[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 28 (Tuesday, February 23, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1775-S1790]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COUNTLESS FRIENDS MOURN VINEGAR BEND MIZELL
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, one doesn't lose a friend like Wilmer
Mizell without experiencing a deep and penetrating sadness. And, by the
way, Mr. President, my reference to ``Wilmer'' just now is one of the
few times I have ever called him that. Sure, that's the name on his
birth certificate; he was officially identified as Wilmer for the very
good reason that Wilmer is the name given him by his parents.
At least 95 percent of his thousands of friends knew him as ``Vinegar
Bend'', or sometimes as just ``Vinegar''. And everybody who knew him
loved him. (He was born in Vinegar Bend, Alabama, 68 years ago.)
Vinegar Bend died this past Sunday while visiting his wife's family
in Texas. He suffered a severe heart attack some weeks ago, but had
bounced back and was apparently feeling well until the fatal attack on
Sunday.
Vinegar Bend Mizell served three terms in the U.S. House of
Representatives from 1969 through 1974. His first wife, Nancy, was
exceedingly popular among Members of the House and Senate until her
death several years ago. He and his second wife, Ruth Cox Mizell, were
a devoted couple.
Mr. President, I have at hand a newspaper account regarding Vinegar
Bend's death. I ask unanimous consent that the article, published
Monday in The Greensboro (N.C.) News and Record, headed ``Former
Ballplayer; N.C. Congressman Mizell Dies at 68'' be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Greensboro (NC) News and Record, Feb. 22, 1999]
Former Ballplayer, N.C. Congressman Mizell dies at 68
(From Staff and Wire Reports)
Wilmer ``Vinegar Bend'' Mizell spent 10 years in the majors
and three terms in Congress.
High Point.--Former congressman and Major League Baseball
pitcher Wilmer ``Vinegar Bend'' Mizell died Sunday while
visiting his wife's family in Texas. He was 68.
Mizell, whose folksy, country-boy ways made him popular
with voters in central North Carolina and with baseball fans
in St. Louis and Pittsburgh, may have died from lingering
effects of a heart attack suffered last October while
attending a highs school football game, said his son, David
Mizell who is coach at High Point Andrews High School.
David Mizell's team was playing North Davidson in Welcome,
near the Midway community where Mizell has lived since the
early 1950s when he pitched for the minor league team in
Winston-Salem.
Mizell, after a 10-year career in the Major Leagues, became
a Davidson County commissioner and then served three terms in
Congress from the 5th Congressional District which included
Davidson and Forsyth counties. He was defeated in 1974 by
Democrat Stephen Neal, a year in which Republican candidates
nationwide suffered losses in the aftermath of the Watergate
scandal.
Mizell later held sub-cabinet posts in the Commerce and
Agricultural departments under President Ford and Reagan. For
Reagan, Mizell was the agricultural department's top lobbyist
in the halls of Congress.
Mizell was known for his flat-top haircut. His nickname
came from his hometown of Vinegar Bend, Ala. In the majors,
Mizell pitched for the St. Louis Cardinals from 1952 until
1960 when he was traded to the Pittsburgh Pirates. He helped
the Pirates win the National League pennant that year. Mizell
pitched a losing game in the World Series that followed.
He finished his career with the New York Mets in 1962. His
career record was 90 wins and 88 losses, with an earned run
average of 3.85.
Mizell died in Kerrville, Texas, while he and his second
wife, Ruth Cox Mizell, were visiting her family. Besides
Midway, the couple also had a home in Alexandria, Va., David
Mizell said.
Funeral services will be Thursday in Midway.
(Pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement of February 12, 1999,
pertaining to the impeachment proceedings, the following statements
were ordered to be printed in the Record:)
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, in just a few moments,
each of us will be called upon to do something that no one has done in
American history. We will be voting on two articles of impeachment
against an elected President of the United States.
Having listened carefully to nearly 50 of our colleagues who share my
point of view, it is both difficult and unnecessary to attempt to
reiterate the powerful logic and the extraordinary eloquence of many of
their presentations.
I share the view expressed by so many that this body must be guided
by two fundamental principles. I recognize that we are not all guided
by these principles, but I and others have been guided, first, by this
question: Has the prosecution provided evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt; and, second, if so, do the President's offenses rise to the
level of gravity laid out by our founders in the Constitution?
After listening to both sides of these arguments now for the past 5
weeks, I believe--I believe strongly--that the record shows that on
both principles the answer is no--no, the case has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and, no, even if it had been it would not
reach the impeachable level.
I also share the view expressed by many of my colleagues on the
process which brought us here: an investigation by an independent
counsel which exceeded the bounds of propriety; a decision by the
Supreme Court subjecting sitting Presidents to civil suits--it is my
prediction that every future President will be faced with legal trauma
as a result--a deeply flawed proceeding in the House Judiciary
Committee, which in an unprecedented fashion effectively relinquished
its obligation to independently weigh the case for impeachment; the
disappointing decision to deny Members of the Senate and the House the
opportunity to vote on a censure resolution, even though I believe it
would be supported by a majority in both Houses; and finally, the
bitterly partisan nature of all the actions taken by the House of
Representatives in handling this case.
But as deeply disappointed as I am with the process, it pales in
comparison to the disappointment I feel toward this President. Maybe it
is because I had such high expectations. Maybe it is because he holds
so many dreams and aspirations that I hold about our country. Maybe it
is because he is my friend. I have never been, nor ever expect to be,
so bitterly disappointed again.
Abraham Lincoln may have been right when he said, ``I would rather
have a full term in the Senate, a place in which I would feel more
consciously able to discharge the duties required, and where there is
more chance to make a reputation and less danger of losing it, than 4
years of the Presidency.''
Maybe it is because of my disappointment that I was all the more
determined to help give the Senate its chance to make a reputation, as
Lincoln put it, at this time in our Nation's history.
The Senate has served our country well these past 2 months. And I now
have no doubt that history will so record. There are clear reasons why
the Senate has succeeded in this historic challenge.
First is the manner in which the Chief Justice has presided over
these hearings. We owe him a big, big debt of gratitude. He has
presented his rulings with clarity and logic. He has tempered the long
hours and temporary confusion with a fine wit. In an exemplary fashion,
he has done his constitutional duty and has made it possible for us to
do ours.
The second reason is our majority leader. Perhaps more than anyone in
the Chamber, I can attest to his steadfast commitment to a trial
conducted with dignity and in the national interest. He has
demonstrated that differences--honest differences--on difficult issues
need not be dissent, and in that end the Senate can transcend those
differences and conclude a constitutional process that the country will
respect, and I do.
Third is our extraordinary staff--the Chaplain, my staff in
particular, Senator Lott's staff, the floor staff, the
Parliamentarians, the Sergeant at Arms, the Secretary of the Senate.
They have served us proudly. Their professionalism and the quality that
they have demonstrated each and every hour ought to make us all proud.
Finally, if we have been successful, it has been because of each of
you--your diligence, your deportment, your thoughtful arguments on
either side of these complex, vexing questions. This experience and
each of you--each of you--have made me deeply proud to be a Member of
the U.S. Senate.
Growing up in South Dakota, I learned so much, as many of us have,
from relatives and from the people in
[[Page S1776]]
my hometown, and my parents especially. Something my father admonished
me to do so many, many times in growing up is something I still
remember so vividly today. He said, ``Never do anything that you
wouldn't put your signature on.'' I thought of that twice during these
proceedings--once when we signed the oath right here, and again last
night when I signed the resolution for Scott Bates.
I will hear Scott Bates' voice when I hear my name called this
morning. My father passed away 2 years ago. He and Scott are watching
now. And I believe they will say that we have a right to put our
signature on this work, on what we have done in these past 5 weeks, for
with our votes today we can now turn our attention to the challenges
confronting our country tomorrow. And, as we do, I hope for one thing:
That we will soon see a new day in politics and political life, one
filled with the same comity and spirit that I feel in the room today,
one where good governance is truly good politics, one which encourages
renewed participation in our political system. It is a hope based upon
a fundamental belief which is now 210 years old, a belief that here in
this country with this Republic we have created something very, very
special, a belief so ably articulated by Thomas Paine as he wrote
``Common Sense.''
The sun will never shine on a cause of greater worth. This
is not the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a
kingdom, but of a continent. This is not the concern of the
day, a year, or an age.
Posterity is are virtually involved in the contest, and
will be more or less affected even to the end of time by the
proceedings now.
So it is as we cast our votes today and begin a new tomorrow.
Each of us understands that the decision we must make is the most
demanding assigned to us, as Senators, by the Constitution. The Framers
did not believe it a simple matter to remove a President. They did not
intend that it occur easily.
Only a certain class of offenses--treason, bribery and other high
crimes and misdemeanors--could justify the President's removal. Only a
supermajority--two-thirds of the Senate--could authorize it.
The Framers made as plain as they could that each Senator must judge,
on all the circumstances of the case, whether the facts support this
extraordinary remedy.
As I look at this case, I am compelled to consider it from beginning
to end--from the circumstances under which the House fashioned and
approved the articles, to the trial here in the Senate when the House
pressed its arguments for conviction. And I find a case troubled from
beginning to end--one marked by constitutional defects, inconsistencies
in presentation, surprising concessions by the Managers against their
own position, and even damage done to that position by their own
witnesses.
In short, the case I have seen is one that I do not believe can bear
the weight of the profound constitutional consequences it is meant to
carry.
Its constitutional defects began in the House.
Rather than initiating its own investigation, and making its own
findings, the House rested on the referral from Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr.
Never before has the House effectively relinquished its obligation to
independently weigh the case for impeachment.
But this time it did, relinquishing that obligation to Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr's 454-page referral became the factual record in the House.
The arguments he made in that referral served almost exclusively as the
basis for the articles prepared and voted by the House.
The House called no independent fact witness. The only witness was
Mr. Starr. And it is telling that Mr. Starr's own ethics adviser,
Professor Sam Dash, resigned his position with the Office of
Independent Counsel to protest the improper role played by Mr. Starr in
the impeachment process.
The House proceedings set a dangerous constitutional precedent, and
the decision to follow this course has reverberated throughout the
trial here in the Senate.
Because Mr. Starr carried the case in the House, the House did not
develop or explain its own case until the time came to prepare for
trial in the Senate. Those explanations, when they came, were replete
with inconsistencies--not technical or minor inconsistencies, but
rather inconsistencies that struck at the heart of their position.
On the one hand, the Managers charged the President with serious
crimes. Yet, they also argued that they should not be required to prove
``beyond a reasonable doubt'' that the President committed those
crimes--that they need not meet the standard that applies throughout
our criminal justice system.
On the one hand, the Managers acknowledged that the House rejected an
article based on President Clinton's deposition in the Jones case. Yet,
throughout their presentations, including their videotaped presentation
on February 6, they repeatedly relied on the President's statements in
that civil deposition.
On the one hand, the Managers insisted that the record received from
the House provided clear and irrefutable evidence of the President's
guilt. Yet, one Manager declared that reasonable people could differ on
the strength of the case, and another stated that he could not win a
conviction in court based on that record.
On the one hand, the Managers originally claimed a record so clear
that the House was not required to call a single fact witness--other
than Mr. Starr. Yet, in the Senate, they insisted that their case
depended vitally on witnesses.
In the end, the Senate authorized the deposition of witnesses, two of
whom--Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan--were central to the core allegations
of perjury and obstruction of justice. These were witnesses identified
by the House--witnesses the Managers expected to help support their
case.
This is not, however, how it turned out.
In the final blow to the case for removal brought by the Managers,
those very witnesses provided the Senate with clear and compelling
testimony--in the President's defense.
It cannot have escaped many of us that the defense showed more and
longer segments of this testimony than the Managers who sought these
witnesses in the first place.
What did Ms. Lewinsky say about the false affidavit she filed in the
Jones case? That she never discussed the contents with the President.
That she thought she might be able to file a truthful, but limited
affidavit and still avoid testifying. That she had reasons completely
independent from the President's for wanting to avoid testimony. That
the President did not ask her to lie or promise her a job for her
silence.
