



House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 42) regarding the use of United States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement. The first reading of the concurrent resolution shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the concurrent resolution and shall not exceed two hours equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations. After general debate the concurrent resolution shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. The concurrent resolution shall be considered as read. No amendment to the concurrent resolution shall be in order except those printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII and except pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Each amendment so printed may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee and shall be considered as read. The chairman of the Committee of the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any postponed question that follows another electronic vote without intervening business, provided that the minimum time for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of the concurrent resolution for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the concurrent resolution to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the concurrent resolution to final adoption without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BURR of North Carolina). The gentleman from Florida (Mr. DIAZ-BALART) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HALL). During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding me this time. I rise in support of this rule. I would like to address the House for a few moments on the issue we are preparing to consider, the possible deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo.

The President has made it clear that he is committed to sending approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO force intended to keep the peace. I am convinced that the President firmly believes the presence of U.S. troops in Kosovo is essential to maintaining peace in this troubled area. Like every American, I hope the Serbs and the Kosovars are able to achieve a peaceful resolution to their dispute. We all pray for that outcome. Kosovo is a great human tragedy, fanned by injustice and unexplained hatred.

As a Member of this great body and now as your Speaker, I have never wavered in my belief and trust in this institution. Some have argued that we should not have this debate today, that we should just leave it to the President. Some have even suggested that taking part and talking about this could damage the peace process. I disagree. No one should fear the free expression of ideas, the frank exchange of opinions in a representative democracy. Two weeks ago, the German Bundestag held an extensive debate and voted on whether or not Germany should deploy over 5,000 German troops in Kosovo. The British Parliament has also discussed the deployment of British troops in Kosovo. I do not believe that any harm has been done to the peace process by the workings of these two great democracies. In fact, one message which should come from this debate and those held in the parliaments of our allies is that a free people can disagree without violence and bloodshed.

On this important subject, I have tried to be direct and honest. I have spoken with the President and with his Secretary of State. I told them that I believed it was my duty as Speaker to ensure that Members of the House of Representatives, Republicans and Democrats, have the opportunity to fairly and openly debate the important issue before troops are sent into a potentially dangerous situation. I believe Congress must have a meaningful role in this decision, no matter how difficult our choice nor how hard our task.

I have been equally honest in telling the President that I personally have reservations regarding the wisdom of deploying the additional U.S. troops to the former Yugoslavia, but I have not made up my mind and I will listen intently and closely to this debate. I hope that each of you will do the same, because it is our heavy responsibility and high honor to represent the men and women who are being asked by the President to go into harm's way. Each of us must be prepared to answer to their families and loved ones. I am deeply convinced that we owe them today's debate, for under our Constitution we share this burden with our President.

Our debate today will enable each of us to carry out our responsibilities in a fair and thoughtful way. The gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), at my request, has offered without prejudice this resolution stating the President's position, that troops be deployed. I urge the adoption of this open rule that allows every Member of this House to have a say and to amend this resolution. We have set in place a fair and open process. We are here to discuss sensitive issues of policy and not personality. And let me repeat, we are here today to discuss policy and not personality. I know it does not need to be said, but I urge all Members to treat this issue with the seriousness that it

deserves. We have a solemn duty to perform. And let us do it with the dignity that brings credit to this great House.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 103 is a modified open rule providing for the consideration, as the Speaker of the House has just explained, of House Concurrent Resolution 42, the Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution.

The purpose of the resolution is to authorize the President to deploy United States armed forces to Kosovo and just as importantly it makes possible congressional discussion of this very complex situation.

The rule provides for 2 hours of general debate equally divided between the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations. It is the intention of the rule that the managers of general debate yield time fairly to Republican and Democratic proponents and opponents of the concurrent resolution.

Further, the bill provides that the concurrent resolution shall be considered as read and makes in order only those amendments preprinted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, to be offered only by the Member who caused the amendment to be printed, or his designee, and each amendment shall be considered as read.

In addition, the rule allows the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole to postpone votes during consideration of the bill and to reduce voting time to 5 minutes on votes following a 15-minute vote. Finally, the rule provides one motion to recommit, with or without instructions.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 103 is a fair framework to provide a forum to debate the issues surrounding the possible deployment of U.S. troops for participation in a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Any Member can offer any germane amendment to this resolution providing the amendment was preprinted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD prior to its consideration. The gentleman from California (Mr. DREIER) made this announcement on Monday, March 8, on the House floor, as well as through a Dear Colleague letter to Members.

It has been well known, including in fact through constant press reports, that the House would be debating this difficult issue this week. In spite of the snowstorm we had on Tuesday, Members have known for weeks that we would be taking up this issue prior to the March 15 peace talks in France, the deadline. Were it not for this fair rule, if, for example, we had brought H. Con. Res. 42 to the floor under suspension of the rules, it would be non-amendable and would be allowed only 40 minutes of debate. Therefore, I think it is very important that Members support this rule, regardless of their position on deployment or nondeployment of troops, because Congress has every

right to be debating this resolution today and this rule provides a fair way to do so.

Some Members as well as other foreign policy experts have questioned the timing of this debate while peace negotiations have not been concluded. But if Congress is to deliberate these serious issues prior to the possible deployment of U.S. troops, now is the time. March 15, the proposed deadline for a peace agreement for Kosovo, is this Monday, and U.S. troops could be on their way to Kosovo Monday night if agreement is reached.

As the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS) stated at the Committee on Rules during our markup, there is no perfect time for this. At least two of the Members of the six-nation contact group on Kosovo, Germany and Great Britain, as the Speaker of the House just made reference, have debated in their parliaments this precise issue this past month. Now is indeed an appropriate time for the United States House of Representatives as the sovereign representative body of the American people to take up the issue of possible deployment of our troops to join a NATO force.

The situation in Kosovo is indeed precarious. It has now been over a year since fighting broke out between the Albanian rebels and the Serbian forces in Kosovo and in spite of an October 1998 cease-fire agreement, hostilities have continued.

□ 1145

March 15 is the current deadline for negotiations to be completed on a peace agreement. What is at issue is the expansion of the U.S. role in Kosovo and whether U.S. troops should be deployed to participate in a NATO peace mission should a peace agreement be reached.

Historically it is well known that the Balkans have been a tinder box for regional wars, and we must not forget that World War I began in that part of the world.

In 1995, as a member of the Committee on Rules, I brought to the floor the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-defense Act to end the arms embargo on Bosnia. That embargo was morally wrong, and I believe that it was legally questionable as well from the very beginning. While not contiguous with Bosnia, where U.S. troops are currently deployed, the dangers of a spill-over effect and renewed violence in the region have been realized in the Serbian province of Kosovo. I am extremely concerned by the genocidal attacks on civilians in Kosovo. As a British statesman said while debating the situation in the Balkans:

No language can describe adequately the condition of that large portion of the Balkan peninsula, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and the other provinces, political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of public spirit, hatred of all races, animosities of rival religions and an absence of any controlling power, nothing short of an army of

50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in these parts.

That statement was made by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in October 1878. Unfortunately his words still ring true today.

In summary, the Congress, Mr. Speaker, has every right to debate whether we should put U.S. troops in harm's way before they are sent. That is the reason for today's debate.

I urge my colleagues to support this fair rule so that the House will have the opportunity to debate this very critical issue regarding the possible deployment of our troops to Kosovo. I would urge my colleagues to support the rule.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DIAZ-BALART) for yielding me the time. This is a modified open rule. It will allow for consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 42 which, as my colleagues have heard, is a resolution authorizing the President to deploy United States troops to Kosovo. As my colleague has described, this rule provides for 1 hour of general debate to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations. The rule permits amendments under the 5-minute rule, which is the normal amending process in the House. Under this rule, only amendments which have been preprinted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will be in order.

The Committee on Rules has crafted a rule which at another time would be acceptable. However I believe that the Kosovo resolution should not be brought up at this time. Therefore I will oppose the previous question so that the rule can be amended.

For most Americans Kosovo and Serbia are only distant points on the globe, but that is not so for the community of Dayton, Ohio, the community which I represent, because it was my community of Dayton that hosted the peace talks in 1995 that led to the fragile peace that we are trying to preserve. Today there is continued unrest between the Serbians and the Albanians in Kosovo. The conflict has already left more than a thousand civilians dead and as many as 400,000 homeless. If left unchecked, the turmoil could lead to a broader war in Europe.

However there is hope. Sensitive peace talks are taking place in the region. Through the efforts of Bob Dole the Albanians appear to be ready to sign a peace agreement. The United States and its allies continue to press the parties to restore peace to the region.

My concern with this resolution is not whether Congress has the right to authorize the commitment of U.S. troops; we have that right. My concern with this resolution is whether it is in

our national interest to take it up today in the middle of the peace talks that appear to be succeeding.

Yesterday at the hearing of the Committee on Rules the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), who is the ranking Democratic member of the House Committee on International Relations warned against bringing this resolution to the House floor today. He testified that it seriously undermines the prospects for reaching peace in the region and could lead to more warfare.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sounded a similar note of alarm. Yesterday she testified before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary that this vote will be taken as a green light for the warring parties to continue fighting.

During the Committee on Rules consideration the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MOAKLEY), the ranking Democratic member, offered an amendment to the rule postponing consideration of the resolution until the end of the current peace negotiations, and that amendment was defeated on a straight party line vote. Mr. MOAKLEY also offered an amendment to the rule making in order a floor amendment by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) supporting the peace process and authorizing the deployment of troops if a fair and just peace agreement is reached. The amendment was also defeated on a straight party line vote.

Perhaps when the time comes under the right conditions Congress should support the deployment of troops to Kosovo, and perhaps when the time comes Congress should oppose the move. But the time is not today.

We in Dayton, Ohio, know about peace negotiations in Kosovo and Serbia. We know how sensitive they can be. We also know how important they can be because for a brief moment the negotiations of the 1995 accord lived in my community. Let us let the administration negotiate a peace without Congress sending the wrong signal, and we should not bring up the resolution today.

If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an amendment to the rule which will permit the Kosovo resolution to come up only after the two parties have signed the agreement on the status of Kosovo. The delay is necessary to ensure that the actions of the House do not interfere with the peace negotiations in Kosovo.

Before concluding I want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from California (Mr. DREIER) and to the Republicans on the Committee on Rules for keeping this a relatively unrestricted rule and for permitting the motion to recommit. I am heartened by the bipartisan spirit in which gentleman from California (Mr. DREIER) approached this rule, and I believe this sends a positive signal at the beginning of this Congress. Our differences are not in the crafting of the rule, only in the timing.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS), a member of the Committee on Rules and chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Florida for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, today the House will debate whether to send U.S. troops to Kosovo, an issue that may seem to have little relevance to the lives of many Americans in this time of very blue skies in this country which we are fortunate to enjoy. But appearances aside, the decisions we make about Kosovo will affect the course of the United States and our allies in the world over the next several years.

This matters. It is a critically important debate, and I urge Members to give it their most thoughtful attention.

Some may question whether this is the right time for a congressional debate, as we have already heard, about sending U.S. troops to Kosovo. Once an agreement is reached, the Clinton administration has announced that it will deploy troops forthwith to begin enforcement of the agreement. So when is the right time to debate the issue? The answer is before our men and women in uniform are placed in harm's way.

I am concerned that the administration tends to place U.S. troops into a dangerous situation where they are unwelcomed by both parties and do not have clear marching orders. Serbian President Milosevic, an unsavory strong man in my view, refuses to accept the presence of foreign troops on Serbian soil, and the Kosovar rebels on their part refuse to give up their ultimate goal of independence from Serbia. Of even greater concern is the possibility that the NATO mission may have the unintended consequence of destabilizing the region by encouraging separatism in neighboring areas, a situation we are already familiar with.

Mr. Speaker, there is no question that the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo cries out for international attention and assistance. But the real question is: How should the United States of America respond? Is the answer always the commission of U.S. forces no matter what? Listening to the Clinton administration, we would think that bombing and deployment of troops is the only solution available to us.

I am also concerned about the implications of the administration's Kosovo plans on the future of NATO. For several years NATO has been grappling with its role in the post cold war period. The administration's headlong rush to support deployment of NATO troops outside the treaty area risks damage to the delicate consensus that underlies the alliance.

In April at NATO's 50th anniversary to be celebrated here in Washington the Alliance will announce its new strategic concept for the direction and mission of NATO. Will this document explain why NATO must intervene in Kosovo, an area outside the treaty boundary, but not intervene in an area, say, in Africa where there is genocide and a civil war going where human suffering is just as great.

Mr. Speaker, when President Clinton first proposed sending U.S. troops to Kosovo, he laid out the following criteria: a strong and effective peace agreement with full participation by both parties, a permissive security environment, including the disarmament of the Kosovar power militaries and a well-defined NATO mission with a clear exit strategy. These criteria are a good starting point for the congressional consideration.

Later today I or others may offer amendments to this resolution to ensure that these criteria and other equally important ones are met before U.S. troops are sent to Kosovo.

Before I vote to support sending our men and women in uniform to Kosovo, people in my district want to know the exit strategy as well as the entry strategy. They want to know how this fits into our national interest, and they want to know the costs. These are basic questions that we in Congress should raise so that the American people are fully informed. Getting answers from the administration is part of our job description, especially when the use of our men and women in uniform is involved.

This rule provides for full debate. I urge its support.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BONIOR).

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HALL) for yielding me the time, and again I rise to say that the timing of this resolution could not be worse, not the fact that we are debating it. I think the fact that they have allowed a debate and under a generally open rule is a positive sign, as my friend from Ohio has stated. But having this debate and having this vote in the midst of negotiations makes little sense and, in fact, undermines those negotiations.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for us to review where we have been in the Balkans. In Bosnia tens of thousands of people lost their lives, thousands of women were raped, hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their home before we had the courage to finally say no, and within the past year in Kosovo we have had 2000 people killed, we have had 400,000 people displaced in Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal campaign of violence and human rights abuses against the 2 million ethnic Albanians.

Mr. Speaker, this is not the time to have this resolution on the floor of the House. On the 15th of January, at Racak, Serbian special police shot at

least 15 ethnic Albanians including elderly people and children. Human Rights Watch has evidence suggesting that the Serbians had, and I quote, "direct orders to kill village inhabitants over the age of 15." In Rogovo, just 2 weeks later Serbian police raided a farming village and executed 25 people.

This has gone on for a year, it has gone on for more than a year, but within the last year we have seen these numbers rise to 2,000 people.

Why would Milosevic do anything but stall, not agree to a peace agreement, if the United States Congress says in a vote later today, if this rule passes, that we, in fact, will not deploy troops? We will be giving him a green light, and we will be seeing more Racaks, we will be seeing more slaughters as we saw in Rogovo, and we will be in an unvirtuous circle of islands in which we undoubtedly will have to revisit again on this House floor.

Just today, while Richard Holbrooke was talking with Milosevic yesterday, violence continued, and there is a picture in the New York Times showing the deaths of people in the village of Ivaja in Kosovo.

□ 1200

This slaughter must stop, and the way to stop it is to stop this resolution from coming to the floor of the House, and we can do that by voting against the rule. Arthur Vandenberg once said that politics should stop at the water's edge when it comes to foreign policy. Bob Dole asked us not to do this yesterday. Let us not do this. Let us stop here. Vote no on this rule. Then we can have a good debate on this issue when the issue comes before us when an agreement occurs in this troubled land.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. LINDER).

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DIAZ-BALART) for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 103, the rule providing for consideration of the resolution regarding peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. This rule ensures a free and open debate and provides Members the opportunity to have their voices heard on this very important matter involving the lives of our troops.

The modified open rule passed the House Committee on Rules and it did not provide any preferential waivers. It allows for all germane amendments and complies with the request of the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), who requested that all amendments be preprinted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The passage of this rule will, I admit, lead to a wide open discussion on a very public issue, with the prospect of counter argument and earnest debate. I welcome that debate and I expect it to be an extraordinary exchange of ideas and opinions.

I will be honest in stating that I have grave reservations about the deployment of American troops in Kosovo,

but I also do not see anything wrong with giving Members the opportunity to listen closely to the arguments on each side of the debate.

Our allies, Great Britain and Germany, have deliberated and engaged in this debate already, and that leads us to the question underlying the rule we are discussing today: Should the United States House of Representatives have the opportunity to participate in the decision to deploy our troops in Kosovo and debate it today?

My personal view is that it would be better if we did not. I would prefer that this resolution inform the President that we are unwilling to fund his adventurism without clear rules of engagement, exit strategies, specific goals and a budget. We have a constitutional responsibility to participate in decisions putting our troops in harm's way. I do believe that would better be the question before us.

Having said that, I urge Members to support the fair rule that will initiate a full and open debate regarding the deployment of young Americans' lives in a dangerous foreign land.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), who is the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HALL) for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, I speak against the rule. I will vote against the rule. I am deeply concerned that taking this matter up now in the midst of negotiations between the opposing parties, the Kosovars and Milosevic's people, will cause great harm and great damage to the negotiating process.

Should what we do today cause there to be no agreement, we would have lost, Europe would have lost and there will be continued bloodshed and anguish in Kosovo. I think it is wrong to take this up now. It is untimely. It is improper to do so.

Secondly, as it was mentioned by my friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HALL), I am the ranking member on the Committee on Armed Services. This deals with the military of the United States of America.

We in our committee should have had the opportunity to have had a hearing to find out what troops, under what conditions and if there is a possibility of saving some other deployments because we are short on troops today. These are questions that we in our committee should have had the opportunity to ask, a full and fair hearing in the Committee on Armed Services, which we did not have.

Thirdly, I would like to mention that I also have an amendment, should this rule carry, which I hope in all sincerity it does not. I will have an amendment that requires that there be an agreement between the parties before any American troops are allowed to go into Kosovo. That is the bottom line. Right now, bringing up this resolution is im-

proper and uncalled for because it could very well change the agreement, cause there not to be an agreement and cause confusion in that part of the Balkans.

I wish that everyone could have been with me to witness the four-starred German general who is the second in command at NATO a few weeks ago when I asked him why is it important that America be involved in Europe and in NATO?

His answer was a full and complete one, which said it is important that America be there. I think that if America should be there, we should have the opportunity to do it the right way, the right time and under the right resolution and the right vote.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. COBLE).

(Mr. COBLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DIAZ-BALART) for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I usually vote consistently in favor of rules, and I may vote for this rule, but I am opposed to our dispatching troops to Kosovo, not unlike my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) who just spoke.

I recall Bosnia. The President told us our troops would be back home, I believe, by December 1996. Well, when I last checked, December 1996 has come and long gone and our troops are still there. I was uneasy about it because I could not grasp the importance of our national security vis-a-vis Bosnia. Now Kosovo is on the screen and, unlike Bosnia, as best I remember it, I do not think we have even been invited to come to Kosovo.

Given these two situations, I don't mean to portray myself as an isolationist but to suggest that Bosnia and Kosovo are European problems that should be resolved by Europeans hardly constitutes isolationism. It is isolationism light at its best, if that.

I just believe that we do not need to insert our oars into those waters, and I don't mean to come across as uncaring or indifferent to the problems plaguing Europe, but doggone it, it is indeed a European problem.

Let our European friends handle it unless it becomes a situation that causes United States national security to be exposed.

Now, absent that, Mr. Speaker, and my colleagues on both sides, I think we need to go about our business here. Let our friends across the water, as my late grandma used to say, let them resolve those problems.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ORTIZ).

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a member of the House Committee on Armed Services to oppose the rule allowing the House to consider House Resolution 42 regarding Kosovo.

I want to say this in the strongest possible terms, considering this vote today is so ill-timed as to adversely affect the peace negotiations ongoing in the Balkans. It has taken us so long to build the coalition that we have been able to build in that part of the world, and we understand this. This Congress says they have the obligation to ensure that the diplomats in the region exhaust all possible means in their negotiations.

Like the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), I wish that we had been able to debate this issue in the committee before it came to the House floor to see what the needs are, how many troops, the equipment. So I think that it has all been done in good faith but it is ill-timed.

We also have a unique responsibility in this situation, as we do in most global spots. We are the world's only remaining superpower. We have more and better military might than any other country in the world. If we are indeed the only remaining superpower, then that status brings certain obligations and responsibilities. This is why I say, let us discuss it further.

I just got back from Bosnia 4 days ago. The morale of our troops is high and, not only that, they believe in the mission that they are conducting in that part of the world. They said for the first time we have seen young children play in the parks, play in the streets, go to school. So please help us defeat this rule.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM).

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, this is exactly the time to have this discussion, exactly the time. It may not be the time for negotiators and bean counters but it is for our troops.

I remember Somalia, where the President did not come to Congress when he changed going after Aideed, and we lost 22 rangers because they failed to give armor which the military wanted; or Haiti, that we are today spending \$25 million a year in building schools and roads out of the defense budget.

Kosovo is like any of the United States is to Greater Serbia. It is not a separate entity. It is the birthplace of the Orthodox Catholic religion. It is their home. It was occupied by 100 percent Serbs, and the Turks and the Nazis eliminated and desecrated and ethnically cleansed Jews, Gypsies and Serbs and now the population is Albanian.

Albania does not want just Kosovo. They want part of Greece. They want Montenegro. This is only a beginning.

Listen to George Tenet's brief. Bin Laden is working with the KLA, the terrorists, that is going to hit the United States. If we do not want to stop this, then do not talk about it, but if we go in there, we are going to lose a great number of people. For what? They have been fighting for 400 years.

This debate is well timed. Maybe not for my colleagues on the other side but for the kids that have to put those backpacks on and carry rifles. It is the time to stop this.

Take a look at the number of military deployments. It was 300 percent during the height of Vietnam. We are killing our military as it is, and we have one-half the force to do it. That is why they are bailing out. This is exactly the time, Mr. Speaker, and I reject the other side.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. POMEROY).

Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I strongly object to this rule which will provide for the House to debate the U.S. involvement in the Kosovo peace agreement. The reason I object to consideration of this issue at this time is that as of today, there is no peace agreement and the process leading to the arriving at a peace agreement is at a terribly tenuous, sensitive and delicate stage.

□ 1215

We have all read with horror about the atrocities committed in Kosovo. Innocent civilians, including little children, have been savagely and brutally murdered. For the sake of humanity and decency, we all want this butchery to end. It will require a peace agreement to end this killing. Our taking up the resolution now while the deliberations are still underway can only make it more difficult to resolve this.

Yesterday, former Majority Leader Bob Dole gave advice to the Committee on International Relations. He says, "We have 2 steps here. First, we get an agreement, then the President goes to the American people to explain it."

Mr. Speaker, I think we must follow Majority Leader Dole's advice. Defeat this rule and let the deliberations leading to peace be concluded.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado (Mr. MCINNIS).

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida yielding me this time.

The preceding speaker talked about the tragedies that are going on. Mr. Speaker, those kinds of tragedies are going on throughout the entire world. This country cannot be the world's police officer. We do have international commitments, but before we exercise these commitments, we need to look at the precedents, what we have done in regards to these kinds of situations.

Number one, we have never gone into the sovereign territory of another country like this without being invited to settle a dispute within their boundaries. This is a very similar situation. If the State of Colorado that I am from got in a dispute with the State of Texas, would we invite the Turks or the Greeks or NATO to come in and resolve the dispute between Colorado and Texas?

There are atrocities occurring in Kosovo. It is a proper mission for humanitarian efforts. It is not a proper mission to intervene with American military troops that will be there on an indefinite basis. Do not kid ourselves. It is an indefinite basis.

Look at Cyprus, the United Nations. I just came from Cyprus. United Nations troops have never been able to make the peace there. They have been able to keep the peace because of the fact they have troops there. They have been there for 27 years. It is the same thing here. We are attempting as outsiders to intervene within the boundaries of a sovereign country to resolve a dispute that is based in large part on religion, in large part on nationality; a dispute of which we have very little historical knowledge; we certainly have very little historical experience, and we think by force and sending in troops we are going to make peace. We are not.

We are going to be able to keep the peace. As long as we have troops in Kosovo, we can keep peace. But we cannot, we do not have the capability to take hundreds of years of battle and hundreds of years of rock-solid feelings and force them into a peace agreement.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, let me wrap up by saying that some would suggest that this is not an appropriate time for delay. This is an appropriate time for delay before the troops go in. Do not debate after the troops are in; do it before the troops are in.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York, (Mr. ENGEL).

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Ohio for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I have spent as much time as anyone over these past 10 or 11 years dealing with the problem in Kosovo. I want to tell my colleagues as far as I am concerned this is a wrong rule and the wrong resolution at the wrong time, and it should be defeated. I have hardly seen anything more irresponsible, quite frankly, in my 10 plus years here than this resolution and this rule.

As far as I am concerned, this is an attempt to embarrass the President, this is mischief-making at its worst, and it undermines American foreign policy, it undermines the negotiations going on. I returned from Rambouillet 3 weeks ago, and I can tell my colleagues that if we pass this rule and the resolution offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) goes down to defeat, as I suspect it will, this will destroy the negotiations and destroy the peace process, and we will be responsible for that.

The Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HASTERT) came and said that this was an open process, and I think he was a bit disingenuous, quite frankly. He says that he wants to meet Democrats halfway. We have not seen that meeting us halfway on committee ratios, we have not

seen it on funding, and now the Democrats are pleading, the administration is pleading and saying please postpone this vote until there is an agreement, and we cannot even get a postponement on the vote.

Senator Dole was quite eloquent yesterday. He said, quite simply, first we get an agreement and then we go before Congress to ratify the agreement. We do not do it the other way around. Senator Dole has also spent more time than anybody in terms of Kosovo, and he thinks this will be very damaging. Everybody that has worked in this process thinks it will be very, very damaging.

There is no reason to do this kind of thing now, except to embarrass the President politically and undermine U.S. foreign policy. This is absolutely irresponsible. It will damage the peace process.

Let me remind my colleagues that foreign policy should be bipartisan. I was one of those Democrats that voted with President Bush and supported him in the Persian Gulf War when he asked for bipartisanship. Now that the shoe is on the other foot, we get very little of it from the other side. All I know is that in Kosovo there is genocide, ethnic cleansing and killing, and it needs to stop, and if the United States Congress votes against sending troops to Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic, the butcher of Kosovo, will laugh and laugh and laugh, because we will have given him cover.

The Albanians, who have agreed to the agreement will back off, because without strong American participation they will not have the fortitude; they only trust the United States of America. We have seen time and time again, we saw it in Bosnia, 200,000 people were ethnically cleansed, and until the United States grabbed the bull by the horns and showed the leadership in NATO, people were being killed and genocide was happening again on the face of Europe. And when the United States grabbed the bull by the horns, only then did it stop, and it is the same situation here. It is disingenuous of my colleagues to say they want the killing to stop, but they do not want to support American troops as part of NATO on the ground.

Without our participation, the killing will continue and the ethnic cleansing will continue.

Defeat this rule. It is nothing more than mischief making and it does not do this Congress good service at all.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I feel obliged to reject the allegation that Congress would be responsible for atrocities based on the fact that we are bringing forth this resolution as a sovereign representative body of the American people. I am unaccustomed to citing, to quoting The Washington Post, Mr. Speaker, but I feel at this time that I must.

The Washington Post editorial today says, "It is a bad time for Congress to

debate whether the United States should send troops to help police any peace reached in Kosovo. But there is no better time left, and Congress has good reason to proceed."

The Washington Post continues by saying, "The President ought to be asking forthrightly for congressional approval, not trying to evade a congressional judgment on his policy in Kosovo."

So with all respect, I tell my colleagues that it is not fair, based on a policy disagreement, which is genuine and which is most appropriate to say that we would be responsible for atrocities or horrors that are based on unexplainable and historical reasons in that part of the world.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in support of the rule, H. Con. Res. 42, authorizing deployment of our U.S. armed forces in Kosovo. It provides for a clear general debate, and then opens this measure up to amendments from any member, as long as these amendments were preprinted in the RECORD.

I understand that some 53 amendments have been filed and some are duplicates and I expect the debate will focus on authorizing the deployment, requiring reports, praising the negotiations, praising our troops, or prohibiting the deployment. This debate will fulfill our historic constitutional and legal mandate given by our Founding Fathers to put the war powers in the hands of the Congress, not the President.

We have called for this because as I understand it, the President does not want us to vote prior to the conclusions of the ongoing Kosovo negotiations, and will deploy troops within 48 hours of the agreement, as he has indicated that he will deploy some 4,000 troops to support the agreement. And if we were to vote subsequent to deployment, we would risk undercutting our troops in the field.

According to the Secretary of State, the people's elected representatives should not vote before deployment and to avoid undercutting the troops, we should not vote after deployment. That must not be so. The elected representatives of the people must vote on this risky mission.

From some of the past conflicts up to and including Desert Storm, Congress has voted on deployment of our troops and when we did so, we strengthened our Nation's resolve and our diplomacy.

I believe we must have this vote to require the President to clarify our mission and to bring the American peo-

ple into the debate that could put our uniformed personnel in harm's way.

I want to state that I support this resolution. I support the deployment of troops to Kosovo, provided they enter Kosovo in a permissive environment and with agreed-on conditions of the contact group. With such conditions, I would support our President's commitment to guaranteeing peace in Kosovo.

To quote the editorial that was just cited by our good colleague from Florida, the editorial in today's Washington Post entitled "Bring Congress In," and I quote, "It takes a bold decision for Bill Clinton to bring Congress in as a partner this Kosovo, and he should not shy away from it."

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), who is the ranking minority member on the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, first let us get straight where we are. There is no constitutional requirement that the United States Congress take action prior to the President putting troops into a peacekeeping situation. This is not initiating a war; this is not moving troops in an area where we anticipate war. These are peacekeeping operations, and we have troops all over the world in peacekeeping operations without having gotten prior congressional approval.

Let us also get rid of some of the arguments that we have heard here on the floor that we are going to let the Europeans take care of that. That was tried. The previous administration waited for Europe to respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia. Mr. Speaker, 200,000 people murdered, raped, killed in their homes, in open fields, maybe not reaching the numbers of other mass murders in this century, but certainly enough that the American people felt that we could no longer wait, and this President led our effort to end that slaughter.

Burden sharing. We have never had an action where the United States is to play such a small role in the number of people on the ground; that in every other action, American forces were there in larger number and in this case the Europeans are, for the first time in my memory, accepting a larger responsibility. When we look at the statements, not just of Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Senator Dole who are clearly in favor of the President's policy, and in particular Senator Dole deserves great praise for his actions, his efforts, going to the region and the work he has done. But even Secretary Kissinger, who has written in opposition to the policy, was very hesitant to suggest that anybody should interpret from his article that they should vote against this resolution.

□ 1230

What is the right thing to do? The right thing to do, as Senator Dole said, is first have an agreement and then have a vote. Because if we do not do it

that way, as again Senator Dole said, if we have the vote first and we fail to pass it, we will probably not have an agreement.

It is an awfully hard place to get an agreement in the first place. Without all the support from Congress, with the unanimity of the American people, expressed by 435 Members of this House voting in favor of the President's actions, it will be exceedingly difficult to achieve a goal of peace in that area.

But with the actions that we take today, even if we pass it, but with a small number, it will encourage Milosevic and others who object to the peace process, who want to see battle continue, and who care not for the lives on the ground.

I do hope this is a sincere effort where we differ. I sure hope that we do not see a unified rejection of the negotiations that are going on today because it is a Democratic President. Speaker Foley, when he sat in this House, held up the vote on the Persian Gulf for months at the request of the President of the United States, George Bush. He waited until the troops were there and ready, and then, with agreement from the administration, held a vote.

We are asked to vote before there is an agreement, before there is a conclusion. Support the Committee on Rules' proposal to send this back and bring it back to the floor when there is actually something to vote on.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), who is also a very distinguished member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I have the highest regard for all of my colleagues on the other side of the Chamber, and of course, I recognize, as we all must, that this is not a partisan issue.

When President Bush asked this body to support him with respect to the Persian Gulf, I was one of those Democrats who proudly and publicly supported him. I want to pay tribute to Senator Dole for his courageous public statements and actions supporting the policy that we support.

It is self-evident that this is the wrong time to deal with this issue. There may be no agreement for us to implement. But if we vote now, the likelihood of an agreement diminishes.

How many innocent children and women have to be killed in the former Yugoslavia for us to talk about genocide? Had we acted in 1991, a quarter million innocent people who are now dead would be here, and 2½ million refugees would still be living in their homes.

I know the difference between the Persian Gulf and Kosovo. Kosovo has no oil. That is the principle that is invoked here, under the table. Clearly we are not protecting our oil resources in Kosovo, as we did in the Persian Gulf.

This ought not to be a partisan dispute. We are undermining NATO, that succeeded in destroying the mighty Soviet Union, if we as the leader of NATO

bail out on our international responsibilities.

If we listen closely, we hear the voices of isolationism reverberating in this Chamber. It is mindboggling. As we close this century, the lesson of it is that appeasement does not pay, that aggression must be resisted. I ask my colleagues to reject this rule, and to have this debate after an agreement will have been reached.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN).

(Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I was in Bosnia 4 years ago as cochair of a House delegation, and there were three clear lessons from that trip.

Number one, there is a U.S. national interest in preventing an outbreak of major conflagration in the Balkans. We should not be the world's policeman, true. We also should not be asleep at the switch. Whether we like it or not, the Balkans is an important crossroads.

Secondly, Mr. Milosevic is a major roadblock to peace, and understands only firmness, total firmness.

Third, the U.S. has a special credibility there. We have a special credibility, and we need to use it to help bring about peace and to help enforce it.

The question now is not whether we are going to go to war, but whether we can negotiate a peace. I urge Members on the majority side to listen to their standardbearer of 1996, Robert Dole, who said just yesterday, I would rather have the vote come after the agreement. Mr. Dole, to his credit, knows the importance of bipartisanship in foreign policy.

I close with this. This is a particularly sensitive time in the negotiations for peace in Kosovo. This is not the time to take risks in undermining those efforts. Those who insist on a debate at this particular moment should think again, or they bear the responsibility for the possible consequences of their actions.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Mrs. MYRICK), a distinguished member of the Committee on Rules.

Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I do rise today in support of this rule, because it provides a fair and open debate, as should be the case with such an important matter. But that said, I strongly oppose the commitment of U.S. troops to Kosovo unless we are going to go in and solve the problem.

I do not believe the United States can be the parent or the policeman of the world, and the fighting there and in the rest of the Balkans is primarily a European matter and should remain a European matter, and they should be involved in taking the lead in this.

I believe wholeheartedly in maintaining a strong national defense, and I will always support our men and

women in uniform. In fact, it is because of my commitment to the troops and not despite of it that I oppose this deployment of the troops to Kosovo.

To put it simply, our forces are stretched too thin around the globe to commit 4,000 or 5,000 troops in an effort whose end is nowhere in sight. When we committed troops to Bosnia, we were told they would be home that fall; then, that Christmas. That was in 1996. Three years later, our troops are still in Bosnia.

I have tremendous confidence in America's Armed Forces, and have no doubt that given a properly defined mission with a clear objective and a sensible exit strategy, our forces would perform brilliantly. That, however, does not describe our presence in the former Yugoslavia.

I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this rule and opposing House Concurrent Resolution 42.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to our leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT).

(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I have always believed that Congress should be involved in decisions by our government to send our armed services into harm's way. I really believe it is best to first commit the people and then commit the troops.

However, I object strongly to the timing of this debate. We should not be debating this matter while our diplomats at this very moment are seeking to convince the parties to this conflict to lay down their weapons and choose the path of peace.

To conduct a divisive debate in Congress and perhaps fail to support our government's efforts is the height of irresponsibility, and threatens the hope for an agreement to halt the bloodshed and prevent the widening of this war.

We all know that we are at a very delicate moment in the Kosovo peace negotiations. In part due to the efforts of former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, the Kosovar Albanians are reportedly ready to sign an agreement, and our diplomats are right now continuing to convince Yugoslavia President Milosevic to agree, as well.

If we reject this legislation, the Kosovars may refuse to sign an agreement out of fear that U.S. leadership is wavering, and clearly, Milosevic will be emboldened to continue his rejection of a NATO force as part of any agreement. Either outcome will only lead to more violence, more bloodshed, which has engulfed this region over the past years.

This should not be about politics. It should not be about giving the administration a black eye. This is about ending a humanitarian catastrophe and preventing the slaughter of thousands of innocent people caught in a simmering ethnic conflict.

Lives are at stake here. Our actions today may determine whether the peo-

ple of Kosovo have a chance for a peaceful future, or simply resume the killing that could destabilize the region and threaten United States interests. I thought until recently that the Republican leadership shared this view, and grieve that partisanship has no place in this debate.

When asked a few weeks ago about a House vote on Kosovo, the Speaker stated publicly, I think we need to make sure that the administration has the room to negotiate and get the job done in Rambouillet first. The fact that we are here today demonstrates that Republican leaders have chosen partisan politics over a united American effort to end the conflict. It seems that politics has infected foreign policy, and I think, if that has happened, with great harm to our credibility overseas.

Others will talk about the importance of U.S. leadership in the Balkans and Kosovo's significance for the future of NATO. I will simply reiterate to the Members what Bob Dole said yesterday in the Committee on International Relations. When asked about the timing of the vote, Senator Dole said, "I would rather have the vote come after the agreement between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia."

When asked how Members should vote if this resolution is not postponed, Senator Dole said, we hope there will be strong bipartisan support. It is in our national interest to do this.

I regret that the leadership in Congress has forgotten our history and our background, and the importance of standing united as we attempt to resolve yet another international conflict. I urge all Members, Republican and Democratic alike, to vote against this rule, and defer this action that very well may provoke further bloodshed in the Balkans.

We can have this vote if there is a treaty. We can have this vote once there has been some kind of pulling together of a policy that we can look at and evaluate. This vote today is premature. It is wrong to have it today. The Members have it within their ability to put this vote off. I urge Members to vote against the previous question, vote against the rule, and let us bring up this vote when it is timely and appropriate.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. HALL of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote against the previous question. If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an amendment to the rule that will delay consideration of the Kosovo peacekeeping resolution until an agreement on the status of Kosovo has been signed between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanians.

There is potential for serious damage to the peace process if we insist on

bringing this debate while negotiations are in midstream and are in a precarious state. We certainly would not want to do anything in this body which could have the effect of disrupting or even ending the prospect for peace in the Balkan region.

□ 1245

Mr. Speaker, I urge a no vote on the previous question.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD the document entitled "The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means," as follows:

THE VOTE ON THE PREVIOUS QUESTION: WHAT IT REALLY MEANS

This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote against the Republican majority agenda and a vote to allow the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be debating.

Mr. Clarence Cannon's "Precedents of the House of Representatives," (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the previous question on the rule as "a motion to direct or control the consideration of the subject before the House being made by the Member in charge." To defeat the previous question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling of January 13, 1920, to the effect that "the refusal of the House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes the control of the resolution to the opposition" in order to offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: "The previous question having been refused, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first recognition."

Because the vote today may look bad for the Republican majority they will say "the vote on the previous question is simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive legislative or policy implications whatsoever." But that is not what they have always said. Listen to the Republican Leadership "Manual on the Legislative Process in the United States House of Representatives," (6th edition, page 135). Here's how the Republicans describe the previous question vote in their own manual:

"Although it is generally not possible to amend the rule because the majority Member controlling the time will not yield for the purpose of offering an amendment, the same result may be achieved by voting down the previous question on the rule. . . . When the motion for the previous question is defeated, control of the time passes to the Member who led the opposition to ordering the previous question. That Member, because he then controls the time, may offer an amendment to the rule, or yield for the purpose of amendment."

Deschler's "Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives," the subchapter titled "Amending Special Rules" states: "a refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the resolution to amendment and further debate." (Chapter 21, section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues:

"Upon rejection of the motion for the previous question on a resolution reported from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member leading the opposition to the previous question, who may offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time for debate thereon."

The vote on the previous question on a rule does have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only available tools for those who oppose the Republican majority's agenda to offer an alternative plan.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ROEMER).

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HALL) for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, I want to encourage Members on both sides of the aisle to support the motion of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HALL) to defeat the previous question and do so for the following two reasons: One, maybe the most important book written on the history of Kosovo and Bosnia in the last several years by Robert Kaplan is "Balkan Ghosts." Certainly the ghosts of this distinguished Chamber are rattling around as we play some politics with the timing of this resolution.

When it comes to foreign policy, it used to be that we did not play politics and go across the water's edge. Certainly when it comes to war, my very first vote in this Chamber, we had dignified and civil debate really that embodied the comity that this institution is capable of.

The timing of this resolution is very important. We should not do it before we see the peace agreement that is reached, if one is reached in this very volatile and delicate region of the world.

Secondly, Mr. Speaker, and I openly will criticize the administration for this, I do not know how I would vote next week or the week after on deploying troops. I think we should have answers to questions about how thinly our troops might be deployed, what the cost would be, what the exit strategy will be, how we are going to pay for this, what is the morale of the troops like and what state is that?

I do not think we should give carte blanche to the administration who simply announces to Congress that they are going to send 4,000 troops overseas whether Congress wants to or not.

So in terms of these two reasons, the politics of the timing today is not appropriate. Let us see if we can get a peace agreement; and then once we have it, let us debate it. Let us play our constitutional role in the United States Congress and have input, valuable input and debate on such a critically important matter for our Constitution, our country, and our Congress.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the accusations made by our distinguished colleagues on the other side of the aisle, especially the minority leader, have been most unfair, unfortunate, and must be rejected.

Partisanship has not played a role in this timing. The deadline for negotiations is Monday night. Our troops could be on their way to being deployed Monday night. If Congress is to have a voice on this issue, Congress must speak now, as even the Washington Post has recognized.

I personally will join the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, in voting in favor of the authorization, in other words, the underlying concurrent resolution being brought forth by this rule.

So I would urge my colleagues to vote to support the previous question and to support the rule.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on House Concurrent Resolution 42, a measure regarding the use of United States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation to implement a peace agreement in Kosovo.

At the outset, Mr. Speaker, I would voice my objection on procedural grounds to the rule authorizing debate today of H. Con. Res. 42, a measure on which the Democrats had no input and the Administration has not been permitted to comment upon.

As we all know, Mr. Speaker, the fragile peace negotiations on Kosovo are being conducted by the six member Contact Group and international community as we speak. Because of the sensitivity of these on-going negotiations, this is the absolute worst time to hold a contentious debate on Kosovo in the House of Representatives. Mixed signals from the U.S. Congress concerning the U.S. role in Kosovo undercut the Administration's ability to forge a successful peace agreement between the warring factions in Kosovo.

Already the situation is being manipulated by Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, whose belligerence has been encouraged by perceived ambivalence in Washington. No doubt this has played a role in recent setbacks to the peace process, as exemplified by Milosevic's emboldened insistence to U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke that any political agreement based upon his country's acceptance of foreign troops is unacceptable.

Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues to vote against the rule on H. Con. Res. 42. It is clearly irresponsible to hold a divisive Kosovo debate now in Congress that will, in all likelihood, materially damage prospects for a lasting peace agreement being reached in that war-torn province.

Having said that, Mr. Speaker, if a peace accord in Kosovo is negotiated, I would urge support for the President's authority to deploy U.S. troops to implement the peace agreement, as embodied in H. Con. Res. 42.

As the world's lone superpower, I believe the government of the United States has a moral obligation to do what we can to stop the senseless bloodshed in Kosovo. Already over 200,000 lives have been sacrificed in the region's violence and it must be stopped.

On a strategic level, it is important that the war in Kosovo not be allowed to escalate and spread, threatening the stability of surrounding Balkan states as well as that of NATO partners, Greece and Turkey. The United States has a strategic interest in preserving the peace and stability of all of Europe, including its southern flank.

Achieving these important objectives require that an international peacekeeping force be formed by NATO. As NATO's leader, I believe it appropriate and not an undue burden that the United States contribute 4,000 U.S. troops, only 14% of the total NATO deployment of 28,000 peacekeeping soldiers. History has shown repeatedly that if the United States does not participate and lead, NATO is ineffective and falls apart.

Mr. Speaker, whether we like it or not, America cannot afford to walk away from the genocide and instability festering in Kosovo. I urge our colleagues to support H. Con. Res. 42 and its urgent mission to bring peace to the long suffering people of Kosovo.

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the rule allowing for the consideration of H. Con. Res. 42.

Mr. Speaker, the consideration of this bill comes at a most inopportune time. Timing is the key issue in this debate. As Negotiations to end the fighting in Kosovo are scheduled to resume next week this body has scheduled a debate as to the course of American policy in the region. In debating this resolution now we send the wrong message to friend and foe alike. In debating this issue now we send a message of indecisiveness and reluctance to fulfill our role as a peace partner in the region.

A decisive debate on this issue could undermine the talks at a critical juncture in the dialogue. Even former Senator Dole who supports a NATO ground presence, recognizes the bad timing of this resolution. On March 10, Senator Dole testified before the House International Relations Committee that he "would rather have the vote come after the agreement between the Albanians and Serbia."

Mr. Speaker, I will vote against the rule on H. Con. Res. 42 because this is the wrong time for the consideration of this legislation by the House at such a critical moment in the peace negotiations.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BURR of North Carolina). The question is on ordering the previous question.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the question of agreeing to the resolution.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 219, nays 203, not voting 12, as follows:

[Roll No. 45]

YEAS—219

Aderholt	Ballenger	Bass
Archer	Barr	Bateman
Armey	Barrett (NE)	Bereuter
Bachus	Bartlett	Biggert
Baker	Barton	Bilirakis

Bliley	Hall (TX)	Pickering	Kaptur	Minge	Sherman
Blunt	Hansen	Pitts	Kennedy	Mink	Shows
Boehlert	Hastert	Pombo	Kildee	Moakley	Sisisky
Boehner	Hastings (WA)	Porter	Kilpatrick	Moore	Skelton
Bonilla	Hayes	Portman	Kind (WI)	Moran (VA)	Slaughter
Bono	Hayworth	Pryce (OH)	Kleckzka	Murtha	Smith (WA)
Brady (TX)	Heffley	Quinn	Klink	Nadler	Snyder
Bryant	Herger	Radanovich	Kucinich	Napolitano	Spratt
Burr	Hill (MT)	Ramstad	LaFalce	Neal	Stabenow
Burton	Hildeary	Regula	Lampson	Oberstar	Stark
Buyer	Hobson	Reynolds	Lantos	Obey	Stenholm
Callahan	Hoekstra	Riley	Larson	Olver	Strickland
Calvert	Horn	Rogan	Lee	Ortiz	Stupak
Camp	Hostettler	Rogers	Levin	Owens	Tanner
Campbell	Houghton	Rohrabacher	Lewis (GA)	Pallone	Tauscher
Canady	Hulshof	Ros-Lehtinen	Lipinski	Pascrall	Taylor (MS)
Cannon	Hunter	Roukema	Lofgren	Pastor	Thompson (CA)
Castle	Hutchinson	Royce	Lowey	Payne	Thompson (MS)
Chabot	Hyde	Ryan (WI)	Lucas (KY)	Pelosi	Thurman
Chambliss	Isakson	Ryun (KS)	Luther	Peterson (MN)	Tierney
Chenoweth	Istook	Salmon	Maloney (CT)	Phelps	Towns
Coble	Jenkins	Sanford	Maloney (NY)	Pickett	Traficant
Coburn	Johnson (CT)	Scarborough	Markey	Pomeroy	Turner
Collins	Johnson, Sam	Schaffer	Martinez	Price (NC)	Udall (CO)
Combest	Jones (NC)	Sensenbrenner	Mascara	Rahall	Udall (NM)
Cook	Kasich	Sessions	Matsui	Rangel	Velazquez
Cooksey	Kelly	Shadegg	McCarthy (MO)	Rivers	Vento
Cox	King (NY)	Shaw	McCarthy (NY)	Rodriguez	Visclosky
Crane	Kingston	Shays	McDermott	Roemer	Waters
Cubin	Knollenberg	Sherwood	McGovern	Rothman	Watt (NC)
Cunningham	Kolbe	Shimkus	McIntyre	Royal-Allard	Waxman
Davis (VA)	Kuykendall	Shuster	McKinney	Rush	Weiner
Deal	LaHood	Simpson	McNulty	Sabo	Wexler
DeLay	Largent	Skeen	Meehan	Sanchez	Weygand
DeMint	Latham	Smith (MI)	Meek (FL)	Sanders	Wise
Diaz-Balart	LaTourette	Smith (NJ)	Meeks (NY)	Sandlin	Woolsey
Dickey	Lazio	Smith (TX)	Menendez	Sawyer	Wu
Doolittle	Leach	Souder	Millender-	Schakowsky	Wynn
Dreier	Lewis (CA)	Spence	McDonald	Scott	
Duncan	Lewis (KY)	Stearns	Miller, George	Serrano	
Dunn	Linder	Stump			
Ehlers	LoBiondo	Sununu			
Ehrlich	Lucas (OK)	Sweeney			
Emerson	Manzullo	Talent			
English	McCollum	Tancredo			
Everett	McCrary	Tauzin			
Ewing	McHugh	Taylor (NC)			
Fletcher	McInnis	Terry			
Foley	McIntosh	Thomas			
Forbes	McKeon	Thornberry			
Fossella	Metcalf	Thune			
Fowler	Mica	Tiaht			
Franks (NJ)	Miller (FL)	Toomey			
Frelinghuysen	Miller, Gary	Upton			
Gallegly	Moran (KS)	Walden			
Ganske	Myrick	Walsh			
Gekas	Nethercutt	Wamp			
Gibbons	Ney	Watkins			
Gilcrest	Northup	Watts (OK)			
Gillmor	Norwood	Weldon (FL)			
Gilman	Nussle	Weldon (PA)			
Goode	Ose	Weller			
Goodlatte	Oxley	Whitfield			
Goss	Packard	Wicker			
Graham	Paul	Wilson			
Granger	Pease	Wolf			
Green (WI)	Peterson (PA)	Young (AK)			
Greenwood	Petri	Young (FL)			

NAYS—203

Abercrombie	Clayton	Fattah	Aderholt	Bryant	Cox
Ackerman	Clement	Filner	Armeay	Burr	Crane
Allen	Clyburn	Ford	Bachus	Burton	Cubin
Andrews	Condit	Frank (MA)	Baker	Buyer	Cunningham
Baird	Conyers	Gejdenson	Hill (IL)	Ballenger	Davis (VA)
Baldacci	Costello	Gephart	DeFazio	Barry	Deal
Baldwin	Coyne	Gonzalez	Hillard	Calvert	DeLay
Barcia	Cramer	Gordon	Hinchey	Barrett (NE)	Barton
Barrett (WI)	Crowley	Green (TX)	Hinckley	Bilirakis	Campbell
Bentsen	Cummings	Gutierrez	Hill (OH)	Bliley	Bass
Berkley	Danner	Hastings (FL)	Holden	Blunt	Canady
Berman	Davis (FL)	Hastings (FL)	Holt	Boehlert	Bateman
Berry	Davis (IL)	Hill (IN)	Hooley	Jefferson	Cannon
Bishop	DeFazio	Hilliard	Hoyer	Johnson, E. B.	Bereuter
Blagojevich	DeGette	Hinchey	Inslee	Jackson (IL)	Biggert
Blumenauer	DeLauro	Hinojosa	Jackson-Lee	Jones (OH)	Bilirakis
Bonior	Deutsch	Hoeffel	(TX)	Kanjorski	Bliley
Borski	Dicks	Holden	Jefferson	Blunt	Cole
Boswell	Dingell	Holt	Johnson, E. B.	Boehlert	Coburn
Boucher	Dixon	Hooley	Jones (OH)	Bonilla	Collins
Boyd	Doggett	Hoyer	Farr	Bono	Combest
Brady (PA)	Dooley	Inslee		Brady (TX)	Cook
Brown (CA)	Doyle	Jackson (IL)			Cooksey
Brown (FL)	Edwards	Jackson-Lee			
Brown (OH)	Engel	(TX)			
Capuano	Eshoo	Jefferson			
Cardin	Etheridge	Johnson, E. B.			
Carson	Evans	Jones (OH)			
Clay	Farr	Kanjorski			

NOT VOTING—12

Becerra	Frost	Mollohan
Bilbray	Goodling	Morella
Capps	Gutknecht	Reyes
Delahunt	John	Saxton

□ 1308

Messrs. BISHOP, HOEFFEL and PAYNE changed their vote from "yea" to "nay."

