[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 40 (Monday, March 15, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2625-S2646]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1999
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
resume consideration of S. 257, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 257) to state the policy of the United States
regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable
of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, the National Missile Defense Act of
1999 will make it the policy of the United States to deploy an
effective missile defense system to defend against a limited ballistic
missile attack as soon as technologically possible. Today, American
citizens are completely vulnerable to ballistic missile attack.
Last year, when the Senate debated similar legislation, some
suggested that our bill was premature, that there was not yet any
reason to suspect that we were confronted with a ballistic missile
threat. Now, however, there is no disagreement about the nature of the
threat. Consider these recent developments:
(1) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence said, ``Gaps and
uncertainties preclude a good projection of when `rest of the world'
countries will deploy ICBMs.''
(2) Last year, both Pakistan and Iran successfully tested new medium-
range missiles, each based in some degree on a newly deployed North
Korean missile, the No Dong.
(3) Also last year, in July, the bipartisan commission headed by the
former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, reported its unanimous
conclusions that foreign assistance to missile programs was a pervasive
fact and that new ICBM threats to the United States might appear with
``little or no warning.''
(4) A few weeks after the Rumsfeld report, North Korea launched the
Taepo Dong 1, successfully demonstrating a multiple-staging capability,
and using a solid-fuel third stage. According to the National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Systems, instead of
having the expected 2,000-kilometer range, the Taepo Dong 1 can attack
targets up to 6,000 kilometers away, which puts Alaska and Hawaii
within its range. The Taepo Dong 2 is expected to be able to reach the
entire United States.
(5) The Secretary of Defense announced in January that the ballistic
missile threat to the United States was no longer in question. He said,
``We have crossed that threshold.''
These recent events have answered the question about the threat. The
question today is whether we intend to defend ourselves against that
threat. The National Missile Defense Act is the appropriate answer to
that question. It will send a clear message--to our adversaries, our
allies, and our own citizens--that the United States will not leave
itself vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-
range ballistic missiles.
Some may suggest instead a continuation of our old policy of mutual
assured destruction. That was the policy of deterrence we used to deal
with the threat from the former Soviet Union. Former Defense Secretary
William Perry warned us about using this policy with a new class of
rogue states that may be ``undeterrable'' in the sense that we
understand that concept.
The fact is, we do not need to be at the mercy of a policy of mutual
assured death or destruction. Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward
Warner said in January,
I believe that we are unlikely to turn back to the point
where we will rely only on deterrence. I think over time we
will rely on a combination of deterrence by threat of
retaliation and this limited type of national missile
defense. . . .
The passage of this bill by the Senate will also send an important
message to those who are working to develop our missile defenses. The
development program has suffered from the lack of a commitment to
deploy the system. No other acquisition program has been handled by the
Defense Department without an endpoint of deployment to aim for and
reach.
The National Missile Defense Act will put an end to this uncertainty
by telling the talented people building this system that it will be put
in the field just as soon as they can get it ready. The NMD
contractor's program manager testified in the Armed Services Committee
last month that passage of this legislation would be a major motivation
for those building the system, saying, ``It would make them feel better
about the mission they are being asked to carry out than any one thing
I can think of [and that] people are much more motivated by knowing
that the Government is truly behind this. . . .''
Finally, passage of this bill will tell America's citizens that its
Government is meeting its first and most important constitutional
duty--providing for the common defense. One legacy of the cold war may
be the absence of a defense against a massive and deliberate strategic
attack from the former Soviet Union. But vulnerability to attack by
everyone who desires to threaten America does not have to continue, and
our Government would be irresponsible if it were to let it continue.
Madam President, there is no purpose in this bill other than to
clearly establish, as a matter of policy, that the United States will
deploy, as soon as technologically possible, an effective national
missile defense system which is capable against limited threats. There
are no ulterior motives, no hidden goals; there is only an intent to
correct a defense policy that leaves us vulnerable to a serious and
growing threat.
On the subject of missile defense, there are other things the Senate
could legislate, such as system architecture, schedule, costs, or ABM
Treaty issues. These issues will have to be dealt with in due course.
But none of them has to be resolved in this bill, and we should not let
this legislation become an effort to answer all of the questions
related to missile defense.
The question this bill addresses is not a simplistic one, as
suggested by an administration spokesman; it is more fundamental: Will
we, or will we not, commit in a meaningful way to defending ourselves
against limited ballistic missile attack? Will we tell the world the
United States will not be subject to blackmail by ballistic missile?
Will we tell our citizens they will not be hostages to the demands of
those nations who seek to coerce the United States?
We have heard many statements made to reassure us about the
willingness of the United States to defend itself, but there is always
an ``if'' attached--``if'' the threat appears, ``if'' we can afford it,
``if'' other nations give us their permission. With all of these
``ifs,'' these qualifiers, we should hardly be surprised that the world
doubts the United States is serious about defending itself from
ballistic missile attack. And no one should be surprised that, in the
face of this doubt, the threat continues to grow.
The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 will put an end to those
doubts. It will tell the world that there is no question of ``if,'' and
as soon as it is able, the United States will deploy a system to defend
itself against limited ballistic missile attack. I urge all Senators to
support this bill.
Amendment No. 69
(Purpose: To clarify that the deployment funding is subject to the
annual authorization and appropriation process)
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, to make it crystal clear that this
legislation is a statement of policy and not an effort to circumvent
legislative and appropriations committees of jurisdiction, I send an
amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.
[[Page S2626]]
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran], for himself,
Mr. Inouye, Mr. Lieberman, and Mr. Warner, proposes an
amendment numbered 69.
On page 2, line 11, insert before the period at the end the
following: ``with funding subject to the annual authorization
of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for
National Missile Defense''.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I will state for the Record that the
cosponsors of the amendment are Senators Warner, Lieberman, and Inouye.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I share the goal of providing the
American people with effective protection against the emerging long-
range missile threat from rogue states.
I support developing an operationally effective, cost-effective
limited national missile defense, and making an effort to negotiate
with Russia, for a reasonable period of time, any appropriate
modifications to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that might be
necessary to permit deployment of a limited national missile defense
system. That is why, Madam President, I support the Defense
Department's National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program to
develop a limited NMD system to protect the United States against such
a developing threat.
But that is not what this bill before us does.
This bill says we are going to deploy a national missile defense
system ``as soon as technologically possible.'' No other factors are to
be considered. Don't consider if the system is operationally effective.
Those are important words to the military, ``operationally
effective.'' But we are not supposed to consider that under this bill.
Don't consider if it is cost-effective. Don't consider whether it
ends the elimination of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia under
the START process. Don't consider whether it increases the threat of
the proliferation of these terrible weapons to rogue states interested
in getting them by any means possible. This bill says to heck with all
of these considerations--we are going to deploy a national missile
defense system as soon as it is technologically possible, no matter
whether it is operationally effective, no matter if it increases the
threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons, no matter what it costs.
The fundamental question that we should ask ourselves is whether
passing this bill will make us more secure or less secure.
That is truly the fundamental question that all of us must address.
I agree with the President's senior national security advisors that
enacting this bill will make us less secure. It puts at risk our
decades-long efforts to reduce strategic offensive nuclear weapons in
Russia and increases the likelihood that these weapons will proliferate
to rogue states.
concerns of the uniformed military
And where is the support of our uniformed military leaders for this
bill, Madam President? The answer is, there isn't any. I have not heard
any of our senior military leaders say they support this legislation.
Our military leaders tell us that we are not ready yet to make a
decision to deploy a national missile defense system. They are worried
that if we make a hasty and head-long rush to deployment, we will be
less able to deal with other very real--and unfortunately more likely--
threats to our security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their use by terrorists.
General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified
before the Armed Services Committee in January that the decision to
deploy a national missile defense system should be made only after
considering a number of critical factors:
There are two aspects of the National Missile Defense
[issue] that we have to be concerned with. No. 1 is: is the
technology that allows us to deploy one that is an effective
system, and within the means of this country money-wise?
Second is the threat and whether or not the threat, when
measured against all the other threats that we face,
justifies the expenditure of that type of money for that
particular system at the time when the technology will allow
us to field it?
Right now it is not a matter of whether or not we should
field one because the technology has not reached the point
that we have the capability. It is a 12-year system that we
have been trying to do within 3 years. It is a high risk
program which has yet to prove that we will be able to make a
bullet hit the bullet. Certainly we need to continue to
pursue this technology, and DOD has that within their program
right now to pursue it. They are also putting money into the
program so that at the time that we have the technology, that
if in fact the threat justifies it, then we in fact could go
ahead with the fielding. If not, then we need to continue
with the R&D that will develop a system that could provide
missile defense.
Listen to just a few of the factors that General Shelton says that we
ought to be concerned with; that is, that the technology, one, is
effective. Is it within the means of this country moneywise? Assess the
threat. Measure the threat against all the other threats that we face,
and then see whether or not that justifies the expenditure of that type
of money for that particular system at the time the technology will
allow us to field it. And he points out that it is a high-risk program.
Lieutenant General Lester Lyles, the Director of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Office, made similar points in January:
We've always stated within the National Missile Defense
program that a decision to deploy is based essentially on
four basic things. One, whether or not we have a valid
threat; two, whether or not we have the right amount of
dollars budgeted for deployment; three, whether the issue
with the treaty has been addressed; and four, are we
technically ready, is the technology ready in order to make
such a decision and to support the deployment.
That is the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office who says
four basic things must be considered. This bill considers one. Is it
technologically possible? The Director of the Missile Defense Office in
charge of this program, who surely is interested in securing this
Nation as much as anybody against an attack, says there are four
factors that need to be considered.
General Lyles says that these four factors are essential. At least we
surely should not limit General Lyles, General Shelton, and the
Secretary of Defense to considering the sole criterion of
``technologically possible,'' as this bill does.
The Joint Chiefs have expressed reservations about the commitment now
to deploy a national missile defense system; they have raised these
concerns in many ways and at many times.
Last September, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer told the
Armed Services Committee: ``I think we need to have something that's
practical; has a degree of success. I think it also has to be balanced
against other priorities.''
The question of other priorities--other threats--is a major concern
of the Joint Chiefs. In an interview last month, General Shelton
pointed out: ``There are other serious threats out there in addition to
that posed by ballistic missiles. We know, for example, that there are
adversaries with chemical and biological weapons that can attack the
United States today. They could do it with a briefcase--by infiltrating
our territory across our shores or through our airports.''
Does the bill we are debating today address any of these concerns
raised by our senior military leaders? The answer is, Madam President,
it does not. And that is one of the many reasons we do not see our
senior military leaders supporting this bill.
If this legislation would advance--even by one day--the development
of an operationally effective and cost effective NMD system suitable
for deployment, then maybe our military leaders would support it. But
this bill doesn't do that.
It doesn't advance by one day the development of an operationally
effective, cost-effective national missile defense system.
The bill simply says that we are going to deploy a national missile
defense system as soon as it is technologically possible, without
regard to operational effectiveness, without regard to cost, without
regard to the impact on nuclear weapons reduction in Russia, without
regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons that could result. If this
legislation said that we should stop any further reductions of nuclear
weapons on Russian soil, I do not think many Members of this Senate
would support it.
[[Page S2627]]
That may not be what the language of this bill says, but that will be
the likely outcome of the policy in this bill. And here is why. At the
Helsinki summit on March 21, 1997, President Clinton and President
Yeltsin issued a joint statement on the ABM Treaty, on the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, which began as follows:
President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their
commitment to strengthening strategic stability and
international security, emphasizing the importance of further
reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the
fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
for these objectives, as well as the necessity for effective
theater missile defense systems, consider it their common
task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it,
and enhance its viability.
That is a summit statement. That is not some casual comment to a
reporter. That is a joint statement that was issued at the highest
level by the two Presidents of the United States and Russia.
Defense Secretary Cohen has made it clear that both pursuing a
limited national missile defense program and maintaining the ABM Treaty
are in our national interests and can both be accomplished. During his
press conference in January, Secretary Cohen stated his view on the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as follows:
I believe it's in our interest to maintain that. I think we
need to modify it to allow for a national missile defense
program that I've outlined, but the ABM Treaty, I think, is
important to maintain the limitations on offensive missiles.
To the extent that there is no ABM Treaty, then certainly
Russia or other countries would feel free to develop as many
offensive weapons as they wanted, which would set in motion a
comparable dynamic to offset that with more missiles here.
The bill before us, S. 257, states that we will deploy a national
missile defense system as soon as it is technologically possible
despite our treaty commitment to Russia and the ABM Treaty and its
importance to strategic stability and future nuclear arms reductions in
Russia. The bill before us will jeopardize our recently begun effort to
reach a negotiated agreement with Russia on possible changes to the ABM
Treaty that may be necessary to permit deployment of a limited national
missile defense system. We cannot, and we will not, give Russia or any
other nation a veto over our national missile defense requirements or
programs.
I want to repeat that so it is not misunderstood. We cannot and we
should not give any nation, including Russia, a veto over our decision
whether or not to deploy a national missile defense. But making a
decision now to deploy a national missile defense system before we
attempt to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty, before the military and
civilian leadership of the Defense Department say that the Nation can
responsibly make such a decision, will likely reduce Russia's
willingness to continue reducing nuclear weapons under the START
process, likely lead Russia to retain thousands of nuclear weapons that
it would otherwise eliminate, and thereby dramatically increase the
threat of nuclear proliferation.
The Committee on Armed Services has previously recognized the
importance of a cooperative approach on missile defense and the ABM
Treaty. Last year, the committee included a provision in the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999 that encouraged the
United States to work in a cooperative manner with Russia on issues of
missile defense. The conference report for that bill said the
following:
The conferees believe that a cooperative approach to
ballistic missile defense could lead to a mutually agreeable
evolution of the ABM Treaty, i.e., either modification or
replacement by a newer understanding or agreement that would
clear the way for the United States and Russia to deploy
national missile defenses each believes necessary for its
security. If implemented in a cooperative manner, the
conferees do not believe that such steps would undermine the
original intent of the ABM Treaty, which was to maintain
strategic stability and permit significant nuclear arms
reduction.
That was from the conference report on our 1999 defense authorization
bill. And how different it is from the bill before us, when the
conferees said that a cooperative approach, cooperative approach to
ballistic missile defense, could lead to a mutually agreeable evolution
of the ABM Treaty.
None of that is in the bill before us. Instead, S. 257 is
inconsistent with this understanding of the importance of a cooperative
approach toward the ABM Treaty, to maintaining strategic stability and
permitting large reductions in nuclear weapons because it threatens a
unilateral breach of the ABM Treaty.
Passing this bill would make it much more difficult for the
administration to maintain the continuing benefits of the ABM Treaty
and the cooperative approach to nuclear arms reduction under the START
process. Russia's Foreign Minister Ivanov recently noted the following:
We believe further cuts in strategic offensive weapons can
be done only if there is a clear vision for preserving and
observing the ABM Treaty.
There is no such vision or attempted vision, no reference to
modification of the ABM Treaty here as being desired, to allow us to
cooperatively move toward the deployment of national missile defense,
nothing in the bill before us other than the statement, ``We're going
to deploy this system as soon as technologically possible.''
And so by making the deployment decision now, S. 257, the bill before
us, would be giving the Russians an ultimatum: We are going to deploy a
national missile defense system regardless of the ABM Treaty. That kind
of ultimatum will make it more difficult to negotiate possible changes
to the ABM Treaty before the scheduled deployment decision in June of
2000.
Some are going to say that we move forward with NATO expansion in the
face of Russian opposition. Why not move forward this legislation to
commit to deploy a national missile defense system in spite of Russia's
objection.
There is a critical difference. When we expanded NATO, we were not
taking an action that explicitly violated a bilateral treaty with
Russia such as the ABM Treaty. In all likelihood, the unilateral
deployment of a national missile defense system that is truly an
effective system to defend all 50 States would violate the ABM Treaty.
How different from the expansion of NATO. NATO was not a treaty with
Russia that we were violating by expanding it.
The ABM Treaty is a treaty with Russia that we would almost certainly
be violating with deployment of a 50-State national missile defense.
There is another difference that has to go to the relationship
between us and Russia. Russia may be economically extremely weak and
militarily weak at the moment, but, nonetheless, Russia is still a
power that has huge numbers in military capability and nuclear
capability and will someday surely be even more powerful than it is
now.
But what did we do before we expanded NATO? All of the NATO members,
including the United States, worked with Russia to explain that NATO
expansion was not aimed at Russia. Indeed, the alliance entered into
the NATO-Russia Founding Act and, as a result of those efforts, Russia
has worked constructively with NATO on a number of issues. That is what
we are trying to do now with the ABM Treaty. We are trying to negotiate
with Russia right now to amend the ABM Treaty, to allow both the United
States and Russia to retain this important treaty and the nuclear arms
reduction benefits that it has brought us while still moving forward
with the development and deployment of a limited missile defense. This
bill will make that much more difficult.