What did Ms. Lewinsky say about the return of the gifts given to her
by the President? That she raised with the President whether she should
turn the gifts over to Ms. Currie. That she recalls that the President
may have advised her to turn them all over to the Jones lawyers. That
she told an FBI agent of this advice, but it somehow was omitted from
the Independent Counsel's investigative report. That six days before
her White House meeting with the President, she had already made an
independent decision to withhold gifts from her own lawyer.
What did Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan say about the job search for Ms.
Lewinsky? That it was never connected to the preparation of her
affidavit, much less conditioned on her making any false statements to
a court.
What did Mr. Jordan say about any pressure placed on the companies he
contacted to hire Ms. Lewinsky? That he only recommended her. That two
companies he contacted would not hire her. That the third company,
which did hire her, did so on the strength of an interview in which she
made a strong personal impression--much like the one she made to the
Managers in their first meeting with her.
These witnesses--the House's witnesses--made it impossible, I
believe, for the Managers to sustain a case already weakened by a
defective House process, serious inconsistencies in their arguments,
and doubts about its merits that even some of the Managers themselves
candidly expressed.
Surely a case for removal of the President must be stronger.
Surely a case for conviction must be strong enough to unite the
Senate and the public behind the most momentous of constitutional
decisions.
[[Page S1777]]
Surely a case to remove the President from office must be strong
enough to meet the high standards established with such care by the
Constitution's framers.
In requiring that the Senate remove only for ``high'' crimes and
misdemeanors, the framers acted with care. As the House Judiciary
Committee stated in its Watergate report 25 years ago, ``[I]mpeachment
is a constitutional remedy addressed to serious offenses against the
system of government.'' Its purpose is to protect our constitutional
form of government, not to punish a President.
It is for this reason that the framers made clear that not all
offenses by a Chief Executive are ``high'' crimes--and that even a
President who may have violated the law, but not the Constitution,
remains subject to criminal and civil legal process after he or she
leaves office.
Whatever legal consequences may follow from this President's actions,
the case made by the House Managers does not satisfy the exacting
standard for removal.
For all of these reasons, I will vote to acquit on both articles.
This is my constitutional judgment about whether the Senate should
remove the President from office. My personal judgment of the
President's actions is something altogether different, reflecting my
values and those of South Dakotans and millions of Americans.
Like them, I am extraordinarily disappointed, and angered, by the
President's behavior. Since I have long considered the President a
friend, my own sense of betrayal could not run more deeply.
There is no question that the President's deplorable actions should
be condemned by the Senate.
I fervently hope that the Senate will do what the House would not--
permit the people's elected representatives to express themselves and
reflect their constituents' views on the President's conduct, for the
benefit of our generation and those still to come.
So let us proceed now to a vote and resolve this constitutional task
after these long and arduous months. Then the time will have come to
return to the urgent work of the country.
When we do, I believe that all of us--members of the majority and
members of the minority, however we choose to cast our votes--will be
able to agree on this:
That in 1999, 100 Senators acted as the Constitution required,
honoring their oath to do impartial justice and acting in the best
interests of this country they so dearly love.
Mr. BOND. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, I do not intend to give a
comprehensive statement, nor do I intend to use all of the time
allotted. But I feel it is very important to answer some of the points
that have been raised. And let me deal with just a few of those.
When I spoke to you in a previous session here, I mentioned the cover
story, and said that while the cover story was not impeachable--the
cover story which was admitted by counsel for the White House--it is a
framework and a context in which we judge other actions.
Objection has been made by my friends primarily on this side of the
aisle that on occasion we have cited evidence where the President may
not have been truthful, and we may have raised other arguments that go
beyond the boundaries of the articles of impeachment as grounds for
impeachment. Let me hasten to add that I hope that no one would vote
for a conviction on anything other than the items set forth in article
I and the items set forth in article II. If there are other activities
that may bear upon or indicate a pattern of conduct, that is one thing.
But we must make our decision on the basis of that which has been
presented to us by the House.
On the other side, we have heard some very spirited and enthusiastic
attacks on the independent counsel and on the House managers and even
on the Paula Jones case itself. Let me make just a few points.
No. 1, we threw Judge Alcee Hastings out of office as a judge for
lying in a grand jury proceeding where he was not convicted. The
objective is not to say that you can only commit perjury when a case is
won or someone is convicted.
No. 2, the independent counsel got into this because the attorney
general felt that there were grounds to pursue the potential violations
of law by the President in the Monica Lewinsky case. And a three-judge
court agreed, and the independent counsel was assigned to pursue this.
Whatever you may think about what the House did, or what the Paula
Jones attorneys did, or what the independent counsel did, that is not
the question before us. That can be addressed, as some of my colleagues
said, if there are investigations by the Department of Justice on
improper activities by the OIC. Let that proceed in its own realm. We
are here to judge on the evidence before us.
As I said, we have a cover story. We have a cover story that was
utilized regularly throughout by this President and by Monica Lewinsky.
Objection has been made that, while we have the clear testimony that
William Jefferson Clinton never said you should lie, he never said
expressly you should file a false affidavit. Well, of course, he
didn't. Of course, he didn't. He is a very sophisticated, very able
lawyer. And, if you are concocting a scheme to obstruct justice, you
don't tell somebody who is to be part of that scheme with you that you
should lie under oath, that you should file a false affidavit because
those people might just get called to testify under oath at some point,
as they were in this case. But Mr. Clinton didn't have to do that,
because Monica Lewinsky understood very clearly that she was to stay
with the cover story until she was told not to. She filed the false
affidavit that he sought. He and his counsel used it in the deposition.
Why was it filed? To keep him from having to testify truthfully in
the deposition. Was he surprised by it? I do not believe it has one
iota of credibility to say that after he went out and procured that
false affidavit, he didn't know that his attorney was going to use it,
and he was not going to rely on it. He got her to do the felonious deed
of filing a false affidavit so he could avoid the danger of having to
lie himself in a deposition.
Mr. Clinton didn't engage in a conspiracy with his lawyer, Mr.
Bennett. We hear about the one-man conspiracy. No. He foisted that on
his attorney. And Mr. Bennett, when he found out about the falsity of
that affidavit, had to do what no attorney ever wants to do--he had to
write a letter to the judge, and say, ``Disregard it. Disregard it. I
was part, inadvertently, of a scheme to defraud the court.'' And you
notice he is not in the case any longer. He could not be part of that.
We know that Mr. Clinton enlisted his loyal secretary to violate the
law to go pick up gifts, and she and Monica Lewinsky, once again,
committed felonies to continue the story to protect the President. And
the gifts wound up under Betty Currie's bed.
Mr. Clinton went to Betty Currie on a Sunday and 2 days later and
told her things that he hoped she would say before the grand jury. He
told his other subordinates things that he hoped they would say. He
even trashed her when it appeared that she might be a hostile witness.
Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I suggest to you that when you
have this clear-cut evidence of a scheme carried out with direct
evidence, testimony of Monica Lewinsky and others, Betty Currie and his
subordinates, an Audrain County jury would not have any trouble finding
him guilty of tampering with a witness or obstructing justice.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chief Justice and fellow Senators, I appreciate
this proceeding. And I appreciate the process we have gone through. I
hope my remarks will be in the spirit of deliberation, and that some of
what I say will be of value to you.
If there was a mistake made in this case, it is that we have treated
this more like a piece of legislation than a trial. It probably would
have been better to have just allowed the House to have a week or 8
days to present evidence and the other side present their evidence and
then vote and we would have been out of here. As it is, we have been
involved in the managing of it. And I have been impressed that together
we have somehow gotten through it in a way that I think I can defend.
It is marginal, but I think we have conducted a trial that I feel we
can defend.
[[Page S1778]]
The impeachment came from the House so we have to have a trial and a
vote, in my opinion. Judging on matters like this is not easy, but we
all have had to do it. Juries make decisions like this every day. The
President has to grant pardons and make appointments and remove
appointments. Senators have to vote on nominations and so forth. I have
had the adventure of appearing before Senators judging me on a previous
occasion. And now I am in this body and the other day the Chief Justice
declared that we were all a court, and I thought, ``My goodness, I am a
Federal judge and a Senator, how much better can life get than that?''
Now, someone suggested that this is a political trial. But the more
we make it like a real trial, the better off we are going to be and the
better the people are going to like it and the more they will respect
it. Our responsibility is to find the facts, apply the Constitution,
the law, and the Senate precedent to those facts. And precedent is
important. We should follow it unless we clearly articulate a reason to
change. Unless we do so we are failing in our duty. If we want to
change our precedent, we obviously have that power. But we don't come
at this with a blank slate since the 1700s and Federalist 65. We have
had a lot of impeachments since then, and this Senate has established
some precedent during that time. I think the dialogue between Madison
and Mason suggests a somewhat different view of things than Federalist
65, in the mind of many. But I would just say to you we have had
impeachment trials of Judges Claiborne, Nixon and Hastings since then.
That is our precedent, in recent years, about what we believe are our
laws and how they should be interpreted.
I would say this about the case. Others may see it differently. But
with regard to the obstruction article, I might have a bit of a quibble
with the way the case was presented. I think there was a lot of time
and effort spent on trees and not enough on the plain forest. Let me
just say to you why I believe the proof of obstruction of justice is so
compelling, beyond a reasonable doubt, to a moral certainty. And that
is, because the President received interrogatories, he got a subpoena
to a deposition, and he knew his day was coming. He knew he was going
to have to tell the truth or he was going to have to tell a lie, and it
wasn't going away.
He tried to avoid the day. He went all the way to the Supreme Court
to try to stop that case from going forward, and the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously ruled ``No, you don't get special privileges. You have to
go forward with the case.'' So, here he is having to do something. If
he states he did not have a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky,
if he files an answer to an interrogatory, which he did in December, in
which he flatout stated that he had never had sex with a State or
Federal employee in the last decade, that would be false. He filed such
a false answer to a lawful interrogatory.
Then he is at a deposition, and what happens at the deposition? His
attorney tries to keep him from being asked about Monica Lewinsky. They
produce her affidavit and the attorney says that the President has seen
that affidavit and had the opportunity to study it. The President
testifies later in that deposition: It is ``absolutely true.'' That is
when it all occurred, right there, and talking with Monica beforehand
was critical because if she didn't confirm the lie he was going to tell
he couldn't tell it. She wanted a job and the President got it for her.
If they didn't submit the Lewinsky affidavit, the President was going
to be asked those questions. If they talked about the gifts, the cat
was going to be out of the bag. It is just that simple. The wrong
occurred right there.
Then, when he left that deposition, he was worried. He called Betty
Currie that night, right after that deposition, the same day, because
he knew he had used her name and she was either going to have to back
him up or he was in big trouble. So, he coached her. That is what it is
all about. You can talk about the facts being anything you want to, but
that is the core of this case and it is plain and it is simple for
anybody to see who has eyes to see with, in my view. So I think that is
a strong case. The question is whether or not, if you believe that
happened, you want to remove him from office, and I would like to share
a few thoughts on that.
Having been a professional prosecutor for 12 years as U.S. attorney,
and I tried a lot of cases myself, I really have felt pain for Ken
Starr. I had occasion to briefly get to know him. I knew that his
reputation within the Department of Justice as Solicitor General was
unsurpassed. He was given a responsibility by the Attorney General of
the United States and a court panel to find out what the truth was. The
President lied, resisted, attacked him, attacked anybody Mr. Starr
dealt with, virtually, in seeking the truth. And Ken Starr gets blamed
for that, and then 7 months later we find out that the President was
lying all the time. He was lying all the time. And somehow this is Ken
Starr's fault that he pursued the matter? I am sure he suspicioned the
President was lying but it couldn't be proven until the dress appeared
and then we finally got something like the truth.
Now, one of the most thunderous statements made by counsel--I am
surprised it didn't make more news than it did--was the representation
by White House counsel that judges hold office on good behavior.
Those of you who fight tenaciously for the independence of the
judiciary, know that this is not the standard for removal of judges.
The courts have gone through it in some detail. Law reviews have been
written about it. Judge Harry T. Edwards, Court of Appeals for D.C.
Circuit, wrote in a Michigan law review that:
Under article II, a judge is subject to impeachment and
removal only upon conviction by the Senate of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
This is because he is a civil officer. The President, Vice President
and Judges are civil officers of the United States. There is only one
standard for impeachment.
