[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 5 (Thursday, January 14, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S59-S251]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of Impeachment. 
The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                 ______
                                 


                                 PRAYER

  The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following prayer:
  Almighty God, whose providential care has never varied all through 
our Nation's history, we ask You for a special measure of wisdom for 
the women and men of this Senate as they act as jurors in this 
impeachment trial. You have been our Nation's refuge and strength in 
triumphs and troubles, prosperity and problems. Now, dear Father, help 
us through this difficult time. As You guided the Senators to unity in 
matters of procedure, continue to make them one in their search for the 
truth and in their expression of justice. Keep them focused in a spirit 
of nonpartisan patriotism today and in the crucial days to come. Bless 
the distinguished Chief Justice as he presides over this trial. We 
commit to You all that is said and done and ultimately decided. In Your 
holy Name. Amen.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.
  The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as follows:

       Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
     keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
     United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
     impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
     William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Presiding Officer recognizes the majority 
leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.


        Installing Equipment And Furniture in the Senate Chamber

  Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk providing for installing 
equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber and ask that it be agreed 
to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the resolution by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A resolution (S. Res. 17), to authorize the installation of 
     appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber for 
     the impeachment trial.

  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the resolution is considered 
and agreed to.
  The resolution (S. Res. 17) was agreed to, as follows:

                               S. Res. 17

       Resolved, That in recognition of the unique requirements 
     raised by the impeachment trial of a President of the United 
     States, the Sergeant at Arms shall install appropriate 
     equipment and furniture in the Senate chamber for use by the 
     managers from the House of Representatives and counsel to the 
     President in their presentations to the Senate during all 
     times that the Senate is sitting for trial with the Chief 
     Justice of the United States presiding.
       Sec. 2. The appropriate equipment and furniture referred to 
     in the first section is as follows:
       (1) A lectern, a witness table and chair if required, and 
     tables and chairs to accommodate an equal number of managers 
     from the House of Representatives and counsel for the 
     President which shall be placed in the well of the Senate.
       (2) Such equipment as may be required to permit the display 
     of video, or audio evidence, including video monitors and 
     microphones, which may be placed in the chamber for use by 
     the managers from the House of Representatives or the counsel 
     to the President.
       Sec. 3. All equipment and furniture authorized by this 
     resolution shall be placed in the chamber in a manner that 
     provides the least practicable disruption to Senate 
     proceedings.

                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent floor 
privileges be granted to the individuals listed on the document I send 
to the desk, during the closed impeachment proceedings of William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The document follows.

                 Floor Privileges During Closed Session

       David Hoppe, Administrative Assistant, Majority Leader.
       Michael Wallace, Counsel, Majority Leader.
       Robert Wilkie, Counsel, Majority Leader.
       Bill Corr, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
       Robert Bauer, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
       Andrea La Rue, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
       Peter Arapis, Floor Manager, Democratic Whip.
       Kirk Matthew, Chief of Staff, Assistant Majority Leader.
       Stewart Verdery, Counsel, Assistant Majority Leader.
       Tom Griffith, Senate Legal Counsel.

[[Page S60]]

       Morgan Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel.
       Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
       Bruce Kasold, Chief Counsel, Secretary & Sergeant at Arms.
       David Schiappa, Assistant Majority Secretary.
       Lula Davis, Assistant Minority Secretary.
       Alan Frumin, Assistant Parliamentarian.
       Kevin Kayes, Assistant Parliamentarian.
       Patrick Keating, Assistant Journal Clerk.
       Scott Sanborn, Assistant Journal Clerk.
       David Tinsley, Assistant Legislative Clerk.
       Ronald Kavulick, Chief Reporter.
       Jerald Linnell, Official Reporter.
       Raleigh Milton, Official Reporter.
       Joel Breitner, Official Reporter.
       Mary Jane McCarthy, Official Reporter.
       Paul Nelson, Official Reporter.
       Katie-Jane Teel, Official Reporter.
       Patrick Renzi, Official Reporter.
       Lee Brown, Staff Assistant, Official Reporter.
       Kathleen Alvarez, Bill Clerk.
       Simon Sargent, Staff Assistant to Sen. Cleland.


    Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Authority to Print Senate Documents

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Secretary of the Senate be authorized to print as a Senate document all 
documents filed by the parties together with other materials for the 
convenience of all Senators.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I am about to submit a series of 
unanimous-consent agreements and a resolution for the consideration of 
the Senate. In addition to these matters, I would like to state for the 
information of all Senators that, pursuant to S. Res. 16, the 
evidentiary record on which the parties' presentations over the next 
days will be based was filed by the House managers yesterday and was 
distributed to all Senators through their offices. These materials are 
now being printed at the Government Printing Office as Senate 
documents. The initial documents of the record have been printed and 
are now at each Senator's desk. As the printing of the rest of the 
volumes of the record is completed over the next few days, they will 
also be placed on the Senators desks for their convenience.


                              THE JOURNAL

  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the Journal of the proceedings 
of the trial are approved to date.
  The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in the 
Senate Journal the following documents:
  The precept, issued on January 8, 1999;
  The writ of summons, issued on January 8, 1999; and the receipt of 
summons, dated January 8, 1999.
  The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in the 
Senate Journal the following documents, which were received by the 
Secretary of the Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 16, 106th 
Congress, first session:
  The answer of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of 
Representatives against him on January 7, 1999, received by the 
Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
  The trial brief filed by the House of Representatives, received by 
the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
  The trial brief filed by the President, received by the Secretary of 
the Senate on January 13, 1999;
  The replication of the House of Representatives, received by the 
Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; and
  The rebuttal brief filed by the House of Representatives, received by 
the Secretary of the Senate on January 14, 1999.
  Without objection, the foregoing documents will be printed in the 
Congressional Record.
  The documents follow:
     The United States of America, ss:

     The Senate of the United States to James W. Ziglar, Sergeant 
     at Arms, United States Senate, greeting:
       You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with 
     William Jefferson Clinton, if conveniently to be found, or if 
     not, to leave at his usual place of abode, a true and 
     attested copy of the within writ of summons, together with a 
     like copy of this precept; and in whichsoever way you perform 
     the service, let it be done at least 2 days before the answer 
     day mentioned in the said writ of summons.
       Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and 
     precept, with your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before 
     the day for answering mentioned in the said writ of summons.
       Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the 
     Senate, at Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, 
     the two hundred and twenty-third year of the Independence of 
     the United States.
       Attest:
                                                       Gary Sisco,
     Secretary of the Senate.
                                  ____

     The United States of America, ss:

     The Senate of the United States to William Jefferson Clinton, 
     greeting:
       Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States 
     of America did, on the 7th day of January, 1999, exhibit to 
     the Senate articles of impeachment against you, the said 
     William Jefferson Clinton, in the words following:
       ``Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of 
     Representatives of the United States of America in the name 
     of itself and of the people of the United States of America, 
     against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
     States of America, in maintenance and support of its 
     impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

                               Article I

       ``In his conduct while President of the United States, 
     William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
     oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
     United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
     protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, 
     and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that 
     the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
     manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his 
     personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of 
     justice, in that:
       ``On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to 
     tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth 
     before a Federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to 
     that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided 
     perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury 
     concerning one or more of the following: (1) the nature and 
     details of his relationship with a subordinate Government 
     employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading 
     testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought 
     against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he 
     allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil 
     rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the 
     testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
     evidence in that civil rights action.
       ``In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined 
     the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
     Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has 
     acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, 
     to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.
       ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
     warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
     disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, 
     trust, or profit under the United States.