So the previous question was ordered.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BURR of North Carolina). The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 218, noes 201, not voting 15, as follows:

[Roll No. 46]

AYES—218

Aderholt	Bryant	Cox
Armeay	Burr	Crane
Bachus	Burton	Cubin
Baker	Buyer	Cunningham
Bartlett	Callahan	Davis (VA)
Barton	Calvert	Deal
Bass	Camp	DeLay
Boehlert	Campbell	DeMint
Bonilla	Canady	Diaz-Balart
Bono	Cannon	Dickey
Brady (TX)	Castle	Doolittle
Bilirakis	Chabot	Dreier
Bliley	Chambliss	Duncan
Blunt	Chenoweth	Ehlers
Coble	Cole	Ehrlich
Coburn	Collins	Emerson
Collins	Combest	English
Cook	Cooksey	Everett
Cooksey		Ewing

Fletcher LaHood Royce Nadler Roybal-Allard Tauscher  
 Foley Largent Ryan (WI) Napolitano Rush Thompson (CA)  
 Forbes Latham Ryan (KS) Neal Sabo Thompson (MS)  
 Fossella LaTourette Salmon Oberstar Sanchez Thurman  
 Fowler Lazio Sanford Obey Sanders Tierney  
 Frank (MA) Leach Scarborough Olver Sandlin Towns  
 Franks (NJ) Lewis (CA) Schaffer Ortiz Sawyer Traficant  
 Frelinghuysen Lewis (KY) Sensenbrenner Owens Schakowsky Turner  
 Gallegly Linder Sessions Pallone Scott Udall (CO)  
 Ganske LoBiondo Shadegg Pascrell Serrano Udall (NM)  
 Gekas Lucas (OK) Shaw Pastor Sherman Velazquez  
 Gibbons Manzullo Shays Payne Shows Vento  
 Gilchrest McCollum Sherwood Pelosi Sisisky Visclosky  
 Gillmor McCrery Shimkus Peterson (MN) Skelton Waters  
 Gilman McHugh Shuster Phelps Slaughter Watt (NC)  
 Goode McInnis Simpson Pickett Smith (WA) Waxman  
 Goodlatte McIntosh Skeen Pomeroy Snyder Weiner  
 Goss McKeon Smith (MI) Price (NC) Spratt Wexler  
 Graham Metcalf Smith (NJ) Quinn Stabenow Weygand  
 Granger Mica Smith (TX) Rahall Stark Wise  
 Green (WI) Miller (FL) Souder Rangel Stenholm Woolsey  
 Greenwood Miller, Gary Spence Rivers Strickland Wu  
 Gutknecht Moran (KS) Stearns Rodriguez Stupak Wynn  
 Hall (TX) Myrick Stump Rothman Tanner  
 Hansen Nethercutt Sununu  
 Hastert Ney Sweeney  
 Hastings (WA) Northup Talent  
 Hayes Norwood Tancredo  
 Hayworth Nussle Tauzin  
 Hefley Ose Taylor (MS)  
 Herger Oxley Taylor (NC)  
 Hill (MT) Packard Terry  
 Hilleary Paul Thomas  
 Hobson Pease Thornberry  
 Hoekstra Peterson (PA) Thune  
 Hostettler Petri Tiahrt  
 Houghton Pickering Toomey  
 Hulshof Pitts Upton  
 Hutchinson Pombo Walden  
 Hyde Porter Walsh  
 Isakson Portman Wamp  
 Istook Pryce (OH) Watkins  
 Jenkins Radanovich Watts (OK)  
 Johnson (CT) Ramstad Weldon (FL)  
 Johnson, Sam Regula Weldon (PA)  
 Jones (NC) Reynolds Weller  
 Kasich Riley Whitfield  
 Kelly Roemer Wicker  
 King (NY) Rogan Wilson  
 Kingston Rogers Wolf  
 Knollenberg Rohrabacher Young (AK)  
 Kolbe Ros-Lehtinen Young (FL)  
 Kuykendall Roukema

## NOES—201

Abercrombie DeLauro Kildee Kilpatrick  
 Ackerman Deutsch Dicks Kind (WI)  
 Allen Dingell Kleczka  
 Andrews Dingell Dixon Klink  
 Baird Baldwin Doggett Kucinich  
 Baldacci Dooley Doyle LaFalce  
 Baldwin Doyle Edwards Lampson  
 Barcia Edwards Engel Larson  
 Barrett (WI) Eshoo Etheridge Lee  
 Bentsen Engel Evans Levin  
 Berkley Eshoo Evans Lewis (GA)  
 Berman Etheridge Farr Lipinski  
 Berry Evans Fattah LoFGren  
 Bishop Fattah Filner Lowey  
 Blagojevich Filner Ford Lucas (KY)  
 Blumenauer Ford Gejdenson Luther  
 Bonior Gejdenson Gephart Maloney (CT)  
 Borski Gephart Gonzalez Maloney (NY)  
 Boswell Gonzalez Gordon Markey  
 Boucher Gordon Green (TX)  
 Boyd Gordon Gutierrez Martinez  
 Brady (PA) Gordon Hall (OH)  
 Brown (CA) Hastings (FL) McCarthy (MO)  
 Brown (FL) Hastings (FL) McCarthy (NY)  
 Brown (OH) Hill (IN) McDermott  
 Capuano Hilliard McGovern  
 Cardin Hinchey Hinojosa McIntyre  
 Carson Hinchey Hoeffel McKinney  
 Clay Hinojosa Holden McNulty  
 Clayton Holden Holt Meehan  
 Clement Holden Hooley Meek (FL)  
 Clyburn Holt Hooley Meeks (NY)  
 Condit Hooley Hoyer Menendez  
 Conyers Hoyer Inslee Millender-  
 Costello Inslee Jackson (IL) McDonald  
 Coyne Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee Miller, George  
 Cramer Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Minge  
 Crowley (TX) Jefferson Mink  
 Cummings Minge Jones Moakley  
 Danner Johnson, E. B. Mink Moore  
 Davis (FL) Jones Moran (VA)  
 Davis (IL) Kanjorski Moran (VA)  
 DeFazio Kaptur Murtha  
 DeGette Kennedy Murtha

Nadler Napolitano Oberstar Sanchez Thurman  
 Ryan (WI) Ryan (KS) Sanford Obey Sanders Tierney  
 Salmon Sanford Olver Sandlin Towns  
 Oberstar Sanford Ortiz Sawyer Traficant  
 Sanchez Obey Olver Sandlin Towns  
 Thurman Sanders Ortiz Sawyer Traficant  
 Udall (CO) Sabo Ortiz Sawyer Traficant  
 Udall (NM) Serrano Pickett Smith (WA) Tierney  
 Sherman Pastor Pomeroy Snyder Vento  
 Velazquez Payne Shows Rodriguez Spratt Wexler  
 Shows Pomeroy Snyder Spratt Wexler  
 Vento Rodriguez Stupak Wexler  
 Weygand Rothman Tanner Wynn

## NOT VOTING—15

Archer Delahunt John  
 Bartlett Frost Mollohan  
 Becerra Goodling Morella  
 Bilbray Horn Reyes  
 Capps Hunter Saxon

## □ 1319

So the resolution was agreed to.  
 The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, regrettably I was unavoidably detained for rollcall votes 45 and 46. Had I been present, I would have voted "yes" on both rollcall votes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BURR of North Carolina). Pursuant to House Resolution 103 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the concurrent resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 42.

## □ 1322

## IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 42) regarding the use of United States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement, with Mr. THORNBERRY in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the concurrent resolution is considered as having been read the first time.

Under the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) will each control 1 hour.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to begin this historic debate on H. Con. Res. 42. The purpose of this resolution, which I introduced at the Speaker's request, is to afford an op-

portunity for the House to participate in a decision whether or not to deploy our armed forces to Kosovo to implement the peace agreement now being negotiated at Rambouillet, France. The Congress has not only a right but a constitutional responsibility with respect to deployments of our armed forces into potentially hostile situations and, along with the Speaker, I believe that debating and voting on this resolution is an appropriate way for the Congress to begin to carry out this responsibility.

Some Members of Congress have serious reservations about deploying U.S. Armed Forces to Kosovo as peacekeepers. Others strongly support the President's policy. In an effort to give the benefit of the doubt to our President, the text of this resolution does not criticize or oppose the proposed deployment to Kosovo. To the contrary, it states that "the President is authorized to deploy United States armed forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement."

The Speaker has stressed that this resolution is being offered without prejudice to the underlying question. We expect Members to vote their conscience on the resolution, in the solemn exercise of their responsibility as elected representatives of the American people. No one can deny that the debate now under way in this House is one of the most weighty questions a Congress can face: sending into harm's way, on foreign soil, our uniformed personnel who volunteered to be part of our Nation's military.

The administration has asserted that it believes it has the authority to send U.S. troops to Kosovo to enforce a peace plan without congressional approval. There are many in the House who disagree. Regardless of where our individual Members may stand on the role of the Congress in the deployment of our armed forces on foreign soil to undertake risky missions, it is undeniable that the President's hand will be strengthened when he seeks and obtains the assent of the Congress.

There are two observations on this prospective deployment, and I stress that we are debating this issue before it is fully developed in order to have a meaningful debate. First, this resolution is an authorization if the conditions are appropriate, that is, if and only if hostilities have ceased and if there is an agreement that has been accepted by both sides.

And, second, as Senator Bob Dole told our Committee on International Relations yesterday, "If we're not part of this agreement, there will not be an agreement." Senator Dole's point is that the Albanians of Kosovo believe that our Nation has to be present for them to accept the peace plan. We must recognize, also, the proportion of the burden that we will be accepting in sending our troops to Kosovo. Out of

some 30,000 total troops that are expected to guarantee the peace, our share will be only 15 percent. The Europeans will be doing the rest, and I think it is a fair distribution if the United States wants to continue to be considered the leader in the NATO alliance.

I would also point out that today's debate is not the last we will have regarding the U.S. role in Kosovo. There will be ample opportunities as events unfold in Kosovo for Members to introduce, to debate and to vote on measures regarding what the U.S. is doing and not doing in Kosovo. We need, however, to start this debate today and to demonstrate that the Congress is involved, that it should be involved, and that it can be involved responsibly in foreign policy questions of this nature.

Mr. Chairman, in our committee's hearings yesterday, we were also privileged to have Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick provide some of her acumen on complex foreign policy questions such as Kosovo. Ambassador Kirkpatrick pointed out that there is a risk in not paying attention to violence because it may seem to be disorganized, or its proponents remote or poorly armed. Ambassador Kirkpatrick went on to state that "violence can spread, not like dominoes but like putty because we don't think that it is dangerous." This was the attitude of European nations when Hitler moved into the Rhineland. If the conditions are appropriate and there are no hostilities, I am inclined to support the deployment of our forces to Kosovo. I will vote for this measure in its present form in order to preserve human life. I am confident that this House over the next several hours will conduct a debate that will be remembered as one of the higher points of this 106th Congress, where our Members do the work that they have been entrusted to do by the American people. Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I ask that each one of our colleagues follow the debate closely and vote their conscience on this measure.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. As I said earlier, I do not think we should be here today. As a general practice, I think the Congress ought to execute its authority based on a concluded agreement, not taking action prior to having any understanding what the parameters of the agreement will be in that region or anywhere else. It would be akin to voting on treaties before they were drafted. If the leadership of this body were running the Senate, I imagine the next time we had a nuclear missile proliferation treaty or other arms control treaty, the Senate would either approve them or reject them before the ink was even on the page.

□ 1330

But we are here now, and we have taken this fateful step. The lives of

men, women and children in the region will depend on the actions we take, and again I would like to briefly review a little history.

A previous administration said this was a European problem, let the Europeans solve it. Over 200,000 men, women and children died, entire villages were exterminated, a level of atrocity not seen since World War II or Cambodia occurred in the heart of Europe.

When the committee called in witnesses, they brought in the majority's best: Senator Dole, who deserves great credit for actually going to the region on behalf of the administration to try to argue for the peace plan. Senator Dole testified that if we fail to act today, it will be likely that we will fail to achieve peace. He wanted to put this vote off, but he said:

"If you have this vote, make sure you pass it, because if you do not pass it, you will undermine the possibility of peace in the region."

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said the same thing.

The only witness brought forth that day to argue the opposite proposition was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and even he said that he would be very careful to take his previous editorial comments as an excuse to vote against this resolution. Even he understood the importance of not undermining our negotiators as they try to achieve the goal to stop murder in the region.

This is not a question about whether we trust the President or we trust the Secretary of State's agreement. We do not have an agreement before us.

So I would hope we would accept some amendments that give the Congress time to reflect but that support the policy that we have initiated, that we continue to support America's power to save lives and bring peace to this region of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WOLF).

(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I was in Kosovo 2 weeks ago. It was my second trip there since 1995. I rise in support of the resolution. I will stipulate the administration has not done a good job on educating and conferring with the Congress, nor has it done a good job of telling the American people what the mission is. However, if there is an agreement in France, I support the deployment of American troops because I believe without U.S. participation it will not work.

I spoke to one person over there. I said, "How many American soldiers do you need?"

He said, "At least one, and he has to be out in front because without America's involvement it will not take place."

Two hundred thousand people died in Bosnia. Were it not for the Sarajevo

market slaughter, we would not have gotten involved then, and since our participation nobody has died and it is working.

This is the 50th anniversary of NATO. NATO leaders from all the world will come here to celebrate the working of NATO, and how can they celebrate the working of NATO if NATO forces go into Kosovo if there is an agreement and the Americans do not participate in it?

George Will wrote in *Newsweek* where he said:

If NATO cannot stop massacres in the center of Europe, it cannot long continue as an instrument of collective security against Wye. Given how well things have gone in the last 50 years on the continent, wherein the preceding 35 years things went wrong at such cost in American blood and treasure, do Americans want the risk, arising tide of anarchy?

It is important, if there is going to be a NATO, and what we are voting on today is not only troops with regard to Kosovo if there is an agreement, we are in essence today, whether we like it or not, voting on the vitality and the future of NATO.

In closing, if there is a lasting peace though in this region, it is important that we do everything we can to see that President Milosevic is removed from power. A just and permanent way for him to step down must be found. The longer he remains, the longer the turmoil and unrest and killing will continue in Eastern Europe.

It is not an easy vote, but in the Bible in Luke it says to whom much is given much is expected, and in one verse it says to whom much is given much is required. We have been blessed in this country with peace and prosperity. NATO has been a success, NATO has worked, NATO is important, and with the 50th anniversary coming up to say that NATO will participate in Kosovo if there is an agreement, and I stipulate, but the United States will not participate, will basically be the first nail in the coffin in the death of NATO.

So with great reluctance stipulating the administration has not treated our troops fairly with regard to benefits and pay and they have been weakened, and also they have not made the case, I support the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 42, a resolution authorizing the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo. I support the resolution, although imperfect, in its current form. I do so reluctantly. I do not believe President Clinton has made a credible case to the American people or to the Congress about the need for this deployment. I urge him to do so and do so quickly. We will, after all, be sending America's young men and women into harm's way and the people deserve to know "why."

Two weeks ago I visited Kosovo to get a first-hand glimpse into the current conflict. I met with representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK), Serb government officials, NGO representatives and U.S. Ambassador William Walker, the head of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) mission in Pristina. I also had the chance to talk to members of the KLA army, many of them everyday people, farmers, storekeepers, workers and such who were driven to the KLA by the constant, brutal action of the Serbs.

I am submitting a copy of my trip report for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. It contains my observations and recommendations regarding the Kosovo conflict.

I have concluded that if there is a signed peace agreement in Rambouillet, it will be necessary to commit troops to the Kosovo peace effort. It is only with the greatest reluctance that I support the deployment of American troops abroad, but I believe that without U.S. troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is both the leader of the world and of NATO. If NATO is involved, we must be part of the effort or it will not succeed.

This year is the 50th anniversary of NATO. The anniversary will be celebrated with events in Washington and elsewhere in the United States. Kosovo will be a big test for this important alliance. The U.S. has always been the leader of NATO and we should not shy away from our commitment now. If we refuse to become part of the NATO effort in Kosovo, it could only further embolden Serb President Slobodan Milosevic and dim the prospects for reaching a lasting, peaceful settlement. The fighting will continue and more people, including many women and children, will lose their lives. I agree with the words of Bob Kagan in the Weekly Standard of March 1, 1999. He says the practical effect of opposing U.S. involvement "would be to reinforce Milosevic's conviction that NATO, and particularly the United States, does not have the stomach to take him on."

George Will wrote in Newsweek on March 1, ". . . if NATO cannot stop massacres in the center of Europe, it cannot long continue as an instrument of collective security against . . . what? Given how well things have gone in the last 50 years on the continent where in the preceding 35 years things went so wrong, at such cost in American blood and treasure, do Americans want to risk a rising tide of anarchy?" I agree with this thoughts.

However, I do not believe the Clinton administration has made a credible case for U.S. involvement in Kosovo to the American people nor do I believe that this administration has done a good job taking care of our men and women in uniform who, at personal risk, have been carrying out our policy in Bosnia, in Iraq, in Haiti, in South Korea, on our high seas and "wherever the U.S." needs its strength. We have drawdown troops to a level now insufficient to meet today's needs. Many troops go from one deployment to another without time to be home with their families. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not being treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo of operations is too high (we just need a larger military force to face the tasks they have been given) and we are not giving our first class military men and women the tools they need to do the job.

I want to emphasize that there are no better soldiers anywhere in the world and the morale of our troops is high. But they are not being treated fairly.

If the troops are to be deployed to Kosovo, we must give them strong political leadership and a clear mission. We also must be sure that Americans soldiers, airmen, seamen and

marines are given the resources they need to carry out their ever increasing number of missions around the world. It's not enough to pass a resolution. Congress must ensure that the resources available for the American military are there for them to carry out the growing number of missions the military is being called upon to carry out.

We also must do more than we have done in Bosnia to build a lasting peace. While our military effort in Bosnia has been successful, thanks to the commitment and skill of American troops, the civilian side of the effort has fallen far short. We have failed so far to bring about reconciliation among the ethnic factions. An interdependent society enhanced by an effective marketplace and economic trade system has not gotten off the ground. For example, three years after the Dayton accord, the railroad in Bosnia does not yet operate.

We must learn lessons from Bosnia and help create a working regional government in Kosovo that effectively represents and is accountable to the people and contributes to the creation of a viable economy. We also must ensure that a new Kosovo government has effective civilian oversight over the military and that KLA forces are disarmed and brought under civilian command. Without strong civilian control, the KLA could get out of hand.

Most importantly, lasting peace may not occur in the Balkans while Serbian President Slobodan Milesovic is in power. A just and permanent way for him to step down must be found. The longer he remains, the longer turmoil, unrest and killing will continue in eastern Europe.

It is never an easy decision for a Member of Congress to decide to vote in favor of sending American men and women into a possibly dangerous situation. I believe, however, that once a peace agreement is reached—if it is reached—deploying NATO troops to the region to keep the peace, prevent the conflict from spreading and prevent destabilizing refugee outflows into neighboring countries is the only way to ensure stability in Europe. Stability in Europe is in the best interest of the United States.

STATEMENT BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF, REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE BALKANS KOSOVO: THE LATEST BALKAN HOT SPOT, FEBRUARY 13-18, 1999

This report provides details of my trip to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo during mid-February, 1999. This visit occurred during the time the Serb-Kosovo Albanian peace conference was taking place in Rambouillet, France, and ended only a few days before the contact group's initially imposed deadline to reach agreement of February 20. There is every indication that the U.S. will be concerned with Kosovo for some time to come and it was important to have a clear, first-hand view of conditions there.

I have, for many years, had a deep interest in the Balkans and concern for the people who live there. I have traveled numerous times to the region. There has been hostility, unrest and turmoil for hundreds of years. It has been said that there is too much history for these small countries to bear. If this is so, it has never been more true than today.

During this trip, I spent one day in Tirana, Albania, where I met with the U.S. Ambassador Marissa Lino and her embassy staff; Albanian President Meidani; Prime Minister Majko; cabinet ministers; the Speaker and other members of parliament; religious leaders, and heads of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) active there.

I spent parts of two days in Skopje, Macedonia, where I met with embassy Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'affaires Paul Jones; Political Officer Charles Stonecipher; members of the Macedonian parliament; former Prime Minister and President of the Social Democratic Union (opposition political party) Branko Crvenkovski; American soldiers assigned to United Nations forces guarding the Macedonia-Kosovo border, and the commander and men of the NATO Kosovo verification and extraction forces as well as representatives of NGOs in Macedonia.

In Kosovo for a day and a half, I met with head of mission Ambassador William Walker and senior adviser to ethnic Albanian elected President Ibrahim Rugova, Professor Alush Gashi. I also met with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) spokesman Adem Demaci (who previously spent 26 years in Serb prisons) and senior Serbian representative in Kosovo, Zoran Andelkovic. Other meetings included NGO representatives, head of the Kosovo office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other officials and representatives. Our understanding and most able escort was State Department Foreign Service Officer Ronald Capps. We also stopped at a Serb police barracks and met with the officer in charge. We met individual members of the KLA and with a number of individual Kosovars who had returned to their villages after having been driven out by Serb attacks. Some villages were largely destroyed and remain mostly deserted.

The fate of Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, which border one another, is interrelated. Albania has a population of about two million people. Macedonia's population of two million includes about one third ethnic Albanian. About 90 percent of the nearly two million people in Kosovo are also ethnic Albanian.

Kosovo is the southernmost province of present-day Serbia and has a centuries long history of conflict, turbulence and hatred. By 1987 Serbian dominance in the region had been established. Slobodan Milosevic was President and ethnic Albanian participation in government was virtually nonexistent.

In response, ethnic Albanians in 1991 formed a shadow government complete with president, parliament, tax system and schools. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president and has since worked for Kosovo independence through peaceful means.

By the mid-1990, the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo had grown to nearly 90 percent as human rights conditions continued to go down hill with the Serbs in total control of police and the army. Many, if not most, individual Serbs also have weapons as opposed to ethnic Albanians for whom possessing a gun is against strictly enforced law. Beatings, harassment and brutality toward ethnic Albanians became commonplace, particularly in villages and smaller towns.

In 1996 the shadowy, separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) surfaced for the first time, claiming responsibility for bombings in southern Yugoslavia. KLA efforts intensified over the next several years, government officials and alleged ethnic Albanian collaborators were killed. The Serbian government cracked down and violence has escalated since.

I met with a number of KLA members. Most of them are everyday people, farmers, storekeepers, workers and such who were driven to the KLA by the constant brutal action of the Serbs. There are, no doubt, some bad people in the KLA including thugs, gangsters and smugglers, but most are motivated by a hunger for independence. Still, it must be recognized that some acts of terrorism have been committed by the KLA.

Conditions in Kosovo continued to deteriorate and alarm the international community. In October 1998, under threat of NATO air strikes, Serbian President Milosevic made commitments to implement terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199 to end violence in Kosovo, partially withdraw Serbian forces, open access to humanitarian relief organizations (NGOs), cooperate with war crimes investigators and progress toward a political settlement.

As part of this commitment, in order to verify compliance, President Milosevic agreed to an on-scene verification mission by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO surveillance of Kosovo by non-combatant aircraft. These activities are in progress and NATO has deployed a small extraction force in next door Macedonia. I visited with each of these groups.

However, conditions in Kosovo have not stabilized and more have been killed. Finally, a contact group with members from the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Germany issued an ultimatum to the sides to reach a peace accord by February 20, 1999. NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia were threatened if Belgrade did not comply.

The Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture and their orthodox religion and are not willing to give it up. I visited the Field of Blackbirds where the Serbs battled for and lost control of the region in 1389. I also visited a Monastery dating back to 1535 that is an important part of Serb history.

The Clinton administration, which does not favor independence for Kosovo, worries this conflict could spread if NATO does not intervene and could even involve Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. While this is of concern, there are other reasons for the U.S. to remain active. The U.S. can never stand by and allow genocide to take place. Part of the effort, once a peace agreement between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians has been signed, could include a NATO ground force in Kosovo containing a contingent of U.S. troops.

It is clear that a main pipeline for arms reaching ethnic Albanians in Kosovo is across the Albania-Kosovo border and any stabilization effort will likely include shutting off this arms route. It has been suggested that an effective arms blockade could be accomplished by the Italian government from the Albanian side of the border with Kosovo.

A number of issues must be addressed before the outcome of this conflict can be predicted. Principal among these is the likely strength and stability of an ethnic Albanian led Kosovo government. Another is the economic potential of a stand-alone Kosovo, free from Serbia. Also important is what will be the future of the KLA? Will they give up their arms? Many in the KLA say "no". Could an independent Kosovo make it on its own? Political ability has not been demonstrated. Economic development help from the private sector in the West may not be immediately forthcoming. How would they be propped up? How will long term cross border hatred between Serbs and ethnic Albanians be kept in check? Who is going to foot the bill for all this? European nations?

How and by whom will the issue of war crimes be addressed? A terrible job on this issue has been done in Bosnia. Known war criminals have not been pursued after more than three years. Reconciliation is an important ingredient to lasting peace but terrible acts have been committed and justice must be served. The principal perpetrator of injustice and brutality has been Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. What about him?

The White House and the present administration are deserving of some sharp criticism

for allowing conditions to get where they are today.

There appear to be few lessons this administration has learned from the painful experience of Bosnia. Our government waited too long to get involved and, once engaged, has been somewhat ineffective. Too many died in Bosnia during this delay. While committing troops to the region for one year (now over three years with no end in sight) has indeed halted killing, at least temporarily, Bosnia is no further along toward peaceful self sufficiency than when troops arrive. Rather, it is as though there is merely a pause in time. If our troops leave, hostility and brutality would likely resume. Little infrastructure is being created. Railroads are not running. Little economic development or growth is emerging. No lasting plan for peace has been developed and no interdependent community has been created which would make undesirable, a return to conflict. Little has been done to bring about reconciliation.

Meanwhile, as we look at our overall U.S. military capabilities throughout the world, we see that this administration has drawn down U.S. military strength to the level where there are now insufficient forces to meet today's needs. When I met with our soldiers in the Balkan region I found many who have gone from one deployment to another without time to be home with their families. The troopers I met on the Kosovo border are assigned to a battalion on its third deployment in three years.

There are no better soldiers anywhere in the world than these and their morale is high. They are ready to do what is expected of them and more. But they are not being treated fairly. Pay and benefits have been allowed to deteriorate. The tempo of operations has grown to the point where they have too little time at home. There are just not sufficient forces to do all the things they are expected to do. According to the February 17, Washington Post, the Secretary of the Army's answer is to lower standards and recruit high school drop-outs. Turning his back on history, this official has unwisely decided upon another social experiment rather than dealing fairly with the shortfall.

From 1990 to 1998 the armed forces went from 18 active army divisions to eight. The navy battle force went from 546 ships to 346. Air force fighter wings decreased from 36 to 30. Discretionary defense budget outlays will decrease 31 percent in the ten years beginning 1990. Service chiefs predict FY 1999 ammunition shortages for the army of \$1.7B and \$193M for the marines. These statistics are just the tip of the iceberg. There is compelling evidence that, in the face of a huge increase in troop deployments (26 group deployments between 1991 and 1998 by the Army's own count), this administration has not made the investment to give our fighting men and women the tools to do the job asked of them.

The fact that the men and women in uniform are bending to their task is to their credit, but it is past time to give them what they need and stop driving them into the ground. The White House must face up to this shortfall and address the issue of where the money to pay for our involvement is to come from. They have not yet done so and time is short.

A strong NATO involvement, with solid U.S. participation, will be an important part of any workable solution to this mess. There is a story making the rounds of NATO forces where an American general, about to depart the region asks his NATO counterpart how many U.S. troops must remain to ensure safety and success of the mission. The NATO commander responds, "Only one, but he must be at the very front". This is only a story told in good humor but it makes the

point that U.S. presence is key—perhaps vital.

It is not without irony that the one key player omitted from the contact group meetings in France is a NATO representative. The irony deepens when the presence on the contact group of chronic problem-makes Russia and France is noted.

Frankly, the U.S. Congress has also had too little involvement in this Balkan process. The administration has done and continues to do a poor job in dealing with these issues. Consultation with the Congress does not appear to have been a major concern to the White House. While foreign policy is largely the prerogative of the President, American lives are being placed at risk in a far-off land and untold dollars are being committed to this effort. Congress has a role and must participate in this debate. Congressional hearings to explore all aspects of this situation are in order.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. If there is a signed peace agreement in Rambouillet, it could be necessary to commit U.S. troops to the Kosovo peace effort. I make this recommendation with reluctance but, without U.S. troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is both the leader of the world and of NATO. If NATO is involved, we must be a part of the effort or it will fail. NATO's 50th anniversary is later this spring and there will be a large celebration in the U.S. Kosovo will be a big test for this important alliance.

2. There are many differences between the situation existing several years ago in Bosnia and what is happening today in Kosovo. Still, thousands died in Bosnia including too many women and children before NATO troops including a large contingent of U.S. soldiers moved in and put an end to the killing. Had not NATO peacekeepers acted over three years ago, the killing might still be going on today. Without the commitment of U.S. troops, a NATO peacekeeping intervention might not even have been attempted. We may wish this were not so, but it is. Perhaps things can change in the future but this is today's reality.

3. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not being treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo of operations is far too high (we just need a larger military force to face the tasks they have been given) and we are not giving our first class military men and women the tools they need to do the job. The administration needs to take better care of our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Congress should force this issue.

4. Special attention must be paid to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). While many, perhaps most, are common people whose interest is defending their families, their homes and themselves, the army is not without a rogue element. There is no clearly established and proven civilian government and there is no line of authority/responsibility between the KLA and a representative government. Without control, the KLA could get out of hand.

5. When peacekeepers arrive in Kosovo, one of their first tasks must be to disarm the KLA. Many in the KLA have said they will not give up their weapons. An armed KLA will be a time bomb in the way of progress toward peace. Providing safeguards for Serbs in Kosovo is an important part of the peace process.

6. Efforts thus far to build a lasting peace in Bosnia have come up short. Not only must more be done there but the lessons learned must be applied to Kosovo. The military presence in Bosnia has done the job of ending killing and brutality as it likely will in Kosovo, but the peace-building effort of reconciliation and creating an interdependent

society and effective marketplace and economic trade system has not gotten off the ground.

7. Lasting peace in the Balkans will not occur while Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is in power. A just and permanent way for him to step down must be found. The longer he remains, the longer turmoil, unrest and killing will continue in eastern Europe.

8. American and other workers and officials of all nations present in Kosovo (diplomats, United Nations, NGOs, contract workers, humanitarian care-givers and others) are true heroes. They risk their lives daily to make life a little better for the people in Kosovo and we should all pray for them. I happened to see a warning sign posted in a U.N. office talking about mines. In part, it said, "There is strong evidence to suggest some police posts have had anti-personnel mines placed near them. . . . All staff are asked to be extremely cautious when in the vicinity . . ." Yet these men and women go about their daily duties with dedication and care for others in spite of the harm that is just a step away.

9. The foreign policy of this administration continues to come up short and is deserving of sharp criticism. America is the one remaining superpower and, like it or not, must assume this responsibility. Unfolding events continue to point to the absence of a coherent idea of what to do and how to do it. While we should have already developed a peace-making strategy and an exit strategy, the participants at Rambouillet remain unable to even get things started.

10. President Clinton has done a poor job of making the case to the American people for U.S. involvement in this conflict which also has a significant moral aspect to it. While the U.S. cannot be involved all over the world, we are a member of NATO which deals with peace and stability in Europe. Kosovo is a part of Europe and its destabilization could create a huge refugee population there. Fighting could even break out elsewhere if this issue is not dealt with early and effectively. America has been blessed with peace and prosperity. In the Bible, it says that to whom much is given, much is expected and there is an obligation on our part to be a participant in the search for solutions in this troubled spot.

11. I would like to conclude on a personal note to thank all of those who assisted me on this mission. I am especially grateful to U.S. Ambassador Marisa Lino and her staff, foreign service officer Charles Stonecipher who assisted me in Macedonia, foreign service officer Ron Capps whose knowledge and concern was of great help in Kosovo and U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike Prendergast who traveled with me. I appreciate their invaluable assistance.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. BAIRD).

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding this time to me. I am speaking to my colleagues today on a matter of deep personal importance to me. For 3 years my family and I hosted a young Bosnian student. His name is Namik, and when he was 14 years old he was running through his village when a Serbian mortar shell landed next to him and blew his left leg off just below the hip. For 3 years I worked with Namik, kept him in our home as my own son taught him to climb and to kayak so that he could have a normal life. But for 3 years I helped him deal

with what it is like to be a young man who has lost a leg in a war that was not his fault.

When we talk about this issue, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about human lives, we are talking about NATO, and we are talking about standing up to genocide and standing up to tyranny. Mr. Milosevic is a sociopath. He is bloodthirsty, he does not respect basic tenets of human dignity and morality. If a sociopath were holding hostages, and he had a police scanner and heard that the police were debating about whether or not to send in officers to put a stop to what he was trying to do, we know what would happen to those hostages: they would be killed. Mr. Milosevic has got to be stopped.

I urge my colleagues for the sake of Namik, for the sake of the future of NATO, for the sake of the future of our country and for the sake of stability in Europe and peace internationally, please pass this resolution. Do not undermine the President at this time, do not allow the killing to continue in the Balkans.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington for his support for this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. KELLY).

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.Con.Res. 42, a resolution which supports the deployment of U.S. troops in support of a NATO peacekeeping effort in Kosovo. The reason we need to support this legislation today and the reason why we should resist weakening amendments is the simple fact that NATO peacekeepers, supported by U.S. troops, represent our last and best chance for a workable peace in this very troubled land.

I would also add that if we are to maintain any credibility within NATO, we have an obligation to support this vital peacekeeping mission.

Mr. Chairman, I visited the former Yugoslavia on two separate occasions in recent years, and I have had the opportunity to visit Rambouillet recently, to observe the peace talks firsthand and to talk with the participants. Let me be very clear about this. I believe the only peace that will occur in Kosovo is one that is enforced by NATO. Serbian strong man Slobodan Milosevic has shown us time and time again that he does not recognize international law, he does not respond to international appeals for peace, and the experience has demonstrated that he does not always respect prior peace agreements. What he does respect and what he does respond to is the very real threat of force.

NATO peacekeepers are the only safeguard that will put a stop to the killing in Kosovo and the only thing that will prevent further violence down the road.

I cannot over emphasize how sensitive the point at which we now find ourselves in these negotiations is and that the failure of this resolution

would deal a potentially fatal blow to the peace effort. Indications are that absent a peace agreement both sides are preparing for a major escalation of fighting in the spring, and as always in this case, it will be the innocent civilians who are once again suffering the horrifying consequences.

Mr. Chairman, a considerable amount of time and effort has been put into this peace effort, and the stakes could not be higher. Success means an end to the fighting, an end to the killing and an end to the destruction of entire villages and towns.

Ultimately we have all witnessed on the evening news the price that failure has brought to the people of Kosovo. Thousands have been killed, and tens of thousands turned into homeless refugees.

Peace is at hand if we have the wisdom and the courage to see this through.

I strongly urge my colleagues to send a message to both sides that the United States is committed to the peace process and, with that message, the assurance that we will stand by our commitments to NATO.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this resolution, but I seriously question the Republican leadership's timing in bringing this measure to the floor for debate while negotiations are still underway. I believe a fractious congressional debate about whether or not to support implementation of a peace agreement at such a critical juncture in the negotiations seriously undermines our ability to negotiate a settlement and place directly into the hands of Mr. Milosevic. We must, as a Congress, show that we are committed to peace in the former Yugoslavia and working with our allies in NATO towards that common goal.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. RYUN).

Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, the United States Armed Forces are being stretched too thin. They have been asked to take on peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and now possibly Kosovo. President Clinton told Congress and the Nation that the United States deployment to Bosnia in 1995 would be over in 1 year. However, the mission in Bosnia has continued for 4 years with no strategic exit plan in sight and, at a cost to the United States at \$10 billion, not only are their peacekeeping missions costly, but they are degrading to the overall readiness of our fighting forces.

Mr. Chairman, 2,200 troops from the 24th Marine expeditionary unit currently stationed aboard the Navy ships in the Mediterranean will be part of the initial force moving into Kosovo as soon as an agreement is reached between ethnic Albanians and the Serbian government. However that unit is

headed into its final month of a 6-month deployment and scheduled to be home in North Carolina by May 1. To be home by that time the unit will have to leave Kosovo no later than mid-April.

Mr. Chairman, that leaves the administration with limited options, the most prominent one being extending the length of the unit's deployment. How long will this unit be there? How much longer will they be away from their families and beyond their expected 6-month deployment?

Mr. Chairman, for America's Armed Forces to sustain this administration's peacekeeping pace the forces must be augmented by an increased amount of part-time Reserve and National Guard personnel. Not only are Reserve and National Guard personnel being forced to leave their families more often, but they are also being asked to increase the amount of time and technical knowledge taken away from their careers here in the United States. These military personnel are being forced to explain open end deployments to their employers who are becoming less willing to continually lose their skilled employees.

Mr. Chairman, to be able to keep these individuals in the Reserve and National Guard we must continue to send them into peacekeeping situations around the globe. In the future, when the Reserve and National Guard personnel have the opportunity to leave military service, they will choose their family quality of life and their career over serving their country. A Kosovo peacekeeping mission will place a heavy burden on America's Armed Forces and compromise their readiness levels, the quality of life of their families and the national security of the United States. We cannot and must not continue to ask our military to do more with less.

Mr. Chairman, before the administration decides to deploy troops to Kosovo, I ask that they lay out their plan and details to Congress.

Mr. Chairman, before the Administration decides to deploy troops to Kosovo, I ask that they lay out their plan in detail to Congress. The administration should not be able to put the men and women of our armed forces in harm's way without explaining their reasons for doing so.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS).

(Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H. Con. Res. 42, legislation to authorize U.S. involvement in peacekeeping actions in Kosovo.

This debate is about how we see our role in the world. Do we want to be involved? Do we want to be an active part of the NATO alliance? Do we want to export our values of democracy? Do we want to be in a position to influence world events? Because, if we do, we

have to be active even when the direct benefit to the United States is difficult to discern and most certainly when we can discern that genocide may occur.

□ 1345

A secure and stable Europe is of great concern to the United States. We have fought two major wars of this century, both on the continent of Europe and both because Europe was completely destabilized by tyrannical despots and weak economies.

If we weaken the contact group alliance that has worked on this matter, as well as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, efforts on the ground, by defeating this resolution, it will surely stoke the fires of instability in Europe.

If our allies cannot count on us, they will surely stop looking to us for leadership and our influence will wane.

I talked to a colleague of mine in the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, who is the Chair of the first committee on which I served. His name is Bruce George and he is a member of the British Parliament and is their defense expert. He said if we fail today to support this resolution, it will be short of catastrophic.

Yesterday Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said that if we do not support this resolution, we will regret it. I suggest to this body that we cannot stand idly by and watch children maimed, autonomy destroyed and a people who are seeking no more than freedom, an opportunity to gain the same.

Support this resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. BEREUTER), the distinguished vice chairman of our Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I rise in opposition to the resolution. I want to drop back, though, to some of the debate that took place on the rule. The minority leader came here and suggested it was inappropriate for us to be debating this resolution at this time. That was also voiced by the ranking minority member of the House International Relations Committee here today, and by others.

As the gentleman from New York (Chairman GILMAN) said, unfortunately debating the issue before the situation fully developed is important for Congress to have a meaningful role.

I want to remind my colleagues what happened in Somalia where without any consultation we saw the Administration move from protecting the people involved in the deliveries of food to a nation-building process. It was classic mission creep. I want to remind Members what happened in the formulation of the Dayton Accords when, in fact, we were told by the Administration "do not do anything, it might upset these delicate negotiations ongoing in Dayton."

Then what happened? Before Congress had any opportunity express its view or to have a role, before the Dayton Accords were actually signed, troops were on the way to Bosnia and we were locked in. Then what were we told? What we had been told before, we have to support our troops, our men and women in the field, and Congress was cut out of the process.

Here we are in another similar situation, but what we have here is very different. What we have here is an invasion by the United States and NATO of a sovereign country. Kosovo is an autonomous region within Serbia.

This Member has previously voiced, and still has enormous difficulties for many reasons, with the proposal for a peace keeping, I would have to call it a peace enforcement, plan in Kosovo. Chief among them is the Member's reservation that the President is ready to act outside the U.S. Constitution to engage uninvited U.S. combat forces in an internal conflict in a country which is not a threat to the United States.

The U.S. Constitution clearly limits his authority to place U.S. Armed Forces in hostile situations, but can do so only in response to a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or its armed forces.

The more extreme measure of launching unprovoked air strikes against Serbia, a sovereign country for which I have little respect in terms of their leadership, who have committed extraordinary atrocities in Kosovo, nevertheless the Administration proposal to deploy troops to Kosovo is tantamount to a declaration of war against Serbia.

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution specifically grants war declaration authority exclusively to the Congress. The President's commitment to deploy our troops into a hostile and foreign territory of Kosovo cannot be considered a defensive measure that falls under his authority.

What is going to happen? If we ever have a peace agreement on Kosovo, it will be coerced and it will have to be an enforced peace—for who knows how long. We have an Administration which has threatened, imagine this, if you do not sign, Mr. Milosevic, we are going to bomb you.

I suppose we are going to bomb the KLA, too. How does one find the KLA to bomb? How does one enforce peace on that side?

Let me ask some questions about the current peace proposal. We have one party somewhat bound to the U.S., the other bound by the threat of U.S. force.

Many questions need to be addressed: By what means are we going to protect the Kosovars? Who will police the borders? How will we neutralize the danger of Kosovo expansion when it has no international status? What is the political objective? (Autonomy is not the destination sought by the Albanians.) How do we handle the relationship of the Albanians in Kosovo with those in the surrounding region? What are the rules of engagement? What is the concept of how it will end?

Under what authority can NATO "invade" a country in this matter?

Moreover, the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to enjoy the support of the parties for a long period of time. For Serbia, acquiescing under the threat of NATO bombardment, it involves nearly unprecedented international intercession. Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, is being asked to cede control and in time sovereignty of a province containing its national shrines to foreign military force.

Though President Slobodan Milosevic has much to answer for, especially in Bosnia, he is less the cause of the conflict in Kosovo than an expression of it. On the need to retain Kosovo, Serbian leaders—including Milosevic's domestic opponents—seem united. For Serbia, current NATO policy means either dismemberment of the country or postponement of the conflict to a future date when, according to the NATO proposal, the future of the province will be decided.

The same attitude governs the Albanian side. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is fighting for independence, not autonomy. The KLA is certain to try to use the cease-fire to expel the last Serbian influences from the province and drag its feet on giving up its arms. And if NATO resists, it may come under attack itself—perhaps from both sides. What is described by the administration as a "strong peace agreement" is likely to be at best the overture to another, far more complicated set of conflicts.

Ironically, the projected peace agreement increases the likelihood of the various possible escalations sketched by the President as justification for a U.S. deployment. An independent Albanian Kosovo surely would seek to incorporate the neighboring Albanian minorities—mostly in Macedonia and FYROM—and perhaps Albania itself. And a Macedonian conflict would land us precisely back in the Balkan wars of earlier in this century. Will Kosovo then become the premise for a semi-permanent NATO move into Macedonia just as the deployment in Bosnia is invoked as justification for the move into Kosovo? Is NATO to be the home for a whole series of Balkan NATO protectorates?

In Bosnia, the exit strategy can be described. The existing dividing lines can be made permanent. Failure to do so will require their having to be manned indefinitely unless we change our objective to self-determination and permit each ethnic group to decide its own fate. In Kosovo, that option does not exist. There are no ethnic dividing lines, and both sides claim the entire territory. America's attitude toward the Serbs' attempts to insist on their claim has been made plain enough; it is the threat of bombing. But how do we and NATO react to the Albanian transgressions and irredentism? Are we prepared to fight both sides and for how long? In the face of issues such as these, the unity of the contact group of powers acting on behalf of NATO is likely to dissolve. Russia surely will increasingly emerge as the supporter of the Serbian point of view.

The President's statements "that we can make a difference" and that "America symbolizes hope and resolve" are exhortations, not policy prescription. This is bumper sticker foreign policy. Is NATO to become the artillery to end ethnic conflict? If Kosovo, why not intervention in East Africa or Central Asia? And would a doctrine of universal humanitarian

intervention reduce or increase suffering by intensifying ethnic and religious conflict? What are the limits of such a policy and by what criteria is it established? In Henry Kissinger's view, that line should be drawn at American ground forces for Kosovo. Europeans never tire of stressing the need for greater European autonomy. Here is an occasion to demonstrate it. If Kosovo presents a security problem, it is to Europe, largely because of the refugees the conflict might generate. Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe—and we never asked for NATO support here. The nearly 300 million Europeans should be able to generate the ground forces to deal with the problems for 2.3 million Kosovars. To symbolize Allied unity on larger issues, we should provide logistics, intelligence and air support. But I see no need for U.S. ground forces; leadership should not be interpreted to mean that we must do everything ourselves.

Again, paraphrasing Henry Kissinger, he said in opposing ground troops in Kosovo that: Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North Korea. The psychological drain may be even more grave. Each time we make a peripheral deployment, the administration is constrained to insist that the danger to American forces is minimal—the Kosovo deployment is officially described as a "peace implementation force." Such comments have two unfortunate consequences: They increase the impression among Americans that military force can be used casualty-free, and they send a signal of weakness to potential enemies.

#### MILITARY READINESS

Where will the money be coming from to support Kosovo deployment? Will it be pulled from readiness accounts? As recently as Monday, March 8, in an HASC hearing that included Maj. Gen. Larry R. Ellis, the 1st Armored Division commander (Germany based division now with troops in Bosnia and FYROM), five other flag officers, and a group of mid-grade and senior noncommissioned officers, readiness was described as "a rubber band that is stretched very, very tight." While military strength has drawn down, deployments have picked up steadily and there aren't enough people to do the job. Across the board, readiness is wearing dangerously thin.

A former militaryman described the plight of the mid-career professional soldier this way:

"They are sent to far-off places with inadequate support, pointless missions and foolish rules of engagement so the cocktail party set back in D.C. can have their consciences feel good."

"We keep drawing down long-term readiness to meet near-term missions," said Gen. Charles C. Krulak, the Marine Corps commandant. "That is severely straining our long-term readiness and modernization efforts."

A 4,000 troop commitment translates into 12,000 troops involved in Kosovo support (4,000 training to go in, 4,000 on the ground, and 4,000 being retrained upon coming out). This is demoralizing, it degrades retention, and leads to questions about management.

Secretary Cohen said yesterday that NATO forces would enter Kosovo to maintain an ongoing peace—that may be true, but it is certainly debatable. Indeed, this Member would argue that we are talking about peace-enforcement, not peacekeeping. And I would remind my colleagues that our last experience

with peace enforcement (Somalia) was not a pleasant one.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an armed separatist group that would appear bent on independence; major element in the Serb population are adamantly opposed to the KLA's objective. This is a situation where any existing "peace" is highly suspect.

There is no way to place a time limit on a Kosovo deployment.

Remember the Bosnia experience. Upon the rapid deployment (without congressional consent) following the Dayton Accord, Secretary Christopher assured the nation that it would be for one year only—to give the Bosnians a chance for peace. Four years later, everyone acknowledges there is no end in sight to the Bosnia deployment. The cultural difficulties that gave rise to the violence are far too great.

The cultural difficulties in Kosovo are at least as serious as those in Bosnia. Milosevic has successfully preyed upon the ancient fears and hatreds of the Serb population. The Albanian diaspora has fed the most violent tendencies of the Kosovar Albanian population. And the Albanians in Kosovo are insisting that a NATO presence remain for at least three years!

In short, we lack an exit strategy. This is the same point that House Members argued four years ago regarding Bosnia. At that time, the Administration discounted our warning that, once deployed, U.S. troops would be in Bosnia for the long haul. Well, we were right and the Administration was wrong.

I absolutely do not condone anything that the Serbians have done. In many ways, they are their own worst enemy. Belgrade has been condescending and abusive of the rights of ethnic Albanians, and their brutality gave rise to the KLA. My concern is, do the very real abuses of the Serbian forces warrant the long term deployment of an undetermined number of U.S. ground troops?

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. WYNN).

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. CROWLEY) for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution. The only problem with being a world leader is that sometimes we have to lead. In the first instance, leadership requires patience, and in that context, although I strongly support the resolution, I believe it is premature.

We have representatives in the region attempting to negotiate a framework for peace. We should not be debating whether or not we are going to intervene at this point.

Having said that, I do support our intervention in the context of this resolution. It seems to me that leadership also requires taking some risk and also adopting some unpopular positions.

I do not think anyone is cavalier about putting American troops in harm's way, but the fact remains that if we are going to support peace around the world, if we are going to try to maintain and promote an environment for peace, we have to get involved.

Amendments later today will set parameters for our involvement. We are not talking about an extensive involvement. We are talking about a limited

involvement, with the limited use of American troops.

The fact remains we are a world leader. We are a leader in NATO, and if we want to maintain that position of leadership, we cannot back away, we cannot cut and run when we are confronted with an unpopular situation.

Some will say in the course of this debate, we do not know what the objective is. The objective is abundantly clear. We are trying to maintain a framework for peace and maintain an environment for peace. We are trying to prevent genocide.

Thirdly, we are trying to prevent the spread of this violence throughout the region, which could lead to even greater catastrophe. This is not a popular situation. This is a situation that calls for American leadership.

I think we should proceed on that assumption, allow U.S. troops to be involved to a limited extent in the context of a negotiated treaty. I hope people will rise above narrow concerns and take a broader view.

We used to have a notion that Americans were about preserving world peace. I think we should continue to adopt that position.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BATEMAN), a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

(Mr. BATEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am more than aware of the prospects of negative consequences if our country declines to become involved in a peace-keeping or peacemaking mission in Kosovo, but in its present form I cannot support the resolution before us.

If I had some confidence that it would indeed be a peacekeeping mission, I would feel much differently. Even if certain people signed an agreement that others have written for them, which is the case here, and have cajoled them into signing it, it will not be a true peace agreement.

An agreement requires consent. Absent true consent, we will not be enforcing or keeping the peace. We will be making a peace foisted upon parties whose goals are widely disparate and who are determined to resist by violence those who oppose the achievement of their goal.

Our country has repeatedly enunciated a policy that recognizes Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. While we have urged a high degree of autonomy for that province of Yugoslavia, we have not endorsed the determination of the ethnic Albanian majority for independence. For our country to intervene in an issue of the operative relationship between the central government of Yugoslavia and one of its provinces would be tantamount to Great Britain having intervened in our Civil War on behalf of the Confederate States of America. History has verified the wisdom of our English friends in not having done so.

Consistent with international law, we do not have the legal authority to intervene against the will of the sovereign state involved.

Policy statements of the administration that we would participate in bombing of Serbian targets if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not sign an agreement written by us or someone is an appalling notion.

An agreement, even if it is signed under a direct threat of aerial bombardment, is not worthy of being called an agreement. If the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not accept the agreement we wrote for them, I must condemn American military action that our country will be involved in for what it will be, an act of war without sanction under our Constitution or international law.

As to the ethnic majority in Kosovo, who is duly authorized to bind them to an agreement? Is it Mr. Rugova, the head of the Democratic League of Kosovo? Or is it Mr. Demaci, who is described as, quote, the chief political representative of the Kosovo Liberation Army?

This gentleman has resigned and condemned those in the KLA who are inclined to vote for the so-called agreement.

By what authority, if any, was Mr. Thaci charged with the formation of a provisional ethnic Albanian government?

My generation has a special affinity for collective security, and I have and hope to remain a steadfast supporter of our NATO alliance.

I wish this debate was not taking place today but unfortunately it must because if it did not, any debate would come only after the President had committed us to a military action without the consent of a majority in the Congress and with only minimal consultation.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH).

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, Jesus said, blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God.

What can be said of a Congress which will not let the United States make peace in Kosovo? What can be said of a Congress which would intervene at a critical point in peace negotiations and take steps to undermine a peace agreement? What can be said of a Congress which refuses to let the United States join hands with other peacekeepers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

What can be said is this: If we are not letting peace be waged, then we are letting war be waged.

What can be said is that if we are not thoughtful as to the consequences of our actions today upon the Kosovo peace talks, then we are as sorcerer's apprentices, mindlessly stirring a cauldron full of the blood of Balkan innocents. When this cauldron is stirred, there will be blood on our hands.

What will be said about this Congress is that with our NATO allies at the ready, Congress abdicated the United States role as a world leader.

Blessed are the peacemakers.

We are able to make peace because we are the strongest nation in the world. We are able to make peace because we have been committed to peace.

Listen to the words of John F. Kennedy's inaugural. He said that we have been unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

We are challenged every day to renew our commitments to peace, to justice, to the American way of democratic principles, to lifting the burden of our brothers and sisters anywhere in the world, to becoming the light of the world.

Our Star Spangled Banner asks this question every day: Oh, say, does that star spangled banner still wave over the land of the free and the home of the brave?

Let us continue to demonstrate that we will be brave so that we may remain free and that others may remain free. Let us not turn our backs on peace. Let us not turn our backs on our allies. Let us not turn our backs on those principles which have helped form this Nation. Let us not turn our backs on those who thirst for justice, on those who hunger for righteousness, on those who look to the United States to be first in peace.

□ 1400

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman who has just made a very eloquent address, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KUCINICH), for his supporting remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM), a member of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I will not condemn any one of the Members in here for the way that they vote on this. They do it so because they have different knowledge, they have different beliefs. But I do resent the minority leader impugning the motives of many of us.

I make my statements on some very deep, rich beliefs and experience from training, of planning innovations in the defense of countries all over this world on military staff. And I hated politicians that sat in soft, cushy chairs and put our men and women in harm's way so easily, they who had never done that themselves.