The Constitution is a marvelous document. We respect it. To do so, we
must enforce it as it is written. It says that civil officers, judges
are removed for only those offenses. There are no distinctions between
the President and judges. Just because one official is elected and one
is not elected, one's term is shorter, or there are more judges than
Presidents--makes no difference--that is not what the Constitution
says. They face the same standard for impeachment.
I really believe we are making a serious legal mistake if we suggest
otherwise. If the standard is the same, then we have a problem, because
we removed a bunch of judges for perjury.
Of course, a President gets elected, but the President holds office
subject to the Constitution. One of the limitations on your office as
an elected official is don't commit a high crime or misdemeanor and if
you commit a high crime or misdemeanor, you are to be removed. I don't
think there is a lot of give in this, frankly.
With regard to precedent, precedent is important because it helps us
be objective, less political, less personal and do justice fairer. That
is what the Anglo-American common law is all about. Judges have
established precedent, and judges tend to follow that precedent unless
there is a strong reason not to. This is important for the rule of law.
Perjury and its twin, obstruction of justice, do amount to
impeachable crimes and our precedent in the Judge Nixon case proves
that. I believe we set a good standard in that case, finding that
perjury is a high crime, clearly, and we ought to stay with this
standard.
Some have argued that the House Judiciary Committee on the President
Nixon matter declared that tax evasion was not an impeachable offense
because it was not directly related to one of the President's duties. I
don't think that is clear at all. As a matter of fact, as I recall a
few House Members and minority Members signed a statement to that
effect. But let me ask you this, and think about this, if a minority on
the House Judiciary Committee voted on something, or Gerald Ford said
something when he was in the House about impeachment, such is not
precedent for the U.S. Senate. It is our precedent that counts. It is
the precedent established by Judge Hastings, Judge Nixon, and Judge
Claiborne that we ought to be concerned about.
[[Page S1779]]
I do not believe the Constitution says that the standard for removal
is whether somebody is a danger to the Republic's future. The
Constitution says if you commit bribery, treason, or other high crimes
or misdemeanors, you are out, unless there are some mitigating
circumstance somebody can find, but the test is not whether or not the
official is going to continue to do the crime in the future. What if it
is a one-time bribery that is never again going to happen. Mr. Ruff
advocated the ``danger'' standard, and it really disturbed me because
it is not in the Constitution.
If we were to reject the standard we use for judges for impeachment,
I do believe that would mean a lowering of our standards. We will not
be holding the President to the same standards we are holding the
judges in this country, and I don't think the Constitution justifies a
dual standard.
As a prosecutor who has been in the courtroom a lot, I am not as
cynical as some have suggested today about the law. I have been in
grand juries hundreds of times--thousands really. I have tried hundreds
of cases. I have seen witnesses personally. I have been with them
before they testified and have seen them agonize over their testimony.
I know people who file their tax returns and pay more taxes than they
want to, voluntarily, because they are men and women of integrity. I
have seen it in grand juries. I have seen people cry because they did
not want to tell the truth, but they told it. They filed motions to
object to testifying, but when it came right down to it, they told the
truth.
I believe truth is a serious thing. Truth is real and falsehood is
real. This is, in my view, a created universe and we have a moral order
and when we deny the truth we violate the moral order and bad things
happen. Truth is one of the highest ideals of Western civilization
commitment to it defines us as a people. As Senator Kyl said, you will
never have justice in a court of law if people don't tell the truth.
So this is a big deal with me. I have had that lecture with a lot of
people who were about to testify. I believe we ought not to dismiss
this lightly.
There was a poignant story about Dr. Battalino and her conviction for
lying about a one-time sex act and the losses she suffered. Let me tell
you this personal story, and I will finish.
I was U.S. attorney. The new police chief had come to Mobile. He was
a strong and aggressive leader from Detroit. He was an African-
American. He shook up the department, established community-based
policing, and caused a lot of controversy. A group of police officers
sued him. His driver, a young police officer, testified in a deposition
that the chief had asked him to bug other police officers illegally.
Not only that, he said, ``I've got a tape of the chief telling me to
bug.''
It leaked to the newspapers, all in the newspapers. They wanted to
fire the chief. The FBI was called because it is illegal to bug
somebody if there is not a consenting person in the room.
It is different with Linda Tripp. Let me just explain the law. If you
can remember and testify to what you hear in conversation, you can
record that conversation and play it later under law of virtually every
State in America. Maryland apparently is different.
Here, the driver's action would be illegal. Anyway, the young officer
finally, under pressure of the FBI, confessed. The lawsuit hadn't
ended. The civil suit was still going on. He went back and changed his
deposition and recanted. His lawyer came to me and said, ``Don't
prosecute him, Jeff. He's sorry. He finally told the truth. He went
back. The case wasn't over.''
We prosecuted him. I felt like he had disrupted the city, caused
great turmoil and violated his oath as a police officer, and that we
could not just ignore that. The case was prosecuted. He was convicted,
and it was affirmed on appeal.
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. Chief Justice and fellow colleagues, in the
Capitol's Mansfield Room where our Conference has met over the last few
weeks, there is a picture of our first president--George Washington--
who celebrates a birthday this Monday. I was reminded that, from
childhood through adulthood, George Washington carried around with him
a copy of the Rules of Civility. The rules could be seen as a roadmap
of how one should conduct himself or herself appropriately in society.
As the Senate began its course through uncharted waters, civility has
been our goal, if not our duty. We have done our best to work together,
to be respectful of each other's views and to do justice according to
the Constitution. Had we not started with this goal in mind, I fear the
debate would have quickly descended into rancor doing a disservice to
our Nation.
In the next few minutes, I want to explain how this trial unfolded
for me, as well as the rationale behind some of the votes I've cast,
including on the Articles of Impeachment.
When the historians write their accounts of the impeachment trial of
William Jefferson Clinton, I trust that, regardless of where one comes
down on the facts of the case, they will agree that the Senate did it
right. We conducted a trial that was fair to all sides, correct
according to the Constitution and expeditious in accordance with the
wishes of the American people. We also did our best to conduct our
deliberations on a bipartisan basis.
We began this process by taking a second and most solemn oath of
office: to do impartial justice. For me, as a Senator, I can think of
no more somber and important a constitutional duty than the one that
was given us. Our first task was to draft a blueprint of how we would
proceed in the trial. We met in closed session in the Old Senate
Chamber where the discussions were civil, respectful and frank on both
sides. In the end, it was Senator Gramm of Texas, joined by Senator
Kennedy of Massachusetts, two opposite sides of the political spectrum,
that led us to a unanimous bipartisan agreement on how to proceed. The
support of all 100 Senators was important because it opened the door to
a trial that was conducted in a professional and judicious manner and
without the discord that so many of the Washington wisemen had
predicted.
After hearing the opening arguments made by both sides, Senator
Robert Byrd offered a motion to dismiss the case against the President.
If successful, this would have been the first dismissal of an
impeachment trial in our Nation's history.
My vote against this dismissal motion was premised on my sworn
Constitutional obligation to hear the facts and evidence, and consider
the law before I rendered a decision on whether the Articles warranted
the President's conviction and removal from office. Indeed, this was
part of the oath we took--to do impartial justice. The Senate would not
have been able to render a fair and correct judgment on the Articles
without receiving and objectively assessing the wealth of evidence
presented by the House of Representatives and the White House. In
short, dismissal was premature and inappropriate.
Consistent with our duty to consider all the evidence fully, I
supported an effort to allow both the House Managers and the White
House the opportunity to depose a limited number of key witnesses to
resolve inconsistencies in testimony. After reviewing the depositions,
I supported a bipartisan motion to make all of this information--both
the videotapes and written transcripts--part of the permanent record so
that each and every American could examine the evidence and draw their
own conclusions. I also voted to allow both the House Managers and the
White House to use the videotaped deposition testimony on the floor of
the Senate.
Although I did support deposing a limited number of witnesses, I did
not support an attempt to allow Ms. Lewinsky to testify as a live
witness on the floor of the Senate. In my judgment, we provided the
House Managers a more than adequate opportunity to present their case:
allowing for witnesses to be deposed, for House Managers to ask any
questions necessary to resolve inconsistencies in testimony and to
allow any portion of these tapes to be used on the floor to argue the
case against the President. Consequently, I thought it inappropriate
and unnecessary for Ms. Lewinsky to testify on the Senate floor.
Seventy Senators felt similarly on this issue.
The presentation with videotaped excerpts, rather than live
witnesses, allowed both sides to make their arguments cogently. In my
opinion, witnesses questioned on the floor, under a time agreement,
would have made for a
[[Page S1780]]
more fragmented process--objections by counsel would have disrupted the
flow of presentations considerably. I believe that our decision to
exclude live witness testimony was appropriate, fair and improved the
nature of closing arguments.
It is the same sense of obligation and a desire to maintain decorum
that guided me in my vote to uphold the Senate's time-tested tradition
of deliberating impeachment trials in private. Opening the doors of the
Senate during these final deliberations would have been a tragic
mistake that would ignore years of precedent on this issue. For 2,600
years, since the ancient Athenian lawgiver Solon, trials have been open
and jury deliberations have been private. Throughout our own history in
every courthouse in America, we have open trials, we have public
evidence, we have public witnesses, but when the jury deliberates, it
meets in private. Jury deliberations are held in private for the
protection of all parties, and to ensure for a frank and open
discussion of the evidence.
Private jury deliberations have also been part of the Senate rules
for 130 years. Some argue that these rules are outdated and need to be
revised. However, in 1974 and 1986, when the Senate had an opportunity
to vote on changes to these rules, it chose to leave intact the
precedent that the deliberations should remain closed.
Our private deliberations have promoted civil discussion on this
grave matter of impeachment. Some of the most profound and thoughtful
statements I've heard have come during these private meetings--where
the absence of cameras has had the effect of turning politicians into
statesmen. These private deliberations set a tone of civility and
allowed the healing process to begin.
After hearing all evidence and deliberations, at the end, I voted for
both impeachment articles. Setting all the legal contortions aside, as
vote against the Articles, or to acquit, would be to ratify that there
are two sets of law in our country--one set for our citizens, and
another for the President of the United States. This is a conclusion I
could not reach or support. Therefore, my vote on both Articles says in
the simplest terms that no American is above the law and there must be
one law that applies to us all.
Today's outcome should be a surprise to no one. From the beginning,
our two parties approached this issue in fundamentally different ways.
While Democrats and Republicans agree that President Clinton committed
very serious offenses, the disagreement is over whether or not these
issues rise to the level that he should be removed from office. To some
extent, the die had been cast when the Democrat Party decided to rally
around the President. Like President Nixon's fate was sealed when his
party fell against him, President Clinton's presidency was secured by
his party's allegiance.
My hope is that no future Senate will ever be required to consider
Articles of Impeachment against the President of the United States.
But, if they do, I have every confidence that we have left behind an
appropriate roadmap for them to fulfill their constitutional
responsibilities. I am proud of the Senate and its Members. The Senate
should be proud of the way it has conducted itself: we have done our
jobs right by being fair to all parties, correct according to the
Constitution and expeditious in accordance with the wishes of the
American people.
In conclusion, I would like to thank the leaders on both sides. In
particular, I would like to single out Senator Lott for his
leadership--this has clearly been one of his finest hours as our
Majority Leader.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, Daniel
Webster once observed that a ``sense of duty pursues us ever. It is
omnipresent like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of
morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, duty performed or
duty violated is still with us. . . .'' The duty which has faced each
United States Senator is the obligation to do impartial justice in a
matter of significant historical import with lasting consequences for
our constitutional order--the consideration of the impeachment articles
against President William Jefferson Clinton.
Our duty calls on us to answer a serious question--whether the
President's actions warrant his removal from office. Fundamentally, in
arriving at our individual decisions, we must consider what is in the
best interests of the American people. The President engaged in
conduct, that even his defenders recognize, was reprehensible and
wrong. A bipartisan majority of the House also found that he committed
serious, impeachable crimes.
