[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 28 (Tuesday, February 23, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1771-S1773]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         USE OF FORCE IN KOSOVO

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I had intended to offer a joint 
resolution on the subject of the use of force in Kosovo for this bill, 
but events have overtaken this issue as the picture is now unfolding. I 
did want to put this joint resolution in the Record. I did want to talk 
about it for a few minutes. I discussed it with the distinguished 
chairman of the committee.
  The concern I have is on the repeated use of force that constitutes 
acts of war by the President of the United States without authorization 
by Congress, in violation of the constitutional provision that only the 
Congress of the United States has the authority to involve the United 
States in war.
  We have seen an erosion of the congressional authority in modern 
times on many, many occasions. Perhaps the strongest, sharpest example 
is the Korean war, a subject on which I have questioned nominees for 
the Supreme Court of the United States, trying to get a delineation on 
the power of the Commander in Chief under the Constitution, contrasted 
with the authority of Congress. But where we have had the air and 
missile strikes recently in Iraq, I raised the same question 
challenging or questioning the authority of the President. And as it 
has appeared in the past several days, there has been discussion of 
using force, air-strikes, perhaps missile strikes, in Kosovo, and it 
seems to me this is a matter that ought to be decided by the Congress.
  I do think there is a good bit to be said in support of the United 
States participating in the air-strikes in light of what has gone on 
there, and I shall not speak at any length. The issues are submitted in 
this joint resolution. I

[[Page S1772]]

would like to engage my colleague, the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia, as to his sentiments on this subject.
  Mr. WARNER. Senator, you and I came to this marvelous institution 
roughly two decades ago, give or take a year or so. We have witnessed 
on this floor spirited debates on the very issues that you raise, more 
or less circling around the War Powers Act legislation that followed 
the war in Vietnam and legislation which, in the judgment of many, is 
questionable to constitutional standing. I think it is time that we had 
another debate on this issue because it is very important.
  Mr. President, had we used force in Kosovo, it would have been the 
fourth time President Clinton has directed force against a sovereign 
nation. Now, I must say, in the course of the deliberations in 
Rambouillet, France, and prior thereto, I think the administration 
tried to take an almost unmanageable situation and do the best they 
could. Frankly, I am relieved that force at this moment is not to be 
used. I have not had the opportunity in the last 4 or 5 hours to get 
the latest situation, given that I have been on the floor managing this 
bill. But I believe the talks are at a virtual stalemate; am I not 
correct?
  Mr. SPECTER. I think the Senator is correct. It does not appear that 
the United Nations, with the United States' participation, will engage 
in strikes.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, Mr. President, I think it is timely that the Senate 
went back and, once again, as we did in years past, take a look at the 
War Powers Act, take a look at the proposal that the distinguished 
Senator from Pennsylvania has, not by way of criticism at the moment of 
the President, because you have two situations--one in Kosovo, and, of 
course, the parallel in Bosnia, and then you have Iraq.
  I have said from time to time, as we have had deliberations among 
ourselves in small groups, if anybody has a better idea how to manage 
it, come forward. They are the most complex situations that I have had 
in my tenure here in the Senate, and prior thereto in the Department of 
Defense, in terms of the complexity and the difficulty to resolve it.
  I would encourage the Senator, and I would be happy to participate in 
that debate at some future date.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Virginia for 
those comments. It was 8 years ago in early January--I believe January 
10--where we had a much publicized debate on this floor about the use 
of force in the gulf war. A number of the people who are on the floor 
today, the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Virginia, and I, 
participated in that debate with our distinguished then-colleague, 
Senator Nunn.
  I do believe, as I have said, there is much to recommend of U.S. 
participation in Kosovo. But I do not like to see further erosion of 
the congressional authority. I think too often the Congress stepped 
aside.
  About a year ago this time there was a key issue about the use of 
force against Iraq. We discussed it on the floor to some extent. We had 
a winter recess. By the time we got back, the issue had not matured. 
But force was used in Iraq in December. It was not authorized by the 
Congress. I think that the Congress ought to take a stand one way or 
another before force is used in accordance with the Constitutional 
provisions.
  In the interest of brevity, Mr. President, I send this joint 
resolution to the desk and ask that it be printed since it makes a 
fuller statement on this subject.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 12

