[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 45 (Monday, March 22, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3028-S3031]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 KOSOVO

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, the American people should realize and 
understand that in his press conference just 2 days ago, President 
Clinton talked about the justification for United States-led airstrikes 
against Serbian troops in Kosovo and that today we are apparently 
within hours--within hours--of going to war. He acknowledged that our 
U.S. pilots would be put at risk. And last week, the Pentagon's top 
military commanders also warned those of us on the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that there could be U.S. casualties if NATO launches 
airstrikes in an effort to pressure President Milosevic to accept the 
peace agreement that has been drafted by the U.S. and its allies and 
apparently signed by the Kosovar Albanians.
  General Michael Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said this:

       There is a distinct possibility we will lose aircraft in 
     trying to penetrate those defenses.

  Our Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak said:

       It is going to be tremendously dangerous. Serbian air 
     defenses are mobile, the terrain is very tough and the 
     weather cannot be underestimated.

  General Krulak also said there were some bottom-line questions that 
still need to be answered: What is the end game? What happens if the 
Serbs do not come to the table after the first airstrike? How long will 
the strikes go on? Will our allies stay with us?
  General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, also discussed the 
probability--and I emphasize the word ``probability''--of sending 4,000 
U.S. troops as part of the NATO peacekeeping force. He said:

       The current commitment on the ground remains a still-
     elusive peacekeeping argument. However, our troops earmarked 
     for that are prepared.

  General Reimer agreed with the chairman of the committee, Senator 
John Warner, who warned of the massing of Serbian troops on the border 
of Kosovo preparing for extensive ground operations.
  Mr. President, my colleagues and the American public should 
understand, notwithstanding yet another round of last-minute diplomatic 
efforts by the administration's special envoy and the architect of U.S. 
policy in the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, who is meeting with Mr. 
Milosevic as of today, the United States is preparing to go to war 
against the sovereign country of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
and this air attack is very likely to be followed by U.S. ground 
troops.
  As former Senator Bob Dole said on ``Meet the Press'' yesterday, it 
is time for the U.S. to fish or cut bait in the Balkans.
  Compounding the situation is the fact that the Russian Prime 
Minister, Mr. Primakov, a staunch opponent of airstrikes and an ally of 
Milosevic, will be in Washington tomorrow, and I think his visit really 
presents a unique problem. An attack during Primakov's visit would 
certainly not help repair frayed U.S. and Russian relations. However, 
he is not due to leave until Friday. In a real paradox, by meeting with 
Mr. Primakov this week and delaying the attack, the administration may 
well give Mr. Milosevic additional time to launch an offensive, an 
offensive, by the way, which is also happening now.
  General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander, has warned time and again 
that if no accord is reached, the Serb forces will resume fighting on a 
very large scale, and that is happening.
  As the debate showed in the House of Representatives several weeks 
ago, and as the debate also continues in this body as of today and 
tomorrow, many in the Congress are concerned and frustrated and torn. 
Some support airstrikes and some do not. Some support ground troops; 
more do not. But we all agree, I think, that the Congress and the 
American people certainly deserve a better explanation of the 
administration's policy in the Balkans.