So, the test for the Senate must be to do what's in the best interest
of our nation. It is not a matter of what is easiest or cleanest. It is
a matter of what is in the immediate and long term national interest.
This has been, and it will continue to be, a subjective and difficult
standard and one which I will discuss in greater detail later in my
remarks.
First, however, I wish to speak on the Senate's procedural
responsibility when sitting as a Court of Impeachment, the
constitutional law concerning impeachable offenses, and the Articles of
Impeachment at issue in the present case; finally, I will conclude with
a discussion of whether--assuming the facts alleged have been proven--
the best interests of the country would be served by removing President
Clinton from office.
I. The Senate's Role
Let me begin by explaining what the role of the Senate is in the
impeachment process.
Simply put, the Senate's role in the impeachment process is to try
all impeachments. As Joseph Story wrote:
The power [to try impeachments] has been wisely deposited
with the Senate. . . . That of all the departments of the
government, `none will be found more suitable to exercise
this peculiar jurisdiction than the Senate.' . . . Precluded
from ever becoming accusers themselves, it is their duty not
to lend themselves to the animosities of party, or the
prejudices against individuals, which may sometimes
unconsciously induce'' the other body. In serving as the
tribunal for impeachments, we must strive to attain and
demonstrate impartiality, integrity, intelligence and
independence. If we fail to do so, the trial and our judgment
will be flawed.--Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, Section 386.
In short, impeachment trials require Senators to act, wherever
possible, with principled political neutrality. One question I have
repeatedly asked myself during this scandal--when faced with questions
concerning the interpretation of the relevant law, the process, the
calls for resignation, or forgiveness--has been whether I would have
taken the same position were this a Republican President. I have done
this throughout the past year I and expect many of my colleagues have
done the same.
In 1993, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of United States versus
Nixon that the process by which the Senate tries impeachments was
nonjusticiable. As a result of the Nixon decision, the Senate has a
heightened constitutional obligation in impeachment cases. As
constitutional scholar Michael Gerhardt notes in his 1996 book, The
Federal Impeachment process, ``Congress may make constitutional law--
that is, make judgments about the scope and meaning of its
constitutionally authorized impeachment function--subject to change
only if Congress later changes its mind or by constitutional amendment.
Thus, Nixon raised an issue about Congress's ability, in the absence of
judicial review, to make reasonably principled constitutional
decisions.''
I believe the Senate has conducted this trial in a fair manner and
that we have made principled constitutional decisions. I want to
commend my colleagues on both sides of the aisle--in particular the
Majority Leader, Trent Lott--for the impartial and proficient manner in
which we have conducted our constitutional obligation.
At the core of our deliberations was the tension between, on the one
hand, our shared interest in putting this matter behind us and getting
on with the Nation's business, and, on the other hand, our interest in
affording the President, and the weighty matter of impeachment, that
process which is due and fair. While there are decisions the Senate
reached with which I differed, I want to make clear my view that the
Senate has ably balanced these competing interests. A fair and full
trial that we were once told would take one year has been completed in
less than six weeks. The credit for this process rests with every
Member of the Senate, with the House Managers, counsel for the
President, and the Chief Justice.
[[Page S1781]]
ii. the impeachment standard
Of great concern to me is what the standard should be for impeachment
in this and future trials. The President's Counsel has argued that the
President can only be removed for constituting, what Oliver Wendell
Holmes termed in free speech cases, a ``clear and present danger.'' It
was contended that a President can only be removed if he is a danger to
the Constitution. As such, according to the President's Counsel,
removable conduct must relate to egregious conduct related to
performance in office. Even if the House's allegation--that President
Clinton committed acts of perjury and obstruction of justice is proven
true--it was argued--than such behavior does not rise to impeachable
offenses because it was private, not public, conduct. In this case an
inappropriate sexual relation with a subordinate employee--was the
predicate of the charged offenses.
But such a standard establishes an impossibly high bar as to render
impotent the impeachment clauses of the Constitution. I hope that no
matter the outcome of this trial, President Clinton's view of what
constitutes an impeachable offense does not become precedent. If it
does, I fear the moral framework of our Republic will be frayed. If it
does, the legitimacy of our institutions may very well become tattered.
It would create the paradox of being able to convict and jail an
official for committing, let's say, homicide, but not to be able to
remove that official from holding positions of public trust. Committing
crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury and obstruction of justice,
go to the very heart of qualification for public office.
The overwhelming consensus of both legal and historical scholars is
that the Constitution mandates the removal of the ``President, Vice
President, and all civil Officers of the United States''--which
includes federal judges--``upon impeachment by the House and conviction
by the Senate of ``treason, bribery or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.'' (U.S. Const. Art. II. Sec. 4). The precise meaning of
this latter clause is critical to the outcome of the impeachment trial.
The President's advocates agree with their critics that this standard
is the sole standard for presidential impeachment, but contend that the
``or other'' phrase indicates that grounds for impeachment must be
criminal in nature because treason and bribery are crimes or acts
committed against the state.
Such crimes or acts must be heinous, they contend, because the term
``crimes and misdemeanors'' is preceded by the descriptive adjective
``high'' in the impeachment clause. These advocates also claim that
there exists no proof of criminal wrongdoing, that we have evidence of
only a private affair unrelated to performance in public office, and
that abuse of power related to official conduct--not present here--is a
prerequisite for impeachment.
Many learned scholars oppose this view. Looking at the debates in the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, they note that the
Convention originally chose treason and bribery as the sole standard
for impeachment. George Mason argued that this standard was too
stringent and advocated that ``maladministration'' be added to the
list. James Madison objected, believing that no coherent definition of
``maladministration'' existed and that such a lenient standard would
make the President a pawn of the Senate. The Convention, as a result,
settled on the phrase ``treason, bribery or other high crime or
misdemeanor.'' It is clear that the phrase ``high crimes and
misdemeanors'' was considered by the Framers to have a more narrow and
specific meaning and, indeed, it is a term taken from English
precedent.
Accordingly, many scholars, including Raoul Berger, the dean of
impeachment scholars (Impeachment: the Constitutional Problems (1973)),
contend that the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' is a common
law term of art that reaches both private and public behavior. Treason
and bribery are acts that harm society in that they constitute a
corruption on the body politic. Consequently, ``other high crimes and
misdemeanors'' encompasses similar acts of corruption or betrayals of
trust, and need not constitute formal crimes. Indeed, Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 65 makes clear that impeachment is
political, not criminal, in nature and reaches conduct that goes to
reputation and character. In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
the term ``misdemeanor'' refers not to a petty crime, but to bad
demeanor.
History thus demonstrates that acts or conduct that demeans the
integrity of the office, or harms an individual's reputation in such a
way as to engender a lack of public confidence in the office holder or
the political system is an impeachable offense. Justice Joseph Story,
in his celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
Sec. 762 (1835), made this abundantly clear when he wrote that
impeachment lies for private behavior that harms the society or demeans
its institutions:
In the first place, the nature of the functions to be
performed: The offences, to which the power of impeachment
has been, and is ordinarily applied, as a remedy, are of a
political character. Not but that crimes of a strictly legal
character fall within the scope of the power, (for, as we
shall presently see, treason, bribery, and other high crimes
and misdemeanors are expressly within it;) but that it has a
more enlarged operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed,
political offenses, growing out of personal misconduct, or
gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the
public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political
office.
Even though the Framers rejected the English model of impeachment as
a form of punishment and promulgated removal as the remedy for
conviction, most scholars contend that the Framers looked to English
precedent to define ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' There is a wealth
of evidence that a betrayal of public trust or reckless conduct that
places a high office in disrepute constitutes ``high misdemeanors.''
The modifier ``high'' refers to acts against the state or commonwealth.
In the eighteenth century, the term ``political'' also encompassed our
modern term of ``social.'' So conduct that harmed society as a whole,
or denigrated the public respect and confidence in governmental
institutions, constituted ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
As such, both English and American officials have been impeached for
drunkenness, for frequenting prostitutes, even for insanity, in other
words private conduct that is unrelated to official acts. Such behavior
is seen as defaming the office that the accused held and diminishing
the people's faith in government. Impeachment is thus seen by many
scholars as a means of removing unqualified office holders.
Thus, impeachment and removal does not have to be predicated upon
commission of a crime. Consequently, impeachment and removal is not in
essentially a criminal punishment, a conclusion that is also textually
demonstrated by the fact that the Framers expressly provided for later
indictment and criminal conviction of an impeached and removed
President.
A high crime and misdeameanor--according to this view--does not have
to amount to a crime or be related to official conduct. Even if
President Clinton's acts of perjury were predicated upon lying about a
private sexual relation, they still must be considered high crimes and
misdemeanors. The fact that the underlying behavior was private in its
genesis is irrelevant. Such private acts demean the Office of the
President, and betray public trust. Those acts therefore are
impeachable.
But I must emphasize that even if the President's Counsel is correct
in that private acts unrelated to performance in office are not
impeachable offenses, I believe the gravamen of what President Clinton
committed are public, not private, acts that are unambiguous breaches
of public trust. Perjury and particularly obstruction of justice are
conduct that attack the very veracity of our justice system.
(Furthermore, I vehemently disagree that the underlying conduct was a
purely private concern because the conduct involved a federal employee
in a work environment).
Lying under oath, hiding evidence, and tampering with witnesses
destroy the truth-finding function of our investigatory and trial
system. Perjury and obstruction of justice are particularly pernicious
if committed by a President of the United States, who has sworn
pursuant to the oath of office to protect the Constitution and laws of
the United States. Whether perjury and obstruction of justice can be
considered private or public acts is of no moment.
[[Page S1782]]
They are twin ``high crimes'' harming the political order and requiring
impeachment and removal from office.
A related argument made by the President's Counsel is that a
President should be held to a less stringent standard than federal
judges in impeachment trials. Because many judges have been removed for
conduct unrelated to performance in office, such as Judges Clairborne
and Nixon, who were convicted and removed for perjurious statements
unrelated to their performance in office, the President is almost
compelled to make this argument.
In essence, The President's Counsel contend that Article III's
requirement that judges hold office for ``good behavior'' is not simply
a description of the term of office, but a grounds for impeachment if
violated. Presidents--and other civil officers--are subject to the more
stringent high crimes and misdemeanor standard.
Most scholars reject this view. For instance, Michael J. Gerhardt
(The Federal Impeachment Process (1996)) testified in the House
Constitutional Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in November that
the impeachment standard of high crimes and misdemeanors applies to all
civil officers, including judges as well as the President. This is the
sole constitutional ground for impeachment. Article III's good behavior
provision for judges simply sets the duration for judicial office
(lifetime unless impeached). There are simply no differing standards
for judges and the President.
iii. article one--perjury
Let me now turn to the facts of this case. The House alleges in
Article I that the President should be removed because he committed
acts of perjury. The House alleges in Article II that the President
should be removed because he obstructed and interfered with
the mechanisms and duly constituted processes of the justice system.
To demonstrate why I believe it is so, it is necessary to discuss
both the legal standards and how the facts meet the requirements of
those standards. I will first discuss perjury, and, next, turn to
obstruction of justice.
Article I of the Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton
In his conduct while President of the United States, William
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal
gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:
On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal
Grand Jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading
testimony to the grand jury.
I. Statements before the Grand Jury that constitute perjury
Overview
``Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to
any court or grand jury knowingly makes any false material declaration
. . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.'' See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a). In a prosecution for
perjury under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a), the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the declarant was under oath, (ii) the
testimony was given in a proceeding before a court of the United
States, (iii) the witness knowingly made, (iv) a false statement, and
(v) the testimony was material. United States v. Whimpy, 531 F.2d 768
(1976). The first two elements are not at issue here because it is
undisputed that President Clinton testified under oath before a Grand
Jury of the United States. As the discussion below reveals, the House
Managers proved the remaining elements of perjury beyond a reasonable
doubt for key aspects of President Clinton's Grand Jury testimony.