The President's National Security Advisor, on February 3, 1999, wrote
us that:
If S. 257 were presented to the President in its current
form, his senior national security advisors would recommend
that the bill be vetoed.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this
letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. LEVIN. I will just read a few other portions of Mr. Berger's
letter, where he explains the basis for the position of the President's
senior national security advisors recommending that this bill be vetoed
if it is passed:
The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it
suggests that our decision on deployment of this system
should be based solely on a determination that the system is
[[Page S2628]]
``technologically possible.'' This unacceptably narrow
definition would ignore other critical factors that the
Administration believes must be addressed when it considers
the deployment question in 2000, including those that must be
evaluated by the President as Commander-in-Chief.
We intend to base the deployment decision on an assessment
of the technology (based on an initial series of rigorous
flight-tests) and the proposed system's operational
effectiveness. In addition, the President and his senior
advisors will need to confirm whether the rogue state
ballistic missile threat to the United States has developed
as quickly as we now expect, as well as the cost to deploy.
Then Mr. Berger went on to say the following:
A decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed
within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for
achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms
through START II and III. The ABM Treaty remains a
cornerstone of strategic stability and Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to
achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear
arms under these treaties.
Madam President, senior Defense Department officials have stated
repeatedly that the Department of Defense is already developing a
national missile defense system as fast as is technically possible.
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre testified to the Armed Services
Committee on October 2, 1998, that the national missile defense
program:
. . . is as close as we can get in the Department of
Defense to a Manhattan project. We are pushing this very
fast.
And General Joe Ralston, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, testified at the same hearing:
I know of no other program in the Department of Defense
that has had as many constraints removed in terms of
oversight and reviews just so that we can develop and deploy
it as quickly as possible.
As the Department of Defense has made clear on numerous occasions,
adding more money will not accelerate the program because we are moving
this program, the development program, as quickly as is possible, and
there are no resource constraints on that development. In addition, on
January 20, Defense Secretary Cohen announced four steps, demonstrating
the commitment to develop an operationally effective national missile
defense as quickly as possible, achieving the option to deploy, not
only as quickly as possible, but also in a way consistent with
continuing nuclear arms reductions.
First, Secretary Cohen announced the Defense Department would be
budgeting the funds--and they now have $6.6 billion--in the Future
Years Defense Program for possible deployment of a limited national
missile defense system. This funding will permit deployment if the
decision is made to deploy. This would bring the total national missile
defense funding for 1999 through 2005 to $10.5 billion.
Second, Secretary Cohen affirmed that the administration expects that
the threat of ballistic missiles from rogue nations will continue to
grow and will pose a threat to the U.S. territory in the near future.
Third, Secretary Cohen announced that the administration is seeking
possible changes to the ABM Treaty with Russia in the event that
deployment would require modification.
I was particularly glad to hear that because I had been urging the
administration to take this step myself for many, many months.
Secretary Cohen also noted that if we cannot agree on changes to the
treaty, the United States can exercise its right to withdraw from the
treaty under the ``supreme national interest'' clause of the treaty, if
necessary for our national security.
Finally, Secretary Cohen announced that the earliest anticipated
deployment date for the national missile defense system was going to be
2005 instead of 2003, because of concerns about the technology of the
system and because certain critical tests will not occur until 2003.
Secretary Cohen's announcement clearly demonstrates the
administration's commitment to moving forward as quickly as possible
with the development of an operationally effective national missile
defense program. The Department of Defense policy, unlike the bill
before us, permits consideration of a number of relevant factors,
including operational effectiveness and cost, and permits us to pursue
planned negotiations on possible ABM Treaty modifications before making
a deployment decision next year, in the year 2000.
The national missile defense program is a high-risk program. It faces
numerous technical challenges. The integration of all the component
parts into a system that can demonstrate its capability is still years
away. The first integrated system test using a production interceptor
is not scheduled to take place until the year 2003. Prior to that time,
tests will rely on surrogate components for some of the most critical
pieces of hardware. But S. 257 will make the deployment commitment now,
prior to any demonstration of the capability of the system, prior to
any ability to evaluate whether it is operationally effective--key word
``operationally''--and able to meet its system requirements. As the
Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out, if we
were to commit to deployment of an NMD system ``as soon as
technologically possible,'' we might be committing ourselves to
building a system that is not as effective as we would need or desire
to counter the evolving threat.
In 1997, General John Shalikashvili, then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, testified to the committee that the earliest possible
system may not provide the necessary capability:
If a decision is made to deploy an NMD system in the near
term, then the system fielded would provide a very limited
capability. If deploying a system in the near term can be
avoided, DOD can continue to enhance the technology base and
the commensurate capability of the NMD program system.
That is why General Shalikashvili stated at the same time that the
National Missile Defense Readiness Program of the administration is the
program that ``optimizes the potential for an effective national
missile defense system.''
The normal Department of Defense acquisition process for major
weapons systems requires a rigorous review of numerous technical
performance and cost considerations at each major decision point in the
development or acquisition process. The Department of Defense has
mandatory procedures for major defense acquisition programs that
provide that ``threat projections, system performance, unit production
cost estimates, life cycle costs, cost performance tradeoffs,
acquisition strategy, affordability constraints and risk management
shall be major considerations at each milestone decision point.''
S. 257 would make a deployment decision now while ignoring all of
those critical requirements that have been applied, I think, with one
exception where we paid a huge price, to the acquisition of every major
system.
Secretary Cohen's announcement that the actual deployment date is
expected no sooner than 2005 is designed to reduce the risk of failure,
but in mandating deployment ``as soon as technologically possible,''
the bill before us could undermine the Department's efforts to ensure
that the national missile defense system is operationally effective,
emphasis on the ``operationally.''
For example, it may be ``technologically possible,'' with a 1 in 20
success rate for a specific system to hit an incoming missile under
certain circumstances, but do we really want to make a deployment
commitment now to a national missile defense system under those
conditions?
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and our warfighting commanders certainly do
not want a system that is not operationally effective. Gen. Howell
Estes, the then-Commander in Chief of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command, testified before the Armed Services Committee in March
of 1997 that, from his perspective, ``it is vitally important that any
ballistic missile defense system we ultimately deploy must be
effective.''
The bill before us also ignores the issue of cost-effectiveness. If a
system does not provide us with a capability at a cost that can be
justified in light of other high priority national security
requirements, then, it seems to me, we are missing an opportunity,
indeed, a requirement, that a logical factor be considered as part of
the decision process, because what happens then is that we will be
saying, regardless of the cost, it makes no difference whether
[[Page S2629]]
this is cost-effective or not, in light of whatever its capability is,
regardless of whether it is operationally effective, if it is
technologically possible, to heck with the cost, to heck with the
operational effectiveness, and to heck with the impact on nuclear arms
reductions.
This cost-effectiveness issue is one of the four crucial factors that
Secretary Cohen and National Security Advisor Berger have said that the
administration will take into account in its deployment decision review
in June of next year. We should not disregard cost-effectiveness
completely, as this bill does.
Madam President, Secretary Cohen has testified that the
administration will make the decision in June of 2000 on whether to
deploy a limited national missile defense system, after taking into
account the threat, the operational effectiveness of the national
missile defense system, the cost-effectiveness of the system, and the
impact of deployment on nuclear arms reductions and arms control. This
bill ignores these factors and reduces the issue to one--what is
technologically possible and, when that is shown, then we are going to
deploy regardless of what those other factors indicate.
The bill would undermine the current effort of the administration to
reach a negotiated agreement on any changes to the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty that may be necessary to permit deployment of a limited
national missile defense system. Again, the summit statement of the two
Presidents, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, in March of 1997,
underscores the continuing importance of this treaty between us and the
Russians for strategic stability and for further reductions in
strategic offensive nuclear weapons. It pledges both parties to
``consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent
circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.'' This bill would throw
that pledge into the wastepaper basket.
As Secretary Cohen has made clear, we will not negotiate any needed
changes to the ABM Treaty forever. There may come a time when we
determine that we must withdraw from the treaty under the supreme
national interest clause. That would be a very serious step, but it is
not one that we need to take now or should take now before we have a
system developed, before we have tried to modify the ABM Treaty to
allow both the United States and Russia to move toward defenses against
limited ballistic missile threats.
Making a decision to deploy an NMD system before we even attempt to
negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty and before the Department of
Defense says that the Nation can responsibly make such a decision will
almost surely reduce Russia's willingness to cooperate with us on
reducing nuclear weapons on her soil under the START process, and
likely will lead Russia to retain thousands of nuclear warheads it
would otherwise eliminate, and would, thereby, dramatically increase
the threat of nuclear proliferation. The most likely threat that we
face isn't an intercontinental ballistic missile strike with a return
address guaranteeing our massive destruction of the sender. The most
likely threat is a terrorist using weapons of mass destruction.
This bill increases that threat by significantly increasing the odds
that Russia will end the reduction of nuclear weapons, which the treaty
that this bill would violate has led to, and for no good reason,
because this bill would not accelerate the national missile defense
development by a single day. It increases the proliferation risk from
thousands of nuclear weapons that would otherwise be eliminated through
the START process for no tangible benefit to this program.
This bill reduces our security by increasing the threat of
proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states, and that is one of
the many reasons why this bill has no support among our military
leaders.
Next week, the Prime Minister of Russia is coming to Washington for
an important series of meetings. Senate adoption of this bill
effectively says we are going to deploy a national missile defense
system in violation of an important treaty that we have with Russia.
The message that we are sending to Russia with this bill is we do not
care about our treaty commitment. We do not care about cooperation on
nuclear weapons reduction. I just wonder how the U.S. Senate would
react if, on the eve of an American President's visit to Moscow, the
Russian Duma passed legislation that undermined one of the basic
foundations of U.S.-Russian relations. You can bet it would cause one
heck of an uproar here, and I think Congress would be leading the
chorus.
Those of us who say that this bill will contribute to our national
security have to answer the question: why don't our senior military and
senior civilian defense and security leaders in this administration
support the bill? Where are the senior military leaders supporting this
bill? Why don't General Shelton and the Joint Chiefs of Staff support
this bill? Why doesn't General Lyles, the Director of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Office, support this bill? Why doesn't the Secretary of
Defense Bill Cohen, who is a proponent of national missile defense now
and when he served in the Senate, support this bill? They don't support
this bill because they know it will not contribute to our national
security.
Secretary Cohen's national missile defense plan has the strong
support of General Shelton, has the support of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. We should stick with it and vote against this bill.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
The White House,
Washington, February 3, 1999.
Hon. Carl Levin,
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Levin: I understand the Senate Armed Services
Committee will consider tomorrow S. 257--The National Missile
Defense Act of 1999.
I want to underscore that the Administration shares with
Congress a commitment to ensuring the American people are
provided effective protection against the emerging long-range
missile threat from rogue states. That is why we have since
1996 diligently pursued a deployment readiness program to
develop a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system
designed to protect against such threats. We have now
budgeted $10.5 billion between FY 1999-2005 for this program,
including the funds that would be necessary during this
period to deploy a limited NMD system.
Secretary Cohen has recently made clear that the
Administration will address the deployment decision in June
2000. The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it
suggests that our decision on deploying this system should be
based solely on a determination that the system is
``technologically possible.'' This unacceptably narrow
definition would ignore other critical factors that the
Administration believes must be addressed when it considers
the deployment question in 2000, including those that must be
evaluated by the President as Commander-in-Chief.
We intend to base the deployment decision on an assessment
of the technology (based on an initial series of rigorous
flight-tests) and the proposed system's operational
effectiveness. In addition, the President and his senior
advisors will need to confirm whether the rogue states
ballistic missile threat to the United States has developed
as quickly as we now expect, as well as the cost to deploy.
A decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed
within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for
achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms
through START II and III. The ABM Treaty remains a
cornerstone of strategic stability, and Presidents Clinton
and Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to
achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear
arms under these treaties.
The Administration has made clear to Russia that deployment
of a limited NMD that required amendments to the ABM Treaty
would not be incompatible with the underlying purpose of the
ABM Treaty, i.e., to maintain strategic stability and enable
further reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The ABM Treaty
has been amended before, and we see no reason why we should
not be able to modify it again to permit deployment of an NMD
effective against rogue nation missile threats.
We could not and would not give Russia or any other nation
a veto over our NMD requirements. It is important to
recognize that our sovereign rights are fully protected by
the supreme national interests clause that is an integral
part of this Treaty. But neither should we issue ultimatums.
We are prepared to negotiate any necessary amendments in good
faith.
S. 257 suggests that neither the ABM Treaty nor our
objectives for START II and START III are factors in an NMD
deployment decision. This would clearly be interpreted by
Russia as evidence that we are not interested in working
towards a cooperative solution, one that is in both our
nations' security interests. I cannot think of a worse
[[Page S2630]]
way to begin a negotiation on the ABM Treaty, nor one that
would put at greater risk the hard-won bipartisan gains of
START. Our goal would be to achieve success in negotiations
on the ABM Treaty while also securing the strategic arms
reductions available through START. That means we need to
recognize the address the interrelationship between these two
tracks.
The Administration hopes the Senate will work to modify S.
257 to reflect the priority that we believe must be attached
to the ABM and START objectives I have outlined above. But if
S. 257 were presented to the President in its current form,
his senior national security advisors would recommend that
the bill be vetoed.
Sincerely,
Samuel R. Berger,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. COCHRAN. I am happy to yield to my friend.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
privilege of the floor be granted to David Auerswald of Senator Biden's
staff.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I, likewise, ask unanimous consent for
the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Abraham, that Bill Adkins, a legislative
fellow on his staff, be granted the privilege of the floor during the
Senate's consideration of S. 257.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, it is interesting to hear the comments
of my good friend from Michigan. It reminds me, though, of someone who
has heard what this bill is about but really hasn't read the fine print
yet. That is one reason why when the bill was reported I was hopeful
that we could start off by reading the bill. It is very short. Unlike
the legislation that was debated last year in the Senate, this bill has
really a very small operative section. It is so small and clear and
concise that I could almost recite it. I am sure I would leave out
something. But the operative words are that it will be the policy upon
the passage of this legislation for the United States to deploy a
missile defense system--an effective missile defense system--that would
be capable of defending the United States against limited ballistic
missile attack as soon as technologically possible, and that that
attack would include missiles that were launched either intentionally,
accidentally or unauthorized. That is the bill that we are debating
here.
The suggestion that we are insisting on the passage of this bill that
the administration immediately deploy a system that may not be
workable, that may not be operationally effective, ignores the clear
wording of the legislation. It describes the missile defense system
that we are directing be deployed as an effective ballistic missile
system. So that is taken care of.
The amendment that has been submitted, which I hope will be adopted
by the Senate on a voice vote--it certainly is not controversial or it
should not be controversial--says that the deployment would be subject
to the authorization of appropriations and the appropriation of funds
by the committees of jurisdiction of the Congress.
Like any other defense system or new acquisition of weapons system by
the Department of Defense, the deployment of a national missile defense
system will be subject to the review of the committees with
jurisdiction over that subject in the Congress, and bills to authorize
the deployment and to fund the deployment will have to be passed and
they will have to be signed by the President.
The suggestion that the passage of this bill is the final step in the
process misses the point completely. It is the first step in the
process. We are trying to correct an outdated, outmoded, irrelevant
policy of wait and see--wait and see if a threat to the security
interests of the United States develops from ballistic missiles.
We have waited, and we have seen. We have seen the testing of a
multistage rocket by North Korea which they said was launched for the
purpose of putting a satellite in orbit. Our analysts have been
reported as saying that missile system used a solid fuel in its last
stage. It would be capable of striking the territory of Hawaii and
Alaska, and the last time I checked, they were part of the United
States.
At the present time, we have no defense against such a ballistic
missile attack from a rocket like that or from a missile. The design or
possible uses are virtually the same.
We are also puzzled over the fact that the Senator seems to suggest
in his statement that our relationship with Russia is going to be put
at risk if we adopt this bill, the first step in a process to correct
an outdated policy. This is our policy. This is our policy to defend
the security interests of the United States and American citizens who
might be at risk from a ballistic missile attack and weapons of mass
destruction that could be delivered by long-range, speedier missiles.
We have known for some time that our administration has been trying
to negotiate a so-called demarcation agreement with Russia,
distinguishing between theater missile defense capability and other
kinds of missile defense capabilities. It has been an excruciating
process to watch, and we basically have watched in the Congress as the
administration has reached agreements or suggestions of agreements
reduced to memoranda of understanding, not submitted to the Senate for
ratification as amendments to the ABM Treaty, but changes, nonetheless,
in the definition of what is permissible and possible for us to do as a
matter of our own national security interests with respect to theater
defensive missiles. It limits the speed at which our interceptors can
be tested against targets.
