[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 34 (Thursday, March 4, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E341-E343]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         REPORT ON NORTH KOREA

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 4, 1999

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, North Korea policy is undoubtedly one of 
this country's most pressing foreign policy challenges. With the 
discovery of a secret underground nuclear weapons-related facility and 
the launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong ballistic missile over our 
troops and allies in Asia, our policy towards North Korea has been 
called into serious question. And rightfully, so.
  Today, I received a copy of a study done by a working group of Asia 
experts under the able guidance of former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Richard Armitage. The National Defense University Strategic 
Forum ``A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea'' is a timely and 
insightful study which will add much to the ongoing debate about the 
direction of our policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea.
  I commend this report to my colleagues and the foreign and defense 
policy community and ask that they give due consideration to the 
report's findings and recommendation as we work together to craft a 
policy which protects and advances American interests on the Korean 
peninsula.
  Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I ask that the National Defense 
University's Strategic Forum Number 159 of March 1999 be inserted at 
this point in the Congressional Record:

 [National Defense University, Strategic Forum, Number 159, March 1999]

                A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea

                      (By Richard L. Armitage) \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     \1\ Ambassador Richard L. Armitage is President of Armitage 
     Associates and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
     International Security Affairs. He chaired a working group on 
     U.S. Policy Toward North Korea whose members included: 
     Johannes A. Binnendijk, Institute for National Strategic 
     Studies; Peter T.R. Brookes, House Committee on International 
     Relations; Carl W. Ford, Ford and Associates; Kent M. 
     Harrington, Harrington Group L.L.C.; Frank S. Jannuzi, 
     Minority Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; 
     Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; RADM Michael 
     A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.), Center for Naval Analyses; James J. 
     Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies; GEN 
     Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.), L-3 Communications 
     Corporation; and Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze 
     School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins 
     University.
     Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or 
     implied in this paper are solely those of the working group 
     and do not represent the views of the National Defense 
     University, the Department of Defense, or any other 
     government agency or nongovernment organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Since the Agreed Framework (AF) was signed by the United 
     States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, the security 
     situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia has 
     changed qualitatively for the worse. The discovery last year 
     of a suspect North Korean nuclear site and the August 31 
     launch of a Taepo Dong missile have combined to raise 
     fundamental questions about Pyongyang's intentions, its 
     commitment to the agreement, and the possibility of North-
     South reconciliation. These developments also raise profound 
     questions about the sustainability of current U.S. policy 
     toward the Korean peninsula.
       The Agreed Framework successfully addressed a specific 
     security problem--North Korea's plutonium production at the 
     Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. Under the agreement, 
     operations were frozen at the two facilities and Pyongyang 
     was prevented from obtaining fissile material from the fuel 
     rods of the reactor core for five to six nuclear weapons. Had 
     the program continued unabated, North Korea might have been 
     able to produce enough fissile material for a substantial 
     nuclear arsenal. Arguably, the Agreed Framework was a 
     necessary but not sufficient response to the multiple 
     security challenges posed by North Korea. Indeed, the 
     development of the Taepo Dong missile poses an expanding 
     security threat to Northeast Asia and, increasingly, to the 
     Middle East, Europe, and even the United States itself.


                          Changing Assumptions

       Experience in dealing with Pyongyang since the Agreed 
     Framework was signed challenges several critical assumptions 
     on which public and Congressional support for U.S. policy has 
     been based.
       The first is the assumption made by some senior 
     administration officials that the Agreed Framework had ended 
     North Korea's nuclear program.
       The second is that North Korea is a failed state on the 
     verge of collapse and that a ``hard landing''--collapse 
     perhaps accompanied by aggression--should be avoided.
       The third is that the Agreed Framework would induce North 
     Korea to open up to the outside world, initiate a gradual 
     process of North-South reconciliation, and lead to real 
     reform and a ``soft landing.''
       These assumptions suggested that, even if little progress 
     was made on other political/security issues, the Agreed 
     Framework was an effective, time-buying strategy. At a 
     minimum, North Korea's conventional capabilities would 
     continue to degrade (as they have). Optimally, the North 
     would solve our problems by ultimately reconciling or uniting 
     with the South. These assumptions are now open to question.