A. Statements to Betty Currie on January 18, 1998
President Clinton committed perjury before the Grand Jury when he
testified falsely concerning his motivation for making five statement
to Betty Currie. Hours after his deposition in the Jones case,
President Clinton called his secretary Betty Currie and asked her to
come to the White House the next day, January 18. See Currie 1/27/98 GJ
at 65-66. On that Sunday afternoon, the President made the following
five statements to Ms. Currie about Monica Lewinsky: (1) ``You were
always there when she was there, right?''; (2) ``We were never really
alone.''; (3) ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her,
right?''; (4) ``You can see and hear everything, right?''; and (5)
``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.'' Id. at 71-74.
President Clinton repeated these same questions and statements to Betty
Currie a few days later. See BC 1/27/98 GJ at 80-81. When he discussed
his deposition testimony regarding Ms. Lewinsky with Betty Currie on
these two occasions, President Clinton violated Judge Wright's strict
order prohibiting any discussion of the Jones deposition.
falsity
President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury when he testified about his
motivation for making these statements. When asked before the Grand
Jury about these statements to Betty Currie, the President testified
that he asked these ``series of questions'' in order to ``refresh [his]
memory about what the facts were.'' See WJC 8/17/98 GJ at 131. He
further testified that he wanted to ``know what Betty's memory was
about what she heard, what she could hear'' and that he was ``trying to
get as much information as quickly as I could * * * [a]nd I was trying
to figure [it] out * * * in a hurry because I knew something was up.''
See WJC 8/17/98 at 56. Immediately following extensive questioning on
this issue, a different prosecutor from the Office of Independent
Counsel asked the President that ``[i]f I understand your current line
of testimony, you are saying that your only interest in speaking with
Ms. Currie in the days after your deposition was to refresh your own
recollection.'' (Emphasis added.) See WJC 8/17/98 GJ at 141-142.
President Clinton answered: ``Yes.'' Id.
President Clinton's testimony that he was ``only'' trying to
``refresh [his] memory about what the facts were'' is perjury because a
person cannot ``refresh'' his memory with statements and questions that
he knows are false. Each of President Clinton's five statements to
Currie is either an outright lie or extremely misleading. President
Clinton knew the facts of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he
knew his statements to Betty Currie were false. By definition, these
false questions and statements could not have helped President Clinton
accurately refresh his memory.
In addition, Betty Currie could not possibly have known the answers
to some of these questions. For example, how could Betty Currie have
known whether the President ever ``touched'' Ms. Lewinsky or whether
Ms. Currie was ``always there when [Ms. Lewinsky] was there?'' Common
sense defies the President' explanation: if one is trying to refresh
his memory or gather information quickly, he does not ask questions of
a person to which the person could not know the answers. The fact that
Betty Currie could not have known the answers to these questions
further undermines President Clinton's testimony that he was trying to
refresh his memory or gather information quickly.
If the President was merely trying to refresh his recollection or
gather information quickly why did he repeat these questions and
statements to Currie a few days later? As the House Managers noted
during the trial, instead of asking a series of specific leading
questions, why didn't President Clinton ask Currie a general question
about what she recalled about Ms. Lewinsky's activity at the White
House? Moreover, President Clinton's blatant violation of Judge
Wright's order prohibiting any discussion of the Jones deposition casts
further doubt on his testimony on this issue. The President's testimony
regarding his motivation for these statements is false. He did not make
these statements to refresh his recollection. Rather, as the following
section explains, the President made these statements to Ms. Currie in
order to influence her potential testimony in the Jones suit and to
influence her possible responses to the media.
[[Page S1783]]
Knowingly
In a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant ``knowingly'' made the false statement. Under
this statute, ``knowingly'' means merely that the defendant made the
false statement ``voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of
mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' United States v.
Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Watson, 623
F.2d 1198, (7th Cir. 1980).
The President knowingly made these false statements about his
motivation for speaking to Betty Currie after his deposition. He did
not make these statements by ``mistake or accident or other innocent
reason.'' Rather, President Clinton lied about his motivation to
conceal his true purpose in making these statements to Currie. In
reality, President Clinton was attempting to corroborate his deceitful
testimony in the Jones deposition with a prospective witness. When he
made these statements to Currie, the President knew that she was a
likely witness in the Jones case because he repeatedly referred to
Currie when asked about Ms. Lewinsky by the Jones lawyers. See Clinton
1/17/98 Dep. at 58. President Clinton actually told the Jones lawyers
to ``ask Betty'' in response to one question in the deposition. Id. at
64-66. In fact, Betty Currie was subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers only
days after the President's deposition.
Moreover, in addition to influencing a prospective witness in the
Jones suit, the President had another motivation for coaching Ms.
Currie: She was a probable target of press inquiries about this
controversy. In fact, a prominent reporter from Newsweek had already
called Currie on January 15, 1998 and asked her about Ms. Lewinsky. See
Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 120-121. The President had a motive to influence
information Currie might give to the media--in addition to testimony
she might give as a witness in Jones versus Clinton. The President
knowingly made these statements to Ms. Currie in order to influence
both her potential testimony and her possible responses to the media.
Materiality
``Because the Grand Jury's function is investigative, materiality in
that context is broadly construed.'' United States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d
471 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have consistently held that in a Grand Jury,
``a false declaration is `material' within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.]
Sec. 1623 when it has a natural effect or tendency to influence, impede
or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation.'' United
States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994).
President Clinton's false statements to the Grand Jury regarding his
January conversations with Betty Currie are material to the Grand
Jury's investigation of obstruction of Justice. To determine whether
the President obstructed justice in the Jones case, it was critical for
the Grand Jury to ascertain whether President Clinton attempted to
influence the testimony of Currie, a potential witness in that case.
President Clinton's statements to Currie the day after his deposition
strongly indicate that he was seeking to influence her testimony. The
President's false statements about his motivation for making these
statements to Currie had the ``natural effect or tendency'' to ``impede
or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation'' of
obstruction of justice in the Jones case.
The President's Defense
In his trial brief, the President offers only a brief defense to this
perjury allegation. First, the President argues that ``Ms. Currie's
testimony supports the President's assertion that he was looking for
information as a result of his deposition'' when he made these
statements to Currie. See President's Trial Brief at 53. As discussed
earlier, however, this is implausible. A person cannot accurately
gather information by making false or misleading statements to another
person.
Second, in his brief, the President refers to Currie's Grand Jury
testimony in which she testified that she felt no pressure to agree
with the President when he made these questions and statements. See
President's Trial Brief at 51-53. However, the fact that Ms. Currie
testified that she did not feel pressured is completely irrelevant to
whether the President committed perjury concerning these statements.
President Clinton's state of mind--not Ms. Currie's--is at issue here
because he is the one accused of perjury.
In sum, the House Managers proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
President Clinton (1) knowingly (2) lied about his motivation for
making these deceitful statements to Betty Currie (3) concerning a
material matter under investigation by the Grand Jury (4) while under
oath before a federal Grand Jury.
B. The nature and extent of the physical relationship with Lewinsky
Another example of perjury before the Grand Jury concerns President
Clinton's testimony that he did not engage in ``sexual relations'' with
Ms. Lewinsky even under his alleged understanding of the definition
used in the Jones case. Even under his purported interpretation of the
term, however, Clinton admitted to the Grand Jury that if the person
being deposed touched certain enumerated body parts of another person,
then that would constitute ``sexual relations.'' See WJC 8/17/98 at 95-
96. When asked if he denied engaging in such specific conduct, Clinton
answered ``[t]hat's correct.'' Id.
Falsity
President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury when he testified concerning
the nature and extent of the sexual relationship. First, human nature
and common sense strongly undermine President Clinton's testimony. It
is undisputed that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in
sexual activity on at least ten occasions over the course of 16 months.
President Clinton's testimony to the Grand Jury that he never touched
Ms. Lewinsky in certain areas with the intent to arouse is simply not
believable given the nature and extent of their contact.
In addition, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony directly contradicts the
President. She testified in detail repeatedly before the grand jury
about each of their sexual encounters. According to Ms. Lewinsky's
testimony, she and President Clinton engaged in conduct that
constituted ``sexual relations'' even under the President's purported
understanding of the term during 10 encounters. It is important to note
that Ms. Lewinsky's testimonty about the extent of their sexual conduct
occurred before the President's Grand Jury testimony made these precise
sexual details important. Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky's friends, family
members, and medical therapists corroborated her account by testifying
to the Grand Jury that Lewinsky made near-contemporaneous statements to
them that President Clinton fondled her in a variety of ways during
their encounters. Finally, the fact that President Clinton lied to the
American people about this tawdry affair badly undermines his
implausible testimony on this issue.
Knowingly
As mentioned earlier, in a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623,
the prosecution must prove that the defendant ``knowingly'' made the
false statement. Under this statute, ``knowingly'' means merely that
the defendant made the false statement ``voluntarily and intentionally,
and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.''
United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1998), United
States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980).
President Clinton knowingly made these false statements about the
nature and extent of his sexual relationship. He did not make these
statements by ``mistake or accident or other innocent reason.''
Instead, the President had a strong motive to lie about the extent of
the sexual contact in order to avoid being accused of perjury in the
Jones deposition. After Ms. Lewinsky's dress was discovered, President
Clinton could no longer deny a sexual affair. However, because he
repeatedly denied having ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the
Jones deposition, the President was trapped. As mentioned earlier, the
President was forced to admit that fondling Ms. Lewinsky in certain
ways would constitute ``sexual relations'' even under his purported
interpretation of the term. Consequently, President Clinton had to deny
such fondling before the Grand Jury to prevent an admission that he
committed perjury in his civil deposition, despite how implausible this
denial is. In summary, President Clinton committed perjury before the
Grand jury by insisting that his testimony in the Jones deposition on
this key matter was true.
[[Page S1784]]
Perhaps due to fear of being charged with perjury in the Jones
deposition, President Clinton committed the more serious offense of
perjury before a Grand Jury.
Materiality
As mentioned earlier, ``because the Grand Jury's function is
investigative, materiality in that context is broadly construed.''
United States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have
consistently held that in a Grand Jury, ``a false declaration is
`material' within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.] Sec. 1623 when it has a
natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the Grand
Jury from pursuing its investigation.'' United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d
751 (2d Cir. 1994).
The President's false statements about the extent of his sexual
conduct with Ms. Lewinsky are material to the Grand Jury's
investigation of whether the President committed perjury in the Jones
deposition. In an effort to determine whether President Clinton
testified truthfully in his deposition, the Office of Independent
Counsel questioned the President at length before the Grand Jury about
the nature and extent of his sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The
President's tortured definition of sexual relations makes these details
material to whether he committed perjury in the Jones deposition.
Simply put, if the President touched Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways, he
is guilty of perjury in the Jones deposition. Obviously, President
Clinton's false statements on this matter had the ``natural effect or
tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing
its investigation'' of perjury in the Jones deposition.
The President's Defense
In President Clinton's trial brief, the only rebuttal to his
allegation of perjury is that ``[t]his claim comes down to an oath
against an oath about immaterial details concerning an acknowledged
wrongful relationship.'' See Clinton Trial Brief at 44. Even this one
pithy sentence, however, is inaccurate. First, as the earlier
discussion reveals, there is more evidence than an oath against an
oath. Human nature and common sense badly undermine the President's
testimony. In addition, Ms. Lewinsky testified in detail repeatedly
before the Grand Jury about the extent of the sexual relationship,
while the President reverted to his prepared statement 19 times to
avoid answering specific sexual questions. Moreover, the testimony of
Ms. Lewinsky's family, friends, and medical therapists provide
additional evidence of the President's perjury. Finally, the fact that
President Clinton lied to the entire nation about this sordid affair--
and only acknowledged the affair when confronted with evidence of Ms.
Lewinsky's dress--devastates his credibility on this issue.
In sum, the House Managers provide beyond a reasonable doubt that
President Clinton (1) knowing (2) lied about the extent of his sexual
activity with Ms. Lewinsky (3) concerning a material matter under
investigation by the Grand Jury (4) while under oath before a federal
Grand Jury.
Other Lies before the Grand Jury
In addition, I have concluded that President Clinton lied in other
instances before the Grand Jury. While these lies might not sustain a
conviction for perjury in a court of law, they are profoundly troubling
nonetheless. For instance, it strongly appears that President Clinton
lied to the Grand Jury when he testified that he did not believe
certain acts that he and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in were covered by any of
the terms and definitions used in the Jones suite. The following
definition of ``Sexual Relations'' was used at the Jones deposition:
For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in
`sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in or
causes contact with . . . [certain enumerated body parts] of
any person with the intent to arouse . . .'' (Emphasis
added.)