The point of this is, this administration has gone to great lengths
to try to manage the relationship with Russia so as not to ruffle any
feathers, not to upset Russia. Ask Mr. Primakov when he comes to the
United States why hasn't his government, his government
parliamentarians, ratified START II.
This is an effort to reach an agreement and an arrangement with
Russia to reduce and limit strategic arms, missiles systems and nuclear
weapons capabilities. We ratified that agreement 3 years ago in the
Senate. Russia has not kept its part of the bargain by ratifying that
agreement.
My point in saying this is that the relationship between the Russians
and the United States is of great importance to us, to me, to this
Senate. We cannot ignore the fact that Russia remains heavily armed
with nuclear weapons and missile capabilities like no other country in
the world, other than the United States. We do have concerns about that
relationship. We should take care to try to reach understandings with
the Russians on these matters, and I think we will continue to work
closely with our administration officials as they negotiate, discuss
and try to reach understandings about what are our intentions.
We are not trying to upset the strategic balance between the United
States and Russia on missile capability or nuclear weapons or the like.
We are trying to change a policy about our relationship with other
States that are developing weapons that are capable of threatening our
security where we do not have a history of much success.
North Korea is an example. There are other nation states that are now
engaged in developing missile capabilities where their missiles can go
much farther and much faster than they have in the past, and we have to
take that into account. We would be derelict in our duty if we did not.
We think this administration is behind the curve on the policy
decisions with respect to ballistic missile defense, and it is putting
the security interests of the United States at risk. That is what we
are trying to correct.
We are not trying to answer every question that can be raised or
every issue involved in ballistic missile defense in this one bill. It
just cannot be done. But that is the test that my good friend is trying
to measure this bill against. Does it answer every question? Does it
answer the question of whether or not a system will be adequately
tested? No. But before the Congress will authorize the deployment of a
system, it is bound to insist that there be some indication that it is
workable, that it is effective. That is why we use the phrase
``effective ballistic missile defense system'' in this bill. We also
want to make sure it is ``technologically feasible or possible'' for us
to
[[Page S2631]]
field a system. And that is why we use that phrase in this bill.
What we are hoping to accomplish is to make this administration
recognize that there is a legitimate concern. The threat exists today
to the security interests because of developments we have seen over the
last several years. Senators will remember that our subcommittee had 2
years of hearings analyzing the problems of proliferation of missile
technology, other technologies, computer technology, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, the easy access that some countries
have to information here in the United States, over the Internet, at
universities, at laboratories--we have heard a lot about that
recently--at laboratories here in the United States. You can get
information from those sources, and you can use them then if you are a
country that needs to upgrade its missile capability or nuclear weapons
capability. There are suggestions that that has been happening. Are we
to just close our eyes to that? Are we to ignore that and say, ``Well,
let's wait and see what happens''?
We have been waiting, and we have seen what has happened in North
Korea, in Iran, in China, in other countries as well. All of these
facts now convince us, the authors and the sponsors of this
legislation, that it is time to change our policy. That is what the
passage of this bill will do. It will put an end to the outdated wait-
and-see policy of the Clinton administration on this issue, and it will
say that as a matter of national policy we will deploy an effective
ballistic missile defense system as soon as technologically possible to
defend our country against limited ballistic missile attack--whether
unintentional, unauthorized, or deliberate.
I suggest we keep in mind that we dedicated that proliferation report
from our 2 years of hearings to the 28 U.S. servicemen who were killed
in the gulf war with a Scud missile. That was several years ago. We
have 8 years of experience to build on from that event. But that got
the attention of the American people and the families of those soldiers
who were killed that the United States is vulnerable and its service
men and women and its citizens and its embassies all around the world
are very vulnerable to missile attack and other attacks by weapons of
mass destruction.
This bill does not solve all those problems but it states as a matter
of national policy that we are not going to sit back and wait and see
any longer. We are going to move, and as quickly as technologically
possible, we are going to deploy a national missile defense system.
I am convinced that that is the right policy. We are not going to
disregard our obligations to work toward improving relationships with
Russia or China or other countries. That is a part of our
responsibility, too. But neither are we going to sacrifice the security
of our citizens to those relationships. We are, first of all, going to
protect the security interests of this country. That is the highest
priority we have as Members of this body.
We have every reason to believe that there are clear and present
dangers to the security of American citizens and our country. This is a
step, a first step, toward changing that policy and doing what has to
be done to fully protect our security interests.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of New Hampshire). The Senator from
Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, just a couple of additional brief points.
First, there is one thing we do agree on, I hope unanimously, in this
body, which is that our highest priority is to defend the security
interests of the United States. I do not know of anybody in this body
who would disagree with that premise. The question is, Is our security
advanced or is it harmed by making a statement that we are going to
deploy a system that violates a treaty with Russia, without first
trying to at least negotiate a modification in that treaty so that we
can do so jointly without a unilateral breach?
The stakes here are huge. We should make no mistake about it. The
stakes are that Russia has been reducing the number of nuclear weapons
on its soil. Indeed, we have been helping to dismantle those weapons so
that we are safer. And what they have told us is that the reason they
have done that is because they have a treaty with us which has
permitted them to do that called the ABM Treaty, and that without that
treaty in place--indeed, without that treaty enhanced--those reductions
are going to end.
We want fewer nuclear weapons on Russian soil. The fewer weapons they
have on their soil, the more secure we are. We have a treaty which has
permitted a significant reduction of those weapons on Russian soil, and
other states in the former Soviet Union. The fewer weapons they have,
the less the chance of proliferation.
I think most of us would agree that the greatest threat that we
face--security threat that we face--is the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. And the leakage of even one of those weapons from
Russian soil to a rogue state or a terrorist organization would create
a greater threat to the security of this Nation than any Soviet threat
we face, because a rogue nation could use it against us, where the
Soviets would have been committing suicide and would have cared about
committing suicide if they started an attack.
The proliferation threat against us is real. We keep talking about it
in this body. We keep saying the greatest emerging threat is the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Before we take any step
which would lead Russia to stop reducing the number of nuclear weapons
on its soil, surely we ought to sit down and negotiate with Russia to
see if we cannot do two things: One, accomplish a national missile
defense here, assuming we can come up with one which is operationally
effective; and, two, keep those reductions of nuclear weapons flowing.
Those goals are not incompatible. We are seeking both of them right
now. We are negotiating with the Russians in terms of a modification of
the ABM Treaty, and we are developing national missile defense as
quickly as is possible to develop.
There is no wait-and-see approach that has been going on here. The
uniformed military have told us this is a high-risk development
program. We are trying to do in a few years what usually takes us over
10 to develop. So we are engaged as quickly as we can in what Deputy
Secretary Hamre called the closest thing to a Manhattan project as
exists in the Defense Department. We are trying to develop a national
missile defense.
I think most if not all Members of this body are in favor of that
development.
The issue here in this bill is whether we commit to deploy that
system before it is developed, before it is shown to be operationally
effective, with no consideration to cost and without considering the
need to try, if possible, to negotiate a modification in a treaty with
the Russians which has allowed us and them to significantly reduce the
number of nuclear weapons on their soil.
We can accomplish all those things, hopefully, but not if we perceive
to tell the Russians, in advance of these negotiations being completed
or at least proceeding, that we are pulling out of this treaty in order
to deploy a system. There is not the slightest awareness in this
resolution of the desirability of modifying the ABM Treaty with Russia
so that we can continue to see reductions in nuclear weapons on their
soil.
For heaven's sake, aren't we more secure if they have fewer nuclear
weapons on their soil and if the ones that are being reduced are
dismantled, ``defanged,'' so they no longer threaten us? Shouldn't we
ask ourselves, Why is it the senior military leadership of this country
does not support this bill, people who spend their lives and have
dedicated their lives to the security of this Nation--our top military
officials--do not support this bill. Shouldn't we ask ourselves why?
There is no use invoking the question of Scud missiles. The defense
against Scud missiles does not violate a treaty between us and Russia.
The Patriot antimissile system, which we continue to support I think
unanimously in this body and continue to seek to improve it, is a
defense against theater ballistic missiles, the missiles such as the
Scud missile. There is no issue about that. I think everybody in this
body has for decades supported a theater missile defense system. That
is not a violation of the ABM Treaty. A limited national missile
defense system probably will violate that treaty.
[[Page S2632]]
Before we commit to do as this bill does, we should seek to modify a
treaty between us and Russia so that we can do two things at once:
Deploy a system, assuming we can get one that is operationally
effective against the rogue states, at the same time that we continue
to obtain and achieve the reduction of nuclear missiles on Russian
soil. Those goals are compatible, they are both desirable, they are
both achievable. At least we hope they are both achievable. Surely we
ought to explore whether they are both achievable without committing
ourselves to a course of action which tells the Russians, on the eve of
the visit of Prime Minister Primakov we are going to do something, like
it or not, whether it violates a treaty between us or not. I must again
ask this question: If the Russian Duma had taken an action 1 week
before our President went to Moscow, which tore at the basic
fundamental security relationship between us and Russia, what would our
reaction be in this Senate?
What troubles me the most is it is so needless. We are not advancing
by 1 day the development of a national missile defense system in this
bill; not by a day. I think everybody in this body wants to develop a
national missile defense system as quickly as can be done. The money is
in the budget to do so and has been there. The Congress has added some
hundreds of millions dollars, by the way, over the years for broad
support in order to make sure we do develop a national missile defense
as quickly as we possibly can. The President's budget has the money in
there to deploy such a system--assuming we can develop it. We are not
advancing by 1 day the development of a national missile defense with
this bill.
What we are doing is jeopardizing the reductions of nuclear weapons
on Russian soil for no gain in terms of the development of national
missile defense. That commitment to deploy, which this bill represents,
gains us nothing in terms of developing more speedily the system which
we all want to be developed, but jeopardizes the reduction of nuclear
weapons on Russian soil which is so important to the security of this
Nation.
My good friend from Mississippi surely speaks for all of us when he
says that is our top priority as a Senate. I couldn't agree with the
Senator more. There are very strong differences, however, as to whether
or not that priority is achieved with this bill, which ignores one-half
of a very important issue, which is the relationship between the
deployment of a national missile defense and the reduction of nuclear
weapons on Russian soil and the proliferation problem that is increased
when we act in a way that reduces the prospects of those continuing
reductions.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, in addition
to being sort of a jawbreaker of a title, is exceedingly significant
legislation which takes the first step toward protecting the American
people from the growing threat of attack from ballistic missiles
carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.
Now, I am gladly a cosponsor because this establishes the
unmistakable policy of the U.S. Government emphasizing the need to
defend the American people from missile attack. This policy is clear,
it is unequivocal.
However, it is only the first step. Ultimately, the President must
agree or be compelled to agree by an overwhelming congressional
override of his veto to begin immediately the building and deploying of
a national missile defense.
The construction of a meaningful defense will take time, obviously--
time that, given North Korea's recent missile test--we may not have. I
am among those who have become increasingly frustrated as the Clinton
administration has squandered month after month, year after year,
dithering and delaying, and otherwise reacting in ostrich-like fashion
to the fast-approaching threat of missile attack by a rogue regime.
I have long regarded as beyond belief that the Clinton administration
still refuses to commit to the immediate deployment of a national
missile defense. I wonder, given the fact that North Korea now has a
three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile capable of dropping
anthrax on U.S. cities in Alaska and perhaps Hawaii, how much
indifference could so dictate such a perilous do-nothing attitude by
the President and his advisors. Nero fiddled as Rome burned--and the
crowd in charge on Pennsylvania Avenue may wake up one morning and
realize that they have been playing with the safety of the American
people and playing fast and loose.
I trust I am very clear on this point: it is an absolute, irrefutable
fact that a hostile tyrant today possesses missiles capable of
exterminating American cities.
Mr. President, North Korea is not our only concern. The Islamic
fundamentalists in Iran continue their crash missile program. The
Rumsfeld Commission has warned that Iran has everything it needs to put
together an ICBM within a few years. And because the Clinton
administration has fooled around in its do-nothing mode for so long,
Iran may very well be able to deploy an ICBM before America has a
missile defense to counter it, even if the United States breaks ground
on construction tomorrow morning.
Perhaps most troubling, however, is Communist China's nuclear missile
program. China fields dozens of submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
hundreds of warheads on heavy bombers, roughly 24 medium and long-range
ballistic missiles, and has several crash modernization initiatives in
progress this very moment.
Further, Red China has begun deploying several new types of ballistic
missiles. And most troubling, it is now clear that China has stolen
America's most sensitive nuclear secret--technical data for the W-88
warhead. Theft of that warhead design, coupled with the multiple-
satellite dispenser that China developed working with United States
satellite companies, will enable the PRC to deploy MIRVed weapons far
sooner than expected.
In other words, China is on the verge of tripling or quadrupling, the
number of warheads pointed at our cities, and this, Mr. President, is
the same country that flexed its military might by firing missiles in
the Strait of Taiwan in an effort to intimidate a longstanding and
peaceful ally of the United States. The People's Republic of China--
that is to say, Communist China--also is the same nation that engaged
in a bit of nuclear blackmail by threatening a missile strike against
Los Angeles.
Obviously, Mr. President, with these hostile threats emerging, it
would be assumed that the United States would already have deployed a
system to protect the American people against this danger; and it would
be assumed that the Clinton administration surely is working, in
cooperation with a bi-partisan majority in Congress, to make certain
that the United States will never be exposed to a missile attack by a
terrorist regime.
Well, such assumptions have been woefully wrong. The do-nothing
Clinton administration has aggressively blocked every effort by
Congress to implement a national missile defense system to protect the
American people. More than 3 years have already been lost in deploying
a missile defense system because of the President's veto, in December,
1995, of critical legislation designed to protect the American people.
The President's people, in fact, are out there right now lobbying
against the pending business of the Senate today, the National Missile
Defense Act of 1999, of which I am a cosponsor.
Indeed, China, North Korea, and Iran can today hold the American
people hostage to missile attack because of the do-nothing attitude of
the President of the United States who, here in Washington, has
consistently refused to build, or even consider building, the strategic
missile defenses necessary to protect the American people from such an
attack.
For years, liberals have tut-tutted that no long-range missile threat
existed to necessitate a missile defense. But now, in the wake of the
Rumsfeld Commission's report and North Korea's missile launch, even the
most zealous arms control advocates have been forced to admit that
their critical lapse of judgment and foresight has put our nation at
heightened risk.
Though these people now admit the existence of a serious threat, just
the
[[Page S2633]]
same, they cannot bring themselves to agree to the deployment of a
shield against missile attack. Why, Mr. President?
I'll tell you why. It is because of an incredible and dumb devotion
to an antiquated arms control theory. Critics of the National Missile
Defense Act of 1999 claim that Henny Penny's sky will fall because even
the most limited effort to defend the American people will scuttle
strategic nuclear reductions. One Senator, for example, declared in a
recent press release that, if S. 257 is passed, ``Russia would likely
retain thousands of nuclear warheads it would otherwise eliminate under
existing and planned arms reduction treaties.''
Mr. President, if this is the last, best argument that can be
mustered against deploying a national missile defense, opponents of the
pending National Missile Defense Act of 1999 had better go back to the
drawing board in search of logic. While they are at it, they
should ponder the fact that Russia has been threatening to block
ratification of START II since almost the day it was signed. For more
than 6 years, the United States has been waiting for the Russian
Government to put this treaty into force; in the meantime the American
people have been subjected to a barrage of Russian threats and demands
for concessions on a bewildering array of issues, largely unrelated to
the treaty.
For the benefit of Senators, and the American people, I ask unanimous
consent that a document, cataloging just a few of these Russian demands
regarding START II, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
An Ever-Growing Number of Russian Excuses For Not Ratifying Start II
The United States and Russia signed the START II Treaty on
January 3, 1993. The Senate provided its advice and consent
to ratification on January 26, 1996. Since then, Russia has
used START II ratification as a pretext to hold hostage an
ever-changing number of issues. As the Chairman of the Duma's
International Affairs Committee said on March 14, 1998, the
Duma contains people ``who are ready to use any pretext in
order to delay consideration of this issue.''
Threat Number 1: No START II unless the U.S. Gives in to
Russian demands on the CFE Treaty.
In 1994, Defense Minister Grachev declared that CFE treaty-
limits on Russia's conventional armed forces were
unacceptable and demanded their revision. No action on START
II would be possible, according to Grachev, until this issue
was resolved. So what did the Clinton Administration do? The
U.S. dutifully changed the treaty to meet the Russian
demands. We are, by the way, now changing it yet again to
meet more Russian demands.
Threat Number 2: No START II unless the U.S. ratifies the
treaty first.
In 1995, the Russian foreign minister, Mr. Primakov--now
the Prime Minister--demanded that the U.S. must first ratify
START II as a sign of good faith. We did that in January,
1996, and we are still waiting.
Threat Number 3: No START II if the U.S. Does not pay for
Russian implementation of START I.
