[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 19 (Wednesday, February 3, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1119-S1122]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ENERGY SECURITY
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, first of all, I want to raise with my
colleagues two issues that revolve around energy security. The first
issue is the state of the domestic oil industry and the second issue is
the Oil-for-Food Program for Iraq. I think that this marks the first
departure from the debate on the impeachment, and I hope the Presiding
Officer will find it refreshing.
Last week, the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which I chair,
held a hearing to review the state of the domestic petroleum industry,
and to assess the threat to our economic security from our growing
dependence on foreign oil. The domestic oil industry in the United
States is in serious trouble. Companies are laying off workers in
droves. In my State of Alaska, British Petroleum, just announced the
layoff of some 600 workers, and another one of our major oil companies
lost somewhere in the area of just under $800 million in the last
quarter of 1998.
Exploration and drilling budgets are way down. Drilling contractors
have been cut to the bone. Marginal and stripper wells are being shut
in. These are production capabilities, Mr. President, that, once lost,
will unlikely be regained. These, to a large degree, represent an
ongoing operating petroleum reserve--one might conclude a strategic
petroleum reserve--because while they are small, they are substantial
in their numbers and contribute to domestic production.
Now, to quote a recent report by the John S. Herold Company, 1998 was
a ``catastrophe'' for the U.S. oil industry, ``nothing short of
murderous for investors'' in that industry. We are seeing mergers and
consolidations, significant implications for the Nation's energy
security, and certainly U.S. jobs--30 merged companies alone last year.
This situation in the oil industry is interesting, as we look at the
commodities in this country. As the Presiding Officer is well aware,
the agricultural industry--production, livestock, hogs, beef--the
farmers can hardly raise them anymore. Many aspects of the agricultural
industry are under water. This is true of the timber industry. It is
true of the steel industry. It is true of the mining industry, and
certainly true of the oil and gas industry.
So as we reflect on the prosperity of this country, it is interesting
to note the job losses in the commodities industries of this country--
and one has to wonder when it is going to catch up with itself. Of
course, we enjoy low gasoline prices when we fill our car or boat, low
heating oil prices when we warm our home, and low inflation due in
large measure to low oil prices. Let's recognize where it is.
But a decimated U.S. oil industry creates a risk to consumers, to the
economy, to our national energy security. And we only have to look back
at history. Some say we learn from history, and some say not much.
Well, we recall the 1973 Arab oil embargo when we were only 36 percent
dependent on foreign imported oil. That had a devastating impact on
consumers and the economy. We saw oil shortages, and long lines at the
gas stations. Many people have forgotten that timeframe--soaring
prices, double-digit inflation, and an economy put into recession. What
was the prime rate at that time? Well, the prime rate was 20.5 percent
in 1980. Inflation was in the area of 11 percent--double-digit.
If it happened today, we could be hit even harder. And we are getting
set up for it because we are in worse shape today than we were in 1973.
Since 1973, our foreign dependence has grown by leaps and bounds. U.S.
crude oil production dropped by one-third. U.S. oil imports--oil
imports--soared by two-thirds.
Today, U.S. foreign oil dependence is 56 percent, compared to 36
percent back in 1973. Our excessive foreign oil dependence puts our
national energy security interests at stake and hence our national
security at stake. We can't forget that the United States went to war
in 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened the world oil supplies.
Part of that was our supply.
In 1995, President Clinton issued a Presidential finding that imports
of oil threatened our national security, and a short time ago the U.S.
bombed Iraq because Saddam continues to threaten the stability in the
Persian Gulf. Well, it is fair to say, Mr. President, if we do nothing,
what will happen: We know things are going to get worse.
The Department of Energy projects in the year 2010 U.S. foreign
dependence will hit about 68 percent. That means we will be depending
on foreign sources for 68 percent of our oil supply.
I don't think we should put our trust in foreign oil-producing
nations that have their interests in mind, not ours. I plan to work
closely with the small and independent producers to develop a solution
to this crisis. Already I have cosponsored Senate bill 325, a bill
introduced by my colleague from Texas, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison,
that would amend the Tax Code to add marginal producers. I will work as
a member of the Finance Committee to consider this and see it is
adopted.
I also intend, with Senators from producing States, to consider a
non-tax means to assist domestic production through regulatory and land
access issues.