Amazingly, President Clinton testified to the Grand Jury that he does
not believe and did not believe at the Jones deposition that this
definition includes certain acts which I will not specify. Without
addressing these lurid details, Clinton interprets ``any person'' to
mean ``any other person'' under the definition. There is no legal basis
for him to interpret the definition in this manner.
I do not believe that President Clinton can reasonably claim this
interpretation. First, under the President's interpretation, one person
can engage in sexual relations, while his or her partner in the same
activity is not engaged in sexual relations. Obviously, this is an
implausible and absurd conclusion. Second, no reasonable person would
have understood the definition in the Jones suit not to encompass the
particular activity that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in.
It is important to remember that the underlying allegation in the Jones
suit concerned the same particular acts involved in the Lewinsky
affair. Why would the Jones' lawyers use a definition that did not
include the very conduct alleged by their client? Given this context,
the President's testimony that he did not believe the definition
included certain conduct is not believable.
Finally, the President had a clear motive to lie about his
understanding of the definition of sexual relations. After Ms.
Lewinsky's dress was discovered, the President could no longer deny his
sexual affair. However, the President repeatedly denied having ``sexual
relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones deposition. President
Clinton's absurd interpretation of the definition of sexual relations
allowed him to admit to a sexual relationship--which he had to do given
the dress--without simultaneously admitting to perjury in the Jones
deposition. Because perjury is such a difficult crime to prove, I have
concluded that the President might not be convicted in a court of law
for perjury concerning his testimony on this issue. I am convinced,
however, that President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury about this
matter. While this testimony might not generate a conviction in a court
of law, it was clearly contrived and is profoundly troubling.
IV. Article Two--Obstruction of Justice
Let me now turn to the facts of the second article of impeachment
alleging obstruction of justice. Article Two alleges that:
In his conduct while President of the United States,
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his oath
faithfully to execute the office of President of the United
States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in
violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and
impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end
engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents,
in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede,
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony
related to a Federal civil rights action brought against him
in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.
In order to determine whether the President has engaged in the type
of acts charged, it is important that the law be first addressed in
order to guide us in understanding how the facts relate to the
violations alleged.
A. The Law of Obstruction of Justice:
1. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503:
The Federal obstruction of justice statute punishes ``[w]hoever . . .
corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.'' 18
U.S.C.A. Sec. 1503(a). Known as the ``omnibus clause,'' Sec. 1503(a)
``clearly forbids all corrupt endeavors to obstruct or impede the due
administration of justice,'' United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968,
976 (5th Cir. 1989), which is defined as ``the performance of acts
required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as a
witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.'' United States
v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977). The statute has
alternatively been interpreted as forbidding ``interferences with . . .
judicial procedure'' and aiming ``to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.'' United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1398 (11th Cir.
1984).
``There are three core elements that the government must establish to
prove a violation of the omnibus clause of section 1503: (1) there must
be a pending judicial proceeding; (2) the defendant must have knowledge
or notice of the pending proceeding; and (3) the defendant must have
acted corruptly with the specific intent to obstruct or impede the
proceeding in its due administration of justice.'' United States v.
Williams, 874 F2d 968, 976 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord United States v.
Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 437 (4th Cir. 1993) (adding the word ``influence''
to the terms ``obstruct or impede'' in the intent element).
[[Page S1785]]
The purpose of the statute, according to the Supreme Court is not
directed at the success of the corruptive effort, ``but at the
`endeavor' to do so.'' United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143
(1921) (opining that the word ``endeavor'' was used instead of
``attempt'' in order to avoid the technical distinctions between
attempts, which are punishable, and preparation for attempts, which are
not). See also United States v. Aguilar 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995)
(holding that while the endeavor must have the `natural and probable
effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice, the
defendant's actions need not be successful, citing Russell).
2. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512.
The statute criminalizing witness tampering prohibits, inter alia,
the use or attempted use of corrupt persuasion or misleading conduct
with the intent of influencing delaying, or preventing testimony in an
official proceeding, causing a person to withhold testimony or
documentary evidence, alter or destroy physical evidence, evade legal
process, or be absent from an official proceeding to which such person
has been legally summoned. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b). ``To sustain its
burden of proof for the crime of tampering with a witness . . . the
Government must prove . . . that the [d]efendant knowingly, corruptly
persuaded or attempted to corruptly persuade . . . a witness; and
second, that the [d]efendant . . . did so intending to influence the
testimony of [that witness] at the [g]rand [j]ury proceeding.'' United
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452-453 (2d Cir. 1996).
The witness tampering statute's prohibition of corruptly persuading
someone with intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of
any person in an official proceeding,'' has been interpreted to mean
exhorting a person to violate his legal duty to testify truthfully in
court. United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(rejecting defendant's argument that a simple request to testify
falsely was outside the scope of Sec. 1512(b)), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct.
1279 (1997). As the Second Circuit explained: ``Section 1512(b) does
not prohibit all persuasion but only that which is `corrupt.' The
inclusion of the qualifying term `corrupt' means that the government
must prove that the defendant's attempts to persuade were motivated by
an improper purpose to . . . . A prohibition against corrupt acts `is
clearly limited to . . . constitutionally unprotected and purportedly
illicit activity.' United States v. Thompson 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir.
1996) (quoting United States v. Jeter, 775 F2d 670, 679 (6th Cir.
1985)).
Apart from corrupt persuasion with intent to influence a person's
testimony, Sec. 1512(b) proscribes engaging in misleading conduct with
intent to influence such testimony. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b)(1). As one
court described it, ``[t]he most obvious example of a section 1512
violation may be the situation where a defendant tells a potential
witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the
witness believe the story and testify to it before the grand jury.
United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1986).
Some courts have interpreted conduct that was not misleading to the
person at whom it was directed, even if it was intended to misled the
government, as outside the scope of Sec. 1512. See e.g. United States
v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237-238 (2d Cir. 1985). However, the Rodolitz
court distinguished the facts in King, where there was insufficient
evidence that the witness was actually misled, from the situation where
the declarant makes false statements to a witness who is ignorant of
their falsity. See Rodolitz, 786 F2d at 81-82 (``In giving the
statutory language its fair meaning, the court must find that making
false statements to convince another to lie falls squarely within the
definition of `engaging in misleading conduct toward another person'
under section 1512.'').
The witness tampering statute explicitly states that ``an official
proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of
the offense.'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(e)(1). However, courts have implied
some state of mind element. E.g. United States v. Kelly, 36 F.3d 1118,
1128 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (``It therefore follows that Sec. 1512 does not
require explicit proof of [defendant's] knowledge . . . that such
proceedings were pending or were about to be instituted. . . . The
statute only requires that the jury be able reasonably to infer from
the circumstances that [defendant], fearing that a grand jury
proceeding had been or might be instituted, corruptly persuaded persons
with the intent to influcence their possible testimony in such a
proceeding.'')
B. The Facts Related to Obstruction of Justice.
1. Subparts (1) and (2) of Article II:
In Subpart (1) of Article II, it is averred that:
On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly
encouraged a witness in a federal civil action brought against him to
execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be
perjurious, false and misleading.
Subpart (2) alleges that:
On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly
encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against
him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when
called to testify personally in that proceeding.
Subparts (1) and (2) are flip sides of the same coin. In essence, the
two subparts charge that the President's 2:30 a.m. phone call to Ms.
Lewinsky on December 17, 1997, informing her of her presence on a
witness list in the Jones case was designed to encourage her to provide
a false affidavit in the case to avoid testifying, or failing that,
that she give false testimony hiding the true nature of their
relationship. What does the evidence show?
It should be recalled that the presence of Ms. Lewinsky's name on the
Jones witness list first came to the attention of the President no
later than December 17, 1997. See WJC 8/17/98 at 83-84. He was
certainly aware of the true nature of their relationship, and it can be
inferred that he knew that knowledge of the existence of that
relationship would be detrimental to his case. It is also known that a
cover story had been developed earlier to hide the relationship from
others that included the false representation that Ms. Lewinsky's
visits to the oval office were for the purpose of bringing the
President papers or to visit Ms. Currie. See WJC 8/17/98 at 83-84.
Ms. Lewinsky testified that in the same 2:30 a.m. conversation in
which he informed her of the presence of her name on the witness list,
the President told her that she could always say she was bringing him
papers or visiting Ms. Currie, consistent with their previous cover
series. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1219. Ms. Lewinsky and the
attorneys for the President have argued that since Ms. Lewinsky did in
fact ``see'' Ms. Currie on those visits to the President and since she
was ``carrying'' papers, that story was not untruthful and therefore
could not have been designed to obstruct justice. However, that
rationale defies logic and common sense.
In the first place, the purpose of the visits was not to see Ms.
Currie. Secondly, the papers she carried were just props, not to be
handed over to the President, but to falsely characterized as papers
for the President if questioned. Therefore, were she to testify in a
deposition that the purpose of her trips to the Oval Office to visit
the President were actually to deliver papers or visit Ms. Currie,
those would be false representations. The creation of a cover story
followed by actions consistent with that cover story do not make the
story any more truthful. Therefore, the President's instruction to her
to rely on the cover story is in fact an instruction to her to lie.
Other evidence supports this conclusion, not the least of which is
the affidavit filed by Ms. Lewinsky in the case after those discussions
with the President took place, an affidavit she herself later testified
as being false. How else could she have characterized it? In that
affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she ``never had a sexual
relationship with the President.'' This was false. She swore that
``[t]he occasions I saw the President after I left my employment at the
White House in April, 1996, were official receiptions, formal functions
or events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was
working at the time. There were other people present on those
occasions.'' This statement too was false. She also averred that ``I do
not possess any information that could possibly be relevant to the
allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to admissible evidence in this
case.'' Once again, this statement
[[Page S1786]]
was false, as the President was aware, since he knew of the gifts he
had given to Ms. Lewinsky. See WJC 8/17/98 at 32-35.
The President repeatedly said that he thought that Ms. Lewinsky
``could,'' and he emphasizes the word ``could,'' have been able to
draft a narrow truthful affidavit. See WJC 8/17/98 at 69, 116-17. The
problem is that although she ``could'' have been able to draft such an
affidavit, the end product was not a truthful affidavit. Thus the
President's intentional failure to prevent his attorney from using that
false affidavit at his deposition provides further evidence of his
corrupt intention during the December 17, 1997, phone call to Ms.
Lewinsky.
Given these facts, the House has proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the President endeavored to corruptly influence the affidavit and
potential testimony of Ms. Lewinsky in his December 17, 1997, 2:30 a.m.
call to her.
2. Subpart (3) of Article II:
In Subpart (3), it is alleged that:
On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly
engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that
had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought against
him.
This allegation relates to the obstruction of justice by Ms. Lewinsky
and Ms. Currie in hiding gifts provided to Ms. Lewinsky by the
President under the bed of Ms. Currie. The only question that needs to
be answered here in whether the President participated in that effort.
What does the evidence show? By December 28, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky had
been subpoenaed to appear as a witness in the Jones case. In addition
to demanding her appearance to testify, the subpoena also required that
Ms. Lewinsky turn over any gifts given to her by the President. See ML
2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1221. Under the pretense of meeting with Ms.
Currie, Ms. Lewinsky went to the White House on Sunday, December 28,
1997, to discuss her subpoena with the President. Now at the time of
that visit, there is no indication that the President was aware that
particular items had been subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers from Ms.
Lewinsky. Without the benefit of that information, the President freely
gave Ms. Lewinsky a number of additional gifts. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong.
Rec. S1224. So when Ms. Lewinsky informed the President of that fact,
one can infer that he must have been at the very least, surprised, and
probably, somewhat troubled. When asked by Ms. Lewinsky at that meeting
whether she should hide the gifts or give them to someone else like Ms.
Currie for safekeeping, the President either failed to respond or said
he needed to think about it. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1224.
