[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 43 (Thursday, March 18, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2972-S2974]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

 Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, this bill calls upon the United 
States to take a momentous step--the deployment of a National Missile 
Defense system--on the basis of one, and only one criterion: 
technological feasibility. This bill gives no consideration to the 
ramifications of deploying such a system on U.S. security, political 
and diplomatic interests.
  It is true that missile technology is proliferating more rapidly than 
we

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could have predicted. And this is of grave concern to us all. 
Certainly, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology 
constitutes a serious threat to U.S. national security. The question 
before us is, Will deciding today to deploy a National Missile Defense 
system--as yet untested, unproven and un-paid for--advance our national 
security interests? The answer, in my view, is that it will not.
  First, I believe this bill will undermine long-term U.S. national 
security interests, by placing too much emphasis on just one of the 
many threats we face today.
  While the United States is enjoying a period of relative safety and 
security in world affairs, we must prepare to face a multitude of 
diverse challenges in the international security environment in coming 
years. These include: transnational threats, such as terrorism and drug 
trafficking; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the 
chaos of failed states, as we have seen in Somalia and the former 
Yugoslavia--just to name a few. The threat from ballistic missiles is 
one of many.
  Ballistic missiles are a threat, because they are capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction to American soil. The United 
States has faced this threat for decades, posed by the nuclear arsenals 
of the Soviet Union and China. Russia and China maintain their ability 
to strike American soil. But even though both nations are today 
struggling through a period of great uncertainty, the threat to the 
United States of a ballistic missile attack from either nation is low.
  The threat of a missile attack from a rogue state, such as North 
Korea or Iran, is obviously growing. Last fall, North Korea tested its 
new Taepo-Dong One missile, with a range of up to 3000 km. We also know 
the North Koreans are developing a Taepo-Dong Two missile, which could 
have a range two to three times greater. Pakistan has tested a 1500 km 
range missile. Iran is expected to have one of similar range in the 
near future.
  But ballistic missiles are only one means of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction. Nuclear weapons can be delivered in trucks, ships, 
and suitcases; chemical and biological weapons can be delivered through 
the mail, dispersed in a crowded subway, or inserted into our water 
supply. These methods of delivery are far simpler, less costly, and far 
less detectable than ballistic missiles, and they pose a much more 
immediate threat to U.S. security. A National Missile Defense won't 
protect us from these threats.
  The proposed NMD system would only allow us to defend ourselves 
against an unsophisticated long-range missile threat with a single 
warhead. We would not be able to defend against a missile that carried 
decoys along with the warhead. Multiple objects would readily defeat 
the proposed system. We would have no defense against a warhead 
containing chemical or biological agents divided into many small 
``bomblets'' for better dispersion. This would simply overwhelm the NMD 
system. The NMD system would be ineffective against cruise missiles or 
missiles launched from air or sea platforms.
  An NMD system also has very limited use as a deterrent to the threats 
we currently face. In the case of a ballistic missile attack, the 
perpetrator is readily identified, and U.S. retaliation could be swift 
and devastating. That alone is a serious deterrent, a much greater 
deterrent than a deployed NMD system. Deploying an NMD system would 
simply encourage potential adversaries to develop appropriate 
countermeasures or to pursue other, more effective means of attack. It 
is exactly this logic--that an NMD system would be more destabilizing 
than deterrent--that underpins our commitment to the ABM Treaty.
  Which brings me to my second point. I oppose this bill because it 
will undermine decades of U.S. leadership in international efforts to 
reduce the nuclear danger.
  A unilateral decision by the United States to proceed with a National 
Missile Defense would sound the death knell for the ABM Treaty, a 
development that is apparently quite welcome to many of my colleagues 
across the aisle. This is puzzling to me, because a U.S. signal that we 
intend to circumvent, violate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty would 
almost certainly kill prospects for Russian ratification of START II. 
This would delay any further reductions in the large remaining Russian 
nuclear force, a goal we have worked for decades to achieve.
  I would remind my colleagues that, in 1991, the United States--under 
the leadership of President George Bush--reached agreement with Russia 
that it would legally succeed to all international treaties of the 
former Soviet Union. These include the UN Charter, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, SALT/START, and others, as well as the ABM 
Treaty. If we refuse to recognize the validity of the ABM Treaty, we 
not only undermine the credibility of our past commitments to 
international arms control agreements--such as the Nuclear Non 
Proliferation Treaty--we also weaken U.S. leadership in future 
international efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  If we proceed with this legislation and deal a blow to international 
arms control efforts, we will have succeeded in fostering precisely the 
threats we intend to reduce. And furthermore, we can encourage this 
threat without ever deploying an NMD system, simply by establishing our 
intention to deploy an NMD system.
  Finally, I have deep concerns about the technical feasibility, 
operational effectiveness and costs of the proposed NMD system.
  I have consistently supported development of effective missile 
defense technology, and continue to do so. In particular, I have 
supported the development and deployment of effective theater missile 
defense systems, to protect our forces and our regional allies. But we 
have encountered tremendous technological challenges in trying to build 
defenses against these theater missile systems. We have spent billions 
of dollars and experienced many failures in our efforts to ``hit a 
bullet with a bullet.'' The THAAD system has experienced five 
successive failures. Yet, THAAD is much simpler to develop than NMD.
  On cost, the Administration's FY 2000 budget request calls for an 
additional $6.6 billion in new funding for National Missile Defense. 
This would bring total FY 1999 - 2005 funding for NMD to $10.5 billion. 
But the Defense Department does not anticipate that we will be able to 
test key components of the proposed system until 2003. If we encounter 
problems with this system that are the least bit similar to those we 
have seen in testing THAAD, we can expect delays well beyond the 
projected deployment date of 2005--and costs far above the $10.5 
billion we are currently contemplating. And, while I have every 
confidence that American technological know-how will eventually produce 
a feasible system, I wonder: At what cost, and with how much real 
benefit to our national security, will this technological marvel be 
achieved?
  In addition to the financial costs of deploying a feasible NMD 
system, we must also acknowledge the opportunity costs that pursuing 
this project will entail. America's leadership in world affairs relies 
on ready military forces. And the fact is, if we dedicate tens of 
billions of dollars to developing a National Missile Defense system, we 
will not be able to devote the resources and energy we should to 
ensuring the long-term readiness of America's fighting forces. At a 
time when the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff have publicly and repeatedly expressed their concerns over our 
ability to attract and keep bright young men and women in the U.S. 
armed forces, I am not convinced that we should move NMD to the top of 
our list of defense priorities.
  With so much at stake, it would be irresponsible for us today to 
commit to the deployment of a National Missile Defense system, without 
further consideration of the implications and potential consequences of 
that commitment. We must not devote these resources to defending 
against the wrong threat with the wrong system. We must not create a 
world where weapons of mass destruction proliferate because arms 
control agreements are no longer credible. And we must not become so 
focused on this one defense issue that we leave our nation defenseless 
against other, more imminent threats.
  Mr. President, this legislation poses tremendous risks to our long-
term national security interests.

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