                             Reality Check

       The disclosure of at least one suspect site--on which 
     construction began prior to the agreement--reinforces the 
     possibility that Pyongyang has frozen only a portion of its 
     nuclear program or is seeking to develop a covert nuclear 
     weapons program. The Agreed Framework was structured to 
     become stronger over time in constraining the

[[Page E342]]

     North's nuclear weapons capability. This meant deferring the 
     requirement for the North Korean nuclear program to come into 
     full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA) full-scope safeguards until roughly 2002-03. In 
     effect, the agreement accepted the possibility that North 
     Korea might have one or two nuclear devices. Since 1994, it 
     is also possible that Pyongyang could have acquired 
     additional nuclear weapons technology and/or fissile material 
     from external sources.
       Moreover, the core assumption of imminent collapse is 
     seriously flawed. Despite severe hardships, there are no 
     signs of regime-threatening social or political unrest, or 
     military disaffection. As underscored in its 50th anniversary 
     celebration last year, the North Korean regime appears to 
     have consolidated itself under Kim Jong Il.
       There are also no signs that the regime is contemplating 
     any radical market-oriented reforms. Instead, forced by 
     necessity, it is experimenting at the margins with modest 
     reform to alleviate food shortages at the local level and 
     gain hard currency. With Chinese aid and a variety of hard 
     currency schemes--missile exports, counterfeiting, narcotics 
     trafficking, selling overflight rights--the regime has been 
     able to keep urban areas minimally functioning. By all 
     appearances, the regime may be able to stagger on 
     indefinitely.
       Starvation has not politically weakened the regime. As 
     demonstrated in the cases of Ukraine under Stalin and China 
     under Mao, there is not necessarily a connection between 
     human misery and the stability of the regime in a 
     totalitarian system. The regime has been willing to destroy 
     an entire generation to preserve its power.
       At the same time, Pyongyang has spurned the political 
     overtures of the most conciliatory president in the history 
     of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae Jung. President Kim has 
     written volumes on Korean unification, including plans for 
     reunification that are similar to those offered by the late 
     Kim Il Sung. The unwillingness to deal seriously with Kim Dae 
     Jung suggests a fundamental fear that North-South 
     reconciliation would undermine the legitimacy of the regime 
     in Pyongyang.
       President Kim's Sunshine Policy (now known as the 
     Engagement Policy) has established a formula for 
     reconciliation on the peninsula, while deferring the ultimate 
     goal of reunification as a practical matter. To date, 
     Pyongyang has responded to Seoul's economic, social, and 
     cultural nongovernmental overtures, but has rejected any 
     political reconciliation with South Korea. Moreover, as 
     evidenced by recent incidents of military infiltration, it 
     continues its aggressive behavior.


                          Who Is Buying Time?

       The notion that buying time works in our favor is 
     increasingly dubious. A growing body of evidence suggests 
     that it is North Korea that is buying time--to consolidate 
     the regime, continue its nuclear weapons program, and build 
     and sell two new generations of missiles, while disregarding 
     the well-being of its 22 million people. Kim Jung Il's 
     assumption of the post of Chairman of North Korea's 
     Military Commission has raised the influence of the armed 
     forces. These developments have created an increasingly 
     dangerous security environment in Northeast Asia.
       Indeed, North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the 
     development of missile delivery systems have combined to pose 
     an enhanced threat to the security of Japan. This threat has 
     grown even as Japan has continued to support the Agreed 
     Framework and its light-water reactor project. Yet we cannot 
     expect Tokyo's continued support for approaches to Pyongyang 
     that fail to address Japan's security concerns.
       North Korea's provocative actions and belligerent posture 
     have challenged--and taken advantage of--our interest in 
     stability. For Pyongyang, the lesson of the past four years 
     is that brinkmanship works.