Kosovo is not an independent state, it is part of Greater Serbia. When we go into the full committee, I want to put in here some 1,500 shrines and sanctuaries that the Serbs have in Kosovo, the birthplace of the orthodox Catholic religion. This is their homeland. This is a map of Albania. The Albanians do

not want just Kosovo, they want part of Greece, they want Montenegro, and they want Kosovo. This is a map of the massacred Serbs, Jews, gypsies that the KLA has murdered in recent times, not World War II. The KLA is supported by the mujahedin, Hamas, and even bin Laden. Get George Tenet's brief, classified brief. That is about as far as I can go.

This is a list of where the Serbs established Kosovo and were ethnically cleansed and murdered and forced to flee across the Danube, their homeland, and Albanians filled the void. Yet, they are defending their own homeland right now and being murdered.

Now, Milosevic is an impediment. He needs to be removed, in my opinion, much worse than that. So is Tudjman. But then we look at Itzebegovic, who has 12,000 mujahedin and Hamas surrounding him. The prime minister under him trained with Kadafi. If we want to talk about a foreign policy and we say we are saving lives, it is a powder keg when we move out of there. Let us not send our men and women to Kosovo.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS).

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding this time to me.

There is an air of unreality about this debate. Tomorrow, some of us will be at the Harry Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, when Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland will formally become members of NATO. NATO, this incredible defensive alliance, which kept the peace in Europe for two generations, which resulted in the collapse of the mighty Soviet Union, and which is the cornerstone of security, not just for Europe, but for much of the rest of the world, and we are now debating as to whether, after the Albanians and the Serbs agree and invite us, we might participate with the force of 4,000 in a NATO contingent of 28,000 to keep the peace in Kosovo.

My wife and I went to Kosovo the first time maybe 35 years ago, and we have been back there many times since. It is the only place in Europe where one can find a beautiful young woman of 22 or 23 who has two teeth because they have no dental care. There is a grinding poverty that boggles the mind, and these people have been suppressed, persecuted, given third class citizenship for a long time.

This is our opportunity to do a tiny bit, a tiny bit of what the great generation of the second war did under infinitely more dangerous circumstances with infinitely greater sacrifices.

Sunday night, the two vice presidential candidates of the last presidential election, AL GORE and Jack Kemp, join me for the Washington premier of *The Last Days*, a movie about the Holocaust. The pictures of that movie will remain with everybody who will ever see that movie. Do we want such movies made of Kosovo? Have we not had enough slaughter and massacre

and murder and extermination of innocent people there? The only thing that differentiates Kosovo from the Persian Gulf War is that there is no oil there. But there are principles there. The same principles that compelled President Bush decide to send not 4,000 NATO U.S. forces, but half a million American troops to the Persian Gulf; President Bush, who drew a line at Kosovo at Christmas 1992, when he said, we are drawing the line, we are not going to allow Bosnia to be repeated.

Now we have another President, a Democratic President who says the same thing. One of the great heroes of the second war in public service, Senator Bob Dole, yesterday told us in committee he is passionately committed to this course of action.

I am sick and tired of my colleagues saying, this is in Europe; let the Europeans deal with it. Sarajevo was in Europe. That was the genesis of the First World War. Czechoslovakia was in Europe. That was the genesis of the Second World War.

These people who never learn, who are uneducable cannot carry the day today. I plead with my colleagues to give our government an opportunity to participate in a NATO peacekeeping force to the tune of 4,000 American soldiers to keep the peace. This is the only honorable way, and this is the only way not to undermine NATO and the hope of mankind.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary and a member of our Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I recognize this is a very difficult decision, and I regret disagreeing with some of my colleagues who oppose the participation of our forces in the NATO peacekeeping effort, but it boils down really to a simple proposition: Is NATO worthwhile? What is the purpose of NATO? What is our role with NATO? We are the leaders of NATO. NATO is an extremely useful institution to have. It is beginning to integrate Germany in this exercise. Germany is to provide 3,000 troops, the British, 8,000, the French, 6,000, the United States 4,000, and to what end? To stop genocide. To stop the slaughter. To be peacekeepers.

There really is a moral obligation on those people who have the resources to intercede when people are being wantonly, atrociously killed, and that is what our purpose is. We have a national purpose: to prevent the spread of this conflict. If we appease Milosevic, if we leave the field and let the killing go on, we are inviting a wider spread of the war that could involve two of our NATO allies on the opposite side, Greece and Turkey.

So there is a humanitarian purpose; there is a peacekeeping purpose, and in my judgment, the very purpose of NATO would be frustrated; it would be eviscerated if we turned our back and walked away.

Mr. Chairman, leadership imposes heavy burdens and a cost must be paid, but we either are going to lead in the struggle, and it is a struggle for world peace, or we are going to be on the sidelines. I think for the vitality of NATO, for our role in NATO as a leader, for integrating the peacekeeping forces with these other countries, clearly we have to participate, and I will support the resolution.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), the ranking Democrat on the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Our colleague from Illinois posed the question, is NATO worth it? Absolutely. NATO is worth it.

First, we should understand those pages of history that point out that World War I started in the Balkans, and if NATO in its role in keeping peace in Europe can be fulfilled, it will be necessary for NATO to do a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.

Second, in answer to the gentleman's question, is NATO worth it, history also tells us that we have had more years of continuous peace in Europe since the days of the Roman Empire. NATO not only is worth it, it works, and the United States of America is the leader of NATO.

Tomorrow in Independence, Missouri, at the Truman Library, with the Secretary of State present as well as other noted Americans, the 50th anniversary of NATO will be celebrated.

Today, by this vote, we will declare whether NATO is worth it, whether NATO is to fulfill its goal and mission in the days and years ahead. I agree with the resolution.

I might also say that I have an amendment which I do not see how anyone could vote against. Later in the day, my amendment to this resolution will be to the effect that there should be no troops deployed until there is an agreement and a subsequent vote. But the bottom line is, NATO, Mr. Chairman, is worth it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BLILEY), the distinguished chairman of our Committee on Commerce.

(Mr. BLILEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I want to address my remarks to my colleagues on this side of the aisle. Yes, the Clinton administration has failed to address the American people on why we should be in the Balkans, why we should be in Bosnia, and why we should be in Kosovo. But let me tell my colleagues, I have spent 15 years as a

member of the U.S. delegation to the NATO parliamentary group. I now serve as the Vice President. We must be a participant in Kosovo.

Why? Because the Europeans cannot do it themselves. They have historic alliances. The French and the Russians have been with the Serbs. The Germans and the Italians have been with the Albanians. If we are not there and the NATO alliance is not able to go because we are not there, we are going to see the fighting begin again.

When the Yugoslavs begin bringing in heavy weapons, the Kosovos are going to call on their Albanian brothers to come to their aid. We run the risk of Macedonia being involved or the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and then the really big danger that we have of the Turks and the Greeks becoming involved.

□ 1415

Remember, World War I began at Sarajevo. Remember, we hesitated and did not go into Bosnia right away. We were treated every night to the atrocities on CNN. Please, support the resolution, even though the administration has failed to come forward and adequately address the Congress and the American people.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. MCKINNEY).

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, today we are debating sending U.S. forces to keep a peace that does not exist, to carry out an agreement that has not been agreed to, and to assist people on both sides who do not seem to want our help.

We are being asked to vote on something we cannot even see, and to sign a blank check. We have written blank checks before, and we have discovered afterwards just how high the cost has been. In what we do on Kosovo, we should first make sure that we have an agreement, know the plans, and know the cost.

In thinking about the cost, we should realize how much our own reckless actions have added to the bill. For years we have been selling our highest technology weapons to countries whose possible involvement in this conflict is important, both for those who want us in and those who want us to stay out. By our own actions we have greatly raised the stakes for such a conflict, and we have raised the risks that our soldiers again and again unnecessarily will be facing the products of our own factories.

If the parties in Kosovo really want peace, they will both sign the agreement, and if they do not, the mission of our forces will be truly impossible. Arms selling and peacemaking do not mix in Kosovo or anywhere else.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROHRABACHER), a member of our Committee on International Relations.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to sending

America's young defenders to Kosovo. We are being asked to deploy our troops yet again, eroding our overall strength even as new threats are becoming evident in Asia. Our military is being stretched so thin we are putting them at grave risk.

Unlike what is happening in the Balkans, there are other national security threats to our country. By dissipating our limited resources, asking our military for yet more sacrifice, we are doing a horrible disservice to our country and to its defenders.

I have no doubt that the people of Kosovo have a right to their self-determination, just as the people in Slovenia had a right to their self-determination, in Croatia, in Macedonia, and in Bosnia. Yes, we were given an option then, do nothing or send in the troops. We could have then provided the support necessary for those people to fight for their own independence, but instead, we held off, and then it was just send in the American troops.

But the people of Kosovo, just like the people in Croatia, are willing to fight for their own freedom. We are being told, it is either send troops or do nothing. That is nonsense. If we are too timid to even recognize that the people of Kosovo, 90 percent of whom want their independence, they are Muslims, Albanians, who do not want to be under the heel of oppression of the Serbs, if we cannot at least recognize their independence, if we are too timid to do that, how can we ask our own military to jump in the middle of that cauldron?

There is no peace plan. There is no peace plan at all. Our troops will end up either being the police force of the Serbians, or we will end up fighting the battle that the people of Kosovo are willing to fight for themselves.

We have been promised things before in the Balkans. We have been promised, the last time we have sent our troops, that it would take 1 year and \$2 billion. That was 5 years and \$12 billion ago. That dissipation of our money, that stretching our troop strength so wide that it is about to break, is causing great damage to our national security.

The Balkans is not in America's national security interest. We can talk about NATO in nostalgic terms all we want. The job of NATO was done when the Soviet Union split apart. It is not our job now, because at that time it was in our national security interest. Now it is not in our interest to send our young people all over the world, trying to be the police force of the world in a way that it weakens us as a Nation, so when there are threats to us from China or from elsewhere, or in Korea, that we will be unable to act, and that perhaps thousands of American lives will be lost in situations like that.

Let us support the people of Kosovo's right to self-determination. Let us give them the weapons they need to do their own fight, and not have American lives at stake.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would just say, the gentleman's proposition would lead to arms races globally, and increased murder. The choice we have here today is to support peacekeeping, as compared to warmaking. It is the right use for our people.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. POMEROY).

Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask, what does it say about the United States and its NATO allies that we cannot take on a two-bit bully down the block? By allowing Milosevic to get away with his third brutal war in a decade, the United States and NATO will send an encouraging message to dictators, aggressors, and terrorists around the globe.

Those are not my words, Mr. Chairman. Those are the words of majority leader Bob Dole in his testimony yesterday to the Committee on International Relations. He is now charged with getting the parties to an agreement, and is in the final stages of accomplishing that extraordinarily difficult undertaking.

It is therefore deeply regrettable, Mr. Chairman, that we are having this debate today. How can we reasonably make a decision on a resolution regarding a peace agreement when the peace agreement itself has yet to be finalized?

But we are where we are, so I urge Members to vote for the resolution. The slaughter that has been occurring in Kosovo is so deeply disturbing. If we look at the statistics, they are shocking. If we look at the individual accounts, they are even more disturbing. I have a 5-year-old daughter at home. When I read the New York Times account of the 5-year-old that was hunted down in her backyard and brutally murdered, and the photograph of her little shoes in the garden, it is something of a tragedy of a magnitude we cannot ignore.

The U.S. role being considered is only a minor, supporting role. Our participation will be 15 percent or less, we are told. It is a situation where we have to do our part to bring the genocide and atrocities to an end. Vote yes on the resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. HEFLEY), a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted we are doing this debate today. I think that for us not to do this and to wait until it was too late would be a terrible mistake. I think, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, there are four considerations that we need to

consider before we send troops into Kosovo.

First, the manner in which this administration has circumvented the legislative process when it comes to deployment of U.S. military forces around the world has been unprecedented, so it should come as no surprise that the President does not want us to debate this today. The President is the Commander in Chief, but he has a consultative partner in the Congress. He ought to consult us about these things.

When we were debating Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, when we were going to debate it that night, the President told me he did not care what we thought about Bosnia. He did not care. He was sending troops into Bosnia anyway. That should not be the attitude of the Chief Executive. So we are doing something right here today. Even if he does not care what we think, we are doing something that should be done.

Secondly, before we send troops in we should have a measure of success. How do we know when we have done our job? How do we know when we are finished, when we have completed it? I do not see that in the plan at this point. I do not see any clear mission or goals or accomplishment standards, what will be the measure of success.

Third, for the United States to enter the region, there should be a signed agreement by both the Albanians and the Serbs. Following that, there should be a request that we in NATO come in to help them. This is a civil war in a sovereign nation. We should be there only at their request.

I recently visited similar nations in the Balkans. We can see the hatred all over that part of the world. The idea that we would be so arrogant as to believe that we can go in and fix a problem without the full participation of all the stakeholders in this is just ridiculous. Then it is even more arrogant, I believe, to think we can mollify this problem in a short period of time. We may be there a while, if we go in.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would like to say that for all the talk of an end game, if we had had the discussion when we put NATO forces in Europe to stop Communist expansion, and said, how long are you going to be there, are you going to be out of there in 2 years, out in a year, we would have lost Europe while we were debating how long we would stay.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. CLEMENT).

Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, and thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

This is a serious matter, we all know that. But the fact is, I think a lot of us are questioning the timing of this. I was in Bosnia last year with the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. IKE SKELTON) and others. Those people were so

appreciative of the United States, knowing that the United States is the one and only superpower in the world. We also know that we do not want to be the Big Brother in the world, as well. But we also realize that we have a responsibility. We also know that that is where World War I started, was in the Balkan area.

We have to ask ourselves the question, how can we help? How can we be supportive, knowing that whatever we do it is not going to be just a unilateral effort, it is going to be a number of other countries in concert with the United States agreeing on a peace plan?

The atrocities over there are horrendous, how peoples' lives have been destroyed, their homes are being destroyed, the looting. It was an orchestrated conspiracy, and Milosevic, operating in Belfast, is going to look at all of the things we are doing or not doing.

Yet, we know what Senator Dole has already said. The Republican nominee for President has made it very clear why. This was before the Committee on International Relations just yesterday. He said, "I would rather have the vote come after the agreement between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia." I think he is correct, because are we going to put ourselves in a position where we are going to be responsible for ruining any opportunity for peace at the table? Let us support our leadership, and let us have peace in Kosovo.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. WELDON).

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

I rise reluctantly to speak in opposition to sending our United States Armed Forces into Kosovo. If we look at the U.S. military, it is overwhelmingly apparent that the Clinton administration has placed our military budget and the needs of our men and women in uniform on the back burner while greatly increasing the number of overseas deployments.

By reducing our national defense budget and failing to provide the funding necessary for training, equipment, and compensation, this administration is eroding morale and troop strength. I cannot, in good conscience, support sending our troops again overseas to support another overseas mission. It is not fair to our troops. It is not fair to our families.

Let us review some of the facts on this issue. The number of active duty army divisions has been reduced from 18 to 8. Under the Clinton-Gore administration, the number of fighter wings has gone down from 36 to 20. Our naval forces have been reduced by 30 percent.

Today our troops do not have enough ammunition. The Army is short \$1.7 billion in ammunition, the marines \$193 million. Too many of our men and women in uniform have gone too long without seeing their families, their wives, their husbands, children, and

parents. This is having a terrible effect on morale and retention of a fine, qualified, uniformed service.

This Administration's neglect of our troops has led to fewer troops reenlisting and more troops leaving the Armed Forces. Some of our men and women in uniform are actually on food stamps. This is an outrage.

It is time for this administration to put its money where its mouth is. It is time for it to draw a line in the sand, and demand that we send the right amount of funds to support our troops, particularly if now we are going to send 3,000 more troops overseas to support another unending overseas deployment.

□ 1430

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. CUMMINGS), former speaker of the Maryland House.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleague for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I stand today in support of House Concurrent Resolution 42. Probably one of the most significant moments of my life was when, back in December of 1997, I went over to Bosnia with the President. There I saw our troops. When we arrived in Bosnia at about 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning, thousands of people had stood all night just to simply say thank you for saving our lives. Thank you for giving us our lives for Christmas.

The President is right. We have to act. We cannot just stand aside and allow lives to be lost. The fact is that we have a duty, and we must fulfill that duty. Lest we forget, let us not turn a blind eye. Remember the Holocaust, remember South Africa, remember Rwanda.

Our Nation is a very, very powerful nation. The fact is, is that we have to stand up and bring peace and bring life to life. So I stand in support of House Concurrent Resolution 42 and urge all of my colleagues to vote for it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. HOUGHTON), a member of our Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I am tempted to go through the philosophies and the history and the risks and the costs that are involved here. But to me, and it may be a reflection on my own position, to me, it is a very simple issue that we are in a situation now where decisions have to be made. We can be doubtful and unclear and opinionated about some of the things, whether it is the reigniting of anarchy in Albania or destabilizing Macedonia, but that is not the point.

The point is this is a horrible time I think to have this debate. If we are going to have peace, we must have successful negotiations. We are right in the middle of negotiations now.

If we vote down this resolution, the negotiations have no merit because there is no incentive for the people to continue the negotiations. If we vote for this resolution, we can continue the negotiations. It is a nonbinding resolution. If we want to, we can take up the issue whether we should have troops in Bosnia or not.

So, therefore, it is a very clear issue. Do we want to continue the negotiations? Do we not want to continue the negotiations? I am for continuing, and I am for this resolution.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. LAMPSON).

Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my colleagues to help Kosovo achieve peace, not only for the benefits of the thousands of people living in that troubled area of the world, but also for their family members who live here in the United States.

Let me tell my colleagues about a family in my southeast Texas district who has loved ones who are trapped in violence-torn Kosovo. John and Lisa Halili, who own and operate an oyster and shrimp business in San Leon, watch 24-hour television and read newspapers with anxiety and anticipation each and every day. Why? Because John's father and brother, and many other people, have been forced to flee their homes and, in one instance, hide in a single house in the village of Vushtrri.

Unfortunately, Bajram and Idriz Halili have been unable to leave their hideaway and escape to the safety of the United States. So they, along with their son and daughter-in-law in Texas, wait and wait and wait for peace to come to Kosovo and the entire region.

Feeling helpless and sometimes hopeless, John and Lisa have contacted me, hoping that I, as a United States Representative, could do something to diminish their worry or reunite their family.

Unlike the Halilis, Congress is not helpless, nor should it be hopeless about peace talks in Kosovo. I know that there are other areas of the world that are crying out for help, including places in our own country. But where we can make a difference, we have an obligation to do so. We have the duty to do whatever it takes to help this troubled region of the world create an environment of peace for its people and their families who live within all of our Congressional District.

We as a Congress have a responsibility to support the President so that the United States speaks with one voice on foreign policy.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. LAZIO).

Mr. LAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by congratulating and thanking the chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) for his leadership in helping to move this to a debate which is such an important part of this process.

One of the most important accomplishments of which America can be justly proud is its victory in the Cold War, a 50-year struggle during which literally 500 million people were liberated from control of the Soviets.

Our ideals, our American ideals of democracy and market capitalism are in triumph throughout the world, but not in every corner of the world. With that triumph comes some responsibility.

In the Balkans where slaughter and bloodshed and systemic rape as a tool of terror have been used over and over again, where families and villages have been wiped out, America properly has a role, not the only role, but a leading role. But this is a sobering debate frankly because of some of the failures of our foreign policy that got us here.

I am in support of the Gilman amendment, because I believe in America's role in ensuring the peace, in ensuring a strong, integrated Europe. But let us remind ourselves of the fact that the Dayton Accord helped perpetuate this because the people of Kosovo who pursued a nonviolent strategy were left out. The message that was translated from the State Department was that we will only be engaged if violence is pursued as a tool. That is the wrong message.

The message from Milosevic was, if one pursues a strategy of violence and terror, one can consolidate their gains; and we will not push them back, and they will win.

When our lead negotiator, the Special Envoy to the Balkans, praised Milosevic for his cooperation in Bosnia and branded the Kosovo Liberation Army, "without question a terrorist organization," what is the message that he sends?

We must be there because of a failed American foreign policy, but we must also be there to keep the people of Kosovo confident in America's efforts.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TRAFICANT).

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, a 1986 intelligence report warned us of today's debate. They said the genocide in Kosovo will end by one of two means, by Western governments assisting and pressuring Belgrade to grant independence to Kosovo, or be revolutionized.

This is a tough vote. I, like everybody else, want to stop the slaughter in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo. But let me say this, today's vote will also reward an international tyrant Milosevic, because we will be rewarding a flawed agreement.

This agreement should be modified to say, number one, upon enactment of the agreement, there should be no Serbian troops in Kosovo; number two, a provision clearly warning Milosevic he will be bombed if he violates the terms of the agreement; number three, that all war criminals will be apprehended and will be subject to prosecution, bar none; and, number four, that, on conclusion of the terms of Rambouillet,

there shall be a referendum vote for independence.

God, we are here in the halls of Washington and Lincoln. In 1986, they told us, there would be more genocide, more killing, more oppression, and we have done nothing, and we are about to make the same mistake.

This is a tough vote for me. But our committee must look at those facts, Mr. Chairman. My bill clearly speaks to it. There should be an amendment on this floor to modify that agreement, at least the sense of this House to, in fact, infer that that subject mattered.

Be careful here. It just is not about deploying troops. Europe should be providing those ground troops. We should be providing the air and strategic support. But it is a tough vote, and I give credit to the Speaker for at least taking up the issue. Our war making powers should not come down from the White House.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SANFORD), a member of our Committee on International Relations.

Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Chairman, I stand as one against sending troops to Kosovo and one very much behind the timing of this vote for a couple of different reasons, but one in which was well described by Henry Kissinger yesterday.

Yesterday, he said before our committee that he and President Nixon believed that we were in trouble in Vietnam because our predecessors had launched the U.S. into an enterprise in a distant region for worthy causes but without adequately assessing the national interest and the likely cost. Now, not after the troops are deployed, not after troops are in the field, but now is the time to assess that cost.

I do not think it passes the cost test for a couple of different reasons, the first of which is the domino theory has long been disproven. Clifford Clark was sent by Lyndon Johnson to see our C2 allies in Southeast Asia over 30 years ago to use the same argument. The C2 allies said, no, we do not think this will grow into a giant conflict in Southeast Asia. We choose not to go into South Vietnam or North Vietnam. We ignored their advice and, as a result, 50,000 American boys died.

The domino theory has been disproven. For us to send boys into Kosovo means it has got to pass the mommy test. The mommy test for me means it is not only in our strategic interest, but we also have a chance in making a difference.

Here, as my colleague just pointed out just a moment ago, we were signing an agreement with Milosevic, who is a person who does not exactly have a lot of trust in the world community. Yet we are validating him by signing an agreement with him. In other words, we are building an agreement on shifting sand.

Thirdly, I would say that troops are thought to be used as policemen. Modern armies are designed to move. They

are not designed to stand still. I sat on a plane the other day with a young enlisted officer who complained about the fact that he had not seen his baby in 6 months and was being used as a policeman in Bosnia.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. CARDIN).

(Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution although I must tell my colleagues I have certain misgivings. My misgivings are not surrounded by the U.S. role, because I think it is clear that the United States has a very vital role in this peace process. The stability in the Balkans are very important to our national interests, and we are not going to achieve peace in the Balkans without U.S. leadership.

It is important for the United States to maintain a very strong position with NATO. So I support the Clinton administration's efforts in this area.

My concern is a matter of timing. Why are we considering this resolution now? I agree with my friend the gentleman from New York (Mr. HOUGHTON) in his comments, in that we should have an agreement first before we are asked to vote on what the United States' role should be in enforcing that peace agreement.

We do not know what the agreement itself will be. However, I plan to vote in support of this resolution because I want to make it clear that I support the Clinton administration's efforts to bring peace to the Balkans, that I acknowledge that the U.S. will play, must play a leadership role in enforcing that peace agreement that we hope will be achieved.

By voting for this resolution, I think we move forward the peace process in the Balkans. If we do otherwise, then we are going to be at least partially responsible for making it more difficult for us to achieve peace in that very difficult area of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the resolution if we must vote on it today. If we must vote on it today, then we should support it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PAUL).

(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the leadership for allowing this debate to come to the floor. I have, for quite a few weeks, advocated that we talk about this and have urge that the troops never be sent to Kosovo without our consent. I do believe, though, that the process here is less than perfect. The fact that we are talking about a House Concurrent Resolution at the same time authorizing troop deployment raises serious questions.

□ 1445

Since World War II we have not been diligent here in the Congress to protect our prerogatives with respect to the declaration of war. Korean and Vietnam wars were fought without a declaration of war. And these wars were not won.

Since 1973, since the War Powers Resolution was passed, we have further undermined the authority of the Congress and delivered more authority to the President because the resolution essentially has given the President more power to wage war up to 90 days without the Congress granting authority. It is to our credit at least that we are bringing this matter up at this particular time.

We must remember that there are various things involved here. First, whether or not we should be the world policeman. That answer should be easy. We should not be. It costs a lot of money to do what we are doing, and it undermines our military strength. So we should consider that.

We should consider the law and the process in the War Powers Resolution and just exactly how we grant authority to the President to wage war. We should be more concerned about the Constitution and how we should give this authority. We should be concerned about this procedure.

The bigger question here, however, is if we vote for this, and I strongly oppose passing this, because if we vote for this, we authorize the moving of troops into a dangerous area. We should ask ourselves, if we are willing to vote for this resolution; are we ourselves willing to go to Kosovo and expose our lives on the front lines? Are we willing to send our children or our grandchildren; to not only be exposed to the danger, with the pretext we are going to save the world, but with the idea that we may lose our life? That is what we have to consider.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. MENENDEZ).

(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, now is not the time to have this debate. Too much is at stake to risk sending a message of America's disunity at this critical point in the negotiations. Innocent men, women and children, little babies, entire families have been butchered, children have been orphaned, women have been raped, 400,000 people have been driven from their homes. That is what is at stake here today: human lives.

If we are the leaders of the free world, if we are still that brave Nation that stood against darkness in World War II, now is the time to stand together to help the people of Kosovo find peace. But as we speak, negotiations are at a critical stage. We are either on the brink of a breakthrough or at the point of a breakdown. If the negotiations succeed, thousands of lives

will be saved. Thousands of these children will live to grow up. And if we fail, many of these people will die.

With all that at stake, at a time when these poor people are looking to us for stability, to help them find their way back to peace, why are Republicans holding this debate here today at the very moment we need to show unity?

If there are parts of any final agreement we want to debate, then for God's sake, let us wait until we see it, let us wait until the ink is dry, let us wait until it is signed. Right now there is no accord to debate, there is only the possibility of sabotaging the process before it has had the chance to reach a conclusion.

That is why this premature debate is the very height of irresponsibility, and even more so because this is where World War I began. My colleagues, past is prologue, and we should not have to learn this lesson twice. This region does have strategic importance to the United States and many Americans died when the world ignored these tensions once before.

Preventing an escalation will save American lives in the long run. We cannot afford a war in Kosovo that could destabilize the region, that could spill over into Albania, to Macedonia, Turkey, and Greece, which are NATO allies. We should be standing together. We should be supporting these negotiations. We should be supporting the suffering families in Kosovo, and we should have delayed this debate until the negotiators have had the time to finish their work.

But if Republicans want to force a decision now, the decision should be and must be that this is a cause and a region in the national interests of the United States and, ultimately, in the national security interests of the United States worth defending. And if troops are needed to do that, we should support that mission and we should support them.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to once again join with us to try to delay this vote and, if not, then to vote to send a clear message that America stands ready to help in Kosovo.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. ROTHMAN).

(Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, the peace talks in Kosovo are predicated on one very simple premise: The international community must pose a credible military threat to enforce any peace agreement that is reached between the Kosovars and the Serbs.

To discuss today whether or not the United States, the world's only superpower and the world's greatest military force, will lend its support to any Kosovo peace settlement is premature and is inappropriate at this time. To debate this issue today undermines the efforts of the envoys who are trying to

negotiate a peace settlement between the Serbs and Kosovars.

However, the credible threat of military force does provide an incentive for the Serbs and Kosovars to reach a peace agreement. To debate this issue today threatens that incentive and could embolden Slobodan Milosevic to reject NATO peacekeeping troops completely, and could cause the Kosovars to give up on the peace process.

The bottom line, though, is that wavering American leadership in this situation has the potential to lead to more bloodshed in Kosovo that could spill over into other parts of Europe and metastasize beyond our control. Mr. Chairman, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot be the world's only superpower but then remain aloof when the situation demands our leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I do not rise today to say that the United States is obligated to resolve every conflict that erupts around the world. We have the right to decide these matters on a case-by-case basis. But in this case it is in our national interests to lend our country's support to the international effort to prevent the return of wanton bloodshed, murder, rape and wholesale slaughter in Kosovo.

The Balkans have been the birthplace of war before. Allowing a conflict to explode in that region could have devastating consequences to the peace and stability of Europe and, hence, to America's national interests.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER).

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I rise in support of this resolution; in support of basic human rights, in support of doing the right thing for our country and for the people of Kosovo.

I welcome this debate, Mr. Chairman, yet I fear that in undertaking it, what we have done today could have a very serious negative impact on the current sensitive negotiations on a peace plan. That is why I voted against the rule. The resolution, however, I pray, will be passed; that America, at our shores, will stand united; that the message we send this day will be that America is united in its conviction and in its commitment to face tyranny where it finds it.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that we will ratify and support the representations of two American Presidents, President Bush and President Clinton.

President Bush said, in his Christmas warning to Milosevic, and I quote, 'In the event of a conflict in Kosovo, caused by Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.' That was George Bush, then President of the United States, Christmas 1992.

Mr. Chairman, shortly thereafter, the President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, recommitted to

that proposition set forth by George Bush; that Milosevic, perceived by this Nation as a war criminal, perceived as savaging the people of Bosnia, if he tried to do the same in Kosovo, would be confronted by America and, yes, by its troops.

Mr. Chairman, today we hear that Robert Dole, the candidate for President of the United States in 1996, testified before the Committee on International Relations that we should not have this resolution on the floor. But if we did have it on the floor, as we do, that it ought to be passed.

That sentiment was shared by Jeane Kirkpatrick under President Reagan, our representative to the United Nations, by Richard Perle, an assistant in the Department of Defense, known as a hard-liner, I might say. A conservative. Vin Weber, a member of this Congress, a close friend of the former Speaker, signed a letter saying that this action that the President proposes should be supported. And, lastly, I cite Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan.

Mr. Chairman, America's strength has, in instances overseas, been our unit, our unity of purpose, our unity of conviction. It is clear that the Europeans alone will not be able to summon up the political will and, indeed, the military strength to confront this Bully of Belgrade, as referred to by Senator Dole.

I would hope, my colleagues, that we come together today, as has Bob Dole and Bill Clinton, Jeane Kirkpatrick and others, and Richard Holbrooke, our perhaps next secretary of the United Nations—come together and say that we will confront war crimes when our Presidents commit us to that end; that we will support this President and facilitate the attaining of an agreement. Because to facilitate that agreement may not only save lives, but it will save the dispossession of thousands of people. The dispossession from their homes, from their lands.

Mr. Chairman, this is a great country, and I would remind my Republican colleagues that when George Bush made a determination to confront tyranny and send troops to Saudi Arabia, there was a request on our side for a vote. President Bush asked Tom Foley, the Speaker of the House of Representatives—and I sat in the room with him—let us not vote now; let us support this policy so we can put together this coalition and bring peace and stop this aggression. Speaker Foley agreed to do so with the President of the United States.

And, indeed, when there was a vote, I tell my friends on the Republican side of the aisle, as to whether or not we were going to then deploy those troops in Saudi Arabia into Kuwait, that almost half of our caucus supported President Bush. I hope we find that bipartisanship today. I hope we follow Bob Dole. I hope we commit ourselves to bipartisanship in foreign policy in confronting tyranny.

There are those who say that the United States has no strategic interest in Kosovo, that we have no interest in the "internal affairs" of another country, that war has become a "fact of life" in the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Chairman, I submit to you and my colleagues that helping to resolve the crisis in Kosovo, as we have in Bosnia—stopping war in the heart of Europe—is a preeminent strategic and moral interest of the United States. The crisis in Kosovo, like Bosnia, has the potential to ignite the entire Balkan region, undoing what we have achieved in Bosnia and drawing in already unstable Albania, Macedonia and potentially our NATO allies Greece and Turkey.

To those who say that the international community has no interest in the "internal affairs" of another state, I say that both the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act to which the United States is a signatory, hold otherwise.

Fifty years ago, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights shattered the idea that national sovereignty should shield governments from scrutiny of their human rights records. This concept had long insulated countries from being held accountable for the gross mistreatment of their own citizens. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the declaration captured the world's revulsion of that traditional view of international relations and made clear a new norm—how a state treats its own people is of direct and legitimate concern to all states and is not simply an internal affair of the state concerned. Thirty years later, the Helsinki Final Act reaffirmed this principle.

Mr. Chairman, the events which have occurred in Kosovo since the beginning of last year are but an escalation of the repression and brutality the Albania Kosovars have suffered at the hands of the Belgrade authorities since 1989 when Slobodan Milosevic unilaterally revoked the substantial autonomy Kosovo enjoyed under the old Yugoslav Federation. Of course, since the beginning of 1998 more than 2,000 ethnic Albanians—including women and children—have been killed, many brutally massacred. Hundreds of villages have been destroyed, and more than 400,000 people have been displaced. Make no mistake about it, this is ethnic cleansing.

To those who say that what is happening in Kosovo is the continuation of centuries old ethnic hatreds, and that "War has become a fact of life in this part of the world," I ask, what do you propose? Accept the status quo? Let the opposing factions "slug it out"—let the bloodbath continue? I say this is totally unacceptable. Such a course legitimizes the violence—the murder, the ethnic cleansing—and accepts the premise that this is the kind of world in which we will always live.

Mr. Chairman, Kosovo is not Bosnia. The situation on the ground is certainly different in many ways, yet both share a common suffering—the scourge of ethnic cleansing, and a common curse—Slobodan Milosevic. The killing and devastation in Kosovo, like the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, are a direct result of the efforts of Milosevic and his thugs to maintain and consolidate their power.

Mr. Chairman, the United States, NATO and the international community have made a commitment to bring peace and long-term stability to the former Yugoslavia. This is a long and difficult struggle, and any peace agreement will not be effectively implemented without NATO muscle. The United States must

lead and take a strong stand against the enemies of peace.

Mr. Chairman, NATO no longer confronts a monolithic enemy. The threats with which it must now deal come from terrorism and regional conflicts—like Kosovo. If we and our NATO allies are not willing to confront the bullies in Kosovo and lay the groundwork for long-term peace in that region, we will encourage such bullies and ensure that they will act again sometime, somewhere. That is the lesson of history we must not forget.

Vote for H. Con. Res. 42.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. GRAHAM).

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. If we believe this operation is equal to what was going on in Kuwait, we should vote "yes".

□ 1500

If we see it to be different, then we ought to ask what are the differences. I think it is dramatically different. Our country is about to commit 4,000 young men and women into a sovereign nation, in a region in that nation where 90 percent of the inhabitants of Kosovo are Albanian, who are trying to become independent. We are about to get ourselves in the middle of a Civil War. This is not fighting Saddam Hussein, this is interjecting 4,000 Americans into a faraway place where heartache is normal, where tyranny has existed before, and will exist after. How do we come home?

You are asking the Congress to have a one-way ticket to a region of the world that is not going to lead to a world war. It is going to be a place where they will eventually figure out they can live together, with our help, but our help should not include 4,000 young Americans standing in the middle of people with a lot of hot temper. This makes no sense. Piling this on top of Bosnia is unbelievably expensive. This is different than Bosnia, this is different than Kuwait. The American public does not understand what we are doing or why. And all the big names in international politics to me have not justified why we are there and how we are going to get out.

Secretary Kissinger says this is more like Vietnam than it is Kuwait. I hope he is wrong, but I believe he is right. How many more young men and women are going to go in faraway places to get in the middle of civil wars where there is a dubious reason to be there to start with and no way home? I hope none of them come home hurt or maimed. Vote "no." Stand up for America.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. NORTON).

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

What has become of us, my friends? We may well be on the brink of a peace agreement between the Serbian government and the Kosovo ethnic Albanian population. Our hearts have been

broken for months now. Yet in the midst of possibility finally, a resolution on this floor to polarize our country as to what it is already doing. We have been polarized on domestic issues, but I think the American people expect more of us when it comes to our international posture.

As I speak, we are erasing the rhetoric of bipartisanship that the majority has sounded. Because if we cannot be bipartisan when our country is in the midst of what looks like it can be a successful effort to stop genocide, then I do not know when we can be bipartisan. We are undermining not war but peace. There can be no debate that this is in our national interest, and I have not heard that it is not. Nor after the Bosnia precedent should there be any debate as to whether we should go forward now having gotten this far.

What has happened to the Albanians is unspeakable. Milosevic began shutting down their language institutions and he has ended with genocide. We have gone, on the other side, from partisanship to isolationism.

My friends, we cannot lead the world in war or in peace if every time the party on the other side of the aisle wants to move, you on that side says, "We don't move simply because you want to move," and that is what this comes down to. We are assuming the posture you have historically assumed and yet now that it is our posture, because it is our President, you have simply jumped to the other side, against the national interest.

I ask you to stand beside our country, postpone this vote, but, to be sure, I hope that you will not be found on the other side of a vote that would undermine our country as it wages peace, not war.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MICA).

(Mr. MICA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I come reluctantly to the floor to oppose the use of United States troops on the ground in Kosovo. I do that because of two reasons. First, because of the lack of trust and confidence that I have in this President, and secondly because of the pattern of experience.

When I got elected in 1992 and began service in 1993, this President inherited the question of Somalia which President Bush had started as a humanitarian rescue effort. President Clinton turned that into a national tragedy, a loss of our troops as we saw our troops drug through the streets of Somalia. Where are we in Somalia 4 or 5 years later? Just a few days ago 60 were killed in Somalia.

Then we had Haiti, our second experience in nation-building. And what have we done in Haiti? We have traded one corrupt government for supporting another corrupt government at the cost of billions to our taxpayers. This President and this administration opposed

an international pan-African force in Rwanda before the genocide of our time took place. That was the experience then, they said no troops then, and after the genocide we sent our troops into that area.

Bosnia. Time and time again we have set deadlines for our troops in Bosnia, and our troops are still in Bosnia and our troops are spread thin across the globe with these deployments from this President, this administration. Only after Congress stepped in and made sure that we micromanaged the military effort in Bosnia did we ensure that our troops would not be killed, that they would have adequate equipment and that they would serve under United States command and not U.N. international command. We have no exit strategy. Our military is stretched to the limits. When the wives and mothers of our reserve forces call me, I am going to refer them to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and this President.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to our distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARMEY).

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, let me thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for bringing this to the floor. I must tell the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) that this is not an easy vote for me. Indeed I have spent most of the last week worrying and studying about this vote and even at times trying to come to the point where I could vote in agreement with you on this proposition, largely out of the respect that I have for yourself, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) and others that I have talked to. But I have to say, it has been a struggle.

I have always been very proud of the American people, proud that Americans love freedom so much that they are prepared to risk their peace to defend the freedoms of others.

Since the end of the last war, we have rightly held a larger vision of our national interest. We do not see it as merely defending our coastal waters, protecting our commercial interests, or stopping an invasion of our homeland. We have understood in a way that no other people in history have that our freedom depends on the freedom of others.

This principle has inspired our great national initiatives, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Policy, the democratization of Japan, our fights for freedom in Korea and Southeast Asia, the Reagan doctrine, and most recently the expansion of the NATO Alliance for which many in this body, including the gentleman from New York, and especially the gentleman from New York, have been responsible.

The result of this effort is that America has made a world in which hundreds of millions of human beings are living in peace and under governments of their own choosing and working together for their common benefit. Very

few times in this bloody century would anyone have predicted that it would have ended as well as it does. But it does, because of the wisdom of the United States of America.

Mr. Chairman, we do have an enduring interest in a peaceful Europe. What happens in the Balkans is important to our security. Indeed we must do all we can reasonably expect to do to prevent further killing and suffering in these troubled lands. But I cannot in good conscience support the proposed deployment we are debating today. I believe it has been poorly considered and is unlikely to achieve our desired ends.

I make this objection on purely practical grounds. Its central flaw is that it depends on negotiating an agreement with the Serbia dictator, the very man who is responsible for the Balkan horrors in the first place. Mr. Chairman, he is a brutal killer and we can have no confidence that he or his followers will respect any agreement that might be reached.

On the other side will be the Kosovar Liberation Army, a new formation with little experience in these matters. Its cause may be noble, but there is little reason to hope its leadership will be able to discipline its members. The agreement will, after all, come far short of their desire for true independence.

Our troops may thus find themselves opposed by free-lance opponents on both sides of this brutal conflict, opponents undisciplined by any central authority. The resulting bloodshed may produce events that are far more destabilizing than those the administration fears today. This could be, Mr. Chairman, another Somalia. For these and other reasons I have heard stated today, I believe this deployment is unwise and must be opposed.

Mr. Chairman, we need to take a fresh look at our policy towards the world's outlaw governments, not just in Serbia, but in Iraq, North Korea and elsewhere. These rogue regimes are without question the greatest security threat we face today. The administration response to them has been haphazard containment efforts, loose arms control arrangements or other negotiations. Containment and negotiation, however, can do little to solve the underlying problem, the very existence of the regimes. What we need is a new version of the Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s, a policy that seeks not to contain these regimes but to replace them with democratic alternatives.

Last year, Congress began to shape exactly such a policy towards Iraq with our passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. We need to consider similar legislation for other rogue states, including Serbia. I for one reject the idea that the Serbian people are themselves inherently bent on ethnic warfare. As the large civil liberties protests in Belgrade have shown, they aspire to the same democratic privileges that other Europeans enjoy.

The problem, Mr. Chairman, is Milosevic. Had we followed a deter-

mined policy to change his regime, we could have vastly improved the prospects for peace in the Balkans and liberated the Serbian people as well. It is time to begin such a policy now.

The lesson of the Cold War should be clear. True peace, justice and security come not from negotiating with inhuman regimes but transcending them. Even the most enduring dictatorships can melt before the power and the ideals of the United States. The power of freedom is an ideal shared by all people. It can be and must be in the end larger than any man, no matter how brutal.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the majority leader for his words with regard to this issue.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER).

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, the debate we are entered upon today has the gravest of consequences for our Nation and for our future. Having recently returned from Bosnia, I had the opportunity there to learn a little bit about the attitudes present in that region. One thing that I did learn is that our allies, our NATO allies, have a strong commitment to keeping peace in the Balkans and they feel very strongly about our willingness as a NATO partner to stand tall with them in this crisis. I also learned from talking to some of our military leaders that there is a clear relationship between the situation in Bosnia and the developing events in Kosovo. Our investment in Bosnia, as one military leader told me, is clearly threatened by the developments in Kosovo.

□ 1515

I also had the opportunity to talk with soldiers on the ground who are doing an excellent job keeping the peace in Bosnia, and, as one first sergeant shared with us in testimony before a committee hearing, he has made a spiritual investment in Bosnia and believes very strongly that we have done the right thing in trying to help keep the peace there. He said because of our soldiers children now go to school in Bosnia, can safely play in playgrounds without fear of land mines or snipers. We have clearly accomplished the objective of keeping peace in Bosnia, and the relationship between the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia is undisputed by those who serve us in our Armed Forces.

I also learned that there are clear limits to what we can hope to accomplish in that part of the world, and for that reason there must be clear guidelines before we commit troops to any mission, any joint NATO mission, in Kosovo. Those principles were set out by the President in a February 4 address, and I think we must include those principles in the resolution that will be adopted here today.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. HANSEN).

(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I believe this debate is timely and important. Public debate, by those Representatives closest to the people, before our troops are put in harms way, is not a sign of weakness and division but rather a clear reminder that the great power of America comes not from its government, or its military might, but from its people and their commitment to freedom, peace and democracy.

In my recent travels to the Balkans and Southwest Asia, I have been greatly impressed by the professionalism of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. They have done tremendous service to our country with few rewards. They care for their aging equipment with great pride, though hampered by a worsening shortage of spare parts and lack of meaningful training. While at home, their loved ones struggle to keep their families together during the many long separations. The military mission to Bosnia has been an almost flawless success.

In contrast, the foreign policy and political decisions that so easily put our troops in harms way is a growing failure.

This administration has engaged our troops too often, for too long, with too small a budget and with too little support from the American people, the Congress and the world. Our soldiers can stop the fighting, but Bosnia is not closer to peaceful, stable government today than they were 5 years ago. Remember, the President promised this effort would take only 1 year and cost \$1 billion. Five years and \$10 billion later there is no end in sight.

In this new age foreign policy, which replaces "power projection" with "sympathy projection," we find the easier it is for the United States to commit its troops into the war zone, the harder it is to get them out. The objectives of these new entanglements are ambiguous—if stated at all. The goals change in the middle of the operation. The troops are left without any way of gauging their progress or even visualizing the set of circumstances which would enable them to finally return home.

Today our troops are engaged in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South and Central America—virtually all over the globe. And they are doing a magnificent job with only half of the cold war force, and 35 percent fewer resources. The rate of overseas deployments is up more than 400 percent in this administration alone. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated requirement for an additional \$22 billion in defense investment falls on deaf ears at the White House.

Now we learn that there is another crisis that "requires" American intervention. This time the call comes not from a threatened ally, a loyal friend or even a recognized country, but from a province within a sovereign country. When will it end? Or will this new policy or well meaning enlargement, simply encourage any group with a gripe to choose separation over the harder course of honest dialogue and true democracy. There is no doubt in my mind that Serbian President Milosevic is a brutal and oppressive thug who is guilty of crimes against humanity and genocide. However, an invasion of his country to embrace a "county" in search of independence can only speed our sinking into a Balkan quagmire.

Though we would like to think we can, America cannot erase, merely by its presence, the animosity between religious and ethnic enemies. We cannot cause a love of freedom and devotion to democracy to bloom in this fallow land. We cannot make thugs and tyrants believe that "it takes a village". U.S. troops separating warring factions does nothing to soothe the root cause of the hatred. It only delays the explosion of vengeance and mistrust. As I see it, these conflicts will eventually explode. We can only choose whether the explosion happens with U.S. troops at ground zero or not.

With regard to the prestige and effectiveness of NATO. The only action which weakens our most important alliance is this President's repeated use of empty threats of therapeutic air strikes and endless promises that twenty thousand troops can solve in 1 year—problems which have defied solution for thousands.

As the American presence lengthens in these "peacemaking" and "nation building" missions, the animosity inevitably broadens to also be directed at our troops. Soon the referee is taking blows from both of the fighters. Our troops must eventually defend themselves, but in that self-defense they will only serve to increase the hate of both sides toward America. In these situations, there is no resolution for America, but shameful retreat or total war. Has the tragedy of Somalia been that long ago? I cannot support this flawed political effort without a clear goal, a believable exit strategy and guarantee that this mission will not further degrade fragile military readiness.

In this case, the best way to support our troops is to keep them home.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. SMITH).

(Mr. SMITH of Michigan asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I heard somebody on the other side of the aisle say this is a partisan decision. Not so. Republicans have mixed emotions. This is a serious decision. Our chairman is voting for the resolution. Some of us question it very seriously. It is only partisan if the Democrats decide that they are going to support whatever the President might do.

It seems reasonable that the President of the United States should come to not only Congress, but the American people, and present some of the reasons why it is in America's interest to send our young men and women into this land of Serbia, into one of the regions of that sovereign country called Kosovo, to risk their lives. There needs to be a compelling reason. Dr. Kissinger yesterday said that we might have to bomb our way in and then not really know which side is going to shoot at us. The President is planning to deploy U.S. troops without a clear objective or exit strategy.

Before we deploy any troops, we need clear answers to basic questions like how will our presence advance lasting peace, and how long will our troops remain in the region. Serbs and Alba-

nians have fought in Kosovo, an Albanian-dominated region of southern Serbia, for centuries. Conflict in the last year between ethnic Albanian rebels and Serb police has resulted in over 2,000 deaths.

If the President is not willing to come to Congress, and explain; here is the plan, here is the strategy, here is how long we expect to be there, here is what we expect American taxpayers to pay; what is going to happen when we start taking out some of our young men and women in body bags? One question I had to Dr. Kissinger is why is NATO willing to commit 24,000 of their troops? His answer was partly the U.S. demand and the U.S. initiative.

Mr. Chairman, we can not be the police force for the world. We can not keep spending the Social Security trust fund money. One day, if we are not careful we will not even have these options of helping those in need.

While some remain optimistic about the potential peace agreement, I have serious reservations. Ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo have said that they will settle for nothing less than independence. Serbia refuses to sign an agreement which dismembers the country. As Dr. Kissinger stated, "the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to enjoy the support of the parties involved for a very long period of time."

The long history of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans makes a lasting peace in Kosovo unlikely, with or without a NATO presence. If our goal is to quell the hostilities that have persevered for centuries, than we will find ourselves in the same situation that we face in Bosnia, where our troops deployed for an unlimited amount of time, with no end in sight. U.S. troops have been in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995 at a cost of more than \$9 billion to the U.S. taxpayer. Roughly 6,900 troops are still in Bosnia, even though President Clinton promised that U.S. participation would be limited to one year.

Despite the massive cuts made to our military, we have more troops deployed to hostile regions now than during the Cold War. Dr. Kissinger made the point that "each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North Korea."

If NATO intervenes with troops in Kosovo, the U.S. can assist its NATO partners with communications and intelligence support and back a political strategy aimed at boosting Serbian opposition to Serbian President Milosevic. However, I will not support Congressional authorization to deploy ground troops into a civil conflict with a sovereign nation to enforce a peace agreement that neither side supports.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL).

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

As I mentioned before, I think this resolution is ill-timed and we should not be doing this, but since it is on the floor I rise to support the Gilman resolution.

Carnage has gone on in Kosova for too long, and by the way, I say Kosova

with an "A" because 92 percent of the people that live there are ethnic Albanians and pronounce it Kosova. Ethnic cleansing and genocide has gone on for too long. The butcher of Kosova, Slobodan Milosevic, continues to kill people. We continue to see genocide on the face of Europe. We cannot sit still and continue to allow this to happen. Until the United States stepped in in Bosnia, we saw 200,000 people ethnically cleansed by Milosevic and his people, murdered, and we are going to see it again unless the United States grabs the bull by the horns.

We were told by some on the other side of the aisle that when U.S. troops went to Bosnia there would be many, many American casualties. That has not happened. It will not happen in Kosova, but we will prevent innocent civilians from dying.

I support independence for the people of Kosova because I believe that is the only long-range plan that works, they are entitled to the same things that we hold dear, they are entitled when Yugoslavia broke up the former Yugoslavia, the Croats, and the Slovenians, and the Bosnians, and the Macedonians all had the right to independence and self-determination. The Kosovar Albanians should have that same right. This agreement does not do that, but at least it stops the killing, it stops the ethnic cleansing, it gives them half a loaf.

Milosevic does not want it. He does not want U.S. troops or NATO troops because he wants to keep the killing and he wants to keep the stranglehold on the people of Kosova that have no political rights, no economic rights, no human rights.

NATO has to lead, and the United States has to lead in NATO. NATO cannot do it alone. If we are not the leaders, we will not be successful, NATO will not be successful, and I say to my colleagues we cannot be in favor of stopping genocide and helping the Albanians if we are not willing to have NATO troops on the ground with U.S. leadership and U.S. participation. This is in the vital interests of the U.S. We do not want a larger war.

We need to support the Gilman resolution. It is time to step up to the plate.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPENCE), the chairman of our Committee on Armed Services.

(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have some prepared remarks I would like to make on this subject, but, if I might, I would like to submit my remarks for the RECORD and try to sum up how I feel about this very important resolution we have before us today.

Of course, as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I know that each and every Member will support our men and women in uniform whenever and wherever they are called upon

to go in harm's way. That is why I am in opposition to sending ground forces to Kosovo, however my colleagues want to pronounce it. My abiding concern is for the ability of our fighting forces to respond to crises that amount to real wars. We are right now stretched thin all over the world with all kind of commitments. The op tempo is great. We have torn down our forces to the extent that I have very real grave concerns about our ability to carry out our national strategy of being able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies, or whatever they call them.

We ask our military leaders are we capable, what is our position, our readiness from the standpoint of being able to carry out this mission, and they tell us that they can do it, but the risk will be high to moderate. Mr. Chairman, high to moderate means hundreds of thousands of casualties I am not prepared to take.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. HALL).

(Mr. HALL of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my dire concern and the concern of many of my constituents in my district and in my State regarding any further deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo. I would like to thank the Speaker for providing us with the opportunity to state our beliefs at this time on this controversial issue, and I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. HOEFFEL) and the leadership of my party for giving me this opportunity to differ with my party on this very important item.

I have always supported our uniformed service members and will continue to do so, but I just cannot support the deployment of our sons and daughters to locations around the world where we, as an administration, we, as a Congress, we, as a country, have not explicitly spelled out our objectives.