Second, I want to talk about oil-for-food and our relations with
Iraq. This deals with our energy security; that is, our U.S. policy
towards Iraq, specifically, the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. Six weeks
have passed since President Clinton ordered America's Armed Forces to
strike military and security targets in Iraq. What has Saddam's regime
done since then? They have shot at U.S. fighter planes on almost a
daily basis. They have challenged Kuwait's right to exist. They have
demanded compensation for U.N. crimes against Iraq--isn't that ironic.
They have demanded an end to sanctions and no-fly zones. They have
reiterated that no weapons inspectors will be allowed to return. That
is a pretty bold statement.
Now, what policy initiative has the Clinton administration launched
to deal with Saddam's defiance? U.S. officials offered to eliminate the
ceiling on the Oil-for-Food Program, a de facto ending of the sanctions
on oil exports. My views on the absurdity to this proposal were
included in a recent Washington Post op-ed, and I ask unanimous consent
that be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 25, 1999]
Our Toothless Policy on Iraq
(By Frank H. Murkowski)
On the eve of Operation Desert Fox, President Clinton
announced to the nation that ``we are delivering a powerful
message to Saddam.'' That message now appears to be that as
long as Saddam Hussein refuses to cooperate with inspections,
refuses to comply with U.N. resolutions and refuses to stop
illegally smuggling out oil, he will be rewarded by the de
facto ending of economic sanctions.
At least, that was the message sent by the U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations Peter Burleigh on Jan. 14 when he
offered a plan to eliminate the ceiling on how much oil Iraq
can sell abroad. This proposal was in reaction to a proposal
(made by France and supported by Russia and China) to end the
Iraq oil embargo.
Do not be fooled. The distinctions between the U.S. plan
and the French plan are meaningless. This is the end of the
U.N. sanctions regime. Security Council Resolution 687,
passed in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War, requires that
international economic sanctions, including an embargo on the
sale of oil from Iraq, remain in place until Iraq discloses
and destroys its weapons of mass destruction programs and
capabilities and undertakes unconditionally never to resume
such activities. This, we know, has not happened.
But the teeth in Resolution 687 have effectively been
pulled, one by one, with the introduction and then continued
expansion of
[[Page S1120]]
the so-called oil-for-food exception to the sanctions.
Although the humanitarian goals of the oil-for-food program
are worthy, Saddam Hussein already has subverted the program
to his own benefit by using increased oil capacity to smuggle
oil for hard cash and by freeing up resources he might have
been forced to use for food and medicine for his own people.
The increase in illegal sales of petroleum products
coincided with implementation of the oil-for-food program in
1995. Part of this illegally sold oil is moving by truck
across the Turkish-Iraqi border. A more significant amount is
moving by sea through the Persian Gulf. Exports of contraband
Iraqi oil through the gulf have jumped some 50-fold in the
past two years, to nearly half a billion dollars. Further,
Iraq has been steadily increasing illegal exports of oil to
Jordan and Turkey.
Oil is Saddam Hussein's lifeline; it fuels his ability to
finance his factories of death and rebuild his weapons of
mass destruction. Revenue from oil exports historically has
represented nearly all of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings.
In the year preceding Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's export
earnings totaled $10.4 billion, with 95 percent attributed to
petroleum. Iraq's imports during that same year, 1990,
totaled only $6.6 billion.
The United States proposes to lift the ceiling on the only
export that matters. In addition, it is prepared to relax the
scrutiny applied to contracts for spare parts and other
equipment needed to get Iraqi industry working better.
France, China and Russia, of course, did not support Desert
Fox, and have wanted to lift the Iraq embargo for some time.
They are willing to put economic gain before international
security, because these appeasers of Iraq stand to earn
billions in a post-sanctions world. In fact, earlier this
month, the U.N. released more than $81 million under the
expanded oil-for-food program to enable Iraq to buy
electrical generating equipment, nearly all of which ($74.9
million) will come from China. Will these new turbines merely
guarantee an uninterrupted power supply for Saddam Hussien's
poison gas facilities?
Why is the Clinton administration prepared to take this
course? Because our Iraq policy is bankrupt. We have relied
on Koki Annan and the Iraq appeasers to sign meaningless
deals with Saddam Hussein regarding inspections that were
useless from the moment they were signed. When we called back
our aircraft at the last moment in October, despite the
unanimous support of the Security Council for the attack, our
Iraq policy suffered a near-fatal collapse. It finally did
collapse when we decided to strike at a time when the
president's credibility was at its lowest and the approach of
Ramadan guaranteed Saddam Hussien easily could outlast our
attack. Indeed the absurdity of our policy is reflected in
the fact that in December our bombers targeted an oil
refinery in Basra and at the end of the attack we pledged
support to rebuild Iraq's oil-export capacity.