       Whereas, Congress strongly supports the men and women of 
     our military forces;
       Whereas, bomber and missile strikes constitute acts of war;
       Whereas, only Congress has the Constitutional prerogative 
     to authorize war;
       Whereas, the unilateral Presidential authorization of 
     military strikes, however well-intentioned, undercuts that 
     power established clearly in the Constitution for Congress to 
     make such decisions;
       Whereas, the autonomy of Kosovo, a region in southern 
     Serbia, was abolished by the Serbian leader, Yugoslav 
     President, Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 and 1990;
       Whereas, conflict between ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and 
     Serbian police led by President Slobodan Milosevic has 
     resulted in over 2000 deaths since the end of February 1998 
     and has displaced nearly 400,000 people;
       Whereas, over one-third of Kosovo's villages and an 
     estimated 4,000 homes have been deliberately damaged or 
     destroyed;
       Whereas, the assault on the civilian population has been 
     reported to include atrocities which could be considered war 
     crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide;
       Whereas, the international community has spoken out 
     repeatedly against Serbian human rights abuses in Kosovo;
       Whereas, the instability in the Kosovo represents a 
     significant regional threat;
       Whereas, Yugoslav and Serbian officials, reportedly led by 
     Slobodan Milosevic, similarly instigated, organized and 
     directed aggressive action against civilians in Croatia in 
     1991, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995;
       Whereas, peace was only restored to the region of the 
     former Yugoslavia in 1995 when Yugoslav and Serbian 
     officials, including Slobodan Milosevic, were confronted with 
     the clear resolve of the international community to use force 
     against them;
       Whereas, on Jan. 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized 
     Secretary-General Solana to order air-strikes anywhere in 
     Yugoslavia, if a peace settlement was not accepted by the 
     deadline of February 20, 1999 and subsequently extended to 
     February 23, 1999;
       Whereas, the United States participation in NATO military 
     operations is important in maintaining the strength of the 
     NATO alliance generally;
       Whereas, Congressional support and cooperation with our 
     NATO allies will send an important signal of national resolve 
     that would strengthen the ability of the United States to 
     bring the two sides together toward a peace agreement in 
     Kosovo;
       Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America Congress assembled, That the 
     President is authorized to conduct air operations and missile 
     strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
     and Montenegro) for the purpose of bringing about a peaceful 
     resolution of the conflict in Kosovo.

  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the Senator departs, I think the 
Record should reflect that in connection with the action taken against 
Iraq in the fall, and then in connection with the proposed sending of 
ground troops as part of the NATO force and U.S. contingent of up to 
4,000, there was confrontation with leadership in the Senate and the 
House in both instances. I think there has been a level--whether it is 
up to the expectations of my colleagues, it is individually for them to 
say --a level of confrontation in both sequences. We must bear in mind 
that under the Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief. 
He has the right to direct the deployment of our Armed Forces in harm's 
way when he thinks hopefully it protects the vital security interests 
of the United States, and only under those situations because 
oftentimes the Congress has dispersed--it is in recess, and the like--
and those decisions have to be made quickly. Nevertheless, we have a 
coequal responsibility with the President regarding the welfare and the 
state of our men and women in uniform and the circumstances under which 
they are employed, particularly in harm's way.
  I commend the Senator.
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, by way of a very brief supplemental 
comment, it is true that the President has authority as Commander in 
Chief. When he exercises his authority in the deployment of some 4,000 
U.S. troops, it is another question. He has a stronger claim to do that 
under his power as Commander in Chief than he does to have air-strikes 
or missile strikes, in my opinion. Those air-strikes and missile 
strikes are acts of war. If he deploys U.S. troops, if they go into a 
hostile situation, that may trigger the War Powers Act, which is a 
little different consideration with the Constitutional provision which 
authorizes only the Congress to declare war. But I do think that we in 
the Congress do need to consider these issues, debate them, and make 
decisions about them. We have the authority by restraining spending in 
the Department of Defense to stop the deployment of troops. I am not 
saying we should do it, but I think there is too much of a tendency on 
the part of Congress to sit back and not to make these kind of tough 
decisions. If things go wrong, there is always the President to blame. 
If things go right, we haven't impeded Presidential action.
  But these raise very, very serious Constitutional issues. There is a 
continuing erosion. Before the President

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uses force, we have a chance to intervene. If it is an emergency 
situation, that is different; he has to act as Commander in Chief.
  But we have had ample opportunity to consider this Kosovo issue. And 
it is on the back burner now. But if it reappears, I will reactivate my 
resolution.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I again commend our colleague. I thank him 
for recalling the history of the 1991 debate. I recall it well because 
I was one of the floor managers. It was legislation that I had drawn up 
in accordance with the directions of Senator Dole, then-leader. We had 
a vigorous debate for some 3 days, and it is interesting. There we had 
in place a half million men and women in the Armed Forces. We had seen 
the most atrocious form of aggression by Saddam Hussein down through 
the gulf region, primarily Kuwait. Yet, that debate took 3 days. And by 
only a mere margin of five votes did the Senate of the United States 
express its approval for the President of the United States, in the 
role as Commander in Chief, to use force in that situation.
  I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague.

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