                               Article II

       ``In his conduct while President of the United States, 
     William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
     oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
     United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
     protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, 
     and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that 
     the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, 
     and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that 
     end engaged personally, and through his subordinates and 
     agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, 
     impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and 
     testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought 
     against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.
       ``The means used to implement this course of conduct or 
     scheme included one or more of the following acts:
       ``(1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson 
     Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil 
     rights action brought against him to execute a sworn 
     affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, 
     false and misleading.
       ``(2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson 
     Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil 
     rights action brought against him to give perjurious, false 
     and misleading testimony if and when called to testify 
     personally in that proceeding.
       ``(3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson 
     Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a 
     scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a 
     Federal civil rights action brought against him.
       ``(4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and 
     continuing through and including January 14, 1998, William 
     Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to 
     secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights 
     action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the 
     truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a 
     time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have 
     been harmful to him.
       ``(5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal 
     civil rights action brought against him, William Jefferson 
     Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
     misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an 
     affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by 
     the judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
     subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication 
     to that judge.

[[Page S61]]

       ``(6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, 
     William Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading 
     account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights brought 
     against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in 
     order to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness.
       ``(7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William 
     Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to 
     potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in 
     order to corruptly influence the testimony of those 
     witnesses. The false and misleading statements made by 
     William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to 
     the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and 
     misleading information.
       ``In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined 
     the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
     Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has 
     acted in a manner subversive to the rule of law and justice, 
     to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.
       ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
     warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
     disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, 
     trust, or profit under the United States.''

     And demand that you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, 
     should be put to answer the accusations as set forth in said 
     articles, and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, 
     and judgments might be thereupon had as are agreeable to law 
     and justice.
       You, the said William Jefferson Clinton, are therefore 
     hereby summoned to file with the Secretary of the United 
     States Senate, S-220 The Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20510, an 
     answer to the said articles of impeachment no later than noon 
     on the 11th day of January, 1999, and therefore to abide by, 
     obey, and perform such orders, directions, and judgments as 
     the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises 
     according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
       Hereof you are not to fail.
       Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the 
     Senate, at Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, 
     the two hundred and twenty-third year of the Independence of 
     the United States.
       Attest:
                                                       Gary Sisco,
     Secretary of the Senate.
                                  ____

       The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to William 
     Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and the 
     foregoing precept, addressed to me, were duly served upon the 
     said William Jefferson Clinton, by my delivering true and 
     attested copies of the same to Charles Ruff, at the White 
     House, on the 8th day of January, 1999, at 5:27 p.m.
       Attest:
                                                  James W. Ziglar,
                                                 Sergeant at Arms.
                                                    Loretta Symms,
                                          Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
       Dated: January 8, 1999.

     Witnesseth:
       Gary Sisco, Secretary,
       United States Senate.
                                  ____


 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

     In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
         the United States

   ANSWER OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF 
                              IMPEACHMENT

       The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
     United States, in response to the summons of the Senate of 
     the United States, answers the accusations made by the House 
     of Representatives of the United States in the two Articles 
     of Impeachment it has exhibited to the Senate as follows:

                                Preamble

     The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or 
                              Misdemeanors

       The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not 
     permit the conviction and removal from office of a duly 
     elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct 
     with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper. But Article II, Section 
     4 of the Constitution provides that the President shall be 
     removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and 
     Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and 
     Misdemeanors.'' The charges in the articles do not rise to 
     the level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as contemplated 
     by the Founding Fathers, and they do not satisfy the rigorous 
     constitutional standard applied throughout our Nation's 
     history. Accordingly, the Articles of Impeachment should be 
     dismissed.

        The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice

       The President denies each and every material allegation of 
     the two Articles of Impeachment not specifically admitted in 
     this answer.

                               Article I

       President Clinton denies that he made perjurious, false and 
     misleading statements before the federal grand jury on August 
     17, 1998.

                     Factual Responses to Article I

       Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton 
     offers the following factual responses to the allegations in 
     Article I:
     (1) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
         misleading statements to the grand jury about ``the 
         nature and details of his relationship'' with Monica 
         Lewinsky
       There is a myth about President Clinton's testimony before 
     the grand jury. The myth is that the President failed to 
     admit his improper intimate relationship with Ms. Monica 
     Lewinsky. The myth is perpetuated by Article I, which accuses 
     the President of lying about ``the nature and details of his 
     relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky.
       The fact is that the President specifically acknowledged to 
     the grand jury that he had an improper intimate relationship 
     with Ms. Lewinsky. He said so, plainly and clearly: ``When I 
     was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 
     1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was 
     wrong. These encounters . . . did involve inappropriate 
     intimate contact.'' The President described to the grand jury 
     how the relationship began and how it ended at his insistence 
     early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. 
     He also described to the grand jury how he had attempted to 
     testify in the deposition in the Jones case months earlier 
     without having to acknowledge to the Jones lawyers what he 
     ultimately admitted to the grand jury--that he had an 
     improper intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
       The President read a prepared statement to the grand jury 
     acknowledging his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The 
     statement was offered at the beginning of his testimony to 
     focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the Office 
     of Independent Counsel to obtain necessary information 
     without unduly dwelling on the salacious details of the 
     relationship. The President's statement was followed by 
     almost four hours of questioning. If it is charged that his 
     statement was in any respect perjurious, false and 
     misleading, the President denies it. The President also 
     denies that the statement was in any way an attempt to thwart 
     the investigation.
       The President states, as he did during his grand jury 
     testimony, that he engaged in improper physical contact with 
     Ms. Lewinsky. The President was truthful when he testified 
     before the grand jury that he did not engage in sexual 
     relations with Ms. Lewinsky as he understood that term to be 
     defined by the Jones lawyers during their questioning of him 
     in that deposition. The President further denies that his 
     other statements to the grand jury about the nature and 
     details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were 
     perjurious, false, and misleading.
     (2) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
         misleading statements to the grand jury when he testified 
         about statements he had made in the Jones deposition
       There is a second myth about the President's testimony 
     before the grand jury. The myth is that the President adopted 
     his entire Jones deposition testimony in the grand jury. The 
     President was not asked to and did not broadly restate or 
     reaffirm his Jones deposition testimony. Instead, in the 
     grand jury he discussed the bases for certain answers he 
     gave. The President testified truthfully in the grand jury 
     about statements he made in the Jones deposition. The 
     President stated to the grand jury that he did not attempt to 
     be helpful to or assist the lawyers in the Jones deposition 
     in their quest for information about his relationship with 
     Ms. Lewinsky. He truthfully explained to the grand jury his 
     efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition 
     without disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. 
     Accordingly, the full, underlying Jones deposition is not 
     before the Senate.
       Indeed, the House specifically considered and rejected an 
     article of impeachment based on the President's deposition in 
     the Jones case. The House managers should not be allowed to 
     prosecute before the Senate an article of impeachment which 
     the full House has rejected.
     (3) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
         misleading statements to the grand jury about 
         ``statements he allowed his attorney to make'' during the 
         Jones deposition
       The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
     misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements 
     his attorney made during the Jones deposition. The President 
     was truthful when he explained to the grand jury his 
     understanding of certain statements made by his lawyer, 
     Robert Bennett, during the Jones deposition. The President 
     also was truthful when he testified that he was not focusing 
     on the prolonged and complicated exchange between the 
     attorneys and Judge Wright.
     (4) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
         misleading statements to the grand jury concerning 
         alleged efforts ``to influence the testimony of witnesses 
         and to impede the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones 
         case
       For the reasons discussed more fully in response to Article 
     II, the President denies that he attempted to influence the 
     testimony of any witness or to impede the discovery 
     of evidence in the Jones case. Thus, the President denies 
     that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements 
     before the grand jury when he testified about these 
     matters.

