[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 26 (Friday, February 12, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1669-S1671]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                                [ERRATA]

  The statement of the Senator from Maine [Ms. Snowe], delivered in 
closed session while the Senate was sitting as a Court of Impeachment, 
was inadvertently omitted from the Record of Friday, February 12, 1999. 
The permanent Record will be changed to reflect the following:

                          ____________________



   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished colleagues, let me begin 
by expressing my appreciation to the Chief Justice for his wisdom, for 
his infinite patience, and for conferring upon this body the judicial 
temperament envisioned by the Framers.
  I would also like to commend both the Senate majority and minority 
leaders for upholding the dignity of this body, by preserving 
judiciousness and fairness, and maintaining bipartisanship and 
civility.
  Colleagues, we have arrived at a juncture in our public lives that 
will largely define our place before the judgment of history, and I 
think it will be said that justice and the Constitution were well 
served.
  Indeed, the consequences of our decision are manifest in the words of 
Alexander Hamilton, who wrote of ``the awful discretion which a court 
of impeachment must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the 
most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the 
community.''
  Those words should weigh heavily upon us. But while the gravity of 
our task is humbling, the genius of our Constitution is ennobling; for 
we deliberate not under the imposing shadow cast by the exceptional men 
who framed this Nation, but in the illuminating light of their wisdom.
  Impeachment was designed by the Framers to be a circuitbreaker to 
protect the Republic, when ``checks and balances'' would not contain 
the darker vagaries of human nature. Impeachment empowers the Senate--
under the most extraordinary of circumstances--to step outside its 
legislative role, reach into the executive branch, and remove a 
popularly elected President.
  Impeachment was not, however, devised as an adjunct or independent 
arm of prosecution. It is not for the U.S. Senate to find solely 
whether the President committed statutory violations.
  Rather, we have a larger question--whether there is evidence that 
persuades us, in my view beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
President's offenses constitute high crimes and misdemeanors that 
require his removal.
  Here is the precise point of our challenge--to give particular 
meaning to the elusive phrase, ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' This 
task is critical, because impeachment is not so much a definition, as 
it is a judgment in a particular case--a judgment based not upon an 
exact or universal moral standard--but upon a contemporary and 
historical assessment of interest and need.
  ``High crimes and misdemeanors'' speak to offenses that go to the 
heart of matters of governance, social authority, and institutional 
power--offenses that, in Hamilton's words, ``relate chiefly to injuries 
done immediately to the society itself.''
  And these crimes must be of such magnitude that the American people 
need protection, not by the traditional means of civil or criminal 
law--but by the extraordinary act of removing their duly elected 
President.
  For removal is not intended simply to be a remedy; it is intended to 
be the remedy. The only remedy by which the people--whose core 
interests are meaningfully threatened by the President's conduct--can 
be effectively protected.
  This, to me, is what President Woodrow Wilson meant when he referred 
to ``nothing short of the grossest offenses against the plain law of 
the land.'' This, to me, is what Framer George Mason meant when he 
emphasized ``great and dangerous offenses.''
  So in determining whether this President has committed a ``great and 
dangerous offense'' requiring removal, we must first weigh all of the 
credible evidence to identify which acts were actually committed. Then, 
we must assess the gravity or degree of the misconduct. This process 
requires that we review the acts from their origin, and the 
circumstances in their totality.
  The allegations in article I do not paint a pretty picture. Indeed, 
we are all struggling with having to reconcile the President's lowly 
conduct with the Constitution's high standards. And we should all be 
concerned with the minimal threshold that he has set, and the poor 
example he has created for leadership in this country.
  The President himself admits he gave evasive and incomplete 
testimony. He admits he worked hard to evade the truth. He admits he 
misled advisers, Congress, and the Nation. And he looked all of America 
in the eye--wagging his finger in mock moral indignation when he did 
it.
  The fact is, the truth is not our servant. The truth does not exist 
to be summoned only when expedient. And I find his attempts to contort 
the truth profoundly disturbing. A President should inspire our most 
noble aspirations. Unfortunately, he has fueled our darkest cynicisms.
  And I resent the ordeal he has put this country through--and we 
should make no mistake about it--whatever else may be said, we are here 
today because of the President's actions. I resent the shadow he has 
cast on what should be--and I feel still is--an honorable profession; 
public service. And I

