbs 
are not presently willing to sign the Rambouillet agreement or allow 
NATO troops into Kosovo makes it hard to believe that there will be any 
peace at all for foreign troops to keep.
  Second, since 1995, I have vigorously opposed the deployment of U.S. 
troops to Bosnia. One can draw disturbing parallels between the 
deployment to Bosnia and the proposed deployment to Kosovo. The 
administration, in my opinion, has again failed to make the case to the 
American people and to the Congress for the deployment of U.S. ground 
troops in the Balkans. As with the Bosnia mission, there is no clear 
set of goals beyond ``maintaining'' a currently nonexistent peace, 
there is no timetable for withdrawal, no cost estimate, and no exit 
strategy.
  Mr. President, I have come to the floor of the Senate many times in 
the last 3 years to talk about the U.S. deployment to Bosnia. I have 
consistently opposed that deployment and have supported a number of 
attempts to end it. I cannot help but think that this proposed 
deployment to Kosovo is another in the long line of ill-fated and 
seemingly unending peacekeeping missions that this administration has 
chosen to undertake without the explicit authorization of the Congress.
  Last week in the Washington Post, columnist David Broder wrote, 
``Sending in the military to impose a peace on a people who have not 
yet settled ancient quarrels has to be the last resort, not the 
standard way of doing business.'' I agree with Mr. Broder. Peacekeeping 
should be the exception, not the rule. I ask unanimous consent that the 
full text of Mr. Broder's column be printed in the Record following my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am seriously concerned that the 
administration has cited the Bosnia mission as some kind of positive 
precedent for a deployment to Kosovo--or anywhere else. In my view, the 
mission to Bosnia should not be a precedent for anything. The 
deployment to Bosnia has resulted in, of course, some real benefits for 
the people of that region, but it has resulted in less favorable 
consequences for the United States. However, the lack of clear goals 
and a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, and the glaring absence of an exit 
strategy, now more than 3 years later, and more than $9 billion after 
the initial deployment, remain troubling.
  Let me repeat that. We were promised that the troops would be out of 
Bosnia in 1 year, that the troops would be home by December of 1996; 
and after we were promised that, we would spend at the most $2 billion. 
Our troops are still there, and it has cost over $9 or $10 billion. And 
now they do not even talk about getting out on any date certain. Any 
new deployment to the Balkans must not unduly add to the spiraling cost 
American taxpayers are being asked to bear for our already very, very 
expensive mission in Bosnia.
  I do not want to see the mistakes of Bosnia repeated in Kosovo at the 
expense of our men and women in uniform. Our armed services have served 
very admirably in the Balkans. They and their families and fellow 
citizens have a right to know the details of the proposed deployment 
before it happens.
  Third, I am concerned that the proposed deployment to Kosovo could 
set a new precedent for international peacekeeping. As we prepare to 
mark NATO's 50th anniversary, the topic of continued out-of-area NATO 
deployments for peacekeeping is a valid point of concern. How do we 
justify United States participation in NATO missions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo but not in international deployments in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or 
the Congo, where many of the same tragic types of occurrences have been 
occurring for several years? Violent civil wars have shredded the 
fabric of civil society around the globe, but it doesn't seem to me, 
after observing this for over 6 years, that we have a clear principle 
for deciding where and when to intervene. No such principle emerges 
from the observation and the justifications for both the Bosnia and 
Kosovo proposed intervention.
  Finally, I am concerned about the deployment of our men and women in 
uniform to Kosovo because our troops are already stretched too thin 
around the globe. Currently, there are more than a quarter-million 
American troops deployed in foreign areas, from Haiti, to Bosnia, to 
the Persian Gulf, to the Korean peninsula. When I talk to my 
constituents, they are startled to hear that there is something like a 
quarter-million American troops, approximately 250,000 American troops, 
stationed around the world at this time.
  I commend again our men and women in uniform for their service to our 
country. I cannot, however, support a policy that overcommits our 
American troops abroad, especially when the situation into which they 
would be sent in Kosovo is so very uncertain. Again, there will be more 
debate on this, and I think that is terribly important.
  I conclude my remarks by thanking the Senators from Texas and New 
Hampshire for their work on this issue. I am also pleased that the 
House of Representatives took an opportunity to debate this extremely 
important issue and that the Senate has followed suit today.
  Again, I regret that I am unable to support the deployment of U.S. 
troops to Kosovo at this time.