 First Affirmative Defense: Article I Does Not Meet the Constitutional 
                  Standard for Conviction and Removal

       For the same reasons set forth in the preamble of this 
     answer, Article I does not meet the rigorous constitutional 
     standard for conviction and removal from office of a duly 
     elected President and should be dismissed.

[[Page S62]]

Second Affirmative Defense: Article I Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction 
                              and Removal

       Article I is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person 
     could know what specific charges are being leveled against 
     the President. It alleges that the President provided the 
     grand jury with ``perjurious, false, and misleading 
     testimony'' concerning ``one or more'' of four subject areas. 
     But it fails to identify any specific statement by the 
     President that is alleged to be perjurious, false and 
     misleading. The House has left the Senate and the President 
     to guess at what it had in mind.
       One of the fundamental principles of our law and the 
     Constitution is that a person has a right to know what 
     specific charges he or she is facing. Without such fair 
     warning, no one can prepare the defense to which every person 
     is entitled. The law and the Constitution also mandate 
     adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the 
     vote they must make. Without a definite and specific 
     identification of false statements, a trial becomes a moving 
     target for the accused. In addition, the American people 
     deserve to know upon what specific statements the President 
     is being judged, given the gravity and effect of these 
     proceedings, namely nullifying the results of a national 
     election.
       Article I sweeps broadly and fails to provide the required 
     definite and specific identification. Were it an indictment, 
     it would be dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is 
     constitutionally defective and should fail.

 Third Affirmative Defense: Article I Charges Multiple Offense in One 
                                Article

       Article I is fatally flawed because it charges multiple 
     instances of alleged perjurious, false and misleading 
     statements in one article. The Constitution provides that 
     ``no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two 
     thirds of the Members present,'' and Senate Rule XXIII 
     provides that ``an article of impeachment shall not be 
     divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time 
     during the trial.'' By the express terms of Article I, a 
     Senator may vote for impeachment if he or she finds that 
     there was perjurious, false and misleading testimony in ``one 
     or more'' of four topic areas. This creates the very real 
     possibility that conviction could occur even though Senators 
     were in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed. 
     Put simply, the structure of Article I presents the 
     possibility that the President could be convicted even though 
     he would have been acquitted if separate votes were taken on 
     each allegedly perjurious statement. For example, it would be 
     possible for the President to be convicted and removed from 
     office with as few as 17 Senators agreeing that any single 
     statement was perjurious, because 17 votes for each of the 
     four categories in Article I would yield 68 votes, one more 
     than necessary to convict and remove.
       By charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of 
     Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to 
     comply with the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be 
     by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, 
     Article I should fail.

