[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 28 (Tuesday, February 23, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E250-E252]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT--WHY WE NEED TO STAY THE COURSE

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. IKE SKELTON

                              of missouri

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 23, 1999

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, on January 27, 1999, I had the privilege to 
address all of America's National Guard Adjutants General here in 
Washington. I spoke about the need for America to stay engaged in the 
world. My speech to that group is set forth as follows:

        International Engagement--Why We Need to Stay the Course

       It has been more than ten years since the fall of 1988, 
     when the communist government of Poland agreed, under great 
     popular pressure, to permit free elections--elections which 
     ultimately led to the ``velvet revolution'' throughout 
     Eastern Europe. It has been nine years since the historic 
     fall of 1989, when the border between Hungary and Western 
     Europe opened, and thousands of East Europeans first swept 
     aside the Iron Curtain and then brought it crashing down. It 
     has been eight years since the two Germanies agreed to 
     reunification, and seven years since the Soviet Union 
     disintegrated.
       For the United States, the events of a decade ago were the 
     beginning of the end of long struggle--a struggle that was 
     characterized by terrible sacrifices in Korea and Vietnam; by 
     periods of great national confidence and occasional episodes 
     of uncertainty; by debates in the halls of Congress that were 
     sometimes historic and solemn and sometimes partisan and 
     shrill; and, above all, by a widely shared sense of national 
     purpose that endured despite occasionally bitter internal 
     divisions.
       The constancy with which the United States carried out its 
     global responsibilities over the long course of the Cold War 
     is a great testimony to the character of the American people 
     and to the quality of the leaders who guided the nation 
     through often trying times. In spite of the costs, in the 
     face of great uncertainties, and despite grave distractions, 
     our nation showed the ability to persevere. In doing so, we 
     answered the great question about America that Winston 
     Churchill once famously posed--``Will you stay the course?'' 
     he asked, ``Will you stay the course?'' The answer is, we 
     did.
       Today, I think we need to raise a similar question once 
     again, but this time for ourselves and in a somewhat 
     different form. Churchill's question, ``Will you stay the 
     course?'' implied that there might some day be an end to the 
     struggle, as there was, indeed, to the Cold War, though no 
     one foresaw when and how it would come. Today the key 
     question is perhaps more challenging, because it is more 
     open-ended. It is ``Will we stay engaged?''
       The term ``engagement,'' to be sure, has not yet captured 
     as broad a range of support among political leaders and the 
     public as those who coined it, early in the Clinton 
     Administration, evidently hope it would. But neither did the 
     notion of ``containment'' capture broad public support until 
     several years after it was articulated during the Truman 
     Administration. Indeed, some political leaders who later 
     championed containment as the linchpin of our security 
     initially criticized the notion as too passive and even 
     timid.
       ``Engagement,'' while not yet widely embraced as a 
     characterization of our basic global posture, seems to me to 
     express quite well what we need to be about today--that we 
     need to be engaged in the world, and that we need to be 
     engaged with other nations in building and maintaining a 
     stable international security system.
       Engagement will not be easy to sustain. Indeed, as has 
     become clear in recent years, it will be as challenging to 
     the United States to remain fully engaged today as it was to 
     stay the course during the Cold War.
       We now know much more about the shape of today's era than 
     we did eight or four or even two years ago.
       We know that we have not reached the end of history.
       We know that we face challenges to our security that in 
     some ways are more daunting than those we faced during the 
     Cold War.
       We know that it will often be difficult to reach domestic 
     agreement on foreign affairs because legitimate, deeply held 
     values will often be hard to reconcile.
       We know that we will have to risk grave dangers and pay a 
     price to carry out our responsibilities, and because of the 
     costs, it will sometimes be tempting to think that we would 
     be more secure if we were more insulated from turmoil abroad.
       We know that we will have to struggle mightily not to allow 
     domestic travails to divert us from the tasks that we must 
     consistently pursue.
       But we also know that our political system, which 
     encourages open debate, and which constantly challenges 
     leaders to rise to the demands of the times, gives us the 
     opportunity, if we are thoughtful and serious about our 
     responsibilities, to see where our interests lie and to 
     pursue our values effectively.

[[Page E251]]

       Today I want to say a few things about engagement in the 
     world--why it may sometimes be difficult to sustain; why it 
     is nonetheless necessary; and, finally, how it has succeeded 
     in bolstering our security.


