[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 32 (Tuesday, March 2, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E315-E316]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 EAST ASIA AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. DOUG BEREUTER

                              of nebraska

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, March 2, 1999

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, during this Member visit to several East 
Asian countries in January, considerable Japanese interest in 
developing a missile defense system was mentioned in the region's news 
media as a result of the North Korean missile launch over Japanese 
territory on its course to the Pacific. Also noted was very substantial 
public discussion and media coverage of the possibility of a missile 
defense system in Taiwan because of the Chinese missile firings in the 
run-up to the last Taiwanese presidential elections and because of the 
Chinese mainland missile build-up in the Taiwan Strait region.
  The following editorial from the February 20, 1999, edition of The 
Economist magazine notes not only the impact on Japan of the North 
Korean's provocative action and demonstrated advancement of their 
missile development program, it also suggests that ``[w]ith its 
missile, North Korea was thumbing its nose as much at China as at Japan 
and America.'' This Member has long felt that China's influence on 
North Korean is generally over-estimated, but certainly it has more 
influence on the isolated, paranoid North Korean regime than any other 
country. The Economist editorial notes what is almost certainly true, 
that ``North Korea felt it could take such missile liberties in part 
because China has stoutly opposed all international pressure on North 
Korea to curb its nuclear and missile activities.'' China is 
complaining loudly and threateningly against the possible deployment of 
missile defense systems in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan rather than 
examining its own culpability in increasing its missile threat against 
Taiwan and ignoring, to its own danger, the destabilizing missile and 
nuclear development programs of North Korea. The United States, 
threatened itself by the North Korean missiles under development, 
cannot ignore their threat to our allies, the Republic of Korea and 
Japan, nor its commitment that Taiwan not be forcibly placed under the 
control of Beijing. As The Economist concludes, China ``has mostly 
itself to blame'' for any new tilt in East Asia's unease balance of 
power may have been

[[Page E316]]

caused by more Potent missile forces and the resultant urgent interest 
in American assistance for missile defense systems.
  This Member urges his colleagues to read the entire Economist 
editorial on this important set of related developments.

                  [From the Economist, Feb. 20, 1999]

                            Causing Offence


 Talk about missile defences is a symptom of East Asia's tensions, not 
                               the cause

       Are America and China heading for another bust-up? The 
     ``strategic dialogue'' inaugurated by Presidents Bill Clinton 
     and Jiang Zemin has been shrilly interrupted, this time by 
     Chinese concern about America's discussions with Japan and 
     others of possible missile defences in East Asia, and by 
     American worries about Chinese missiles pointed at Taiwan 
     (see page 37). The row threatens to sour preparations for the 
     visit to America in April of China's prime minister, Zhu 
     Rongji. Handled sensibly, the missile tiff need not produce a 
     crisis. Yet it goes to the heart of what divides China from 
     America and most of its Asian neighbours: China's pursuit of 
     power by at times reckless means.
       China may never be a global power to rival America. It is, 
     however, an increasingly potent regional power, with 
     territorial scores to settle. It makes plain that it intends 
     to recover sovereignty over Taiwan, to extend jurisdiction 
     over almost all the rocks and reefs of the South China Sea, 
     and ultimately to displace America as East Asia's most 
     influential power.
       Until recently, events had seemed to be moving China's way. 
     Recognising China's extreme sensitivity on the Taiwan issue, 
     on a visit to China last year Mr. Clinton made clear that 
     America did not support independence for the island, despite 
     the protective arm America throws round it at times of 
     military tension with the mainland. Meanwhile China had 
     skilfully used the region's economic turmoil to reinforce its 
     claims in the South China Sea, blame rival Japan for not 
     doing enough to aid regional economic recovery and play on 
     sharp economic differences between America and Japan. Hence 
     China's fury that the question of missiles and missile 
     defences could blow a hole in these stratagems.
       The launch of a North Korean rocket over Japan last August 
     reminded the Japanese of the importance of their alliance 
     with America, and persuaded the government to set aside 
     China's objections and start discussions on missile defences. 
     Without such defences in a dangerous neighbourhood, America 
     had worried and China had calculated that pressure would 
     eventually grow in Congress to pull back the 100,000 or so 
     American troops in Japan and South Korea. China's reaction 
     has been all the shriller for knowing that any missile 
     defences eventually deployed to protect America's troops and 
     close allies from rogue North Korean missiles could be used 
     to help protect Taiwan from China.
       With its missile, North Korea was thumbing its nose as much 
     at China as at Japan and America. Yet the success of its 
     engineers owes at least something to past Chinese collusion. 
     North Korea felt it could take such missile liberties in part 
     because China has stoutly opposed all international pressure 
     on North Korea to curb its nuclear and missile activities.
       The Taiwanese had their reminder of the potential value of 
     missile defences three years ago, when it was China lobbing 
     missiles, these ones falling near the island's shipping lanes 
     in a crude effort to intimidate voters before Taiwan's first 
     democratic presidential election. China now has snazzier 
     missiles. Its belligerence drove Taiwan to seek better 
     defences, not, as China would have it, the other way around.
       There is still time to calm tensions over Taiwan, and still 
     time for the regional powers to talk over the problems raised 
     by any future (limited) missile defences. Yet these issues 
     give a new tilt to East Asia's uneasy balance of power. If 
     this tilt upsets China, it has mostly itself to blame.

     

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