[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 45 (Monday, March 22, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3028-S3031]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
KOSOVO
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, the American people should realize and
understand that in his press conference just 2 days ago, President
Clinton talked about the justification for United States-led airstrikes
against Serbian troops in Kosovo and that today we are apparently
within hours--within hours--of going to war. He acknowledged that our
U.S. pilots would be put at risk. And last week, the Pentagon's top
military commanders also warned those of us on the Senate Armed
Services Committee that there could be U.S. casualties if NATO launches
airstrikes in an effort to pressure President Milosevic to accept the
peace agreement that has been drafted by the U.S. and its allies and
apparently signed by the Kosovar Albanians.
General Michael Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said this:
There is a distinct possibility we will lose aircraft in
trying to penetrate those defenses.
Our Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak said:
It is going to be tremendously dangerous. Serbian air
defenses are mobile, the terrain is very tough and the
weather cannot be underestimated.
General Krulak also said there were some bottom-line questions that
still need to be answered: What is the end game? What happens if the
Serbs do not come to the table after the first airstrike? How long will
the strikes go on? Will our allies stay with us?
General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, also discussed the
probability--and I emphasize the word ``probability''--of sending 4,000
U.S. troops as part of the NATO peacekeeping force. He said:
The current commitment on the ground remains a still-
elusive peacekeeping argument. However, our troops earmarked
for that are prepared.
General Reimer agreed with the chairman of the committee, Senator
John Warner, who warned of the massing of Serbian troops on the border
of Kosovo preparing for extensive ground operations.
Mr. President, my colleagues and the American public should
understand, notwithstanding yet another round of last-minute diplomatic
efforts by the administration's special envoy and the architect of U.S.
policy in the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, who is meeting with Mr.
Milosevic as of today, the United States is preparing to go to war
against the sovereign country of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
and this air attack is very likely to be followed by U.S. ground
troops.
As former Senator Bob Dole said on ``Meet the Press'' yesterday, it
is time for the U.S. to fish or cut bait in the Balkans.
Compounding the situation is the fact that the Russian Prime
Minister, Mr. Primakov, a staunch opponent of airstrikes and an ally of
Milosevic, will be in Washington tomorrow, and I think his visit really
presents a unique problem. An attack during Primakov's visit would
certainly not help repair frayed U.S. and Russian relations. However,
he is not due to leave until Friday. In a real paradox, by meeting with
Mr. Primakov this week and delaying the attack, the administration may
well give Mr. Milosevic additional time to launch an offensive, an
offensive, by the way, which is also happening now.
General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander, has warned time and again
that if no accord is reached, the Serb forces will resume fighting on a
very large scale, and that is happening.
As the debate showed in the House of Representatives several weeks
ago, and as the debate also continues in this body as of today and
tomorrow, many in the Congress are concerned and frustrated and torn.
Some support airstrikes and some do not. Some support ground troops;
more do not. But we all agree, I think, that the Congress and the
American people certainly deserve a better explanation of the
administration's policy in the Balkans.
It is not that we have not asked the administration for
clarification. Last July, I offered an amendment to the defense
appropriations bill that required the President to come before the
American people and the Congress before he committed the U.S. to a
military involvement in Kosovo. The amendment was not prejudicial. It
simply required the President to make the case as to why intervention
in Kosovo was in our vital national security interest.
The language contained in section 8115 of Public Law 105-262--and it
is the law of the land--unambiguously states that none of the funds
appropriated or otherwise made available under the act may be obligated
or expended for any additional deployment of the Armed Forces of the
United States unless and until the President, in consultation with the
leadership of the Congress, transmits to Congress a report that
includes the following:
No. 1: certification that the presence of those forces to be deployed
is necessary to the national security interests of the United States;
No. 2: the reasons why the deployment is in the national security
interest;
No. 3: the number of military personnel to be deployed;
No. 4: the mission and objectives of forces to be deployed;
No. 5: the expected time schedule for accomplishing the objectives of
the deployment;
No. 6: the exit strategy;
No. 7: the costs;
And lastly,
No. 8: the anticipated effects on the morale, the retention and the
effectiveness of United States forces.
Mr. President, although our United States pilots are about to take
part in an air attack that will put them in harm's way, to be followed
by some 4,000 ground troops, that report--that report--required by
law--has not been submitted to the Congress.
Last week, in the briefing that was conducted by Secretary of State
Albright, National Security Council Chairman Berger, and Secretary of
Defense Cohen, I again asked if the report would be forthcoming. I
asked if the latest briefing--requested, by the way, by our Majority
Leader Lott--served in lieu of the report. The response of Mr. Berger
was unclear to me, but in past conversations in previous briefings he
said the administration should and could answer all the questions
involved, and that the report would be made ``at the appropriate
time.''