                    Factual Responses to Article II

       Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton 
     offers the following factual responses to the allegations in 
     Article II:
     (1) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, 
         he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute 
         a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
         perjurious, false and misleading''
       The President denies that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to 
     execute a false affidavit in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky, 
     the only witness cited in support of this allegation, denies 
     this allegation as well. Her testimony and proffered 
     statements are clear and unmistakable:
        ``[N]o one even asked me to lie and I was never 
     promised a job for my silence.''
        ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed 
     Lewinsky to say anything or to lie . . .''
        ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or 
     anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to 
     lie.''
       The President states that, sometime in December 1997, Ms. 
     Lewinsky asked him whether she might be able to avoid 
     testifying the Jones case because she knew nothing about Ms. 
     Jones or the case. The President further states that he told 
     her he believed other witnesses had executed affidavits, and 
     there was a chance they would not have to testify. The 
     President denies that he ever asked, encouraged or suggested 
     that Ms. Lewinsky file a false affidavit or lie. The 
     President states that he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could 
     have filed a limited but truthful affidavit that might have 
     enabled her to avoid having to testify in the Jones case.
     (2) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, 
         he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give 
         perjurious, false and misleading testimony of and when 
         called to testify personally'' in the Jones litigation
       Again, the President denies that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky 
     to lie if and when called to testify personally in the Jones 
     case. The testimony and proffered statements of Monica 
     Lewinsky, the only witness cited in support of this 
     allegation, are clear and unmistakable:
        [N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never 
     promised a job for my silence.''
        ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed 
     Lewinsky to say anything or to lie . . .''
        ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or 
     anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to 
     lie.''
       The President states that, prior to Ms. Lewinsky's 
     involvement in the Jones case, he and Ms. Lewinsky might have 
     talked about what to do to conceal their relationship from 
     others. Ms. Lewinsky was not a witness in any legal 
     proceeding at that time. Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and 
     statements support the President's recollection. Ms. Lewinsky 
     testified that she ``pretty much can'' exclude the 
     possibility that she and the President ever had discussions 
     about denying the relationship after she learned she was a 
     witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky also stated that 
     ``they did not discuss the issue [of what to say about their 
     relationship] is specific relation to the Jones matter,'' and 
     that ``she does not believe they discussed the content of any 
     deposition that [she] might be involved in at a later date.''
     (3) The President denies that on or about December 28, 1997, 
         he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a 
         scheme to conceal evidence'' in the Jones case
       The President denies that he engaged in, encouraged, or 
     supported any scheme to conceal evidence from discovery in 
     the Jones case, including any gifts he had given to Ms. 
     Lewinsky. The President states that he gave numerous gifts to 
     Ms. Lewinsky prior to December 28, 1997. The President states 
     that, sometime in December, Ms. Lewinsky inquired as to what 
     to do if she were asked in the Jones case about the gifts he 
     had given her, to which the President responded that she 
     would have to turn over whatever she had. The President 
     states that he was unconcerned about having given her gifts 
     and, in fact, that he gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on 
     December 28, 1997. The President denies that he ever asked 
     his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve gifts he had 
     given Ms. Lewinsky, or that he ever asked, encouraged, or 
     suggested that Ms. Lewinsky conceal the gifts. Ms. Currie 
     told prosecutors as early as January 1998 and repeatedly 
     thereafter that it was Ms. Lewinsky who had contacted her 
     about retrieving gifts.
     (4) The President denies that he obstructed justice in 
         connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job 
         in New York to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful 
         testimony'' in the Jones case
       The President denies that he obstructed justice in 
     connection with Ms. Lewinsky's job search in New York or 
     sought to prevent her truthful testimony in the Jones case. 
     The President states that he discussed with Ms. Lewinsky her 
     desire to obtain a job in New York months before she was 
     listed as a potential witness in the Jones case. Indeed, Ms. 
     Lewinsky was offered a job in New York at the United Nations 
     more than a month before she was identified as a possible 
     witness. The President also states that he believes that Ms. 
     Lewinsky raised with him, again before she was ever listed as 
     a possible witness in the Jones case, the prospect of having 
     Mr. Vernon Jordan assist in her job search. Ms. Lewinsky 
     corroborates his recollection that it was her idea to ask for 
     Mr. Jordan's help. The President also states that he was 
     aware that Mr. Jordan was assisting Ms. Lewinsky to obtain 
     employment in New York. The President denies that any of 
     these efforts had any connection whatsoever to Ms. Lewinsky's 
     status as a possible or actual witness in the Jones case. Ms. 
     Lewinsky forcefully confirmed the President's denial when she 
     testified, ``I was never promised a job for my silence.''
     (5) The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his 
         attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
         Federal judge'' concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
       The President denies that he corruptly allowed his attorney 
     to make false and misleading statements concerning Ms. 
     Lewinsky's affidavit to a Federal judge during the Jones 
     deposition. The President denies that he was focusing his 
     attention on the prolonged and complicated exchange between 
     his attorney and Judge Wright.
     (6) The President denies that he obstructed justice by 
         relating ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a 
         potential witness,'' Betty Currie, ``in order to 
         corruptly influence [her] testimony''
       The President denies that he obstructed justice or 
     endeavored in any way to influence any potential testimony of 
     Ms. Betty Currie. The President states that he spoke with Ms. 
     Currie on January 18, 1998. The President testified that, in 
     that conversation, he was trying to find out what the facts 
     were, what Ms. Currie's perception was, and whether his own 
     recollection was correct about certain aspects of his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified that she 
     felt no pressure ``whatsoever'' from the President's 
     statements and no pressure ``to agree with [her] boss.'' The 
     President denies knowing or believing that Ms. Currie would 
     be a witness in any proceeding at the time of this 
     conversation. Ms. Currie had not been on any of the witness 
     lists proffered by the Jones lawyers. President Clinton 
     states that, after the Independent Counsel investigation 
     became public, when Ms. Currie was scheduled to testify, he 
     told Ms. Currie to ``tell the truth.''
     (7) The President denies that he obstructed justice when he 
         relayed allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to 
         his aides
       The President denies that he obstructed justice when he 
     misled his aides about the

[[Page S63]]

     nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the days 
     immediately following the public revelation of the Lewinsky 
     investigation. The President acknowledges that, in the days 
     following the January 21, 1998, Washington Post article, he 
     misled his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation to 
     conceal the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
     sought to avoid disclosing his personal wrongdoing to protect 
     his family and himself from hurt and public embarrassment. 
     The President profoundly regrets his actions, and he has 
     apologized to his family, his friends and staff, and the 
     Nation. The President denies that he had any corrupt purpose 
     or any intent to influence the ongoing grand jury 
     proceedings.

First Affirmative Defense: Article II Does Not Meet the Constitutional 
                  Standard for Conviction and Removal

       For the reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, 
     Article II does not meet the constitutional standard for 
     convicting and removing a duly elected President from office 
     and should be dismissed.

     Second Affirmative Defense: Article II Is Too Vague To Permit 
                         Conviction and Removal

       Article II is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable 
     person could know what specific charges are being leveled 
     against the President. Article II alleges that the President 
     ``obstructed and impeded the administration of justice'' in 
     both the Jones case and the grand jury investigation. But it 
     provides little or no concrete information about the specific 
     acts in which the President is alleged to have engaged, or 
     with whom, or when, that allegedly obstructed or otherwise 
     impeded the administration of justice.
       As we set forth in the Second Affirmative Defense to 
     Article I, one of the fundamental principles of our law and 
     the Constitution is that a person has the right to know what 
     specific charges he or she is facing. Without such fair 
     warning, no one can mount the defense to which every person 
     is entitled. Fundamental to due process is the right of the 
     President to be adequately informed of the charges so that he 
     is able to confront those charges and defend himself.
       Article II sweeps too broadly and provides too little 
     definite and specific identification. Were it an indictment, 
     it would be dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is 
     constitutionally defective and should fail.

Third Affirmative Defense: Article II Charges Multiple Offenses in One 
                                Article

       For the reasons set forth in the Third Affirmative Defense 
     to Article I, Article II is constitutionally defective 
     because it charges multiple instances of alleged acts of 
     obstruction in one article, which makes it impossible for the 
     Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandates that any 
     conviction be by the concurrence of the two-thirds of the 
     members. Accordingly, Article II should fail.
           Respectfully submitted,
     David E. Kendall,
     Nicole K. Seligman,
     Emmet T. Flood,
     Max Stier,
     Glen Donath,
     Alicia Marti,
       Williams & Connolly,
       725 12th Street, N.W.,
       Washington, D.C. 20005.
     Charles F. C. Ruff,
     Gregory B. Craig,
     Bruce R. Lindsey,
     Cheryl D. Mills,
     Lanny A. Breuer,
       Office of the White House Counsel,
       The White House,
       Washington, D.C. 20502.

       Submitted: January 11, 1999.
                                  ____


 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

     In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

     TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

       Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by 
     and through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully 
     submits to the United States Senate its Brief in connection 
     with the Impeachment Trial of William Jefferson Clinton, 
     President of the United States.

                                Summary

       The President is charged in two Articles with: (1) Perjury 
     and false and misleading testimony and statements under oath 
     before a federal grand jury (Article I), and (2) engaging in 
     a course of conduct or scheme to delay and obstruct justice 
     (Article II).
       The evidence contained in the record, when viewed as a 
     unified whole, overwhelmingly supports both charges.