Do I regret suffering around the world? Of course. Everyone here does on both sides of the aisle. But would I sacrifice one American life for all of Bosnia, Iraq or Kosovo? I absolutely would not without a true national interest, or a plan to successfully enter, a plan to successfully succeed and a plan to successfully leave.

Originally the administration assured Congress that it would not send troops to Kosovo without first providing this body a chance to consider such an action, but the administration knows that this Congress will always support our troops once they are deployed, so off they went. And I would like to ask the President what is our strategy in Kosovo, what are our objectives, how long are we going to keep our men and women in uniform away from their families, what action dictates their return and, finally, what is the overriding national interest in

Kosovo that has prepared him to risk the life of a single American.

In 1996 there were 15,000 American soldiers in Bosnia. Today there are still some 7,000. We promised our troops an end to Bosnia, yet they remain a broken promise. At some time we are going to have to keep our promises to the young men and women of arms of this country.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. BURR), a member of our Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. BURR of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BURR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

I had remarks to make, and I cannot make them. As I have sat here, I found that this is an ever-changing process and some are not relevant. I would only say to many of my colleagues who suggest that this is ill-timed, to debate whether we send troops is not ill-timed. It is, in fact, a debate that I believe our process demands.

That process also demands us to ask questions like my colleague from Texas just asked: Does a deployment to this region make us too thin for the mission of protecting our national interests? What is our exit strategy? Will a peace agreement that may be reached be agreed to by both sides? These are legitimate questions that we need answers to before we agree to anything.

I found myself going through this process when I sat down with people that I have a great deal of confidence in: Senator Dole, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Henry Kissinger, those mountains of the past in foreign policy and, more important, in United States policy.

As my colleagues know, Mr. Chairman, there are people around the world that will watch what we do. They will watch what we do, and they will watch how we act. They realize, as we do, that as we see more and more evidence of genocide on the TV, that we reach out not necessarily because of national interests, but because of injustice, injustice in a region where we have seen martial law take doctors and teachers and eliminate their profession.

We have many questions to find answers to. I am hopeful that the resolution that we have got we can perfect and that we can have unanimous support, but until that point we have a tremendous amount of work to do, and this administration has a tremendous number of questions to answer.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. PRICE).

(Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, at least 2,000 people have been killed and 400,000 have been displaced over this past year by Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal campaign of violence and human rights abuses against

the 2 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The peace process now underway represents our best hope for ending this bloodshed. We do not know if this peace process will succeed, but we do know that NATO is the best and most credible peacekeeping force, and we know that U.S. participation may be critical to the viability of NATO operations.

□ 1530

A vote at this point against authorizing the deployment of troops will embolden Milosevic, disrupt the peace process, and call into question our commitment to NATO.

It used to be said, Mr. Chairman, that politics stopped at the water's edge. It used to be that if a President said, as this President has, that a divisive vote of this sort would undermine delicate negotiations and would harm national security, that that vote would be deferred.

This raw display of partisanship, this calculated attempt to undermine the President, and this reckless disregard for the consequences of our action are unworthy of this body and should be rejected.

This resolution should not be on the floor in the first place, and bringing it up is an irresponsible act. But since it is before us and since the delicate peace negotiations are at risk, the only responsible vote is yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. HAYES).

(Mr. HAYES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Concurrent Resolution 42. This is not a partisan issue. I oppose sending our troops to Kosovo. However, I strongly support the Speaker's call for debate on this issue.

Enough is enough. We can no longer expect some of the Nation's finest men and women to travel halfway around the world to accomplish a mission without objectives.

Mr. Chairman, my district, the 8th of North Carolina, is steeped in military tradition. We hail Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base as our own, two installations that have sent their fair share into combat. I visit these bases frequently and I am sure these young men and women I speak to there are no different than the million and a half soldiers we have stationed all over the world.

What amazes me every time I speak with these young soldiers is, without exception, the can-do spirit they demonstrate. They so quickly forget the sacrifices we asked of them yesterday to accept the challenges of tomorrow, never once questioning why their government continues to ask for more while giving less.

In the forty years leading up to 1990, the United States deployed our troops 10 times. Since then, in only nine years, this country has deployed more

than 25 times; 19 under this administration.

Mr. Chairman, today I am doing what all of our men and women in this service proudly resist. I am asking why? I am asking why do we continue to send our troops on missions navigated by an administration with seemingly rudderless foreign policy?

Nearly 20 years ago, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger laid out a doctrine of criterion that must be met before our forces are sent into combat.

Is a vital national interest at stake? Will we commit sufficient resources to win? Will we sustain the commitment? Are the objectives clearly defined? Is there a reasonable expectation that the public and Congress support the mission? Have we exhausted our options? And I would add we must have a clear exit strategy.

Mr. Chairman, on the eve of yet another deployment I ask my colleagues to join me in sending the administration a strong message. Do not approve, do not send our troops to Kosovo.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my support for this resolution and for the attempts to bring peace and stability to Kosovo. While valid questions have been asked whether or not this is a reasonable time to debate this issue we now must act and send a message to Milosevic and to the world community that enough is enough.

The U.S. must demonstrate leadership. We can only help bring about democracy, peace and stability, the cornerstones of our society, if we engage, if we send troops, as part of a NATO peacekeeping force.

Mr. Chairman, our purpose in sending troops if a peace agreement is reached is clear, to help implement and enforce that peace. We must not shrink from this responsibility. We must not allow politics to undermine our leadership abroad. We must stand tall.

Just yesterday, as I sat as a member of the Committee on International Relations, I heard Ambassador Kirkpatrick say that it is important for Congress to vote yes. I urge all of my colleagues to do so.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SMITH), the distinguished chairman of our Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution before us. Frankly, the administration, the Congress, our allies and the international community as a whole have no easy choices regarding Kosovo.

Many of our colleagues agree that the United States has the responsibility to assert its leadership in the world. In asserting this leadership role, I believe that it is in the interest of the United States to include protection of human rights, especially the mitigation

of atrocities and the cessation of slaughter, and this sometimes requires the prudent use of force.

As we debate the deployment of American troops in Kosovo, however, those of us who had advocated last summer and in the fall that NATO should intervene, not as peacekeepers but peacemakers, to stop the Serbian offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo feel that we have lost some very significant ground.

NATO has threatened to intervene time and time again and its credibility regrettably has been tarnished by inaction. Innocent lives have been lost as a result of indecision, and now one of the seemingly only alternatives is the deployment of NATO forces, including our own troops, in an environment in which one side or another may test NATO's resolve.

Many of us felt the same frustration regarding the United States' policy towards Bosnia. The Dayton agreement of late 1995 was no substitute for action. Even just lifting the arms embargo might have made a significant difference in stopping that genocide in those early years.

At yesterday's hearing in the Committee on International Relations regarding Kosovo, Senator Bob Dole and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick made very convincing arguments for participation in a peacekeeping force. I have sympathy with those who take the side that Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made about not being involved in all of the conflicts around the world. We must, however, consider involvement where we can make a difference. Kosovo fits that category.

I want to say very clearly, unambiguously, I respect everyone's position on this. This is one of the harder, more difficult issues that we have to decide, and we need to listen to all sides, obviously, as we work through this policy decision.

I intend, Mr. Chairman, to vote for H. Con. Res. 42 as introduced. I think many of us do have some misgivings about our own Commander-in-Chief. It is very often not said but thought, but we need to factor in that fact.

I do believe this is the right thing to do at this particular time. Failing to participate could mean a further slaughter, perhaps on a larger scale, of innocent civilians in the Balkans. Failing to participate could lead to a renewed Balkan conflict which could spread to neighboring Macedonia and elsewhere. Failing to do so will send a signal that the United States will not take the lead, even when matters of principle are being challenged, when people are being killed in droves, to the detriment of NATO and the other alliances we have around the world.

This is a resolution that I think deserves support and I hope Members will consider doing so.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON-LEE).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise this afternoon to save lives. I rise in particular to acknowledge the gentleman from New York (Chairman GILMAN), and the ranking member, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) for realizing the importance of this commitment.

I would, however, disagree that we should even be on the floor today precipitously raising this issue, because I believe that we still have the opportunity for a peace agreement, and we should have awaited what the details of that peace agreement would be.

There is not one American, Mr. Chairman, that has not acknowledged and has not shared in the hurt and the pain of the disaster in Kosovo and the terrible strife between Albanians and Serbs; there is not one. There is not one that has not watched the bloodshed, has seen the reports of massacres, seen the untold graves that have been discovered, there is not one American that does not realize that we hold a very privileged position in this world. It is one where others look to us.

Mr. Chairman, I do not come here out of guessing, reading news articles and looking at news reports. I went to Bosnia. I went there on behalf of the President at the start of us trying to determine how we in this Congress and the United States could best respond to the terrible plight of innocent people, women and children.

It was my belief, my heartfelt and studied belief, that the Dayton Peace Treaty was right. Why? Was it because I sat in rooms behind closed door? No. Because I walked the streets of Sarajevo and talked to the people there who said, please help us.

I, too, do not want to see American lives lost. I do not want to send young men and women in harm's way, but I say we have got a wonderful bunch in the military, proud, determined, fine. I think we should get behind them in a bipartisan way, Mr. Chairman, and support this resolution but let us not do danger to the peace operations that are going on.

I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 42. This resolution authorizes the President's use of approximately 4,000 troops for a peacekeeping operation with Kosovo.

This Body can send an invaluable message to the peace negotiations, which begin next week. In sending our troops we signal our willingness to participate as partners in peace. In sending our troops we signal our continued resolve to see that all of the people of the Balkans enjoy the benefits of their human rights. In sending our troops we signal our willingness to be accountable to our NATO commitments and to the world as its sole remaining super power.

If this Body fails to adopt this resolution now it would be interpreted as a vote of no confidence for our foreign policy in the Balkans. It would send confusing signals about our national resolve to persevere to friend and foe alike. I wish we were not considering this bill

in the middle of the peace talks in Kosovo. But if we are to consider this resolution let us send a clear signal of America's resolve to be a partner for peace.

The conflict in Kosovo has caused great human suffering and if left unchecked this conflict could potentially threaten the peace and stability of Europe. Despite the seriousness of this conflict there are those who oppose the use of troops. I wonder if those who are opposed to the use of troops are paying attention to the daily reports of atrocities, as some 2,000 people have been killed. Are those in opposition to the use of our troops listening to the international aide workers who are trying to aid the thousands of refugees fleeing the war-ravaged province.

Tension in this ethnic Albanian region has been increasing since the government of Yugoslavia removed Kosovo's autonomous status. Belgrade's decision came without the approval of the people of Kosovo, which has a population consisting of 90% ethnic Albanians. Several human rights groups have made ominous reports of Serbian forces conducting abductions and summary executions. These reprisal killings and the continued human rights violations gives rise to the specter of ethnic cleansing.

The United States and its allies need to take concrete steps to ensure that this continued violence in the Kosovo region does not spread to Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey. In supporting the President's use of troops, this body would signal a determination to take proactive measures in the Balkan region and encourage an immediate peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Mr. Chairman, this bill expresses the sense of the United States Congress that it deeply deplores and strongly condemns any loss of life or the destruction of property. In supporting this bill this body does not choose sides but indicates a willingness to choose the side of human rights and human dignity.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill and continue the U.S. role as a active participant in the Balkan peace process.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MORAN).

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, it is in our interest to engage in Kosovo. It is in our interest because the reason we enjoy world peace and domestic prosperity is that we gain from worldwide peace and prosperity more than any other nation in the world today. If there were war and depression in Europe we would pay the higher price. We are the leader of this free world because we have defined ourselves as a principled nation; because we believe in democracy and free enterprise and freedom of expression and respect for human rights. And because we do more than just believe in it and talk about it. We are willing to stand up for those principles.

One might say we do not belong in the Balkans, that we have nothing to do with the Balkans. To say that, though, we would have to conveniently ignore the fact that two world wars were started in the Balkans, but we cannot ignore it because the reason Europe is stable today is that we invested after World War II to make sure that it

would not come apart; that it would not be taken over by fascists. We did that through the Marshall Plan. We did it through investing in the European powers, and we did it by establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO.

We established NATO, have invested in it sustained it, and must lead it. The nations of Europe depend upon the strength of our leadership. A free democratic Europe might not exist today if it were not for the United States, and it might not exist as free democratic states in the future if we do not lead through NATO in defense of democracy and human rights.

The other countries of the world recognize they have to look to us for leadership. They also have to look to us because we are the principal military power in this world. We have the capacity to enforce peace, and the moral compass to insist that it be a principled peace.

We should not be empowering a war criminal, a bully, somebody who has gained power by using the situation in Kosovo to divide Yugoslavia and to appeal to the Serbian peoples' worst instincts.

He took away the autonomy of Kosovo in the late 1980s and Milosevic knew exactly what he did. He bred upon the hatred of ethnic fears. He used Kosovo to rise to power and he wants to use Kosovo to stay in power.

It is not in our interest that war criminals have that kind of power. As we all know, when one stands up to a bully they back down. This is our opportunity to stand up to that bully. He should not be given the kind of credibility he has been given. He cannot compete with us militarily, and he understands that we are acting out of principle; that if we act, if we lead, the rest of the European powers will follow. He is counting, though, on the U.S. Congress doing the politically expedient thing by tying the President's hands and refusing to stand up to him.

We need to do the right thing in Kosovo today because if we do not do the right thing in Kosovo today, tomorrow it will be some place else because other bullies around the world will be empowered by Milosevic's success in Kosovo. They will learn from this that the United States is not as determined, we are not as resolved, we are not as principled that we are not the same Nation that rebuilt Europe after World War II.

The fact is we are the same Nation. We must be the same Nation. We must not allow this situation to implode so that we enter the conflict after thousands more people have died and when our troops will be subjected to far greater danger. Do the right thing in Kosovo today.

The CHAIRMAN. All time of the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) has expired. The gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BARR).

(Mr. BARR of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution for military involvement in Kosovo.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition not only to this resolution, but to the principle of governing that has brought it to the floor today.

As we all know, this resolution binds no one; it is fundamentally meaningless. Its passage or failure may make a sound, but that sound will not be heard outside this chamber.

Right now, American troops are deployed all over the globe on missions of dubious value with questionable rules of engagement. We will do our business here today, close the doors, turn out the lights, and go home; yet American troops will still be deployed all over the globe, on missions of dubious value, with questionable rules of engagement.

We can listen to college professors, government bureaucrats, diplomats, and pundits talk about international law for days. However, once they're silent, we'll still be left with the cold, hard fact that it is our job to determine when to commit American troops to military action.

Once again, we seek to tiptoe around a tough decision. We're trying to avoid doing our job so we won't sustain any political damage that might come as a side effect.

What are we afraid of? The Constitution gives us—the Congress—exclusive power to commit American military forces to action. Congress certainly hasn't shown similar reticence to use its appropriation powers, or its power to tax, or its power to regulate.

Personally, I have carefully considered the merits of using American troops as policemen in Kosovo. I have come to two simple conclusions.

First, the job of a soldier is not to act as a referee, an arbiter, a builder of societies or nations, or a policeman. The job of a soldier is to protect America's interests by destroying America's enemies on the battlefield. It is even more insulting to ask a soldier to serve as a policeman under the aegis of some international organization instead of the American flag. Such actions do nothing to further vital American strategic interests. The role of such international groups is to perpetuate themselves by talking, sopping up U.S. tax dollars, and satisfying the goals of some committee of leaders more concerned about the shape of the table they are sitting around than with the interests of the United States.

The second conclusion I have come to is that no amount of American involvement in Kosovo is going to eliminate ethnic conflicts that have raged for centuries. We've been trying to resolve this problem for three years and have gotten nowhere. The 4,000 American troops serving in a NATO occupation are exactly where they started. In a few short years, Kosovo will take its place in history books along with Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia as examples of a foreign policy that has no principled framework, and which bounces from one so-called crisis to another, as a drunk bounces off the walls going down a flight of stairs.

The only people who will rate this action a success are the foreign policy bureaucrats in

the Clinton Administration. Because their foreign policy is not saddled with the burden of concrete goals and objectives, they therefore can—and will—define anything as a “success” whenever pollsters tell them the “public” needs a dose of “success.” This is not a recipe for measured military action; it is a recipe for failure, as defined by sound historical standards of politics among nations. Doubtlessly, as this operation sputters to close—whenever that might be—it will be praised in panel discussions and campaign speeches as a resounding success, when the facts indicate it was a tremendous waste of time, resources, prestige, and possibly lives.

However, no matter how strong my feelings on this issue are, I’m willing to agree that sensible people can disagree over the merits of military action in Kosovo. What I am not willing to do is agree that Congress should have a non-binding vote on this matter, wash our hands of it, move on to other issues that test better in focus groups, and then periodically return to this issue when bullied by the Administration into pouring more money into it.

Right now, our soldiers are risking their lives in a country many Americans have never heard of. My constituents feel very strongly about this issue. Sadly, their opinions will not be a part of American foreign policy. While I urge a no vote on the resolution today, it is far more important for Congress to reassert its role in determining when and where American forces are committed. To do otherwise is to knowingly reject a specific, constitutional, and moral duty.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. HORN).

(Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, I commend the chairman of the Committee on International Relations for bringing this resolution to the floor.

The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. If we are going to go to war with a sovereign nation, we ought to provide a declaration of war. That is what the Constitution of the United States would have us do. I think all of us in this Chamber know that Serbian leader Milosevic is a war criminal that should be tried by an international tribunal. The issue here today is, by what criteria should Congress and the President of the United States judge whether American troops should go there?

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When is the success known by American troops sent to Kosovo? The President repeatedly broke promises regarding the length of service in Bosnia before admitting our troops will be there indefinitely. Are they going to spend 50 years in the Balkans around Kosovo to bring peace as we have in Korea? Korea was where another Nation invaded South Korea.

This is the time to ask the President to face up to the tough questions and give us the answers to the questions that have been submitted to him. I would keep American troops out of Kosovo.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, we should not be asked to vote on this ill-timed resolution, asked to sign a blank check for this deployment; and were it not for the consequences, I would not vote for it, certainly not in the form it comes to us. But if at this critical point, we vote down this resolution, the winner will be Slobodan Milosevic. He will read our action as his warrant to act with impunity, to stonewall the peace negotiators and move with vicious aggression against Kosovo. The best we can make of the choices before us is to vote for the Gejdenson-Turner Amendment, and make this resolution turn on the achievement of a genuine peace agreement.

I would gladly vote for more conditions, for conditions like those proposed by Mr. COX and Mr. NETHERCUTT in the amendments they filed in the record. At the very least, before we send ground troops, we should know: are they peace-keepers or peace-makers? The words sound similar, but the missions differ dramatically. I am opposed to sending ground troops to be peace-makers. But if a durable agreement is reached, I can support, reluctantly, the deployment of our troops as peace-keepers. I say “reluctantly” because if there were a reasonable division of labor between us and our European allies, they would take on this mission. We have at least made the minor precedent of committing only 4,000 troops out of a force of 28,000.

Like everyone in this House, I would prefer to send none. I would prefer not to put any of our young men and women in harm’s way. But we have learned that if the United States wants things to happen, we have to lead; and if we want to be the leader among our allies, we have to participate.

As Senator Dole told us yesterday, if we want to remain the “leader of NATO,” the “United States cannot ignore serious threats to stability in Europe.” I think the U.S. should remain the leader of NATO, and I will, therefore, vote for this resolution, as amended by GEJDENSON and others.

Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express support for the peace process in Kosovo and our troops in the Balkans. Failure to pass this resolution would seriously hamper the efforts of the United States to seek a peace agreement in Kosovo.

Ten years ago, Slobodan Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy—an action which precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia and ethnic violence throughout the Balkans. Since that time, the Kosovars have been struggling to attain self determination—a principle we cherish so deeply here in the United States. Milosevic has responded with brutality, using the Yugoslavian army to crush the aspirations of the Kosovars. His forces have terrorized and murdered innocent civilians and forced thousands from their homes. Indeed, the region today is on the verge of massive violence and human suffering.

The U.S. is currently leading international negotiations to achieve a peace agreement between the Serbian Government and Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population. America and its allies have given Milosevic every opportunity to resolve this conflict through peaceful means. We are not asking him to grant anything new to Kosovo—only to restore the autonomy that we stripped from Kosovo in 1989. Yet Milosevic remains resistant to an agreement and the presence of an international peacekeeping force to implement it.

Without forceful diplomatic effort from the U.S. and our allies, peace will never be achieved in Kosovo.

Mr. Chairman each member of this body has reservations anytime we commit U.S. troops to peacekeeping forces, or to any deployment in a potentially hostile area. In fact, I have always believed that our European allies should commit a higher proportion of the peacekeepers in the Balkans. Fortunately, the Kosovo plan takes a step in that direction by calling on our European allies to contribute over 24,000 troops—86 percent of the total force.

While U.S. troops would comprise a small portion of the overall force, the absence of U.S. troops in a NATO peacekeeping force would have great consequences. NATO’s members continue to look to the U.S. as a leader—imagine the consequences of not honoring our obligations as leader of this security alliance. If we fail to respond to new challenges in the Balkans, our allies will leave the Balkans. If we abandon our responsibilities in the alliance, we greatly jeopardize our national interests in Europe, and weaken our leadership role in the world.

As a new member of the House delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, I have been studying our role in NATO in the post-cold-war world. We recently celebrated the 50th anniversary of NATO—the most successful security alliance in our Nation’s history. But like all successful institutions, NATO must adapt to the new challenges it confronts.

In the post-cold-war Balkan world, ethnic conflicts know no boundaries. Violence in Kosovo greatly jeopardizes the fragile peace in neighboring Bosnia and Macedonia. It also threatens to place Greece and Turkey—our NATO allies—at odds with each other. Without peace in the Balkans, NATO’s credibility as a guarantor of peace and stability in Europe is at risk.

We are at a crucial juncture today in this delicate and complex peace process. All parties will reconvene on Monday, March 15, to hopefully achieve an agreement. Any actions taken by Congress between now and next week will have a profound impact on the final outcome of the peace process.

Fortunately, the U.S. and its allies are negotiating from a position of strength. Thanks in large part to the efforts of Bob Dole, the Kosovars are reportedly united and ready to sign a peace agreement. Clearly, the pressure is now on Milosevic to make concessions and sign on the dotted line.

But if we fail to approve this resolution, the pendulum will shift the other way, and possibly destroy all hopes of achieving a peace agreement. Defeat today would clearly strengthen Milosevic’s hand, diminish our ability to keep the Kosovars united and greatly weaken our position of leadership in NATO.

Peace in Kosovo is not a Democratic or Republican priority—it is in the interests of all of us who support the values of freedom and the growth of democracy. I would remind my Republican colleagues that President George Bush in 1992 took forceful steps to warn Milosevic against the use of force in Kosovo—an action supported in a bipartisan manner by Congress. I would certainly hope that this same bipartisan spirit would prevail on the floor today.

Mr. Chairman, instead of sniping at the foreign policy of our President, we should be expressing our strongest possible support for the

men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. They will not go to Kosovo if there is no peacekeeping agreement to enforce. But should they be called upon to serve in Kosovo, our troops should know that they are strongly supported by Congress.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, earlier today I expressed my views on why the American military should not be sent to Kosovo.

The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. If we are going to go to war with a sovereign nation, we ought to provide a declaration of war. That is what the Constitution of the United States would have us do. I think all of us in this Chamber know that Serbian leader Milosevic is a war criminal that should be tried by an international tribunal. The issue here today is, by what criteria should Congress and the President of the United States judge whether American troops should go there? When is the success known by American troops sent to Kosovo? The President repeatedly broke promises regarding the length of service in Bosnia before admitting our troops will be there indefinitely. Are they going to spend 50 years in the Balkans around Kosovo to bring peace as we have in Korea? Korea was where another Nation invaded South Korea.

This is the time to ask the President to face up to the tough questions and give us the answers to the questions that have been submitted to him. I would keep American troops out of Kosovo.

The President has failed to explain the urgent national interest which requires the introduction of U.S. forces into Kosovo. He has failed to even attempt a full explanation of this policy to Congress. The Constitution has given Congress a clear role to play which the President has ignored.

The Administration argues that if the House votes against authorizing its experiments in peacebuilding today, it will undercut ongoing negotiations and perhaps even lead to more bloodshed. This is insulting. It is the Administration's refusal to consult with Congress and its inability to form a strong policy against Serbian aggression that has led to the debate today. The Administration has rejected all attempts by Congress to assert its Constitutional role on every occasion it has put our forces in harm's way without a clear explanation of its mission or on what our forces were supposed to accomplish. The current objections by the White House are more of the same rhetoric from an Executive Branch derisive of consultation with Congress.

The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. Intervention in Kosovo, even following an agreement forced upon both sides, is the intervention in a civil war to mediate between two sides which we are trying to force into an agreement that will require our forces to uphold.

By what criteria would the President judge success in this mission whereby American troops could be recalled from Kosovo? The President repeatedly broke promises regarding the length of service in Bosnia before admitting that our troops will be there indefinitely. Once a peacekeeping force enters Kosovo to uphold a forced agreement, that force will serve indefinitely unless Congress acts to responsibly to restrict yet another open-ended commitment to achieve nebulous goals.

While the House debates the commitment of forces to Kosovo, we are also wrestling with

the question of funding our armed forces, forces stretched thin by multiple commitments around the world. We are debating how to protect our nation from missile attack, perhaps from missiles improved with stolen American technology. How, then, will another open-ended commitment of American forces help American security. I have heard the argument on why American forces must be present to make a peacekeeping force work, and while these arguments have merit, they also point out the failure of Europe to deal with issues in its own backyard.

Under the agreement being negotiated now, the peacekeeping force would attack Serbia if its forces or sympathizers violate the agreement, but what would happen if elements of the Kosovo Liberation Army violates the agreement? How would the United States with NATO punish Kosovar violations?

The United States presumably has a responsibility to end the bloodshed in Kosovo because it is the only nation left with the resources to do so. So why, then, is the Administration not seeking to put peacekeepers on the ground in Turkey, where thousands of innocent Kurds have been killed in Turkey's attempt to destroy the terrorists of the PKK? Why have American peacekeepers not been dispatched to Sierra Leone, where the killing continues? Why were international peacekeepers not part of the Irish or Basque peace agreement? What makes Kosovo different?

Let us keep American troops out of Kosovo. If lives are to be in harm's way let the European members of NATO handle regional conflicts in their own backyard.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, for the past decade, ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, a province of Serbia, the dominant republic of Yugoslavia, have fought a courageous campaign to regain the rights they had taken away by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic who in 1989 stripped away the autonomy they had enjoyed under the Yugoslav Constitution. Milosevic, the architect of this crisis who also produced the Bosnian tragedy, and presided over the dissolution of what was once Yugoslavia, has brought poverty and misery to his own people and has sown the seeds of strident nationalism throughout the Balkans.

Milosevic has met all attempts to reach a peaceful settlement with the ethnic Albanian community with forceful vengeance and repression. President Milosevic escalated this campaign of terror about one year ago when he launched a brutal crackdown on the majority Albanian population. Civilians were terrorized, tortured and murdered by Serbian police and military forces while hundreds more were driven from their homes. This systematic campaign of repression manifested itself this past January, when Serbian security forces brutally massacred 45 Albanian citizens in the village of Racak.

Spurred on by Milosevic's campaign of terror, the United States and its European allies initiated peace talks between the two sides which ended with both agreeing to resume negotiations on March 15. As part of a proposed peace agreement, the United States would contribute 4,000 American troops to an international peacekeeping force of 28,000 that would be responsible for implementing the provisions of the peace accord.

This possible deployment of American troops to Kosovo has created a contentious debate within congress. Critics of an American

participation in Kosovo claim that the United States lacks a vital national interest in this conflict, that we "don't have a dog in this fight". But I would argue that we do indeed have a vital national interest in this conflict, as this region has previously been the source of great pain and suffering. Twice before in the 20th century we have seen American soldiers drawn to Europe to fight wars that either began in the Balkan region or ignited fighting there. When this region was again the source of conflict after World War I, the United States did not intervene and subsequently hundreds of thousands of brave Americans and Europeans paid the ultimate price. As George Santayana once said, "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Experience dictates that turning a blind eye to this region can be fraught with peril.

I believe that the current crisis in Kosovo, if not confronted now, could have devastating and disastrous effects on this region. We must remember that violence in southern Europe has no boundaries. There is a strong possibility that the current fighting in Kosovo could trigger a chain reaction of conflict that might engulf the entire region. A spreading conflict could re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and destabilize fragile Macedonia where the UN peacekeeping force mission has ended. In addition, our NATO allies Greece and Turkey, longtime adversaries with historical ties to both sides, could also be brought into the conflict. Increasing hostilities would cause massive suffering, displace tens of thousands of people, undermine stability throughout South Central Europe and directly affect our key allies in the region.

As we have learned in Bosnia and seen in Kosovo, the only language that President Milosevic understands is that of force. Additionally, what we have seen in the former Yugoslavia in the last decade is that it is very difficult to stop internal conflicts if the international community is not willing to use force. The United States must be willing to show Mr. Milosevic that we will not stand idly by while his forces systematically murder and displace innocent civilians.

President Clinton once said that the United States is the world's indispensable nation. I strongly believe this to be true. Our country has a moral obligation to stand up and act when innocent civilians are being murdered and their basic fundamental rights are being violated. As the leading voice in the world for democracy, respect for the rule of law and fundamental human rights, we are sometimes confronted with difficult decisions.

This I believe, is one of those decisions. And while I do not take lightly the decision to dispatch our armed forces abroad, I strongly believe that the United States must lead the efforts to halt the bloodshed and violence in Kosovo.

Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, our responsibility is to protect America. Our responsibility is to act prudently before placing any of our fellow Americans in harm's way. We have no responsibility to referee bloody disputes wherever they crop up.

The fuse on Kosovo has been lit. The Serbs have no interest in relinquishing their historic claims on the territory. The Albanians speak with so many voices that the only certainty we have is that any Albanian leader we deal with will not be speaking for most of his armed compatriots. When we make ourselves this region's policeman we make our young men and

women targets for armed fanatics. And committing them will continue to place greater strains and burdens on our over-stretched military.

Neither side there likes us. Neither side respects us. Neither side wants us there. Who are we protecting?

There is no reason to believe that the Albanian and Serb positions are reconcilable or that either side wants reconciliation.

The risks of this strategy are that transparent. The benefits in contrast are little more than wishes and hopes which we have no reason to believe will materialize. Some have argued that defeating this resolution today will kill the peace process. Let me just say that if killing the so-called peace process saves American lives I will always make that choice.

We should oppose this deployment because it will only erode our military strength, weaken our nation's credibility and place our military forces at great risk.

If you vote to approve this resolution, you should know why, because you may have to explain that to the family of an American soldier. That's not a pleasant thought. I hope, with all my heart, it will never come true, but that's your responsibility if you vote for this resolution.

The administration has failed diplomatically. Please don't send our troops over to make some diplomats look good.

Please reject this misguided policy which threatens the lives of our military and the security of our nation.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I support H. Con. Res. 42 and encourage my colleagues to vote for it. At this delicate moment, our support of the President is critical to the success of this peace agreement.

I am always wary of committing our uniformed men and women into conflict. However, I strongly believe that we cannot turn a blind eye to a genocide that is steadily destroying Kosovo and threatening the peace throughout the region. Rejecting this resolution is complying with the continued slaughter of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children. To date, over 400,000 people have been driven from their homes, 200,000 have perished and entire villages have been pillaged in the name of "ethnic cleansing."

As the sole remaining superpower, we have a responsibility to the people of the Balkans, NATO and the greater global community to take our proper role in helping to end this tragedy. I believe that our allies have truly stepped up to the plate—the bulk of the peacekeeping forces will not be American, but European. Our participation will help achieve a European solution to this crisis—something that we must encourage.

Now is not the time to step away from our responsibility, but to seize it. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution.

Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of our troops, as always, but I stand absolutely opposed to yet another black hole-undefined U.S. troop deployment, this time to Kosovo, for peacemaking and peacekeeping reasons.

The debate today mirrors what we have debated the last 4 years over Bosnia, and yes Mr. Speaker, it is not a news flash that thousands of U.S. troops are right next door and will unfortunately remain there indefinitely.

I remind my colleagues of what the President said before he dispatched thousands of

troops to Bosnia. It was to only be a temporary operation of 12 months and only cost the American taxpayers \$1 billion dollars. As we all know, we are now in year 4 and the price tag is over \$10 billion. We should not be fooled again.

Asked what the plans are now, the Administration says about one year and about \$2 billion. Two billion dollars to merely detour warring factions. If and when the United States ever does leave the region, some estimates are that fighting would be restarted within months, if not weeks.

Mr. Chairman, Kosovo is a dangerous place. If there are questions about troop safety and regional stability in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), I encourage my colleagues to please take a look at a recently released classified GAO report entitled "International Security: NATO's Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans" (GAO-C-NSIAD-99-4).

However, I have also asked that the GAO provide an unclassified version of this report for the public record. I hope that my colleagues will consider reading one of these versions before we vote.

The President's plan to add more than 4,000 U.S. ground troops to Kosovo on top of the 6,900 troops next door in Bosnia, is wrong.

Much to my dismay, this geographic region is increasingly becoming a permanent forward deployment area and it is conceivable that within the next few years, we might be in half a dozen countries because of a Balkan domino effect.

The Administration failed to answer many key questions before U.S. troops were sent into Bosnia. I ask my colleagues to consider the following three questions which were never answered before.

What is the mission?

Is the mission in our national security interest or is it a European security interest?

What is the exit strategy and when does it kick in?

Mr. Chairman, Congress needs to regain control of this peacemaking/peacekeeping situation, because I think we have a White House with an itch to disperse U.S. troops worldwide with insufficient American security interests at stake.

I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join me in opposing this important Kosovo resolution.

Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak on this most serious issue that confronts us today.

There is little disagreement on the brutal behavior of the Serbs and the inhuman atrocities they have inflicted upon the Albanian Kosovars. There is a great human tragedy unfolding in the region.

But the placement of American troops on the ground as a part of peacekeeping force in a sovereign state torn by civil war must be a decision that has been fully debated and consented to by Congress. The President must include Congress in the formulation of this policy.

The Washington Post stated this morning that, "We think the stakes are sufficient to make it highly desirable that the president's policy be supported by a strong bipartisan vote in Congress. The president ought to be asking forthrightly for congressional approval, not trying to evade a congressional judgment on his policy in Kosovo."

Some argue that those in this House that have reservations about sending American ground forces to Kosovo are isolationists. I emphatically disagree with this assertion. I firmly support a strong U.S. presence throughout the world on every stage, including military, economic, and political. I worked hard in this body on issues such as full participation in the IMF, being a leader in world trade, economic support to many nations, humanitarian relief and the fight against hunger throughout the world, and the strengthening of NATO to mention a few.

There is no doubt a brutal bloody ethnic civil war is occurring in Kosovo and that there is the need for a greater debate on this issue. These ethnic animosities have existed for centuries of time. But to place American troops in the middle of this ethnic war without a defined mission, without a defined goal, and without an exit strategy is highly questionable. It is a question that must be answered by both the President and Congress before any action is taken.

I question the use of NATO to coerce a sovereign nation to consent to our position on their own internal issues. Europe should take the lead on dealing with the Kosovo situation. Europe should supply the ground troops. I have no problem with the United States providing logistic, technical, and intelligence assets to support our European allies.

As Henry Kissinger stated in his widely read article, Kosovo, in terms of security, is a European interest not an American interest. "Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe and our NATO allies were not asked to help there."

Let me add this . . . if the President decides to send troops to Kosovo, with or without the consent of Congress, once young Americans hit the ground I will strongly support them with the knowledge that America's sons and daughters will perform with true fidelity to honor, duty, country. They will as always do their best and make us proud.

So I caution my colleagues that this debate is about policy not support of our troops in the field and it is about Congress' role in foreign affairs not isolationism.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I must state my great reservations about sending American troops to Kosovo.

I include the Kissinger editorial in the RECORD of this debate.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1999]  
No U.S. GROUND FORCES FOR KOSOVO—LEADERSHIP DOESN'T MEAN THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING OURSELVES.

(Henry Kissinger)

President Clinton's announcement that some 4,000 American troops will join a NATO force of 28,000 to help police a Kosovo agreement faces all those concerned with long-range American national security policy with a quandary.

Having at one time shared responsibility for national security policy and the extrication from Vietnam, I am profoundly uneasy about the proliferation of open-ended American commitments involving the deployment of U.S. forces. American forces are in harm's way in Kosovo, Bosnia and the gulf. They lack both a definition of strategic purpose by which success can be measured and an exit strategy. In the case of Kosovo, the concern is that America's leadership would be impaired by the refusal of Congress to approve American participation in the NATO force that has come into being largely

as a result of a diplomacy conceived and spurred by Washington.

Thus, in the end, Congress may feel it has little choice but to go along. In any event, its formal approval is not required. But Congress needs to put the administration on notice that it is uneasy about being repeatedly confronted with ad hoc military missions. The development and articulation of a comprehensive strategy is imperative if we are to avoid being stretched too thin in the face of other foreseeable and militarily more dangerous challenges.

Before any future deployments take place, we must be able to answer these questions: What consequences are we seeking to prevent? What goals are we seeking to achieve? In what way do they serve the national interest?

President Clinton has justified American troop deployments in Kosovo on the ground that ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia threatens "Europe's stability and future." Other administration spokesmen have compared the challenge to that of Hitler's threat to European security. Neither statement does justice to Balkan realities.

The proposed deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any threat to American security as traditionally conceived. The threatening escalations sketched by the president—to Macedonia or Greece and Turkey—are in the long run more likely to result from the emergence of a Kosovo state.

Nor is the Kosovo problem new. Ethnic conflict has been endemic in the Balkans for centuries. Waves of conquests have congealed divisions between ethnic groups and religions, between the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic faiths; between Christianity and Islam; between the heirs of the Austrian and Ottoman empires.

Through the centuries, these conflicts have been fought with unparalleled ferocity because none of the populations has any experience with—and essentially no belief in—Western concepts of toleration. Majority rule and compromise that underlie most of the proposals for a "solution" never have found an echo in the Balkans.

Moreover, the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to enjoy the support of the parties for a long period of time. For Serbia, acquiescing under the threat of NATO bombardment, it involves nearly unprecedented international intercession. Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, is being asked to cede control and in time sovereignty of a province containing its national shrines to foreign military force.

Though President Slobodan Milosevic has much to answer for, especially in Bosnia, he is less the cause of the conflict in Kosovo than an expression of it. On the need to retain Kosovo, Serbian leaders—including Milosevic's domestic opponents—seem united. For Serbia, current NATO policy means either dismemberment of the country or postponement of the conflict to a future date when, according to the NATO proposal, the future of the province will be decided.

The same attitude governs the Albanian side. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is fighting for independence, not autonomy. But under the projected agreement, Kosovo, now an integral part of Serbia, is to be made an autonomous and self-governing entity within Serbia, which, however, will remain responsible for external security and even exercise some unspecified internal police functions. A plebiscite at the end of three years is to determine the region's future.

The KLA is certain to try to use the cease-fire to expel the last Serbian influences from the province and drag its feet on giving up its arms. And if NATO resists, it may come under attack itself—perhaps from both sides. What is described by the administration as a

"strong peace agreement" is like to be at best the overture to another, far more complicated set of conflicts.

Ironically, the projected peace agreement increases the likelihood of the various possible escalations sketched by the president as justification for a U.S. deployment. An independent Albanian Kosovo surely would seek to incorporate the neighboring Albanian minorities—mostly in Macedonia—and perhaps even Albania itself. And a Macedonian conflict would land us precisely back in the Balkan wars of earlier in this century. Will Kosovo then become the premise for a NATO move into Macedonia, just as the deployment in Bosnia is invoked as justification for the move into Kosovo? Is NATO to be the home for a whole series of Balkan NATO protectorates?

What confuses the situation even more is that the American missions in Bosnia and Kosovo are justified by different, perhaps incompatible, objectives. In Bosnia, American deployment is being promoted as a means to unite Croats, Muslims and Serbs into a single state. Serbs and Croats prefer to practice self-determination but are being asked to subordinate their preference to the geopolitical argument that a small Muslim Bosnian state would be too precarious and irredentist. But in Kosovo, national self-determination is invoked to produce a tiny state nearly certain to be irredentist.

Since neither traditional concepts of the national interest nor U.S. security impel the deployment, the ultimate justification is the laudable and very American goal of easing human suffering. This is why, in the end, I went along with the Dayton agreement in so far as it ended the war by separating the contending forces. But I cannot bring myself to endorse American ground forces in Kosovo.

In Bosnia, the exit strategy can be described. The existing dividing lines can be made permanent. Failure to do so will require their having to be manned indefinitely unless we change our objective to self-determination and permit each ethnic group to decide its own fate.

In Kosovo, that option does not exist. There are no ethnic dividing lines, and both sides claim the entire territory. America's attitude toward the Serbs' attempts to insist on their claim has been made plain enough; it is the threat of bombing. But how do we and NATO react to Albanian transgressions and irredentism? Are we prepared to fight both sides and for how long? In the face of issues such as these, the unity of the contact group of powers acting on behalf of NATO is likely to dissolve. Russia surely will increasingly emerge as the supporter of the Serbian point of view.

We must take care not to treat a humanitarian foreign policy as a magic recipe for the basic problem of establishing priorities in foreign policy. The president's statements "that we can make a difference" and that "America symbolizes hope and resolve" are exhortations, not policy prescriptions. Do they mean that America's military power is available to enable every ethnic or religious group to achieve self-determination? Is NATO to become the artillery for ethnic conflict? If Kosovo, why not East Africa or Central Asia? And would a doctrine of universal humanitarian intervention reduce or increase suffering by intensifying ethnic and religious conflict? What are the limits of such a policy and by what criteria is it established?

In my view, that line should be drawn at American ground forces for Kosovo. Europeans never tire of stressing the need for greater European autonomy. Here is an occasion to demonstrate it. If Kosovo presents a security problem, it is to Europe, largely be-

cause of the refugees the conflict might generate, as the president has pointed out. Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe—and we never asked for NATO support there. The nearly 300 million Europeans should be able to generate the ground forces to deal with 2.3 million Kosovars. To symbolize Allied unity on larger issues, we should provide logistics, intelligence and air support. But I see no need for U.S. ground forces; leadership should not be interpreted to mean that we must do everything ourselves.

Sooner or later, we must articulate the American capability to sustain a global policy. The failure to do so landed us in the Vietnam morass. Even if one stipulates an American strategic interest in Kosovo (which I do not), we must take care not to stretch ourselves too thin in the face of far less ambiguous threats in the Middle East and Northwest Asia.

Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North Korea. The psychological drain may be even more grave. Each time we make a peripheral deployment, the administration is constrained to insist that the danger to American forces is minimal—the Kosovo deployment is officially described as a "peace implementation force."

Such comments have two unfortunate consequences: They increase the impression among Americans that military force can be used casualty-free, and they send a signal of weakness to potential enemies. For in the end, our forces will be judged on how adequate they are for peace imposition, not peace implementation.

I always am inclined to support the incumbent administration in a forceful assertion of the national interest. And as a passionate believer in the NATO alliance, I make the distinctions between European and American security interests in the Balkans with the utmost reluctance. But support for a strong foreign policy and a strong NATO surely will evaporate if we fail to anchor them in a clear definition of the national interest and impart a sense of direction to our foreign policy in a period of turbulent change.

Mr. EWING. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my concern with the possibility that U.S. troops may soon be deployed to Kosovo. The U.S. has promised to send approximately 4,000 troops to Kosovo to enforce a cease-fire that has not yet been agreed to. We are told that our servicemen and women will be in Kosovo for at least three years, but are given no indication of the expected cost, or the goals of the mission.

I am troubled by the fact that the administration appears to be rushing towards a quick deployment without explaining to the Congress and the country why our troops need to be sent to Kosovo. I have yet to hear a clear explanation of what our interests are in Kosovo—why does the most powerful nation in the world need to put its troops in harm's way to enforce a peace agreement that doesn't even exist?

I am not convinced that it is in our best interest to send U.S. troops to Kosovo. We have many potential trouble spots brewing around the world that beg for our attention—North Korea, China's missile race, and the deteriorating situation in Russia are national security problems vital to our interests, and they beg for strong U.S. involvement. Yet Congress is being told that the situation in Kosovo is a vital national security concern, and this threat justifies placing our troops in harm's way.

We have had troops in Bosnia since 1995, at a cost of more than \$12 billion. This is

money that is taken directly from DoD accounts, reducing our readiness in other crucial areas. Even worse, the long and repeated tours of duty in Bosnia have convinced many soldiers in the active and reserve branches to retire, depleting our ranks of dedicated and experienced people. Congress is now told that the Army wants to lower its recruitment standards and begin hiring high school dropouts to make up for shortages in manpower.

The same crowd that ridiculed the "Domino Theory" of communist expansion now appear to be advancing their own "Domino Theory" for the region around the former Yugoslavia—first it was Macedonia, then Bosnia, now Kosovo, and then what?

Mr. Chairman, a convincing case has not been made for the necessity of U.S. troop involvement in Kosovo. The U.S. does not need the best trained and most powerful army in the world sitting in Kosovo playing peacekeeper. If Europe is so concerned about the destabilizing effects of Kosovo, then let them handle the problem. When it is said that "NATO" will be providing the troops, that usually can be translated as "the U.S." America pays the bills and undertakes most of the difficult missions—virtually all the bombing and other air missions are handled by our Air Force.

Our troops have been in Bosnia since 1995, at a huge cost to our military readiness and to the Defense budget. We must resist the urge to use military force to resolve every humanitarian problem that crops up. We need to take our troops out of the equation in Kosovo and begin focusing on real national security concerns.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to consideration of this resolution authorizing the use of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo.

I do not support putting American ground troops, even as part of a NATO force, in the middle of a civil war in central Europe. But I object to this resolution on other grounds, as well. This very debate may hamstring our negotiators as they seek a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict with the Serbian government and ethnic Albanians.

It makes no sense to me that the Congress is debating a resolution on use of force before our negotiators have even concluded their attempts to resolve the Kosovo situation peacefully. I hope we do not damage their efforts by even taking this resolution under consideration.

I am not opposed to NATO forces being involved in enforcing an agreement. Our air forces have effectively been used to enforce the United Nations resolutions involving Iraq, for example. However, I do not believe it is in our best interests—or in the interest of the European Community—for Americans to be part of a ground force in Kosovo. That is why I will cast my vote against this resolution today.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, while there may be no desire by President Clinton and his Administration to recognize Congress' role in determining whether or not to deploy troops to Kosovo, we all know that their decision will require Congress to find the necessary dollars to pay for this mission. And there is no question that Congress will provide the necessary dollars to support our men and women in uniform.

But we need to be prepared for the tough choices that lie ahead.

Let's take the U.S. mission in Bosnia as an example. We have been in Bosnia for almost

four years and there is still no end-date in sight. Yet, the Administration has not included funding for this mission in their budget until this year. This open-ended mission, while it has saved lives, it has also cost \$19 billion to date.

The Administration may be embarking on this mission in Kosovo to save lives and prevent open warfare in the Balkans, but we here in Congress will be responsible for making the tough decisions about how to pay for it.

There is no money in the President's budget to pay for this deployment. The Administration has requested increased spending on all sorts of new programs from education to health care but there is no money for our troops that may be deployed in Kosovo.

And from the hearings I have attended so far as a Member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, we are already facing real shortfalls in funding and manpower in several other ongoing missions, including the Persian Gulf. And don't be fooled by claims that this mission will be far more limited than the one in Bosnia and thus, less costly. In a recent hearing with Secretary of Defense Cohen, I asked him about the U.S. commitment to deploy 4,000 troops as part of a larger NATO force. In reality, he told me that the number is closer to 12,000 because for every one of our men on the ground, 3 more of our soldiers are required in support.

So, I rise to forewarn my colleagues that we will face some very tough choices about how to pay for these missions, as well as the proposed pay raise for our military personnel and to address the many other shortfalls in our military readiness. The President has failed to do so in his budget, but we will not. The President has not only failed to consult Congress, but he has failed in his budget proposal to say how he will pay for this critical decision.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H. Con. Res. 42, a concurrent resolution regarding the use of U.S. Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

Let me first say that I am a strong supporter of the brave and hard-working men and women of our armed services. I salute them for all they have done for our great nation, and I am extremely proud of them.

However, this is an initiative that NATO was never intended to undertake. As Henry Kissinger said at a House International Relations Committee hearing, this would be an "unprecedented extension of NATO's authority."

More importantly, I believe that inserting our troops in the middle of an ethnically charged civil war is very dangerous. Neither the Albanians nor the Serbs are interested in any sort of compromise. The Albanians want only independence and the Serbs, who view Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian civilization, are unwilling to give up their ancestral homeland. If neither side is interested in working out a peaceful agreement, the introduction of American troops into the conflict will probably inflame anti-American sentiments and Albanian nationalism with disastrous results. They don't want our help and don't want to work towards peace. I do not believe that we should risk the lives of our troops for intangible goals that have no basis in reality.

Now, I certainly do not advocate the actions of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. There is a compelling body of evidence to be-

lieve that Milosevic is guilty of crimes against humanity and other war crimes, and I am deeply concerned about this affront to human rights. This chamber has voted to support the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its efforts to bring Milosevic to justice. However, without a well thought out plan on how we should utilize our troops, I cannot support this action.

Mr. Chairman, look at the other conflicts we have gotten involved with. Somalia was a disaster. Iraq continues in its defiance. American troops are still inextricably entangled in Bosnia. Haiti dissolved its democracy and now has an authoritarian regime. The track record for this Administration is not good.

The Administration has not explained how dragging American troops into another ethnic conflict will protect American interests, and until that is done in a satisfactory fashion, I cannot and will not support the Administration's attempts to put American troops in harm's way.

Mr. Chairman, we are not the emergency 911 number for the world, and I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Gejdenson Amendment to H. Con. Res. 42. Three months before he died, in his fourth inaugural address, President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his hope for a "just, honorable, and durable" settlement to World War II. But he cautioned against acting impetuously to bring about this settlement, knowing that "peace could not be achieved immediately."

President Roosevelt was aware that peace-making is a delicate process. We have learned, as a country and as a people, that peace is a difficult goal to achieve. Peace takes engagement. Most of all, peace takes time.

As most of you know, I am the youngest member of the House. Many people have tried to find a name for my generation, because in earlier times there was the World War I generation, the World War II generation, and the Vietnam Generation. There are no wars to name us by. Why is that? Because we have learned that U.S. forces should only be used when there is a clear goal and U.S. interests are threatened. And even then, we must use force judiciously and effectively.

I myself have some concerns on the extent of our commitment, our exit strategy, and our rules of engagement. But how can we dictate the terms of our involvement when a settlement has not yet been reached?

Unfortunately, the majority has brought this resolution to the floor at this time, against the blatant wishes of all those involved in the process, from Senator Dole to the President to the Kosovars to the Serbs. This is an obstruction of the peace process. I support this amendment because I support the Administration's efforts to secure a just peace.

At the same time, we must play our constitutional role responsibly. Let the Administration continue its efforts toward reaching a settlement. As Speaker HASTERT himself said two weeks ago, let's give them the "room to negotiate." I would be surprised to learn that Speaker HASTERT considers two weeks enough time to resolve a conflict that spans centuries.

The President should continue taking steps to bring the parties to a fair and just agreement. If and when such an agreement is

reached, we should give our full support for the deployment of U.S. troops. For these reasons, I support the Gejdenson Amendment to H. Con. Res. 42.

The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the concurrent resolution is considered read for amendment under the 5-minute rule.

The text of House Concurrent Resolution 42 is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 42

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),*

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

This resolution may be cited as the "Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution".

**SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The conflict in Kosovo has caused great human suffering and, if permitted to continue, could threaten the peace of Europe.

(2) The Government of Serbia and representatives of the people of Kosovo may agree in Rambouillet, France, to end the conflict in Kosovo.

(3) President Clinton has promised to deploy approximately 4,000 United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

**SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.**

The President is authorized to deploy United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the concurrent resolution is in order except those printed in the portion of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD designated for that purpose and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments printed in the RECORD may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee, and shall be considered read.

The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone a request for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the time for voting on any postponed question that immediately follows another vote, provided that the time for voting on the first question shall be a minimum of 15 minutes.

Are there any amendments to the concurrent resolution?

AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MR. GEJDENSON

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. GEJDENSON:

Page 2, after line 3, insert the following:

(3) Former Senator Robert Dole recently traveled to the region to meet with the Kosovar Albanians and deliver a message from President Clinton encouraging all parties to reach an agreement to end the conflict in Kosovo.

(4) Representatives of the Government of Serbia and representatives of the Kosovar Albanians are scheduled to reconvene in France on March 15, 1999.

Page 2, line 4, strike "(3)" and insert "(5)".

Page 2, strike line 9 and all that follows and insert the following:

**SEC. 3. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.**

(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY RELATING TO INTERIM AGREEMENT.—The Congress urges the President to continue to take measures described in (b) to support the ongoing peace process relating to Kosovo with the objective of reaching a fair and just interim agreement between the Serbian Government and the Kosovar Albanians on the status of Kosovo.