With the attack imminent, it would seem now is the appropriate time.
As a matter of fact, with all due respect to the administration,
submitting such a report would not be difficult and it would be
helpful. If the administration thinks--and they apparently think--that
this is the case, that threats of military action may alter the
behavior of the Serbs, of Milosevic, what clearer signal of intent to
forcibly stop the violence against the Albanians than the President of
the United States laying out the issues to Congress and the American
people?
Perhaps we can do the administration a favor today. In answering
these questions, required by public law, let us simply take public
statements from the President and his Cabinet officers, as well as
statements made in briefings to the Congress that have been reported in
the public press.
As a Member of both the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence
Committees, I want to emphasize there should not and cannot be any
disclosure of military details of any proposed action, the timing of
the action or the types or selection of various weapon platforms.
Let's take the reporting requirements--1, 2, and then 4. They ask the
President to describe why deploying to Kosovo is in the national
security interest of the United States as well as
[[Page S3029]]
what specific objectives our forces will have once on the ground in the
province.
They are of particular importance because it will be these goals for
which our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines will be risking their
lives. Let me put it another way. Should a father, a mother, a husband
or a wife--or any family member--have to ask, ``For what did my son or
daughter, husband or wife, mom or dad die for?'' the answers to these
questions will have to suffice.
Questions Nos. 1 and 2:
Certify the presence of forces to be deployed is necessary to the
national security interests of the United States and the reasons why
the deployment is in the national security interest.
Here is the answer that I am suggesting to the Clinton
administration. President Clinton, taken from President Clinton's press
conference last Friday: It could be in the report. I am quoting the
President:
A part of my responsibility is to try to leave to my
successors, and to our country in the 21st century, an
environment in Europe that is stable, humane and secure. It
will be a big part of America's future.
The President went on to say:
As we prepare to act, we need to remember the lessons
learned in the Balkans. We should remember the horror of the
war in Bosnia, the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children,
the faces of young men behind barbed wire, the despairing
voices of those who thought nothing could be done. It took
precious time to achieve allied unity there, but when we did,
our firmness ended all that. Bosnia is now at peace.
I continue to quote the President:
Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will
to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with
aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill.
But, action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.
And then the President goes on to specifically talk about why he
thinks this is in our national interest. And it should be made part of
the report, if he would simply submit it to the congressional
leadership. He said:
We must also understand our stake in peace in the Balkans
and in Kosovo. This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much
more. This is a conflict with no boundaries. It threatens our
national interests. If it continues, it will push refugees
across borders, and draw in neighboring countries. It will
undermine the credibility of NATO, on which stability in
Europe and our own credibility depend. It will likely
reignite the historical animosities, including those that can
embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey. These
divisions still have the potential to make the next century a
truly violent one for that part of the world that straddles
Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
Unquestionably, there are risks in military action, if that
becomes necessary. U.S. and other NATO pilots will be put in
harm's way. The Serbs have a strong air defense system. But,
we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction. If
we don't act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not
be able to contain it without far greater risk and cost. I
believe the real challenge of our foreign policy today is to
deal with problems before they do permanent harm to our vital
interests. That is what we must do in Kosovo.
Finally, the President said this:
One of the things that I wanted to do when I became
president is to take advantage of this moment in history to
build an alliance with Europe for the 21st century, with a
European undivided, strong, secure, prosperous and at peace.
That is why I have supported the unification of Europe
financially, politically, economically. That is why I've
supported the expansion of NATO and a redefinition of its
missions.
Here is another answer that the administration could include in the
report to the Congress as justification for an attack on Serbia and
whether or not this is in our vital national interest.
Secretary of State Albright: This is taken from press accounts of
congressional briefings. Six reasons:
No. 1: the Balkans represent a bridge between Europe and the Middle
East and therefore are of strategic interest.
No. 2: unless we stop this conflict, it will spin into Albania,
Macedonia, Greece and Turkey. The First World War started there.
Another could again.
No. 3: we have a humanitarian obligation to stop massacres and
refugee flight.
No. 4: what we do in Kosovo has a direct bearing on what has been
achieved in Bosnia.
No. 5: what we do in Kosovo represents our leadership role in NATO,
the credibility of NATO; both relevant to the future of NATO into the
next century.
And lastly, No. 6: it is in our national interest to oppose Serb
aggression.
One more answer: Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1999:
First, we have a clear interest in protecting stability in
a key part of Europe and our investment in Bosnia. If we
don't stop the conflict in Kosovo, it could draw in
Albania and Macedonia, potentially threaten our NATO
allies in Greece and Turkey and thereby divide the
alliance.