The inept policies that have brought us to this point must
be reversed. As a first step, the administration ought to
turn back from its path toward lifting, rather than
tightening, the sanctions on Saddam Hussein. Second, when the
U.N. reconsiders reauthorizing the oil-for-food program in
May, the United States should use its veto to end this
program, which has allowed Saddam Hussein to rebuild his
political and military support.
We can bring Saddam Hussein to his knees by eliminating his
ability to market any of his oil, thereby cutting off his
cash flow. Not only should the United States strengthen oil
interdiction and inspection operations, the administration
should consider adopting a policy similar to the air blockade
we enforce in the ``no-fly'' zone. A strictly enforced ``no-
oil-export'' policy is what is called for.
Only then will Saddam Hussein realize that cooperation with
U.N. inspectors is the only way to rebuild his economy. The
policy predicated on so-called humanitarian grounds--oil for
food--not only has failed but has ensured the survival of
Saddam Hussein.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I don't have time to go into that in
depth, but let me remind my colleagues of a few things. One, the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 passed in 1991 at the end of
the Persian Gulf War requires that international economic sanctions,
including an embargo on the sale of oil from Iraq, remain in place
until Iraq discloses and destroys its weapons of mass destruction
programs and capabilities and undertakes unconditionally never to
resume such activities.
But the teeth in Resolution 687 have effectively been pulled out one-
by-one with the introduction and then continued expansion of the so-
called oil-for-food exception to the sanctions: In 1995, UNSCR 986
allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every 6 months. Iraq
produced 1.2 million barrels per day in 1997. In 1997, UNSCR 1153
doubled the offer to $5.2 billion in oil every 6 months. Iraq is now
producing 2.5 million barrels of oil. In 1999, United States, France,
and Saudi Arabia will offer varying plans on removing the limit on how
much oil Iraq can sell and for what purpose.
This means that Iraq's oil production of 2.5 million barrels per day
equals--their production now equals--the prewar production levels in
the year preceding Desert Storm. Iraq's export earnings total $10.4
billion, with 95 percent attributed to oil, which is Iraq's only
significant identifiable cash flow. Iraq's imports that same year were
only $6.6 billion.
The President's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, takes issue
with my characterization of the U.S. proposal. In a Washington Post
editorial, he said that under the Oil-for-Food Program:
We prevent Saddam from spending his nation's most valuable
treasure on what he cares about most--rebuilding his military
arsenal--and force him to spend it on what he cares about
least--the people of Iraq. From Saddam's point of view, that
makes the program part of the sanctions regime.
I ask unanimous consent that editorial in the Washington Post be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post]
Oil for Food: The Opposite of Sanctions
(By Samuel R. Berger)
The Post's Jan. 17 editorial ``Rewarding Saddam Hussein''
endorsed the administration's policy of containing Iraq and
our continued readiness to back that policy with force.
Unfortunately, it also misconstrued important elements of our
approach to sanctions to Iraq. The confusion was compounded
by a Jan. 25 op-ed by Sen. Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska). Both
took issue with what the editorial referred to--
incompletely--as an administration statement offering ``to
eliminate the ceiling on how much oil Iraq is permitted to
sell.'' The second half of that statement--which the
editorial omitted--read: ``to finance the purchase of food
and medicine for the Iraqi people.''
Under the U.S. proposal, Iraq could pump as much oil as is
needed to meet humanitarian needs. All the revenue would go
directly to a U.N. escrow account, as it does now. From that
account, checks could be written--directly to the
contractor--to buy food, medicine and other humanitarian
supplies, as well as parts for equipment that we know is
being used to pump oil for this program. These supplies then
would be distributed under U.N. supervision. Saddam would
never see a dime.
The Post and Sen. Murkowski also asserted that our proposal
to increase the flow of humanitarian aid to Iraq is no
different from proposals to lift sanctions. In fact, it is in
direct opposition to them.
If sanctions were lifted, the international community no
longer could determine how Iraq's oil revenues are spent. The
oil-for-food program would have to be disbanded, not
expanded. Billions of dollars now reserved for the basic
needs of the Iraqi people would become available to Saddam to
use as he pleased. The amount of food and medicine flowing
into Iraq most likely would decline.
In contrast, under the current program, we prevent Saddam
from spending his nation's most valuable treasure on what he
cares about most--rebuilding his military arsenal--and force
him to spend it on what he cares about least--the people of
Iraq. From Saddam's point of view, that makes the program
part of the sanctions regime.