                Perjury and False Statements Under Oath

       President Clinton deliberately and willfully testified 
     falsely under oath when he appeared before a federal grand 
     jury on August 17, 1998. Although what follows is not 
     exhaustive, some of the more overt examples will serve to 
     illustrate.
        At the very outset, the President read a prepared 
     statement, which itself contained totally false assertions 
     and other clearly misleading information.
        The President relied on his statement nineteen 
     times in his testimony when questioned about his relationship 
     with Ms. Lewinsky.
        President Clinton falsely testified that he was 
     not paying attention when his lawyer employed Ms. Lewinsky's 
     false affidavit at the Jones deposition.
        He falsely claimed that his actions with Ms. 
     Lewinsky did not fall within the definition of ``sexual 
     relations'' that was given at his deposition.
        He falsely testified that he answered questions 
     truthfully at his deposition concerning, among other 
     subjects, whether he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky.
        He falsely testified that he instructed Ms. 
     Lewinsky to turn over the gifts if she were subpoenaed.
        He falsely denied trying to influence Ms. Currie 
     after his deposition.
        He falsely testified that he was truthful to his 
     aides when he gave accounts of his relationship, which 
     accounts were subsequently disseminated to the media and the 
     grand jury.


                         Obstruction of Justice

       The President engaged in an ongoing scheme to obstruct both 
     the Jones civil case and the grand jury. Further, he 
     undertook a continuing and concerted plan to tamper with 
     witnesses and prospective witnesses for the purpose of 
     causing those witnesses to provide false and misleading 
     testimony. Examples abound:
        The President and Ms. Lewinsky concocted a cover 
     story to conceal their relationship, and the President 
     suggested that she employ that story if subpoenaed in the 
     Jones case.
        The President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky provide 
     an affidavit to avoid testifying in the Jones case, when he 
     knew that the affidavit would need to be false to accomplish 
     its purpose.
        The President knowingly and willfully allowed his 
     attorney to file Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit and to use it 
     for the purpose of obstructing justice in the Jones case.
        The President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she 
     provide a false account of how she received her job at the 
     Pentagon.
        The President attempted to influence the expected 
     testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie, by providing her with 
     a false account of his meetings with Ms. Lewinsky.
        The President provided several of his top aides 
     with elaborate lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, 
     so that those aides would convey the false information to the 
     public and to the grand jury. When he did this, he knew that 
     those aides would likely be called to testify, while he was 
     declining several invitations to testify. By this action, he 
     obstructed and delayed the operation of the grand jury.
        The President conspired with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. 
     Currie to conceal evidence that he had been subpoenaed in the 
     Jones case, and thereby delayed and obstructed justice.
        The President and his representatives orchestrated 
     a campaign to discredit Ms. Lewinsky in order to affect 
     adversely her credibility as a witness, and thereby attempted 
     to obstruct justice both in the Jones case and the grand 
     jury.
        The President lied repeatedly under oath in his 
     disposition in the Jones case, and thereby obstructed justice 
     in that case.
        The President's lies and misleading statements 
     under oath at the grand jury were calculated to, and did 
     obstruct, delay and prevent the due administration of justice 
     by that body.
        The President employed the power of his office to 
     procure a job for Ms. Lewinsky after she signed the false 
     affidavit by causing his friend to exert extraordinary 
     efforts for that purpose.
       The foregoing are merely accusations of an ongoing pattern 
     of obstruction of justice, and witness tampering extending 
     over a period of several months, and having the effect of 
     seriously compromising the integrity of the entire judicial 
     system.
       The effect of the President's misconduct has been 
     devastating in several respects.
       (1) He violated repeatedly his oath to ``preserve, protect 
     and defend the Constitution of the United States.''
       (2) He ignored his constitutional duty as chief law 
     enforcement officer to ``take care that the laws be 
     faithfully executed.''
       (3) He deliberately and unlawfully obstructed Paula Jones's 
     rights as a citizen to due process and the equal protection 
     of the laws, though he had sworn to protect those rights.
       (4) By his pattern of lies under oath, misleading 
     statements and deceit, he has seriously undermined the 
     integrity and credibility of the Office of President and 
     thereby the honor and integrity of the United States.
       (5) His pattern of perjuries, obstruction of justice, and 
     witness tampering has affected the truth seeking process 
     which is the foundation of our legal system.
       (6) By mounting an assault in the truth seeking process, he 
     has attacked the entire Judicial Branch of government.
       The Articles of Impeachment that the House has preferred 
     state offenses that warrant, if proved, the conviction and 
     removal from office of President William Jefferson Clinton. 
     The Articles charge that the President has committed perjury 
     before a federal grand jury and that he obstructed justice in 
     a federal civil rights action. The Senate's own precedents 
     establish beyond doubt that perjury warrants conviction and 
     removal. During the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed 
     three federal judges for committing perjury. Obstruction of 
     justice under mines the judicial system in the same fashion 
     that

[[Page S64]]

     perjury does, and it also warrants conviction and removal.
       Under our Constitution, judges are impeached under the same 
     standard as Presidents--treason, bribery, or other high 
     crimes and misdemeanors. Thus, these judicial impeachments 
     for perjury set the standard here. Finally, the Senate's own 
     precedents further establish that the President's crimes need 
     not arise directly out of his official duties. Two of the 
     three judges removed in the 1980s were removed for perjury 
     that had nothing to do with their official duties.

                              Introduction

       This Brief is intended solely to advise the Senate 
     generally of the evidence that the Managers intend to 
     product, if permitted, and of the applicable legal 
     principles. It is not intended to discuss exhaustively all of 
     the evidence, nor does it necessarily include each and every 
     witness and document that the Managers would produce in the 
     course of the trial. This Brief, then, is merely an outline 
     for the use of the Senate in reviewing and assessing the 
     evidence as it is set forth at trial--it is not, and is not 
     intended to be a substitute for a trial at which all of the 
     relevant facts will be developed.

               H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998)

       The House Impeachment Resolution charges the President with 
     high crimes and misdemeanors in two Articles. Article One 
     alleges that President Clinton ``willfully corrupted and 
     manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his 
     personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of 
     justice'' in that he willfully provided perjurious, false and 
     misleading testimony to a federal grand jury on August 17, 
     1998. Article Two asserts that the President ``has prevented, 
     obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice and 
     engaged in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, 
     impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and 
     testimony related to a federal civil rights action brought 
     against him.'' Both Articles are now before the Senate of the 
     United States for trial as provided by the Constitution of 
     the United States.
       The Office of President represents to the American people 
     and to the world, the strength, the philosophy and most of 
     all, the honor and integrity that makes us a great nation and 
     an example for the world. Because all eyes are focused upon 
     that high office, the character and credibility of any 
     temporary occupant of the Oval Office is vital to the 
     domestic and foreign welfare of the citizens. Consequently, 
     serious breaches of integrity and duty of necessity adversely 
     influence the reputation of the United States.
       This case is not about sex or private conduct. It is about 
     multiple obstructions of justice, perjury, false and 
     misleading statements, and witness tampering--all committed 
     or orchestrated by the President of the United States.
       Before addressing the President's lies and obstruction, it 
     is important to place the events in the proper context. If 
     this were only about private sex we would not now be before 
     the Senate. But the manner in which the Lewinsky relationship 
     arose and continued is important because it is illustrative 
     of the character of the President and the decisions he made.