Ms. Lewinsky testified that she left the White House and later
received a phone call from Ms. Currie stating that she understood Ms.
Lewinsky had something for her, or, the President said you have
something for me. Ms. Lewinsky immediately understood that statement by
Ms. Currie to refer to the gifts from the President she had discussed
with him earlier in the day. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1225. She
then proceeded to gather up all those gifts. However, according to Ms.
Lewinsky, she unilaterally withheld some of those gifts from Ms. Currie
which were of sentimental value to her.
The President's first defense to this allegation is based upon a
minor discrepancy in Ms. Lewinsky's testimony concerning the time that
the gifts were retrieved by Ms. Currie. The argument is that if Ms.
Lewinsky was mistaken by one and one half hours in her recollection of
when the gifts were retrieved by Ms. Currie, then her recollection of
who initiated the retrieval is also suspect. See Statement of Cheryl
Mills 1/20/99 at Cong. Rec. S826-27.
This is a red herring. The timing itself is unimportant. What is
important is the fact that the call came from Ms. Currie. See ML 2/1/99
at Cong. Rec. S1225. Ms. Currie's cell phone records tend to support
the notion that Ms. Lewinsky's memory is accurate as to who called whom
about the gifts. After all, the only way that Ms. Currie would have
known about the gifts and made the call is if the other party to those
discussions, the President, apprised her of that conversation and asked
her to pick up the gifts.
The fall-back defense of the President is based upon the fact that he
had given her more gifts that same day, the idea being that his giving
other gifts to Ms. Lewinsky is inconsistent with a plan to hide those
gifts. See Statement of Cheryl Mills 1/20/99 at Cong. Rec. S827. This,
however, is belied by the fact that the President provided her with
those gifts before the issue of the gifts being subpoenaed came up in
their conversation that day. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1224. It is
reasonable to infer that the President's understanding of the gift
pickup was unrestricted. He expected Ms. Lewinsky to give all the gifts
to Ms. Currie for safekeeping, even the ones she had received that day.
The fact that Ms. Lewinsky kept some of the gifts does not change the
nature of the intended scheme.
The evidence adduced as to Subpart (3) shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged or supported
a scheme to conceal evidence in the Jones case.
3. Subpart (4) of Article II:
Subpart (4) makes the accusation that:
Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and
including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified and
succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a
Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a
time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been
harmful to him.
It is uncontroverted that Vernon Jordan did not actively seek to find
a job for Ms. Lewinsky until she was on the witness list in the Jones
case. Once she was on the witness list, she engaged in a high level job
search under the guidance of the President and reported his progress in
that regard directly to the President. See VJ 2/2/99 at Cong. Rec.
S1231-36. Moreover, he knew at the time of his job search that Ms.
Lewinsky was a potential witness in the Jones case and, according to
Ms. Lewinsky, was apprised by her of the sexual nature of her
relationship with the President. See ML 8/6/98 GJ at 138-39. And of
course, in that very same time frame, he procured for her an attorney
to help her file a false affidavit freeing her from testifying in the
case and to prepare that false affidavit in time for it to be used in
the President's deposition in the Jones case. See VJ 2/2/99 at Cong.
Rec. S1240-41.
One could speculate that the President's use of one of the most
powerful attorneys in Washington, and a close friend of the President,
to find a lowly Defense Department employee and former intern a
lucrative and prestigious job by contacting some of the most powerful
executives in the country was just an act of kindness unrelated to her
pending testimony in the Jones case. One could conclude that the
numerous calls made by Mr. Jordan to the President and Ms. Currie, the
calls made by the President to Mr. Jordan, and the calls made by Mr.
Carter to Mr. Jordan, calls which coincided with the effort to get Ms.
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and secure her a job, were simply
coincidental.
One could surmise that Mr. Jordan's call to Ronald Perelman after Ms.
Lewinsky felt she had a bad interview, which call led to a second
successful interview, was unrelated to her cooperation in signing the
affidavit only a day earlier. One could believe that Mr. Jordan had a
great interest in assisting Ms. Lewinsky to find a job prior to her
name showing up on the witness list in the Jones case and only failed
to do so because he had no time, but was somehow able to find and
devote substantial time to that effort, coincidentally, after her name
showed up on the witness list. One could undertake such speculation.
But that would defy common sense and reason.
The President became personally engaged in the effort to find Ms.
Lewinsky a job only after her name appeared on the Jones witness list.
He then used his powerful friend to find Ms. Lewinsky a job because he
believed out of gratitude for his help in obtaining a job, she would
continue to hide their relationship. He kept in constant direct contact
with Mr. Jordan up until the time that the affidavit was completed and
she had received and accepted a job offer from Revlon. Indeed, the
President actually spoke to Mr. Jordan during a meeting between her and
Mr. Jordan on December 19, 1997. See ML 8/6/98 GJ at 131. Mr. Jordan
immediately
[[Page S1787]]
called the President to report his fears the moment he thought Ms.
Lewinsky may have turned government witness when he learned Mr. Carter
had been relieved of his representation by her. See VJ 6/9/98 GJ at 45-
46.
One need only look at the contrary actions by the President once he
believed Ms. Lewinsky may have decided to cooperate with the
Independent Counsel investigation. Once he believed that she may have
been cooperating with the Office of the Independent Counsel, he began
to disparage her to aides like Sidney Blumenthal. See SB 2/3/99 at
Cong. Rec. S1248. After that date, the President discussed the wisdom
of destroying her credibility and reputation with Dick Morris. See DM
8/18/98 GJ at 35. Can anyone doubt that her favorable testimony was
tied into the President's efforts to conceal his relationship with her
and that the intensified job search was the President's endeavor to
keep her from telling the truth? Put another way, does anyone believe
that the President would have used Vernon Jordan to help get her a job
after she agreed to tell the truth to the Jones attorneys or to the
Independent Counsel? Of course not. It was not in the President's
interest to reward her for the truth--she was only rewarded for her
failure to tell the truth. Her reward for telling the truth was to be
smeared by the President and his spin machine.
The President's attorneys repeat the mantra that Ms. Lewinsky
believes that she was not promised a job for her false testimony in the
Jones case. But that really isn't the issue. The law requires an
endeavor to corruptly influence her testimony. Regardless of how Ms.
Lewinsky perceived or misperceived the reasons for the high level
assistance she received, there was no such misconception on the part of
the President and Mr. Jordan. The corrupt endeavor by the President was
confirmed by two powerful and compelling words that cannot be parsed or
stripped of meaning. Those two words summed up the month long effort to
protect the President: ``Mission Accomplished.'' There can be no other
meaning of those words in the context used by Mr. Jordan other than the
completion of a crucial and time sensitive task by him on behalf of the
President.
The proof as to subpart (4) is sustained beyond a reasonable doubt
that the President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job
assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought
against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of
that witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony
of that witness would have been harmful to him.
4. Subpart (5) of Article II:
Subpart (5) alleges that:
On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil rights
action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed
his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge
characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed
relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading statements were
subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that
judge.
There is no question that during the deposition of the President by
the Jones attorneys, the President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, made the
following statement.
. . . Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has
an affidavit which they are in possession of saying that
there is absolutely no sex of any kind, in any manner,
shape or form, with President Clinton . . .
Mr. BENNETT made this statement in an effort to cut off any
questioning of the President about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
That statement was false, as was later admitted by Mr. Bennett, even
given the contorted reading of the definition of sexual relations as
purportedly understood by the President. It is equally clear that the
President did not correct this assertion by his attorney.
The President's primary defense to this allegation is that he wasn't
paying attention to what was said by his attorney. This statement can
not be believed. The videotape of that deposition clearly shows the
eyes of the President shifting from person to person as each spoke or
argued their perspective on the issue. As each spoke, the President
focused on the speaker. It is ludicrous to assert that when the name
Monica Lewinsky was brought up, the President was not keenly aware of
the significance of that line of questioning.
The President's primary defense to this allegation is that he wasn't
paying attention to what was said by his attorney. This statement can
not be believed. The videotape of that deposition clearly shows the
eyes of the President shifting from person to person as each spoke or
argued their perspective on the issue. As each spoke, the President
focused on the speaker. It is ludicrous to assert that when the name
Monica Lewinsky was brought up. the President was not keenly aware of
the significance of that line of questioning.
He knew the work that had been done to get her affidavit completed
before the deposition. He understood the disclosure of that
relationship could do irreparable damage to his case and to his
Presidency. There is nothing to indicate he was anything less than
completely aware of what was said and of his failure to correct that
record to his detriment. I choose to believe my own eyes and common
sense, not the implausible explanation put forward by the attorneys for
the President.
The secondary defense offered by the President, that Mr. Bennett's
use of the word ``is'' precluded the necessity to reveal any sexual
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky not occurring, essentially, in that room
during the deposition, is not worthy of a detailed refutation or
response.
The evidence demonstrates that the President allowed his attorney to
make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing
an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the
judge, thus obstructing the administration of justice.
5. Subpart (6) of Article II:
In Subpart (6), the House makes the contention that:
On or about January 18, 1998, and January 20-21, 1998, William
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence
the testimony of that witness.
This allegation relates to the statements made to Ms. Currie by the
President in his unusual Sunday meeting with her after the Jones
deposition, and in his repetition of those statements the following
Tuesday or Wednesday after the Starr investigation had become public.
The President has not contested the fact that the statements made to
Ms. Currie were false and misleading. Nor has he provided any answer as
to why the statements, if designed to help refresh his recollection,
were false and had to be repeated to her again several days later.
After being confronted with the subpoena issued to Ms. Currie by the
Jones attorneys in the days after his deposition, and the revised
witness list containing her name, the President's attorneys have now
backed off the notion that no one could have thought Ms. Currie would
be a witness at the time of these statements. Despite this, the
President still asserts that those false and misleading statements were
designed to refresh his recollection and that he personally did not
believe that she would become a witness. Once again, this defense
defies credulity.
When these statements were made, the President was defying a court
order not to discuss his testimony. See WJC 1/17/98 DT at 212-13. He
knew it was essential to do so regardless of that order because he had
blatantly inserted Ms. Currie into the case as a fact witness. He
mentioned her name during his deposition no less than six times, on one
occasion even stating that the Jones attorneys would have to ``ask
Betty.'' See generally WJC 1/17/98 DT. Clearly, the Jones attorneys got
the message; they added Ms. Currie to the witness list and subpoenaed
her the following week. So did the President. Having ``brought'' her
into the case, the President realized the absolute need to make sure
her testimony would dovetail with his assertions that he had no
improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
It is apparent that the Sunday meeting was designed to corruptly
mislead Ms. Currie when she would be called as a witness in the Jones
case. What was left unanswered by the President, but for which there
can be but one answer,
[[Page S1788]]
was why the President repeated the false statements to Ms. Currie on
Tuesday or Wednesday.
The answer lies in the record. By Tuesday, the president had learned
that Judge Starr was investigating the case. See VJ 6/9/98 GJ at 55-74.
He knew that the evidence in the Jones case would lead Judge Starr to
Ms. Currie, just as surely as he knew it would lead the Jones attorneys
to her. So he had to reinforce the false statements he had told Ms.
Currie the previous Sunday because the stakes had just risen
substantially. The President needed to be sure he was covered by Ms.
Currie for both the Jones case and for the Independent Counsel
investigation to come.
Once again the evidence shows that the President related a false and
misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights action
brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order
to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness.
6. Subpart (7) of Article II:
The House asserts in Subpart (7) that:
On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton
made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a
Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading
information.
This subpart relates to the President's discussions with Erskine
Bowles, John Podesta and Sidney Blumenthal concerning the nature of his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Now the President does not deny the
testimony of Mr. Podesta where he related that the President said that
he had no sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, including oral sex.
Nor does he deny the testimony of Sidney Blumenthal that he
characterized Ms. Lewinsky as a stalker who had threatened him, and
whose seduction he had declined. The President also admits that he knew
it was likely they would be grand jury witnesses when he made those
statements to them.