Indeed, Saddam already has rejected our initiative to
expand it. He knows that every drop of oil sold to feed the
Iraqi people is a drop of oil that will never be sold to feed
his war machine. Oil for food means no oil for tanks.
Saddam's intent is clear: He is cynically trying to exploit
the suffering of his people--for which he is responsible--to
gain sympathy for his cause and to create a rift in the
international coalition arrayed against him. In this way, he
hopes to build support for ending sanctions so that he can
resume his effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
But he is failing. In recent weeks, opinion has hardened
against Saddam in Arab countries. On Sunday, the Arab League
called on Iraq to stop provoking its neighbors and to comply
with U.N. resolutions. Newspapers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia
have called for Saddam's ouster. But there remains strong
public sympathy for the Iraqi people.
The effect of our policy is to make clear that the source
of hunger and sickness in Iraq is not sanctions but Saddam.
After the Gulf War ended, the United States made certain that
food and medicine would never be subject to sanctions. Saddam
always has been free to import them. When he refused to do
so, the United States took the lead in proposing that Iraq be
allowed to sell controlled quantities of its oil in order to
purchase humanitarian supplies. Remarkably, until 1996,
Saddam refused to do even that.
Currently, the United Nations allows Iraq to spend up to
$5.2 billion in oil revenue every six months for humanitarian
purposes. Saddam is so indifferent to the suffering of his
people that he still refuses to make full use of this
allowance. But the food supply in Iraq has grown, and soon
will provide the average Iraqi with about 2,200 calories per
day, which is at the top of the United Nations' recommended
range.
[[Page S1121]]
To leave no doubt about who is responsible for the
suffering of Iraq's people, we are willing to lift the $5.2
billion ceiling to allow Iraq--under strict supervision--to
use as much oil revenue as is necessary to meet humanitarian
needs. In the meantime, we will continue to enforce sanctions
against Iraq and remain prepared to take action against any
oil facilities being used to circumvent them.
Critics of this effort imply we should starve Iraq into
submission. They forget that starving Iraq is Saddam's
strategy. The oil-for-food program helps us to thwart it.
The program does not reward Saddam; it further restrains
him, while relieving the suffering of ordinary Iraqis. It has
helped to deepen Saddam's isolation, and it will remain a
logical part of our strategy against him and the threat he
poses.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. In conclusion, I don't care much about Saddam's point
of view, but from the point of view of this Senator from Alaska, what
this program does is allow Saddam to use his increased oil capacity to
smuggle oil for hard cash and free up resources he can use to finance
his weapons of mass destruction. Saddam's cash flow is oil. The
smuggling is documented. The displacement issue is harder to track, but
Saddam's war machine is still working and his troops are still fit.
Let me take issue with the definition of ``humanitarian supplies.''
The most recent U.N.-approved plan would allow Saddam to spend this
oil-for-food money, and I think it is interesting to reflect where is
he spending his money. Let's look at it, because I think it counters
Sandy Berger's remarks that this is going for ``humanitarian''
purposes: $300 million for petroleum equipment; $409 million for
electricity networks; $126 million for telecommunication systems; $120
million to buy trucks, repair the railway system, and build food
warehouses; $180 million for agriculture equipment, including
pesticides.
What is the humanitarian goal in guaranteeing an uninterrupted power
supply for Saddam's poison gas facilities? What is the humanitarian
goal in making sure his elite guards can communicate with each other?
And finally, with a new emphasis on building an effective Iraq
opposition, I wonder how an opposition can take root when Saddam is
able, through the Oil-for-Food Program, to take care of his citizens'
basic needs?
The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, and I
will be holding a joint hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee and
the Energy Committee next week to ask the administration these
questions. I have asked Sandy Berger to come up and defend his
arguments, along with Secretary Richardson and Under Secretary
Pickering.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excellent
analysis of the various proposals for changing the sanctions by Patrick
Clawson from the Washington Institute.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[The Washington Institute, January 19, 1999]
Assessing Proposals for Changing U.N. Restrictions on Iraq
(By Patrick Clawson, with Nawaf Obaid)
In the last two weeks, France, the United States, and Saudi
Arabia have all proposed changes in UN restrictions on Iraq.
While all would have the effect of cutting Saddam some slack,
intriguingly, the Saudi plan is about as good as the
American.