                     Foundation for a New Approach

       A Congressionally mandated review has made it clear that 
     current policy toward North Korea is politically 
     unsustainable. Similar political pressures are today evident 
     in Japan and may soon surface in the Republic of Korea. The 
     appointment of former Secretary of Defense William Perry to 
     conduct a review of policy toward North Korea is an important 
     step in fashioning a policy that is politically viable and 
     protects the vital interests of the United States and its 
     allies.
       A new approach must treat the Agreed Framework as the 
     beginning of a policy toward North Korea, not as the end of 
     the problem. It should clearly formulate answers to two key 
     questions: first, what precisely do we want from North Korea, 
     and what price are we prepared to pay for it? Second, are we 
     prepared to take a different course if, after exhausting all 
     reasonable diplomatic efforts, we conclude that no worthwhile 
     accord is possible?
       Current policy is fragmented. Each component of policy--
     implementing the Agreed Framework, four-party peace talks, 
     missile talks, food aid, POW-MIA talks--operates largely on 
     its own track without any larger strategy or focus on how the 
     separate pieces fit together. In the absence of a 
     comprehensive policy, North Korea has held the initiative, 
     with Washington responding as Pyongyang acts as demandeur.
       A successful approach to North Korea must be comprehensive 
     and integrated, and must address the totality of the security 
     threat. The stakes involved should make Korea a matter of the 
     highest priority for the President. This will require 
     sustained attention to manage the issue with Congress, our 
     Korean and Japanese allies, and China. The diplomacy leading 
     to the Agreed Framework had such focus when Robert Galucci 
     was named special coordinator, reporting directly to the 
     Secretary of State and the President. Unfortunately, after 
     Ambassador Galucci left his Korea post in 1995, no successor 
     was named.
       The logic of the policies pursued by the United States, its 
     allies, and China has been one of muddling through. This has 
     allowed North Korea to obtain economic benefits while 
     maintaining its military threat. Given the opacity of North 
     Korea's totalitarian regime, its decision-making process is 
     unknowable. Only by fairly testing Pyongyang's intentions 
     through diplomacy can we validate policy assumptions. If a 
     diplomatic solution is not possible, it is to our advantage 
     to discover this sooner rather than later in order to best 
     protect our security interests. If North Korea leaves no 
     choice but confrontation, it should be on our terms, not its 
     own.
       One cannot expect North Korea to take U.S. diplomacy 
     seriously unless we demonstrate unambiguously that the United 
     States is prepared to bolster its deterrent military posture. 
     This can be done without appearing to threaten Pyongyang. At 
     the same time, policy should provide an adequate incentive 
     structure to any forces inside the North Korean elite who may 
     be inclined to believe that the least bad choice for survival 
     is one of civil international behavior and opening. To 
     convince the North to modify its posture, we need a larger 
     conceptual framework, with greater incentives and 
     corresponding disincentives.
       The first step toward a new approach is to regain the 
     diplomatic initiative. U.S. policy toward North Korea has 
     become largely reactive and predictable, with U.S. diplomacy 
     characterized by a cycle of North Korean provocation (or 
     demand) and American response. The intention is to be 
     proactive and to define the agenda.
       This begins with setting new terms of reference. Diplomacy 
     must fashion an initiative that integrates the entire 
     spectrum of security challenges, while enhanced deterrence 
     must address what we are prepared to do, should diplomacy 
     prove inadequate.
       Our strategy must be closely coordinated with our allies. 
     It must integrate Tokyo's interests and assets, as well as 
     Seoul's Engagement Policy and defense capabilities. Such 
     integration, at a minimum, would strengthen the U.S. alliance 
     structure, while positioning Washington to deal more 
     effectively with Pyongyang.
       A new approach to North Korea will necessarily test China's 
     intentions. Beijing was helpful in the process leading to the 
     Agreed Framework, and the United States publicly cites that 
     cooperation as a major payoff of its China policy.
       But China is also pursuing its own agenda. Beijing is 
     sustaining North Korea with aid, despite Pyongyang's apparent 
     unwillingness to heed its advice. China has resisted active 
     cooperation--with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
     Organization, with the World Food Program, and on missiles. 
     Its independent actions pose a challenge to any successful 
     U.S. policy. No approach to North Korea is likely to succeed 
     absent some modicum of active cooperation from--and clear 
     understanding with--China. Beijing must understand that it 
     will either bear a burden for failure or benefit from 
     cooperation.


          Operational Elements of A New Comprehensive Approach

       We would propose a new comprehensive approach for 
     management of the problems posed by North Korea. The package 
     should combine the elements of deterrence and diplomacy cited 
     below. This package is not offered with any unwarranted 
     optimism regarding what is possible vis-a-vis North Korea. 
     Thus, the strengthening of deterrence is central to this 
     package.
       To make a comprehensive approach sustainable politically, 
     it is critical to start with and maintain close coordination 
     with Congress. To be successful, policy toward the Korean 
     peninsular requires a foundation of strong bipartisan 
     support. A regular mechanism for executive-legislative 
     interaction should be developed. The former Senate Arms 
     Control Observer Groups on U.S.-Soviet relations can serve as 
     a model.
       To protect U.S. and allied interests, a strengthening of 
     deterrence must support diplomacy. Deterrence depends 
     essentially on the proper blend of diplomacy, declaratory 
     policy, and demonstrable military capability. As a result, if 
     diplomacy fails, North Korea should be faced with the 
     consequences of its choice: isolation or containment in an 
     environment in which U.S. leadership and alliance structures 
     have been reinvigorated and strengthened, allowing the United 
     States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan to act together.
       The following steps are critical to bolstering credible 
     deterrence.
       The United States should encourage Japanese leaders to 
     accelerate the timetable for Guidelines Legislation, and to 
     underscore the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to 
     Tokyo's security interests in the region and beyond.
       The United States should call for a trilateral (the United 
     States, Republic of Korea, and Japan) defense ministers 
     consultative meeting to address a range of peninsula 
     contingencies. In particular, this meeting

