[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 41 (Tuesday, March 16, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E437]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E437]]



                   KAZAKSTAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, March 16, 1999

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to bring to the 
attention of my colleagues concerns about the general prospects for 
democratization in Kazakstan, considering the disturbing news about the 
presidential elections in that country earlier this year. On January 
10, 1999, Kazakstan held presidential elections, almost two years ahead 
of schedule. Incumbent President Nursultan Nazarbaev ran against three 
contenders, in the country's first nominally contested election. 
According to official results, Nazarbaev retained his office, garnering 
81.7 percent of the vote. Communist Party leader Serokbolsyn Abdildin 
won 12 percent, Gani Kasymov 4.7 percent and Engels Gabbasov 0.7 
percent. The Central Election Commission reported over 86 percent of 
eligible voters turned out to cast ballots.
  Behind these facts--and by the way, none of the officially announced 
figures should be taken at face value--is a sobering story. Nazarbaev's 
victory was no surprise: the entire election was carefully orchestrated 
and the only real issue was whether his official vote tally would be in 
the 90s--typical for post-Soviet Central Asia dictatorships--or lower, 
which would have signaled some sensitivity to Western and OSCE 
sensibilities. Any suspense the election might have offered vanished 
when the Supreme Court in November upheld a lower court ruling barring 
the candidacy of Nazarbaev's sole possible challenger, former Prime 
Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, on whom many opposition activists have 
focused their hopes. The formal reason for his exclusion was both 
trivial and symptomatic: in October, Kazhegeldin had spoken at a 
meeting of an unregistered organization called ``For Free Elections.'' 
Addressing an unregistered organization is illegal in Kazakstan, and a 
presidential decree of May 1998 stipulated that individuals convicted 
of any crime or fined for administrative transgressions could not run 
for office for a year.
  Of course, the snap election and the presidential decree deprived any 
real or potential challengers of the opportunity to organize a 
campaign. More important, most observers saw the decision as an 
indication of Nazarbaev's concerns about Kazakhstan's economic decline 
and his fears of running for reelection in 2000, when the situation 
will presumably be even much worse. Another reason to hold elections 
now was anxiety about uncertainties in Russia, where a new president, 
with whom Nazarbaev does not have long-established relations, will be 
elected in 2000 and may adopt a more aggressive attitude towards 
Kazakhstan than has Boris Yeltsin.

  The exclusion of would-be candidates, along with the snap nature of 
the election, intimidation of voters, the ongoing attack on independent 
media and restrictions on freedom of assembly, moved the OSCE's Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to urge the 
election's postponement, as conditions for holding free and fair 
elections did not exist. Ultimately, ODIHR refused to send a full-
fledged observer delegation, as it generally does, to monitor an 
election. Instead, ODIHR dispatched to Kazakhstan a small mission to 
follow and report on the process. The mission's assessment concluded 
that Kazakhstan's ``election process fell far short of the standards to 
which the Republic of Kazakhstan has committed itself as an OSCE 
participating State.'' That is an unusually strong statement for ODIHR.
  Until the mid-1900s, even though President Nazarbaev dissolved two 
parliaments, tailored constitutions to his liking and was single- 
mindedly accumulating power, Kazakhstan still seemed a relatively 
reformist country, where various political parties could function and 
the media enjoyed some freedom. Moreover, considering the even more 
authoritarian regimes of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and the war and 
chaos in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan benefited by comparison.
  In the last few years, however, the nature of Nazarbaev's regime has 
become ever more apparent. He has over the last decade concentrated all 
power in his hands, subordinating to himself all other branches and 
institutions of government. His determination to remain in office 
indefinitely, which could have been inferred by his actions, became 
explicit during the campaign, when he told a crowd, ``I would like to 
remain your president for the rest of my life.'' Not coincidentally, a 
constitutional amendment passed in early October conveniently removed 
the age limit of 65. Moreover, since 1996, Kazakhstan's authorities 
have co-opted, bought or crushed any independent media, effectively 
restoring censorship in the country. A crackdown on political parties 
and movements has accompanied the assault on the media, bringing 
Kazakhstan's overall level of repression closer to that of Uzbekistan 
and severely damaging Nazarbaev's reputation.
  Despite significant U.S. strategic and economic interests in 
Kazakhstan, especially oil and pipeline issues, the State Department 
issued a series of critical statements after the announcement last 
October of pre-term elections. In fact, on November 23, Vice President 
Gore called President Nazarbaev to voice U.S. concerns about the 
election. The next day, the Supreme Court--which Nazarbaev controls 
completely--finally excluded Kazhegeldin. On January 12, the State 
Department echoed the ODIHR's harsh assessment of the election, adding 
that it had ``cast a shadow on bilateral relations.''
  What's ahead? Probably more of the same. Parliamentary elections are 
expected in late 1999, although they may be held before schedule or put 
off another year. A new political party has been created as a vehicle 
for President Nazarbaev to tighten his grip on the legislature. 
Surprisingly, the Ministry of Justice on March 1 registered the 
Republican People's Party, headed by Akezhan Kazhegeldin, as well as 
another opposition party--probably in response to Western and 
especially American pressure. But even if they are allowed to compete 
for seats on an equal basis and even win some representation, 
parliament is sure to remain a very junior partner to the all-powerful 
executive.
  Mr. Speaker, Kazakhstan's relative liberalism in the early 1990s had 
induced Central Asia watchers to hope that Uzbek and Turkmen-style 
repression was not inevitable for all countries in the region. Alas, 
the trends in Kazakhstan point the other way: Nursultan Nazarbaev is 
heading in the direction of his dictatorial counterparts in Tashkent 
and Ashgabat. He is clearly resolved to be president for life, to 
prevent any institutions or individuals from challenging his grip on 
power and to make sure that the trappings of democracy he has permitted 
remain just that. The Helsinki Commission, which I chair, plans to hold 
hearings on the situation in Kazakhstan and Central Asia to discuss 
what options the United States has to convey the Congress' 
disappointment and to encourage developments in Kazakhstan and the 
region toward genuine democratization.

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