The French Proposal. The French proposal is soft both on
inspections and on sanctions. In the words of Foreign
Minister Hubert Vedrine, the French proposal aims at
``preventing any new [emphasis added] development of weapons
of mass destruction [WMD].'' Vedrine proposes no action be
taken about what he describes as ``remaining [WMD] stocks
that may have escaped control or destruction''--stocks that
include some long-range missiles and biological weapons
materials. The French-proposed inspection system would be
built on the model of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), rather than UNSCOM. Since the Gulf War, the IAEA has
continued its practice of looking primarily at fissile
material rather than at the full scope of activities needed
to make a nuclear weapon. Intelligence reports suggest Iraq
has produced weapon components from which functioning nuclear
weapons could be assembled soon after Iraq acquired fissile
material. The French proposal may be the most intrusive
regime that Saddam would accept. Yet, France is asking the
wrong question; the issue is not what Saddam will accept, but
what will accomplish the goal of eliminating the threat of
Iraqi WMD. From this perspective, France's plan comes up
short.
France has also proposed that Saddam be permitted to use
oil export receipts as he wishes, subject only to the
restriction that he not import arms or dual-use technologies.
The practical effect of this proposal would be to allow
Saddam to reduce food and medicine imports to fund his
priorities. The French proposal would also eliminate the
current system under which all earnings from approved Iraqi
oil exports go into an escrow account abroad, and each
payment out of the account requires documentation showing for
what the funds are being used. The French would instead trust
Iraq to keep honest accounts and report accurately to the UN,
without diverting any money into clandestine accounts.
The U.S. Proposal. The U.S. government's January 14
proposal to the Security Council focuses not on the
inspection system but instead on what can be done to
alleviate humanitarian suffering while sustaining sanctions.
The first element in the U.S. proposal would be to allow
Saddam to export as much oil as he wants. Such a step may be
a good way to win a propaganda victory without having any
practical effect, because the UN-imposed limit is so far
above what Iraq can produce. In the six months to November
1998, Iraq exported $3.04 billion through the oil-for-food
program, or less than 60 percent of the UN limit of $5.26
billion. The practical constraint was not the UN limit, but
Iraq's production capacity.
The only way Iraq can produce more is if it can import
equipment needed to repair and modernize its oil industry. In
1998, the UN approved imports of $134 million worth of oil-
field equipment. A team from the Dutch firm Saybolt, hired by
the UN, visited Iraq in December 1998 to identify what more
is needed. The issue is whether to expedite approval of the
$300 million program that team recommended. A sticking point
has been Iraqi oil exports outside the oil-for-food program,
namely, shipments to Jordan (80,000 barrels a day of crude
and 16,000 barrels a day of oil products) and the smuggling
of oil products to Turkey and via Iranian waters (the amounts
vary from month to month, with the total averaging perhaps
50,000 barrels a day). The United States could adopt a tough
approach--for instance, insisting that Iraq not be allowed to
import oil equipment while illegal exports continue--but that
would run counter to the U.S. desire to expand Iraqi
humanitarian imports.
The second element in the U.S. proposal is to expedite
humanitarian deliveries and, for this purpose, allow Iraq to
borrow in order to import more. Yet, the basic problem with
the oil-for-food program is neither a lack of money nor an
excess of red tape; instead, the problem is that Saddam does
not care about the welfare of Iraqis. To generate more
pressure to end the sanctions. Saddam continues to hinder
international relief. For instance, the plan Iraq
submitted to the UN for the latest six-month relief
program would have provided insufficient protein; this
caused the UN to delay its approval for two weeks (from
November 29 until December 11) until Iraq agreed to an
extra $150 million for food. Clear proof that Saddam, not
UN restrictions, is responsible for Iraqi suffering can be
found in the detailed UN reports about the improving
living conditions in the Kurdish areas outside Saddam's
control, where the UN administers the oil-for-food program
directly rather than through the Iraqi government.
The fact is that Iraq has ample funds for food and
medicine. Under current procedures, Iraq will have the
resources to import at least $1.8 billion over the next six
months, even if prices for its oil stay at $9 per barrel and
even after the deductions for the Compensation Fund and UN
expenses. But even after the UN modification, Iraq's plan
calls for only $1.6 billion for humanitarian goods: $1.446
billion for food, medicine, and water and sanitation
equipment, and $165 million for nutrition programs, education
needs and, in the Kurdish north, demining and resettling
refugees. Any extra money will go for activities that not all
would call humanitarian. The UN-approved plan authorizes
$1.135 billion for other purposes; $300 million for petroleum
equipment; $409 million for the electricity network; $126
million for the telecommunications system; $120 million to
buy trucks, repair the railway system, and build food
warehouses; and $180 million for agricultural equipment,
including pesticides. The telecommunications system repairs
are presented as a way to coordinate food and medicine
deliveries, but they also allow Saddam to stay in touch with
his secret police and military commanders. To date, the
United States has used its veto in the Sanctions Committee to
block shipments of such dual-use items, even though such
items are authorized by the plan approved by the Secretary
General. Yet, as the January 14 U.S. proposal focuses on how
to increase imports, the United States may consider allowing
more questionable items.