Then the Russians complained that they could not afford to
meet their obligations under the START I agreement and
threatened not to move on START II unless the U.S. taxpayer
paid to dismantle all of Russia's obsolete missiles (to make
room for the deployment of far more modern systems). So what
did the Clinton Administration do/ It has shelled out
billions of dollars in Cooperative Threat Reduction funding
to meet this demand.
Threat Number 4: No START II unless the U.S. makes
concessions on the ABM Treaty.
As negotiations to clarify the ABM Treaty's demarcation
line between strategic and theater missile defenses dragged
on, the Russians insisted that tissue had to be resolved
before they could ratify START II. The United States agreed
to a series of concessions that resulted in a demarcation
agreement which did not clarify the distinction between
theater and strategic defenses but which did impose new
restrictions on theater missile defense systems.
Threat Number 5: No START II unless the U.S. makes more
foreign aid concessions.
In 1996 the Chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee,
Sergei Yushkov, tied START II ratification not just to the
ABM Treaty, but to ``the provision of adequate funds for the
maintenance of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.''
Threat Number 6: No START II unless the U.S. makes other
concessions.
In September, 1997, Ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky,
who controls a sizeable bloc of Duma votes, declared that
START II should not be ratified until ``a favorable moment''
and that Russia should hold out for more U.S. concessions.
According to Zhirinovsky, ``We have created a powerful
missile complex, and we must use it to get certain
advantages.''
Threat Number 7: No START II if the U.S. strikes against
Saddam Hussein.
In connection with the U.S. military build-up in the
Persian Gulf, the Deputy Speaker of the Duma declared that
START II would never be approved if the United States were to
use force against Iraq.
Threat Number 8: No START II unless the U.S. agrees to
allow continued Russian violation of the START Treaty.
Most recently, U.S. arms control negotiators were told that
their refusal to shelve U.S. concerns over repeated Russian
violations of the START Treaty would jeopardize START II
ratification.
Bottom line: The Russian threat over deployment of a U.S.
missile defense is just one in a long, tired litany of ever-
changing excuses for not ratifying START II.
Mr. HELMS. The bottom line, Mr. President, is that it is prima facie
ridiculous to still insist that the United States must forgo defending
itself against missile attack in order to ensure that Russia ratifies
START II. The United States has already paid a dozen ransom notes to
Russia in an effort to secure START II's ratification--to no avail.
This latest price demanded by Russia is simply too high.
Now, I believe that START II may still be in the United States'
national security interests, but it is not of such overriding interest
that we must forgo the defense of the American people in order to
salvage START II. What will happen if START II is not ratified?
Strategic forces are expensive to maintain, as both the United States
and Russia have rediscovered. That is why the Clinton administration is
seeking permission to fall below START I levels regardless of whether
the Russians honor their START II obligations--because it wants the
money that would be spent on strategic nuclear forces to be used for
other, neglected requirements like readiness.
And what of Russia, Mr. President? The truth is that Russia's
strategic force levels are going to plummet far past the levels
mandated by START II regardless of whether there is any agreement in
force. The strategic missiles Russia (then the Soviet Union) deployed
in the 1980s are reaching the end of their useful life, and cannot be
replaced. Russia has neither the money nor a reason, to replace them.
In fact, last year the Russian Minister of Defense told Russia's
Security Council that even the new SS-27 Topol ICBM currently being
deployed, Russia will be unable to field more than 1,500 warheads by
the year 2010, which, at the rate things are going, might be about the
time the Duma finally gets around to ratifying START II.
The truth is that arms control agreements are not controlling force
levels. Fiscal and strategic realities are. Why is Russia allowing its
forces to fall to historically low levels? I will tell you. For the
same reason as is the United States. We no longer live in a cold war
world in which huge nuclear arsenals are our top spending priority. The
notion that limited ballistic missile defenses will somehow set off a
new arms race--or forestall further reductions--is absurd.
Mr. President, the truth of the matter is that the arguments about
START II are really a cover for those who continue to worship the arms
control doctrine of mutually-assured destruction. No amount of policy
sophistry or arms control rhetoric by the Clinton administration can
alter the fact that the United States is vulnerable to nuclear-tipped
missiles fielded by China, or any one else. Rectifying this dangerous
deficiency requires leadership and action. It is an all the more
pressing issue because the current course charted by the administration
fails to recognize the inherent danger in China's pursuit of an
advanced nuclear arsenal, based--as we have learned in recent days--
around the W-88 warhead.
Mr. President, any further delay in the development by the United
States of a flexible, cost-effective national missile defense is
unconscionable. I am honored to cosponsor the National Missile Defense
Act of 1999 and I urge Senators to support this legislation to make
certain that the United States Government will finally adopt a policy
to protect the American people from attack by ballistic missiles.
Mr. President, I yield the floor. I thank the Chair.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I rise today to support S. 257, the National Missile
Defense Act
[[Page S2634]]
of 1999, and, in doing so, I rise to support development and deployment
of a limited national missile defense.
Colleagues have said that this debate has begun today, and I am sure
each Member of the Senate believes, because we have no greater
responsibility under the Constitution than to provide for the common
defense of our Nation. That is one of the fundamental reasons people
form governments, to provide for their common defense. It is a duty we
must fulfill with intellectual honesty and with thoughtful attention to
the world in which we reside.
Let us look honestly at the world today. The cold war is over,
thankfully. Democracy triumphed over communism. The bipolar strategic
tension of the world--two armed camps living in a strange balance of
terror where each threatened to destroy the other if the first acted--
is over, thankfully over. And in that sense we enjoy today the benefits
of that victory. Everybody around the globe--people here in the United
States, those in Russia, and certainly those who lived under the
tyranny of the Soviet Union, three peoples of which so proudly and
joyously joined NATO just this past weekend. Though the existential
threats we faced are not there, the threats to our very existence are
not there, as the operating tempo of our military makes clear, we face
a remarkable series of threats to our security around the world. And we
face something like threats we have faced before, but with an intensity
and a breadth that are unparalleled; and that is the potential of
threats to our homeland, to the United States of America, shielded as
we have been by geography, by two oceans. Although we have worried in
the past and we have been at war and conflict about threats to our
homeland, we have never faced them, I fear, to the same extent we will
in the years ahead. And this is a reflection not only of the dispersion
of power, the breakup of the two armed camps that dominated and defined
the cold war, it is a reflection of what history tells us, which is
that whenever there are developments in the nonmilitary world, in the
industrial, or, in our time, the technological world, they work their
way into the military.
Today, even as nationalism rears its head with a new intensity in
places like the Balkans, national boundaries in the conventional sense
are seamless and less dominant. We communicate with each other through
television and now, dramatically, in two-way communication over the
Internet, jumping over traditional national boundaries. We have a
growing number of assets, defense and civilian related, which exist in
space that affect our lives, civilian and military, in very, very
fundamental ways. We have increasing capacity through technology to
deliver weapons of mass destruction against other peoples and to fear
and face the potential of their delivery against us.
So it is not surprising that, within the community of those who worry
about our national security, and particularly, of course, within the
Department of Defense, there is new concern, new thinking, talk of new
organization, to deal with homeland defense, the defense of the United
States of America; that the very technology that has enabled us to
reach across national boundaries, to have international commerce at
enormous volume and worth with remarkable speed, also begins to subject
us in our homes, businesses, neighborhoods, communities, and States to
attack.
I don't mean to suggest a panic, but, to be intellectually honest and
thoughtful about it, the fact is that we have in our time already seen
ourselves subject to terrorist attack here in our homeland, some of
which has been inspired from outside, that we know we face a risk of
attack to our information systems, which dominate and on which we
depend for so much in the lives that we lead so well today.
Another element of that new vulnerability that our homeland faces is
from missile attack. We faced it during the cold war when the Soviet
Union and the United States were two armed camps with intercontinental
ballistic missiles aimed at each other, in which we reached a kind of
bizarre agreement, ``rationality'' in the midst of irrationality, that
neither would push the button for fear of what damage that would do to
the one who pushed the button. Today, we are facing a threat of a
different order. Though it is limited, it is coming from people who
will not, we fear, bind to the same rationale of a system of mutual
assured destruction.
That is what motivates this bill. I see it as a response not just to
the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, but as part of a broader, growing concern that we in the
Senate and the American people will have to face to raise our defenses
once again here at home.
In the very near future--perhaps within a few months--erratic
leaders, tyrants of rogue regimes, will control ballistic missiles
possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction that can reach our
national territory. One or more rogue states may have the technology to
do so today. Equally unsettling is the fact that criminal or insurgent
elements from countries in turmoil could also have access to those
weapons.
So the threat is real and it is current, and everything we know about
the rapid dissemination of technological information and the commercial
proliferation of ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass
destruction tells us that the threat will get worse faster than we had
previously thought.
Until this past year, most observers, intelligent observers,
thoughtful observers, believed that the emergence of such a threat was
way over the horizon, a problem for the future. A national intelligence
estimate written in 1993 and revised in 1995 concluded that no country
other than the declared nuclear powers would develop or otherwise
acquire ballistic missiles that could reach the 48 contiguous United
States within the next 10 to 15 years. But in July of 1998, a
commission of distinguished experts, chaired by former Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, concluded that this earlier estimate was far too
optimistic.
The Rumsfeld Commission report found that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq
were engaged in concerted efforts to build or acquire ballistic
missiles. The panel also found that North Korea and Iran could use
these missiles to inflict major damage on the United States within 5
years of a decision to do so. Iraq, a rogue state that has constantly
challenged its neighbors, the United States, and the international
community militarily for two decades now, so the Rumsfeld Commission
said, could inflict major damage on the United States within 10 years.
The Commission warned that the ability of our intelligence community to
provide timely and accurate warning of attempts to produce ballistic
missiles was eroding.
So a problem is growing, with the capacity of the intelligence
community to warn us of its forward movement eroded. And then the
Rumsfeld Commission predicted prophetically, as it turned out, that
Iran would soon deploy a Shahab-3 missile on the way to developing
intercontinental ballistic missile capability and that North Korea
would soon have a missile capable of hitting Alaska or Hawaii.
Well, unfortunately, the Rumsfeld Commission was right on target.
Within a month of its report, Iran did flight test the Shahab-3
missile, and 1 month later North Korea launched its Taepo Dong
missiles. We had long known North Korea had strong missile technology.
Analysts were broadly surprised that the Taepo Dong was a three-stage
missile with enough range to hit parts of the United States of America.
The Iranian and North Korean missile tests validated two of the
Rumsfeld Commission's findings. First, that rogue states are in
possession of missiles that threaten American territory; and, second,
that these states have developed this capability far more rapidly than
we had assumed possible and with very little warning.
Recent events in places such as North Korea and Iran have contributed
to a revision and updated a speeding up of the administration's
approach to missile defense, and I appreciate that acceleration very
much. Just a few months ago, in January of this year, Secretary of
Defense Cohen announced that the administration would seek $6.6 billion
over 5 years to field a limited national missile defense.
Secretary Cohen explained:
We are affirming that there is a threat and the threat is
growing, and that it will pose a danger not only to our
troops overseas but also to Americans here at home.
[[Page S2635]]
The Taepo Dong I test was another strong indicator that the
United States will, in fact, face a rogue nation missile
threat to our homeland against which we will have to defend
the American people.
The bill before us today, S. 257, is designed to respond to that very
real threat that rogue states and organizations with missile technology
pose to our Nation. S. 257 states what I think we all believe, which is
that we should take action to protect ourselves against this threat. We
would be derelict in our duty if we did not. I view S. 257 as a
statement of policy, a statement of policy that it is the intention of
the United States of America, the administration, executive branch,
Members of Congress, shoulder to shoulder together, to develop a
defense to this threat which could be a cataclysmic threat that we all
seem to agree we are now facing.
So I must admit that I am disappointed by the disagreement that still
exists over this measure. The statement of policy that came from the
Clinton administration in January of this year seems to me to be
reflected in and consistent with the simple statement embodied in S.
257. And yet, there is opposition. I hope that the debate and
discussion that we are having today and the days ahead will lead us to
find a way to express what I believe we all feel: The threat is real
and we have to do something about it as quickly as possible.
As I understand the concerns of the administration and my colleagues
in the Senate who oppose S. 257, they are as follows: They argue that
this bill considers only technological feasibility in making a
commitment now to deploy a national missile defense without taking into
account the actual threat, the operation, the effectiveness of the
system against a threat, the affordability of the system, including the
balance of other critical defense needs, and the impact of the policy
stated in this bill on nuclear weapons reductions and arms control
efforts particularly with Russia.
I know that some are also concerned that S. 257 contradicts the
administration's policy of not deciding on deployment until June of
2000 after a series of tests. Some also fear that this bill will make
it less likely that the Russians would continue arms control
negotiations. Some still feel that since the administration has
budgeted $6.6 billion for national missile defense development and
deployment, S. 257 is not necessary and will not advance the deployment
deadline, as the effort is technology constrained, not policy or
resource constrained. And there are others who say that this response
does not help defend against the most likely methods of delivery such
as maritime vessels.
Of course, the most likely methods of delivery, if they are in fact
the most likely methods of delivery such as maritime vessels, if I may
start with the last argument, should only lead us to want to accelerate
the development of a limited defense because delivery from the water,
from the oceans may speed up the date by which the United States will
be vulnerable to this attack.
Let me try to respond to some of the arguments that have been made.
First, while it is true that S. 257 does state that the United States
should deploy a limited national missile defense when technologically
feasible, that is a broad statement of policy which does not preclude
consideration of other important factors. It simply says--and I hope
when I join with Senator Cochran, Senator Inouye and others, that it
would be a broad enough statement of policy--that it would lead a broad
bipartisan majority to feel comfortable coming to its support.
The fact is that we will consider questions of affordability and
other questions each year, as we in Congress carry out our
responsibility to authorize and appropriate with regard to a limited
national missile defense and other defense programs, to decide how to
proceed and how much money to devote to the program. To me, that is
implicit in the bill, because it is inherent in the legislative
process. A policy statement saying that it is our intent to deploy a
national missile defense when technologically feasible doesn't mean it
will happen automatically or overnight, it doesn't mean that Congress
will be precluded from participation in the program and that the
Ballistic Missile Defense Office will essentially be given a blank
check. Quite the contrary. Each year we will authorize--which this bill
does not do; it is a policy statement--and we will appropriate, which
this bill most certainly does not do.
Though I think that is clear from the wording in S. 257, I am very
pleased to be a cosponsor of the amendment which has been laid down by
the Senator from Mississippi which makes clear that this policy that we
would declare in S. 257 is subject to the annual authorization and
appropriations process.
As to the question of the administration's policy or plan to make a
judgment about deployment in June of 2000 based on some tests that will
be done by then--four tests, I believe, that would be done by then--to
me the bill before us neither negates nor endorses that policy. In
fact, under the bill before us, it is possible that the decision to
deploy would not be made until well after June of 2000, because the
threshold of technological feasibility, technological possibility,
would not have been reached. But the fact that we are not ready now to
deploy a system surely cannot mean that we should not now declare our
policy to deploy such a system, to get ready to defend our territory
and our people as soon as possible. In fact, we should declare that
policy unequivocally, and I think this bill, S. 257, gives us the
opportunity to do that.
Let me now talk of the concerns about the impact that passage of this
bill will have on our relations with Russia and particularly on arms
control negotiations that are going on with Russia. I have long
supported those negotiations, they are so clearly and palpably in our
national security interests. They have run into obstacles along the
way--START agreements ran into political difficulties in the Russian
Duma. But of course we are part of a process in which we are trying to
move those forward in our national security interests.
But I must say, I fail to see how passage of this measure, in which
we in the U.S. Senate would be declaring our intention to develop a
limited national missile defense, should be stopped by our concern
about what I believe is a misunderstanding or misapprehension, if in
fact it exists, in Russia, about our intentions here. In all the debate
and discussion I have heard about the development of a national missile
defense, a limited national missile defense, I have not heard anybody--
certainly I have not, Senator Cochran has not, Senator Inouye has not--
suggest that the country we are developing this defense against is
Russia.
The countries we are developing this defense against are rogue
nations, subnational groups that may attempt to inflict harm,
intimidate us, leverage us to extract compromises on our national
security from our leadership--not Russia. In fact, I believe the
administration has spoken these words to the Russians.
We have common enemies here in these rogue states. This system is not
being developed against the nations of the former Soviet Union or
Russia. This is not star wars. Star wars was aimed at--speaking
simplistically, if I may--putting a security umbrella over the United
States to protect us from a massive ICBM attack from the Soviet Union.
This is a highly limited system aimed at trying to preserve a measure
of security for our people against limited missile attack from rogue
nations.