                             Exhibit No. 1

               [From the Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1999]

                   Before We Send in the Troops . . .

                          (By David S. Broder)

       Last Saturday, two days after the House of Representatives 
     had narrowly defeated a resolution opposing the deployment of 
     U.S. troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, 
     The Post's Douglas Farah reported some disquieting news about 
     a previous peacekeeping mission to Haiti.
       The chief of the U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Charles E. 
     Wilhelm, had told a closed session of a House subcommittee 
     last month he wanted the troops removed from Haiti because 
     the continuing instability of that poverty-stricken island 
     nation put them at too grave a risk, according to a 
     transcript of the hearing obtained by Farah.
       You may be forgiven if you are surprised to learn the Army 
     is still in Haiti. It has been more than four years now since 
     the September day in 1994 when President Clinton sent a force 
     of 20,000 troops onto the island. There was immense relief 
     when last-minute negotiations cleared the way for their 
     arrival; when they left their bases, they expected to have to 
     fight their way ashore. But the brutal generals running the 
     country backed down, and soon were replaced--thanks to U.S. 
     force--by elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
       Neither Aristide nor his successor, Rene Preval, has been 
     able to bring peace or democracy to Haiti. Factional fighting 
     has immobilized the government and stymied efforts at 
     economic recovery. And now that the factionalism has provoked 
     assassinations and bombings reminiscent of the bad old days, 
     the 500 U.S. troops still in Haiti spend much of their energy 
     just trying to protect themselves against those they came to 
     help.
       It would be difficult for the Clinton administration to 
     accept the general's call for a pullout, for it would concede 
     the failure of a peacekeeping mission regularly touted as one 
     of the signal achievements of recent years.
       It would be especially embarrassing at the very moment when 
     the administration is

[[Page S3056]]

     trying to squelch opposition in Congress--fed by such foreign 
     policy luminaries as Henry Kissinger--to sending 4,000 U.S. 
     troops to Kosovo in a new peacekeeping mission.
       Two days before peace talks resumed between the Serb forces 
     occupying Kosovo and the rebel forces who claim to speak for 
     the 90 percent Albanian population of the province, bombs 
     planted by unknown persons killed at least seven people--a 
     reminder of how far from peace Kosovo is.
       During House debate, the question repeatedly raised was 
     what assurance the administration could give that once the 
     troops were sent into Kosovo, they would ever be able to get 
     out. The response was that without NATO troops on the ground, 
     the killing would go on, and without U.S. participation, our 
     European NATO allies would not go it alone.
       This was the latest manifestation of what might be called 
     the Wilsonian conundrum. It was Woodrow Wilson, in the 
     aftermath of World War I, who most boldly asserted the 
     doctrine that the United States would not only use its might 
     to protect its national interests against any external 
     threats but would aid the struggle for democracy, freedom and 
     self-determination of oppressed people wherever it was being 
     fought.
       Wilson's ambitions were almost instantly repudiated by the 
     Senate in the debate over the League of Nations, but his 
     ideas have influenced almost all his successors from FDR 
     through Clinton. Under the slogans of human rights, 
     liberation of captive nations or peacekeeping, they have 
     tried--with only intermittent success--to lift American 
     foreign policy beyond the crass calculations of power 
     politics and into the exalted realm of morality and justice.
       What we have learned, I think, is that all those good 
     values cannot be imposed at the point of a gun--even if the 
     gun is held by an American soldier who wants nothing in 
     return but a safe trip back home.
       Peace cannot be built unless and until the warring parties 
     have exhausted themselves with bloodshed and are ready to 
     take the responsibility on themselves to turn a new page. No 
     better example can be found this Saint Patrick's Day than 
     Northern Ireland, where decades of sectarian violence 
     blessedly have given way to a shaky peace.
       The United States, led personally by Clinton, played an 
     honorable and vital role in bringing about that change. But 
     it did so at the conference table, using diplomats, not 
     troops.
       The lesson is not that we should never be peacekeepers; 
     rather, that there has to be a peace to keep. Sending in the 
     military to impose a peace on people who have not settled 
     ancient quarrels has to be the last resort, not the standard 
     way of doing business.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in view of the posture taken by the other 
side of the aisle, as I understand it, we will not take up any other 
amendments until we dispose of this amendment, which I understand. I 
will pursue the closing arrangement for the Senate so that we might put 
Senators on notice that there will be no other amendments considered 
today and that we will close.

                          ____________________