(b) AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES.—If a fair and just interim agreement described in subsection (a) is reached, the President is authorized to deploy United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing such interim agreement.

(c) DECLARATION OF POLICY RELATING TO SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES.—The Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are carrying out their missions in support of peace in the Balkan region, and throughout the world, with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism, and exemplary bravery.

**SEC. 4. LIMITATION.**

The authorization in section 3 is subject to the limitation that the number of United States Armed Forces personnel participating in a deployment described in that section may not exceed 15 percent of the total NATO force deployed to Kosovo in the peacekeeping operation described in that section, except that such percentage may be exceeded if the President determines that United States forces or United States citizens are in danger and notifies Congress of that determination.

**POINT OF ORDER**

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, subsection 3 of the proposed amendment includes language that goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee on International Relations and extends into the jurisdiction of the Committee on National Security. Additionally, the subject matter of the amendment is different from the underlying text.

For both of these reasons, I urge the Chair to sustain a point of order.

**PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY**

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, is it my understanding that the objection relates to the statement that the Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission in support of peace in the Balkans and throughout the world with professional excellence and dedicated patriotism?

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, regular order.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, is that the section the gentleman is objecting to?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.

If the gentleman has a parliamentary inquiry, or if the gentleman would like

to be heard on the point of order, the Chair would recognize him.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, my question is, is that the section that the gentleman objects to?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is not making a proper parliamentary inquiry of the Chair. The Chair will rule on the germaneness of the amendment after hearing argument.

Does the gentleman wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I do wish to be heard, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that the Chairman has just indicated that he objects to this one section that commends the armed forces for the excellence that they are involved in in carrying out their mission and their commitment. I would, at the appropriate time, ask for unanimous consent that we allow this language to be retained, because I do think, no matter which side of this issue people are on, that they want to express their support and admiration for our troops.

So I would ask unanimous consent at the appropriate time, or ask the gentleman to withdraw his point of order so that we can go forward with our amendment. It does not really change the policy or the amendment itself; it is simply, I think, the kind of support we have always included in times when we are dealing with foreign policy issues, and we ought not let jurisdictional battles in the Congress preclude us from making a positive statement about the troops.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other Member who wishes to be heard on the point of order?

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to express support for our forces, as all of our colleagues do, and as a veteran, I know the sacrifices that our men and women are asked to make.

I would support a separate resolution on this matter at an appropriate time, but I do not think that this is an appropriate part of this resolution, and I raise the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other Members who wish to be heard on the point of order, the Chair is ready to rule.

The gentleman from New York makes the point of order that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut is not germane.

The concurrent resolution authorizes the President to deploy United States Armed Forces to implement a Kosovo peace agreement. Its provisions fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Committee on International Relations. That committee has jurisdiction over "intervention abroad", which includes the deployment of armed forces by the President. Conditions, limitations or



Gejdenson amendment or to the Fowler amendment. It is not a substitute. It is in fact an additional section that would leave the Gejdenson amendment in effect.

What would be the process here since the Fowler amendment is in fact a substitute for Gejdenson? Is it? It is not?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair informs the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TRAFICANT) that the amendment pending is the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON). No other amendment or substitute has been offered to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut. The gentleman from Connecticut is entitled to speak for 5 minutes on his amendment.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, further parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I will have, then, an amendment, a secondary amendment to the Gejdenson amendment in the form of an addition, and I would like to be protected for an opportunity to provide that amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot guarantee recognition of any Member for the purpose of offering second degree amendments. The Chair's job is to follow regular order, and that is what the Chair intends to do.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) for 5 minutes on his amendment.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, let me first say to my friends that the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TRAFICANT), while he referenced it as a perfecting amendment, I would say that is a term of the parliamentary procedures. I would not see it as an improvement on the underlying amendment. He has a right to offer it, but I disagree with that. I will just get that out on the table.

Let me tell my colleagues a story about my father. My father will turn 87 in the next 5 days. Although he never spoke about World War II much, he told me this one story of a day that raised his hopes, and then of course there was a lot more calamity after that day. It was December 7, 1941.

He was a prisoner in a work camp run by the Germans, the Nazis in World War II. He was one of thousands of Jews across Eastern Europe who had been rounded up. In his small village of Profonia, there was about 400 Jews and 400 non-Jews. The Jews were put into a labor camp.

On that day or shortly after December 7, he heard that American ships had been bombed in Pearl Harbor. While in this country there was obviously great anxiety, my father saw great hope, because for the first time in the darkness of World War II, he had the vision and hope that America would be rapidly in this war and that it would soon be over. But he was wrong.

Before American forces could liberate concentration camps and work

camps across Europe, virtually every member of his family and every Jewish member of that village, except for a few, were shot to death in a small depression in their town.

A friend of mine, Senator WYDEN's father, found me a letter from a Nazi who witnessed the executions. He said the first person he shot was a woman who had given birth the day before. They had her stand naked. They shot her and her child and proceeded to shoot every other member of the village that they had rounded up.

What we do here today is not an academic exercise. It is not simply a function of parliamentary procedures between the executive and the legislative. This has a real life and death impact for people on this planet.

We are going to decide whether or not today these negotiations have a chance at succeeding. There is no guarantee they will succeed. There is a hope that they will succeed, but there is a guaranteed failure if the House shuts off the administration's abilities to move forward.

There is no constitutional demand that we vote on this, but we are here by the procedures that have been forced upon us. So having them before us, we had better vote yes.

We are not asking to assert American forces in a live fire zone. We have had on both sides of the aisle broad bipartisan support to send Americans in harm's way where many would perish. We are sending the smallest percentage of Americans in a conflict in my memory, and the President and the Secretary of State say they only enter if a peace agreement has been signed.

So whatever my colleagues' inclinations are, whatever my colleagues' philosophies are about war powers in the Constitution, that small village in Profonia may be replayed again, and it will be on our head what happens to those people.

Think carefully before one makes their final vote today. This is not about relationships with the White House, Democrats versus Republicans, those who believe in intervention and nonintervention. This is about whether we give peace a chance and whether we have an opportunity to let children grow into adults.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER), the cosponsor of this resolution.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to offer this amendment which I think embodies the intent of many Members of this body. This amendment very clearly states that if a just and fair interim agreement is not reached we will not deploy troops.

The President made that very clear as his position on February 4 in a speech made here in Washington at the Baldridge Quality Awards Ceremony. No troops unless there is first an agreement. We believe this amendment should be adopted to make that clear.

Secondly, we believe that there is a limited involvement that the United

States should have and that that involvement should be limited to 15 percent of the total troop force assembled by the NATO forces for this mission.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MRS. FOWLER TO AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MR. GEJDENSON

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment Offered By Mrs. FOWLER to Amendment No. 5 Offered By Mr. GEJDENSON:

Page 1, strike line 1 and all that follows through line 9 and insert the following:

(1) President Clinton is contemplating the introduction of ground elements of the United States Armed Forces to Kosovo as part of a larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation to conduct peace-making or peacekeeping between warring parties in Kosovo, and these Armed Forces may be subject to foreign command.

(2) Such a deployment, if it were to occur, would in all likelihood require the commitment of United States ground forces for a minimum of 3 years and cost billions of dollars.

(3) Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, is a province of the Republic of Serbia, a sovereign foreign state.

(4) The deployment of United States ground forces to enforce a peace agreement between warring parties in a sovereign foreign state is not consistent with the prior employment of deadly military force by the United States against either or both of the warring parties in that sovereign foreign state.

(5) The Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, has opposed the deployment of United States ground forces to Kosovo, as reflected in his testimony before the Congress on October 6, 1998.

(6) The deployment of United States ground forces to participate in the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia, which has resulted in the expenditure of more than \$10,000,000,000 by United States taxpayers to date, which has already been extended past 2 previous withdrawal dates established by the administration, and which shows no sign of ending in the near future, clearly argues that the costs and duration of a deployment to Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes will be much heavier and much longer than initially foreseen.

(7) The substantial drain on military readiness of a deployment to Kosovo would be inconsistent with the need, recently acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to reverse the trends which have already severely compromised the ability of the United States Armed Forces to carry out the basic National Military Strategy of the United States.

(8) The Congress has already indicated its considerable concern about the possible deployment of United States Armed Forces to Kosovo, as evidenced by section 8115 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262; 112 Stat. 2327), which sets forth among other things a requirement for the President to transmit to the Congress a report detailing the anticipated costs, funding sources, and exit strategy for any additional United States Armed Forces deployed to Yugoslavia, Albania, or Macedonia.

(9) The introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities may occur, clearly indicates authorization by the Congress when such action is not required for the defense of the United States, its Armed Forces, or its nationals.

(10) United States national security interests in Kosovo do not rise to a level that

warrants the introduction of United States ground forces in Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes.

Page 1, strike the second amendatory instructions and insert the following:

Page 1, strike line 8 and all that follows through line 3 on page 2.

Page 2, strike line 4 and all that follows through line 8.

Page 1, line 10, strike "DEPLOYMENT" and insert "LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT".

Page 1, line 14, strike "described in (b)" and insert ", subject to the limitation contained in subsection (b),".

Page 2, strike line 1 through line 6 and insert the following:

(b) LIMITATION.—The President is not authorized to deploy ground elements of the United States Armed Forces to Kosovo as part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation to implement a peace agreement between the Republic of Serbia and representatives of ethnic Albanians living in the province of Kosovo.

(c) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this concurrent resolution shall be construed—

(1) to prevent United States Armed Forces from taking such actions as the Armed Forces consider necessary for self-defense against an immediate threat emanating from the Republic of Serbia; or

(2) to restrict the authority of the President under the Constitution to protect the lives of United States citizens.

Strike the second line 1 and all that follows:

Mrs. FOWLER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Florida?

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, we have not yet seen the language of this amendment, and we would like our counsel to just have a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman object to the dispensing of the reading?

Mr. GEJDENSON. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is considered as having been read.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is recognized for 5 minutes on her amendment.

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I am putting forward today with the gentlewoman from Missouri (Ms. DANNER) would make it clear that the House does not support the deployment of United States ground forces to Kosovo and would spell out the reasons why.

There is no question that the situation in Kosovo is a tragedy. My heart aches for the people there just as it does for those who are caught in the midst of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the victims of religious strife in Kashmir and Indonesia, the hundreds of thousands suffering from induced famine in North Korea, the masses subjected to suppression of human rights in China and Cuba, the many who have been violated by enslavement in Sudan.

But as much as we would like to see all of these tragedies resolved and as

much energy as our diplomats and other officials might appropriately expend to accomplish that, we have not sent our troops to those places because it is not within our power to solve all the world's problems.

□ 1630

It does not make sense to me to compound the tragedy in Kosovo by deploying American troops there and subjecting them to hostilities and potential casualties. That would be an even greater tragedy.

Simply put, while I am willing to provide other forms of support, including air, intelligence, communications and logistics support to a European initiative to deploy ground forces to Kosovo, steps which my amendment would permit, I do not believe that our national security interests in Kosovo rise to a level that warrants the commitment of U.S. ground troops.

I am deeply concerned that U.S. ground forces are about to be deployed on the sovereign territory of a dictator who is essentially being blackmailed to accept a NATO military presence. The administration is pressuring Milosevic and the KLA to negotiate by literally holding a gun to their heads. Even if an agreement on Kosovo is reached, it is a recipe for resentment, not reconciliation, and it will be our troops on the ground in the cross hairs.

Furthermore, I am deeply concerned that the administration has not articulated an exit strategy and that there has been no determination made regarding the cost of the operations or the source of funds to pay for it. The administration's initiative would draw the United States further into commitments in the Balkans that have already cost U.S. taxpayers some \$10 billion. After violating two self-imposed deadlines for the withdrawal of our military forces from Bosnia, the administration today offers no end in sight to our commitment there.

I would note that the Congress is already on record in requiring the administration, in Section 8115 of the fiscal year 1999 Defense Appropriations bill, to provide a report to the Congress on the national security justification, exit strategy, cost, source of funds, and other key considerations before the deployment of any additional U.S. forces to Yugoslavia, Albania or Macedonia. That is Public Law that we voted on in this House and the President signed.

The President has indicated that the size of any U.S. ground presence will be small. The fact is the deployment will last for a minimum of 3 years. It will increase already sky-high military personnel deployment rates. It will place a significant additional strain on our troops and will further compromise the Nation's military readiness.

For those who have not been out in the field to see our troops firsthand, today our military is undermanned, is undertrained, and is underequipped. Our service people have had it with constant deployments, chronic shortages and cannibalized equipment.

For me, the bottom line is this: Could I look one of my neighbors in the eye and tell them, with conviction, that their loved one died in Kosovo in defense of America's vital interests? The answer is no. I urge Members to vote "yes" on the Fowler-Danner amendment.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's amendment.

I have visited our troops in Bosnia on several occasions. One of the great miracles of the Bosnia venture is that not one single American soldier has been injured or killed as a result of that participation, but our presence, along with our NATO allies, has prevented the continuing bloodbath that has inflicted that territory.

Now, no one is arguing that American troops should go to war in Kosovo. What we are advocating is a conclusion of an agreement between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo, after which, upon invitation, a 28,000 person force would go to that country to keep the peace. Of the 28,000 soldiers, 4,000 should be members of our own armed forces.

Kosovo, in a sense, is becoming a secondary issue in this debate. What we are talking about is the survival and the vitality of NATO. As I mentioned earlier today, some of us will be in Independence, Missouri, tomorrow at the Truman Library with the ambassadors and governmental leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as we invite them to join NATO. They will ask the question: Why should they join NATO if NATO is unwilling, upon invitation, to take part in a peacekeeping mission?

The gentlewoman is talking about military readiness. What is the military readiness for if it is not to prevent the continuance of bloodshed upon reaching an agreement between the Albanians and the Serbs?

This debate today in this House makes me awfully glad that some of my colleagues were not here when the decision was made to participate in the Second World War or the Korean War or the Persian Gulf War. Isolationism is rampant in this body. I repeat that. Isolationism is rampant in this body. If the Congress of the United States is not prepared to participate in a NATO peacekeeping mission, upon the invitation of the two parties, for goodness sake, what is NATO prepared to do? What is the purpose of NATO if it is not minimally to preserve peace in Europe?

I ask my colleagues to reject my colleague's amendment and to accept the responsibility of the one remaining superpower for making a modest contribution, and I underscore it is a modest contribution, to a NATO effort to preserve the peace.

Our friends in the United Kingdom are ready to send 8,000 people to Kosovo, twice as many as we are, yet the Brits' population is one-fifth of ours. What do we tell our friends in

London when they are ready to send 8,000 people into that peacekeeping force; that they should do it all? Well, they have told us there will not be a NATO peacekeeping force unless we participate. It is only rational that this minimal participation on the part of the United States be approved overwhelmingly by this body.

The voices of isolationism have often carried the day in the Congress of the United States. I hope to God this will not be one of those days.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I rise in support of the Fowler amendment.

I particularly want to claim the right to speak after the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), because the gentleman knows perfectly well that this Member is not an isolationist, since the gentleman from California and I were among the two Members who probably had more impact on the President's decision to have a preventive force sent into Macedonia, or the former Yugoslavian, Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), if one prefers, under United Nations auspices. And, of course, this Member voted for deployment of our troops to the Persian Gulf area for Desert Shield and Desert Storm because, in fact, one country, a member of the United Nations, invaded another.

But I do think the gentlewoman's amendment is entirely appropriate, and it does not go to totally restricting American involvement in Kosovo. It simply says no ground troops. It does not prevent all kinds of support, such as logistical, intelligence or even air support.

Now, I would like to address the issue of why the Europeans think American forces should be involved on the ground in Kosovo. Our European friends and allies say they cannot act without American leadership. As a long-term member of the North Atlantic Assembly from the House, I regularly have heard from our European friends that nothing can be done without America. Frankly, this is nonsense. NATO has established and has had in place for the last 2 years a concept or procedure called Combined Joint Task Forces, CJTF, where, out of area, some members of NATO can participate in a mission, out of area without all of them participating. This is an ideal time for the CJTF concept to be employed.

I also would note that the press reports coming out of the negotiations have some of our European friends insisting that the administration's willingness to offer several thousand troops is far too small—that several times that number are necessary. The Europeans desperately want to be treated as equals but they seem terrified to act on their own. While I firmly support the Alliance, we have to break our friends of their undue reliance on U.S. military superiority.

This Member is also concerned about the deployment of more U.S. armed forces on yet another peacekeeping

mission. Really, however, in Kosovo it is peace enforcement. There is not going to be any peace to be kept because both these parties, the Government of Yugoslavia or Serbia and the KLA and the Kosovars are being coerced. That peace enforcement mission for U.S. ground forces in Kosovo will exacerbate the detrimental impact these missions are having on our military readiness to respond to a major attack against our direct interests.

Mr. Chairman, peacekeeping is wholly different from war fighting. Military units deployed on peacekeeping assignments must undergo extensive training to regain, renew and reestablish their fighting skills. Reliance on the U.S. to spearhead and to put teeth into peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions is, frankly, eroding the war fighting capability of the United States armed forces. The ever-increasing number of peacekeeping operations threatens to erode it. And, in fact, I would have to say that what has been done by moving this country's armed forces more and more into peace enforcement activities. It is damaging the capability of the U.S. military.

This Member would also mention that frequent and recurring recalls of reservists and National Guardsmen to support these missions will eventually take its toll on U.S. businesses, American productivity and personal careers. Perhaps the Members understand that the gentleman from Washington (Mr. NETHERCUTT) already has a tax credit bill introduced to try to assist businesses whose National Guard personnel and military reservists are abroad all the time. That is an understandable concern. I guess we have had about 10,000 lawsuits filed now against enterprises by Guardsmen or reservists who have not been able, in the eyes of the Guardsmen or the reservists, to be placed back in the job they left for deployment or in a comparable job when they return. Now that should tell us something.

The Administration appears intent to act independent of Congress to commit troops to Kosovo. This is both unconstitutional and it is shortsighted. It jeopardizes the very interests President Clinton has vowed to preserve and protect, placing at risk not only the Balkans but also the U.S. war-fighting capacity.

And I would say that what is happening in Macedonia today, with Serbian troops on their border with tanks and artillery as a result of American and coalition threats, certainly does not stabilize Macedonia; Certainly does not prevent the possibility of Greece and Turkey coming in on opposite sides; it makes a destabilized Macedonia more likely. What is happening there today because of this so-called peace enforcement, peace arrangement between Serbia and the KLA, or the Kosovars, is really destabilizing.

The Kosovars, particularly the KLA, do not have any interest in autonomy. Their interest is independence. And, in

fact, we have Members standing up in our committees insisting that the Kosovars should be acting for independence. What is that going to do to the stability of Albania, Turkey, Macedonia and Bulgaria? It is not positive.

Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleagues for listening.

Mr. Chairman, this member has yet to be convinced that this mission is well-thought-out or that it is necessary to risk the lives of U.S. armed forces men and women in another country's civil war. This Member is also mindful of assertions that a civil war in Serbia could spread to Macedonia and then bring two NATO allies into conflict—Greece and Turkey. While this might make a case if the conflict were occurring in a country adjacent to a NATO ally, Serbia does not meet this criteria. The use of this argument, to deploy U.S. armed forces to Serbia, is nothing more than veiled, highly speculative justification. In this Member's mind, it is a poor display of leadership for the world's only superpower. The Clinton Administration is too quick to resort to the heavy hand of U.S. military intervention. Just because we can, doesn't mean we should!

While some liken the circumstances leading to our potential involvement in Kosovo as similar to those that resulted in U.S. troops deploying to Bosnia, this Member disagrees with this assessment. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo is not a sovereign nation—it is a province within the sovereign nation of Serbia. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an armed separatist group that appears focused on a singularly important objective—independence for the approximately two (2) million ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo. Kosovar leaders, in Serbia, want independence, not peace. Serbs are led by one man, Slobodan Milosevic, who is adamantly opposed to independence for Kosovo and who is willing to militarily oppose the presence of foreign troops in Serbia. With tension on both sides, and a history of failed attempts to establish an accord between Serbs and Kosovars, it is highly likely that the already sizeable casualty count will continue to rise. This Member has not been convinced we should risk adding the names of U.S. personnel to that growing casualty list.

The high tension between KLA and Serb forces, compounded by recent action by the Serbs to amass 4,500 heavily armored troops with artillery on the southern Kosovo border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), will turn this into peace-enforcement—a police action. This brings back haunting memories of Korea, Vietnam, and Somalia. As history has shown, peace-enforcement does not lend itself to an exit strategy. Police presence is rarely a temporary situation. In 1995, the Administration indicated that U.S. troops would be home from Bosnia within a year. The fact is that about 6,200 American military personnel remain deployed within Bosnia nearly four years later. The successful resolution of the crisis in Serbia will guarantee a continuous, long-term U.S. military presence there, as well as in Bosnia.

This Member has previously voiced, and still has, enormous difficulties, for many reasons, with the proposal to deploy several thousand U.S. troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force for Kosovo. Those reservations have nothing to do with whether Serbian misbehavior merits punishment. This Member certainly does not condone anything the Serbs

have done recently, or over the past decade, to foment Kosovar unrest. Belgrade has been condescending toward, and abusive of, the rights of ethnic Albanians, giving rise to the KLA. Yet, Secretary of Defense William Cohen correctly has noted that "the notion that only the Serbs have engaged in atrocities is incorrect." While acknowledging that both sides are contributing to the conflict, this member would quickly point out that the KLA forces were not the ones to displace nearly 400,000 people, they did not destroy more than 19,000 homes, nor did they destroy nearly 500 villages. The Serbs accomplished this brutality, now under the ultimate direction of one individual, Slobodan Milosevic.

Despite the precedents set by this Administration's previous actions, or by previous presidents, President Clinton has avoided the constitutional framework for determining whether it is of vital national interest to devote a significant portion of our military capability keeping the peace at two places in the Balkans. Why is this important? It is important because it jeopardizes the continuity of American policy. Policy set by the Administration acting alone in this case becomes susceptible to change upon election of a new president, which will occur in less than 2 years. Congressional approval of any American or NATO invasion of Kosovo, on the other hand, enables continuity of four foreign policy and use of combat force, even after the end of the president's term.

Last, and far from least, we are on the verge of what this Member considers to be a much more serious breach of peace in the Balkans. The People's Republic of China has used its veto power on the U.N. Security Council to kill extension of the first-ever United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Continuation of the international peacekeeping presence in Macedonia (FYROM) has now come into question. Yesterday, the distinguished gentleman from the 12th District in California, the Honorable Tom Lantos, joined this Member in signing a joint letter to the Secretaries of Defense and State, urging, in the strongest possible terms, that a continued U.S. "preventative" peacekeeping force remain in Macedonia. It is this Member's hope that the Scandinavian forces of UNPREDEP will also remain.

Macedonia is surrounded by countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey—that, themselves, are experiencing internal or external difficulties, or both. Macedonia is a highly volatile friction point, and it is no coincidence that the Macedonian region has been the starting point for past wars. Therefore, it is vitally important that the presence of a stabilization force be maintained. A continuation of the U.N. mandate may no longer be an option, but the U.S. may find it necessary to expand its force structure in this sovereign country, where we, legitimately, have been invited, where we have unambiguous national interests because of threats to the integrity of the NATO alliance, and where we absolutely cannot afford an escalation of conflict. Were Macedonia to become engulfed in ethnic conflict, it is quite possible that Greece and Turkey, two key NATO allies, would become engaged on opposing sides—and Albania and Bulgaria might become involved, too. The potential is that instability in Macedonia would cause the southern Balkans to erupt into yet another conflict, potentially leading to a much

broader conflagration, or even war. It is a possibility that must be avoided.

There are appropriate places in the Balkans to deploy U.S. troops: Macedonia, for example. This Member is not convinced, yet, that it is appropriate to further tax the U.S. or its armed forces by allowing this Administration to risk the lives of U.S. service personnel in Serbia, including Kosovo.

Ms. DANNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my strong support of the Fowler-Danner amendment and in opposition to sending troops to Kosovo. We must always question the wisdom of putting our military in harm's way, most particularly in what is essentially a civil war.

I would like to share with my colleagues today a letter I received from a constituent whose husband and family are much closer to this situation and its ramifications than those of us here today.

□ 1645

I like many of my colleagues have also traveled to Bosnia, but let me tell you the story of someone who has served there.

She writes:

Congresswoman Danner, I would like to commend you for your stance on the issue of sending troops into Kosovo. You may remember that Bob was with one of the first units to serve in Bosnia. Ten days after we were married, he left for 11 months there. At the time, I supported it, believing that the troops would be out in a short period of time and that real peace would be achieved. After the experience of spending time in Europe, my position has changed. I have watched soldiers spending multiple tours in Bosnia away from families. The divorce rate is high, children do not have their fathers and mothers with them, and families are breaking apart due to the strain. Please work to encourage your colleagues to think about the ramifications of sending troops to Kosovo in human terms.

Mr. Speaker, we were told that our military commitment to Bosnia would last 1 year. We are now approaching the fourth year. We were told it would cost \$1 billion. It has now cost \$10 billion. Thus, we must have, I think, great concern for any commitment with regard to Kosovo. There is no reason to believe that a mission in Kosovo would not drag on indefinitely with a high possibility of American casualties.

I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we keep talking about a peace agreement. There is not one. If there were one and our forces were sent in, that is fine. But without a peace agreement, we are going to coerce those other nations into signing one, and I do not think that that is a very American way to deal with this problem, not by force. And I do not think that we ought to be bombing over there in an effort to try to coerce them to

comply with our peace agreement that we put forward.

NATO is not at risk. NATO is a defensive organization, not an offensive organization. We appear to be aggressors. I really worry after talking with our people over there that we are going to lose an airplane or two. It may not be from ground fire but ultimately we could lose one from engine failure, and we may. And if that guy gets down in that area, those people are not going to be very nice to him. They do not like us over there.

Yesterday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the Congress to put off today's debate because it might harm the negotiations. I would tell the Secretary the reason this debate is necessary is because the real danger is recklessness with our foreign policy.

The President is about to put our troops in the middle of an ethnic and religious war that has been going on for thousands of years. It is a lose-lose situation for America. We lose because our troops will be deployed to a country without a clear mission. Just as in Bosnia, the President has no entry or exit plan, he has failed to explain the cost of the mission, and he has failed to explain what effect it will have on the already sinking morale of our fighting men and women. The President's continued use of hollow threats of force only guarantees that our soldiers will be put in harm's way and that dictators will continue to control how our foreign policy is run. Despite this, the President continues to state he will send 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo if a peace agreement is signed.

Mr. Chairman, I fought with our Air Force in both Korea and Vietnam, and I am opposed to the use of U.S. military force where we are not threatened in this country. I am disturbed that the President would use NATO to attack a sovereign nation. NATO was not designed to and should not be used for those purposes. The President knows this, and he has continually ignored the Congress when making decisions that impact our ability to keep peace throughout the world. Our fighting men and women are being used as pawns in a failed foreign policy by this administration. Our soldiers are leaving the services in droves. Recruiting is down, morale is low, and the main reason is failed policies that ship our soldiers, sailors and airmen around the world with no purpose or plan.

Mr. Chairman, we should not send troops, we should not send bombs, we should not get involved. It is a conflict that is destined to follow the rest to failure. The President ought to think long and hard before he puts our troops in a bottomless pit. He has a responsibility to our fighting men and women and to this Nation to admit there is no defined mission in Kosovo and our troops do not belong there. I know that, however, if our fighting men and women are called to duty, they will go and they will serve with honor as they always do. But under our Constitution,

I believe we in the Congress have as much responsibility as the President and we must not ask our soldiers, sailors and airmen to serve in Kosovo without a defined mission or national interest.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the other side talks about all kinds of reasons why the United States should not send any of its troops into Kosovo. We know that there has been ethnic cleansing. We know there has been genocide. I was always taught that two wrongs do not make a right and to me it is ridiculous to say, well, there is genocide going on in all parts of the world so therefore we should not intervene in any part of the world. That does not make sense to me at all.

I rise in opposition to the gentleman from Florida's amendment which in effect guts the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment. The isolationist attitude that I hear amongst some of my colleagues is indeed troubling and puzzling. We have heard these arguments time and time again. We heard these arguments during the Second World War when 6 million people plus were ethnically cleansed and the Holocaust was there. I am not saying that this is on the same level, but when innocent people are killed because of their race, or ethnicity, we have a right and a duty, I think, to respond. We saw in Bosnia that until the United States grabbed the bull by the horns, Europe was not capable of stopping the carnage, and we saw 200,000 people ethnically cleansed because of their ethnicity, and we will see it again in Kosovo unless we are willing to step in.

Now, we talk about burdensharing, and I accept the argument that it is not fair to ask us to do the lion's share. But here we are only proposing 4,000 troops out of 28,000. This is the poster child for burdensharing. Our NATO allies are doing the bulk of the troops. And for the United States to pull out now or for this Congress to send a wrong message now does such harm to the negotiations, I think probably destroys the negotiations, and how many more thousands of people will have to be killed until we step in a year or two or three years away? Isolationism did not work during World War II, it did not work during other wars, and it will not work now. I can never understand my colleagues who say that somehow people who volunteer for the armed forces and do not want to go, somehow that is a reason not to send troops. If you volunteer, you know you are volunteering, and in the future you know you may have to go. So to me because somebody wants to be with their family, I would want to be with my family, too, but that is not a reason for United States troops not to do what we need to do, which is in our national interest. It is in our interest to stop genocide. It is in our interest to stop a wider war which will surely happen if we let it go

unchecked. We have allies, Greece and Turkey and other allies, that can be sucked into a wider Balkan war. But if we take steps now along with NATO, we can prevent all this.

I also do not understand some of my colleagues who are always one to have more money for the defense budget, they always fight for more money for defense but yet they never seem to want to use the defense. It does not make sense to me at all. If we are the superpower in the world, and we have a strong defense, and we need to beef up our defense, then there are times we need to use our defense. This is such a time. We heard when we were debating Bosnia here in Congress that there would be hundreds if not thousands of American casualties. That has not happened. It will not happen in Kosovo, either. The naysayers, the doom and gloom people, it will not happen because our forces are the best. There is a mission here, and it is a specific mission here. We are going to Kosovo to keep the peace. Mr. Milosevic has slaughtered hundreds and hundreds and thousands of Albanians. People there have no rights. They have no civil rights. They have no human rights. Men, women and children are slaughtered. We have seen the carnage. Only the United States leadership can stop it. This is not the time to be isolationists.

I appeal to my colleagues, and again I think this is the wrong time to be debating this, because there is no peace agreement. That is just the point. The gentleman from Texas said there was no agreement. I think if we pull the rug out from under the President and say we do not want troops before there is an agreement, there surely will not be an agreement. We should have waited until there was an agreement to debate this in the United States House of Representatives.

I sincerely hope that our colleagues will understand the gravity of this issue and support the gentleman from Connecticut and support the gentleman from Texas. No more than 15 percent United States participation is needed.

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice my complete opposition to sending American troops to Kosovo. There is simply no vision to this mission. Even the casual observer can see that the proposed Kosovo initiative has no timetable, no rules of engagement and no greater strategic plan for that region. Unfortunately, the undefined Kosovo mission is symbolic of the lack of direction of our recent American foreign policy. There is a 6-year trend to send American troops anywhere for any reason, but there are no consistent goals that tie all of these missions together.

Ronald Reagan once said that changing America's foreign policy is a little like towing an iceberg. You can only pick up speed as the frozen attitudes and mistakes of the past melt away.

America needs to quickly change directions and leave behind the chilling comedy of errors that has defined our recent foreign policy.

Ronald Reagan is a statesman. During his administration, the United States was the dominant force on the world's stage because there was no mystery to American foreign policy. During that time, America boldly told the world that we would bring peace through strength. Ronald Reagan stood up to the tyranny of communism and said that the American way would triumph, but not through conciliation and not through appeasement. The United States won that Cold War because of the truth of our principles. In every corner of the world we pushed for freedom and democracy.

Oh, how American policy has changed since the days of Ronald Reagan. Today there is simply no cohesion and no consistent principles that form the basis for everything we do on any spot of this map of the world. American foreign policy is now one huge big mystery. Simply put, the administration is trying to lead the world with a feel-good foreign policy. This feel-good foreign policy tears us away from peace through strength and it has resulted in creating chaos through weakness. This administration makes threats and never follows up on them. They set deadlines that are broken and reset, just to be broken again. American foreign policy failures over the last 6 years litter the international landscape. Mission-creep in Somalia cost the lives of American soldiers. North Korea continues to flaunt international law by speeding ahead with their nuclear program with no consequences whatsoever. Haiti is still not the beacon of democracy, despite sending U.S. Marines there. Afghanistan and the Sudan were bombed in the blink of an eye. Yet Osama bin Laden still represents a threat to thousands of American lives.

We continuously bomb Iraq, without any clear goals, and without getting any closer to our ultimate objective of Saddam Hussein being removed from power. Russia, with its massive nuclear capability is coming apart at the seams and selling weapons and technology to scrape by, and we do nothing. China is walking all over us, pure and simple. Currently we are stuck in a never-ending peacekeeping mission in Bosnia that was proposed as a 1-year commitment. That promise was made 4 years ago. And now we have Kosovo.

□ 1700

Kosovo is not a hopeful nation aspiring to democracy. It is a big dangerous quagmire. The ethnic Albanians wanted total independence, and the Serbs do not want to give up any important parts of their country. Both parties have consistently rejected any chance of a real cease-fire.

Mr. Chairman, American soldiers are trained to be warriors, not baby-sitters. The administration has no plan to

do anything but just go to Kosovo, hold the hands of both sides and hope that they will behave when we leave. But of course they will not. The killing and mayhem will continue as soon as NATO pulls out.

So how long does the President plan to keep our troops there any way? No occupation can or should last forever.

There is a litany of reasons why we should not send troops to Kosovo, but the most compelling are the new power and responsibilities the mission unthinkingly gives to NATO. There are serious concerns about this new peace making direction for NATO. Its purpose is always to be a defensive alliance, not an offensive force.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELAY was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Chairman, NATO's purpose has always been a defensive alliance, not an offensive force going into nonmember nations uninvited. Once NATO starts meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign nations, where does it stop? Think about this question for a moment. Outside of the questions of time and cost and objective, the Kosovo policy we are debating here today would have tremendous ramifications on NATO's overall mission. We have to take a stand against these kinds of deployments now to ensure that we stop them before they ever get started.

NATO is starting to resemble a power-hungry imperialist army. Originally designed to defend member nations from attack, it is now setting itself up to be the attacker. Despite the fact that the two parties in Kosovo refuse to negotiate even directly amongst themselves and have rejected a cease-fire, the administration threatens to bomb the Serbs to make them cooperate at the peace table.

There is one major catch here. There is no peace table, just like there is no peace. The two sides continue to attack one another with a vengeance. It does not matter how many soldiers NATO sends over there, no number of troops can keep peace if there is no peace to begin with. The proposed Kosovo mission is just another bad idea in a foreign policy with no focus.

As with all the recent failures in American diplomacy, the administration is trying to obscure its lack of a comprehensive agenda, and they are doing it with bombs. Bombing a sovereign nation for ill-defined reasons with vague objectives undermines the American stature in the world. The international respect and trust for America has diminished every time we casually let the bombs fly. We must stop giving the appearance that our foreign policy is formulated by the Unabomber.

Mr. Chairman, sending U.S. troops to Kosovo is a lose-lose situation. No matter how we look at it, it is dangerous, it is costly.

America has no strategic interests in the matter, and no one wants us to be there in the first place. Support the gentlewoman from Florida's amendment.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the underlying amendment, the Gejdenson amendment limiting the U.S. share of the operation 15 percent, and in opposition to the second degree amendment.

I was a bit puzzled by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SAM JOHNSON), who preceded me in the well, who stated that we were voting on an agreement that was not yet complete and, therefore, we should vote against it. I share part of that concern. I wish that the leaders of the House had held this debate until the agreement was complete. I talked to the White House today. They assured me that if an agreement is reached, and I believe if we vote in opposition to this resolution an agreement will not be reached, that there would be a minimum, absolute minimum, of 3 days before U.S. troop deployment could begin. That would give the House more than ample time. We could stay here this weekend and conduct the Nation's business with the full facts of the peace agreement before us instead of having to vote in the context of are we undermining the peace agreement that might happen or are we not, which is what we are doing right now in this debate.

There is no one in this House whose been a stronger proponent for more than a decade of the restoration of the rightful powers of the Congress when it comes to war powers. As my colleagues know, there are a few who have been more critical of the lack of participation of our wealthy NATO allies in many things, including their own defense during the years of threat by the Soviet Union. But that said, the timing of the resolution before us and the debate are very troubling. As my colleagues know, we should not be having a debate on authorizing the use of U.S. troops under not yet totally clear conditions while the negotiations are ongoing.

Mr. Chairman, I really fear that a no vote here by the House of Representatives tonight will embolden Mr. Milosevic and his genocidal henchmen and keep them from signing an agreement. Some say we are bullying him. Well, someone has got to stand up to the bullies in this world, and perhaps it is time that the United States did.

On the other hand, a yes vote is problematic in that we do not have the final agreement before us. The gentleman spoke the truth. What should happen is we should stay in town. If an agreement is signed on Saturday, we can meet on Saturday, we can meet on Sunday, we can meet on Monday, and then we can consider a proper authorization which could have conditions on length, duration, size of the deploy-

ment, scope of deployment, objectives and all those things in it for an up or down vote.

That would be the proper way to proceed in this matter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. We may come out on different sides of this, but I thought the gentleman ought to know that one of the reasons why we are in this debate from my perspective and I think from the perspective of many people is that we were told the same sort of thing: Wait until the Dayton accord is concluded. This is a very delicate negotiation; do not get involved. But by the time the signature ended up on the line at Dayton, troops were already on the way, Congress was precluded from action, and we were told, "You must now support our men and women, the troops abroad."

Mr. Chairman, that is the reason why we are at this stage in my judgment.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that, but we always reserve the power, and I have come to this floor many times to question precipitous deployment without lawful consultation with Congress and without an authorization of Congress. I have gone so far as to sue past Presidents over this issue, but we were denied standing in the courts.

So in this case, as my colleagues know, I believe that we would be given that opportunity. We can certainly grasp that opportunity by staying in town and going into session the moment we hear the accords have been signed, and then framing a resolution that properly addresses the concerns around those accords. That is the way we should proceed. So we are being given a pretty crummy choice here tonight, which is to undermine the peace negotiations by voting no or vote yes on something when we do not fully understand the conditions and terms.

Mr. Chairman, I wish that the leadership on the other side would reconsider perhaps, pull the bill, keep us in town and take up this issue when it is more timely.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, when a member of my own party tried to stop COLAs for our military, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) was the first one to jump and say, "Duke, I'll support you. Let's get a coalition together, and let's stop it." She cares deeply about our military and our troops.

I have an article right here that they started fighting last night again in Kosovo. They are burning houses, they are burning bridges.

I rise in support of the gentlewoman's resolution. Do my colleagues know who rejected it? Not the Serbs. Holbrooke, Mr. Holbrooke, had to cancel the peace talks last night. He canceled them until the 23rd because the

Albanians rejected it. They will stop nothing short of having a separate Kosovo. They do not want just Kosovo. They want Montenegro, and they want parts of Greece.

I said on the floor before, "Look at Bin Laden, look at the terrorist leaders speaking openly and how they then infiltrated around Itzebegovic in Bosnia, 12,000 mujahedin in Hamas. That is a threat to Europe, it is a threat to Greece, and it is a threat to this country. Bin Laden, active in Albania with the KLA; they have genocided Montenegrins, Serbs, gypsies and Jews recently, and they continue to do that. They have been fighting for 500 years.

As my colleagues know, the gentleman talked about some of us fight for defense dollars. Absolutely right. Look at the emergency state that our national security is in right now. The President has not asked for one dime that our defense are going down, and helping building the roads and working our DOD and other agencies. In Honduras, millions of dollars, and I support them doing that. I mean they have made a marvelous expansion down there in helping people in poverty. But when we look at Haiti, as my colleagues know, we are still spending \$25 million a year there building schools and bridges. That comes out of the defense dollar. In Somalia, billions of dollars. And look what four times going to Iraq, the billions of dollars. In the Sudan, a billion dollars did not do very much. Knocked out a pharmaceutical plant. But all of these things come out of that defense dollar, and what has that set us back to?

Our kids, our men and women in the military, we are keeping only 23 percent of them because our deployments exceed by 300 percent the deployments during the height of Vietnam, and yet we are going to ask only 4000 of them. Do my colleagues know the families and what they are going through right now? We are keeping only 30 percent of our pilots. The number one issue is family separation. We are driving our military into the ground in a very balanced budget amount that we allow, and then we take 16, not 8 billion, 16 billion, if we take the cost of bringing on the reserves and we take the other costs associated with going, 16 billion just for Bosnia, and that does not include next year. That all comes out of defense, and then again we are going to have to go in here.

And they were talking about giving a billion dollars to Russia to stop some nuclear weapons. Well, let Europe. My colleagues say Europe had not done it. Leadership would force Europe to pay their fair share and do what we are trying to do. Russia has offered to put more troops in there. KLA did not want that. Well, the hell with the KLA. Let the Europeans, France, run by a Socialist-Communist group when they took over the conservatives' coalition, and they refused to do their part, let them go in and do it, and let us not send our men and women in harm's way.

My colleague talked about not understanding the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SAM JOHNSON). I do not expect my colleague would. He was a POW for 6½ years, and he was a war hero. He was tortured, he was shot down in Vietnam, and he knows what it is to put our kids in harm's way instead of sitting here in a soft, cushy chair saying, "Let's send them."

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gejdenson amendment. I support the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment, but I have strong reservations, strong reservations of the Republican leadership's timing on this legislation. Bringing this measure to the floor for debate while negotiations are still underway is totally irresponsible.

Mr. Chairman, if and when a peace agreement is signed by both sides, I believe an American presence as part of a larger international peacekeeping force in Kosovo is and will be necessary.

□ 1715

The Kosovar Albanians have already made clear that they will not agree to any peace proposal without American participation in an implementation force.

In addition, we have seen that the threat of force is the only language that President Milosevic understands. A strong U.S. presence in Kosovo would demonstrate to Mr. Milosevic that we would not tolerate noncompliance with any of the agreements, provisions or a return to the brutal campaign of repression and genocide that he has brought upon the ethnic Albanian community.

Mr. Chairman, while our NATO allies have already pledged to provide the bulk of a post settlement force in Kosovo, we must recognize that some U.S. participation is not only desired but is expected by our allies. Quite simply, such participation may be essential to securing the confidence of all the parties involved.

Mr. Chairman, I have a strong and vibrant Albanian and American community in my district in the Bronx and Queens. Many of these families have relatives in Kosovo who have been raped, maimed and murdered by Serbian forces.

The United States, and we as a Congress, cannot turn our backs or jeopardize the peace process in Kosovo.

While I strongly support an American presence in an international implementation of force, I believe to debate this issue at this time is both irresponsible and damaging to our ability to conclude a peaceful agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I include for the RECORD the following New York Times article.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 6, 1998]

FAR FROM KOSOVO, ANGUISHED VIGILS AND MOURNING; CONCERN FOR FAMILY MEMBERS RESHAPES IMMIGRANTS' LIVES

(By Barbara Stewart)

Nearly every week, all summer long, Ismer Mjeku, a Bronx entrepreneur from Kosovo, attended at least one wake, as one Albanian compatriot after another learned of relatives back home killed by Serbian soldiers. By late August, it was practically routine. He would meet his uncle and cousins at one of the small, dim clubhouses where Albanian men sit, smoking cigarettes and drinking tiny cups of sweet Turkish coffee and where traditionally, they have also held wakes.

For the last few months, these spaces have been rented time and again by immigrant Albanian men, who would spend a day or two of mourning there. While the women remained home, receiving the condolences of their female friends, the men would spend the day at the club in a ritual called pame, "to see," or ngushellime, "condolences."

By Labor Day, Mr. Mjeku, 38, had attended 10 or 11 pame within 9 weeks. Like the others in his group, he shook the hands or hugged the shoulders of each grieving man, sat and drank a single cup of coffee and smoked one cigarette, rose and offered his condolences to each man again, and then left, making room for the next group.

But a few weeks ago, after the older cousin who had been a second father to him was shot and killed in his home village, Mr. Mjeku refused to hold a pame. "We cannot keep doing these one by one," he said in his small walk-up office on Arthur Avenue in the Belmont section of the Bronx, where he produces an Albanian business directory. "So many people died in Kosovo the last three months. It's not special, each death. It's not-wow. It's war."

For many of the approximately 200,000 Albanians in and around New York and New Jersey—70 percent of whom come from Kosovo, a Serbian province of Yugoslavia in which 90 percent of the population are ethnic Albanians—death is no longer special. After eight months of Serbian attacks on their relatives in Kosovo, even the deaths of children have become numbingly routine.

Yet the deaths back home have reshaped the lives of immigrants here, making them less festive, less social: gone are the big weddings, the nights of folk dancing, the gay music.

"When I hear Albanian music, it hurts me," said Al Haxhaj, an Albanian who is a co-owner of the Mona Lisa, a restaurant in the Murry Hill section of Manhattan that was formerly called the Piazza Bella. "It reminds me."

Since the first Serbian attacks were reported in February, Albanians around the world have watched events back home with anguish: the looted and torched villages, the murdered civilians, the hundreds of thousands of people forced to take refuge in the surrounding mountains. The violence peaked in the summer, with 500,000 Albanians living as refugees, according to international relief agencies. These agencies also say that 1,000 to 2,000 ethnic Albanians have been killed, though many agency representatives say they believe that figure is low.

Reports last week that Yugoslav soldiers were withdrawing from ethnic Albanian villages because of NATO bombing threats offered scant comfort. Local immigrants say they do not believe that the Serbians, their ancient enemies, will stop their attacks.

All along Arthur Avenue and Pelham Parkway in the Bronx, in New Jersey cities like Paterson and Garfield and in neighborhoods throughout Manhattan, ethnic Albanians are trying to deal with their personal

tragedies in the midst of this international drama.

Weddings and other celebrations are being canceled. When their world is right, Albanians frequently celebrate with huge parties, hiring Albanian musicians so that hundreds of guests can do traditional folk dancing until morning. But nobody has the heart now for celebrating.

Last fall, the Piazza Bella hired an Albanian band to play traditional music, attracting expatriates from miles around. In February, after the first massacres were reported, Mr. Haxhaj and Bilbil Ahmetaj, the co-owners, stopped the music.

"We can't be over here dancing and getting drunk when little kids are being killed and villages are being trashed," said Fekrim Haxhaj, the owner's 18-year-old son.

In normal times, the vast majority of the big wedding parties at Il Galletto, a banquet hall in North Bergen, N.J., are held by Albanian parents, said Vymer Bruncaj, who is a part owner. But lately, he said: "The wedding invitation for Albanians is zero—no invitations. The last five, six months, you cannot find one."

Young couples are postponing their weddings or marrying quietly, with fewer guests and afternoon parties without music. Last spring, Alta Haxhaj, Fekrim's cousin, canceled the elaborate wedding for 1,000 guests that she had been planning for a year. Instead, she and her fiance married quietly, in street clothes. "No big pouf," she said. "No tail behind me, no white pearls."

When ethnic Albanians get together these days, it is probably for a candlelight vigil outside the United Nations or the White House. Conversation never strays far from their worries. At home and in offices, the computer stays on; the Web site [www.kosova.com](http://www.kosova.com) carries updates on news from the region in Albanian and lists the most recent victims. (Kosova is the ethnic Albanians' preferred spelling.)

Mr. Mjeku, the Bronx businessman, checks the Internet when he gets to work. On Sept. 30, he spotted his cousin's name on the list of casualties. "I closed the office," he said. "I told my uncle in Riverdale. He started to cry. I felt very bad."

Now, a month later, Mr. Mjeku said he was having a hard time focusing on his work. His mind is occupied by memories of his cousin.

While the Internet brings daily updates, many Albanian-Americans have been able to reach family members in Kosovo through satellite cell phones that allow them to connect even with refugees in the mountains.

The conversations have often been eerie. A few months ago, Dervish Ukehaxhaj was summoned from the kitchen of the Madonia Brothers Bakery in the Bronx, which he manages, to the office downstairs, where Peter Madonia, the owner, handed him a phone.

"It was his brother in Kosova, and he was in the middle of shooting," Mr. Madonia said. "He's sitting here in this office, talking to his brother who is in the front lines, in the middle of a war."

In July, there were other calls. One brother and two cousins had been fatally shot.

The Kosovar Liberation Army, with the help of European expatriates, obtained dozens of powerful cell phones and distributed them to the villages, according to Isuf Hajrizi, managing editor of Illyria, and Albanian newspaper based in the Bronx. When Mr. Hajrizi's parents, along with about 40 other relatives in the village, climbed high into the mountains above the village to escape Serbian soldiers, they carried the cell phone with them. "They had no food," he said. "But they had that phone—their only link to life."

But with only one cell phone for at least 1,000 refugees, it can take hours, or even days

to get through. Mr. Hajrizi last reached his family after spending 10 straight hours dialing, and then persuading the person who answered to hike over to his parents' campsite to deliver the phone.

When he finally heard his 74-year-old mother's voice, she told him that their home and their village had been looted and burned. They had no food or shelter. She begged for help. "Why is it like this?" she asked, as her son listened helplessly.

That was two weeks ago. Since then, he has not been able to get through despite trying every day. They must have returned to the village and are trying to cobble together shelter there, he tells himself.

"I check the Internet constantly," he said. "I haven't seen their names on the lists. As long as they don't show up on the lists, they probably are O.K."

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER). Obviously, she does not come to this issue as a casual observer. In fact, she represents Mayport Naval Station, which is often the first to deploy forces in times of conflict.

I join her in opposition to sending American ground forces to the wartorn province of Kosovo. I would remind my colleagues that four years ago the President sent thousands of American troops to Bosnia for what he assured us would be a 1-year mission.

I underscore the comments of the gentleman from Nebraska who was quite concerned that while we were negotiating a peace agreement at that time of the Dayton Accords, American troops were deployed in Bosnia. There was no way to recall them because we were told by the Administration to support the troops because they are already over there.

We are again falling into the same trap. Four years have passed and our troops are still over there. It has become a mission with no end in sight.

If we send troops to Kosovo, I fear the same thing will happen again, an open-ended commitment of thousands of young American soldiers to yet another bloody conflict in the Balkans.

The President wants to send 4,000 American troops to Kosovo if a peace plan is agreed to by the two warring factions. Of course, we were all sickened by atrocities that have been committed by both sides in this war. However, we cannot put our troops in the middle of a conflict where the rules of engagement are ambiguous.

If American forces go to Kosovo, they will very likely end up in combat situations. I think we should remember 1993, the disaster in Somalia where 18 U.S. Army rangers were killed tracking down a Somalian warlord. These lives were lost because the Administration placed those forces under international command and refused to provide the heavy armor and air support that would have given our forces the upper hand in combat.

Mr. Chairman, too many questions exist as to how our troops will be deployed. There are too many questions

about the rules of engagement and too many questions about a successful exit strategy.

Mr. Chairman, our Armed Forces are stretched very thin across the globe in a multitude of deployments. We should be very, very careful before we commit to another one.

This past weekend, 44 Haitians drowned at sea in an attempt to come to Florida, to the United States of America. Once again, we have problems in Haiti but nobody is addressing it.

Cuba shot down two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft, and now we are sending a baseball team to promote peace and prosperity in Cuba.

The gentleman from Texas (Mr. SAM JOHNSON) and the gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM) spoke on this floor and these two gentlemen, Members of Congress, have the right to speak about the deployment of our troops in conflict because they themselves have represented this great Nation in combat. They speak with authority and I respect their views.

The December bombing of Iraq occurred and the Administration told us it had to be done because Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, was fast approaching. They said we must attack now because if we don't, it would create an international incident.

What about Hanukkah, which was being celebrated at the time of our bombing in Iraq?

So I would suggest to the Congress that we carefully consider the amendment of the gentlewoman from Jacksonville, Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) and that we support it before we become engaged, before we are drawn into another conflict with no end in sight.

Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER). Barely 11 years ago, Slobodan Milosevic seized power in what was then Yugoslavia, and he remains today the last old line, unrepentant Communist dictator in Europe.

Just 10 years ago, in March of 1989, using tactics that would have made Joseph Stalin proud, Milosevic surrounded the elected assembly of Kosovo with Yugoslav Army tanks and secret police and forced that elected body at gunpoint to renounce the autonomy that was guaranteed to Kosovo by the Constitution of Yugoslavia. Milosevic did not even bother to change the Constitution.

In rapid succession, all ethnic Albanian public employees were dismissed from their jobs, 100,000 of them. The Albanian language was proscribed for public purposes. The Albanian schools and the university were closed and systematic repression of the ethnic Albanians began.

Remember that ethnic Albanians were already a majority of the citizens of Kosovo when Yugoslavia was freed after World War II, and now are more than 90 percent of that population.