So I am puzzled and troubled about why we should not simply state our
policy to develop a defense of our homeland against rogue nations
because there may be some in Russia who misunderstand our intention. We
understand that doing so will compromise the ABM Treaty, negotiated in
a very different context for very different reasons more than a quarter
of a century ago at the height of the cold war. That is why top level
officials of our administration have already begun to speak with the
Russians about our intention. It is clearly evident from the policy
that Secretary Cohen articulated in January, clearly evident from the
additional billions of dollars that President Clinton has put into the
defense budget in the coming years to accelerate our development of a
national missile defense. But I, for one, would feel irresponsible--put
it another way. I would feel we had not worked hard enough to reassure
the Russians that this national missile defense that we state in
[[Page S2636]]
this measure that we intend to build is not aimed at them. It is aimed
at common enemies that they and we have.
The fact is, in some measure the content of S. 257 is an honest
expression to the leadership in Russia, with whom we are working on so
many different matters, that this has now become a matter of American
national policy--self defense. And, as much as we value good relations
with Russia, as much as we adhere to our treaty obligations, we are
saying to them here that we have made a judgment in our own national
self-interest and self-defense that we must develop a limited national
missile defense and therefore we must begin, as we have, to renegotiate
the ABM Treaty. But to not go ahead with this policy statement for fear
of the way it will be misread in Russia seems to me to be an
underestimation of both our relationship and of our ability to speak
truth to the Russians and of their ability to understand it.
So, mindful as I am, respectful as I am of the importance of ongoing
arms control negotiations with the Russians, I think we do not serve
our national interests if we yield to that misapprehension when we know
that this system is not being developed to defend against hostile
action by them.
Mr. President, we need the national missile defense. We face a real
and growing threat that cannot be countered by our conventional forces
and which will not be deterred by the threat of retaliation. Remember,
Russia, on whom we are focused in our judgment on this measure--and
some are focused to the extent that they will oppose it because of
concerns in Russia--we and the Russian-dominated Soviet Union reached
this meeting of minds during a cold war that we were each rational
enough to be deterred by the threat of massive retaliation. Deterrence,
after all, requires rationality. By definition, accidental,
unauthorized, or rogue acts are not the acts of rational leaders and
cannot be reliably deterred.
Thus, we have a choice: Either we will endure the possibility of
limited missile attack on our country with weapons of mass destruction,
or we will commit ourselves, with all that we have in us, and will
state so honestly in this measure, that we are going to do everything
we can to defend against such an attack.
I don't agree that this measure is not needed. It is needed. It is a
clarion statement of policy about a critical national security
vulnerability at an important transitional period in our national
history. The fact is, its very existence has already acted as a
catalyst in moving this debate forward, the debate about the threat.
After all, congressional concern about this led to the Rumsfeld
Commission, which led to the report, which predicted the North Korean-
Iranian action, which now has led to a coming closer together between
congressional opinion and administration policy.
Mr. President, both sides in this debate are, after all is said and
done, separated by very little. A critical national security decision
such as this should not be partisan. The amendment that Senator Cochran
and I and others, I believe Senators Warner and Inouye, put down, which
makes clear what was implicit before, that S. 257 will naturally be
subjected to the annual authorization and appropriations process, makes
clear that Congress each year will consider the affordability, the
extent of the threat, the impact funding of this system has on other
defense needs, and even the impact of the level of funding on our
relations with Russia and other arms control negotiations.
I think that defending against limited missile attacks is something
that all of us, both parties, 100 strong, clearly want to do. I take it
that the disagreement is how to do it and what we should express, if
anything, in a statement of policy. This is such an important matter
and at such a critical moment that I hope in this debate we will listen
to each other, that we will reason together, and that we will
ultimately come up with a proposal here that a broad bipartisan
majority can support.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The Senator from Mississippi.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
privilege of the floor be extended to John Rood and Gordon Behr, who
are legislative fellows from the staff of Senator John Kyl.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to support
the pending legislation. I am listed as a cosponsor, and I believe that
it is an important statement of U.S. policy which we ought to adopt.
This is one of the most direct bills that I have seen in my tenure in
the Senate, providing:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as
is technologically possible, an effective national missile
defense system, capable of defending the territory of the
United States against limited ballistic missile attack,
whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate.
The most basic purpose of government is to protect its citizenry. The
most basic purpose of the Government of the United States of America is
to protect the people of the United States from foreign and domestic
dangers. We have focused a great deal of attention on the threat of
weapons of mass destruction, and the top of the list involves the issue
of ballistic missile attack.
Beyond ballistic missile attack, we know that there are many other
concerns of biological warfare and chemical warfare. Right now a
commission is working to try to streamline the Federal Government to
try to make some organizational sense, organizational improvements out
of the 96 separate agencies which now deal with weapons of mass
destruction.
During my tenure as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
working collaboratively at that time with CIA Director John Deutch, a
provision was inserted in the Intelligence Authorization bill in 1996
to provide a commission to take a look at the 96 separate agencies
dealing with weapons of mass destruction. We find that the Department
of Health and Human Services is involved in this venture, as is the
Department of Defense, as is the Department of Justice. Tomorrow we are
holding a hearing on some aspects of the domestic problem.
Internationally, the strategic defense initiative has been a hotly
contested subject for debate for more than a decade, going into the
early administration of President Reagan when he articulated the idea
of a strategic defense initiative, popularly known as Star Wars. At
that time many people debunked the idea that there could be a shield to
protect the United States from a ballistic missile attack, and we have
relied upon the theory of mutual assured destruction--accurately
labeled, in shorthand, MAD, for mutual assured destruction--with our
basic defense posture being that the Soviet Union, our principal
adversary, would not fire ballistic missiles at the United States
because of fear of retaliation, so that the balance of power was
maintained.
More than a decade ago, we had some very lively debates on the Senate
floor as to whether the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should have a
narrow or a broad interpretation, going back to the origin of the
treaty, the history. The debate then was whether we might be able to
deploy some sort of strategic defense initiative under a broad
interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That treaty,
entered into in 1972, has been a subject of very extended debate on the
floor of the U.S. Senate and beyond. It may well be that with the
enactment of this policy, there will have to be some negotiations with
Russia, with other parties to the ABM Treaty. It was entered into by
the Soviet Union, which no longer exists. There have been many
modifications of the policy with the former Soviet Union, with Russia,
where the United States, under the Nunn-Lugar program, has appropriated
very substantial sums of money to acquire and destroy Russian missiles,
missiles formerly housed by the U.S.S.R. I do believe that with the
changing relationship between the United States and the former Soviet
Union, and with the expansion of NATO, a move that many thought Russia
would never tolerate but now has become acclimated to,
[[Page S2637]]
there are signs of a maturation process, a changing relationship
between the United States and Russia.
I do believe that it is important to have talks with Russia about the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but I do think that the treaty is
subject to modification. There are provisions for revocation of the
treaty on notice by the United States, but we now face a very different
kind of a threat. We now face a threat, perhaps, from North Korea,
perhaps soon from rogue nations like Iran or Iraq. It is none too soon
to look toward the deployment of a national missile defense system
which is intended to deal with the threat posed by the rogue nations.
The technology is very hard to calculate as to what can be achieved.
When President Reagan articulated the principle, or the idea of a
strategic defense initiative, people said it was impossible. I recall
reading a commentary more than a decade ago about Vannevar Bush's
comment back in the mid-forties, about 1945, when Vannevar Bush said it
would be an impossibility to have intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Now look at what has happened; we have them by the thousands.
In 1965, then Secretary of Defense McNamara said that the United
States was so far ahead of the Soviet Union that they could never catch
up. They did. For a time, they passed the United States, until we
rearmed America, leading, in effect, to the bankruptcy of the Soviet
Union and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.
There is a story many people believe to be apocryphal, but it is a
true story, about a man who worked for the Patent Office shortly after
the turn of the 19th century who resigned his post because everything
that could be discovered or invented had been discovered or invented.
We see how modern science has produced discoveries, inventions
unthought of, uncontemplated. So, too, we may be able to find an
effective system to protect the United States from missiles from rogue
countries.
I believe this is an important bill. We could not bring it to the
floor in the 105th Congress because we were one vote short of cloture.
There are some 54 cosponsors on this bill, and I believe it articulates
a very important principle, to defend America, to defend Americans and
to find a national missile defense system which would protect our
country against rogue nations, against accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate attacks.
We will have other considerations to deal with regarding Russia,
other considerations to deal with in relation to China where recent
events have shown advances in China's missile technology, in part,
according to reliable reports, as a result of China having gained
access to United States technology through espionage. But this
principle--of having a national missile defense policy--is something
which ought to be adopted.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. REED addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. REED. Madam President, first, as a procedural matter, I ask
unanimous consent that Anthony Blaylock, a defense fellow working in
Senator Dorgan's office, be granted the privilege of the floor during
debate on S. 257.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REED. Madam President, we are here today debating an issue of
fundamental importance to the United States and to the world community,
and that is whether or not we will adopt a resolution of this Senate to
proceed with a national missile defense as soon as it is
technologically possible.
As many of my colleagues have indicated, I believe there is strong
recognition of the need for the careful deployment of a national
missile defense because we are at a historical crossroads.
First, there have been technological advances by rogue states which,
for the first time, allow them in the near future to be able to launch
intercontinental ballistic missiles that would strike the territory of
the United States. That, in and of itself, has focused our attention,
our resolve, and our commitment to begin accelerated development and,
one would hope, the eventual deployment of a national missile defense.
But the issue before us today is whether this legislation, S. 257,
will materially aid that effort without unduly complicating our
ability, first, to defend the United States and, second, to maintain
the regime of deterrence that has lasted throughout the cold war and
has avoided to date, and we hope indefinitely, the use of nuclear
weapons in the world.
I mentioned that we are at a historical crossroads, the first element
of which is the fact that rogue nations can, in fact, begin to launch
in the near future intercontinental ballistic missiles. But the second
aspect of this historical crossroads is the fact that we have been
maintaining over decades a strategic balance which always contemplated
limits on offensive capability and which has led to treaties between
ourselves and the former Soviet Union, and now Russia, with respect to
limitations on offensive weapons. Complementing that has been, since
1972, the limitation on antiballistic missile systems.
Sometimes I think we take this balance for granted. We assume that is
the way it always will be because it exists today. But we are seeing
pressure on this balance. First and most obviously, because of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the constrained position of Russia, we
are seeing some operational wearing around the edges in terms of their
ability to maintain the same type of controls that they had at the
height of the cold war.
We are also seeing a situation where operationally they might,
regretfully, be a little bit quicker on the draw, since they do not
have the same type of panoply of long-term observation or radars that
they had or those that they have are beginning to deteriorate.
The point I want to make with respect to strategic balance is that
this is not something automatically that comes into play, it is
something that has to be sustained and maintained, and when we look at
legislation like the bill before us, we have to seriously ask the
question, Will this aid the maintenance of this strategic balance, or
will it give incentives to act unilaterally? That is a serious question
which I think we have to address.
There is a second factor with respect to the historical crossroads,
and that is, for the first time in recent memory, Russia, as the
legatee of the Soviet Union, is not able to match dollar for dollar,
ruble for dollar, if you will, developments that we, in fact, might put
in place. Unlike the cold war, where they could accelerate their
offensive missile capability by putting out more launches if we did
something, they cannot do that too easily. Nor could they easily copy
an extensive national missile defense if we put it in place. Again,
this is another strategic aspect that has to be considered when we
consider this legislation.
All of these issues together suggest a few things. First, we have to
seriously address the issue of the rogue state with intercontinental
ballistic missiles, but, just as seriously, we have to be concerned
about doing something that might destabilize the overall arms control
regime in the world. What we want to avoid is the temptation for states
with nuclear weapons and a capacity for intercontinental-range launches
to start taking unilateral actions which may imperil us just as much as
the development of missiles by a rogue state.
Having said that, I think we can look at the situations which we
potentially are trying to cover with this national missile defense and
pose two questions which I think are at the heart of our debate.
First of all, we are really focused at this juncture, with respect to
this legislation, on what is called the simple case, as the Ballistic
Missile Defense Office will describe it, the C-1 situation: A few
simple ICBMs, no sophisticated countermeasures. In that context, we are
proposing to create a system to deter that threat and also, in some
respects, to undermine or simply, hopefully, to modify, through mutual
assent, the arms control regime in the ABM Treaty. That is just one
situation.
The second situation is what they call C-2. That is not just some
simple ICBMs but a few advanced ICBMs--those having, for example,
multiple independent reentry vehicles and some more sophisticated
countermeasures.
Finally, the category of many sophisticated reentry vehicles, many
with
[[Page S2638]]
independently targeted warheads, and also with sophisticated
countermeasures.
For this latter category we have to ask ourselves, is that
technologically possible, national missile defense scoped and designed
for the first simple threat going to meet what might evolve into the
more complicated threat? That is a technological question. I think that
is a question that gives us some pause in the sense of rushing into
this, this declaration that we are going to do it now and we are going
to do it with respect to the rogue nation threat.
Again, I think we have to ask two basic questions: First, will this
first technologically possible solution be the best solution, not just
to our short-run dilemma with respect to potential missile development
in North Korea or Iran but over time as these systems may well evolve
from a simple missile threat to a very sophisticated missile threat?
Then second, we have to ask ourselves, will we build a system designed
to counter this simple threat, the rogue threat, and cause,
unwittingly, the precipitation of a much more sophisticated threat--to
cause, unwittingly, powers like Russia, that have the capacity to put
MIRVs on top of their launchers, to have, through strained resources
and through frayed nerves, perhaps the potential to shoot a little
quicker than they did in the cold war? That, I think, would be a
tremendous misstep in maintaining our strategic balance.
For all these reasons, I suggest that we must move with caution--with
deliberation but with caution. I think we have to move not with some
single-factor analysis, simply ``technologically possible,'' but with a
multifaceted analysis which I hope would undergird all our decisions
with respect to momentous decisions and costly decisions. We have to
consider cost. We have to consider the evolution of the threat. We have
to consider our diplomatic relationships and the fact that we have
maintained this nuclear balance through mutual decisions.
First we maintained it through the policy of mutual assured
destruction. We built enough offensive weapons so that no enemy thought
they could conduct a successful first strike. And then we moved down a
much more promising road by talking about limiting offensive weapons
and limiting defensive weapons through diplomacy.
The rejection of this mutuality would be a casualty which I do not
think any of us would like to see. So I think we have to be very, very
careful. And if we need an anecdote to suggest the care which we must
devote to this exercise, I think it could be seen from a story I
recently read in the Washington Post about an incident that took place
on September 26, 1983, where a Russian lieutenant colonel was sitting
in his bunker and suddenly all the lights went on that said ``start.''
And what the ``start'' meant was to start a nuclear retaliation round.
But because of that officer's judgment, in the environment of that
time of 1983, an environment in which the thought was that a nuclear
attack by the United States would not be possible --the fact that there
was no effective ABM system providing national defense--the fact that
the operative motivation was not ordering a counterstrike but waiting
for further information, that could be changed by what we do in the
next several months, particularly, I think, if we do not make a good-
faith effort to modify, through negotiation and through mutuality, the
ABM Treaty.
We could have a situation in which, through an error of software, an
error of misperception, instead of waiting the extra second, a
lieutenant colonel in the Russian rocket forces could decide that this
very well could be an active launch by the United States and that his
only recourse is to launch a retaliatory strike.
So we have to be careful. I believe that such care would lead us, I
hope, to consider legislation that does not just talk about
technological possibility but talks about a range of things, including,
we hope, a mutual adjustment of the ABM Treaty.
Missile defense is a situation, a topic, that has followed us since
1940, when we first became aware that Germany was developing
intercontinental ballistic missiles. It has followed us through my
entire life, and it will go on, we hope, without a dramatic conclusion,
for as long as we can foresee. We have been able to manage these
issues, and each administration has taken them seriously, and the
Clinton administration is no stranger to the seriousness of this
endeavor.
We have also seen changes in terms of programs, in terms of budget.
Just a few years ago, in the Persian Gulf we discovered that there was
a real threat to our theater forces, our forces in the field, and we
began actively upgrading our theater missile defense, a program which
we also bought and which we consider to be vital to the operational
effectiveness of our forces around the world.
In 1996, the administration announced that they were moving forward
with respect to national missile defense with their 3+3 approach. That
would be 3 years devoted to research and development, a deployment
decision due in June of 2000, and then, if required, the deployment
would take place within the next 3 years. All of this, of course,
supposed and presumed that there would be active discussion with Russia
and others with respect to the ABM Treaty.
We have devoted not only conceptual energy to this project, we have
also devoted dollars. We have increased the administration's proposal
for efforts through fiscal year 2005 to the order of $10.5 billion.
This is not a project that is languishing without financial support and
financial resources.
In short, in sum, both the Congress and the administration agree on
the importance of missile defense, of providing the resources to do
that, and are hoping that we can in fact develop a technologically
feasible, cost-effective system that will be appropriate to our needs
and also, hopefully, will be agreed upon by the world community as a
necessary part of our defense.