  It is not that we have not asked the administration for 
clarification. Last July, I offered an amendment to the defense 
appropriations bill that required the President to come before the 
American people and the Congress before he committed the U.S. to a 
military involvement in Kosovo. The amendment was not prejudicial. It 
simply required the President to make the case as to why intervention 
in Kosovo was in our vital national security interest.
  The language contained in section 8115 of Public Law 105-262--and it 
is the law of the land--unambiguously states that none of the funds 
appropriated or otherwise made available under the act may be obligated 
or expended for any additional deployment of the Armed Forces of the 
United States unless and until the President, in consultation with the 
leadership of the Congress, transmits to Congress a report that 
includes the following:
  No. 1: certification that the presence of those forces to be deployed 
is necessary to the national security interests of the United States;
  No. 2: the reasons why the deployment is in the national security 
interest;
  No. 3: the number of military personnel to be deployed;
  No. 4: the mission and objectives of forces to be deployed;
  No. 5: the expected time schedule for accomplishing the objectives of 
the deployment;
  No. 6: the exit strategy;
  No. 7: the costs;
  And lastly,
  No. 8: the anticipated effects on the morale, the retention and the 
effectiveness of United States forces.
  Mr. President, although our United States pilots are about to take 
part in an air attack that will put them in harm's way, to be followed 
by some 4,000 ground troops, that report--that report--required by 
law--has not been submitted to the Congress.
  Last week, in the briefing that was conducted by Secretary of State 
Albright, National Security Council Chairman Berger, and Secretary of 
Defense Cohen, I again asked if the report would be forthcoming. I 
asked if the latest briefing--requested, by the way, by our Majority 
Leader Lott--served in lieu of the report. The response of Mr. Berger 
was unclear to me, but in past conversations in previous briefings he 
said the administration should and could answer all the questions 
involved, and that the report would be made ``at the appropriate 
time.''
  With the attack imminent, it would seem now is the appropriate time. 
As a matter of fact, with all due respect to the administration, 
submitting such a report would not be difficult and it would be 
helpful. If the administration thinks--and they apparently think--that 
this is the case, that threats of military action may alter the 
behavior of the Serbs, of Milosevic, what clearer signal of intent to 
forcibly stop the violence against the Albanians than the President of 
the United States laying out the issues to Congress and the American 
people?
  Perhaps we can do the administration a favor today. In answering 
these questions, required by public law, let us simply take public 
statements from the President and his Cabinet officers, as well as 
statements made in briefings to the Congress that have been reported in 
the public press.
  As a Member of both the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence 
Committees, I want to emphasize there should not and cannot be any 
disclosure of military details of any proposed action, the timing of 
the action or the types or selection of various weapon platforms.
  Let's take the reporting requirements--1, 2, and then 4. They ask the 
President to describe why deploying to Kosovo is in the national 
security interest of the United States as well as

[[Page S3029]]

what specific objectives our forces will have once on the ground in the 
province.
  They are of particular importance because it will be these goals for 
which our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines will be risking their 
lives. Let me put it another way. Should a father, a mother, a husband 
or a wife--or any family member--have to ask, ``For what did my son or 
daughter, husband or wife, mom or dad die for?'' the answers to these 
questions will have to suffice.
  Questions Nos. 1 and 2:
  Certify the presence of forces to be deployed is necessary to the 
national security interests of the United States and the reasons why 
the deployment is in the national security interest.
  Here is the answer that I am suggesting to the Clinton 
administration. President Clinton, taken from President Clinton's press 
conference last Friday: It could be in the report. I am quoting the 
President:

       A part of my responsibility is to try to leave to my 
     successors, and to our country in the 21st century, an 
     environment in Europe that is stable, humane and secure. It 
     will be a big part of America's future.

  The President went on to say:

       As we prepare to act, we need to remember the lessons 
     learned in the Balkans. We should remember the horror of the 
     war in Bosnia, the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children, 
     the faces of young men behind barbed wire, the despairing 
     voices of those who thought nothing could be done. It took 
     precious time to achieve allied unity there, but when we did, 
     our firmness ended all that. Bosnia is now at peace.

  I continue to quote the President:

       Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will 
     to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with 
     aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. 
     But, action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.

  And then the President goes on to specifically talk about why he 
thinks this is in our national interest. And it should be made part of 
the report, if he would simply submit it to the congressional 
leadership. He said:

       We must also understand our stake in peace in the Balkans 
     and in Kosovo. This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much 
     more. This is a conflict with no boundaries. It threatens our 
     national interests. If it continues, it will push refugees 
     across borders, and draw in neighboring countries. It will 
     undermine the credibility of NATO, on which stability in 
     Europe and our own credibility depend. It will likely 
     reignite the historical animosities, including those that can 
     embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey. These 
     divisions still have the potential to make the next century a 
     truly violent one for that part of the world that straddles 
     Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
       Unquestionably, there are risks in military action, if that 
     becomes necessary. U.S. and other NATO pilots will be put in 
     harm's way. The Serbs have a strong air defense system. But, 
     we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction. If 
     we don't act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not 
     be able to contain it without far greater risk and cost. I 
     believe the real challenge of our foreign policy today is to 
     deal with problems before they do permanent harm to our vital 
     interests. That is what we must do in Kosovo.