Then the Milosevic regime was distracted in 1991 and 1992 by its attacks upon two other U.N. members, namely Croatia and Bosnia, that led, as we know, to 200,000 deaths and 2 million refugees that have been spread all over Europe.

It is in that context that President George Bush, on December 27, 1992, warned Milosevic that the U.S. would act if he attacked Kosovo in a similar way. I quote from the letter that President Bush delivered to Milosevic, quote, in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper, and it was that policy that President Clinton has been following and reiterated, reaffirmed in 1993 and has been following.

In that context, the then minority leader, later majority leader and Republican candidate for President, Robert Dole, has always supported the strongest possible action, American action, to contain Milosevic's regime.

In Kosovo, Milosevic used his army and secret police under a renewed rein of terror to impose thousands of arbitrary arrests, beatings and extrajudicial killings on ethnic Albanians. We should remember that just last October, Milosevic signed agreements in regard to Kosovo and because there were no enforcement provisions there has violated every provision of those agreements signed only four months or so ago.

All told, at least 2,000 have been indiscriminately killed, men, women, aged, children, baby in arms and in the womb and at least 400,000 driven from their homes. For all those reasons, the contact powers have agreed to a NATO effort to establish an enforceable peace in Kosovo, and if this NATO effort is subverted, and the amendment by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) clearly subverts the effort to impose a peace in Kosovo, then later this spring this Congress will have contributed to the creation of hundreds of thousands of more refugees and to the deaths of a whole new cadre of victims of the national socialist regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

Milosevic's right-hand deputy, President Seselj, has already told the Yugoslav parliament that they will drive all of the ethnic Albanians, citizens of Yugoslavia, from Kosovo.

I implore this Congress not to make this great United States of America complicit, complicit in these deaths, and creating these refugees and in aiding in Milosevic's brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise regrettably opposed to the amendment, the well-crafted amendment from my good friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER). It is a good amendment and has led to good debate, but I have a different view of this situation.

I think that the underlying resolution, H.Con.Res. 42 that we are talking about cannot be supported in its present form because it is essentially a blank check that grants the Clinton administration authorization to send troops to Kosovo without any limitations or restrictions. I think that is much too broad.

The Fowler amendment, on the other hand, would go to the opposite end of the spectrum denying the administration the authority to send troops under nearly all but the most dire circumstances.

While the President is the primary architect of American foreign policy, and we all understand that, Congress nevertheless has very important obligations in this area, most notably oversight, overseeing the deployment of our troops. That is one of the reasons we are here. We do this on behalf of the people we represent back home.

Finding the right balance is never easy, as we know, but I do believe that the people in my district feel that we should seek something that is more akin to a middle ground solution to either the underlying resolution or the Fowler amendment.

The Clinton administration is intent on deploying U.S. troops to Kosovo and maintains that it does not require congressional approval to do so. In response, I believe Congress should be careful not to deal itself out of the process altogether, and I think this debate has been useful and is going to be more constructive as we go along.

Many members are concerned about the administration's plan and are not satisfied with standing on the sidelines, which is the practical effect of both the resolution that underlies H.Con.Res. 42 and the Fowler amendment. It is either yes or no.

I believe that it is incumbent on Congress to seize this opportunity to offer constructive input and to put into place reasonable requirements before our troops are committed. Rather than providing a blank check or obstructing the way altogether, Congress should require an explicit statement of the national interests involved, the rules of engagement, for example, for our troops; the cost of the mission, for example, of interest to our taxpayers; as well as the entry strategy, the exit strategy, the amount of protection provided to make sure our forces will be as safe as possible; those kinds of questions.

As the debate progresses, I anticipate there will be a series of amendments to do just those kinds of things. I am going to oppose, somewhat reluctantly, the Fowler amendment because I think there is a better way to achieve proper accountability from the President about using our troops in Kosovo.

I urge my colleagues to understand that there are good choices between the carte blanche of the underlying H.Con.Res. 42 and the no deployment proposal by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER).

Those amendments are printed. I urge that my colleagues look at them and in the meantime I urge a no vote on the Fowler amendment.

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my colleague from Florida (Mr. GOSS) for his well thought out, articulate view on this. I want to tell him that I am in total agreement.

□ 1730

I urge my colleagues to vote against both the Gejdenson amendment and the Fowler amendment for all the reasons that the gentleman articulated.

I think the Gejdenson amendment would have us rush into something that has yet to have been written. The Fowler amendment would have us condemn it. I do not think that is a very adult thing to do.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to give strong consideration to an amendment by the ranking minority member on the House Committee on National Security, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON). I think it gives us the best of all of these worlds. It says to those of us, including myself, who are reluctant to commit troops, Mr. President, you cannot send troops right now. It gives those of us who would like to see the details of the peace agreement the opportunity to wait until it is written, wait until it is brought before this body, wait until our Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark, can come to Washington and explain our concerns about the safety of the troops, what our mission is, how much it is going to cost, and yes, how long we are going to be there. Then and only then it calls on Congress to vote on it.

I applaud my colleagues who say that yes, it is time that Congress finally starts fulfilling our duties as given to us by the Founding Fathers in Article I, Section 8, where it says we must decide where and when young Americans are put in harm's way. We have let both Democratic and Republican Presidents walk all over us. We have failed in our duties.

So I applaud those of my colleagues who say, let us do our job. I also want to applaud the people, including the troops who went to Bosnia, who showed me that I was wrong when I opposed our intervention there. It was not a general, it was not an admiral, it was not a bureaucrat, and it was not a State Department official that showed me that I was wrong, it was an 18-year-old kid from Ocean Springs, Mississippi. When I went over there with a notebook looking for kids to tell me why we should not be there and how stupid it was, and a young man by the name of Rhodes who might have been all of a corporal, I said, should we be here? And I was shocked when he said yes. I said, why? Fresh out of high school, he says, Because I am keeping women from getting raped, I am keeping little kids from getting tortured, I

am keeping old men from being murdered just because of their religion. That is why I joined the army, to be a good guy.

Folks, I was dumbfounded. That mission has never been articulated better by anyone anywhere and to Corporal Rhodes, wherever you are, God bless you for saying it, and to his parents, God bless you for bringing such a kid into this world.

Folks, this is the only rational way to go about this. Let us do our job. Mr. President, you have no authority to send troops; therefore, you cannot. Mr. President, bring us a proposal that we can read, take a look at, and then yes, Mr. President, we owe you the respect of at least looking at it and then voting on it.

I urge my colleagues to reject the Fowler amendment, I urge my colleagues to reject the Gejdenson amendment, but I rise in very strong support of the very rational position brought to us by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON).

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the argument that the United States should become militarily involved in Kosovo at all, and I support the Fowler amendment. For an administration that places so much stock in political polls, I wonder if the President does not find it ironic that most Americans cannot even find Kosovo on the map. Not only that, but most Americans could not articulate one reason why we should send other Americans to risk and very possibly lose their lives.

What is the vital interest over there which is being advanced by our getting involved in the middle of this dispute? We have not heard a clear answer to this question. Yet, President Clinton has made very clear what his intention is. He intends to intervene in Kosovo with an open-ended occupation force, perhaps preceded by air strikes.

We have absolutely forgotten the rules of engagement that were laid out in the War Powers Act. We do not have an exit strategy. He has made it clear that he does not think he needs congressional authorization for this mission. Well, I think, as my colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. TAYLOR) just articulated, in the Constitution, Article I, Section 8, it clearly states that it is the Congress that shall raise up armies and declare war. In the War Powers Act, presidential executive powers are defined with the ability for the President to deploy troops without congressional authority only when there has been a declaration of war, a specific statutory authorization, or, and this is very important, Mr. Chairman, a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories, its possessions, or its armed forces. The situation in Kosovo certainly does not match statutory authority.

Mr. Chairman, if we are to prevail under the rule of law, the President must obey the law, like everyone else, and certainly in this situation that could get us into a quagmire that we may never get out of.

The administration policy absolutely goes against the fundamentals of constitutional government and the rule of law. On February 10, for instance, in testimony before the Committee on International Relations, Thomas Pickering, who is the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, confirmed that Kosovo is sovereign territory of Serbia, and that attacking the Serbs because they will not consent to foreign occupation of a part of their territory would be an act of war. An act of war, Mr. Chairman.

The Constitution of the United States gives sole power to declare war to the Congress, not to the President. Nothing in the laws or the Constitution of the United States suggests that a determination by the United Nations Security Council or by the North Atlantic Council is a substitute for our country's laws. The mission in Kosovo intended by this administration is contrary to the principle of national sovereignty and is a major step towards global authority. The United States and NATO are demanding that a sovereign state consent to foreign occupation of its territory, or be bombed if it refuses. This distinction should be a key one for all Americans concerned about the threat of the growing power of international institutions and what they present to national sovereignty.

What kind of precedent are we going to set with this action? What country are we claiming the right to attack next if we determine that its behavior does not rise to some international standard? Should we attack Turkey to protect the Kurds? China, to protect Tibet or Taiwan? Sri Lanka to protect the Tamils, India to protect the Muslims in Kashmir? I think not, Mr. Chairman.

Do all of the Members of the House fully appreciate the complicated quagmire of Kosovo? The history of Kosovo with its competing claims of Albanians and Serbs is at least as tangled as that of Bosnia, and both groups are passionately attached to their irreconcilable differences of what is right and wrong, in their view.

The administration and its supporters tell us all about the sufferings of the Albanians under the Milosevic regime, and those should not be minimized, and I concur and identify with their argument there. But they also tell us almost nothing about the attacks committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army against Serbian civilians and against moderate Albanians as well. They tell us nothing about the ethnic cleansing of Christian Serbs by radical Albanian Muslims under the Turks, Nazis and Communists alike.

Mr. Chairman, this is a dangerous step that we must not take.

They tell us nothing about the drug-trafficking and other criminal activity that funds the

KLA. They tell us nothing about the support of Islamic radicals like the Osama bin Laden network, which, with other radical forces, is well-established in the KLA's staging area in northern Albania and is promising to strike at Americans wherever they are found.

Do we need to put Americans down in a place where they'll be convenient targets for terrorism?

Putting American troops into this quagmire, where we have no legitimate interests, is a dangerous and needless risk to American personnel. Kosovo is not America's fight.

The Congress should reject any measure that is retrospective will be seen as a blank check for Bill Clinton—a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for the Balkans.

Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I want to commend my colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. TAYLOR) for very well articulated remarks. I come to a slightly different conclusion. I rise to speak in favor of the Gejdenson amendment and in opposition to the Fowler amendment.

First, let me speak to the alternative amendment advanced by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER). I believe that it is extremely ill-advised of this House to be debating this resolution at all. We are debating involvement in a peace agreement that has yet to be finalized, so it is not timely right from the outset.

To even try and interject this House into the negotiations underway by placing proscriptions on what the negotiators might come up with is, in my opinion, the direct intervention of this House into the formulation of foreign policy, something placed in the executive branch under the Constitution for very good reasons. We are not constituted as individual representatives representing this country to try and steer negotiations even as they unfold.

Senator Dole, certainly someone who knows the legislative process as well as any American, advised the Committee on International Relations yesterday that the time for congressional involvement in these matters is after the agreements themselves have been reached. Let us look at what the President might bring back, evaluated and debated at that time, but not before.

I favor the Gejdenson amendment, because in the absence of orderly consideration of this matter, it is appropriate, I think, that we not extend a blank check, but rather a measured authorization, and that is the Gejdenson amendment before us. It would encourage a conclusion of the peace process and authorize a NATO force with U.S. involvement of up to 15 percent. That is clearly a minor supporting role in this process, but an essential one, in light of the standing of the United States of America in the world today.

To try and absolutely foreclose any participation by the United States in a peacekeeping force that might be agreed to under the agreement, should an agreement be reached, would I believe give great comfort to those who

are the enemies of peace in this region, and who want no peace agreement.

All of us are involved in our legislative responsibilities in negotiations, and we know that negotiations are, in large part, about leverage. Why would we want to give Slobodan Milosevic, a perpetrator of unspeakable horrors in this region, the leverage at this time in the peace process that, precluding any U.S. troop involvement, would extend to this evil leader.

Mr. Milosevic 11 years ago went down to Kosovo and began his own ascendancy in the region by commencing a reign of terror on the Kosovars of Albanian ethnicity. During the course of that reign of terror, their autonomy has been stripped and they have been the victims of unspeakable horrors. We need to bring this to a conclusion with a negotiated peace, but that is made infinitely more difficult by the House debate today, and if we should adopt the Fowler amendment it would be made, in my opinion and the opinion of many observing this process, it would be made impossible.

The Scriptures tell us, blessed are the peacemakers, and we in the House want to do everything we can to make their job more difficult, if not altogether impossible, at this terribly important time.

So let me conclude by saying, let us oppose the Fowler amendment. I believe it would forestall a conclusion of the peace process. Let us support the Gejdenson amendment, which would place very significant and appropriate strictures on the U.S. involvement in what might be a NATO force, an involvement not to exceed 15 percent; a limited, minor supporting role, but an essential one, to stop the killing and the atrocities that have plagued that region.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, this situation, regardless of which route we take, stay out or go in, has potential dangers. Many people have argued that going in is going to cause more of a conflagration than if we stayed out. There are good intellects on both sides of the debate. It is a very difficult debate. It is a very close question, I think.

I am going to support the base bill. I think in the end the organization that we created, NATO, that we have always been the guts, the leadership of, that was put together to handle then the Soviet Union, has a role in this post-Cold War environment in keeping stability in Europe. If we do not participate in this operation, and it is a very dangerous operation, one in which I think we may take casualties, I think NATO will dissolve as a real entity.

□ 1745

It may be a debating society, it may have a location, but I think that NATO will dissolve, and maybe the stability that NATO could bring to Europe over the long haul will be gone.

So I am going to support the base resolution. All of the dangers that we see and all of the problems with this deployment or with the nondeployment are things that we really cannot do much about. We cannot change the situation, the political situation, in Kosovo. We cannot change the military offsets. We can do something by participating in this force.

There is something we can do something about. That is to provide our men and women who carry out American foreign policy after debates like this one the wherewithal to be effective. We, the government of the United States, have not been doing that. Let me show the Members what we have been doing.

Since Desert Storm, we have cut our military almost in half. We have gone from 18 army divisions to only 10; 546 naval ships to only 325 now. We have cut another 20 since this chart was put together. We have gone from 24 fighter air wings to only 13 fighter air wings, cut our air power almost in half.

Our mission capability, that is the capability of our aircraft to fly off of their runways or off their carrier decks, like the gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM) used to, to fulfill our mission, whether bombing or recon or something else and return to that home base, that mission capability that I want 83 percent in the Air Force has now dropped to 74 percent.

It used to be 77 percent in the Marine Corps. It is now down to 61 percent. Mission capability used to be 69 percent in the Air Force, it is now 61 percent. A lot of our planes are hanging around as old hangar queens. They are like old hay balers that we are taking spare parts off of so the few we have left on the runway will work.

Military aircraft crashes. I can tell the Members, we are now crashing more aircraft, some 55 in the last 13 months, 14 months, than we are building, along with the 55 Americans who died as pilots and crews in those crashes.

Equipment shortages. We are building, and President Clinton's defense budget continues that this year, if we follow it, we are building to a 200-ship Navy, down from 600 ships. The marines are \$193 million short in basic ammunition. The Army is short about \$1.6 billion in ammunition.

We have aging equipment. We are living off the old equipment of the Reagan years. Our CH-46 helicopter is over 40 years old. The Clinton administration intends to fly B-52 bombers with no replacement until they are 80 years old.

Personnel shortages, we are 18,000 sailors short in the Navy. We are going to be over 700 pilots short in the Air Force. We are going to be short in marine aviation, and we are down about 140 helicopter pilots in the Army.

Here is something we have not been paying attention to. We have a 13.5 percent pay gap between the people who wear the uniform and the people in the private sector. I want to ask all of the

patriotic folks who have gotten up and spoken about going into Kosovo, and I am going to vote to go into Kosovo, to really support our troops. I am going to give the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) a substitute amendment that says, let us support them with a pay raise, with new equipment, by building military construction to house their families while they are gone, and maybe we will even give them a little ammunition go. Let us support the troops.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) has expired.

(On request of Mr. CUNNINGHAM, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HUNTER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, the Joint Chiefs have done something this year that they have not done in a long time. I think it is because the services are desperate, they are desperate for help. The 10,000 uniformed service men and women on food stamps are desperate for help.

They have told us what they need. The Army has come forth and said, we need an additional \$5 billion a year just to maintain this downsized military of 10 divisions. The Navy has come forth and said, to maintain 305 ships, we need an additional \$6 billion a year. The Air Force has said, to maintain this downsized Air Force of only 13 active fighter wings, we need an additional \$5 billion a year. The marines have said that to maintain this downsized Marine Corps, that now has the highest operating tempo of any time since World War II, we need an additional \$1.75 billion a year. They said that on top of that they need a pay raise for our troops, to start cutting into that 13½ percent pay gap.

If we add those together, and if we add the cost of Bosnia, which we should not take out of ammunition and operations and maintenance, that is \$21.95 billion or \$22 billion a year more that our service people need to be well-equipped and well-paid to serve our country.

So however Members vote on these resolutions, and let me really commend the brilliant gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. TILLIE FOWLER). I wish I could support her amendment. I think her conditions are excellent. But I am going to support the base bill.

However Members vote on this, we should follow up very quickly with a series of votes, manifested in our budget and in supplemental appropriations bills, to provide our military what they need, so they can provide us what we need.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the 5 minutes to do it, but I want to thank the gentleman for presenting this picture, because that is the picture I wanted to present. He did it better than I could.

Who is going to pay the bill for these kinds of things? If we are going to do them, and we are going to do them, obviously, around the world, who is going to pay the bill? We need to pony up and do what we should for our troops.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the Fowler amendment and to support the Gejdenson amendment.

As we have this debate in this House at this time, a time that is poorly timed in terms of what the national interests of the United States are and ultimately how that may lead to the national security of the United States, we simply should not be having this debate at this time.

Right now, as we debate, I am sure that Slobodan Milosevic is looking at this debate, and how we decide today sends him a signal as to how he will move, and move militarily. Even before we give an opportunity for peace to have a chance, we snuff it out with the actions on the Floor.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) recognizes that the representatives of the respective parties are supposed to reconvene next week in France. We could not hold off until there was the opportunity for those parties to be brought together by the international community, led by the United States, to see if there is a chance to avoid countless numbers of murders, countless numbers of deaths? We could not give that simple opportunity for peace to take place? It was so compelling to proceed today?

Mr. Chairman, this is not about enforcing our will. It is about enforcing, hopefully, an agreed commitment, an agreed commitment to peace. This is a test of NATO, and ultimately, maybe in some different context, at some different time, Members are going to want NATO to work.

If Members do not step up to the plate now, the portion of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) which limits us to 15 percent, and says, in a clear message to the Europeans, this is clearly your problem, but we are part of NATO and we are going to participate in it, if Members want NATO to be put at risk, they will not respond.

The Fowler amendment is ultimately, in my mind, with all due respect, should it pass, a death sentence to thousands of people in Kosovo, because in essence what we are saying by virtue of that amendment, it is a vote on the ultimate question, to not permit troops to be deployed, even before we know that in fact an agreement in which we would be invited in as part of NATO could take place.

We are already sending a message to Slobodan Milosevic that in fact he does not have to make an agreement; go ahead, just hold out there, do what you want, and at the end of the day we will

have that on our minds and in our consciences and in the national security interests of the United States, because the conflagration that will take place if we do not act under an agreed-upon peace will be incredibly dangerous to the United States. This is, after all, the location in which World War II started.

Let me just finish by saying that I am reminded of that quote that said, during World War II, "First they came after the trade unionists, and since I was not a trade unionist, I did not object; and then they came after the Catholics, and since I was not a Catholic, I did not object; and then they came after the Jews, and since I was not a Jew, I did not object; and then they came after me, and there was no one left to object."

I agree with the previous speaker, we need to assist our military. I think many of us are willing to put our votes there. But we need to make sure that we stand ready not to cast today a vote that in essence precipitates the chance for peace, that ends it, that gives it a blow before there is even a chance; and that in essence this vote that we will be casting, particularly on this amendment, ends up being a death sentence to thousands of people. We have an opportunity for peace, and we need to preserve that opportunity for peace.

I urge my colleagues very seriously to vote against the Fowler amendment, because if not, they are already voting on the ultimate question; and to therefore, in voting against her amendment and giving peace an opportunity, then vote for the Gejdenson amendment.

Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of thoughtful and difficult issues that people have been trying to address here on all sides this afternoon. I think there is sincerity on all sides.

The underlying proposal that we are asked to endorse today is to endorse, without conditions, the indefinite assignment of 4,000 Americans as part of a NATO force of 30,000 in the territory of a sovereign country with which we are not at war, and over the objections of that country, on the grounds that the administration of the province of Kosovo is not in accordance with international humanitarian standards.

I am a supporter of NATO, and I am a supporter of American involvement in the world. In fact, I used to serve in the United States mission to NATO. I have worn the uniform of a member of the armed services. But let us not make any mistake here, this deployment is an extraordinary departure from what is envisioned in the NATO charter, and it is a departure from much of American diplomatic history.

There are several questions that I asked myself and that I will share with the Members as a contribution to this debate that I think we are faced with answering today: What is threat to U.S. security or to U.S. vital national interests? Clearly, there is no threat to

U.S. security directly, so we are talking about vital U.S. national interests.

We have to answer this question not in some rhetorical way, but in a very practical, pragmatic, personal way. Put it this way: If a young person in the hometown of one of us does not come home from Kosovo, what do we tell their parents they died for? Every man and woman who has worn the uniform knows that there are things that are worth dying for. I do not believe that this is one of them.

The administration has said that this is about maintaining stability in Europe. They are right, the Balkans have been a cauldron of war in this century. But the threat that they draw from Serbia is overdrawn. We are not talking about a power on the rise, as we faced in the 1930s in Europe, but a vicious leader in decline. It is equally probable that our intervention in Kosovo will itself spread the conflict beyond the borders of Kosovo and Serbia.

Let there be no doubt that Milosevic is an evil man who has wreaked havoc on his own people, but the question must be, what is in the U.S. national interest, and our foreign policy must be based on that.

□ 1800

The second question is, what are the political objectives that we hope to achieve, and will the use of military force help us to achieve those objectives? In Korea, our forces are there to deter aggression from North Korea. In Desert Storm, our objective was to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

This is unlike Bosnia where, after 3 years of war, we had exhausted parties ready to sue for peace, Bosnian Serbs who were being beaten back and who were eager to free the lines of ethnic enclaves where they were.

In Kosovo, we have two groups, two ethnic groups that claim the same territory. There are no enclaves. Into this, we are thrusting U.S. and NATO forces with no lines to be defended. There is no clear objective. We are the beginning of a political process, not a peace-keeping operation, as has been suggested.

Third, what is the size and the structure of the military force, and is it adequate? What are their rules of engagement, and are these all clearly defined? If they are not, not one American should go in not understanding exactly what the rules of engagement are.

If a 19-year-old kid confronts a KLA member who refuses to give up his or her weapon, what is that 19-year-old kid to do? Do they walk away? Do they fight? Until we have the answers to basic questions like that and are confident that our troops know what to do, they should not go in.

Kosovo is a much more dangerous situation than we faced going into Bosnia. We need to recognize those risks there and mitigate against them. There are too many unanswered questions on a deployment of questionable national

interest, and I cannot support the underlying amendment.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I stand here today, not as a Democrat, and I hope that my colleagues do not stand there as Republicans, and I would ask all of our colleagues, indeed, to question why do we stand here. What is this all about? What are our values? Where do we fit in this world?

We think sometimes about heroes. Indeed, what are heroes? A hero is usually an ordinary person who steps out of the crowd, having no gain for himself, and tries to stop a maddened mob from destroying somebody else's life and interjects himself into the fray. These are some of the values that we try to impart to our children. We should not mind only our own business, we should be trying to help other people.

I have heard the question asked over and over again by so many colleagues on both sides of the aisle, what is in the U.S. interest? What are we as a country? I think there is probably not a person in this body who would dispute the fact that they would like to see the U.S. recorded in permanent history as a Nation that is both mighty and just. What is the purpose of our might if we do not use it for good? Is justice not just a state of mind unless we use it for the greater good?

I have been, most of my life, a passive, opposed to so many of the things that so many of my friends have supported. This is a time for peace. This is a time to use our might and our strength and the unique position that the United States of America is in today for good, for something decent, to help save the lives of people in a place so far away, where human beings have been destroyed, where ethnic cleansing has taken place, where genocide has existed. Is that not in the American interest?

Mr. Chairman, I come from a very small people, a people who, in our lifetime, were almost totally annihilated by forces of evil. So much of the world turned its back. Oh, they had excuses. We did not know. We did not see. We did not believe. No one told us.

We have been disabused of those excuses, Mr. Chairman, today, because we know what is going on and what has gone on and what will go on unless the forces of justice and reason somehow intervene.

It was not until the world intervened and democratic countries stepped up to the plate that the people that I come from were liberated, snatched from the jaws of death in concentration camps.

So many of the countries, including the United States, for whom all of us are so grateful, stepped up to the plate because it was in America's national interest, and to do the right thing.

So many of us and so many others took an oath when that happened, Mr. Chairman, that said, never again, never

again were we going to allow something like this to happen. We swore this to ourselves, and we swore this to our God. Others swore along with us.

What does that mean? Did we mean this only for ourselves? Did we mean that we would step up to the plate only if we were going to be wiped out? I do not think so, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. ACKERMAN) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ACKERMAN was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we could not mean that only for ourselves, because that would be ingenuous. Never again will I want to remind my friends who have said that, which include probably everybody in this House, that never again is upon us yet again.

What is it that we are to do? Are we to shrug our shoulder? Are we to examine costs? Are we that people that would let others die unjustly, unpleasantly, because we are cheap, because we are thoughtless? I do not think so. This is the time to act in the interests of justice and in the interests of peace lest the notion that we are a mighty and just Nation be but an illusion.

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. CALLAHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I will admit I am in somewhat of a dilemma. I have spoken to this House in situations such as this on several occasions during Desert Storm, when we first sent our troops into Bosnia, and now here we are back again this year talking about a similar situation.

I read with interest, and in great depth the resolution of the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), and I know that we are talking about probably a substitute or an amendment to the substitute of the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON).

But, Mr. Chairman, in reading the original resolution, I find myself in a State of confusion because I do not know what to do. Certainly no one can disagree in the first part original resolution that this may be cited as peace-keeping operation. I agree with that. Certainly the part that the Congress makes the following findings about the conflict in Kosovo causing human suffering. I agree with that. The government of Serbia and the representatives of the peoples of Kosovo may reach some agreement soon. I agree with that.

Then it says President Clinton has promised to deploy 4,000 troops to Kosovo. I disagree with that. But it is correct. When I was approached, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations, I disagreed with the President about sending our troops

into Kosovo. I have expressed this to him. I have expressed it to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense.

That is my prerogative as a Member of Congress, just as it is my colleagues' prerogative to introduce the amendments and the resolutions as they have today.

But I think it is a very serious mistake for us to send at this time a message to the world and to the people negotiating the hopeful peace agreement that ultimately will be arranged whereby we can provide some vehicle for peace in Serbia and whereby the Albanians and the citizens of Kosovo can someday live in harmony.

I disagree with the President. But I agree with the mission he is trying to undertake, and that is to reach some type of peace agreement before he sends the troops in there. If they reach a peace agreement, he is going to send the troops in there. If they do not reach a peace agreement, he is going to send the troops in there.

The Constitution and this Congress has given the Administrative Branch of government the authority to do that. So we are not here saying let us change the authority. We are expressing a message that could be interpreted by Milosevic or by any of the principles of disagreement as an advantage to his side.

For us to hamstring the President, to hamstring our negotiations I think at this time is a very serious error that we should not be doing that. At the same time, if I vote for the agreement, the original resolution that we have, it indicates that I am supportive of sending troops into Kosovo, which I am not.

So I think that this is ill-timed. I do not know what I am going to do, but I expressed myself on the floor here today. I think a simple "present" vote will convince the people of the district I represent that I am concerned, as they are, about where we are headed.

But I am concerned, as they are, that the Constitution of the United States of America leaves foreign policy to the President of the United States, and that Congress is the check and balance.

I did not vote for Bill Clinton in the last election, nor the time before. But a majority of the people of the United States of America did. As a result, we gave him the authority to be the Commander in Chief of our armed services. We cannot deny him the authority that is granted to him in the Constitution.

So I think I am going to vote "present." It is not an indication of lack of support. It is an indication that is not the correct time to be debating this when they are in negotiations trying to resolve a peace agreement.

So my message is, to my colleagues, is that I applaud their willingness to stand and express their views. But I think this Congress is making a mistake to be handling a resolution about this matter at this time.

To the President, I will tell him I still do not support sending troops to Kosovo.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number or words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the Fowler amendment. I absolutely agree with the last speaker. Let me tell my colleagues, I want to make quite clear where I come from. I regard Mr. Milosevic as a sociopath. If I had my way, NATO would have gone after him a long time ago. I think he ought to be tried as a war criminal. I think he is one of the most useless leaders to ever walk on the face of the earth. That is what I think about him when I am in a mild mood.

But let me tell my colleagues my problem today. My problem is that I totally agree with what the administration is trying to do in the region, but I am not happy, frankly, with their implementation.

□ 1815

I think they have not accurately gauged the position of the Russians in this situation, and I think that they misjudged the reliability of the Kosovars. And under those circumstances, I am not convinced, while I agree with what they are trying to negotiate, I am not yet convinced that their negotiating partners have demonstrated enough maturity to rely on them in a sensitive situation like this.

My problem is, like the gentleman from Alabama, I believe this should not be here today. And the reason I say that is this: I think it is here because a lot of us have a fundamental misunderstanding of our constitutional role. You can make a very respectable argument that we ought to have a vote before we do something such as bomb Mr. Milosevic. I would vote for such an explicit action. I think he has got it coming, and I think NATO needs to lead and we need to lead NATO. But I also do not believe that this Congress has any business whatsoever interposing its judgment on questions that involve the President's Commander-in-Chief responsibilities.

With all due respect to the Fowler amendment and the Gejdenson amendment, both of which I will vote against, there is not a Member on this floor who has any qualification whatsoever to say what our troop levels ought to be in a peacekeeping situation. The most dangerous human being on the face of the earth is a Member of Congress who has taken a 3-day trip somewhere and thinks that they have learned enough to tell the entire country what we ought to do on a crucial issue. Nine times out of ten they are more of a menace than a help.

I do not believe we have the personal expertise to make military decisions. I want the Joint Chiefs of Staff to decide what the level ought to be, if we do have a peacekeeping force. I do not want that decision made on a political basis by the Congress or the White House. And I certainly do not want it made on the basis of a budgetary question.

I do not want to have to look into the eyes of any more parents and explain

why their sons or daughters were killed in an operation. And sometimes, to protect those sons and daughters, we need more troops not less. I happen to think that this is probably one of those cases.

So I am going to vote against the Fowler amendment. I am going to vote against the Gejdenson amendment. I will not vote for the Gilman resolution because I do not believe in giving Presidents blank checks, and I am not going to endorse an agreement until I know what it is and until I have had an opportunity to gauge the reliability of the people that we are negotiating with.

But I also will not vote against it today, because if we vote against it, we help assure that those negotiations will not come to a constructive conclusion. And that is why, like the gentleman from Alabama, I will vote present. Because until we have an agreement to judge, Congress has no right to muck things up when the result will be lost lives.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment and in opposition to H. Con. Res. 42.

Today we are going to have a vote on whether or not troops should be authorized to go to Kosovo. If we vote in favor of this, we are voting for war. This is not a war resolution in the conventional sense of the Constitution, but in this day and age it is about as close as we are going to come to since we have ignored the Constitution with regards to war powers essentially since World War II. If we vote for troops to go to Kosovo, we are complicit in a potential war and the responsibility should be on the shoulders of those who vote to send the troops.

I strongly urge that we not send the troops. It is not our fight. We are not the policemen of the world. It weakens our national defense. There are numerous reasons why we do not need to send more troops into another country someplace around the world. Every time we do this it just leads to the next problem.

It is said that we should not have much to say about foreign policy because the Constitution has given responsibility to the President. The term "foreign policy" does not even exist in the Constitution. The President has been given the authority to be the Commander-in-Chief; to lead the troops after we direct him as to what he should do. He is the commander. We do not have a military commander, we have a civilian commander. But we do not forego our right to debate and be concerned about what is happening on issues of troop deployment and war.

A report put out by those who sponsor this resolution had this to say. "This measure does not address the underlying question of the merits or mis-

givings of sending U.S. forces into Kosovo." We are not even supposed to debate the merits and misgivings of sending troops. Why not? "Instead, the purpose of this resolution" they go on to say, "is to give the House an opportunity to fulfill its constitutional responsibility of authorizing the deployment of U.S. troops into potentially hostile situations." In other words, we are to do nothing more than rubber stamp what the President has asked for.

Where does the President claim he gets his authority? Does he come to us? Has he asked us for this? No, he assumes he has the authority. He has already threatened that what we do here will have no effect on his decision. He is going to do what he thinks he should do anyway. He does not come and ask for permission. Where does he get this authority? Sometimes the Presidents, since World War II, have assumed it comes from the United Nations. That means that Congress has reneged on its responsibility.

We do not just give it to the President, we give it to the President plus the United Nations or NATO. And when we joined NATO and the United Nations, it was explicitly said it was not to be inferred that this takes away the sovereignty and the decision-making powers of the individual countries and their legislative bodies. And yet we have now, for quite a few decades, allowed this power to gravitate into the hands of the President.

After Vietnam there was a great deal of concern about this power to wage war. First, we had Korea. We did not win that war. Next we had Vietnam. And with very sincere intent, the Congress in 1973 passed the War Powers Resolution. The tragedy of the War Powers Resolution, no matter how well motivated, is that it did exactly the opposite of what was intended.

What has actually happened is it has been interpreted by all our Presidents since then that they have the authority to wage war for 60-90 days before we can say anything. That is wrong. We have turned it upside down. So it is up to us to do something about getting the prerogative of waging war back into the hands of the Congress.

It is said that we do not have this authority; that we should give it to the President; that he has it under the Constitution based on his authority to formulate foreign policy. It is not there. The Congress has the responsibility to declare war, write letters of marks and reprisals, call up the militia, raise and train army and regulate foreign commerce. The President shares with the Senate treaty power as well as appointment of ambassadors. The President cannot even do that alone.

We have the ultimate power, and that is the power of the purse. If the power of the purse is given up, then we lose everything. Because we have not assumed our responsibilities up until this point, it is up to us to declare that

the President cannot spend money in this manner. I have legislation that would take care of this; that the President cannot place troops in Kosovo unless he gets explicit authority from us to do so. If he does it, the monies should be denied to the President, unless we want to be complicit in this dangerous military adventurism.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and oppose the Fowler amendment in favor of the Turner amendment.

Mr. Chairman, why are we debating this issue at this point in time? We all recognize that it is political; politics that could come back to haunt us.

One of the biggest problems we have in Congress is the fact that we have an obligation and a duty. The only reason to debate this resolution today is to undercut the administration at the critical time of our negotiations. It is more than irony that some of those pushing for consideration of this resolution today fully intend to oppose the resolution. This is an exercise in rhetoric.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, is it improper, either in the full House or in the body, to characterize the reasons for why different people vote for things; to characterize and impugn?

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, I apologize if I have offended anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.

The Chair will simply state that it is improper debate to question the personal motives of any Member.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I will not demand the words be taken down, but I would ask the gentleman not to characterize.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I have offended anybody, I apologize. But as a member of this Congress, I recognize the fact that politics is played within the House floor, and I recognize that this particular resolution does undermine the administration's efforts at this point in time.

As a Member representing a community of more than 42,000 active duty service members and nearly 6,000 reservists and guard members, I do not take this issue lightly because the lives of those service members may be put in harm's way.

I deplore the timing of this resolution. This resolution is being set up for failure. At least 2,000 people have been killed and 400,000 displaced in the Balkans region. The United States clearly has a vested interest in peace in the region. Kosovo and the Balkans fall in between two allies, Greece and Turkey. The Balkans' historical role in Europe has been critical. We all recognize that we also have in jeopardy Macedonia, Montenegro, Northern Greece, Albania, as well as Turkey, and the possibility

of this particular situation going out of its boundaries.

Our interests are humanitarian, economic and military, and also an interest as it deals with the leadership of this country and the fact that we have not only an obligation but a duty to make sure that peace is obtained. By playing politics with sensitive peace negotiations that are set to resume March 15, the House of Representatives could jeopardize peace in the region. Failure to achieve peace now in Kosovo could cause significant instability in the already volatile region.

Secretary of State Albright stressed this point yesterday before the House Committee on International Relations saying that a new outbreak of fighting in Kosovo could expand into regional hostilities that could cause massive suffering, displace tens of thousands of people, undermine stability throughout South Central Europe, and directly affect key allies.

If we can secure peace, if we can end the slaughter, we have the duty to do so. If we can join our NATO friends and allies by providing those 4,000 troops as part of the large NATO force, then we have the duty to do so. The failure to obtain peace now could put greater numbers of potential U.S. and European troops in danger if broader hostilities break out.

Our Nation's modest personnel but crucial political investments in the Kosovo peace process is essential to achieving peace. Without the U.S. involvement, peace is unlikely. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

I also want to add, Mr. Chairman, that this is very different from Bosnia, and it is very different from Bosnia in the sense that in Bosnia we took the lead. Here only 14 percent of the troops will be from the United States. Europe is taking the lead, and we have an obligation and a duty, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I hopefully will not take the 5 minutes, but let me express to my colleagues the deep, deep anguish I feel in what we are doing and how we are doing it. I cannot rise in support of the base amendment, the Gilman resolution, nor the Gejdenson amendment to it, nor the amendment of my dear friend the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER), or substitute.

Much has been said about the timing of why we are here and that we should not be here at this time. I agree with that, but I am not sure that I attach the responsibility for that fact the way others have done so. If our President had assured us that, upon being able to negotiate an agreement, he would come to us and seek our approval for going forward with military deployments in Kosovo, it would have been the time for this debate to have taken place, after the agreement had been reached.

□ 1830

I almost certainly would have been one of those who would have supported doing what he asked if there was an agreement we could look at and know what it provided and that it was a bona fide agreement. But here we are with the certainty that he would not come to the Congress and yet he does not have an agreement and we do not even know whether or not at such time somebody in Paris signs their names to a stack of papers that it will indeed be an agreement of anyone.

How do you say you have the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when you are saying, "If the Kosovo Albanians sign it and you don't, we're going to bomb you." Now, I am not sure that that is an agreement. How do we know that anyone who purports to be representing the people of Kosovo has any authority to represent the people of Kosovo? The chief political observer of the Kosovar Liberation Army left Paris and criticized those who even entertained the notion of signing the agreement. We do not have any basis for knowing that this agreement is real. If it is not real, then we have put ourselves in a very tenuous position to say that we will deploy American armed forces in the sovereign territory of another state against its will and conduct bombing or other military action. That certainly is an act of war. That requires us to declare it. It makes us an international outlaw if it has not been done that way and we do not in fact go there by agreement.

I do not like the fact that this debate is taking place now. But for anyone to say this Congress does not need to have a debate on matters of this kind and of this consequence I think denigrates the role of this Congress in the governance of the United States of America. I do not want to be in a position where someone has deployed forces, my constituents, and to have to go back to the people I represent and say, "Well, they've been sent there because we didn't think that the Yugoslavia Federal Republic had given Kosovo sufficient autonomy, but we certainly didn't send them there to fight for the independence of Kosovo." Those kind of subtle distinctions certainly escape me. I think they will escape my constituents. I wish this debate came later, when the President could say there is an agreement and we could test whether it was real and then support him. But unfortunately we are not in that position. I frankly do not know whether we are going to find anything that is going to be before us in the course of this debate that I will be in a position to vote for.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I wonder if we vote not to deploy troops in Kosovo if the President would abide by it. I thought the gentleman from New York (Mr. ACKERMAN) made a good statement. I would like to concur.

There is a reason for United States support in the region. Maybe the most important reason is genocide. The world took genocide lightly once before and we should not do it again. But what bothers me is we have been turning aside from this dilemma since 1986 when there was an intelligence report that said there is only going to be two dynamics that come out of Kosovo: We will either press the Serbs for independence for Kosovo or there will be a revolution and there will ultimately be a great entanglement.

I believe we must support the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo who are being brutalized. But the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) brings a good question to the House. How do we do it? She says we should not deploy troops, we should use air strikes, logistics, intelligence and other means of identifiable support. There is a lot of sense to that. I think it is time for Europe to stand up for Europe. We may be the superpower, but by God we are not the only power.

Let me say one last thing. I want to commend the Speaker for this debate. We have been debating war, ladies and gentlemen, after wars have been engaged. If these are peacekeepers, we ought to send the Peace Corps. If these are police actions, we ought to send the D.C. police. These are potential wars.

I am going to support helping in our cause in Kosovo. But I am going to vote for the Fowler amendment. In addition, if the Fowler amendment should fail, I will support Gejdenson, because I think this thing is going to be passed. But I will then offer an amendment to Gejdenson that says no troops shall be deployed unless all Serb troops are removed from Kosovo on the schedule of which Rambouillet would require. Number two, that if Milosevic violates the agreement, it is to be understood that NATO strikes in Serbia at military installations will be immediately commenced. And, number three, that any suspected war criminal shall be investigated and, if necessary or warranted, apprehended and tried by an international tribunal.

In closing out, let me say this. I have left out the question of independence, because we do not have enough guts yet, but I will make this point to you. Milosevic has laughed in our face. Unless there are some terms in that agreement, we will have failed. Ninety-three percent of the population of Kosovo is ethnic Albanians. Milosevic has lost the moral authority to lead. So I am willing to back up on that. But not on the war crimes and not on other conditions. And if this bum violates it again, by God, we should codify it into law that action will be taken.

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard a number of times here today that the Congress should not be acting on this question yet. It is amazing to me that of our NATO allies, the members of the Bundestag can debate this question and

vote on it, the members of the Parliament can debate this question, but the Members of the U.S. Congress cannot debate this question.

I have heard here a number of times today that we should be waiting until there is a final agreement. Mr. Chairman, I am confident that every effort has been made to get assurances that if there was a final agreement, that the Congress would be consulted after that final agreement and before troops were deployed, and those assurances are not there.

Yesterday, before a committee of the House, the Secretary of State said that this is not a good time for the Congress to be debating this issue. But then she went on to say that there is never a good time for the Congress to debate these issues because we just get in the way of diplomacy. That is not the role of the Congress as I see the role of the Congress in the Constitution and many others do. I am grateful for the Speaker's decision to provide this debate. Too many times, the Congress has said we will wait until the decision is made and the decision is made and the commitment is made so quickly that then we have a decision of whether we are going to support troops in the field, not to whether those troops would be in the field or not.

There are questions that this House has an obligation to ask right now. Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former national security adviser, the former Secretary of State, gave some insightful testimony before the House Committee on International Relations yesterday. He said there is a critical question to be asked, under what circumstances should American military forces be used to pursue national objectives and what should those objectives be? Should American military might be available to enable every ethnic or religious group to achieve self-determination? If Kosovo, why not East Africa? Why not Central Asia? Is this part of our policy?

I think there are questions that this Congress has to ask in regard to Kosovo. Why would we be there if we are there? What is our goal in Kosovo? I understand that part of the goal is to get Serbia out of Kosovo without getting Kosovo out of Serbia. I submit to the Congress that that is a very difficult goal to achieve. How will we know when we have done it? We have been in Bosnia now for years and the checklist that we had hoped to be checking off, we cannot check any of the boxes yet. We are no closer to leaving Bosnia than we were the day we went into Bosnia. And what is the cost to our armed forces? What is the cost of our ability to defend America around the world?

I thought the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) made an incredibly effective presentation with the wrong conclusion. The presentation was the diminution of our military forces, our military readiness, our military benefits, our military re-

search, our development of new weapons, and then one of the main reasons for that is this willingness to commit troops, to commit our defense capacity without any end in sight. We need to ask what that end is. There may in fact be a better way for the Congress to take up this issue. I would be fully in favor of the administration negotiating this question and then coming to the Congress and say, "Here is what we have negotiated. What do you think?" That has not happened time after time after time. We have sought assurances it would happen this time. There are no assurances forthcoming. For all those who say now is not the time, I would say to them, there will not be a time if we wait for the administration to determine when the Congress should be involved in this because, as the Secretary of State said yesterday, it is really never helpful for us to discuss these issues.

The President and the Secretary of State should be asking for our approval. We need to be partners in this kind of policy. I rise in support of this amendment and to encourage the administration to fully involve the Congress in its future activities before they are completed.

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, of the hundreds of votes we cast in this Chamber each year I believe money is more important than the issue of deploying our troops abroad and placing them in harm's way. While I believe it is fully appropriate for Congress to have a voice in the crucial decisions, I also know that there are some in this debate who are motivated by questions of domestic politics rather than foreign policy. They want to score political points at the President's expense and I think that is regrettable. This important debate over the nature and extent of our military involvement in the Balkans should be driven by long-term national interests, not short-term political considerations.

It is on the basis of our long-term national interests that I oppose the resolution to authorize the President to deploy American troops to Kosovo. I am not pleased to find myself at odds with a major foreign policy initiative of my President. But I come to this position based on a close evaluation of U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans. Mr. Chairman, the Balkans are a complicated, dangerous area. For six centuries Kosovo has marked the confluence of three vastly different cultures. Since the first battle of Kosovo in 1389, these cultures, Western, Slavic and Islamic, have clashed violently at this very spot. These battles are not over something so simple as land or even as valuable as mineral rights. Instead they are battles in which each party believes they are guided by heaven in a fight for the future of their people.

The current war in Kosovo is no different from those that have preceded

it. The fall of the Soviet empire did not write a new chapter in the history of the Balkans. As much as it repeated one that came before with the fall of the Hapsburgs and before that with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Kosovo belongs less to the end of our century than to the beginning, and the motivations of the combatants are the same as those in previous battles.

Though technically begun by one man, Slobodan Milosevic, who reflects on little more than his own greed, it is being fought by two peoples convinced of their own imminent destruction. These people believe the sword is the only option to preserve their own life and, barring that, their only honorable path to death.

Putting U.S. troops on the ground in Kosovo is not a recipe for peace. It is a recipe for disaster. The history of the Balkans has only marginally been kinder to its inhabitants than it has been to outsiders. Placing U.S. troops in the middle of this conflict will not bring an end to the killing but instead draw Americans into it.

□ 1845

We have put our troops in this position before in places such as Lebanon and Somalia, and while peacekeeping is a noble task, it works only when there is a peace to keep. A signed piece of paper between two peoples who see no options, but war is not peace.

Our troops are going into Kosovo with no clearly defined mission and no exit strategy. We have already seen this pattern in Bosnia. We were originally told our troops would be in Bosnia for 6 months. Almost 4 years later they are still there with no end in sight, and, unlike Bosnia, this conflict in Kosovo would inevitably be far more difficult and dangerous to American forces.

What happens if we begin to incur casualties? Will we fall victim to mission creep? Will we deploy troops to defend Macedonia? Albania? And Bulgaria? The unique and tragic history of the Balkans teaches us that these battles grow into wider conflict, and when outsiders are drawn into it, they are drawn into it and cannot get out.

I do not shy away from the use of military force to protect our Nation's vital interests, and I do not deny that the war in Kosovo is a tragedy that grips our Nation's conscience. In this sad world of ours there are many tragedies around the globe: Turkey's war with the Kurds, Russia's battle with the Chechens, China's war on Tibet. Yet no one suggests that we intervene in these conflicts and for a simple reason. Many American soldiers would die in vain.

Instead of elevating Milosevic as a savior for his people, we should be working to undermine him and make Serbia a democracy.

In Serbia today, pro-democracy groups such as the Alliance for Change, the Council for Democratic Change and the Democratic Party of Serbia strug-

gle to build an open society without us taking notice. This must change.

Tomorrow in Independence, Missouri, the success of our policies elsewhere in Europe will be ratified when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic officially join NATO. Let us use this occasion to acknowledge the serious flaws in our Balkan policy. More troops are not the answer.

Let me say again this is a difficult vote for me and I regret it is taking place at a crucial time in ongoing negotiations. But the fact remains I cannot in good conscience support sending our young men and women in uniform into harm's way without clear, achievable goals.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the single greatest challenge in foreign policy as we head into the next century is our ability to define vital national interests of the United States.

There are many people that are concerned about this debate today because they take a look at some of the terrible violence that goes on around the world, and they say how can the United States not intervene in the face of that?

Mr. Chairman, if we try to pick and choose those areas in the world where we will intervene based on the power of television, I think we will not be able to make good choices.

The fact is whenever the television stations focus their cameras on violence in one particular part of the world and brings that violence to our attention, then it seems as though a case is being made and gets made within this administration, and frankly on this floor, that the United States has a vital interest or has an interest in order to stop the violence.

The fact is, as we look around the world, when we look at the plight of the Kurds, when we look at the tragedy, the ongoing tragedy, in Sierra Leone, when we consider the plight of the people in Afghanistan, and Sudan, and in Somalia, and in Indonesia, the list goes on and on to demonstrate man's inhumanity to man.

But what is the responsibility of a great power? How does a great power decide where to go?

When I came on the floor earlier today, I heard somebody talking about how much they hated the violence and the tragedy that was ongoing in Kosovo, and yet then I heard another speaker stand and say:

But how can we put American forces in harm's way where somebody is going to have to call somebody's mother or father and explain why somebody lost their lives?

This is not a question of whose heart is bigger. This is a question of what is in the best interests of a national power to in the long run do what is in the best interests of world peace and world security.

The fact is there are some benchmarks and some landmarks and some

compasses and some guiding stars that I believe can allow us to make the prudent decision. The first and most important question is: Is it in the vital national interests of the United States? Can we in fact be able to define specifically and with great credence exactly why it does benefit us? And frankly combined and intertwined right with that struggle to define the vital national interest comes right with it the need for the American people to support our involvement.

Now I have been in the Congress, now starting my 17th year, and we have faced this issue over and over again, and it is not a matter of partisanship. I remember the debate on this floor when Ronald Reagan committed us to Lebanon, a place where we saw great ongoing tragedy every night on the national news, and we went frankly because we followed our hearts in order to rescue people from violence, and at the end of the day we lost a great number of marines and we left because we were never able to define Lebanon in the vital national interests of the United States with the combined support of the American people. I voted against Ronald Reagan that day on the floor in regard to Lebanon.

There is another third issue that involves not just the vital national interests and whether the American people support our efforts, but do we have an achievable goal? Do we have something that is an objective that is likely to succeed? And if, in fact, we look at what the goals are and they are ill-defined, as they were in Lebanon and, I believe, as they are in Kosovo, then all the committing of forces in the world will not achieve our goal, our objective, if it is not clear and if it is not achievable.

And in addition to that, what is the timetable? The timetable is one where it is always easy to get in. The question is what is the exit strategy? How do we get out after having achieved our goal? Mr. Chairman, if we consider these notions of is it in the vital national direct interests of the United States, does the commitment have broad support among the American people, is there an achievable goal and is there a timetable to go in and get out; if the answers to those questions are not all in the affirmative, then I believe the United States makes a huge mistake by committing itself. In Lebanon we engaged ourselves in a civil war.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KASICH) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. KASICH was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, look. We got involved against Saddam Hussein because we were able to explain the vital direct national interests of the United States, we were able to get the support of the American people and we had a good timetable. We made a mistake in Lebanon, we made a mistake in

Somalia in the middle of a civil war. See, the fact is that when we engage in conflicts that represent ethnic strife or civil wars where there is not a clear American interest, and an achievable goal and a timetable to get in and get out, what happens is a superpower entangles itself all over the globe, and George Washington warned us in the beginning of his administration, at the beginning of our country, that a great power that entangles itself in too many places in the world will diminish itself.

So the challenge for the United States is to literally define the direct national interests of the United States whenever we go and for our leaders to gather the support of the American people, and to have a good goal and to have a good timetable. Short of that, short of being able to answer those questions affirmatively, then the United States needs to preserve its power, because in preserving its power and at the same time using it successfully, we will enhance a great power. To use it wantonly around the world without answering this affirmatively will diminish us over time.

I believe that the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) is right tonight. We should not make a commitment to go to Kosovo to engage in a civil war, an ethnic conflict. I believe over time that these kind of commitments will diminish us rather than strengthening us and will not serve the peace and the security of people across the world as we would want them to be served.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KASICH. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I am just curious if my distinguished colleague has any concern for our credibility in the NATO alliance and whether or not our decision here would impact that alliance.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman from Florida that we spent 40 years training our NATO allies to work against the Soviet Union moving across the Fulda gap with an incredible display of armor and lethality. I believe that the Europeans in this case, if they want to go into Kosovo, they should go, they should make that decision. The United States could offer them technical support.