                               Background

       Monica Lewinsky, a 22 year old intern, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 8; 
     H.Doc. 105-311, p. 728) was working at the White House during 
     the government shutdown in 1995. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 10; H.Doc. 
     105-311, p. 730) Prior to their first intimate encounter, she 
     had never even spoken with the President. Sometime on 
     November 15, 1995, Ms. Lewinsky and President Clinton flirted 
     with each other. (Id.) The President of the United States of 
     America then invited this unknown young intern into a private 
     area off the Oval Office where he kissed her. He then invited 
     her back later and when she returned, the two engaged in the 
     first of many acts of inappropriate contact. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, 
     p. 12; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 732)
       Thereafter, the two concocted a cover story. If Ms. 
     Lewinsky were seen, she was bringing papers to the President. 
     That story was totally false. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 
     105-311, p. 774; 8/26/98 Dep., p. 34; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
     1314) The only papers she brought were personal messages 
     having nothing to do with her duties or those of the 
     President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 54-55; H.Doc. 105-311, pp. 
     774-775) After Ms. Lewinsky moved from the White House to the 
     Pentagon, her frequent visits to the President were disguised 
     as visits to Betty Currie. (Id.) Those cover stories are 
     important, because they play a vital role in the later 
     perjuries and obstructions.

                               Encounters

       Over the term of their relationship the following 
     significant matters occurred:
       1. Monica Lewinsky and the President were alone on at least 
     twenty-one occasions;
       2. They had at least eleven personal sexual encounters, 
     excluding phone sex: Three in 1995, Five in 1996 and Three in 
     1997;
       3. They had at least 55 telephone conversations, at least 
     seventeen of which involved phone sex;
       4. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky twenty presents; and,
       5. Ms. Lewinsky gave the President forty presents (O.I.C. 
     Referral, App., Tab E; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 104-111)
       These are the essential facts which form the backdrop for 
     all of the events that followed.
       The sexual details of the President's encounters with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, though relevant, need not be detailed either in 
     this document or through witness testimony. It is necessary, 
     though, briefly to outline that evidence, because it will 
     demonstrate that the President repeatedly lied about that 
     sexual relationship in his deposition, before the grand jury, 
     and in his responses to the Judiciary Committee's questions. 
     He has consistently maintained that Ms. Lewinsky merely 
     performed acts on him, while he never touched her in a sexual 
     manner. This characterization not only directly contradicts 
     Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, but it also contradicts the sworn 
     grand jury testimony of three of her friends and the 
     statements by two professional counselors with whom she 
     contemporaneously shared the details of her relationship. 
     (O.I.C. Referral, H. Doc. 105-310, pgs. 138-140)
       While his treatment of Ms. Lewinsky was offensive, it is 
     much more offensive for the President to expect the Senate to 
     believe that in 1995, 1996, and 1997, his intimate contact 
     with Ms. Lewinsky was so limited that it did not fall within 
     his narrow interpretation of a definition of ``sexual 
     relations''. As later demonstrated, he did not even conceive 
     his interpretation until 1998, while preparing for his grand 
     jury appearance.

                        How To View the Evidence

       We respectfully submit that the evidence and testimony must 
     be viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. It is 
     essential to avoid considering each event in isolation, and 
     then treating it separately. Events and words that may seem 
     innocent or even exculpatory in a vacuum may well take on a 
     sinister, or even criminal connotation when observed in the 
     context of the whole plot. For example, everyone agrees that 
     Monica Lewinsky testified ``No one ever told me to lie; 
     nobody ever promised me a job.'' (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 105; H. 
     Doc. 105-311, p. 1161)
       When considered alone this would seem exculpatory. However, 
     in the context of the other evidence, another picture 
     emerges. Of course no one said. ``Now, Monica, you go in 
     there and lie.'' They didn't have to. Ms. Lewinsky knew what 
     was expected of her. Similarly, nobody promised her a job, 
     but once she signed the false affidavit, she got one.

                               The Issue

       The ultimate issue is whether the President's course of 
     conduct is such as to affect adversely the Office of the 
     President and also upon the administration of justice, and 
     whether he has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as 
     President and subversive to the Rule of Law and 
     Constitutional government.

                             The Beginning

       The events that form the basis of these charges actually 
     began in late 1995. They reached a critical stage in the 
     winter of 1997 and the first month of 1998. The event 
     culminated when the President of the United States appeared 
     before a federal grand jury, raised his right hand to God and 
     swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
     truth.


                           december 5-6, 1997

       On Friday, December 5, 1997, Monica Lewinsky asked Betty 
     Currie if the President could see her the next day, Saturday, 
     but Ms. Currie said that the President was scheduled to meet 
     with his lawyers all day. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 107-108; H. 
     Doc. 105-311, pgs. 827-828) Later that Friday, Ms. Lewinsky 
     spoke briefly to the President at a Christmas party. (ML 7/
     31/98 Int., p. 1; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1451; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
     108; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 828)

                      The Witness List Is Received

       That evening, Paula Jones's attorneys faxed a list of 
     potential witnesses to the President's attorneys. (849-DC-
     00000128; 849-DC-00000121-37; Referral, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 
     88) The list included Monica Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky 
     did not find out that her name was on the list until the 
     President told her ten days later, on December 17. (ML 8/6/98 
     GJ, pgs. 121-123; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 841-843) That delay 
     is significant.

                       Ms. Lewinsky's First Visit

       After her conversation with Ms. Currie and seeing the 
     President at the Christmas party, Ms. Lewinsky drafted a 
     letter to the President terminating their relationship. (ML-
     55-DC-0177); ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 2; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1452) 
     The next morning, Saturday, December 6, Ms. Lewinsky went to 
     the White House to deliver the letter and some gifts for the 
     President to Ms. Currie. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 108-109; H. Doc. 
     105-311, pgs. 828-829) When she arrived at the White House, 
     Ms. Lewinsky spoke to several Secret Service officers, and 
     one of them told her that the President was not with his 
     lawyers, as she thought, but rather, he was meeting with 
     Eleanor Mondale. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 111; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 
     831; Mondale 7/16/98 Int., p. 1; H. Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2907-
     2908; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 2654) Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. 
     Currie from a pay phone, angrily exchanged words with her, 
     and went home. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 112-13; H. Doc. 105-311, 
     pgs. 832-833; Currie 1/27/98 GJ, p. 27; H. Doc. 105-316, p. 
     553) After that phone call, Ms. Currie told the Secret 
     Service watch commander that the President was so upset about 
     the disclosure of his meeting with Ms. Mondale that he wanted 
     somebody fired. (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 13, 18-19; H. Doc. 
     105-316, pgs. 3356-3357).