Second, We have an important interest in averting another
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. Continued conflict also
would create new opportunities for international terrorists,
drug smugglers and criminals.
Third, America has a clear interest in ending years of Serb
repression by strengthening democracy, upholding the rule of
law including the valuable contribution of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and protecting
human rights.
Finally, persisting conflict in Kosovo would undermine
NATO's credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in
the Balkans and U.S. credibility as one of the leaders of
NATO.
Now, there, I have submitted the administration's report as to why
this is in our national interest, a report that has not been
forthcoming, by simply quoting the President, the Secretary of State,
and the Undersecretary of State. Whether or not you think that adds up
to a rationale as to why we should be going to war is another question,
but at least it is there.
Question No. 3 that is required by public law: Please provide the
number of military personnel to be deployed.
Answer: In numerous press reports, President Clinton and various
defense officials have stated the United States will commit up to 4,000
troops for deployment to enforce a peace agreement. However, the number
of U.S. personnel who provide intelligence, logistical support,
extraction capability, and offshore platforms is not available.
Question No. 4: What are the mission and objectives of the forces to
be deployed?
Answer: In regard to the airstrike, the press reports as of today
state:
NATO plans call first for a short, sharp demonstration
airstrike consisting mainly of cruise missiles. [Casualty
avoidance--those are my words not the press commentary.] If
Mr. Milosevic does not submit, NATO, after additional
consultation, [with our allies] plans to launch a sustained
and rigorous bombing campaign that could last as long as a
week.
The report went on to say:
A combination of U.S. cruise missiles and up to 400
American and European fighter jets would attempt to take out
Serbia's command and control structures and its air defense
system and also to strip Serbia's military in Kosovo of its
ability to attack Kosovo fighters.
Just for the record again, the same press reports stress senior U.S.
military officers have warned the Congress the air mission over Serbia
would be tremendously dangerous with a high risk of NATO casualties.
Question No. 5, as required in the report: The expected schedule for
accomplishing the objectives of the deployment.
Answer: It is not available--or at least it is not available on all
the press reports, the briefings, and the information I have been able
to obtain in regard to this weekend and in many previous months.
Question No. 6: The exit strategy for the United States forces
engaged in the deployment.
I want all of my colleagues to pay attention to this response; this
is the exit strategy.
Answer: American negotiator Christopher Hill, in discussing the
negotiated peace agreement, has stated in the press that under the
agreement, Serbia would remain sovereign over Kosovo for the next 3
years. Under the NATO peacekeeping force, including the 4,000
Americans, the Kosovo Liberation Army would disband and the Serbs would
withdraw all but security forces.
That is certainly not the case as of today. However, Under Secretary
of State Thomas Pickering, again, in a very cogent and a very
comprehensive briefing in response said before the committee February
25:
With respect to our exit strategy, we have learned from our
experience in Bosnia that we should not set artificial
deadlines. Rather, we should seek to create the conditions
for self-sustaining peace so that the timing and
circumstances for the reduction and ending of the presence of
an international military force is well defined. There are a
series of core conditions--apparently what will
[[Page S3030]]
have to take place in regard to Kosovo before the 4,000
troops--or how many would be deployed there as peacekeepers--
could exit:
One, military stability including the swift and orderly departure of
all Serb forces except those required for border security; two,
replacement of Serb security forces with a functioning, local,
representative police force; elections that meet international
standards; and establishment of legitimate political institutions that
would provide for substantial and sustained Kosovar autonomy.
That is a pretty tall order. That is a pretty tall order. We have
seen the situation in Bosnia where we were to be there for 1 year; we
have been there for 4 so far. It is now $10 to $12 billion. As we
learned in the Balkans, time limits don't mean too much.
Question No. 7, as required by the amendment in the defense
appropriations bill in regard to a report that has not been
forthcoming: The costs associated with the deployment and the funding
sources for paying these costs.
Answer: Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth Bacon on February 29:
We have calculated or estimated the cost of what it would be to send
the U.S. portion of a peacekeeping force into Kosovo. That would be
about $1.5 to $2 billion a year but no decision will be made on sending
peacekeepers in until there is a peace agreement.
Again, the Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, who has been
very candid before the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``An additional
important element''--now, just stop here for a minute. It will be $2
billion a year at least for 3 years and perhaps more.