The U.S. proposal also suggests letting Iraq raise money by
borrowing from the fund to compensate those whose property
was destroyed when Iraq occupied Kuwait. Eight years after
these people suffered a loss, none has received more than
$10,000. The Compensation Commission has approved two more
rounds of payments, mostly to recipients who will get only
$2,500 per claim, as soon as it has the funds available.
The Saudi Proposal. Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah
has presented a plan that overlaps the U.S. strategy in key
areas, calling for retaining sanctions but abolishing
[[Page S1122]]
the limit on how much oil Iraq can sell and making other
changes to speed humanitarian deliveries. It is also said to
call for revamping UNSCOM, with few details on what that
means (evidently not much change is proposed). Saudi Arabia
has lobbied for the plan vigorously at three meetings of the
Gulf Cooperation Council and two other inter-Arab sessions.
It is unusual for Saudi Arabia to be so bold at asserting
leadership in the region, and even more unusual for Saudi
Arabia to pursue the plan so tenaciously in the face of
opposition from those in the region who want to distance
themselves from the U.S.--British air strikes. Under the
direction of the foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faysal, the
Saudis have successfully brought on board Egypt, which was
initially skeptical.
The Saudi initiative underscores the convergence of U.S.
and Saudi interests on Iraq. Although Riyadh was widely
criticized in the United States for its reluctance to
participate in the December air campaign. Saudi policy is in
fact closely aligned with Washington's. For instance, the
political commentator of the official Saudi news agency
wrote. ``The Iraqi people deserve and need a revolution''
against ``the tyrant of Baghdad,'' whereas in Egypt, another
Arab country whose ruler Saddam attacked, the government
confined itself to saying ``the Iraqi leadership is primarily
responsible for the Iraqi people's hardships.'' The
reassertion of leadership in the region by Saudi Arabia, if
sustained, would on many issues correspond well with U.S.
interests.
Although it is unlikely that the Saudis will be able to
convince enough Arab states to support their plan for the
January 24 meeting of Arab League foreign ministers to
endorse it openly, the United States should lend weight to
the Saudi diplomatic effort. The Saudi effort focuses Arab
attention on the issue most important for U.S. interests--how
to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people--rather than on
the question raised by the French proposal, namely, how to
water down inspections so as to win Saddam's assent.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I will ask the administration to take a different tact
to tighten, rather than loosen, the Oil-for-Food Program, to veto U.N.
plans that allow Saddam to use this money to finance nonhumanitarian
purchases, and to strengthen oil interdiction and inspection
operations, including adopting something like the ``no-fly'' zone with
a ``no-oil'' vessel zone. Only by taking these measures can the U.N.
finally cripple Saddam's regime and increase energy security for all
Americas.
If we cut off Saddam's oil supply, we will bring him to his knees.
That is the only way it will happen.
Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to comment on the
Department of the Interior s Mineral Management Service proposed oil
valuation rule.
Earlier this week, speaking with regard to the Administration's FY
2000 budget, Secretary Babbitt said, ``We have met, and talked, and
talked, and talked,'' about the proposed rule. But I submit that the
only talking done by MMS has been at industry and at Congress, not with
them. Mr. President, the proposed rule by MMS was unfair last year and
it remains unfair.
Babbitt has declared that talks are ``over'' and that MMS is
determined to issue its rule in June, when the Congressional moratorium
expires.
This is simply unconscionable. The domestic oil industry is on its
knees right now. But, again, this action by Interior is symptomatic of
Administration attacks on the domestic energy industry.
The federal government should work to save marginal producers, not
put them out of business. Yet that is just what Interior is doing by
issuing an unfair royalty rule at a time when producers can least
afford it.
I would ask Secretary Babbitt the following question: How many
royalties can a bankrupt industry pay? I would also ask him if this
rule is truly about raising revenue, or is it another Administration
scheme to drive petroleum producers out of business. After all, 100
percent of zero is zero.
For the record, Mr. President, I will be speaking to MMS and looking
into this flawed royalty rule.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, thank you.
____________________