I have mentioned before what I think some of the limitations are of
the approach that we are debating today with respect to S. 257.
Principally, it is the sole reliance upon one criterion, and that is,
``technologically possible.''
There are other parameters that we have to look at.
The threat: Again, today we are looking at a very limited threat,
that C-1 threat, a rogue nation with a simple IBM, without any
countermeasures. But that threat quickly will mature to something else.
It does not take too much to incorporate countermeasures on our reentry
vehicle. And once we do that, we might be into a configuration of
national defense which does not fit that neat picture of what is
technologically possible right now.
Of course, we have to look at cost. And it is not just an issue of
cost in and of itself, it is the classic issue of opportunity cost. To
develop this system immediately might preclude us from taking other
steps which are just as important with respect to our defense, with
respect to our missile defense, with respect to other aspects of our
defense policy.
And then we certainly, I think, have to look at the effect on arms
control agreements.
Consideration of these factors I think would mitigate against
unconstrained, unconditional support for S. 257 and would suggest that
we would amend this measure and adopt a more comprehensive and a more
realistic approach to the decision matrix we face when it comes to
national missile defense.
Just briefly, there is a threat out there; no one is denying that.
The administration is not denying it. No one in this body is denying
it.
We have seen just recently, in May of 1998, India and Pakistan
conduct nuclear tests.
We have also been the beneficiaries of the Rumsfeld Commission report
that anticipates the ability of a rogue nation to have an
intercontinental capability by the year 2010.
Then, on July 22, 1998, Iran test fired an intermediate-range
ballistic missile capable of hitting most of the Middle East.
Then, finally, perhaps most chillingly, on August 31, 1998, North
Korea launched a Taepo Dong 1 missile that was far more advanced than
we thought capable at that time. These threats are serious. They are
not taken lightly.
It is because of these threats that we are moving and committing
dollars for the development of a national missile defense system. As
General Shelton, our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
[[Page S2639]]
Staff, pointed out in ``Seapower'' magazine:
There are other serious threats out there in addition to
that posed by ballistic missiles. We know, for example, that
there are adversaries with chemical and biological weapons
that can attack the United States today. They could do it
with a briefcase--by infiltrating our territory across our
shores or through our airports.
Essentially, it raises the issue that if we, in a break-neck race to
just deploy our first technologically possible system, all of these
resources--are we missing out on providing effective deterrence and
defense for these other approaches? I think we raise that issue with
respect to S. 257.
Now, the other aspect of this is we don't want to buy a system with
billions of dollars that will work for a couple of years and then be
obsolete. We don't want to go through the trouble of renegotiating a
treaty--or perhaps the worst case, of walking away from a treaty for a
system that is just not going to work.
William Perry, our former Secretary of Defense, put it well when he
said:
Think of this problem in terms of buying a personal
computer for college. If you had ordered your computer as a
high-school sophomore it would have been obsolete by the time
you started college. It would lack the capabilities you now
need and would be impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to
update.
In many respects, that is the same type of intellectual dilemma we
face today. Putting a system in the field because it is technologically
possible might not be the best approach. That is the only criterion in
S. 257.
We know this is also a very difficult technical problem, essentially
because we are using ``kill'' vehicles that are target upon target,
using kinetic energy--i.e. impact. It is like a bullet hitting a
bullet. That is a tough problem. In fact, we have had very few
successes in the experiments we have tried to run to date. So few, in
fact, a Pentagon review panel has called the program to date a ``rush
to failure.'' We don't want to rush to failure. We want ``progress to
deployment'' of a system that works for us, defends the country and
maintains our strength--not just in the small case of a rogue nation
but in the larger case of international nuclear stability.
Now, S. 257 will require us to deploy this system as long as it is
technologically possible. Again, one could ask, what does that mean? Is
that the first step that succeeds? Is it a series of two or three tests
to succeed in any case? That type of analysis alone is not, I think,
the optimal way to approach this issue.
As I mentioned before, we have to consider costs. Between 1984 and
1994, the Congressional Research Service estimated that the Pentagon
spent $70.7 billion on ballistic missile defense activities, yet no
system was deployed. I hope valuable information was gained and
research could be applied to the ongoing projects, but $70 billion was
spent in a decade without the breakthrough deployment, the breakthrough
technology of a system. Again, we have to consider costs.
Just the simple preparation of one site for a national missile
defense would range between $6 and $13 billion. These costs would be
justified in many respects by the threat if we are confident or more
confident that the system we are putting in place would be something
that could evolve to the greater threats in the future and is something
that really does provide comprehensive protections to the United
States--not just today but in the future. This legislation does not
call for such a comprehensive measure in which to determine whether to
deploy or not to deploy.
As mentioned before, every dollar we spend on national missile
defense is important, but there are some other measures of defense
which are equally important and which may find themselves shortchanged
if we have this rush for deployment as soon as we are technologically
possible. Again, we have to consider, I think, this issue in broader
terms beyond just technological possibility.
Then we have to consider, as I have mentioned, the effect of arms
control agreements. Since 1940, we have been wrestling with this issue
of how to defend the United States against intercontinental ballistic
missiles. We tried to develop defense mechanisms. We have had systems
in place. We were developing in the 1970s and the late 1960s a central
system. The central system turned into Safeguard and Safeguard was
moving forward, but at the height of the cold war at a time when the
tensions between ourselves and the Soviet Union were extremely
pronounced, President Nixon negotiated and ultimately agreed to an
antiballistic missile treaty. In fact, this treaty limited what was
technically possible. The Safeguard system was going in place to
protect our ICBM fields. It was technically possible, it was thought
then that we would be more secure if we limited the deployment of
ballistic missile systems--mutually limited--amongst ourselves and the
Soviet Union. That decision was made. That decision has stood the test
of time to date.
The ABM Treaty has been questioned over time, but it has provided us
a situation where we have a more stable balance between ourselves,
certainly, and at one time the Soviet Union, and now Russia.
I think, however, recognizing the rise of these rogue states with
their missile capability, it is appropriate to look at ABM. It is
appropriate to go back and attempt to modify the treaty--modify it not
just in terms of the simple case, the C-1 case, but look at it in terms
of modifications that will carry us through the medium and the long run
for systems that very well may not be technically possible today or in
2 years but would be extremely important, indeed perhaps necessary, in
5 to 10 years. We could do this if we negotiate with the Russians.
We have to ask ourselves what kind of message S. 257 would send,
basically saying we are going to deploy this as soon as we think it
works, without any mention of negotiation of ABM. I don't think it
sends the right message. It sends the message at a time when the Soviet
missile force has been transferred to the Russians. We know it is
fraying on the edges in terms of command control, in terms of its
replacement, in terms of its technological sophistication.
Again, do we really want to change what was the operative rule in the
cold war--that a missile strike by the United States, a first strike;
or by Russia or the Soviet Union--would be unlikely if not impossible?
That is the type of mindset which gave a lieutenant colonel in the
Russian rocket forces the gut feeling to disregard all the warnings on
his computer and on the screen to say, ``This can't be right; it would
be reckless and foolish for the United States to launch five or so
missiles against us.'' We certainly don't want a situation where some
lieutenant colonel says, ``They have an ABM system which they put in
unilaterally without our consent, over our opposition. You know what?
Maybe these five missiles are more than a mistake on my computer.''
We have to very serious about this. I know we are all serious, but I
suggest, and I think Senator Levin would suggest later, that this
legislation could benefit mightily from the amendments that at least
acknowledge the importance of negotiation, the importance of cost
estimates, the importance of evaluation or threat before we go forward.
The other aspect of this legislation is that it will not speed up the
deployment of a national missile defense. The administration is
committed to developing, doing the research, making a decision based on
all of these factors I mentioned and deploying a missile defense, at
the same time negotiating with the Russians with respect to the ABM
Treaty. As the President indicated, if those negotiations are
fruitless, if we are ready to deploy, if the threat is there with
respect to rogue states, he is quite prepared at that point to make a
decision to deploy.
That is a far cry from standing here today saying, ``Disregard
negotiations, disregard the evolution of the threat, disregard the
cost. As soon as we have one successful test we are going to put it in
the field.'' I don't think that is the wisest course. I think we can do
better. Indeed, I believe that everyone--the sponsors of the
legislation, those who disagree with the legislation--want to do the
best for this country and want to ensure that we are protected, want to
ensure that in the long run we have comprehensive national
[[Page S2640]]
security; that we don't have a situation where we might provide for the
inherent missile strike from a rogue nation, yet we have undermined the
balance between ourselves and another major nuclear power--Russia or,
indeed, China.
I think we can do this, but I think we have to begin with the
conception that it is just not one parameter, one criteria, and that it
is done in a careful way on a multiplicity of issues like cost,
technological possibility, threat, and also maintaining a strong regime
of arms control, which has benefited us mightily over the course of
many decades.
So I hope very much that we will be able to amend this legislation to
reflect those different aspects and, having amended it, to agree
unanimously to send it forward to the President for his signature. I
hope we can do that in the days ahead. We will see.
At this time, I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I rise in support of S. 257, the National
Missile Defense Act of 1999. This straight-forward bill states that due
to the increasing ballistic missile threat we face, ``It is the policy
of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible
an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the
territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack
(whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).'' This bill is
essentially identical to last year's measure which was filibustered by
the minority and failed to gain cloture by a single vote. I would ask
those who opposed the bill last year to consider the events over the
intervening period which reinforce the arguments in favor of national
missile defense:
First, North Korea launched a three-stage missile last August that
overflew Japan in an attempt to orbit a satellite. This missile, the
Taepo Dong 1, has sufficient range to reach Alaska and Hawaii as
demonstrated by the fact that its debris landed 4000 miles out in the
Pacific. The range and the presence of a third stage was a surprise to
the Intelligence Community, according to unclassified statements by
Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear
Programs. Furthermore, successor missile, the Taepo Dong 2 is expected
to be able to reach all of the American mainland and may be ready for
testing this year. As the Chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence
Council noted last October, ``An ICBM threat from North Korea is
looming.''
Second, Iran tested a medium range missile last July that is capable
of reaching Israel and U.S. forces throughout the Middle East. This
missile, the Shahab-3, may already be in production and Iran, with
Russian assistance, is developing a longer-range missile capable of
reaching Central Europe. Russian missile assistance to Iran has
continued despite intensive U.S. efforts to halt this deadly trade. As
CIA Director Tenet noted in testimony last month to the Armed Services
Committee, ``Especially during the last six months, expertise and
materiel from Russia has continued to assist the Iranian missile effort
in areas ranging from training, to testing, to components.'' General
Zinni, our CENTCOM commander has stated that Iran may have nuclear
weapons within five years. Iran has been typically bloody-minded in its
propaganda. During a military parade in Tehran last year, slogans were
written on sides of missiles that read ``Israel should be wiped off the
map'' and ``the USA can do nothing''. Moreover, last year's hopeful
signs that Iranian moderates were gaining ascendancy now look much less
clear.
Third, Iraq has achieved its long-sought goal of escaping from UNSCOM
inspections. Chief UN arms inspector Butler has stated that Iraq has
resumed its weapons programs. There is now no inspection regime in
place, the UN embargo is under mounting attack including by erstwhile
allies, potential suppliers are eager to be of assistance, and Iraq
retains a significant missile production and support infrastructure
upon which to build. UN inspectors had uncovered drawings of multi-
stage missiles and they are within a decade of an intercontinental
missile capability.
Fourth, China continues measured but steady improvement in its
existing force of ICBMs which are already capable of hitting American
cities. China's ICBMs have benefitted from both the outright theft and
the unwisely permitted transfers of American space launch vehicle
technology. Recently there have been disturbing published reports that
China stole the design of the nuclear warhead of our Trident missile.
This sophisticated multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle or
MIRV design has the capability to be a real force multiplier. Moreover,
the technology that China obtains from the United States may not remain
there. According to a Washington Times report on February 23, China has
assisted North Korea's missile and space technology. China has also
developed a habit of using ballistic missiles to intimidate its
neighbors. On the eve of Taiwan's first democratic elections in 1996,
China launched M-9 missiles to areas within 30 miles of Taiwan's two
primary ports. A report just released by the Defense Department states
that China is engaged in an intense buildup of ballistic and cruise
missiles opposite Taiwan. Easy assumptions that the U.S. can enjoy a
constructive relationship with China may be rooted in hope rather than
reality. Beijing's recent crackdown on the fledgling Democracy Party
serves as a reminder that China remains an authoritarian and
potentially hostile regime with a highly uncertain future.
Finally, the condition of Russia is cause for serious concern. Russia
retains over 6000 strategic nuclear warheads and is still conducting
limited modernization even as their strategic forces experience overall
decay. While a return to cold war confrontation is unlikely today, the
prospects for Russia's successful transition to democracy remain
unclear. Their economic meltdown last summer further aggravated
problems of nuclear weapons security, and command and control. The
competence and morale and, hence, the safety of their nuclear forces
are increasingly in question.
The timeliness of the warnings of the bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission
Report last summer have been more than borne out by these events. The
North Korean and Iranian missile tests followed within weeks of that
report. You will recall that the Rumsfeld Commission offered three
major conclusions. (1) The missile threat to the United States is real
and growing. (2) The threat is greater than previously assessed and a
rogue nation could acquire the capability to threaten the U.S. with an
ICBM within as little as five years. And (3) we may have little or no
warning of the emergence of new threats. How prescient these
conclusions were. How quickly they were borne out by subsequent events.
Madam President, the administration is to be commended for its
recognition that a missile threat to the United States exists. On
January 20, Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that ``the United States
will, in fact, face a rogue nation threat to our homeland against which
we will have to defend the American people'' and that ``technological
readiness will be the sole remaining criteria'' in deciding when to
deploy a national missile defense system. But subsequent statements by
administration spokesman have hedged on this forthright statement and
suggested that other considerations may affect our deployment decision.
For example, Secretary of State Albright has suggested that any
deployment was conditional on the actual emergence of a threat and on
the successful renegotiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
I've just outlined the threat and, in particular, the recent events
which demonstrate that it is closer than many believed. There may well
be rogue nations with the capability to reach American shores with
weapons of mass destruction before we can deploy even a limited missile
shield under the administration's most optimistic scenarios of
successful tests and timely decisions. And even after Secretary Cohen's
announcement, there has been slippage in a key program, namely the
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites for missile detection
and tracking. I joined several others Senators in expressing my concern
at this unfortunate decision by the Air Force to delay development of
this vial component of any missile defense architecture. If left
unchanged, this decision will delay the deployment of any NMD
[[Page S2641]]
system until 2006 when the first SBIRS-low satellites are launched. The
bottom line is that the threat is developing more rapidly than our
response to it. We cannot afford additional delays while our potential
adversaries develop and deploy increasingly capable missiles.
Second, Secretary Albright and other administration officials have
spoken of the need to revise the ABM Treaty to accommodate deployment
of a national missile defense. Mr. President, the ABM Treaty is an
anachronism. It is the last relic of the cold war. Whatever its merit
then, it has none now. In fact, some legal scholars believe the ABM
Treaty is no longer binding on the United States since one of the
original parties to the Treaty has ceased to exist. Renegotiation of
the ABM Treaty is likely to prove a long and fruitless undertaking.
Russia will not doubt hold out the prospect of START II ratification as
they have done for six years now. The United States has purchased START
II ratification several times over and we should not do so again. The
economic situation in Russia today renders it unlikely that a START II
level, let alone a START I level, of weapons is sustainable. To hold
hostage the defense of the United States for the constantly receding
mirage of START II would be strategic folly. Russia is not the target
of American national missile defense except in so far as we seek the
capability to defend against accidental or unauthorized launch. We can
and should continue cooperative efforts with Russia, but they should
not exercise a veto over our decision to defend ourselves against an
Iran or a North Korea.
Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have advanced
arms control arguments in opposition to missile defense. I suggest that
American deployment of national missile defense will actually be a
profoundly stabilizing step. If we have the prospect of defending our
country from attack by weapons of mass destruction, we are less likely
to have to resort to nuclear retaliation. Further, our deployment of a
national missile defense will reduce the incentive for nuclear and
missile proliferation by our prospective adversaries. It will reduce
the ability of a North Korea to successfully blackmail us and our
allies with its nuclear and missile programs.
The bill before the Senate does not, however, address the ABM Treaty.
The bill does not say what kind of architecture the missile defense
system should have. It does not say where such a system should be
located, or more generally, whether it should be based on land, at sea,
or in space. It does not specify a date by which such a system should
be deployed. It simply states a national goal, a goal on which
bipartisan agreement should be possible. I am surprised
and disappointed that the administration has chosen to oppose this
bill, the purpose of which seems identical to the policy announced by
the Secretary of Defense in January. I would have hoped that we could
agree on the goal and turn our attention to the means to achieve it.