[[Page E343]]

     should consider actions to implement force enhancement 
     options, which might include agreements to increase counter-
     battery radar around Seoul and deploy more Patriot batteries 
     to Japan from Europe and the continental United States. 
     Public statements should also focus on deepening missile 
     defense cooperation, as well as a spectrum of military 
     exercises to deal with a variety of North Korean actions.
       ``Red Lines'' should be drawn. The United States, together 
     with the Republic of Korea and Japan, should clarify what is 
     unacceptable behavior and underscore that provocative 
     military action by North Korea will not be tolerated and will 
     provoke a response.
       The Pentagon should undertake a review of the American 
     presence in South Korea, not with a view to reduction, but to 
     ensure that U.S. forces can optimally deal with the evolving 
     nature of the North Korean threat.
       As a separate but related action, the Pentagon and the 
     commander in chief of Combined Forces Command in the Republic 
     of Korea should conduct a review to determine what mix of 
     surveillance, radar, and other weapons is required to improve 
     the defense of Seoul against bombardment or surprise attack. 
     To underscore alliance commitments, the United States should 
     also announce that it is prepared to augment forces in 
     theater.
       To enhance the prospects for the comprehensive package and 
     to advance U.S. and allied interests, diplomacy must be 
     closely coordinated with Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing.
       The U.S. point person should be designated by the President 
     in consultation with Congressional leaders and should report 
     directly to the President. This step also aims to move the 
     issue to the highest possible level of decisionmaking in 
     North Korea.
       Diplomacy should seek to align South Korean and Japanese 
     policies to influence positively North Korean behavior as 
     well as to reinforce military deterrence.
       The United States should propose a trilateral (United 
     States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan) foreign minister-
     level consultative meeting. The goals should be to name high-
     level point persons, establish coordinating mechanisms, and 
     raise the issue to the level of a presidential national 
     security priority. Trilateral coordination should reach 
     understandings on a division of responsibilities for the 
     comprehensive proposal.
       China's active cooperation is vital. Because the United 
     States and China share common interests with respect to the 
     Korean peninsula, we expect China to act in a positive 
     manner. Active cooperation will enhance Sino-American 
     relations. However, if conflict occurs as a result of 
     inadequate cooperation, Beijing will bear a heavy 
     responsibility. Moreover, the burden of keeping North Korea 
     on ``life support'' will fall squarely on China if our 
     diplomatic initiative fails.