  Finally, the President said this:

       One of the things that I wanted to do when I became 
     president is to take advantage of this moment in history to 
     build an alliance with Europe for the 21st century, with a 
     European undivided, strong, secure, prosperous and at peace. 
     That is why I have supported the unification of Europe 
     financially, politically, economically. That is why I've 
     supported the expansion of NATO and a redefinition of its 
     missions.

  Here is another answer that the administration could include in the 
report to the Congress as justification for an attack on Serbia and 
whether or not this is in our vital national interest.
  Secretary of State Albright: This is taken from press accounts of 
congressional briefings. Six reasons:
  No. 1: the Balkans represent a bridge between Europe and the Middle 
East and therefore are of strategic interest.
  No. 2: unless we stop this conflict, it will spin into Albania, 
Macedonia, Greece and Turkey. The First World War started there. 
Another could again.
  No. 3: we have a humanitarian obligation to stop massacres and 
refugee flight.
  No. 4: what we do in Kosovo has a direct bearing on what has been 
achieved in Bosnia.
  No. 5: what we do in Kosovo represents our leadership role in NATO, 
the credibility of NATO; both relevant to the future of NATO into the 
next century.
  And lastly, No. 6: it is in our national interest to oppose Serb 
aggression.
  One more answer: Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1999:

       First, we have a clear interest in protecting stability in 
     a key part of Europe and our investment in Bosnia. If we 
     don't stop the conflict in Kosovo, it could draw in 
     Albania and Macedonia, potentially threaten our NATO 
     allies in Greece and Turkey and thereby divide the 
     alliance.
       Second, We have an important interest in averting another 
     humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. Continued conflict also 
     would create new opportunities for international terrorists, 
     drug smugglers and criminals.
       Third, America has a clear interest in ending years of Serb 
     repression by strengthening democracy, upholding the rule of 
     law including the valuable contribution of the International 
     Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and protecting 
     human rights.
       Finally, persisting conflict in Kosovo would undermine 
     NATO's credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in 
     the Balkans and U.S. credibility as one of the leaders of 
     NATO.

  Now, there, I have submitted the administration's report as to why 
this is in our national interest, a report that has not been 
forthcoming, by simply quoting the President, the Secretary of State, 
and the Undersecretary of State. Whether or not you think that adds up 
to a rationale as to why we should be going to war is another question, 
but at least it is there.

  Question No. 3 that is required by public law: Please provide the 
number of military personnel to be deployed.
  Answer: In numerous press reports, President Clinton and various 
defense officials have stated the United States will commit up to 4,000 
troops for deployment to enforce a peace agreement. However, the number 
of U.S. personnel who provide intelligence, logistical support, 
extraction capability, and offshore platforms is not available.
  Question No. 4: What are the mission and objectives of the forces to 
be deployed?
  Answer: In regard to the airstrike, the press reports as of today 
state:

       NATO plans call first for a short, sharp demonstration 
     airstrike consisting mainly of cruise missiles. [Casualty 
     avoidance--those are my words not the press commentary.] If 
     Mr. Milosevic does not submit, NATO, after additional 
     consultation, [with our allies] plans to launch a sustained 
     and rigorous bombing campaign that could last as long as a 
     week.

  The report went on to say:

       A combination of U.S. cruise missiles and up to 400 
     American and European fighter jets would attempt to take out 
     Serbia's command and control structures and its air defense 
     system and also to strip Serbia's military in Kosovo of its 
     ability to attack Kosovo fighters.

  Just for the record again, the same press reports stress senior U.S. 
military officers have warned the Congress the air mission over Serbia 
would be tremendously dangerous with a high risk of NATO casualties.
  Question No. 5, as required in the report: The expected schedule for 
accomplishing the objectives of the deployment.
  Answer: It is not available--or at least it is not available on all 
the press reports, the briefings, and the information I have been able 
to obtain in regard to this weekend and in many previous months.
  Question No. 6: The exit strategy for the United States forces 
engaged in the deployment.
  I want all of my colleagues to pay attention to this response; this 
is the exit strategy.
  Answer: American negotiator Christopher Hill, in discussing the 
negotiated peace agreement, has stated in the press that under the 
agreement, Serbia would remain sovereign over Kosovo for the next 3 
years. Under the NATO peacekeeping force, including the 4,000 
Americans, the Kosovo Liberation Army would disband and the Serbs would 
withdraw all but security forces.
  That is certainly not the case as of today. However, Under Secretary 
of State Thomas Pickering, again, in a very cogent and a very 
comprehensive briefing in response said before the committee February 
25:

       With respect to our exit strategy, we have learned from our 
     experience in Bosnia that we should not set artificial 
     deadlines. Rather, we should seek to create the conditions 
     for self-sustaining peace so that the timing and 
     circumstances for the reduction and ending of the presence of 
     an international military force is well defined. There are a 
     series of core conditions--apparently what will

[[Page S3030]]

     have to take place in regard to Kosovo before the 4,000 
     troops--or how many would be deployed there as peacekeepers--
     could exit:

  One, military stability including the swift and orderly departure of 
all Serb forces except those required for border security; two, 
replacement of Serb security forces with a functioning, local, 
representative police force; elections that meet international 
standards; and establishment of legitimate political institutions that 
would provide for substantial and sustained Kosovar autonomy.
  That is a pretty tall order. That is a pretty tall order. We have 
seen the situation in Bosnia where we were to be there for 1 year; we 
have been there for 4 so far. It is now $10 to $12 billion. As we 
learned in the Balkans, time limits don't mean too much.
  Question No. 7, as required by the amendment in the defense 
appropriations bill in regard to a report that has not been 
forthcoming: The costs associated with the deployment and the funding 
sources for paying these costs.
  Answer: Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth Bacon on February 29: 
We have calculated or estimated the cost of what it would be to send 
the U.S. portion of a peacekeeping force into Kosovo. That would be 
about $1.5 to $2 billion a year but no decision will be made on sending 
peacekeepers in until there is a peace agreement.
  Again, the Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, who has been 
very candid before the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``An additional 
important element''--now, just stop here for a minute. It will be $2 
billion a year at least for 3 years and perhaps more.
  Then, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering in a very candid 
statement said:

       An additional important element in ensuring an effective 
     and sustainable agreement will be international assistance 
     for Kosovo. The U.S. plans to make a substantial contribution 
     to bolster European Union efforts. We have requested $50 
     million as part of the 2000 fiscal year budget request. We 
     anticipate identifying additional funds needed to support the 
     civilian implementation aspects of the agreement including 
     funds to:
       Repair damaged infrastructure--

  The thought has just occurred to me, if we have airstrikes in Kosovo 
and Serbia and we destroy the infrastructure, we are now making the 
promise to send funds to repair the damaged infrastructure--

       Stimulate economic growth in Kosovo through microlending;
       Support free elections;
       Assist in the establishment both of communal police units 
     and an independent Judiciary system.

  It seems to me, Mr. President, that will add up to a great deal more 
money than the $2 billion a year. I can find no statement by the 
administration as to how they will request these funds. I assume they 
would come under an emergency supplemental, very similar to the one we 
are discussing on the floor today.
  Finally, question No. 8: The anticipated effects of the deployment on 
the morale, retention, and effectiveness of the United States forces.
  While I think this is certainly needed, there is no answer that is 
available.
  So that is it. Albeit, with very limited time and access to 
information over this weekend, and probably with some degree a lack of 
expertise, I have tried to piece together the response that the 
administration could make within a consultation requirement--a 
requirement again stated in public law--that would certainly help in 
the debate we are having today in regard to U.S. policy in the Balkans.

  I have to say, with all due respect to the rationale behind this 
policy, I believe there are a great many more questions that remain 
that should have been answered before now, before, once again, U.S. 
credibility is on the line. As a matter of fact, last Friday the 
situation was summed up aptly by Mr. Fred Hiatt, a columnist with the 
Washington Post. The column was entitled ``The Credibility Factor.'' I 
ask unanimous consent to have the full article printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1999]

                         The Credibility Factor

                            (By Fred Hiatt)