                      The Telephone Conversations

       At 12:05 p.m., records demonstrate that Ms. Currie paged 
     Bruce Lindsey with the message: ``Call Betty ASAP.'' (964-DC-
     00000862;

[[Page S65]]

     H. Doc. 105-311, p. 2722) Around that same time, according to 
     Ms. Lewinsky, while she was back at her apartment, Ms. 
     Lewinsky and the President spoke by phone. The President was 
     very angry; he told Ms. Lewinsky that no one had every 
     treated him as poorly as she had. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-14; 
     H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-834) The President acknowledged to 
     the grand jury that he was upset about Ms. Lewinsky's 
     behavior and considered it  inappropriate. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, 
     p. 85; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 537). Nevertheless, in a sudden 
     change of mood, he invited her to visit him at the White 
     House that afternoon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 114; H.Doc. 105-
     311, p. 834)

                      Ms. Lewinsky's Second Visit

       Monica Lewinsky arrived at the White House for the second 
     time that day and was cleared to enter at 12:52 p.m. (WAVES: 
     827-DC-00000018) Although, in Ms. Lewinsky's words, the 
     President was ``very angry'' with her during their recent 
     telephone conversation, he was ``sweet'' and ``very 
     affectionate'' during this visit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-15; 
     H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-835). He also told her that he would 
     talk to Vernon Jordan about her job situation. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, 
     pgs. 115-16; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 835-836)

                The Discussions With the Secret Service

       The President also suddenly changed his attitude toward the 
     Secret Service. Ms. Currie informed some officers that if 
     they kept quiet about the Lewinsky incident, there would be 
     no disciplinary action. (Williams 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 25, 27-28; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 4539; Chinery 7/23/98 GJ, p. 22-23; H.Doc. 
     105-316, p. 456). According to the Secret Service watch 
     commander, Captain Jeffrey Purdie, the President personally 
     told him, ``I hope you use your discretion'' or ``I hope I 
     can count on your discretion.'' (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, p. 32; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3360; Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, p. 3; H.Doc. 105-
     316, p. 3353) Deputy Chief Charles O'Malley, Captain Purdie's 
     supervisor, testified that he knew of no other time in his 
     fourteen years of service at the White House where the 
     President raised a performance issue with a member of the 
     Secret Service uniformed division. (O'Malley 9/8/98 Dep., 
     pgs. 40-41; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3168-3171) After his 
     conversation with the President, Captain Purdie told a number 
     of officers that they should not discuss the Lewinsky 
     incident. (Porter 8/13/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3343; 
     Niedzwiecki 7/30/98 GJ, pgs. 30-31, H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3114)
       When the President was before the grand jury and questioned 
     about his statements to the Secret Service regarding this 
     incident, the President testified, ``I don't remember what I 
     said and I don't remember to whom I said it.'' (WJC 8/17/98 
     GJ, p. 86; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 534) When confronted with 
     Captain Purdie's testimony, the President testified, ``I 
     don't remember anything I said to him in that regard. I have 
     no recollection of that whatever.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 91; 
     H.Doc. 105-311, p. 543)

             The President's Knowledge of the Witness List

       President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he 
     learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list that 
     evening, Saturday, December 6, during a meeting with his 
     lawyers. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 83-84; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 535-
     536) He stood by this answer in response to Request Number 16 
     submitted by the Judiciary Committee. (Exhibit 18). The 
     meeting occurred around 5 p.m., after Ms. Lewinsky had left 
     the White House. (WAVES: 1407-DC-00000005; Lindsey 3/12/98 
     GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2418-19) According to 
     Bruce Lindsey, at the meeting, Bob Bennett had a copy of the 
     Jones witness list faxed to Mr. Bennett the previous night. 
     (Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 65-67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2419) 
     (Exhibit 15)
       However, during his deposition, the President testified 
     that he had heard about the witness list before he saw it. 
     (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 70) In other words, if the President 
     testified truthfully in his deposition, then he knew about 
     the witness list before the 5 p.m. meeting. It is valid to 
     infer that hearing Ms. Lewinsky's name on a witness list 
     prompted the President's sudden and otherwise unexplained 
     change from ``very angry'' to ``very affectionate'' that 
     Saturday afternoon. It is also reasonable to infer that it 
     prompted him to give the unique instruction to a Secret 
     Service watch commander to use ``discretion'' regarding Ms. 
     Lewinsky's visit to the White House, which the watch 
     commander interpreted as an instruction to refrain from 
     discussing the incident. (Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, pgs. 20-21; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3351-3352; Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 32-
     33; H.Doc. 105-315, pgs. 3360-3361)

                    The Job Search for Ms. Lewinsky

       Monica Lewinsky had been looking for a good paying and high 
     profile job in New York since the previous July. She was not 
     having much success despite the President's promise to help. 
     In early November, Betty Currie arranged a meeting with 
     Vernon Jordan who was supposed to help. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 
     176; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 592)
       On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky met for twenty minutes with Mr. 
     Jordan (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pg. 104; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 824) No 
     action followed; no job interviews were arranged and there 
     were no further contacts with Mr. Jordan. It was obvious that 
     he made no effort to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, it 
     was so unimportant to him that he ``had no recollection of an 
     early November meeting'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pg. 50; H.Doc. 105-
     316, p. 1799) and that finding a job for Ms. Lewinsky was not 
     a priority (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 76; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1804) 
     (Chart R) Nothing happened throughout the month of November, 
     because Mr. Jordan was either gone or would not return 
     Monica's calls. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 105-106; H.Doc. 105-311, 
     pgs. 825-826)
       During the December 6 meeting with the President, she 
     mentioned that she had not been able to get in touch with Mr. 
     Jordan and that it did not seem he had done anything to help 
     her. The President responded by stating, ``Oh, I'll talk to 
     him. I'll get on it,'' or something to that effect. (ML 8/6/
     98 GJ, pgs. 115-116; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 836) There was 
     obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan 
     met the President the next day, December 7, but the meeting 
     was unrelated to Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ. pgs. 83, 116; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1805, 1810)

                     The December 11, 1997 Activity

       The first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually 
     procure employment took place on December 11. Mr. Jordan met 
     with Ms. Lewinsky and gave her a list of contact names. The 
     two also discussed the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 119, 
     120; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 839-840) That meeting Mr. Jordan 
     remembered. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1798) 
     Vernon Jordan immediately placed calls to two prospective 
     employers. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 54, 62-63; H.Doc. 105-316, 
     pgs. 1800-1802) Later in the afternoon, he even called the 
     President to give him a report on his job search efforts. (VJ 
     3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1802) Clearly, Mr. 
     Jordan and the President were now very interested in helping 
     Monica find a good job in New York. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 95; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1807)

                   Significance of December 11, 1997

       This sudden interest was inspired by a court order entered 
     on December 11, 1997. On that date, Judge Susan Webber Wright 
     ordered that Paula Jones was entitled to information 
     regarding any state or federal employee with whom the 
     President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, or 
     sought to have sexual relations.
       The President knew that it would be politically and legally 
     expedient to maintain an amicable relationship with Monica 
     Lewinsky. And the President knew that that relationship would 
     be fostered by finding Ms. Lewinsky a job. This was 
     accomplished through enlisting the help of Vernon Jordan.

