[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 28 (Tuesday, February 23, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1793-S1794]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           CENSURE RESOLUTION

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the Senate has just discharged its duty 
under the Constitution to try the impeachment of President Clinton. We 
have rendered our judgment.
  We have been asked to consider another, albeit lesser, form of 
punishment of the President--a resolution of censure. That resolution 
is authored by the Senator from California, Mrs. Feinstein, and the 
Senator from Utah, Mr. Bennett. Senator Feinstein attempted to bring it 
before the Senate by way of a motion to suspend the rules in order to 
permit her motion to proceed. The Senator from Texas, Mr. Gramm, 
objected, and then moved to indefinitely postpone consideration of Mrs. 
Feinstein's motion. Since two-thirds of the Senate failed to vote in 
the negative, his point of order was sustained, and the motion to 
proceed failed.
  I did not support Senator Gramm's motion for the simple reason that I 
did not believe it appropriate to deny to Senator Feinstein and others 
the opportunity to bring before the Senate a resolution of censure 
following the conclusion of the impeachment trial of the President. Had 
this resolution or something similar to it--say, a proposal to make 
``findings of fact'' about the President's conduct--been offered during 
the impeachment trial, I would have strenuously opposed its 
consideration.
  In my view, such a proposal is not permitted by the Constitution when 
raised as part of an impeachment trial. The Constitution is clear on 
this point. Article I, Section 3 states that ``Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or 
Profit under the United States. . . .'' Our sole choice when trying an 
impeachment case is whether or not to convict and remove (and then 
disqualify from holding any further office) the individual in question. 
The Framers decided not to give Senators leeway to create additional 
judgment options--no matter how creative, convenient, or compelling 
they may be.
  Because Senator Feinstein's motion was made after the conclusion of 
the trial, during legislative session, I believed it was appropriate 
and timely for the Senate's consideration.

[[Page S1794]]

  That is not to say, however, that I would have supported the 
resolution had the motion to proceed carried. On the contrary, I would 
have opposed it--as I would have opposed each of the several proposed 
censure resolutions that have circulated in recent days. The President 
has acted in a manner worthy of censure. No one denies that.
  However, I have serious misgivings about a censure resolution 
emanating from this body and this body alone. I am concerned about what 
it may mean--not for this President, but for the institution of the 
presidency. I understand the passion to voice--loudly and 
unmistakably--disapproval of the President's conduct. But it must 
be tempered by an even greater passion for the office he holds, and for 
the constitutional balance of power between the executive and 
legislative branches of government.

  The Federalist Number 73 speaks of ``the propensity of the 
legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the 
powers, of the other departments.'' It warns of a presidency ``stripped 
of [its] authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a 
single vote.''
  My colleagues, we must qualify our understandable disdain for this 
president's conduct with the admonition to protect the office that he 
will occupy for a mere 23 months longer.
  Nowhere does the Constitution expressly permit us to take up such a 
resolution. Nor does it expressly prohibit such a step. Yet the Senate, 
and the Congress as a whole, has been remarkably restrained in even 
considering censure resolutions. It has been even more reluctant to 
adopt them. Only once, in 1834, was a president formally censured by 
resolution. Three years later, that resolution was expunged.
  The President at that time was Andrew Jackson. The driving force 
behind his censure was Henry Clay. Jackson had defeated Clay in the 
presidential election of 1832. In 1834, they remained bitter political 
adversaries.
  Jackson argued that the resolution was repugnant to the 
constitutional principle of checks and balances between the branches of 
government. If the Senate wanted to punish him, he said, it had only 
one avenue acceptable under the Constitution: it would have to wait for 
the House to send an impeachment.
  I am not convinced that a resolution censuring a president is 
unconstitutional. But I certainly agree that it is, at least in the 
context of the present case, unwise. There have been numerous instances 
where presidents behaved in a manner deemed outrageous and even 
dangerous to the country. Franklin Roosevelt was roundly criticized for 
his efforts to ``pack'' the Supreme Court. President Truman seized the 
steel mills. President Reagan and then-Vice President Bush presided 
over the executive branch while an illegal scheme, run out of the White 
House, was conducted to sell arms to Iran and use proceeds from those 
sales to support armed rebellion in Nicaragua. The behavior of these 
individuals arguably was at least as egregious as President Clinton's. 
But the Senate did not pursue a censure resolution against any of them.
  Ours is not a parliamentary system. In the United States, we do not 
entertain votes of ``no confidence'' against our chief executive. We 
elect presidents, not prime ministers.
  A censure resolution in the present instance will seem modest, 
perhaps even insignificant, in relation to the impeachment conducted by 
the House. However, future generations may well come to view censure as 
an American-made vote of ``no confidence'' against future occupants of 
the Oval Office. We may pave the way to a new form of executive 
punishment. And it may be used not only in cases of personal 
misconduct. It could be used against a president who simply makes an 
unpopular or unwise, but nevertheless lawful and well-intended, 
decision.
  Ultimately, we could subject future presidents, who have not been 
impeached, to this form of punishment. In doing so, we risk eroding the 
independence and authority of the presidency. I do not want to see the 
Senate take such a risk.

                          ____________________