       ``It's well known,'' an administration spokesman said last 
     week, that the President is ``a tactician and not a 
     strategist, and maybe looks to the next day and not the day 
     after.''
       The official was talking about Yugoslav President Slobodan 
     Milosevic. But the description seemed oddly apt for President 
     Clinton, too. When the two face off, as they are now doing 
     over Kosovo, that puts the United States at a disadvantage. A 
     tactician with a free totalitarian hand will always have the 
     initiative over one operating in a democracy.
       This isn't to say that Clinton is the moral equivalent of 
     Milosevic, one of the reprehensible war criminals of this 
     decade. But Clinton is always inclined toward the easy, 
     short-term win, the half-way solution; and he has been 
     willing to sacrifice truth and to slight principle to achieve 
     his daily victories.
       Now, when he should be building support in Congress and 
     among the public for a difficult but necessary confrontation, 
     he is paying a price for that record. With good reason, many 
     voters do not believe he has thought out the consequences of 
     his Kosovo policy; in the post-impeachment era, many members 
     of Congress do not believe him, period.
       The tactical victories Clinton has achieved with deception 
     are considerable. During the impeachment trial, it became 
     almost a cliche to attack the President for not having come 
     clean as soon as Ken Starr began nosing around. If he had 
     just 'fessed up in the first place, went the refrain, the 
     country would have been spared this long trauma.
       As a matter of principle, of course that was true. But 
     tactically Clinton was right and his critics were wrong. If 
     Clinton had said back in January 1997 that, yes, he had been 
     using the Oval Office for sexual encounters with an intern 
     and, yes, he had lied about this under oath during a civil 
     deposition and, no, he didn't consider oral sex to be sex--he 
     might not have survived the week. But he lied about ``that 
     woman'' and survived the week, and the next week, and the one 
     after that.
       You could say his tactical dissembling has paid off in 
     foreign policy, too. When he was dispatching troops to Bosnia 
     in 1995, he promised they'd be there for only one year. The 
     promise helped him win acquiescence from a reluctant 
     Congress, and there wasn't much Congress could do when one 
     year rolled into another and the troops did not come home.
       Sending troops was the right thing to do, and keeping them 
     there beyond a year was right, too. Any maybe, given doubts 
     in Congress and the country, Clinton's way was the only one 
     that would have worked. Maybe honest leadership wouldn't have 
     carried the day. We'll never know.
       What we do know is that his method of operation--his search 
     for the risk-free alternative, his reluctance to spend 
     political capital, to fully confront or explain the long-term 
     consequences of policy--has a cumulative, corrosive effect. 
     Clinton wouldn't push for U.S. troops to arrest war criminals 
     or assist in the return of refugees, so Bosnia is farther 
     from real peace than it should be--and the troops will have 
     to stay longer as a result.
       Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility 
     diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of 
     success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force 
     even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the 
     long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be 
     used.
       Now all these chickens--the diminished credibility abroad, 
     the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to 
     fashion a strategy--are coming to roost in Kosovo. Clinton 
     has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe this time 
     he means it. But then what? Clinton also has promised that 
     U.S. troops will not be sent into a ``non-permissive'' 
     environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other words, only 
     when Milosevic welcomes them in.
       ``These are incompatible objectives,'' Sen. Gordon Smith 
     said in an interview. A freshman Republican from Oregon who 
     chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Europe, 
     Smith is no isolationist; he has said he would support a 
     dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right 
     circumstances. But he worries that Clinton has no credible 
     plan.
       Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to 
     call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace 
     treaty and admit NATO troops. But what it if doesn't? What if 
     Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in 
     Pristina and villages through the province? Clinton, to 
     assuage his fretful military commanders, has already promised 
     not to follow air power with troops. But air power can't 
     solve every problem.
       If NATO bombs, Smith said, it should no longer pretend to 
     be neutral. ``The problem is Milosevic,'' he said. ``If you 
     go along that path, go to win.''
       Is Clinton prepared to see it through? On Friday he made a 
     case for bombing, but did not explain what might come next, 
     nor why those next steps would be worth the risk to U.S. life 
     and treasure? Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the day after.