[[Page S1670]]

think all of us who take our oaths to heart should resent it.
  Finally, as a woman who has fought long and hard for sexual 
harassment laws, I resent that the President has undermined our 
progress. No matter how consensual this relationship was, it involved a 
man in a position of tremendous power, with authority over a 21-year-
old female subordinate, in the workplace--and not just any workplace. 
He has shaken the principles of these laws to their core and it saddens 
me deeply.
  But as I work my way through my distaste, my dismay, and my 
disappointment, I return to the discipline that the Constitution 
imposes upon us as triers of fact. My job here is to review the 
evidence, and to measure that evidence against my standard of proof, 
and the constitutional standard of high crimes and misdemeanors.
  So let's look at the evidence. Article I does not go to perjury about 
the underlying relationship--that charge was dismissed by the House. 
Instead, the article before us alleges perjury based on statements 
about statements about conduct. Unfortunately, what this comes down to 
is a case of ``perjury once removed''--an inherently tenuous charge.
  As triers of fact, we are asked under article I not to find whether 
the President lied, but whether he committed the specifically defined 
act of perjury. Here, the law is clear that there must be proof that an 
untruth was told; that it was told willfully; and that it was told 
about a subject matter material to the case. These are the hard rules 
of the statute.
  In this instance, article I alleges perjury in statements the 
President made explaining the nature and details of the relationship. 
Significantly, the underlying subject matter of most of these 
statements was ruled irrelevant and inadmissable in the underlying 
civil case that was itself dismissed and settled. To me, these facts 
undermine the materiality of these statements.
  Article I also alleges perjury in the President's statements 
explaining his concealment of that relationship. Here, I find 
insufficient evidence of the requisite untruth and the requisite 
intent. Given, again, that we are talking here about ``perjury once 
removed,'' I cannot conclude that the President is guilty on article I.
  As I look at article II, I have similar concerns and conflicts. Are 
there any among us who can look at the disturbing pattern that has been 
laid out for us and not be deeply troubled?
  Just look at the allegations. The President may have influenced the 
filing of an affidavit. The President may have initiated the 
concealment of potential evidence. And the President may have 
accelerated a job search, in hopes of influencing a witness.
  But for all of this, there is only circumstantial evidence. Despite a 
64,000 page record and countless hours of argument and testimony, there 
is no direct evidence supporting any of these allegations.
  To the contrary, where there is direct evidence, the testimony is 
against the allegations. Indeed, not one witness with firsthand 
knowledge has come forward since the beginning of this matter to 
corroborate the charges. So, while I can draw inferences from the 
evidence, I cannot draw conclusions beyond a reasonable doubt.
  The Framers clearly prescribed caution when measuring high crimes, 
and such caution is all the more important when a case rests on purely 
circumstantial evidence. Mindful of this caution, I still find that one 
allegation stands out from the rest; the President's attempt to 
influence the potential testimony of his personal assistant.
  Let's look at the facts. In the President's civil deposition, the 
President suggested, at least three times, that the attorneys should 
ask questions of his personal assistant. At the end of the deposition, 
the judge reminded him of the confidentiality order not to discuss the 
testimony with others.
  Within 2\1/2\ hours, the President called his personal assistant to 
arrange a rare Sunday meeting. At that meeting, the President disclosed 
to her the contents of his deposition. In a manner that all but reveals 
the President's motives, he included in his discussion with her false 
statements about the circumstances of his relationship. Indeed, she 
would later testify that she believed the President sought her 
agreement with those statements he was posing.
  Consider this critical exchange in the testimony of the President's 
assistant:
  She was asked, ``Would it be fair to say then--based on the way he 
stated it and the demeanor he was using at the time he stated it to 
you--that he wished you to agree to that statement?'' The President's 
assistant nodded. She was then asked, ``And you're nodding your head 
yes, is that correct?'' And she answered, ``That's correct.''
  And he again violated the gag order when he revisited these 
statements with her several days later.
  As an experienced lawyer, the President knew that, by the force of 
his own testimony, he made his assistant a potential witness.
  As a former State attorney general, the President knew he was 
violating the confidentiality order when he spoke with her.
  As a defendant who repeatedly named his assistant, the President knew 
that his assistant would be subpoenaed.
  And she was subpoenaed just 3 days later. But even if she hadn't, the 
President did not need absolute or direct knowledge that his assistant 
would testify. Under the law of obstruction, which, unlike perjury, 
does not expressly require materiality, he only had to know that she 
could offer relevant facts.
  Make no mistake about it, I find the President's behavior deplorable 
and indefensible.
  If I were a supporter, I would abandon him. If I were a newspaper 
editor, I would denounce him. If I were an historian, I would condemn 
him. If I were a criminal prosecutor, I would charge him. If I were a 
grand juror, I would indict him. And if I were a juror in a standard 
criminal case, I would convict him of attempting to unlawfully 
influence a potential witness under title 18 of the United States Code.
  However, I stand here today as a U.S. Senator, in an impeachment 
trial, with but one decision--does the President's misconduct, even if 
deplorable, represent such an egregious and immediate threat to the 
very structure of our Government that the Constitution requires his 
removal?
  To answer this broad question, we need to ask several finer 
questions.
  Do the people believe that their liberties are so threatened that he 
should not serve his remaining 23 months? Is the President's violation 
on par with treason and bribery? What are the inescapable and 
unprecedented effects of removing a duly elected President? And can the 
President's wrongdoing be more effectively remedied by criminal 
prosecution, in a standard court of law, after he leaves office?
  These are the questions which drive our consideration of the 
``gravity'' and ``degree'' of the President's conduct. To this end, I 
return to the words of another Maine Senator, William Pitt Fessenden, 
who during the Andrew Johnson trial said that removal must ``be 
exercised with extreme caution'' and in ``extreme cases.'' It must, he 
said, ``address itself to the country and the civilized world as a 
measure justly called for by the gravity of the crime . . ''
  In this case, I understand how reasonable minds could differ, for I 
have struggled long and hard with my own decision.
  But the Constitution tempers our passion and measures our judgment. 
And the Constitution requires each of us to determine not just whether 
the President violated a statute. For had the Framers intended the 
offenses charged in this case to require removal in any and all 
circumstances, they would have specifically included them in the 
impeachment provisions of the Constitution.
  Because they did not, we are compelled to ask ourselves whether the 
nature and circumstances of his conduct are such that we have no choice 
but to inflict upon him what one of the House managers called ``the 
political equivalent of the death penalty.''
  If I could conclude that this President's conduct is of that nature, 
I would vote to remove him. Because if there is one thing I've learned 
throughout my 25 years in elective office, it is that the really tough 
decisions leave us with but one choice--doing what we know to be right 
and true.
  In this instance, among the seven allegations charged in article II, 
I have