                      Why Engagement is Difficult

       Engagement is difficult, first of all, because it entails 
     costs and carries risks. Provocations by Saddam Hussein and 
     terrorist attacks in Africa will not be the end of our 
     struggle. In an age of chemical, biological, and nuclear 
     weapons of mass destruction, the United States faces 
     particularly grave dangers in its conflict with these forces. 
     To quail in the face of these risks would, I think, be far 
     more damaging to our security than to confront them--but we 
     should not underestimate the dangers we face.
       Engagement is also difficult because it requires us to make 
     policy choices in which values we hold dear are troubling to 
     reconcile. The debates in Congress over policy toward China 
     illustrate this point forcefully. All of us find China's 
     human rights abuses to be abhorrent. For my part, I believe 
     that U.S. security interests are well served when we stand up 
     for human rights. Tyranny has crumbled all over the globe in 
     large part because of our active commitment to human rights 
     and because we hold out an example of freedom that millions 
     all over the world hope to emulate.
       On the other hand, a policy of isolating China would be 
     self-defeating. The United States and China have interests in 
     common--stability in Asia; preventing war in Korea; and 
     halting weapons proliferation, to name just a few.
       Constructive engagement with China, therefore, requires 
     that we reconcile our deeply held convictions about what is 
     right with our national interests.
       Engagement with long-standing allies may also be turbulent 
     at times. Many, if not most, of our allies have not, for 
     example, wholeheartedly supported our efforts to enforce 
     sanctions on nations that we believe guilty of sponsoring 
     international terrorism or that we see as threats to the 
     peace.
       A related difficulty of engagement is what might be called 
     the paradox of burdensharing--getting the allies to do more 
     often requires that we do more as well. Engagement is 
     difficult, therefore, because it means that we will sometimes 
     become embroiled in undertakings overseas that, on the face 
     of it, cost us more than our immediate interests appear to 
     justify. The obvious example is Bosnia. The reason we must, 
     nonetheless, be engaged, is that our overarching interest in 
     building effective security cooperation with our allies 
     requires that we exercise leadership.
       Engagement is also difficult for domestic political 
     reasons. To be blunt, no one gets elected by promising to 
     devote a great deal of time and attention to foreign affairs. 
     Those in positions of responsibility must make compromises, 
     choose between alternatives that are often bad and less bad, 
     take risks to get things done, and bear the criticism when 
     initiatives fail.
       Finally, engagement is difficult because it is financially 
     expensive. In recent years, it has been difficult to find the 
     resources to meet obvious needs in defense and foreign 
     affairs because of pressures to reduce the budget deficit. 
     Now that the deficit has been brought under control, a part 
     of the discussion of budget priorities ought to be how to 
     restore a reasonable level of investment in meeting our 
     international security requirements.