There is an important debate that has only just begun as to the best
means of providing a national missile defense. For example, one option
that I don't think has received enough attention is a sea-based missile
defense. While the best defense is obviously an integrated land, sea,
and space combination, I think it is becoming more and more clear that
sea-based systems offer our best near term solution to both theater and
national missile defense needs. This is because of their operational
flexibility, cost-effectiveness, ability to deploy rapidly where
needed, and the potential for ascent-phase intercepts. As you will
recall, the ABM Treaty precludes sea-and space-based defenses.
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration is attempting to remain
within the sacred scripture of the ABM Treaty by proposing one or two
fixed land-based sites and hasn't vigorously pursued research and
funding of more promising technologies.
We need a better alternative. For my money, that alternative is to
develop a robust theater navy system which can provide a limited
defense against some strategic missiles possibly at an earlier date
than the administration's proposals would allow. Such a system can be a
bridge to a complete national defense later. For many years now, the
Navy has been heavily involved in missile defense and has invested over
$50 billion in the Aegis fleet which now comprises more than 60 ships
with more than 5,000 missile launchers. The Navy is currently working
on two missile defense programs to be based on Aegis ships--the area or
``Lower Tier'' system that will provide protection for point targets
against short-range missiles, and the Theater Wide or ``Upper Tier''
system capable of defending areas as large as several countries against
much longer range missiles. The Pentagon's current plans do not call
for the Navy Theater Wide system to be deployed before 2010 but this
timing is driven by budget constraints rather than technology
development. In fact, both the navy and the Ballistic Missile Defense
Office have recently concluded that if funding were increased by
roughly $300 million per year, the system could be deployed between
2003 and 2005 without a significant increase in risk.
Madam President, it is a more dangerous world out there than it was
two or five years ago. Rogue nations have been able to pursue missile
and nuclear programs with little effective hindrance from international
proliferation regimes. The past twelve months have witnessed the first
tests of the North Korean Taepo Dong I and the Iranian Shahab-3, the
latter based on North Korea's No Dong design. Russia flirts with chaos
and China once again reminds us that they remain a repressive,
authoritarian regime, not a ``strategic partner'' in the
administration's ill-chosen phrase. Both continue to assist rogue
nations in their weapons of mass destruction. The administration's
diplomacy has been inconsistent, distracted, and shortsighted at best.
Its military programs are hobbled by outdated arms control strictures.
Proliferation outstrips anti-proliferation efforts and rogue state
offensive weaponry is advancing more rapidly than the administration's
programs to counter them. The time has come for the United States to
defend itself from the increasing missile threat that I have just
described. The Cochran bill is the first step on this path. I urge my
colleagues to support its passage.
Madam President, I would like to respond to my friend from Rhode
Island and to speak to the question of whether or not we ought to
maintain a window of vulnerability, because that is basically what has
been presented here. My friend acknowledged the threat to the United
States, but said we ought to go slow; after all, this might cost a lot
and technology is hard and the Russians are going to be nervous about
it. Therefore, maybe we ought to go slow.
Let me remind my colleagues what this amendment says. It is very
simple:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as
is technologically possible, an effective missile defense
capable of defending the territory of the United States
against limited ballistic missile attack.
Madam President, that is pretty straightforward. We are saying that
when it is possible, we should deploy such a system. Why? Because we
are threatened. Is that threat sometime off in the future? No. The
threat is now. There is a window of vulnerability between the time that
we are threatened and the time we can deploy a system to protect
ourselves against the threat. Why is this important? We know that
Russian missiles can reach the United States already. We know Chinese
missiles can reach the United States, and we now know that the North
Koreans probably have a missile that can at least reach some of the
United States, and they are testing further missiles that would have a
longer range and eventually have the capability of reaching the
continental United States.
Have we ever been threatened by any of these countries? Yes, as a
matter of fact, we have. Back when the Chinese were launching missiles
across Taiwan before the Taiwanese elections in an obvious effort to
intimidate them, the United States decided to send carriers to the
Taiwan Strait. One of the Chinese generals is supposed to have said to
an American: ``You know, we believe in the long run that you care more
about Los Angeles than you do about Taiwan''--the implicit threat
being, of course, if you get in our way, if we are ever serious about
doing something to Taiwan, we can threaten to launch ballistic missiles
against Los Angeles.
Is it fair for the people of the United States, for their leaders,
knowing this
[[Page S2642]]
vulnerability exists, to do nothing about it, or to take the ``let's go
slow'' approach that has just been suggested by my colleague? I think
not. We would be negligent to the utmost degree if we understood that a
threat existed, yet, we failed to protect the American people against a
potential attack by a foreign country. That is the first and most
important obligation of the U.S. Government--to protect the American
people.
We now know that ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
carried by them are the weapon of choice--and not just by our old
adversary, the Russians, but by rogue nations. That is why we should
not allow a piece of paper--the ABM Treaty--to get in the way of
defending us. Back in the days my colleague was just referring to, the
United States and Russia--whether for good reasons or bad--decided we
would remain neutrally vulnerable to an attack by the other; thereby,
we would create stability. That may or may not have worked in those
days.
I argue that there were other factors at play, but let's assume that
was the reason. There were only two countries that could threaten each
other; therefore, this was a workable arrangement. But to tie our hands
behind our back mutually with the Russians doesn't account for today's
reality in which there are other nations that could attack us. So while
we politely agree with the Russians to maintain a lack of defense
against ballistic missile attack, other countries have developed that
capability and can threaten us, impede our foreign policy goals and,
God forbid, even use the weapons against us with impunity because we
don't have the means to defend ourselves.
Some would argue that we have the nuclear retaliatory capability to
respond to such an attack. Well, Madam President, I for one would not
like to have to launch a massive nuclear retaliation against North
Korea, or anyone else, as the price of being attacked myself. I would
rather deter that attack in the first place by having a defense--a
limited defense--which would threaten in no way the Russian system
because it would easily overwhelm it, but which would provide limited
protection against an attack by a rogue nation.
I applaud Senator Cochran for his perseverance in continuing to bring
this before the body, even though many on the other side of the aisle
have not up until now allowed us to have a vote on this, and even
though the administration strongly opposes it.
What were the arguments posed against the amendment? First is that we
should not rush to this, and I think I have already made the point.
There is no doubt about the threat here. The window of vulnerability
will be in the neighborhood of a minimum of 5 or 6 years. That is too
long. Under the administration's plan, we would deploy, maybe in 2005,
a system that could defend us--or probably in 2006. We are talking 6 to
7 years from now. I don't think that trying to deploy this system as
soon as technologically possible is rushing in any sense that is bad
for the United States. Rather, I see a 6- or 7-year window of
vulnerability as the problem. I would like to rush even more. I wish we
could create the technology tomorrow and deploy this tomorrow. I don't
think waiting 6 or 7 years and being threatened during that interim is
rushing too much.
Secondly, my colleague suggested that we have to consider the threat.
I don't know of anybody that denies the threat. The Rumsfeld Commission
made it crystal clear that the Russians, Chinese, and the North Koreans
have the capability, and that other countries will soon have the
capability of reaching States of the United States. Now, that is a
threat from weapons of mass destruction.
How about the cost? Of course, we have to consider the cost. So how
much is this going to cost? Well, about as much as it has cost us to go
to Bosnia. The estimates there range from $12 billion to $20 billion.
Whatever the cost is, certainly protecting the American people from
ballistic missile attack ought to at least be as important as what we
have spent in Bosnia, shouldn't it? How about 1 percent of the defense
budget? That is what we are talking about. The administration is
talking about adding about a billion dollars to a defense budget of
$260 billion, or maybe $270 billion. So, Madam President, that is less
than 1 percent of the defense budget. It is a fraction of the overall
budget of the United States.
If this represents the No. 1 threat to the United States from rogue
nations, and if it is 1 percent of the defense budget, is that too
much? How much is too much to protect the American people, I ask my
colleagues? Can you put a number on it? I can't. Certainly, 1 percent
of the defense budget is not too much.
So first of all, there is a threat and there is a window of
vulnerability. We are not rushing this, and we are not spending too
much money on it. I challenge my colleagues to answer the question: How
much is too much to protect the American people? When we don't even
want to see one American life lost in a place like Bosnia, and we go to
great lengths to protect our service people when we deploy them abroad
because we don't want to lose one person, how much is too much to
protect the people of Hawaii or Alaska, the States that are currently
threatened by a country like North Korea, which is a country that
absolutely cannot be predicted in terms of its behavior?
The third issue is diplomacy. We have the ABM Treaty to deal with. I
am going to get into a little bit more detail on that in just a moment
because we certainly have to think about strategic stability. We don't
want to do anything here that would be so disruptive to our
relationships with other nations, that somehow we would find ourselves
in greater danger than from this particular threat. I suggest to my
colleagues that there is no upsetting of the strategic stability of the
world if we proceed to defend ourselves, especially from rogue nations.
As a matter of fact, I suggest that the deployment of missile
defenses to protect the people of the United States will be profoundly
stabilizing. If we have the prospect of defending our country against a
ballistic missile attack, we are less likely to have to use massive
nuclear retaliation, which is more destabilizing. Furthermore, our
deployment of a national missile defense will reduce the incentive for
nuclear and missile proliferation by our potential adversaries knowing
that they can't succeed against us because we have this defense.
That is one of the key things that brought down the Soviet Union--
knowing that we were committed to develop what was then the Strategic
Defense Initiative to preclude the Soviet Union from ever succeeding in
an attack against us. They basically packed it up. They said: We cannot
compete with that; therefore, we are going to quit.
It seems to me that a strong commitment to defend ourselves will have
the right effect. It will cause other countries to get realistic about
the ability to try to push the United States around by the development
of these threatening weapons. They will decide that discretion is the
better part of valor and will decide that they can spend their money on
more useful things. It will certainly reduce the ability of countries
like North Korea to successfully blackmail the United States and our
allies because we can't defend ourselves against their weapons.
Madam President, let me show, with the aid of a couple of charts,
some things that I think are very interesting. This first chart shows
the level of offensive weapons, nuclear warheads, permitted under
different regimens today under treaties. This is the one we are
currently under. It is called the START I. It said both Russia and the
United States had to limit our nuclear warheads to about 6,000. So that
is where we are.
We proposed, and the United States has ratified, the START II treaty,
which almost cuts this in half--down to 3,500. We have been waiting, I
believe now for 6 years, for Russia to ratify the START II treaty. They
haven't ratified it yet.
We are worried here about making the Russians upset. How about us
being upset? For a long time we have said: Let's create a more stable
world; let's get rid of these dangerous weapons; you don't need them;
we don't need them; let's reduce them down to 3,500--6 years ago. The
Russians still haven't ratified. We have given a lot to the Russians as
inducements for them to ratify. We bought the START II treaty many
times. But they have yet to deliver. So we are still waiting.
[[Page S2643]]
Some argue that, because it is so costly to maintain these weapons,
actually the Russians would prefer to go right to a more realistic
level that they could sustain, a START III level, about 2,000; maybe
they can afford to keep 2,000 weapons around; and, therefore, we ought
to just jump right over START II and go all the way down to START III.
Let's examine that argument for a minute.
It turns out that it is not the ABM Treaty at all, or the START II
treaty, that is determining the strategic parity between the United
States and Russia with respect to nuclear weapons. It turns out that
this stability is created more by a very practical situation; that is,
how much can the Russians afford? How much, frankly, can the United
States afford?
As it turns out, Igor Sergeyev, the Russian Minister of Defense, last
summer told the Russian Security Council that Russia will be unable to
muster a strategic nuclear force of more than 1,500 warheads by the
year 2010 and that the reasons have nothing to do with armaments
control. They can't afford it. Their economy is broken. They have no
money. Much of their military force is in disrepair. And, indeed, the
only part they have been modernizing is their strategic nuclear
offensive capability. As a result, Sergeyev points out that this is the
maximum level they are going to be able to maintain with or without an
ABM Treaty, with or without a START II or START III treaty.
So it is not what we do with respect to these arms control agreements
that is going to dictate the parity of nuclear weapons between our two
countries; it is the stark reality of what we can both afford.
Frankly, this level of 1,500 to 2,000 is about where we are going to
end up. So it doesn't matter whether we deploy another defensive system
or not, or a defensive system against nuclear-tipped missiles or not.
The fact is, the Russians are going down to this level because they
can't afford to do anything else.
I think, therefore, that the notion that offensive reductions in
strategic nuclear warheads will not occur if this bill is passed is
simply not borne out by the facts. This bill has nothing whatsoever to
do with that. It is happening and will continue to happen regardless of
what we do today.
But let's suppose something. Let's make believe something--that some
of the arguments similar to those that have just been made are correct
and that ``Russia would likely retain thousands of nuclear warheads''
and somehow they would develop the money to do this that they would
``otherwise eliminate'' under these arms control agreements. Suppose
some miracle occurs and Russia finds the resources to rejuvenate its
strategic forces.
What rationale would Russia have for doing this?
Bear in mind that what we are talking about here is a national
missile defense system. We qualified it, it says ``limited,'' and the
reason is that we do not intend to build anything more, and we would
not build anything more, than a limited system capable of providing a
defense against a limited attack, an attack that we currently believe
we are threatened by a rogue nation like North Korea, or, given the
debate about China these days, perhaps a China, which doesn't have the
same quantity of missiles that Russia does.
There are other nations in the world that I will not list that also
are developing this capability.
Suppose that when we develop this system, Russia looks at it and
says, ``How is this going to affect our strategic missile offensive
warhead situation? Maybe we ought to have more warheads, because the
United States system is going to degrade our capability of successfully
attacking them.'' In other words, ``If they have a good defense, maybe
we need more offense.''
I pointed out that the defense we are talking about is a minimal
defense, perhaps capable of defending against just a handful of
missiles, not the 6,000 warheads that the Russians may have today. If
the strategic stability argument is to be believed, it has to be
because the Russians would find the idea of the United States missile
defense so threatening that they would have to retain thousands and
thousands of warheads in order to be sure they could overcome our
defense.
So, let's examine the defensive side of the equation.
I have another chart which I think will explain this situation. The
offensive warheads again are in red. This is what was originally
permitted under START I. You can see that we had about 2,000 warheads
at the time. But START I eventually got to the level of 6,000 that I
mentioned a while ago. That is where we are today--both countries in
the neighborhood of authorized 6,000 warheads. That is the column in
red. This is the way it began back when START I was actually ratified,
and when the ABM Treaty was created. Back in those days, each side was
limited by the ABM Treaty to 200 interceptor missiles. In 1974, at the
time the treaty was negotiated, or signed, neither side having plans to
deploy the full complement of defensive missiles it was allowed, that
number was reduced to 100. That remains the limit today. So both
countries have 100 authorized interceptors. Of course, Russia has built
its system. We have not built our system.
The limited missile defense system the United States is developing
will be capable initially of shooting down, as I said, a handful of
relatively unsophisticated warheads. The plans for ``Capability 1,'' as
we will call it, called for deployment of 20 interceptor missiles to do
this job--just 20 interceptor missiles. This is the system the
administration claims can be deployed by 2005. Subsequently, this will
grow to ``Capability 2,'' which, according to the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization, will consist of up to 100 interceptor missiles
able to shoot down a somewhat larger number of sophisticated warheads.
Although the concept of operations envisions firing several
interceptors at each warhead, let's assume for the purpose of argument
that each interceptor will work absolutely perfectly and kill one
warhead. That is never going to be the case, but we will give the other
side the absolute maximum benefit of the doubt. That means that, at
most, as envisioned today, the United States system will be capable of
destroying 100 Russian warheads, out of a START III total of no fewer
than 2,000, or perhaps 1,500, if Minister Sergeyev is correct. Let's
examine what that means.
Back in 1974, when the ABM Treaty was created, there was a 10-to-1
ratio in terms of offensive to defensive, because you had about 2,000
warheads and 200-interceptor authorized capability, although we never
built it. We have now built up to 2,000 warheads, and we have an
authorized 100-interceptor capability. The blue line here is the
defensive warheads, or the defensive missile capability.
So you have 6,000 warheads existing, and a 60-to-1 ratio, because you
can only intercept 100 at the absolute most, because you get 1 for 1.
Under START II, that ratio would be 35 to 1, because you would have
3,500 warheads and you still have 100 authorized interceptors. Under
START III, it would be 20 to 1, because you would have 2,000 warheads,
100 interceptors. Even if Minister Sergeyev is correct, as I said, you
would have no more than 1,500 warheads in the Soviet Union and you
would have 100 interceptors, for a 15-to-1 ratio--15-to-1 ratio. That
is still greater than the ratio that existed at the time of the signing
of the ABM Treaty, the time and the age we are trying to go back to and
preserve. This is the way things ought to be--1974, a ratio of 10-to-1,
offensive weapons to interceptors. That was strategic stability. That
was the ratio, the parity that we wanted, and so we negotiated it. That
is what is in jeopardy now.