But I believe this is foremost their job, this is in their direct national interest, but not in the direct national interests of the United States. We can participate in indirect ways to offer the technical support they would need, but for us to be involved in the bombing and the committing of troops on the ground is not in our vital national interests, I do not believe the goal is achievable, and frankly I do not even know what the goal is over there as defined by the administration, and finally, I just do not think there is a timetable that gets us out.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Fowler amendment with the greatest respect for the maker of this motion. I oppose the amendment on the grounds of its substance and find the timing of it most unfortunate.

In doing so, though, I want to praise the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), and the ranking member, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), for their participation on the floor today. I would say for their leadership in bringing this issue to the floor, but I do not think that this issue should be on the floor today. Having said that, I applaud them for their impressive presentation on why we should be supporting the President's policy in Kosovo and why we should be opposing the Fowler amendment here today.

I also want to commend my colleague the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TURNER) for his very wise amendment to the Gejdenson amendment and hope that this House will give it its fullest consideration when the opportunity comes.

Mr. Chairman, other speakers this evening have said that Kosovo, is a very difficult decision. Well, Kosovo is a very difficult and dangerous place, and we are sent here, after all, to make the difficult decisions. I, for one, do not think that we, Congress, has a role in voting on whether the President should send peacekeepers into a region, so I do not think that this debate is a necessary one, and I think again that the timing of it is unfortunate.

What is happening in Kosovo is a challenge to the conscience of our country, what is happening in Kosovo is a challenge to the future of NATO. I would say to our colleague the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. KASICH) that it is in our vital national interest, it is in our vital national interest to support NATO. Indeed the United States is so much a part of NATO that NATO is not effective without U.S. participation.

I would have hoped that we could have had the administration bring the negotiations to fruition. There can be no agreement without American troops on the ground. The Kosovars would never agree to any peacekeeping force that did not include American troops. There can be no agreement without NATO in Kosovo, and NATO will not go in without U.S. troops. So our involvement is fundamental to any agreement about keeping the peace in Kosovo.

I said earlier that Kosovo is a challenge to our conscience. Just a few years earlier Bosnia was, and over 200,000 people were killed there. I wondered when I was a child and first learned about the Holocaust and read "The Diary Of Anne Frank" as a teenager, I wondered how did this ever happen? Didn't anybody know? Why didn't anybody do anything about it? And when the Bosnian situation came

along, I could see how it happened. People knew, people cared, but people did not want to get involved.

Before the 2,000 people who have been killed, 2,000 plus in Kosovo, grow to a greater number, I hope that we can be smart about this and support the reasonable negotiations that would involve U.S. troops on the ground. Two thousand people were killed there, many of whom are women and children. There have to be certain recognitions. As I have said before, there is no effective NATO without U.S. participation.

□ 1900

There is no effective peace agreement without U.S. participation of troops on the ground, and the other recognition is that Milosevic the ruthless president of Serbia, as we know, and is a ruthless killer. He has an endless appetite for killing people. So it is not a question of his conscience ever being challenged.

We cannot count on any balance, on any reason, on any humanitarianism springing from the other side. It must spring from NATO and, again, the U.S. is almost synonymous with NATO now.

I talked about the timing, and I want to return to that, Mr. Chairman, because I think that this is really unfortunate. The President of the United States is bringing a message of compassion and humanitarianism to Central America after the most disastrous natural disaster in this hemisphere. Over thousands of people killed, millions of people made homeless, thousands without jobs, economies wiped out.

The President is bringing the compassion of the American people there. That is an appropriate mission for the President. The Secretary of State is joining him. The Secretary of Defense is out of the country, and we bring up a resolution to undermine their efforts in Kosovo.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this ill-timed resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I first want to commend the Members on both sides of the aisle for the dignified and calm way and thorough way in which they have conducted the debate on this important measure, and I also commend Speaker HASTERT for arranging this debate. I think it is extremely important that we have had this opportunity to voice our views, both pro and con, with regard to the commitment of troops to Kosovo.

Mr. Chairman, I rise with some reluctance to oppose the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER). I understand that the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) is offering this amendment because she is genuinely concerned about the effect of NATO peacekeeping missions in the

Balkans on our troops and on our military readiness.

To a degree, I share some of those concerns. Nevertheless, in the interest of preventing hostility in Kosovo, I must rise in opposition to the Fowler amendment.

My main concern is that the situation there is fluid, and regrettably the Fowler amendment would lock us in an inflexible position of having to decline outright our participation with our NATO allies in bringing peace to Kosovo. Accordingly, I rise in opposition to the Fowler amendment. I believe U.S. participation in this NATO peacekeeping mission is an essential ingredient for peace in Kosovo.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support this evening of the Fowler amendment. If we look at the Fowler amendment it really does not prohibit United States assistance to stop the bloodshed that we see in this region of the world.

My colleagues, I do not think there is anyone who serves here among us that would like to see another person die, another person harmed, would like to see the continuation of tragedy in that part of the world that we have witnessed on television, we have witnessed in media accounts. We all want to see that end, but, my colleagues, we have been there and we have done that before.

I have only served 6 short years in the House of Representatives, but from the time I came to first serve here we have seen what has happened under this administration. Again, I reiterate and recite the experience of Somalia. It started out as a humanitarian mission, a compassionate mission, and we were sucked into this conflict.

If we look at the newspaper just a few weeks ago, we will see that 60 people were killed in Somalia; that, in fact, our policy failed there, our efforts failed, and the killing goes on.

We spoke from the well here about Haiti, about a policy relating to Haiti. We spent \$3 billion. We are the most compassionate government and Congress on the face of this Earth to try to bring peace and order and stability to Haiti and other nations. I say that tonight Haiti is just as unstable as it has ever been and, again, we have turned from one set of dictators to another set of dictators.

We saw the example of Rwanda and how this administration failed to act when we had the greatest genocide in the history of my lifetime, my short lifetime, that only after continuous pleas of the United Nations were rebuked. I spoke here on the Floor of the House and others did asking that the United Nations be allowed to send a pan-African force with no American troops there to stop the situation from turning into a disaster. We knew what was going to happen, and this administration blocked that effort.

In Bosnia, we heard about the quarter of a million people who have lost

their lives there. I have been to Sarajevo and I have looked across the parks in Sarajevo that now have the white crosses of the tens of thousands who died.

Why did they die? They died because of the failed policy of this administration. They did not come to the rescue of the people when they needed it. A quarter of a million had to die and advisors from this administration, who we talked with, resigned in disgust.

They kept people from protecting themselves in that region, and that is why we had that quarter of a million die.

We were promised time and time again here that our troops would be gone, thousands of troops gone, and we still have 6,000 to 8,000 troops in that area and we were told when we visited there recently that, again, it takes 10,000 to support the several thousand that we now have there years later.

So, yes, we want to stop violence.

Does nation building work? Sometimes a thousand years of conflict cannot be resolved by our troops or our fine efforts.

Tonight, as we are here enjoying the comforts of the United States, there are 30 armed conflicts in the world. There are people dying throughout the world for various reasons in almost every hemisphere.

Can the United States be the policeman of the world? I say that we cannot. Can we support organizations like the United Nations, who should go in and take actions? Yes, we should. Should we support NATO? Yes, we should. Have we helped NATO over the years to build forces to resolve conflicts in the European theater? Yes, we have.

We have been good neighbors. We have tried to assist but, again, we have been there, we have done that.

Let me say finally why we are in the situation in Kosovo, and that is again because of a failed policy by this administration.

Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise at this point to speak in favor of the Gejdenson amendment but also to say that I think the original amendment, the Gilman amendment, is an acceptable alternative.

I would prefer that we were not doing this. I think tonight the timing is not exactly right, but we are doing it. So in those terms I would ask that we remember the history that has gone on; who it is we are dealing with and what the history of those dealings have been in the period of time that Slobodan Milosevic has been the leader of Yugoslavia.

I ask us to remember that Milosevic attacked not one but two members of the United Nations in 1991 and 1992, both Croatia and Bosnia, and it was the regular Yugoslav Army, not indigenous folk, who attacked and destroyed the ancient and beautiful city of Vukovar after a 2-month siege, and in the aftermath of that siege the slaughter in-

cluded people who were pulled out of the hospital, men and women pulled out of hospital beds and slaughtered at the end of that siege.

Their crime was that they happened to live in an area that Milosevic wanted to add to Serbia, but their other crime was that they were Roman Catholics.

Then I ask us to remember that Milosevic deployed his regular Yugoslav army, that that was the instrument by which the overwhelming Muslim cities and towns in the Drina River Valley in eastern Bosnia were ethnically cleansed in early 1992. That was when the major ethnic cleansing occurred, early in 1992.

Their crime was that they were in a part of Bosnia that Mr. Milosevic wanted to add to Serbia. Their other crime happened to be that they were Muslims. So they were ethnically cleansed, which meant that they were either killed or driven out.

I ask us to remember Srebrenica, crowded with refugees, whose only crime really was to have taken the U.N. seriously when the U.N. said that Srebrenica would be a safe haven, but, of course, they also happened to be Muslims. They, 8,000 men and boys, every male in that community, when it was overrun, was slaughtered like pigs in a stockyard.

I ask us to remember that Milosevic signed the Dayton Accords in 1995, after it was clear that the tide was running against him. That has been a remarkably successful deployment as peacekeeping. The only area, the major area, where it has been unsuccessful is because Milosevic has violated all of the terms of the Dayton Accords that related to allowing refugees to return.

I ask us to remember that Milosevic signed agreements in regard to Kosovo only four months ago and has violated every one of those agreements. There is no difference between the policy that the Milosevic regime has put forward either before or after those signings back in October. So there have been thousands of people killed and another 400,000 refugees have been sent around in various places in Europe.

It is that history, that history of dealing with this what my ranking member on the Committee on Appropriations called the psychopathic, psychotic, one of those words, whichever one it was, nature of the leader that we are dealing with.

With all of that history, it is the contact powers that have come together and empowered NATO, suggested that they go in and create an atmosphere for peace. NATO has not moved quickly. Those contact powers have not moved quickly before in Yugoslavia and it is only because of the history, the 10 years now virtually of history in dealing with that regime, that they are now acting. I think that it would be a tragedy if we did not support their capacity to act at this time.

It is not our part, nor any part, nor any intent of that effort on the part of

NATO, to give Kosova independence. What is intended is to stop the killing. It is a mission designed to stop the killing, to impose peace.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. OLVER) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. OLVER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

□ 1715

Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I hope in that process, I think everyone hopes in that process, if an agreement can be reached, that it will be possible to see if those people can live together, can live and coexist together. After all that has gone on, all of the repression of the Albanian ethnic majority, now 93 percent of the population of Kosovo is Albanian ethnic citizens of the origination of Yugoslavia, from some time ago, whose autonomy was taken away, and the very policies that Milosevic has followed has led to more Serbs leaving Kosovo. So it is 93 percent Albanian.

But I think also, now, in the last year of the 20th century, we ought to look at this century and see that early in this century there was a peaceful divorce of two nations put together, two peoples put together by an agreement that had been made after a war earlier. The Swedes and the Norwegians in 1905, they peacefully divorced. Not a single person was killed in that process. At the end of this century, we have seen the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They were united. There was no separated sovereignty, there was only one sovereignty. They decided to peacefully divorce, and there was not a single person killed in that process.

We should be seeking ways of developing a peaceful divorce here, if that is what it comes to, and if it is clear that those people cannot live together peacefully and in fairness and in justice, which is what clearly we are trying to have 3 years to be able to develop over a period of time.

So I hope that the Gejdenson amendment will be adopted, and if not, the Gilman underlying amendment, either is acceptable, to allow that kind of policy to go forward.

Mr. BILLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise reluctantly to oppose the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER), my good friend whom I almost always agree with, but she is wrong. We cannot back out of this. If we do, we might as well back out of NATO.

The Europeans cannot do this without us. We have to be there. It is not pleasant. I would just as soon we did not have to be there. However, we need to remember, World War I started in the Balkans, and if we do not participate, the Europeans will not participate without us. I serve in the NATO Parliamentary Group, I have for the last 15 years. They have made it clear

that without us, they will not be there. Then, the fighting will continue. We will see the ethnic cleansing going on that we saw in Bosnia. We will see on the evening news the body bags, the atrocities, and the Kosovars, who are lightly armed in comparison to the Serbs, will call on their Albanian colleagues and brothers to come to their defense, and we will begin to have a widening war in the Balkans.

Is it in our interests? You bet. It is in our interests if for no other reason but for humanitarian reasons to make sure the slaughter does not go on. Far more than that, what it means to the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful defense group in the history of the world, it would be a tragedy.

Has the administration fumbled? Has it failed to come forward as they should have long ago to explain to the American people and to the Congress why it is absolutely necessary that we participate? You bet. The fact is, that is water over the dam. We are here at a crucial point. We need to make sure that we do our part.

Mr. Chairman, 4,000 troops out of a contingency of 28,000 or more is a small price to pay for peace. Would that we had had 4,000 troops in 1934 to boost up the morale of the French and the British when Hitler broke the Treaty of Versailles and moved back into the Saar. We might have had a far different historic turnout.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to underscore and associate myself with the remarks of the previous speaker, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. Chairman, as an internationalist, I believe that the United States can and should intervene when a country violates international law and commits crimes against humanity. It is shameful that we waited as long as we did to intervene during World War II and the more recent genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda.

Yesterday, before the Committee on International Relations, Senator Dole put the question, how many murders make a genocide? Mr. Chairman, do we wait until the deaths in Kosovo number hundreds of thousands as opposed to the 2,000 to 3,000, or do we intervene earlier? Europeans with whom I have discussed Kosovo are truly perplexed. I have had an occasion to discuss it often with my colleagues in Europe and the responsibility that I happily undertake as a rapporteur of the First Committee which deals with politics and security in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Four times a year I have traveled to those meetings for the last 3 years and talked constantly about this particular problem.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in other bodies in Europe cannot fathom how any thinking person can oppose efforts to craft a solution to this enormous human conflict. This is not a

local problem. Objective observers agree that the conflict could draw in Albania and Macedonia, threaten NATO allies Greece and Turkey, divide the NATO alliance, undermine NATO's credibility as a guarantor of peace, jeopardize the fragile situation in Bosnia, and initiate a massive refugee movement throughout Europe.

The President is not considering a particularly large American presence. I believe that all of us know that he anticipates sending less than 4,000 Americans to join 28,000 in the NATO force. Included in the 28,000 will be 8,000 British soldiers, and 6,000 Germans. The fact that the Germans are planning to send ground troops is not insignificant; it is a testament to the importance of this issue for all of Europe and all of the world.

America is truly the greatest country in the world. But perhaps because we are so large and diverse, we are often conflicted about our place in the world. Every time a post-Cold War Congress has had to consider committing United States troops to places such as Haiti or Rwanda or Bosnia or Iraq, it has been difficult to garner sufficient support from Congress. But we cannot expect to be a world leader, actually the only real superpower, without participating in international operations. We demand that the rest of the world cherish our democratic values and that NATO and the United Nations intervene in conflicts that we deem important. But when we are called upon to participate in missions which were not initiated by us, we balk.

For many years, the goal of our foreign policy was the dissolution of the Communist system. We ultimately achieved success, but the erosion of communism created power vacuums around the world. We did not foresee the problems that would be created, and now that we can see them, we are unwilling to do anything to heal the fissures. While communism in its original form may be largely dead, it has been substituted in some places with brutality and instability. We seduced the Communists. We said, our way is better. It works. Come with us, we will help you. The people looked to the West, saw us and saw that it was good, so they took our advice. In some places, our example has worked. In the Balkans, it has not. Rather than help, some of us are prepared to close our eyes. We are telling them that they are on their own. It is your problem, not ours, we are saying.

Well, I do not agree. It is our problem. And if this resolution fails today, we will leave our President and Commander in Chief flapping in the wind, along with the people of Kosovo, and we should be ashamed.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. CALVERT). The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, let me tell my colleagues why we should be there. Our credibility in the NATO alliance is at stake. The fact that two Presidents have put forward our position very plainly, and the work of the contact group, this did not come about in a vacuum. Russia even agrees with the contact group that this peace agreement should be given a chance to go forward, the work of the Organization of Security and Cooperation that has 2,000 people on the ground now and an extraction force. Finally and most importantly, we must make clear to the world that we will oppose genocide any time, anywhere.

Last night on ABC News, seven little boys stood without their mother and father in Kosovo who had done nothing but go somewhere to look for food. I stand here to say that I am committed with those seven children in the hopes that somewhere along the way we can provide what is necessary for peace and stability through our efforts in the NATO alliance to ensure that they grow up and, yes, become just as free as all of us in this great country.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. DEAL of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment. There are many uncertainties regarding the consequences of our action on this resolution, but there is no uncertainty, however, about the historical reaction of the American people when our citizens, either civilian or military, are killed by foreign powers. Whether it is the slaughter of Americans at the Alamo which led to war with Mexico, the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and the loss of 123 American lives that led to our involvement in World War I, or the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the loss of hundreds of American personnel that resulted in our entrance into World War II, one thing is constant. Our Nation will go to war when we believe our citizens have been killed by others without reason.

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So therefore, what are we prepared to do if our soldiers are killed in Kosovo? To say that such has not occurred in Bosnia is no guarantee that it will not happen here. It is altogether appropriate to ask other questions, such as the scope of the mission, the duration of the engagement, and the exit strategy, none of which can be answered with any degree of certainty.

I am more concerned about our escalation strategy. Do we really believe

that the killing of American soldiers will not result in more than 4,000 soldiers being sent to Kosovo? Will we abandon our historical reaction to such events? National pride would say we dare not do so.

Therefore, even though there are many unanswered questions, there is one question to which we do know the answer, the question, what will the United States do if Slobodan Milosevic and his forces kill our troops? The answer, we will respond with greater force to avenge their deaths, and the mission will escalate.

Therefore, I oppose sending troops to Kosovo. Let us not forget the lessons of Vietnam, which many Members of this body have said include that of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another Nation. We should never use our military forces as bait to arouse national indignation when a bloody dictator takes the bait.

If our purpose is to take out Milosevic, then we should have the political courage to do so with overwhelming force. We should not deceive ourselves about the dangers to our troops by calling it a peacekeeping mission, in an effort to simply make ourselves feel good. We should not go to Kosovo.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise against the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER). It is bad policy. It leaves America sending a clear signal that here tonight, on the floor of the United States House of Representatives, America is telling the President and the Europeans to abandon hope in Kosovo, that America is not going to participate; and do not try to take any other view of this, if America does not participate then there will be no agreement.

We can look at history, we can look at recent history in Yugoslavia. The Bush administration I think correctly began with the assumption that as the Soviet Union had dissolved, that there was no longer one monolithic Communist State there to affect our smaller European allies and that they would handle Yugoslavia. For months and years America did nothing, and women and children died, over 200,000, as the world stood by yet again.

What will happen in this new conflict? Tonight on the news we see more people heading for the hills, leaving their homes under the threat of death and destruction.

This President has had some great strengths, and I disagree with the Republican whip, one of them has been foreign policy. In Haiti, when President

Clinton was elected, we had boatloads of Haitians rushing the shores of America, overpowering the social services of the States to our south. We have put an end to that. Is it paradise yet? No, but it was a long way from paradise when President Clinton was elected.

In Iraq, yes, we have not gotten rid of Saddam Hussein, and President Bush, with all the armies of the world there, also did not get rid of Saddam Hussein.

Members look for exit strategies and end dates. Again, if we used that strategy at the end of World War II in confronting Soviet expansionism, the Soviets would merely have taken out their calendars and said, yes, the Americans have come to Berlin to protect Western Europe, and they will do so for 90 days, a year, 2 years? And what would they have done?

I say the same thing here today. When we talked about burden-sharing for over a decade in this House and more, we never dreamed that there would be an action in Europe where American forces represented 15 percent or less. The Europeans are taking on the largest responsibility they have ever undertaken in these exercises.

Defeat the proposal of the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER). Pass one of the proposals that are before us today. Many of us would have preferred to have had this debate on another date. But to leave this Chamber tonight without giving support to our policymakers to end the killing in Kosovo is wrong and irresponsible. Defeat the gentlewoman's amendment.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. PORTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, perhaps no one has been more critical of the President's foreign policies than I have. In China, in northern Iraq, and in Turkey, the United States has done nothing to cover itself with glory, and much to be ashamed of.

In fairness, I would have to say that the President has had some victories, Northern Ireland for one, and Bosnia; yes, Bosnia, where the proud representatives of the United States military, in small numbers, are keeping the peace, and are teaching people who have not really ever known it tolerance and understanding; and have done so, I might add, without casualties, because Slobodan Milosevic will not respond if the United States stands tall and strong.

So I have no case to make for this President's foreign policy generally.

The President has failed to adequately consult the Congress in respect to Kosovo, and he also, I think it is fair to say, deserves great criticism for permitting the conditions in Kosovo to deteriorate to the point at which we find ourselves today.

Clearly no one, including the United States, can force parties to a peace who want to engage in war. Clearly, no deployment can be made before there is a signed peace agreement.

However, Mr. Chairman, the defeat of this resolution or the passage of the Fowler amendment would be a victory for Milosevic. The butcher of Bosnia, the author of the bloody ethnic cleansing and genocide, will win if we do nothing.

We are the world's strongest Nation. We are the beacon of hope to oppressed peoples everywhere. We must stand up to our responsibilities. We cannot expect Europe to do it. They do not have political unity. We do.

I believe that if we do not stand up in Kosovo for what we believe in as a people, NATO itself will suffer the consequences. We have right now the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Bob Dole, Richard Holbrooke. They are providing leadership. They are working for peace. If we defeat the resolution, we will pull the rug out from under our peacekeepers, our peacemakers.

I would commend all of our colleagues in the House to the report of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. FRANK WOLF). He was just there in February. He visited Albania and Macedonia as well. He spent 5 days in the region. No one has given more of his time, no one has gone more miles, no one has cared more deeply, no one has worked harder for peace on behalf of the world's oppressed peoples than the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. FRANK WOLF). He has studied extensively the history and what is happening in the region. I recommend that every single Member read his report. It really tells us what we need to know.

I agree with what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WOLF) believes: Do not prevent the opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict. Support peace. Blessed are the peacemakers. Support the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I include for the RECORD the report of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WOLF).

The report referred to is as follows:

STATEMENT BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF—REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE BALKANS—KOSOVO: THE LATEST BALKAN HOT SPOT FEBRUARY 13–18, 1999

This report provides details of my trip to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo during mid-February, 1999. This visit occurred during the time the Serb-Kosovo Albanian peace conference was taking place in Rambouillet, France, and ended only a few days before the contact group's initially imposed deadline to reach agreement of February 20. There is every indication that the U.S. will be concerned with Kosovo for some time to come and it was important to have a clear, first-hand view of conditions there.

I have, for many years, had a deep interest in the Balkans and concern for the people

who live there. I have traveled numerous times to the region. There has been hostility, unrest and turmoil for hundreds of years. It has been said that there is too much history for these small countries to bear. If this is so, it has never been more true than today.

During this trip, I spent one day in Tirana, Albania, where I met with the U.S. Ambassador Marissa Lino and her embassy staff; Albanian President Meidani; Prime Minister Majko; cabinet ministers; the Speaker and other members of parliament; religious leaders, and heads of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) active there.

I spent parts of two days in Skopje, Macedonia, where I met with embassy Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'affaires Paul Jones; Political Officer Charles Stonecipher; members of the Macedonian parliament; former Prime Minister and President of the Social Democratic Union (opposition political party) Branko Crvenkovski; American soldiers assigned to United Nations forces guarding the Macedonia-Kosovo border, and the commander and men of the NATO Kosovo verification and extraction forces as well as representatives of NGOs in Macedonia.

In Kosovo for a day and a half, I met with head of mission Ambassador William Walker and senior adviser to ethnic Albanian elected President Ibrahim Rugova, Professor Alush Gashi. I also met with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) spokesman Adem Demaci (who previously spent 26 years in Serb prisons) and senior Serbian representative in Kosovo, Zoran Andelkovic. Other meetings included NGO representatives, head of the Kosovo office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other officials and representatives. Our outstanding and most able escort was State Department Foreign Service Officer Ronald Capps. We also stopped at a Serb police barracks and met with the officer in charge. We met individual members of the KLA and with a number of individual Kosovars who had returned to their villages after having been driven out by Serb attacks. Some villages were largely destroyed and remain mostly deserted.

The fate of Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, which border one another, is interrelated. Albania has a population of about two million people. Macedonia's population of two million includes about one third ethnic Albanian. About 90 percent of the nearly two million people in Kosovo are also ethnic Albanian.

Kosovo is the southernmost province of present-day Serbia and has a centuries long history of conflict, turbulence and hatred. By 1987 Serbian dominance in the region had been established, Slobodan Milosevic was President and ethnic Albanian participation in government was virtually nonexistent.

In response, ethnic Albanians in 1991 formed a shadow government complete with president, parliament, tax system and schools. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president and has since worked for Kosovo independence through peaceful means.

By the mid-1990s, the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo had grown to nearly 90 percent as human rights conditions continued to go down hill with the Serbs in total control of police and the army. Many, if not most, individual Serbs also have weapons as opposed to ethnic Albanians for whom possessing a gun is against strictly enforced law. Beatings, harassment and brutality toward ethnic Albanians became commonplace, particularly in villages and smaller towns.

In 1996 the shadowy, separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) surfaced for the first time, claiming responsibility for bombings in southern Yugoslavia. KLA efforts intensi-

fied over the next several years, government officials and alleged ethnic Albanian collaborators were killed. The Serbian government cracked down and violence has escalated since.

I met with a number of KLA members. Most of them are everyday people, farmers, storekeepers, workers and such who were driven to the KLA by the constant brutal action of the Serbs. There are, no doubt, some bad people in the KLA including thugs, gangsters and smugglers, but most are motivated by a hunger for independence. Still, it must be recognized that some acts of terrorism have been committed by the KLA.

Conditions in Kosovo continued to deteriorate and alarm the international community. In October 1998, under threat of NATO air strikes, Serbian President Milosevic made commitments to implement terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199 to end violence in Kosovo, partially withdraw Serbian forces, open access to humanitarian relief organizations (NGOs), cooperate with war crimes investigators and progress toward a political settlement.

As part of this commitment, in order to verify compliance, President Milosevic agreed to an on-scene verification mission by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO surveillance of Kosovo by non-combatant aircraft. These activities are in progress and NATO has deployed a small extraction force in next door Macedonia. I visited with each of these groups.

However, conditions in Kosovo have not stabilized and more have been killed. Finally, a contact group with members from the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Germany issued an ultimatum to the sides to reach a peace accord by February 20, 1999. NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia were threatened if Belgrade did not comply.

The Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture and their orthodox religion and are not willing to give it up. I visited the Field of Blackbirds where the Serbs battled for and lost control of the region in 1389. I also visited a Monastery dating back to 1535 that is an important part of Serb history.

The Clinton administration, which does not favor independence for Kosovo, worries this conflict could spread if NATO does not intervene and could even involve Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. While this is of concern, there are other reasons for the U.S. to remain active. The U.S. can never stand by and allow genocide to take place. Part of the effort, once a peace agreement between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians has been signed, could include a NATO ground force in Kosovo containing a contingent of U.S. troops.

It is clear that a main pipeline for arms reaching ethnic Albanians in Kosovo is across the Albania-Kosovo border and any stabilization effort will likely include shutting off this arms route. It has been suggested that an effective arms blockade could be accomplished by the Italian government from the Albanian side of the border with Kosovo.

A number of issues must be addressed before the outcome of this conflict can be predicted. Principal among these is the likely strength and stability of an ethnic Albanian led Kosovo government. Another is the economic potential of a stand-alone Kosovo, free from Serbia. Also important is what will be the future of the KLA? Will they give up their arms? Many in the KLA say "no". Could an independent Kosovo make it on its own? Political ability has not been demonstrated. Economic development help from the private sector in the West may not be immediately forthcoming. How would they

be propped up? How will long term cross border hatred between Serbs and ethnic Albanians be kept in check? Who is going to foot the bill for all this? European nations?

How and by whom will the issue of war crimes be addressed? A terrible job on this issue has been done in Bosnia. Known war criminals have not been pursued after more than three years. Reconciliation is an important ingredient to lasting peace but terrible acts have been committed and justice must be served. The principal perpetrator of injustice and brutality has been Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. What about him?

The White House and the present administration are deserving of some sharp criticism for allowing conditions to get where they are today.

There appear to be few lessons this administration has learned from the painful experience of Bosnia. Our government waited too long to get involved and, once engaged, has been somewhat ineffective. Too many died in Bosnia during this delay. While committing troops to the region for one year (now over three years with no end in sight) has indeed halted killing, at least temporarily, Bosnia is no further along toward peaceful self sufficiency than when troops arrived. Rather, it is as though there is merely a pause in time. If our troops leave, hostility and brutality would likely resume. Little infrastructure is being created. Railroads are not running. Little economic development or growth is emerging. No lasting plan for peace has been developed and no interdependent community has been created which would make undesirable, a return to conflict. Little has been done to bring about reconciliation.

Meanwhile, as we look at our overall U.S. military capabilities throughout the world, we see that this administration has drawn down U.S. military strength to the level where there are now insufficient forces to meet today's needs. When I met with our soldiers in the Balkan region I found many who have gone from one deployment to another without time to be home with their families. The troopers I met on the Kosovo border are assigned to a battalion on its third deployment in three years.

There are no better soldiers anywhere in the world than these and their morale is high. They are ready to do what is expected of them and more. But they are not being treated fairly. Pay and benefits have been allowed to deteriorate. The tempo of operations has grown to the point where they have too little time at home. There are just not sufficient forces to do all the things they are expected to do. According to the February 17, Washington Post, the Secretary of the Army's answer is to lower standards and recruit high school drop-outs. Turning his back on history, this official has unwisely decided upon another social experiment rather than dealing fairly with the shortfall.

From 1990 to 1998 the armed forces went from 18 active army divisions to eight. The navy battle force went from 546 ships to 346. Air force fighter wings decreased from 36 to 20. Discretionary defense budget outlays will decrease 31 percent in the ten years beginning 1990. Service chiefs predict FY 1999 ammunition shortages for the army of \$1.7B and \$193M for the marines. These statistics are just the tip of the iceberg. There is compelling evidence that, in the face of a huge increase in troop deployments (26 troop deployments between 1991 and 1998 by the army's own count), this administration has not made the investment to give our fighting men and women the tools to do the job asked of them.

The fact that the men and women in uniform are bending to their task is to their credit, but it is past time to give them what they need and stop driving them into the

ground. The White House must face up to this shortfall and address the issue of where the money to pay for our involvement is to come from. They have not yet done so and time is short.

A strong NATO involvement, with solid U.S. participation, will be an important part of any workable solution to this mess. There is a story making the rounds of NATO forces where an American general, about to depart the region asks his NATO counterpart how many U.S. troops must remain to ensure safety and success of the mission. The NATO commander responds, "Only one, but he must be at the very front". This is only a story told in good humor but it makes the point that U.S. presence is key—perhaps vital.

It is not without irony that the one key player omitted from the contact group meetings in France is a NATO representative. The irony deepens when the presence on the contact group of chronic problem-makers Russia and France is noted.

Frankly, the U.S. Congress has also had too little involvement in this Balkan process. The administration has done and continues to do a poor job in dealing with these issues. Consultation with the Congress does not appear to have been a major concern to the White House. While foreign policy is largely the prerogative of the President, American lives are being placed at risk in a far-off land and untold dollars are being committed to this effort. Congress has a role and must participate in this debate. Congressional hearings to explore all aspects of this situation are in order.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. If there is a signed peace agreement in Rambouillet, it could be necessary to commit U.S. troops to the Kosovo peace effort. I make this recommendation with reluctance but, without U.S. troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is both the leader of the world and of NATO. If NATO is involved, we must be a part of the effort or it will fail. NATO's 50th anniversary is later this spring and there will be a large celebration in the U.S. Kosovo will be a big test for this important alliance.

2. There are many differences between the situation existing several years ago in Bosnia and what is happening today in Kosovo. Still, thousands died in Bosnia including too many women and children before NATO troops including a large contingent of U.S. soldiers moved in and put an end to the killing. Had not NATO peacekeepers acted over three years ago, the killing might still be going on today. Without the commitment of U.S. troops, a NATO peacekeeping intervention might not even have been attempted. We may wish this were not so, but it is. Perhaps things can change in the future but this is today's reality.

3. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not being treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo of operations is far too high (we just need a larger military force to face the tasks they have been given) and we are not giving our first class military men and women the tools they need to do the job. The administration needs to take better care of our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Congress should force this issue.

4. Special attention must be paid to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). While many, perhaps most, are common people whose interest is defending their families, their homes and themselves, the army is not without a rogue element. There is no clearly established and proven civilian government and there is no line of authority/responsibility between the KLA and a representative government. Without control, the KLA could get out of hand.

5. When peacekeepers arrive in Kosovo, one of their first tasks must be to disarm the KLA. Many in the KLA have said they will not give up their weapons. An armed KLA will be a time bomb in the way of progress toward peace. Providing safeguards for Serbs in Kosovo is an important part of the peace process.

6. Efforts thus far to build a lasting peace in Bosnia have come up short. Not only must more be done there but the lessons learned must be applied to Kosovo. The military presence in Bosnia has done the job of ending killing and brutality as it likely will in Kosovo, but the peace-building effort of reconciliation and creating an interdependent society and effective marketplace and economic trade system has not gotten off the ground.

7. Lasting peace in the Balkans will not occur while Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is in power. A just and permanent way for him to step down must be found. The longer he remains, the longer turmoil, unrest and killing will continue in eastern Europe.

8. American and other workers and officials of all nations present in Kosovo (diplomats, United Nations, NGOs, contract workers, humanitarian care-givers and others) are true heroes. They risk their lives daily to make life a little better for the people in Kosovo and we should all pray for them. I happened to see a warning sign posted in a U.N. office talking about mines. In part, it said, "There is strong evidence to suggest some police posts have had anti-personnel mines placed near them . . . All staff are asked to be extremely cautious when in the vicinity. . ." Yet these men and women go about their daily duties with dedication and care for others in spite of the harm that is just a step away.

9. The foreign policy of this administration continues to come up short and is deserving of sharp criticism. America is the one remaining superpower and, like it or not, must assume this responsibility. Unfolding events continue to point to the absence of a coherent idea of what to do and how to do it. While we should have already developed a peace-making strategy and an exit strategy, the participants at Rambouillet remain unable to even get things started.

10. President Clinton has done a poor job of making the case to the American people for U.S. involvement in this conflict which also has a significant moral aspect to it. While the U.S. cannot be involved all over the world, we are a member of NATO which deals with peace and stability in Europe. Kosovo is a part of Europe and its destabilization could create a huge refugee population there. Fighting could even break out elsewhere if this issue is not dealt with early and effectively. America has been blessed with peace and prosperity. In the Bible, it says that to whom much is given, much is expected and there is an obligation on our part to be a participant in the search for solutions in this troubled spot.

11. I would like to conclude on a personal note to thank all of those who assisted me on this mission. I am especially grateful to U.S. Ambassador Marisa Lino and her staff, foreign service officer Charles Stonecipher who assisted me in Macedonia, foreign service officer Ron Capps whose knowledge and concern was of great help in Kosovo and U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike Prendergast who traveled with me. I appreciate their invaluable assistance.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I returned Monday from Bosnia with a group from the

Committee on Armed Services led by the chairman, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. BATEMAN). For those in Bosnia, our troops tonight who may very well be listening to this debate, I want to say that we were very much impressed with the spirit and with the quality of our troops. An all-volunteer force, war fighters at their best, are keeping peace tonight in Bosnia.

I rise in opposition to the Fowler amendment for four reasons.

First of all, the Fowler amendment would jeopardize the potential for success of the current peace negotiations that will reconvene in France in just a few days. It strengthens Milosevic's hand, and it will harden his resolve not to cooperate with the negotiators.

Second, the Fowler amendment turns our back on our NATO allies, and it relinquishes an important leadership role that we have always exercised in that alliance for over 50 years.

Third, the Fowler amendment would send the wrong message around the world, where American resolve and American strength is the only barrier to those who would exercise, through the force of arms, violence and terror against their neighbors.

Finally, the Fowler amendment fails to recognize that clear relationship between the safety of our troops in Bosnia tonight and the developing events in Kosovo. Milosevic's hand will clearly be strengthened were we to adopt the Fowler amendment.

On February 4 of this year, in a speech at the Baldrige Quality Awards Ceremony, the President set forth his four preconditions for involvement of U.S. forces in Kosovo.

He said, first, we must have a strong and effective peace agreement signed by the parties. He said, we must have a commitment by the parties to implement the agreement and to cooperate with NATO. Third, he said we must have a permissive security environment, with withdrawal of enough Serbian security forces and an agreement restricting the weapons of the Kosovar paramilitaries. Finally, the President said we must have a well-defined NATO mission with a clear exit strategy.

I would hope this resolution, this sense of the Congress resolution that we are considering tonight, would have no less.

The Gejdenson-Turner amendment which is before this body, which the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is attempting to amend, our amendment requires that there be reasonable limits on U.S. participation. That, we think, is only fair.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) offered an amendment requiring a fair and just agreement signed by the parties before any U.S. troop involvement. I offered an amendment to limit our troop participation to 15 percent of the total NATO force. This is not a number that came out of the air. This is a number that the President acknowledged and that our military leaders have acknowledged

that is being negotiated as we speak with our NATO allies.

These limits are appropriate for two reasons. First, our European NATO allies should properly bear the lion's share of this peacekeeping mission, and they understand that.

Second, these limits are ones that I think in the Balkan region represents the maximum commitment that we should have, considering our current total troop strength and the need to maintain our readiness to address threats to our national interest in other parts of the world. Yes, there is a cost to keeping peace, but its cost is far less than the costs of war.

In this world which grows ever smaller, peace and security in the Balkan region is in our national interest, and is consistent with our moral and political leadership. We must not tell the young sergeant that I spoke to in Bosnia this week that his mission will be placed in jeopardy tonight by virtue of the fact that we fail to make a commitment toward peace in Kosovo.

We should not shoulder the total responsibility, but neither can we be a shrinking violet and fail to shoulder responsibility. Vote no on the Fowler amendment. Vote yes for the reasonable limits in the Gejdenson-Turner amendment.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has not been attacked. Serbia in whose sovereign territory we recognize Kosovo to be, has not invited us to enter. The United States would thus be exercising force against the sovereign territory of a country that has not attacked us, and which we recognize has the right of sovereignty over Kosovo.

The proposal, apparently, is that we bomb Serbia until they agree with this plan. As soon as the Kosovars agree with us, we would commence bombing to force the Serbs to enter into this agreement.

If by dint of that bombing the Serbs agree, we would then insert troops, supposedly to keep the peace agreement. But what kind of peace agreement? A peace agreement that the Serbs did not want, one they were bombed into accepting, a peace agreement that requires us to disarm the Kosovars, a task that they do not wish us to perform.

And there they would be—United States troops, on the territory of a country that did not attack us, committing an act of war against that country. I use the term, "act of war," advisedly, because in the hearings of our committee I had the opportunity to ask Ambassador Pickering, the President's special adviser and delegate on this issue, whether bombing a part of another sovereign country would be an act of war.

□ 1945

He said he thought that it would. So we would be committing an act of war

to force an agreement, and then we would be putting our troops in to monitor an agreement that recent evidence has suggested neither side wants. It is for that reason that I think our colleague, Mrs. FOWLER from Florida, has the right approach, that the case has not been made in favor of this use of force.

I do wish to comment very favorably on the Speaker of the House and what I consider a remarkable act of courage and statesmanship, on his part, to bring the matter before the House so that we could debate it before the use of force is commenced. Speaker HASTERT did what no other Speaker under whom I have served has done, and he deserves credit. He realized that the Constitution requires that only the Congress has the right to declare war.

Mr. Chairman, if the United States bombs a sovereign nation that has not attacked us, if we commit an act of war, which the administration's own spokesman admits is what we would be doing, then it would require the act of this Congress, it seems to me, to declare war, or else that constitutional provision is meaningless. So the debate that we have tonight is remarkable. It is to the credit of the Speaker that we are having it.

Good people will disagree on the policy; I recognize that. But it is right that we, the people's Representatives in the people's House, decide, and not when it is too late to decide, not when the troops are already committed, not when casualties have already been taken, but in advance, which is as the Constitution intended, and which guarantees the practical effect as well that we know what it is we are embarking upon, what the likely cost will be, and whether it is the will of our Nation.

If, contrary to my advice, the majority opinion of this body tonight is to support the President's proposal in using force, then he will be far more effective and stronger in that use of force because he will have the people's Representatives with him. So I applaud Speaker HASTERT for allowing us to have this debate.

I have only one final comment. There must be some occasions, I recognize, when it would be legitimate to use force against another sovereign that has not attacked us. My personal belief is that genocide would constitute such a case.

I have done my very best to research, and what I believe is happening in Kosovo now is a horrible, bloody civil war. But I do not believe the evidence sustains that it is an attempt by the Serbians systematically and by use of government to exterminate Albanians on the basis of their ethnic origin. It is, in other words, not genocide—where I would say it is permissible to use force against another sovereign.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) has expired.

(On request of Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, and by unanimous consent, Mr.

CAMPBELL was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS).

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California, a member of the committee, for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot quarrel with the basic premise. The gentleman answered the question I was going to put to him with reference to genocide. He and I were in the hearing yesterday when Senator DOLE talked about the personal experience where Albanian homes were destroyed, and Serbian homes were standing. His comment was, "It does not take me to be a rocket scientist to recognize what is going on."

The gentleman from California and I have a disagreement as to genocide. Would the gentleman agree that, if genocide is in fact occurring, or at some other time the international community does deign that genocide is occurring, that it would be appropriate for us to respond in that instance?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I do. As one example, let me put on the record I believe that our country should, at least, have assisted African countries in an effort to end the genocide in Rwanda, but we turned our back to our shame, and, to their shame, so did the rest of the world.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, as we debate this resolution, thousands of refugees from Kosovo are trudging down muddy roads, they are shivering in sodden tents, and they are mourning the murder of their families.

These are innocent people, farmers, teachers, shopkeepers, young children, aged grandparents, people whose only hope in this genocidal war is that we can muster the will, that we can muster the will to force Slobodan Milosevic to stop the slaughter.

The list of atrocities grows almost every day. In today's New York Times, there is a picture of an elderly Kosovar, tending to the body of his 22-year-old cousin shot dead by Serbs in a raid on his village.

Aid workers are still looking for hundreds of his neighbors. They disappeared into the hills as the Serbs slaughtered their farm animals and set their homes on fire.

This is a war of terror. This war of ethnic cleansing has been escalating for more than a year. Two thousand ethnic Albanians have died and some 400,000 have been forced to abandon their homes. It is no wonder they flee in terror.

Earlier this year, Serbian special police forces stormed the village of Racak. According to the Human Rights Watch, they had "direct orders to kill village inhabitants over the age of 15."

They executed 45 people, men, women, and children.

Sadly, my colleagues, we have seen this before. What we are witnessing is the nightmare of Bosnia all over again. Now the world has a chance to stop this genocidal war before it goes any further, before the carnage spreads, before it ignites into an even broader regional conflict. But that chance, that chance depends on the outcome of the peace negotiations.

So what will happen if we vote for this amendment before us this evening? If we vote for this amendment, we will undermine those peace talks now teetering between success and failure. If we vote for this amendment, we will take away NATO's bite and leave it gnashing its gums as Milosevic taunts our indecision.

If we vote for this amendment, Milosevic will continue to butcher innocent people based solely on their ethnic heritage and their desire to live free. If we vote for this amendment, and these negotiations falter, the cost will only rise in dollars, in sweat, in tears, and, yes, in blood.

This crisis will not disappear because we simply close our eyes or turn our heads. We made that mistake in Bosnia until, finally, after coming to this floor, week after week, month after month, we finally convinced people to stop the carnage.

Are we going to let things get that bad, tens of thousands dead, thousands of women raped, lives destroyed before we take action here tonight, today? Is this the kind of American leadership we want for the 21st Century? If these negotiations fail because of our actions today, how long can we stand idle?

Will the United States merely wring its hands as the flames of this war spread to Albania and Macedonia and Greece and perhaps Turkey?

Even as we are here tonight, even as we speak, Milosevic has been emboldened. Serb troops are crossing the Kosovo border. Tanks are pounding villages, helpless villages; and refugees are running, literally running for their lives.

We have a chance tonight. Vote "no" on this amendment and say "yes" to the Gejdenson resolution for peace. If we do not, we will face an even higher cost in the months and the years ahead. Let us tonight live up to our responsibilities, not just as Americans, but as human beings, as moral, compassionate people who cannot and will not tolerate, yes, genocide. Vote "no" on this amendment.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in favor of the amendment. Our policy in Bosnia has been a failure, with one broken promise to our troops after another. Remember when they were sent there, they were to be there less than 1 year.

The operations in Bosnia have cost over \$10 billion that we can ill-afford.

The administration continues to seek emergency funding and shifting defense funds away from our troops and away from our readiness in pursuit of an undetermined policy and unstated goals.

What are the vital interests of the United States today in Kosovo? The President has failed to enunciate a clear and compelling reason for our involvement. What are our objectives? The administration has failed to enunciate a clear exit strategy, really critical, no exit strategy.

This Congress should officially notify the President that there will be no money for any military adventure without express authorization by Congress. We must not allow the constitutional authority of Congress to declare war to be undermined again by the administration. We have a responsibility to ensure that, before we take military action against a sovereign nation, this Congress either authorizes or refuses to authorize that action.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, let me say that there are many, many difficult decisions that we have to make in our lifetime. I think that, when the world is looking for leadership, it puts one in a position because, if one is a leader, one is expected simply to lead.

When people say what is our interest there in central Europe, I think that, if we start to remember what our country stood for for many, many years, we were the place that had the Statute of Liberty, we were the place that the whole world looked to for leadership, we were the place that we could stand proud and tall and say in justice anywhere is in justice everywhere.

We should attempt to keep stability in the world. Perhaps it is not a good position to be the strongest Nation in the world. Perhaps if we were weaker, we would not have this responsibility. But I do not know how we could support NATO for decades and decades and then, when there gets to be a little tough situation, we say we should not participate, we should not be a part of this.

No, I do not like to see our young men go off to foreign places and to be put into harm's way. But if we are a Nation of leaders, if we are the world's leader, then people are really looking for us to participate in keeping this world together.

We attempted to have intervention in Rwanda at the beginning of an ethnic cleansing, but the U.N. said the U.S. was not really pushing it. We are not sure this is genocide. Then we waited, and we waited, and close to a million people were killed.

We showed no leadership. We were not even asking for American troops to go there but simply to bring in troops from African countries that were willing to go to get between the combatants and the innocent people.

So here we are talking about having an agreement signed and simply to have our people there trying to keep the peace because the same way that

we went from one to a million in Rwanda, if this conflict goes beyond borders, we will have people lining up on all sides.

So I think that we have actually a responsibility as a world leader or we should simply become a force to simply defend our borders. Maybe we should even start to reduce the size of our forces just to be here to protect our borders.

□ 2000

They wanted to do that before World War II, a lot of isolationists. So I think the thing to do is to stand up tall and to take this serious responsibility not to turn our backs on our colleagues around the world.

We are a proud, strong Nation, and we need to simply behave that way in a world that is full of people who need to know that there is a higher order, there is someone else who is around in order to keep the peace, so to speak.

So I would strongly urge the support of the Gejdenson amendment. I think it is the right thing to do. It is a tough thing to do, but I think when things get tough, that is the time we have to stand up with our back straight and our head held high and we move forward, as this great Nation has done in the past, and I think that we will, of course, be called upon to do this again in the future.

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise here in support of the base bill, I rise in opposition to the Fowler amendment, and I rise in opposition to the Gejdenson amendment. Now I need to explain myself to my colleagues, and let me do it in this manner.

First, I am going to compliment the Speaker, because I think debate on this issue is timely and is appropriate. I think some of the arguments I have heard today are out of place. And the reason I say out of place is because I recall the good debate we had in this House where over 315 Members voted for a Buyer-McHale resolution about the Dayton Accords prior to the signing of the Dayton Accords, which said do not send in ground troops to Bosnia as the predicate to peace. We had a very good debate here on the floor prior to the Dayton Accords.

So we are having a second debate prior to a signing of a peace accord, and if there is something good that comes out of this discussion that can help frame that peace accord, all the better. So I think it is a hollow argument to be talking about timing.

The second point I would like to make is a matter of policy. I think there is a policy disagreement in this House on both sides of the aisle, from some, with the present administration's policies.

There are two things that are rather curious to me. It is rather curious to hear Members come to the well in support of using U.S. ground troops for a humanitarian mission when they were

the same Members who voted against the use of force when I was in the Gulf War. Now, I will keep record of that, and I am remembering that I asked others to be just as curious about their motives as I am.

The second point I would like to make is on the matter of foreign policy. Here is the disagreement. I believe the United States, as the world's superpower, should have a policy of restraint in international conflict management. Regional powers should take greater stability to police and manage the regional stability, economic cohesion and military balance of power. U.S. troops should only intervene on the ground to ensure regional stability, not intervene in civil wars which have no real threat of destabilizing a region.

If the United States intervenes in every intercontinental conflict, in every corner of the world, then the United States becomes the world's guarantor of global security and such action enables the regional powers to escape their regional responsibilities. This leads to the second point of curiosity.

Since when did genocide become the standard for us to commit ground troops around the world? That is not the standard. It needs to be tied to vital national security interests.

Now, here is my difficulty. My difficulty is, having authored three bills, for which my colleagues have supported on this floor with regard to Bosnia, I have told the President of the United States I will not be the barking dog. I will be his constructive critic.

And let me talk to my Republican colleagues. I believe we are going to have a Republican president and we are going to inherit this in 2001. So we need to ask these questions: How do we get America out of the box? How do we turn this over to the European allies? How do we ensure that our regional allies lead on the ground? We do that by ensuring that the time lines of success for the simple implementation of the Dayton Accords are met appropriately. We make sure the leaders of the peace, who are leaders of the war, begin to focus on what brings them together instead of their differences.

We also have to recognize Milosevic and what he is. There are some of us who have been there and have spoken to Milosevic. I have sat on the couch and looked him in the eye, and I could not help but sense that I was talking to a Hitler-type himself. Now, that leads me to something that we had better think long and hard about, and that is when the President of the United States sends the Supreme Allied Commander in to see Milosevic, we better think long and hard before we undercut a United States general on the ground.

Now, that is where I come down painfully on this. Painfully, because I disagree with the administration's foreign policy. I disagree how they utilize the force to these open-ended commitments around the world, as if we can only justify the use of the military for

humanitarian missions. That is why I am torn inside, because I disagree with the policies. But I am not going to undercut General Wesley Clark when he meets with Milosevic on the ground.

So I have to rise in support of the base bill and in opposition to the Gejdenson amendment and in opposition to the Fowler amendment.

Mr. KIND. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise tonight in support of the base resolution as well as the Gejdenson amendment and in opposition to the Fowler amendment.

Our debate today and this evening centers on one of the most serious and fundamental responsibilities that we hold as elected representatives of a free and open democracy, the recommendation to commit our military forces to a hostile or potentially hostile environment.

I respect the fact that we as Members of this body should debate this issue fully. I am, however, concerned that the timing of this debate is suspect and, in fact, is very dangerous and can undermine the peace process that the administration has been engaged in in the Balkan region for some time.

Former Senate majority leader Bob Dole, who recently returned from the peace negotiations in the Kosovo region, testified yesterday that Congress should wait to debate the deployment of American troops there until an agreement between the parties in the region has first, in fact, been reached. In fact, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has said the same exact thing. Delicate negotiations continue to take place in Europe, even as we debate this today.

There is a plan to have the sides meet in 1 week to try to work out an agreement. And over the last few days hopes have been raised that such an agreement may be possible, even as heavy weapons pour into the area and shelling wracks the countryside. I would hope that this body would give those negotiators every opportunity to develop a working peace plan. I am concerned our actions may, instead, give the impression to warmongers in former Yugoslavia that American leadership is divided and its resolve is weak. Such an impression, I am afraid, will only encourage fanatical opportunists to continue their violence and terrorize the innocent noncombatant residents of Kosovo.

I hope our debate today is truly based, as has been stated numerous times today, on the desire to have an open discussion of American foreign policy. It has been said in the past that politics should stop at water's edge, and I would hope that in the context of this debate that that statement is more true today than even in the past.

During my first term in office, Mr. Chairman, in fact, last spring I had the honor to go over to Bosnia and to visit our troops and the military leaders, and even the residents of a war torn region. I wish every American in this

country had the opportunity to go over there and experience the pride that I felt in meeting with the young men and women in American uniforms who are carrying out a very dangerous and a very difficult policy in a distant land. They are proud of their work and show great professionalism and integrity. They are committed to carrying out the tasks that we have asked them to with honor and pride.

In fact, the killing has stopped, and peace does have a chance now. Democratic institutions are being created when, just a few short years ago, there were genocidal practices being conducted in Bosnia. They feel like their mission means something. They have stopped the killing. They are instructing young children who, just a few years ago, were playing in mine fields and getting maimed by the explosion of mines, where it is safe for them to play.