                      Why Engagement is Necessary

       Despite these difficulties, I believe that there is no 
     alternative to continued, active U.S. engagement in the 
     world. We persevered in the Cold War precisely because we 
     felt it our responsibility as a nation to defend against 
     tyranny. In the name of that moral mission, we may sometimes 
     have asked too much of ourselves, and particularly of our 
     young sons and daughters in the military--but it was 
     nonetheless a goal worthy of our people.
       Now we have a very different moral responsibility before 
     us, which may be somewhat more difficult to express, but 
     which I think is equally important. As I see it, our 
     responsibility now is to use our unchallenged position of 
     global leadership in a fashion that will make the universal 
     hope for peace, prosperity, and freedom as much as possible 
     into the norm of international behavior. If the United States 
     were not to try, at least, to use our current position of 
     strength to help construct an era of relative peace and 
     stability, it would be a moral failure of historic magnitude. 
     More than that, to fail to exercise our strength in a fashion 
     that builds global cooperation would also, in the long run, 
     leave us weaker and more vulnerable to dangers from abroad.
       We need to be engaged because only the United States can 
     provide the leadership necessary to respond to global and 
     regional challenges to stability and only the United States 
     can foster the growth of regional security structures that 
     will prevent future challenges from arising.
       We need to be engaged because our continued presence gives 
     other nations confidence in our power and in our reliability 
     and makes us the ally of choice if and when conflicts arise.
       We need to be engaged because only by actively shaping 
     effective regional security systems can we create an 
     environment in which nations that might otherwise challenge 
     stability will instead perceive a community of interests with 
     the United States and with our regional allies.
       We need to be engaged because only by recognizing and 
     responding to the security concerns of other nations can we 
     export them to support our security interests and concerns.
       We need to be engaged because cooperation from other 
     nations is essential to deter and defeat enemies who want to 
     undermine global order.
       Not everyone agrees on the necessity for engagement. Some 
     traditional champions of a strong national defense still 
     complain that the demands of engagement appear to divert 
     attention away from our real national security interests. 
     Engagement, they argue, embroils us in regional conflicts 
     that seem remote. It appears to put too much emphasis on 
     peacekeeping or humanitarian missions that are costly and 
     that are not obviously directly related to the overriding 
     responsibility of U.S. military forces--to prepare for 
     major conflicts.
       For others, who believe the world ought to be more peaceful 
     and less militarized since the end of the Cold War, 
     engagement has seemed to require too much U.S. military 
     involvement in distant parts of the globe. It appears to 
     justify military and other ties with regimes that are 
     distasteful or worse. It seems to emphasize security matters 
     at the expense of other interests--such as human rights, fair 
     trade practices, or environmental protection. It appears to 
     some, even, to be a questionable rationale for continued high 
     military spending in a world with no direct, obvious threats.
       In my opinion, those who see themselves as proponents of a 
     strong national defense and as advocates of assertive 
     American power should reconsider their position in view of 
     the compelling evidence that engagement is essential to our 
     military security. Similarly, those who believe that 
     conflicts can be prevented by promoting multilateral 
     cooperation should understand that military engagement abroad 
     is essential to build and enforce a more peaceful, 
     cooperative world order in which our other interests and 
     values can flourish.
       Two points must be made--first, it is a fact that smaller-
     scale operations demand more resources than military planners 
     had assumed. The answer is not to forswear such operations, 
     which I don't believe we can do, but rather to acknowledge 
     the resource demands and meet those requirements. Second, it 
     is important to be selective in making commitments and in 
     using the military--above all, we need to ensure a balance 
     between the interests we have at stake and the commitments we 
     are making.
       Effective international engagement requires much more 
     active and extensive U.S. military involvement abroad than 
     many expected. In the wake of the Cold War, we decided to 
     maintain a permanent military presence of about 100,000 
     troops both in Europe and in Asia. These deployments, in 
     retrospect, hardly appear excessive. On the contrary, our 
     forces in Europe, if anything, have been badly overworked. 
     They have been involved in countless joint exercises with old 
     and new allies and with former enemies that have been 
     critically important in building a new, cooperative security 
     order in Europe.
       Engagement has also entailed a constant, rotational 
     presence in the Persian Gulf--a commitment which, we now 
     should recognize, is on a par with the commitments we have 
     maintained in Europe and the Far East. It has involved 
     military intervention in Haiti, an ongoing peacekeeping 
     operation in Bosnia, and literally dozens of smaller-scale 
     military operations. One thing should be clear--as long as we 
     are actively engaged abroad, the pace of military operations 
     is likely to be much more demanding than any of us had 
     imagined a few years ago.
       As you know better than anyone, engagement on this level 
     would not be possible without our Reserve Component Forces. 
     As part of our ``Total Force'' concept, the Guard and Reserve 
     are indispensable to U.S. military operations. Just look at 
     the role our Reserve Component Forces have played in Bosnia. 
     Since December 1995, over 16,000 Guard and Reserve personnel 
     have supported Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Joint 
     Guard, and now Operation Joint Forge from bases in Bosnia, 
     Croatia, the U.S., Hungary, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in 
     Europe. Reservists have performed combat and combat support 
     missions including artillery fire support, civil affairs, 
     logistics, public affairs, medical support, and other 
     critical functions.
       Since the end of the Cold War, significant reductions in 
     the size of U.S. Active Forces has resulted in an increased 
     reliance on Reserve Component Forces. Today, 54 percent of 
     the U.S. Army is in the Reserve Component. Our Guard and 
     Reserve are essential to the success of nearly every military 
     operation during peace and war. Changing a stereotype is 
     sometimes difficult, but let me try: You are no longer the 
     ``Weekend Warriors'', you are the ``Seven-Day-a-Week, 365-
     Day-a-Year Warriors''. I, for one, appreciate what you do for 
     our nation. You, and those who serve under you, have my 
     respect and admiration.


                        Engagement Has Succeeded

       The final point I want to make--and perhaps the most 
     important thing we need to keep in mind--is that the U.S. 
     policy of engagement has been a success. Yes, we have 
     suffered some failures. No, we have not accomplished 
     everything we might have hoped. Yes, we have made some 
     mistakes. But failures, shortcomings, and mistakes are 
     inevitable in international affairs--there has

[[Page E252]]

     never been a government in history that has not run into such 
     difficulties.
       Engagement is as centrally important to our security--and 
     to the prospects for peace in the world--as containment was 
     during the Cold War. Perhaps above all, the key issue is 
     whether we will persist despite the fact that the struggle to 
     maintain relative international peace will never be 
     concluded. This is not a struggle we can see through to the 
     end--it is, nonetheless, an effort that we as a nation must 
     continue to make.

     

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