That is what is in jeopardy now, Madam President? If you give the
other side the absolute maximum of a 1-to-1 kill ratio, you hit 100
missiles with 100 interceptors, the ratio today at 15 to 1 is still a
greater ratio than 10 to 1. How could the Russians be more threatened
today with a 15-to-1 ratio of offensive over defensive capability when
they were perfectly happy to sign the ABM Treaty back in 1974 with a
10-to-1 ratio? How could this be more destabilizing? How could any
Senator argue against the protection of the American people today
because it would threaten the Russians because it would be
destabilizing, it would create a worse situation than existed back in
1974, when the ratio then was 10 to 1? And it would be 50 percent more
than that today--15 to 1.
[[Page S2644]]
You cannot argue it; it is illogical. And for the Russians to contend
otherwise would be irresponsible. Certainly for us to act on behalf of
their irrational objections would be irresponsible on our part.
Incidentally, I might add that this Nation that will allegedly be so
angered and concerned about the deployment of our limited defense has
the world's only ABM system, nuclear armed, recently upgraded, now in
its fourth generation. It is deployed around Moscow with all 100
interceptor missiles allowed under the ABM Treaty. So how is it that a
comparable U.S. system cannot be deployed without unduly angering the
Russian leadership? They have 100 very modern interceptor missiles
today. We have none. So if we have 100 just like they have, how is that
going to be destabilizing? It is we who should be arguing about
instability, not the Russians.
I think the argument that strategic stability would be somehow upset
if the United States did what the ABM Treaty authorizes, and that is
create a capability to intercept first 20 and then 100 missiles, would
hardly be destabilizing, at least to the point that we should delay or
preclude ourselves from doing it.
Obviously, the Russians will complain; it is in their interest to do
so. Although the cold war has ended and we still enjoy a much more
positive relationship with the Russians, all traces of rivalry have not
disappeared. They still find it in their interest when possible to work
in ways inimical to U.S. interests, and they know that our
defenselessness against ballistic missile attack constrains our actions
around the world, and that, in the Russian view, is not necessarily a
bad thing.
So one realistically understands that there will be objections, but
one must realistically evaluate those objections. I wish my colleague
who just spoke a few minutes ago, who so tortuously examined all of the
reasons why we could not move forward with this--it is going to cost a
lot, the technology is hard, diplomatically we need to think of how the
Russians would feel--I wish that we were as concerned about the threat
to the United States as we are the feelings of the Russian leadership.
And I wish we were as concerned about our ability to project our
national interests in our foreign policy against the threat of rogue
nations such as the Irans and the Iraqs and the North Koreans of the
world as we are about the feelings of the Russians. Russian soldiers
and scientists understand the reality that is portrayed on these charts
just as well as we do, and we know that a very limited missile defense
system that we have the right to deploy in no way threatens strategic
stability, no matter how loudly they may protest that it does. Our
relationship with Russia is something that must be taken very
seriously, but it cannot prevent us from taking reasonable actions to
defend the American people against threats from other countries. The
day that we conclude that unduly taking Russian concerns into account
would inhibit our ability to defend ourselves is the day we have to
move forward.
So, in summary, strategic stability as defined by the other side in
this debate, the ABM Treaty at the time that it was negotiated, which
created a 10-to-1 advantage of strategic offensive over defensive
weapons, that 10-to-1 ratio is not degraded even under the worst set of
conditions that one might imagine in terms of our ability to defend
ourselves here, or I should say even under the best of conditions
because the ratio will still be 15 to 1 under this condition. It is
more likely to be in the neighborhood of 20 to 1 or 35 to 1, the point
being that no Russian could feel threatened with this kind of
relationship if they didn't feel threatened back here anyway. And this
defines the golden mean, remember.
With respect to the cost, I think I have covered that. Even this
administration is willing to add money to the budget to pay for what it
believes will be a system that it can build when it is technologically
feasible. Recognizing that the technology is hard, we provide in this
amendment that it is our policy to deploy as soon as is technologically
possible an effective missile defense system.
So we are not saying deploy something that is not technologically
possible. Yes, we know technology is hard, but we also know we can get
there, the administration believes, by about the year 2005.
So to the thought we should not be rushing forward with this
amendment, I simply say how long do you want to leave the American
people vulnerable? How valuable is it to you to leave the American
people vulnerable to a missile attack, or to leave our Nation subject
to blackmail, to the threat of such an attack; to prevent us, for
example, from defending our friends in South Korea because the North
Koreans have a nuclear weapon with a missile capable of hitting Alaska
or Hawaii; to prevent us from defending Taiwan against Chinese
aggression because they have missiles that can reach Los Angeles; to
prevent us from supporting a country like Japan or any of the other
interests that we may have around the world?
Eventually, it boils down to this: We have an obligation to defend
the American people. We will have the technological capability of doing
that soon in the next century. There is a threat to the American people
today. The cost of building a national missile defense is not
prohibitive. Even if it were 1 percent of the defense budget, it would
not be prohibitive--I submit, even if it were 10 percent, but it is
obviously not going to cost that much.
So given the nature of the threat, given the fact that technology is
taken into account in this proposal, that it clearly is not going to
cost too much even by this administration's analysis, and the fact that
it will not disrupt strategic stability in the world, it seems to me
that we would be derelict in our duty as representatives of the people
not to move forward.
The first step in moving forward is to adopt this simple resolution
because, as is clear from the debate on the other side, unless we are
committed to deploying a national missile defense, we are going to find
excuses for not doing it. And until the Senate and the House of
Representatives pass a resolution that says we are going to do this,
the bureaucrats and the naysayers and those who don't want to do it
will have good reason for not moving forward. We will not have spoken
on the issue in a definitive way. That is why I applaud my colleague,
Senator Cochran. He understands that we have to get an expression of
serious intent in order to be able to convince the naysayers to move
forward. And that is why adoption of this resolution is so important.
So I urge my colleagues to support this bill when we have a chance to
do so; we do it with great pride and with understanding that it
fulfills the most important responsibility we have to the American
people, and that is to provide for the national defense.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald). The Senator from Rhode
Island.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, if I may just respond briefly to the
comments made by my colleague, the Senator from Arizona.
First, let me again emphasize something that I think is implicit in
his statement, and that is we all recognize the threat that is posed by
the potential development of intercontinental delivery systems by these
rogue nations. No one is discounting that. That has changed the
calculus significantly. The question is whether we are going to move
forward on the very simple--and one might say simplistic--criterion of
``technologically possible,'' or if we are going to, in this
legislation, and in practice, address the complexities of this issue.
Historical analogies are never perfect, but I suspect back in the
1930s when France was debating defense policy, the notion of building a
series of concrete forts along their territorial line was not only
technologically feasible but ultimately was constructed. But when it
came to 1940, the Maginot Line just did not work to defend the people
of France. I am not suggesting we are in the same type of debate, but I
think it is sometimes too alluring to think in the simple terms of: If
we have the technology of doing something, let's do it--particularly
when we get to the issue of national missile defense.
The Senator talked about a window of vulnerability, and there is
increasing potential, because of the development of these missiles by
North Korea and others, of threats to our territory. But I ask that we
think also of the potential vulnerability if Russia, for example,
decides, because of our actions, to abandon reasonable arms control;
[[Page S2645]]
decides, instead, to walk away from START II, to keep their launchers,
their land-based systems with multiple independent reentry vehicles
which complicate our defense enormously; if it decides, in fact, to
more aggressively deploy its submarines with cruise missiles that may
have nuclear warheads, all of which could easily defeat the system that
we are proposing to spend billions of dollars on today to counter a
limited military threat.
Put that new sort of spirit--an ill spirit, I should suggest--
together with what one can see as a decaying command and control system
and we might be increasing our vulnerabilities by moving forward with
this particular legislation.
I think we have to be sensitive to those issues. I would not readily
accept the notion that simply because of the number of launchers that
we have, the number of launchers that they have, that the Russians
would simply disregard our unilateral abandonment of the ABM as not a
threat to them.
We feel threatened, I think with good reason, when the North
Koreans--a very, very remote and ill-prepared power--begin to
experiment with intercontinental ballistic missiles which would have a
capability years from now. To hear on the floor the suggestion that the
Russians will just casually shrug their shoulders, although we have
made no attempt to renegotiate the ABM and we will have a law that says
we have to put the system in place as soon as we can technologically do
it, I think misreads their character and, frankly, the predictable
character of any country--particularly one like Russia which sees its
national greatness eroding greatly, to react, perhaps not rationally
but predictably--to not be cooperative, in fact creating more
vulnerability.
The issue, too, of how much is too much, is a question that can be
raised in every context. But, frankly, we all understand that there are
opportunity costs, not with respect to using defense dollars for other
nondefense matters, but within the context of defense. Take, for
example, not the theoretical but the operational possibility of an
enhanced submarine fleet which the Russians might deploy with cruise
missiles. By the way, those cruise missiles launched reasonably close
to our shores could not be countered by any type of national missile
defense, C-1, C-2, or C-3.
So, in respect to what we have to do, I think we have to ask
ourselves, for one thing, is this the wisest course of action? Are we
truly protecting the American public? And there can be many answers to
that question. But I hope, in the course of this debate and in the
conclusion of this debate, we will simply embrace the reality of the
situation. It is not one dimensional. It is not just technological
feasibility. It has to do with cost, it has to do with threat, it has
to do with the evolution of a threat. It has to do with already-
existing agreements with respect to international arms control.
If we reflect those issues in our legislation, we will find, I
suspect, unanimous support for a strong message which would correspond
with the administration's message on national missile defense.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the
Cochran-Inouye Missile Defense Act because I think it is long overdue
that this Senate take an action that is so very crucial to the security
of our Nation. I commend Senator Cochran and Senator Inouye for trying
so hard to get our Congress to move forward, to deploy this defense
system in the face of opposition from the President of the United
States.
I appreciate that they have twice come to the Senate and twice been
filibustered and have been unable to set this very important national
security policy. In fact, the question is, Shall it be the policy of
the United States to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, an
effective national missile defense capable of defending the United
States against limited ballistic missile attacks? It is a very simple
question, and most people in this country think we already have a
defense to an in-coming ballistic missile. But in fact we do not.
We now know that Chinese missiles can reach our mainland. In a few
short years, Iran, Iraq and North Korea could also be able to attack
the United States. Today, we cannot defend the people of our country
nor any place in the world where we have troops on the ground.
The Clinton administration said that we would have 15 years' warning
for missiles from North Korea and Iran, but the Rumsfeld report said
the danger could arise at any time. I commend former Secretary of
Defense and former Congressman Don Rumsfeld for really delving into
this issue in a very bipartisan commission. He had a very tough row to
hoe. But he said we are going to get to the bottom of this and he did
not stop until he had a unanimous report from his commission, some of
whom were naysayers in the beginning, that said this danger is upon us
and we better do something about it. He gave us the wake-up call, and
we should be forever grateful to Don Rumsfeld for having the guts to
get to the truth so we would have the facts to back up the need for
this security for our country.
Unfortunately, U.S. espionage has shown that China has tremendously
boosted its military space and missile capabilities. There is just no
good argument against this resolution.
The bill has support from both sides of the aisle. It really shows
that people are beginning to be aware that we have a security threat to
the United States. This bill is not what many of the critics have said.
It does not mandate a missile defense architecture. It does not
authorize a particular funding level. It is not a production decision,
and it doesn't lead to the signing of any contracts. Instead, it is a
policy statement by the Senate of the United States. But it is an
important step for our national security.
America, the innovative Nation that landed a man on the Moon, has
built up an impressive array of antimissile technology. We have had a
formal missile defense program since President Ronald Reagan launched
SDI in 1983, and there were various antimissile technologies in
research before that. An operational system is now within our reach.
The experts say we could have one in 2 years, 3 years, perhaps 4. But
because of misinformation, this promising system remains confined to
the laboratory, and the Government has never taken the policy step that
is illustrated in this bill.
As long as we continue to ignore this basic policy question, we won't
have an antimissile protection for our country, nor an effective
theater defense for our forces and allies abroad. We have a chance to
take that first step, and it is time that we did this.
What do the opponents of a missile defense system fear so much that
they will not even permit us to go forward to try to get the technology
in place? The danger of ballistic missiles can no longer be ignored.
The Clinton administration stubbornly sticks to the old ABM Treaty.
In a letter to Senator Levin on February 3, the President's National
Security Adviser, Sandy Berger wrote:
. . . a decision regarding national missile defense
deployment must also be addressed within the context of the
ABM treaty and our objectives for achieving future reductions
in strategic offensive arms through START II and START III.
The ABM treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability.
. . .
The letter promises a Presidential veto of this measure if it is
passed in its present form. Our choice is clear. We deploy a missile
defense system as soon as technologically feasible, or we hide behind a
25-year-old treaty with a country that no longer exists. In fact, many
legal and treaty scholars believe that as a matter of international
law, the treaty terminated when the U.S.S.R. collapsed. How anyone can
believe that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability,
when so many nations outside the treaty are flagrantly ignoring its
principles, I do not understand, when nearly three dozen countries are
building or transferring ballistic missile technology. How does the ABM
Treaty protect us from high-tech missiles in North Korea, in Iran, in
Iraq and in China?
In fact, Mr. President, the White House cannot even say who the
treaty partner is right now. To solve that problem, the administration
negotiated a new ABM Treaty, signed in 1997 in New York, that would
make
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Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan parties to the new treaty. It
would also impose new limits on the most promising theater missile
defenses, limits that were never envisioned in the ABM Treaty of 1972.
The New York treaty would handcuff us, crippling our defenses.
Where is that treaty now? The Senate has gone on record on several
occasions insisting that the new treaty be submitted for our
constitutionally required advice and consent, but the President has
consistently refused to submit the treaty that would put new countries
into it to the Senate for ratification.
Have we learned nothing from the Rumsfeld Commission report, from the
test of a three-stage ICBM by North Korea that went right over Japan
where we have thousands of troops on the ground, from the launch of
Iran's Shahab-3, from China's own threats? Eight years after the fall
of the U.S.S.R., we are still fighting the last war. We are basing our
safety in the cold war strategy of arms control with Russia, coupled
with deliberate vulnerability to missile attack.
Polls show that most Americans believe we have antiballistic missile
protection. Can you imagine our country being vulnerable and not even
taking the first step, the first step to a policy that says we are not
going to leave ourselves open when countries are threatening that they
have ballistic missiles that will reach our shores, based on an
obsolete treaty that is not even in the best interest of Russia, which
is the country that this administration says is the other party to the
treaty? I think we would sit down with Russia, and it would be in both
our best interests to have a defense for both of our countries from
rogue nations that have already shown that they have ballistic missile
capabilities, and some even have nuclear capabilities to put right on
one of those ballistic missiles.
Mr. President, there is no responsibility any greater for the U.S.
Senate than the security of our country. That we would not pass the
Cochran-Inouye resolution immediately and go forward with a technology
that would protect our country is unthinkable; it is unthinkable. Yet,
we have seen a filibuster of this very resolution twice in the last
year in the U.S. Senate. I urge my colleagues not to let one more day
pass that this country is not in high gear, pursuing the security of
our Nation and our forces in any theater in the field and our allies
who depend on us for their protection as well.
Mr. President, we should not let another day pass or we will be
walking away from one of the key responsibilities that Congress has,
and that is to stand up to the President of the United States, to admit
that the ABM Treaty is obsolete and no longer in the best interest of
the former U.S.S.R., nor the United States of America, and to say we
are going to protect the people of America and the troops that are
fighting for our freedom wherever they may be in the world, that we
would protect them from an incoming ballistic missile with nuclear,
chemical or biological capabilities. That is the statement that we will
be making if we pass the Cochran-Inouye bill. I urge my colleagues to
do it, hopefully very soon, to start the first step.
This does not appropriate the money. It doesn't designate the
authorization. It only says it is the policy of this country to go
forward to make the technology something that will work and to put our
very best minds on this issue. Then we will authorize it. Then we will
appropriate for it. We cannot shirk this responsibility, Mr. President.
Once again, I thank Senator Cochran and I thank Senator Inouye for
being determined that on their watch we will do the right thing for the
people of the United States of America and all of our allies, wherever
they may need us in the future.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, first let me thank the distinguished
Senator from Texas for her remarks on the bill and other Senators who
have spoken today on both sides of the aisle on this subject. I think
we have a better understanding now of this issue.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
Mr. COCHRAN. Seeing no other Senators seeking recognition on the
floor at this time, in behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous
consent that the Senate resume the pending missile defense bill at
11:30 a.m. on Tuesday and at that time there be 1 hour for debate on
the pending Cochran amendment, with a vote to occur on or in relation
to that amendment No. 69 at 2:15 p.m. on Tuesday and that no other
amendments be in order prior to that vote.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there is no objection on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, in light of this agreement, the leader
has asked that we announce that the next rollcall vote will occur in
the Senate at 2:15 p.m. on Tuesday, March 16.
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