It is an incredible testament to the leadership the United States has shown in this war torn region. I would hope that we view the success that we have attained so far in Bosnia as a possibility to achieve that type of success in the entire Balkan region, including Kosovo.

I support our troops serving this Nation's interests throughout the world, and I support the peace process in Kosovo. If needed, I will support a well-planned use of troops to assist in maintaining the peace in that region that has been the spark of continental and worldwide conflict in the not-so-distant past. It is in the Nation's interest to work with our European allies to prevent the Kosovo region from destabilizing and drawing the Balkan region into further armed conflict.

But I submit that the debate we are having today is premature. I would like to first see a detailed plan and objective goals that the administration establishes in that region before we introduce U.S. men and women in U.S. uniforms in that region, so we know when we can withdraw them again from that region.

Such a conflict that now exists there poses a humanitarian threat to innocent civilians and a political threat to the struggling independent nations emerging from the Cold War. The United States will be impacted by all these threats and preventive action is the best way to protect our interests there.

The reality is that our Nation holds a unique position in worldwide affairs, whether we like it or not. Most major peace accords in recent years have required a deeply involved American presence and American negotiators at the table. Just a few weeks ago forces in Kosovo indicated that international peacekeeping efforts will have little credibility unless the United States is intimately involved in carrying out that mission.

When the international community speaks out against brutality and tyranny, the voice of the United States of

America resounds with particular strength and emphasis.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KIND) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. KIND was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. KIND. Mr. Chairman, let us be certain we are speaking with sincerity today, because there is no doubt that what we say here will be heard across the oceans and will be acted upon, one way or the other.

Our leadership for freedom and democracy in the world is at stake, our leadership in the NATO alliance is very much at stake. In fact, I would submit, that the very credibility and the justification for the existence of NATO is at stake on how well we negotiate peace agreements in this very important historical region in the Balkans.

I hope and pray our message here today encourages action that is positive and peaceful and brings a tormented region to the brink of freedom, rather than to the brink of war once again.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The gentleman from Wisconsin just noted that he had visited our troops in Bosnia, and it has been noted here in Bosnia there have not been any casualties. Let me say I have visited troops in the last few months as well and American troops are stretched thin throughout the world, whether it is in the Persian Gulf or whether it is in Asia.

We have a situation where thousands of American military personnel lives are on the line. They are being put in jeopardy because we do not know how to say no. We do not know how to lay or to set the parameters. Has our involvement in the Balkans so far been worth the \$12 billion that we have spent and the stretching out of our military forces?

Yes, we have been lucky that there has not been a major crisis. But had there been a major crisis during this time period, yes, we can be proud of those military guys that were there, and they have done a good job, but the fact is that \$12 billion that we have spent, and stretching our forces in that way, could have resulted in a catastrophe. We are talking about the loss of thousands of American lives. But we have been lucky. We have been very lucky. I do not think we can try this again.

We were told that the Bosnia operation was going to be 1 year and \$2 billion, and it has been 5 years and \$12 billion and counting. And this peace accord, the one we are being asked to support now, the plans are not even down yet. Do any of us doubt this is going to cost more than \$2 billion? Do any of us doubt that 3-year time period? They do not even have a plan yet that encompasses something that the Kosovars themselves, not to mention Milosevic, could accept?

No, this will go on and on, and we will spend tens of billions of dollars in the Balkans. Our people around the world, who are putting their lives on the line for us, will be put in great jeopardy because we did not have the courage to say that, in the post-Cold War world, maintaining stability in Europe is the job of the Europeans.

And while we tip our hat to NATO and say they did a good job during the Cold War, and thank God NATO was there because it prevented the Russians from sweeping across Western Europe and creating a war, that the job of NATO has been done, thank God, our hats off to NATO, but through some nostalgic attachment to NATO that we are going to commit our treasury and the lives of our young people to maintaining stability for Europe, and in the far stretches of Eastern Europe at that, is ridiculous and we are not standing by the people we need to stand by.

□ 2015

First and foremost we need to make sure that if we send our military out, we give them the weapons they need, we give them the support they need or we do not send them. We are doing that throughout the world today because we are stretching ourselves too thin.

This has been an historic debate and I am proud tonight to rise in support of the Fowler amendment and opposed to any new deployment of troops in the Balkans. This is an historic debate. We can be proud of this debate. There have been high points, but there have been some low points. Let me first say what the low point is. The low point to me is that there have been some suggestions here by Members, and I do not know what it is by this body but some people cannot disagree without trying to impugn the motives of those who disagree with them. Any suggestion that those of us who are opposing yet another deployment of American troops in the Balkans, that we are in some way politically motivated, that we are just doing this to attack the President or something, that argument is not fit for this debate, this great historic debate where we are trying to define what America's role will be in the post Cold War world. There are conservatives and liberals, there are Democrats and Republicans on both sides of this issue. We will see that when the vote comes, because we are trying to define what our country will stand for and what we will do in the years ahead.

During the Cold War it was easy. We had Ronald Reagan defining everything for us, it polarized everybody, everybody knew what the arguments were, where we were going to stand. Well, it is not that way anymore. It is fitting that now when we are outside of a Cold War setting that the power comes back to us, the elected representatives of the people of the United States to determine what our policies will be. I say yes, there is genocide all over the world, and we have heard these accounts. I am the first one to admit that

the Serbians are engaged in genocide and atrocities. And yes, there have been genocide and atrocities on both sides. However, they are the bad guys.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. ROHRABACHER) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ROHRABACHER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us debate this issue honestly, Mr. Chairman. What are the parameters? Are we going to send troops everywhere where genocide is committed? No, that is obviously not the case. Why then do we determine the Balkans is the case, when in Africa and other places around the world surely tens of thousands of people are dying in a similar fashion? No, in the Balkans, actually this should be the job of the Europeans. We are told, "They won't do it." It is their job now that the Cold War is over. The United States of America shouldered its share of the burden for stability in the whole world in this century. In the First World War we went to Europe to save them. In the Second World War we fought the Japanese and the Nazis, and in the last four decades we have had to carry the burden of the Cold War. Yet we carried that and we carried it to victory and the world has a better chance for peace today. But it will not be a peace where Americans have to continue garrisoning the entire planet for the sake of stability. We must set the parameters or we will lose the peace because we have not been willing to meet the challenges that we can face.

I ask for support for the Fowler amendment.

Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Gilman resolution and also the Gejdenson amendment. Let me agree with my colleague, the previous speaker, when he says that there has indeed been genocide perpetrated by the Serbs in the Balkans.

Let me say that, obviously when one would concur with such an assertion, one would have to therefore be prepared to support the notion that the only remaining superpower in the world, the nation that has the strongest, most well-prepared, well-trained, well-equipped military force anywhere in the world, that we have a responsibility. And that as we come to this debate this evening, I would also like to agree with the previous speaker that I am sure that no one's motives this evening could be political. One could not be seeking to weaken the President of the United States, because the action if we were this evening to do in some unwise fashion, and that is to vote for the Fowler amendment, would not just weaken the President of the United States, it would weaken NATO in which this country has invested so much, it would weaken the United States of America and its reputation

around the world which is represented by the words and actions of our President, the Secretary of State, a respected leader of the other party, Bob Dole; listen to the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick when she suggests that this resolution should be supported.

Clearly no one who wanted to weaken Bill Clinton should use this as the opportunity. For those who would look at what is taking place in the Balkans, genocide, yes. Women, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, raped. Our efforts in Bosnia are something that this Nation should be, and I believe is, very proud of. The Kosovo circumstance threatens the entire operation in Bosnia.

So this evening as we come, I would hope that each of us would bear our burden as well as those who wear the uniform and represent us throughout this world as members of our armed forces. Let us as Members of Congress bear the burden of being Americans, understanding that we do have an unequal share of responsibility in this world because we come to this question with unequal power. And with that power there is the question: Since we have the power, what do we do with it at a moment of crisis? What do we do when human beings are threatened or murdered and are suffering? What do we do when we would have tens of thousands of our troops right nearby but refuse to lift a hand and to lift a finger to save the innocent lives of women and children and others? I would hope that this Congress would rise to the occasion, bear our burden and support the appropriate policy and stand by this President but, more important, stand by America's principles.

Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment because it does what Congress is asked to do and, that is, it asks us to be deliberative. We are a deliberative body. It slows us down to look at what is really going on in that part of the world and what should America's involvement be over there.

I think that this amendment makes sense and that the policy of engagement in Kosovo, by sending 4,000 American troops onto the ground there, is not one that makes sense.

First, because doing so is treating the symptom and not the disease and, therefore, as my colleague from Georgia would realize and know, it is something that does not cure the patient. What I mean by that is that if you had cancer and were given aspirin, you might feel a little bit better but you would not be healed. If you were bleeding because you were in a car wreck and got one of my kid's band-aids to patch you up, you might feel a little bit better but you would not be healed. Milosevic is the problem in that part of the world. Until that problem is fixed, you can have all the agreements you want, you can send all the troops you want, but you will not be doing any-

thing other than treating a symptom, not the disease.

It was back in 1987 that Milosevic realized that iron control, if you want to call it that, over Kosovo was his springboard to power. He exercised that control, and by 1991, the former Yugoslavia splitting up, in part because they saw what was happening in Kosovo. Therefore, an agreement that keeps Kosovo as a part of Serbia and disarms the Kosovars to me is a recipe not for peace but for future conflict. It is an agreement that keeps the cause, the real problem here, as the real problem; that is, it is an agreement that keeps Milosevic in power.

Two, I would say we need to be deliberative about this, because lasting peace requires either good faith or a victor. This agreement would give us neither one. I mean, the Kosovar Liberation Army wants full independence for Kosovo. Milosevic has built his power, has built a large part of his rise to power on subjugation of Kosovo. What we have, therefore, is no victor and certainly no good will.

If we look back to the 1300s, we see not exactly a lot of good will in this part of the world. We leave both ingredients in place which to me again would be a recipe for building an agreement, basically building an agreement on sand, building an agreement that I think would lead to future disaster.

Third, I would say this agreement, the idea of sending 4,000 troops into that part of the world is something that does not pass the mommy test. The mommy test to me would be if somebody was killed in the line of duty and the mother of that son or that daughter was in my district and I had to go back and explain that your son or your daughter died for the right reasons, to me that would mean more than just a strategic interest to the United States, because we have a lot of strategic interests around the globe. It would also mean that that son or that daughter's death would have been part of leading to change, that it would have led to some real action. Again, that is not what we have here. Because if we are signing an agreement that some people have equated to Hitler, some people have equated to Saddam Hussein, I mean, clearly a very bad guy, is that an agreement that we are going to really trust? Is that a lasting thing? Most people would say if we signed an agreement with Saddam Hussein, we would not really trust that agreement. In fact that has been proven in the Persian Gulf. If you sign an agreement with Hitler, would you trust that agreement as a lasting instrument? No, you would not. That is what this would be doing.

I would say, fourthly, this idea does not make sense because the domino theory has long been disproven. Clark Clifford was sent by President Johnson down to Vietnam for the very reason that is being described as one of the reasons we need to go to Kosovo, and, that was, if we do not do something,

this could escalate, this could really grow. That was disproven there. In fact Kissinger came and spoke before our committee yesterday and what he talked about was people did not analyze the cost of involvement and the duration of involvement when they sent people to Vietnam. Are we analyzing that now?

Lastly, I would pick up on what the gentleman from California (Mr. CAMPBELL) was saying, who incidentally was a constitutional lawyer and taught constitutional law at Stanford University, and, that is, it is the Congress' role to declare war. Sending troops into somebody else's sovereign territory or bombing a sovereign territory is clearly an act of war and, therefore, it does need our signature.

With that, I would say again, I would ask this body to support the Fowler amendment.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I come at this from a little bit different approach. I certainly do not seek to impugn the integrity of any of the Members who are involved in this. I am not on the specific committee that this came from. First of all, I think this amendment is wrong, but I also think the whole consideration of the underlying text at this point in time is wrong.

As the gentleman from South Carolina just mentioned in referencing the gentleman from California and the role of Congress in determining whether or not troops should be sent in anywhere, I do agree with that. But the fact is we have got the cart ahead of the horse here. In doing so, we are undercutting the administration's ability to be involved in the working group, in the contact group. I just think that is a mistake. Now, whether or not the motives are political or not is not for me to judge, but I just think this is a terrible policy mistake.

I also do not understand exactly the gentlewoman's amendment, because I think this is a concurrent resolution but it has a strict limitation. So I gather that this amendment and the underlying text really has no force of law, that this is just a piece of paper to make us feel good.

□ 2030

I am very concerned about whether or not we should deploy troops to Kosovo. I do not know if that is the best policy or not. But I also know, and every Member of this body knows, is there is no agreement yet so we do not know what the U.S. involvement will be, we do not know whether or not it is an agreement that we feel is right or wrong, and if the leadership of the House, I think if they want to do the right thing, they would withdraw this bill now, allow the Executive Branch and the State Department to go ahead

with what their role is, and then at the appropriate time call the House back in to address the question of whether or not U.S. troops should be part of any peace agreement in Kosovo.

Do not do it before. Do not try and cut the legs out from under the administration while they are trying to negotiate some deal. Let them negotiate the deal, let them bring it back to the Congress, let us decide whether or not it is a good deal.

That is how we should do things, and I would just remind Members I did not have the honor or the pleasure of serving in this body back in the 1980s, although I was staff back here during part of that time, but some of the Members were. If this had been done when Ronald Reagan was President, Members would have been accused of treason for undercutting the administration while they were trying to conduct the art of foreign policy. We should allow the Executive Branch to do what they want. If we do not like what they have done, we can deal with it later. We can deal with it on a Friday, Saturday, Sunday, whenever, and if we decide we do not want them to send troops, then let us do it once we know what the deal is. Let us not come up with some fig leaf resolution that is going to make us all feel good and we can all send out a press release about it later on. Let us let them go through with it and come up with their agreement, and then let us come back and debate the issue, debate the terms of the agreement on whether or not we think U.S. troops should be involved.

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Fowler amendment, and I would like to make a few comments before we vote.

First of all, I want to emphasize what a number of others have emphasized, and that is this is clearly a constitutional issue.

I have here a copy of the Constitution. I do not think that it is a very difficult decision to come to. Article I, Section 8 states the prerogatives of Congress in just 8 little words: The Congress shall have power to declare war.

Very short, very simple.

Article II, Section 2, uses 34 words to define the prerogatives of the President: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.

It is the Congress that declares war. It is the Congress that commits the troops. It is the President who is the Commander in Chief after the Congress has committed the troops.

The fact that prior Presidents have also violated the Constitution does not mean that we should continue to permit our Presidents to do that. It is a little bit like being hauled into traffic court and protesting to the judge, "Gee, judge, I speed every day on that

strip of road. How can you fine me today because I was speeding all those other times and I was never apprehended?" Past violations do not justify a present violation.

The country to which the President proposes to send our troops is a sovereign state. This is not an emergency. There is no one in the Congress that I know of who wants to limit the power of the President to commit our troops in a true emergency. This is not an emergency. There is plenty of time to debate it, and I am very pleased that we are having this debate.

What is going on in that country is a civil war. No one will argue but what atrocities are being committed. That being true, the correct course of action is to bring the offenders to the bar of justice. There is a war crimes tribunal; that is where they should be brought. Sending our troops there will not solve that problem.

I know of no exit strategy. The problems in Kosovo are very deep, they have been there a very long time, and if we stay there 2 years, or 3 years, or 5 years, when we leave the situation will be exactly as it was when we came. Hostilities will continue. We will not have solved those problems.

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are here debating this this evening. We need to debate this. We need to do more than just debate this. We, as a Congress, need to assert our constitutional prerogatives. We really need legislation that says that no President, this President or any other President, can commit our troops to battle, can put our young men and women in harm's way, without a vote of the Congress.

We must be careful in the wording of the legislation that does this because we do not want to limit his ability, do not want to limit his ability to commit our troops in a true emergency. There is clearly not time to convene the Congress and declare war if intercontinental ballistic missiles are headed our way, and our President must have the ability to commit our military resources in a true emergency. Neither this, nor any of the very large number of deployments that this administration is engaged in have been an emergency, not a single one of them has been an emergency, and there have been more deployments during this administration than during the previous 40 years.

This is the first time since I have been here that we have had a debate before the action occurred except before going into Bosnia we did have some sense of the Congress resolutions that were totally ignored by the President. I hope this one passes with this amendment, and I hope that it is not ignored by the President.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in a very difficult situation for us and unfortunately have come to a very difficult decision. I have supported this President

on a number of occasions that have been very difficult for me, but because I believe we must support the Commander in Chief in very difficult deployments. When he stood up to Saddam Hussein and the Russians were staring us down and very upset with our position, I traveled to Moscow. I met privately with the leadership of the Duma to convince them that they should understand why this Republican supports our Democrat President in his position with Saddam Hussein. It was the right thing, and I felt strongly about that position.

Tomorrow I will travel to Moscow a second time with eight of our colleagues, with former Defense Minister Rumsfeld, former CIA Director Woolsey, former Deputy Undersecretary of State Bill Snyder, and we will make the case on Sunday and Monday and Tuesday of why the proliferation is so great that it threatens both Russian people and American people. I will again underscore my support for the steps being taken by this administration.

The positions of the administration are clear in those areas, and I support them, but I cannot support the insertion of troops now in Kosovo.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the case is not yet been made. There has not been a case made by this President to the American people, let alone to this Congress, about why at this point in time we should place American young people on the ground in Kosovo.

At least we are having a debate, Mr. Chairman. At least we are discussing the pros and cons in a very careful and deliberate way, and I applaud both sides for the level of the debate. We need to debate this issue.

Some are saying, Mr. Chairman, this is not the right time. It is too delicate of a time in the negotiations. Mr. Chairman, there is never a right time to debate these issues. When is the right time? After the President makes a decision? When our troops are on the way in? Then we debate not to support them? This Congress needs to play its appropriate role in deciding whether or not we should take the steps to deploy our troops in Kosovo.

Mr. Chairman, one of the things that bothers me is this past week I met with two members of the German Bundestag. They came in and talked to me about our NATO responsibility, and I agree with them that we need to keep NATO strong. But let me tell my colleagues what the Bundestag members told me, Mr. Chairman. They said in their vote they understood the dollar amount that was being requested for the deployment. In fact, they authorized 400 million Deutsche marks to pay for the operation. We have no idea not only what the mission is, we have no idea what the dollar cost is.

Mr. Chairman, I am very sad. In the previous 40 years to 1991, from World War II until 1991, 40 years under Democrat and Republican Presidents, we deployed our troops a total of 10 times at

home and abroad. Ten times. Mr. Chairman, in the 8 years from 1991 until today, we have deployed our troops 32 times. This will be the 33rd. Mr. Chairman, none of these 32 deployments were budgeted for up front. None of them, except for the deployment to the Middle East in Desert Storm, were requested by the Congress to support. Each of the payments that were required to pay for these deployments were taken out of an already decreasing defense budget.

Mr. Chairman, we spent \$19 billion in contingency costs on these 32 deployments, 9 billion alone on Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, those who support the use of our troops in Kosovo had better be prepared to start to put the funding on the table to pay for these deployments.

Mr. Chairman, we are in an impossible situation now. We are not being asked, we are being told for the 33rd time that we are going to send our troops into harm's way. We were told in Bosnia there would be a time limit, they would be back home in a few years. We were told in Haiti they would be back home. We have troops in Somalia, in Haiti. We have troops in Macedonia. We have troops all over the continent, and the money is being taken out of our defense budget because we did not have the authorization up front, we did not have a legitimate debate on whether or not this Congress supported placing our troops into harm's way, and we are about to do it again.

Mr. Chairman, I may support the deployment of our troops to Kosovo, I may support the President because I want to support my Commander in Chief. He is my President. Even though he is not of my party, he is my leader, and I want to support him, make no mistake about it.

But this President needs to make the case to us and to the American people, and he has not done that. This President needs to tell us how much it will cost, and he has not done that. This President needs to tell us what the allied commitment will be in hard terms, and he has not done that either. Until he does that, we should vote no and not support the deployment of troops in Kosovo.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have great respect and very close personal friendship with the previous speaker. I have great respect for his intellect and for his knowledge with respect to the defense posture of the United States. He is one of our leaders on the Committee on Armed Services, and he has a view which is based upon a very thoughtful analysis of the situation.

Having said that, he and I disagree on this issue.

Now the specific issue, as I understand it, that confronts us is the amendment of the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER), who is also my friend and for whom I have a great deal

of respect, and that specific amendment, as I understand it, limits the Gejdenson amendment which tries to define the limits of participation of the United States in an action by NATO in Kosovo to ensure that the killing and the displacement of persons will stop and that an environment will be created conducive to the possibility of peace for the people of Kosovo, the people of Serbia and indeed the people of the region.

□ 2045

The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON), however, spoke to the overall issue, not to the amendment, the overall issue as to whether or not we ought to support the President.

I am hopeful that this Congress does, in fact, support the President. The previous speaker, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. BARTLETT), spoke of the Constitution. That issue, I would suggest, is not relevant at this point in time, because in fact the Congress is considering whether or not to authorize the President to participate with troops, with American force, in the implementation of a peace agreement.

Very frankly, Mr. Chairman, I doubt that there is a Member on this floor who does not know and does not have a conviction that if America does not participate, there will not be an agreement, period. If there is not an agreement, the butcher of Belgrade, call it a civil war if you want, will continue to commit atrocities. We call them war crimes, genocides, the elimination of a people because of their ethnic or national origin. It occurred in Bosnia and we stood for too long silent.

My friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) had a chart. He talked about 40 years prior to the end of the Cold War that we had 8 deployments. Do my colleagues remember what two of those deployments were in those 40 years? Korea, Vietnam; between them, approximately 100,000 plus loss of life.

In the deployments that have occurred since 1990, we have been very fortunate. No one would have predicted so few losses of lives in the Persian Gulf.

I have stood on this floor with some of my colleagues, and in many of the deployments the predictions of disaster were frequent and impassioned. That was the case in Haiti. That was the case in Bosnia, and that has been the case in other instances of deployment.

Yes, the United States has a unique role and the world, frankly, is better off because we on this floor and the President of the United States and the American people are prepared to accept a responsibility that we would prefer not to have, but it is ours because of our might; it is ours because of our position in the world as the leader; it is ours because we are a moral nation that acts upon its moral precepts.

Are we always perfect? Of course not, but all of us on this floor and every American can be proud of the fact that

it is America usually, not always but usually, that raises the issue of humanitarian concerns, not solely economic or strategic concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) has expired.

(On request of Mr. ROHRABACHER, and by unanimous consent, Mr. HOYER was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, every one of us understands the weighty responsibility to enable this government to put in harm's way young Americans and, yes, even older Americans, in the defense of freedom.

John Kennedy said that this country would pay any price, bear any burden, to defend freedom here and around the world. I heard Jack Kemp on a number of occasions quote that very phrase on the floor of this House. It is not an easy undertaking, but it is an undertaking that saves lives and stabilizes this world, economically and politically.

The amendment of the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) is spoken to by Jeane Kirkpatrick, Bob Dole, Caspar Weinberger and others.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. HOYER was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, when they point out that if we do not put ground troops this effort at trying to stabilize a critically important situation will not succeed and the Europeans will not participate, we can all say they should but we saw in Bosnia that they would not.

My colleagues, I ask that the amendment of the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER) be rejected, which I know is well intended and she believes strongly that it is the right policy, but it is a policy that will inevitably lead to failure of the effort to bring peace to the Balkans. It is an amendment which I think detracts from the Gejdenson amendment which tries, as I said at the beginning, to limit and make proportional our participation.

I would ask my colleagues to reject the Fowler amendment, to pass the Gejdenson amendment and then to pass this resolution so that America continues to lead and continues to be the moral leader as well as the military leader of this world.

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we have had a good debate. There has been honest disagreement. There has been a high degree of sincerity and integrity in the debate, but I rise in strong support of the Fowler-Danner bipartisan substitute amendment. I think to not do so is a recipe for resentment and not reconciliation, and at this time we need reconciliation.

Three things I would like my colleagues to keep in mind as we vote.

Number one, to deploy troops without a clear exit strategy is potentially disastrous. My good friend, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER), had talked about Vietnam. If we go back in history and see the very early days of Vietnam, there was clearly no exit strategy; exactly what we have in front of us today.

Number two, the administration has been vague, at best, about the cost of this operation. As an appropriator we spent two or three hours today debating a billion dollar disaster bill for Honduras. In that, we struggled to find money. The budget is tight. We do not have the budget just to spend money anywhere we want to. We have already spent in this administration \$10 billion in the Balkans, and there seems to be no end in sight of our current commitment.

Number three, as we all know, the military readiness question is a big one. Our military simply does not have the personnel to go every place that there is a problem.

We talk about quality of life for our service men and women. When they are deployed every single weekend of their lives, they are going to get out of the armed services, and that is why we are losing so many good, professional soldiers right now.

I strongly urge my colleagues to support the Fowler-Danner amendment.

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KINGSTON. I yield to the gentlewoman from Florida.

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, this is the conclusion of the speakers on our side for the amendment, and I just want to thank the Members of this body. I think this has been a very serious, a very thoughtful debate this afternoon and evening on a very serious matter.

This is why we were elected. This is why our constituents sent us to be Members of the United States House of Representatives, and no matter what our position, it has been obvious that every Member has given a lot of thought, a lot of concern, to their position and to what we are about to vote on.

I want to just thank my colleagues for the time and effort they have spent this evening, and I do urge them to vote yes on my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. FOWLER), to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON).

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

#### RECORDED VOTE

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII the Chair announces that he may reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for electronic voting

without intervening business on the underlying amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON).

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 178, noes 237, answered “present” 2, not voting 16, as follows:

	[Roll No. 48]
	AYES—178
Aderholt	Goodling
Andrews	Gordon
Archer	Graham
Armeny	Granger
Bachus	Greenwood
Baker	Gutknecht
Ballenger	Hall (TX)
Barr	Hansen
Barrett (NE)	Hastings (WA)
Bartlett	Hayes
Barton	Hayworth
Bass	Heffley
Bereuter	Herger
Bilirakis	Hill (MT)
Blunt	Hilleary
Bonilla	Hoekstra
Brady (TX)	Horn
Bryant	Hostettler
Burr	Hulshof
Burton	Hutchinson
Camp	Isakson
Campbell	Istook
Canady	Jenkins
Cannon	Johnson, Sam
Chabot	Jones (NC)
Chambliss	Kasich
Chenoweth	Kingston
Coble	Kuykendall
Coburn	LaHood
Collins	Largent
Combest	Latham
Condit	Leach
Cook	Lewis (KY)
Cox	LoBiondo
Crane	Lucas (OK)
Cubin	Manzullo
Cunningham	McCollum
Danner	McCrery
Deal	McHugh
DeLay	McInnis
DeMint	McIntosh
Dickey	McKeon
Doolittle	Metcalf
Duncan	Mica
Ehlers	Miller (FL)
Ehrlich	Miller, Gary
Emerson	Moran (KS)
English	Myrick
Everett	Nethercutt
Ewing	Ney
Foley	Norwood
Fossella	Nussle
Fowler	Packard
Franks (NJ)	Paul
Gallegly	Pease
Ganske	Peterson (MN)
Gibbons	Peterson (PA)
Gillmor	Petri
Goode	Pickering
Goodlatte	Pitts

#### NOES—237

Ackerman	Boyd	DeGette
Allen	Brady (PA)	Delahunt
Baird	Brown (FL)	DeLauro
Baldacci	Brown (OH)	Deutsch
Baldwin	Buyer	Diaz-Balart
Barcia	Calvert	Dicks
Barrett (WI)	Capuano	Dingell
Bateman	Cardin	Dixon
Bentsen	Carson	Doggett
Berkley	Castle	Dooley
Berman	Clayton	Doyle
Berry	Clement	Dreier
Biggert	Clyburn	Dunn
Bishop	Conyers	Edwards
Blagojevich	Cooksey	Engel
Bliley	Costello	Eshoo
Blumenauer	Coyne	Etheridge
Boehlert	Cramer	Evans
Boehner	Crowley	Farr
Bonior	Cummings	Fattah
Bono	Davis (FL)	Filner
Borski	Davis (IL)	Fletcher
Boswell	Davis (VA)	Forbes
Boucher	DeFazio	Ford

Frank (MA)	Lewis (CA)	Price (NC)
Frelinghuysen	Lewis (GA)	Rahall
Gejdenson	Linder	Rangel
Gekas	Lofgren	Regula
Gephardt	Lowey	Rivers
Gilchrest	Lucas (KY)	Rodriguez
Gilman	Luther	Rothman
Gonzalez	Maloney (CT)	Royal-Allard
Goss	Maloney (NY)	Rush
Green (TX)	Markey	Sabo
Green (WI)	Martinez	Sanchez
Gutierrez	Mascara	Sanders
Hall (OH)	Matsui	Sandlin
Hastings (FL)	McCarthy (MO)	Sawyer
Hill (IN)	McCarthy (NY)	Schakowsky
Hilliard	McDermott	Scott
Hinchey	McGovern	Serrano
Hinojosa	McIntyre	Shaw
Hobson	McKinney	Shays
Hoeffel	McNulty	Sherman
Holden	Meehan	Sherwood
Holt	Meek (FL)	Shows
Hooley	Meeks (NY)	Simpson
Houghton	Menendez	Sisisky
Hoyer	Millender-Lee	Skelton
Hunter	McDonald	Slaughter
Hyde	Miller, George	Smith (NJ)
Inslee	Minge	Smith (WA)
Jackson (IL)	Mink	Snyder
Jackson-Lee (TX)	Moakley	Spratt
Jefferson	Mollohan	Stabenow
Johnson (CT)	Moore	Stark
Johnson, E. B.	Moran (VA)	Stenholm
Jones (OH)	Morella	Stupak
Kanjorski	Murtha	Tanner
Kaptur	Nadler	Tauscher
Kelly	Napolitano	Taylor (MS)
Kennedy	Neal	Thompson (CA)
Kildee	Northup	Thurman
Kilpatrick	Oberstar	Tierney
Kind (WI)	Obey	Turner
King (NY)	Olver	Udall (CO)
Kleckzka	Ortiz	Udall (NM)
Klink	Ose	Vento
Knollenberg	Owens	Visclosky
Kolbe	Oxley	Waters
Kucinich	Pallone	Watt (NC)
LaFalce	Pascrill	Waxman
Lampson	Pastor	Weiner
Lantos	Payne	Wexler
Larson	Pelosi	Weygand
LaTourette	Phelps	Wise
Lazio	Pickett	Wolf
Lee	Pomeroy	Woolsey
Levin	Porter	Wynn
	Portman	

## ANSWERED "PRESENT"—2

Abercrombie	Callahan
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## NOT VOTING—16

Becerra	John	Thompson (MS)
Bilbray	Lipinski	Towns
Brown (CA)	Quinn	Velazquez
Capps	Reyes	Wu
Clay	Shuster	
Frost	Strickland	

□ 2115

Mr. GREEN of Texas and Mr. FLETCHER changed their vote from "aye" to "no."

Messrs. GORDON, STUMP, SWEENEY and FOSSELLA changed their vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GILMAN TO AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MR. GEJDENSON

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GILMAN to amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. GEJDENSON:

1. Strike section 3 and insert the following:

**SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.**

(a) In general.—Subject to the limitations in subsection (b) the President is authorized to deploy United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peace-

keeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

(b) Reports to Congress.—The President should, before ordering the deployment of any United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo do each of the following:

(1) Personally and in writing submit to the Congress—

(A) a detailed statement explaining the national interest of the United States at risk in the Kosovo conflict; and

(B) a certification to the Congress that all United States Armed Forces personnel so deployed pursuant to subsection (a) will be under the operational control only of United States Armed Forces military officers.

(2) Submit to the Congress a detailed report that—

(A) in classified and unclassified form addresses the amount and nature of the military resources of the United States, in both personnel and equipment, that will be required for such deployment;

(B) outlines and explains the military exit strategy that would control the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces personnel from Kosovo;

(C) certifies the chain of command for any such deployed United States Armed Forces personnel; and

(D) provides the percentage of United States Armed Forces participating in any NATO deployment in the Kosovo peace keeping operation, including ground troops, air support, logistics support, and intelligence support, compared to the other NATO nations participating in that operation.

(3) Submit to the Congress a detailed report that—

(A) in classified and unclassified form addresses the impact on military readiness of such deployment;

(B) provides the timeframe in which withdrawal of all United States Armed Forces personnel from Kosovo could reasonably be expected;

(C) in classified and unclassified form provides an unambiguous explanation of the rules of engagement under which all United States Armed Forces personnel participating in the Kosovo NATO peace keeping operation shall operate;

(D) in classified and unclassified form provides the budgetary impact for fiscal year 1999 and each fiscal year thereafter for the next five fiscal years on the Department of Defense, and each of the military services in particular; on the Intelligence Community; and on the Department of State as a result of any such deployment.

(4) Submit in classified form, to the Speaker, the Minority Leader, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and the Majority and Minority Leaders, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, a detailed report that addresses the threats attendant to any such deployment and the nature and level of force protection required for such deployment.

(5) Submit to the Speaker, Minority Leader, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and the Majority and Minority Leaders and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a detailed report that addresses—

(A) any intelligence sharing arrangement that has been established as a result of the Kosovo peace agreement;

(B) the intelligence sharing arrangement that currently exists within NATO and how such arrangement would be modified, if at all, in the Kosovo context; and

(C) whether Russian participation in a Kosovo peacekeeping deployment alongside NATO forces will affect, impede, or hinder any such intelligence sharing arrangement.

(6) Submit to the Congress a detailed report on the scope of the mission of the United States Armed Forces personnel.

(7) Submit to the Congress a detailed report prepared by the Secretary of State that—

(A) outlines and explains the diplomatic exit strategy that would control the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces personnel from Kosovo;

(B) outlines and explains the means and methodologies by which verification of compliance with the terms of any Kosovo peace agreement will be determined;

(C) in classified and unclassified form, explains the terms and conditions included in any peace agreement reached with respect to the Kosovo conflict. Such report should include—

(1) a detailed discussion and explanation of any side agreement, whether or not all parties to the overall peace agreement are aware of the side agreement;

(2) a detailed discussion and explanation of any obligations of the United States arising from the peace agreement, including any such obligations with respect to the introduction of weapons into Kosovo and Serbia;

(3) a detailed discussion and explanation of any military arrangements, in addition to the NATO deployment, to which the United States has agreed to undertake as a result of the Kosovo peace agreement;

(4) a detailed discussion and explanation of the funding source for any future plebiscite or referendum on independence for Kosovo; and

(5) a detailed discussion and explanation of any requirement for forces participating in the NATO peace keeping operation implementing the peace agreement to enforce any provision of such peace agreement.

Mr. GILMAN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who developed the language in this amendment and who has worked closely with our committee on this issue.

Mr. GOSS. I thank the gentleman for yielding, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to advise Members of what is contained in this proposed amendment, which actually reflects on some of the concerns we have heard in the debate today, and deals with some of the other amendments that we have all read about that we were considering as other amendments for this particular House concurrent resolution.

I would describe generally the resolution that is under consideration as between House Concurrent Resolution 32, which is somewhat of a carte blanche, and the Fowler amendment, which was a prohibition.

What we attempt to do here is authorize deployment, but because of some of the concerns we have heard today, call on the President to submit a number of reports and vital pieces of

information to the Congress before ordering deployment.

These would include reports on a declaration explaining the national interest of the U.S. at risk in Kosovo, and a certification that all U.S. armed forces in Kosovo will be under the operational control of U.S. military officers.

We would request further details on the rules of engagement before we have deployment; the military resources that would be required, both the personnel and the equipment; the military exit strategy; the diplomatic exit strategy; the chain of command for the U.S. forces in Kosovo; the percentage of United States participation compared to other NATO countries in any force, concerning particularly ground troops, air support, logistic support, and intelligence support; the impact on military readiness, and that goes to morale and rotation; that we would have information providing a time frame in which U.S. forces could reasonably expect to be withdrawn; that we would have information on the budgetary impact for this fiscal year and the next 5 fiscal years of deployment; we would have an assessment of the threats to our armed forces in Kosovo, the men and women in uniform, and the level of force protection required to give them the maximum amount of protection; the intelligence-sharing arrangements, if any, resulting from a peace agreement; any modification to the intelligence-sharing arrangement within NATO, the present arrangement we have now; the effect of Russian participation in Kosovo on any intelligence-sharing arrangements within NATO; the scope of the mission of the U.S. armed forces, in other words, what is expected, when do we declare success; the means and methods by which compliance with the terms of the peace agreement will be verified, verification; the terms and conditions in any peace agreement, in particular; the details on any secret side agreements; any other military arrangements of the U.S. as a result of the peace agreement or side agreements or obligations; any other obligations of the United States resulting from the peace agreement, such as weapons interdiction; the funding source for the referendum on independence 3 years hence in Kosovo, and the role of peacekeeping forces to enforce any provision of the peace agreement.

Mr. Chairman, we should support this deployment to make Mr. Milosevic understand that the United States means business. We should support the deployment with our eyes wide open, if we are going to have a deployment, and that is why we are offering these amendments.

I would argue that a successful vote to send the troops can in fact strengthen the hand of our negotiators. I would note that even the minority leader earlier today conceded that we should not deploy troops without a policy. I could not agree more with the gentleman from Missouri.

A commitment to deploy has already been made, pursuant to some ad hoc policy determination. Congress needs to be involved. Therefore, now is the appropriate time to take up this issue, before the troops are deployed without a firm policy.

That is the explanation, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM).

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I understand this amendment is going to be accepted. I asked to speak on it so I would not have to call a recorded vote on it, and I will not do that.

I support strongly the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. PORTER GOSS). I am not going to say why I am against the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) because it would sound partisan, but I want to the gentleman to know that it is not, it is a very deep-seated belief I have, and mistrust. I will support the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from Florida, and vote against the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON).

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. CUNNINGHAM) for his support.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, with some reluctance, I would take the advice of my chair and support the amendment of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) to amendment No. 5 offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON).

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 52 OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I reserve the right to object, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would inquire of the gentleman from Missouri which amendment he is offering.

Mr. SKELTON. It is the one that says Section 4. Section 4.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object.

□ 2130

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment No. 52 offered by Mr. SKELTON:

Page 2, strike line 9 and all that follows and insert the following:

**SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.**

The President shall not deploy United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation unless—

(1) a Kosovo peace agreement has been reached; and

(2) such deployment is specifically approved by the Congress.

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION TO AMENDMENT NO. 52 OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that, on line 1, where it says strike and insert section 3 in the original, it be changed to add section 4.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the modification.

The Clerk read as follows:

Modification to Amendment No. 52 offered by Mr. SKELTON:

The amendment as modified is as follows:  
Add at the end the following:

**SEC. 4 LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.**

The President shall not deploy United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation unless—

(1) a Kosovo peace agreement has been reached; and

(2) such deployment is specifically approved by the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the modification of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri?

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) listed two amendments, one that would not allow U.S. forces to be deployed to Kosovo unless there is an agreement between the two sides, a second that would say that U.S. forces could not be deployed unless there is agreement between two sides and Congress has approved the deployment.

I would ask of the distinguished gentleman from Missouri that he fully explain the implications of this amendment, because it would appear that it may be out of order and require a unanimous consent. If the gentleman from Missouri would explain the amendment.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the amendment is very clear.

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri to explain the impact of the amendment.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, there shall be no deployment of American personnel peacekeeping forces unless there is an agreement reached between the parties in question in Kosovo, and, number two, that such deployment must be approved by Congress.

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON).

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure that whatever happens here, that the sectioning does

not wipe out the section of the gentleman from Texas. So my understanding is that this maybe should actually be section 5.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, then that is fine. I thought it would be 4. Then it will be 5, and I so request.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Virginia object to the modification of the amendment?

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I do object to the modification of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

The gentleman from Missouri is entitled to 5 minutes on his amendment as originally designated.

POINT OF ORDER

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Virginia seek recognition?

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I seek recognition for a point of order that, because the gentleman is amending the portion of underlying text that has already been amended, this amendment is out of order.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, that is not correct. I am merely changing a 3 to a 5. It is in conflict with no other section.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Missouri wish to be heard further on the point of order? The Chair is prepared to rule.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I think that it speaks for itself. It is in addition thereto. It is in conflict with no other section.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is prepared to rule. Pursuant to section 469 of Jefferson's Manual of the 105th Congress and for the reasons stated by the gentleman from Virginia, the point of order is sustained, and the amendment No. 52 may not be offered at this time.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Kosovo resolution before us, however suspect the timing may be. Furthermore, I support the Skelton Amendment, which would specify once a peace agreement is reached, Congress must approve the deployment of our troops.

The United States is in an unquestionable position of world leadership. Along with that position comes a sense of duty. If we want free trade and open markets, not to mention exemplary worldwide standards of behavior in the realms of justice, scientific discovery, human rights, and other democratic values, we must lead by example. The responsibility of neutralizing potential global flare-ups of hostility comes with this territory.

Senator BOB DOLE recently returned from discussions with the KLA in Kosovo. He stated his support of continued work towards a peace agreement, and expressed his hope for bipartisan Congressional support. I stand with Senator DOLE on this issue; I believe partisanship should end at the water's edge. Whatever we think of the muddled foreign policy of this Administration, we should never engage in activities that produce American weakness in the international theater.

NATO is the perfect and appropriate vehicle for this operation. I have supported the mission of NATO and will continue to do so. We have NATO to thank for one of the longest sustained periods of peace in Europe.

Many in this body have complained that the Europeans in NATO were not pulling their weight in dealing with conflict in their own backyard. Many of these same voices are also opposing this peacekeeping operation. This confuses me; if we wanted the Europeans to shoulder a greater responsibility in resolving European issues, shouldn't we be pleased that European forces are going to make up 86 percent of the peacekeeping force?

If we allow ourselves to succumb to the voices of isolationism that have been reverberating around this chamber, all that we do is create an international power void that allows other nations the opportunity to start operating as the Number One world power. Would we prefer to have China calling the shots in the world of international diplomacy, as opposed to the United States? I know I for one sure don't, and I bet my friends that are calling for an isolationist world view, if they really thought about it, wouldn't either.

This resolution before us is only a Sense of Congress that has no binding effect. I support efforts to bring before the House, after a peace agreement has been signed, a bill in which Congress specifically authorizes the deployment of troops. My friend from Missouri, Mr. SKELTON, is offering an amendment that says just that, and I plan to support it.

My colleagues, I urge you to support Mr. SKELTON's amendment, as well as the resolution as whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the resolution?

There being no further amendments, under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. GIBBONS) having assumed the chair, Mr. THORNBERRY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 42) regarding the use of United States Armed Forces as part of NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement, pursuant to House Resolution 103, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the concurrent resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 219, noes 191, answered “present” 9, not voting 15, as follows:

[Roll No. 49]

AYES—219

Ackerman	Baldwin	Berman	Bliley
Allen	Barcia	Berry	Blumenauer
Baird	Barrett (WI)	Biggert	Boehlert
Baldacci	Berkley	Bishop	Bonior

Bonino	Hooley	Hobson	Oberstar
Borski	Houghton	Hoeffel	Olver
Boswell	Hoyer	Holden	Ortiz
Boucher	Hunter	Holt	Ose
Boyd	Hyde	Hoyle	Owens
Brady (PA)	Insllee	Houghton	Oxley
Brown (FL)	Jackson (IL)	Hoyer	Pallone
Buyer	Jackson-Lee	Hyde	Pascrall
Calvert	(TX)	Insllee	Pastor
Capuano	Jefferson	Jackson (IL)	Payne
Cardin	Johnson (CT)	Jackson-Lee	Pelosi
Carson	Johnson, E. B.	Jones (OH)	Pickett
Castle	Jones (OH)	Kanjorski	Pomeroy
Clayton	Kanjorski	Kaptur	Porter
Clement	Kaptur	Kelly	Portman
Clyburn	Kennedy	Kilpatrick	Rahall
Conyers	Kilpatrick	King (NY)	Rangel
Cooksey	King (WI)	Kleczka	Regula
Coyne	King (NY)	Klollenberg	Rivers
Cramer	Kleczka	Kucinich	Rodriguez
Crowley	Klollenberg	LaFalce	Rothman
Cummings	Kucinich	Lampson	Royal-Allard
Davis (FL)	LaFalce	Lantos	Rush
Davis (IL)	Lampson	Larson	Sabo
Davis (VA)	Lantos	LaTourette	Sanchez
DeFazio	Larson	Lazio	Sanders
DeGette	LaTourette	Lee	Sandlin
Delahunt	Lazio	Levin	Sawyer
DeLauro	Lee	Lewis (CA)	Schakowsky
Deutsch	Levin	Lewis (GA)	Scott
Diaz-Balart	Lewis (CA)	Linder	Serrano
Dicks	Lewis (GA)	Lowey	Shaw
Dingell	Linder	Lucas (KY)	Sherman
Dixon	Lowey	Luther	Show
Doggett	Lucas (KY)	Maloney (CT)	Sisisky
Dooley	Luther	Maloney (NY)	Skeletton
Doyle	Maloney (NY)	Markey	Smith (N.J.)
Dreier	Maloney (NY)	Martinez	Smith (WA)
Dunn	Markey	Mascara	Snyder
Edwards	Martinez	Matsui	Spratt
Engel	Mascara	McCarthy (MO)	Stabenow
Eshoo	Matsui	McCarthy (NY)	Thompson (CA)
Etheridge	McCarthy (NY)	McDermott	Thurman
Evans	McCarthy (NY)	McGovern	Tierney
Farr	McDermott	McIntyre	Turner
Fattah	McGovern	Meehan	Udall (CO)
Filner	McIntyre	Meek (FL)	Udall (NM)
Forbes	Meehan	Meeks (NY)	Velazquez
Ford	Meek (FL)	Menendez	Vento
Frelinghuysen	Meeks (NY)	Millender	Waters
Gederson	Menendez	McDonald	Watt (NC)
Gekas	Millender	Miller, George	Waxman
Gephart	McDonald	Minge	Weiner
Gilchrest	Miller, George	Moakley	Wexler
Gilman	Minge	Mollohan	Weygand
Gonzalez	Moakley	Moore	Wilson
Gutierrez	Mollohan	Moran (VA)	Wise
Hall (OH)	Moore	Morella	Wolf
Hastert	Moran (VA)	Murtha	Woolsey
Hastings (FL)	Morella	Nadler	Wynn
Hill (IN)	Murtha	Napolitano	
Hilliard	Nadler	Neal	
Hinchey	Napolitano		
Hinojosa	Neal		

NOES—191

Aderholt	Chabot	Foley
Andrews	Chambliss	Fossella
Archer	Chenoweth	Fowler
Armeny	Coble	Frank (MA)
Bachus	Collins	Franks (NJ)
Baker	Combest	Gallegly
Ballenger	Condit	Ganske
Barr	Cook	Gibbons
Barrett (NE)	Costello	Gillmor
Bartlett	Cox	Goode
Barton	Crane	Goodlatte
Bass	Cubin	Gordon
Bateman	Cunningham	Graham
Bereuter	Danner	Granger
Bilirakis	Deal	Green (WI)
Blagojevich	DeLay	Greenwood
Blunt	DeMint	Hall (TX)
Boehner	Dickey	Hansen
Bonilla	Doolittle	Hastings (WA)
Brady (TX)	Duncan	Hayes
Bryant	Ehlers	Hayworth
Burr	Ehrlich	Hefley
Burton	Emerson	Herger
Camp	English	Hill (MT)
Canady	Everett	Hilleary
Cannon	Ewing	
	Fletcher	

Hoekstra	Nethercutt	Shimkus
Horn	Ney	Simpson
Hostettler	Northup	Smith (MI)
Hulshof	Norwood	Smith (TX)
Hutchinson	Nussle	Souder
Isakson	Packard	Spence
Istook	Paul	Stearns
Jenkins	Pease	Stump
Johnson, Sam	Peterson (MN)	Sununu
Jones (NC)	Peterson (PA)	Sweeney
Kasich	Petri	Talent
Kingston	Phelps	Tancredo
Klink	Pickering	Tauzin
Kolbe	Pitts	Taylor (MS)
Kuykendall	Pombo	Taylor (NC)
LaHood	Pryce (OH)	Terry
Largent	Ramstad	Thomas
Latham	Reynolds	Thornberry
Leach	Riley	Thune
Lewis (KY)	Roemer	Tiahrt
LoBiondo	Rogan	Toomey
Lucas (OK)	Rogers	Traficant
Manzullo	Rohrabacher	Upton
McCullum	Ros-Lehtinen	Visclosky
McCrery	Roukema	Walden
McHugh	Royce	Walsh
McInnis	Ryan (WI)	Wamp
McIntosh	Ryun (KS)	Watkins
McKeon	Salmon	Watts (OK)
McKinney	Sanford	Weldon (FL)
McNulty	Saxton	Weldon (PA)
Metcalf	Scarborough	Weller
Mica	Schaffer	Whitfield
Miller (FL)	Sensenbrenner	Wicker
Miller, Gary	Sessions	Young (AK)
Moran (KS)	Shadegg	Young (FL)
Myrick	Shays	

## ANSWERED "PRESENT"—9

Abercrombie	Callahan	Mink
Bentsen	Coburn	Obey
Brown (OH)	Lofgren	Slaughter

## NOT VOTING—15

Becerra	Frost	Shuster
Bilbray	John	Strickland
Brown (CA)	Lipinski	Thompson (MS)
Capps	Quinn	Towns
Clay	Reyes	Wu

## □ 2155

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska changed his vote from "aye" to "no."

So the concurrent resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated against:

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 49, I was unable to be on the House floor. Had I been present, I would have voted "no."

## GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on House Concurrent Resolution 42, the concurrent resolution just agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GIBBONS). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

## REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 744

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have my name taken off H.R. 744. It was mistakenly placed on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

## LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. BONIOR asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I have asked to speak for the purpose of inquiring of the distinguished majority leader the schedule for the remainder of the week and next week.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BONIOR. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to announce that we have had our last vote for the week. There will be no votes tomorrow, on Friday, March 12.

On Monday, March 15, the House will meet at 2 p.m. for a pro forma session. Of course, there will be no legislative business and no votes that day.

On Tuesday, March 16, the House will meet at 9:30 a.m. for the morning hour and at 11 a.m. for legislative business. Votes are expected after noon on Tuesday, March 16.

## □ 2200

On Tuesday, we will consider a number of bills under suspension of the rules, a list of which will be distributed to Members' offices.

Also on Tuesday, March 16, the House will take up H.R. 819, the Federal Maritime Commission Authorization Act of 1999.

On Wednesday, March 17, the House will meet at 10 a.m. to consider the following legislative business:

H.R. 975, a bill to provide for a reduction in the volume of steel imports and to establish a steel import notification monitoring program; and H.R. 820, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1999.

On Thursday, March 18, we expect a national security briefing on the House floor from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. to discuss the ballistic missile threat. Of course, all Members will want to attend.

The House will then take up H.R. 4, a bill to declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense.

Mr. Speaker, we expect to conclude legislative business next week on Thursday, March 18.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman could address one concern that we have. On Tuesday, I know that the schedule is relatively light in terms of business. We have the two suspensions which I suspect are relatively non-controversial. I am wondering if it would not be possible to help the folks on the West Coast if we could not roll and postpone votes until about 5 o'clock on Tuesday.

Mr. ARMEY. Let me thank the gentleman for his inquiry. I think it is an important point, a point a lot of Members have made, but in the interest of a good bit of the committee work that we hope to conclude in preparation for the appropriations season soon before

us, we really feel that we need that time to have Members in town. Therefore, we constructed the schedule to that end.

Mr. BONIOR. Could the gentleman inform us when he expects the supplemental appropriation bill to come to the floor?

Mr. ARMEY. I appreciate that. I believe the Committee on Appropriations reported a supplemental bill out today. We will probably find it filed on Tuesday of next week and would have it available then for the week following.

Mr. BONIOR. I thank my colleague and wish him a good weekend.

Mr. ARMEY. I thank him and I hope you all have a good weekend.

ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY,  
MARCH 15, 1999

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 2 p.m. on Monday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GIBBONS). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

DISPENSING WITH CALENDAR  
WEDNESDAY BUSINESS ON  
WEDNESDAY NEXT

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order under the Calendar Wednesday rule be dispensed with on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS TO  
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, and pursuant to section 3 of Public Law 94-304 as amended by section 1 of Public Law 99-7, the Chair announces the Speaker's appointment of the following Members of the House to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

Mr. WOLF of Virginia;  
Mr. SALMON of Arizona;  
Mr. GREENWOOD of Pennsylvania; and  
Mr. FORBES of New York.

There was no objection.

GAMBLING EFFORT DIES IN  
PENNSYLVANIA SENATE

(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLF. Madam Speaker, I want to bring to the attention of the Members of the House today the following Philadelphia Inquirer headline where it says gambling efforts die in Pennsylvania Senate. This Monday, the Pennsylvania State Senate rejected a resolution by the vote of 28 to 21 calling for