Their client having conceded the basic facts of this allegation, the
President's attorneys first try to make the argument that the President
could not have been intending to influence the grand jury since he did
not tell his aides anything different than he had told any other person
publicly. However, the evidence is unrefuted that his denials to his
aides were fundamentally different from his public pronunciations in
that they departed from even his tortured definition of sexual
relations. Moreover, he created a false impression of Ms. Lewinsky in
order to besmirch her character and credibility in a blatant attempt to
both misguide the grand jurors, and it can be inferred by the fact such
information was provided to his communications aide, to publicly
disparage her character.
The second defense offered is that the President's attempts to keep
his aides our of the grand jury show he was not trying to corruptly
influence that body. However, this argument loses force in light of the
fact that only specious arguments were made to prevent their testimony.
Knowing they would fail, they were arguably designed to serve his
private interest in delaying the investigation and creating an
impression of Judge Starr as overreaching and out of control. Moreover,
the President had months to correct his misstatements to Mr. Blumenthal
prior to his grand jury testimony, but failed to do so even when he
knew he would be called before the grand jury to repeat the earlier
lies told to him by the President. See SB 2/3/99 at Cong. Rec. S1249.
In effect, the President killed two birds with one stone. His
chimeric fight to prevent his aides from testifying was used
effectively in a public relations campaign to impugn the Independent
Counsel investigation. And when he lost the ``battle'' that he knew
would inevitably fail, he was aware the false and slanderous testimony
preordained to be given by his aides would be of assistance to him in
misleading the grand jury.
There is substantial proof as to Subpart (7) that the President made
false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal
grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of
those witnesses.
For the reasons I have just outlined, the evidence proves beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the President is guilty of Article II.
v. why removal?
This impeachment trial is of momentous constitutional consequence. A
removal of the President--a coequal branch of government--must not be
taken lightly. But that--now that we have decided to end the trial by a
final vote--does not negate the duty that each Senator has, as
individual conscience dictates, to vote to acquit or convict based upon
the evidence. Posterity demands that each of us justify the votes
Senators render in the impeachment trial of the President.
Future generations of Americans will look to what we do as precedents
for impeachments. This is particularly true since our Nation has faced
only one impeachment trial of a President--that of Andrew Johnson in
1868. But it is also true for judges and other federal officials as
well. Let me thus explain in some detail why I shall vote for
conviction.
The Constitution vests great discretion in the Senate in determining
whether to remove an impeached official. The Framers intentionally
followed the English model where the House of Commons possessed the
power to impeach or indict officials and the House of Lords the
authority to try the impeached official. As such, the House of
Representatives was delegated the authority to impeach and the Senate
the power to try, convict, and remove. The Senate was chosen as the
repository of this awesome power because it was considered the more
mature chamber of Congress. Serving six year terms instead of the two
years for the House, the Senate was seen as a bulwark against the
shifting tides of public opinion.
The age qualification differences--30 for the Senate and 25 for the
House-- demonstrates that maturity in the Senate would dominate over
youthful passion. And most important, while the House was prone to
passionate factional rifts, because Representatives are elected from
small sometimes single-issue districts, Senators are elected state-wide
where, it was hoped, factions would counteract factions. Thus, the
Senate was designed to be more attuned to the public interest than to
the special interest.
Consequently, when the Senate sits as a court of impeachment, it does
not have to rubber-stamp the House's view as to what is an impeachable
offense. As recognized by the Supreme Court in the Nixon case, the
Senate was vested by the Framers with the sole power to try
impeachments. The Senate is thus vested with independent judgment as to
what process to employ in the trial.
It also follows that the Senate was granted the discretion to
determine whether the factual allegations made by the House are true
and whether such findings by the Senate rise to the level of high
crimes and misdemeanors. Furthermore, the Senate, as the Upper Chamber
insulated against popular passions and the factions of special
interests, could make a subjective determination of the public good in
defining high crimes and misdemeanors and in removing an official.
In the words of my esteemed colleague, Robert Byrd, the answer of
whether a person is fit to remain in office requires both detached
objectivity and subjective judgment rising above temporary popular
passions of whether continuation in office ``brings the political (or
judicial) system into disrepute and undermines the people's trust and
confidence in government.''
Supportive of this discretionary authority to remove officials--an
authority that must be divorced from the fleeting and flaming emotions
of the times--is the constitutional supermajority safeguard of a \2/3\
vote of the Senate needed to remove officials. This requirement is a
further guarantee against the tide of popular passion and tilts the
impeachment process towards acquittal.
Accordingly, a Senator in impeachment trials must consider two
factors: (1) whether the allegations are true; and (2) whether the
facts proven rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors--
impeachable offenses. In determining the second prong--whether the
facts proven rise to the level of
[[Page S1789]]
high crimes and misdemeanors--the subjective intent of Senators of what
is in the public interest is a factor to consider. I have already
discussed the facts and the standard for impeachable offenses. Now I
will discuss whether the public interest--in other words what is best
for the country--requires that the acts committed by President Clinton
rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors requiring his
removal.
I believe that it has. Some of my colleagues, particularly those on
the other side of the aisle, contend that it is not in the public
interest to remove President Clinton, because the economy is doing
well, or because of his foreign policy successes, or because he is
extremely popular in the polls. But these factors--no matter how
important--do not justify ignoring the constitutional mandate of
removal upon proving that impeachable acts were committed.
Polls should not be a factor in this trial. Our system of government
is not a pollocracy. It is a representative republic where the people,
as a constitutional matter, speak only through elections of their
representatives. America is thus a constitutional republic, and will
remain so ``if''--in the words of Benjamin Franklin--``you can keep
it.'' The only way to ``keep it'' is to respect the processes
established by the Constitution itself.
Simply put, the Constitution mandates the conviction and removal of
civil officers, including the President, upon proving ``treason,
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I believe that the
House Managers have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that President
Clinton has committed acts of perjury and obstruction of justice. I
believe that Senators should come to the same subjective determination,
as I have, that these acts of perjury and obstruction of justice so
erodes our civil and criminal justice system as to conclude that the
public good is served by removal.
A President of the United States is not simply a political leader. A
President is a head of state and a role model for Americans,
particularly our children. What kind of message will we send to our
posterity if President Clinton's conduct is not considered worthy of
removal? What amount of cynicism and disrespect for our governmental
institutions will we engender if we impose one set of rules for the
common man--imprisonment for acts of perjury and obstruction of
justice--and another for the President of the United States--who
receives a pass from removal because he is powerful or has done a
``good job'' in some eyes?
Our children are extremely vulnerable to the growing cynicism
surrounding this trial. We have all heard stories that some children
justify their deceits by claiming that the President of the United
States lied as well. Many wise philosophers have exclaimed that a
republic can survive only if its citizens are moral. I am afraid that
our children may not learn that lesson.
Not to remove here is to diminish the rule of law. As Manager Rogan
warned in his closing argument, ``[u]p until now, the idea that no
person is above the law has been unquestioned. And yet this standard is
not our inheritance automatically. Each generation of Americans
ultimately has to make the choice for themselves. Once again, it is
time for choosing. How will we respond?'' We should respond by
safeguarding the rule of law by voting to remove the President.
Whether President Clinton has done a ``good job'' is a matter of
partisan debate. In fact, adopting a ``god job'' exception--a term that
is so flexible and vague as to be meaningless as a constitutional
standard--merely exasperates the partisan tensions ever present in
impeachment trials.
The same analysis applies for the ``good economy means no removal''
theory. It is intuitive that economic growth can never justify crime or
acts rising to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors warranting
removal. If President Clinton is removed, our economy will not suffer.
The world will still spin on its axis. Our Constitution provides for
orderly succession and stable government. Removal will not overturn an
election, as some have argued. The constitutional impeachment
procedures were designed simply to remove unqualified or corrupt
officials. Vice President Gore, pursuant to the Constitution, will
become President and life will go on.
Let me emphasize that by requiring removal upon proving the
commission of impeachable offenses, the Framers believed that it is in
the public good to remove the official.
President Clinton is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors and his
poll numbers, no matter how lofty, cannot insulate him from the
dictates of the Constitution. The President believes that a rule of
polls should govern the Senate's decision. But as Manager Rogan
correctly observed, ``the personal popularity of any President pales
when weighed against the fundamental concept that forever distinguishes
us from every nation on the planet. No person is above the law. There
is no escaping the Senate's duty enshrined in the impeachment oath that
we do ``impartial justice'' and remove the President if we believe that
his actions amounted to high crimes and misdemeanors.
vi. conclusion
I do not take pleasure or gain any sense of gratification for the
decision I must make today. For literally months, night and day, I have
anguished over the serious accusations against President Clinton and
what they mean for our country, our society, and our children.
I know none of us enjoys sitting in judgment of the President, our
fellow human-being, but that is our job and we cannot ignore our
responsibility. I believe most of us will do a sincere job of trying to
fulfill our oath to do impartial justice.
I have diligently strived to extend my deepest respect to the
President--indeed, to the Presidency--throughout this process. I wanted
to be able to support President Clinton. I believe that I have been
more than fair. I have tried not to rush to judgment.
All of my life I've been taught to forgive and forget. I've always
tried to live up to that belief. As a leader in my church, I have dealt
with a great number of human frailties, people with a wide variety of
problems, and I've always believed that good people can repent of their
sins and be forgiven.
Indeed, to the dismay of some, I had expressed a hope and a desire
early on in this constitutional drama that the President would
acknowledge his untruthful statements. He chose to do otherwise and
perpetuated his untruthfulness. Although some believe this is solely a
private matter, I feel this is really about the President's fidelity to
the oath of office and the rule of law.
I have always been prepared to vote my conscience. Indeed, my
concerns regarding the bad precedent a likely acquittal would set have
been somewhat calmed by something the great constitutional scholar,
Joseph Story, once wrote about acquittal in impeachment cases. Mr.
Story noted that in cases in which two-thirds of the Senate is not
satisfied that a conviction is warranted, ``it would be far more
consonant to the notions of justice in a republic, that a guilty person
should escape than that an innocent person should become the victim of
injustice from popular odium * * * ''
Nonetheless, I am reminded of a quote by President Theodore
Roosevelt, a statement that applies to the matter before the Senate:
Honesty is not so much a credit as an absolute prerequisite
to efficient service to the public. Unless a man is honest,
we have no right to keep him in public life; it matters not
how brilliant his capacity * * *.
`Liar' is just as ugly a word as `thief,' because it
implies the presence of just as ugly a sin in one case as in
the other. If a man lies under oath or procures the lie of
another under oath, if he perjures himself or suborns
perjury, he is guilty under the statute law. Under the higher
law, under the great law of morality and righteousness, he is
precisely as guilty if, instead of lying in a court, he lies
in a newspaper or on the stump; and in all probability the
evil effects of his conduct are infinitely more widespread
and more pernicious.
President Theodore Roosevelt's words cannot be ignored--nor can the
Constitution. After weighing all of the evidence, listening to
witnesses, and asking questions, I have concluded that President
Clinton's actions warrant removal from office.
Committing crimes of moral turpitude such as perjury and obstruction
of justice go to the heart of qualification for public office. These
offenses were committed by the chief executive of our country, the
individual who swore to faithfully execute the laws of the United
States.
This great nation can tolerate a President who makes mistakes. But it
[[Page S1790]]
cannot tolerate one who makes a mistake and then breaks the law to
cover it up. Any other citizen would be prosecuted for these crimes.
But, President Clinton did more than just break the law. He broke his
oath of office and broke faith with the American people. Americans
should be able to rely on him to honor those values that have built and
sustained our country, the values we try to teach our children--
honesty, integrity, being forthright.
For 13 miserable months, we have struggled with the question of what
to do about President Clinton's actions. The struggle has divided the
nation.
To those of us who have ourselves taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution--which represents the rule of law and not of men--it
should not matter how brilliant or popular we feel the President is.
The Constitution is why we goven based on the principle of equality and
not emotion. The Constitution is what guides us as a nation of laws and
not personalities. The Constitution is what enables us to live in
freedom.
I will vote for conviction on both articles of impeachment--not
because I want to--but because I must. Upholding our Constitution--a
sacred document that Americans have fought and died for--is more
important than any one person, including the President of the United
States.
When all is said and done, I must fulfill my oath and do my duty. I
will vote ``Guilty'' on both Article One and Article Two.
____________________