  Mr. ROBERTS. In part he stated:

       Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility 
     diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of 
     success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force 
     even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the 
     long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be 
     used.
       Now all these chickens--the diminished credibility abroad, 
     the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to 
     fashion a strategy--are coming [home] to roost in Kosovo. 
     Clinton has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe 
     this time he

[[Page S3031]]

     means it. [I think he does.] But then what? Clinton also has 
     promised that U.S. troops will not be sent into a ``non-
     permissive'' environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other 
     words, only when Milosevic welcomes them in.
       ``These are incompatible objectives.'' [He is quoting my 
     colleague and my friend from Oregon, Senator Gordon Smith, 
     who said in an interview--and, by the way, Senator Smith is 
     the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
     Europe] [he] is no isolationists; he has said he would 
     support a dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right 
     circumstances. But he worries that [there is] no credible 
     plan.
       Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to 
     call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace 
     treaty and admit NATO troops. But what if it doesn't? What if 
     Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in 
     Pristina and villages throughout the province?

  That is happening as I speak.

       Clinton, to assuage his fretful military commanders--who 
     have good reason to fret--has already promised not to follow 
     air power with troops. But air power can't solve every 
     problem.
       If NATO bombs, [Senator] Smith said, it should no longer 
     pretend to be neutral. ``The problem is Milosevic,'' he said. 
     ``If you go along that path, go to win.''

  I certainly associate myself with the comments of Senator Smith.

       Is Clinton [is this Congress and are the American public] 
     prepared to see it through? On Friday, he made a case for 
     bombing [and the intervention] but did not explain what might 
     come next, nor why those next steps would be worth the risk 
     to U.S. life and treasure. Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the 
     day after.

  That was the conclusion of the editorial.
  I have questions, but I am not going to take too much time to go over 
all the questions I have as a result of the statements that have been 
made. But in regard to Kosovo, what is the end state? What do we want 
to see in Kosovo once we are done doing whatever it is we plan to do?
  If we don't want to support the independence and secession of the 
Kosovars, why are we serving as their air force?
  How do we know we have ever attained our aims?
  What are the measures of merit?
  How long might it take?
  We have talked about an exit strategy. I think we should focus on 
strategy; that is, on what we are trying to achieve, through what 
means, and how do we know we are done?

  I don't accept the argument in regard to NATO credibility, or that 
NATO credibility is on the line, as an answer to why we should go 
there. NATO's credibility is sky high. Just ask all the nations who 
want to get in.
  How is bombing conducive to peaceful conflict resolution? Have we 
ever been able to bomb a country into submission so that they would 
agree with our point of view? What if initial strikes don't attain the 
desired effect? How far are we willing to go to compel the Serbs to 
bend to our will? What are the risks? Why send peacekeepers when there 
is no peace to be kept and neither side wants to compromise? It seems 
that is the case.
  Why are we seeking to compel a sovereign nation--by the way, 
Yugoslavia was a founding member of the U.N.--to cede its territorial 
sovereignty to a guerrilla movement? What message does this send to 
other secessionists worldwide?
  How do you explain supporting Yeltsin in fighting to keep Chechnya 
within the Russian Federation, at a cost of about 50,000 casualties--
indeed, comparing the Russian action to the American Civil War and, by 
implication, Yeltsin to Lincoln--and bombing the Serbs for trying to 
keep their country together? That is a point of view.
  Which of the many Kosovar factions are we supporting? How much top-
down control and professional discipline do we expect from all sides 
involved?
  The mission order for Bosnia, which has been referred to as a good 
case study for Kosovo, was, ``Attack across the Sava River,'' and we 
went in with overwhelming force, which we then scaled down as the 
threat receded. We are doing it the other way regarding Kosovo. Why 
aren't we following that model? Remember the strategic insight of an 
18-year-old Marine in Beirut: ``If we are here to fight, we are too 
few; if we are here to die, we are too many.''
  All of these questions I have mentioned--some of which I share with a 
great deal of support from others--I think certainly should be debated, 
should certainly come to the floor. That has not been the case. I do 
hope the administration will submit their report soon. I hope they 
don't submit the report after the President has given the order and the 
troops are there, for at that time every Member of the Senate and House 
will certainly want to support our troops.
  I worry about this, Mr. President. We are going to war. The President 
has spoken to the issue, other Cabinet officials have spoken to the 
issue, but many questions remain.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WYDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 
15 minutes at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________