                       The Comprehensive Package

       United States objectives should be maintaining and as 
     necessary strengthening deterrence, and eliminating through 
     peaceful means the military threat posed by North Korean 
     nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons and 
     missiles. Our goal is to reduce the risks to the United 
     States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. To the extent the 
     threat cannot be eliminated, the goal is to contain the 
     residual threat. In addition, the United States seeks to 
     facilitate South-North reconciliation.
       Washington should table an offer that meets Pyongyang's 
     legitimate economic, security, and political concerns. This 
     would allow the United States to seize the diplomatic 
     initiative as well as the moral and political high ground. It 
     would also strengthen the ability to build and sustain a 
     coalition if North Korea does not cooperate. Most 
     importantly, the failure of enhanced diplomacy should be 
     demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang.
       The objective of negotiations should be to offer Pyongyang 
     clear choices in regard to its future: on the one hand, 
     economic benefits, security assurances, political 
     legitimization, on the other, the certainty of enhanced 
     military deterrence. For the United States and its allies, 
     the package as a whole means that we are prepared--if 
     Pyongyang meets our concerns--to accept North Korea as a 
     legitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of 
     relations.
       Negotiations would address the following:
       1. The Agreed Framework: We should make clear our intention 
     to honor existing commitments, but also underscore that the 
     political and security environments have deteriorated 
     significantly since October 1994 because of North Korea's 
     actions. To sustain support for the agreement, it is 
     imperative that the issues regarding the suspect site(s) and 
     missiles be addressed.
       Sites: We should note that suspect sites are covered in the 
     ``confidential minute'' to the Agreed Framework. Our 
     objective is to have a credible mechanism to increase on-
     going transparency of the present site--but not be limited to 
     that site. The United States should make it clear in a 
     unilateral statement that the comprehensive package 
     encompasses any suspect site in North Korea.
       Plutonium: To bring North Korea promptly into compliance 
     with IAEA safeguards, we need to prepare for IAEA inspections 
     under the agreement. North Korean cooperation in preserving 
     the historical record of its past nuclear activities is 
     critical. In addition, a new bargain should include early 
     removal from North Korea of the nuclear spent fuel currently 
     in storage at Yongbyon.
       Quid pro quo: Accelerating the process of resolving site 
     questions, and the issue of IAEA compliance, could likely 
     require a U.S. commitment to expedite the construction of the 
     two light-water reactors, and negotiation of a United States-
     North Korean nuclear cooperation agreement.
       2. Missiles: North Korean missiles have become a far more 
     prominent problem that was the case when the Agreed Framework 
     was signed. It implicitly puts the missile problem on the 
     agenda. Our near-term objectives are to end testing and 
     exports, and, over the long term, to obtain North Korean 
     adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime limits. 
     However, if missile exports continue and the United States 
     can identify them, we should do what we can to intercept 
     those shipments. We will make it clear that we will act under 
     the UN Charter's right of self-defense.
       3. Conventional threat: The United States should table a 
     proposal for confidence building measures to begin a process 
     aimed at reciprocal conventional force reductions. Any new 
     peace mechanism should be linked to the reduction of the 
     conventional threat.
       4. Food/economic assistance/sanctions: The United States 
     should continue to provide some humanitarian food and medical 
     aid with the caveat of increased transparency on 
     distribution. But, our emphasis would be on assisting North 
     Korean economic restructuring. We would support actions that 
     open its economy to market forces. We are prepared to further 
     ease sanctions and support its membership in the 
     international financial institutions, recognizing that this 
     requires change on the part of Pyongyang. If the North takes 
     the necessary steps, the United States, with its allies, 
     should consider establishing a Korean reconstruction fund 
     within the World Bank or Asian Development Bank.
       U.S. diplomacy must integrate Seoul's Engagement Policy 
     (e.g., government approval of investment projects, 
     particularly large industrial investment by major firms known 
     as Chaebol) with the broad policy objectives of the 
     comprehensive package.
       As a step-by-step roadmap to a more cooperative 
     relationship, economic benefits beyond humanitarian aid 
     should be phased in as North Korea implements threat 
     reduction measures. In the context of an economic assistance 
     package, the United States could consult with North Korea to 
     review the energy component of the Agreed Framework to 
     develop alternate energy sources.
       5. Security assurances: The United States, along with the 
     Republic of Korea and Japan, should propose a six-party (the 
     United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North 
     Korea) meeting to deal with the security of North Korea. A 
     multilateral commitment should be based on the pledges made 
     in Kim Dae Jung's inaugural address--that we have no intent 
     to implode North Korea, to absorb North Korea, or to force 
     North Korea to change its political system. Assurances could 
     run the gamut from a pledge of nonaggression to a commitment 
     to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of North 
     Korea. Our goal should be to foster an environment making it 
     as easy as possible for Pyongyang to choose reform.
       The United States and its allies should make it clear that 
     we are prepared to coexist with a less threatening regime in 
     the North.
       6. Normalization: If North Korea satisfies our security 
     concerns, the United States should be prepared to move toward 
     full normalization of relations.


                         Should Diplomacy Fail

       The one enduring element of this initiative--irrespective 
     of North Korea's response--is the reinforcing of U.S. 
     leadership in maintaining stability and enhancing security in 
     this critical region. The U.S. effort to strengthen security 
     cooperation with our key allies--the Republic of Korea and 
     Japan--is an integral part of this leadership and becomes 
     even more central to regional security.
       The virtue of this initiative is that it will test North 
     Korea's intentions, discover whether diplomacy holds any real 
     possibility of yielding positive results, and, in the 
     process, restore U.S. leadership. This would enable us to 
     bolster a coalition to deter and contain North Korea. It is 
     aimed at leaving Pyongyang significantly wore off than if it 
     had chosen a future of cooperation on mutually beneficial 
     terms.
       Should diplomacy fail, the United States would have to 
     consider two alternative courses, neither of which is 
     attractive. One is to live with and deter a nuclear North 
     Korea armed with delivery systems, with all its implications 
     for the region. The other is preemption, with the attendant 
     uncertainties.
       Strengthened deterrence and containment. This would involve 
     a more ready and robust posture, including a willingness to 
     interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. Our 
     posture in the wake of a failure of diplomacy would position 
     the United States and its allies to enforce ``red lines.''
       Preemption. We recognize the dangers and difficulties 
     associated with this option. To be considered, any such 
     initiative must be based on precise knowledge of facilities, 
     assessment of probable success, and clear understanding with 
     our allies of the risks.
       We are under no illusions about the prospects for success 
     of the comprehensive package outlined above. The issues are 
     serious and the implications of a failure of diplomacy are 
     profound.



     

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