[[Page S1671]]

only been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the President 
committed one of them. After due consideration of all the factual 
circumstances relating to this one finding, and the constitutional 
dictates and implications of this matter as a whole, I am persuaded 
that the President's wrongdoing can and should be effectively addressed 
by the additional remedy expressly provided by the Framers in the 
Constitution--namely, trial before a standard criminal court. And I am 
further persuaded that future Presidents, and future generations can be 
effectively deterred from such wrongdoing by this impeachment and a 
potential prosecution.
  The President's behavior has damaged the Office of the Presidency, 
the Nation, and everyone involved in this matter. There are only two 
potential victims left--the Senate and the Constitution--and I am 
firmly resolved to allow neither to join the ranks of the aggrieved.
  From the day I swore my oath of impartiality, I determined that the 
only way I could approach this case was to ask myself one question, 
``if I were the deciding vote in this case, could I remove this 
President under these circumstances?'' The answer, I have concluded, is 
``no''--and therefore, I will vote against both articles of 
impeachment.
  Mr. Chief Justice, I came to this process with an open notebook and 
an open mind, determined to honor my oath to do impartial justice and 
serve the best interests of the Presidency, the American people, and 
the Nation. I stand confident that in doing so, my manner has been 
impartial, and my judgment has been measured. Therefore, in my mind and 
in my heart, I believe to a moral certainty that my verdict is just.
  As men and women of honor, that is the highest expectation to which 
we can aspire. For we are writing history with indelible ink, but 
imperfect pens.
  In the end, when future generations dust off the record of what we 
have done here, may they say we validated the Framers' faith in the 
Senate. May they say we reached within ourselves to discover our most 
noble intentions. And may they say we achieved a conclusion worthy not 
just of our time, but of all time.
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