Then, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering in a very candid
statement said:
An additional important element in ensuring an effective
and sustainable agreement will be international assistance
for Kosovo. The U.S. plans to make a substantial contribution
to bolster European Union efforts. We have requested $50
million as part of the 2000 fiscal year budget request. We
anticipate identifying additional funds needed to support the
civilian implementation aspects of the agreement including
funds to:
Repair damaged infrastructure--
The thought has just occurred to me, if we have airstrikes in Kosovo
and Serbia and we destroy the infrastructure, we are now making the
promise to send funds to repair the damaged infrastructure--
Stimulate economic growth in Kosovo through microlending;
Support free elections;
Assist in the establishment both of communal police units
and an independent Judiciary system.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that will add up to a great deal more
money than the $2 billion a year. I can find no statement by the
administration as to how they will request these funds. I assume they
would come under an emergency supplemental, very similar to the one we
are discussing on the floor today.
Finally, question No. 8: The anticipated effects of the deployment on
the morale, retention, and effectiveness of the United States forces.
While I think this is certainly needed, there is no answer that is
available.
So that is it. Albeit, with very limited time and access to
information over this weekend, and probably with some degree a lack of
expertise, I have tried to piece together the response that the
administration could make within a consultation requirement--a
requirement again stated in public law--that would certainly help in
the debate we are having today in regard to U.S. policy in the Balkans.
I have to say, with all due respect to the rationale behind this
policy, I believe there are a great many more questions that remain
that should have been answered before now, before, once again, U.S.
credibility is on the line. As a matter of fact, last Friday the
situation was summed up aptly by Mr. Fred Hiatt, a columnist with the
Washington Post. The column was entitled ``The Credibility Factor.'' I
ask unanimous consent to have the full article printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1999]
The Credibility Factor
(By Fred Hiatt)
``It's well known,'' an administration spokesman said last
week, that the President is ``a tactician and not a
strategist, and maybe looks to the next day and not the day
after.''
The official was talking about Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic. But the description seemed oddly apt for President
Clinton, too. When the two face off, as they are now doing
over Kosovo, that puts the United States at a disadvantage. A
tactician with a free totalitarian hand will always have the
initiative over one operating in a democracy.
This isn't to say that Clinton is the moral equivalent of
Milosevic, one of the reprehensible war criminals of this
decade. But Clinton is always inclined toward the easy,
short-term win, the half-way solution; and he has been
willing to sacrifice truth and to slight principle to achieve
his daily victories.
Now, when he should be building support in Congress and
among the public for a difficult but necessary confrontation,
he is paying a price for that record. With good reason, many
voters do not believe he has thought out the consequences of
his Kosovo policy; in the post-impeachment era, many members
of Congress do not believe him, period.
The tactical victories Clinton has achieved with deception
are considerable. During the impeachment trial, it became
almost a cliche to attack the President for not having come
clean as soon as Ken Starr began nosing around. If he had
just 'fessed up in the first place, went the refrain, the
country would have been spared this long trauma.
As a matter of principle, of course that was true. But
tactically Clinton was right and his critics were wrong. If
Clinton had said back in January 1997 that, yes, he had been
using the Oval Office for sexual encounters with an intern
and, yes, he had lied about this under oath during a civil
deposition and, no, he didn't consider oral sex to be sex--he
might not have survived the week. But he lied about ``that
woman'' and survived the week, and the next week, and the one
after that.
You could say his tactical dissembling has paid off in
foreign policy, too. When he was dispatching troops to Bosnia
in 1995, he promised they'd be there for only one year. The
promise helped him win acquiescence from a reluctant
Congress, and there wasn't much Congress could do when one
year rolled into another and the troops did not come home.
Sending troops was the right thing to do, and keeping them
there beyond a year was right, too. Any maybe, given doubts
in Congress and the country, Clinton's way was the only one
that would have worked. Maybe honest leadership wouldn't have
carried the day. We'll never know.
What we do know is that his method of operation--his search
for the risk-free alternative, his reluctance to spend
political capital, to fully confront or explain the long-term
consequences of policy--has a cumulative, corrosive effect.
Clinton wouldn't push for U.S. troops to arrest war criminals
or assist in the return of refugees, so Bosnia is farther
from real peace than it should be--and the troops will have
to stay longer as a result.
Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility
diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of
success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force
even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the
long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be
used.
Now all these chickens--the diminished credibility abroad,
the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to
fashion a strategy--are coming to roost in Kosovo. Clinton
has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe this time
he means it. But then what? Clinton also has promised that
U.S. troops will not be sent into a ``non-permissive''
environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other words, only
when Milosevic welcomes them in.
``These are incompatible objectives,'' Sen. Gordon Smith
said in an interview. A freshman Republican from Oregon who
chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Europe,
Smith is no isolationist; he has said he would support a
dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right
circumstances. But he worries that Clinton has no credible
plan.
Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to
call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace
treaty and admit NATO troops. But what it if doesn't? What if
Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in
Pristina and villages through the province? Clinton, to
assuage his fretful military commanders, has already promised
not to follow air power with troops. But air power can't
solve every problem.
If NATO bombs, Smith said, it should no longer pretend to
be neutral. ``The problem is Milosevic,'' he said. ``If you
go along that path, go to win.''
Is Clinton prepared to see it through? On Friday he made a
case for bombing, but did not explain what might come next,
nor why those next steps would be worth the risk to U.S. life
and treasure? Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the day after.
Mr. ROBERTS. In part he stated:
Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility
diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of
success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force
even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the
long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be
used.
Now all these chickens--the diminished credibility abroad,
the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to
fashion a strategy--are coming [home] to roost in Kosovo.
Clinton has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe
this time he
[[Page S3031]]
means it. [I think he does.] But then what? Clinton also has
promised that U.S. troops will not be sent into a ``non-
permissive'' environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other
words, only when Milosevic welcomes them in.
``These are incompatible objectives.'' [He is quoting my
colleague and my friend from Oregon, Senator Gordon Smith,
who said in an interview--and, by the way, Senator Smith is
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Europe] [he] is no isolationists; he has said he would
support a dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right
circumstances. But he worries that [there is] no credible
plan.
Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to
call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace
treaty and admit NATO troops. But what if it doesn't? What if
Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in
Pristina and villages throughout the province?
That is happening as I speak.
Clinton, to assuage his fretful military commanders--who
have good reason to fret--has already promised not to follow
air power with troops. But air power can't solve every
problem.
If NATO bombs, [Senator] Smith said, it should no longer
pretend to be neutral. ``The problem is Milosevic,'' he said.
``If you go along that path, go to win.''
I certainly associate myself with the comments of Senator Smith.
Is Clinton [is this Congress and are the American public]
prepared to see it through? On Friday, he made a case for
bombing [and the intervention] but did not explain what might
come next, nor why those next steps would be worth the risk
to U.S. life and treasure. Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the
day after.
That was the conclusion of the editorial.
I have questions, but I am not going to take too much time to go over
all the questions I have as a result of the statements that have been
made. But in regard to Kosovo, what is the end state? What do we want
to see in Kosovo once we are done doing whatever it is we plan to do?
If we don't want to support the independence and secession of the
Kosovars, why are we serving as their air force?
How do we know we have ever attained our aims?
What are the measures of merit?
How long might it take?
We have talked about an exit strategy. I think we should focus on
strategy; that is, on what we are trying to achieve, through what
means, and how do we know we are done?
I don't accept the argument in regard to NATO credibility, or that
NATO credibility is on the line, as an answer to why we should go
there. NATO's credibility is sky high. Just ask all the nations who
want to get in.
How is bombing conducive to peaceful conflict resolution? Have we
ever been able to bomb a country into submission so that they would
agree with our point of view? What if initial strikes don't attain the
desired effect? How far are we willing to go to compel the Serbs to
bend to our will? What are the risks? Why send peacekeepers when there
is no peace to be kept and neither side wants to compromise? It seems
that is the case.
Why are we seeking to compel a sovereign nation--by the way,
Yugoslavia was a founding member of the U.N.--to cede its territorial
sovereignty to a guerrilla movement? What message does this send to
other secessionists worldwide?
How do you explain supporting Yeltsin in fighting to keep Chechnya
within the Russian Federation, at a cost of about 50,000 casualties--
indeed, comparing the Russian action to the American Civil War and, by
implication, Yeltsin to Lincoln--and bombing the Serbs for trying to
keep their country together? That is a point of view.
Which of the many Kosovar factions are we supporting? How much top-
down control and professional discipline do we expect from all sides
involved?
The mission order for Bosnia, which has been referred to as a good
case study for Kosovo, was, ``Attack across the Sava River,'' and we
went in with overwhelming force, which we then scaled down as the
threat receded. We are doing it the other way regarding Kosovo. Why
aren't we following that model? Remember the strategic insight of an
18-year-old Marine in Beirut: ``If we are here to fight, we are too
few; if we are here to die, we are too many.''
All of these questions I have mentioned--some of which I share with a
great deal of support from others--I think certainly should be debated,
should certainly come to the floor. That has not been the case. I do
hope the administration will submit their report soon. I hope they
don't submit the report after the President has given the order and the
troops are there, for at that time every Member of the Senate and House
will certainly want to support our troops.
I worry about this, Mr. President. We are going to war. The President
has spoken to the issue, other Cabinet officials have spoken to the
issue, but many questions remain.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WYDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to
15 minutes at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________