         December 17, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Learns of Witness List

       On December 17, 1997, between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, 
     Monica Lewinsky's phone rang unexpectedly. It was the 
     President of the United States. The President said that he 
     wanted to tell Ms. Lewinsky two things: one was that Betty 
     Currie's brother had been killed in a car accident; secondly, 
     the President said that he ``had some more bad news,'' that 
     he had seen the witness list for the Paula Jones case and her 
     name was on it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
     843) The President told Ms. Lewinsky that seeing her name on 
     the list ``broke his heart.'' He then told her that ``if 
     [she] were to be subpoenaed, [she] should contact Betty and 
     let Betty know that [she] had received the subpoena.'' (Id.) 
     Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do if subpoenaed. The 
     President responded: ``Well, maybe you can sign an 
     affidavit.'' (Id.) Both parties knew that the Affidavit would 
     need to be false and misleading to accomplish the desired 
     result.

                     The President's ``Suggestion''

       Then, the President had a very pointed suggestion for 
     Monica Lewinsky, a suggestion that left little room for 
     compromise. He did not specifically tell her to lie. What he 
     did say is ``you know, you can always say you were coming to 
     see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'' (ML 8/6/98 
     GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843)
       In order to understand the significance of this statement, 
     it is necessary to recall the ``cover stories'' that the 
     President and Ms. Lewinsky had previously structured in order 
     to deceive those who protected and worked with the President.
       Ms. Lewinsky said she would carry papers when she visited 
     the President. When she saw him, she would say: ``Oh, gee, 
     `here are your letters,' wink, wink, wink and he would 
     answer, `Okay that's good.' '' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 
     105-311, p. 774) After Ms. Lewinsky left White House 
     employment, she would return to the Oval Office under the 
     guise of visiting Betty Currie, not the President. (ML 8/6/98 
     GJ, p. 55; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 775)
       Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky promised the President that she 
     would always deny the sexual relationship and always protect 
     him. The President would respond ``that's good'' or similar 
     language of encouragement. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 22; H.Doc. 105-
     311, p. 1078)
       So, when the President called Ms. Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on 
     December 17 to tell her she was on the witness list, he made 
     sure to remind her of those prior ``cover stories.'' Ms. 
     Lewinsky testified that when the President brought up the 
     misleading stories, she understood that the two would 
     continue their pre-existing pattern of deception.

                       The President's Intention

       It became clear that the President had no intention of 
     making his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky a public 
     affair. And he would use lies, deceit, and deception to 
     ensure that the truth would not be known.
       It is interesting to note that when the grand jury asked 
     the President whether he remembered calling Monica Lewinsky 
     at 2:00 a.m., he responded: ``No sir, I don't. But it would . 
     . . it is quite possible that that happened. . . .'' (WJC 8/
     17/98 GJ, p. 115; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 567)

[[Page S66]]

       And when he was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky 
     to continue the cover stories of ``coming to see Betty'' or 
     ``bringing the letters,'' he answered: ``I don't remember 
     exactly what I told her that night.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 
     117; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 565)
       Six days earlier, he had become aware that Paula Jones' 
     lawyers were now able to inquire about other women. Ms. 
     Lewinsky could file a false affidavit, but it might not work. 
     It was absolutely essential that both parties told the same 
     story. He knew that he would lie if asked about Ms. Lewinsky, 
     and he wanted to make certain that she would lie also. That 
     is why the President of the United States called a twenty-
     four year old woman at 2:00 in the morning.

                          The Evidence Mounts

       But the President had an additional problem. It was not 
     enough that he (and Ms. Lewinsky) simply deny the 
     relationship. The evidence was beginning to accumulate. 
     Because of the emerging evidence, the President found it 
     necessary to reevaluate his defense. By this time, the 
     evidence was establishing, through records and eyewitness 
     accounts, that the President and Monica Lewinsky were 
     spending a significant amount of time together in the Oval 
     Office complex. It was no longer expedient simply to refer to 
     Ms. Lewinsky as a ``groupie'', ``stalker'', ``clutch'', or 
     ``home wrecker'' as the White House first attempted to do. 
     The unassailable facts were forcing the President to 
     acknowledge some type of relationship. But at this point, he 
     still had the opportunity to establish a non-sexual 
     explanation for their meetings, since his DNA had not yet 
     been identified on Monica Lewinsky's blue dress.

                        Need for the Cover Story

       Therefore, the President needed Monica Lewinsky to go along 
     with the cover story in order to provide an innocent, 
     intimate-free explanation for their frequent meetings. And 
     that innocent explanation came in the form of ``document 
     deliveries'' and ``friendly chats with Betty Currie.''
       Significantly, when the President was deposed on January 
     17, 1998, he used the exact same cover stories that had been 
     utilized by Ms. Lewinsky. In doing so, he stayed consistent 
     with any future Lewinsky testimony while still maintaining 
     his defense in the Jones lawsuit.
       In the President's deposition, he was asked whether he was 
     ever alone with Monica Lewinsky. He responded: ``I don't 
     recall . . . She--it seems to me she brought things to me 
     once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time 
     she would be in there, drop it off, exchange a few words and 
     go, she was there.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 52-53)
       Additionally, when questions were posed regarding Ms. 
     Lewinsky's frequent visits to the Oval Office, the President 
     did not hesitate to mention Betty Currie in his answers, for 
     example:

       And my recollection is that on a couple of occasions after 
     [the pizza party meeting], she was there [in the oval office] 
     but my secretary, Betty Currie, was there with her. (WJC 1/
     17/98 Dep., p. 58)
       Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica Lewinsky?
       A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before 
     Christmas. She came by to see Betty sometime before 
     Christmas. And she was there talking to her, and I stuck my 
     head out, said hello to her. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68)

             December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Is Subpoenaed

       On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to 
     testify in a deposition scheduled for January 23, 1998 in the 
     Jones case. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 128; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 848) 
     (Charts F and G) Extremely distraught, she immediately called 
     the President's closest friend, Vernon Jordan. As noted Ms. 
     Lewinsky testified that the President previously told her to 
     call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. She called Mr. 
     Jordan instead because Ms. Currie's brother recently died and 
     she did not want to bother her. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 128-129; 
     H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 848, 849)

                          Vernon Jordan's Role

       Mr. Jordan invited Ms. Lewinsky to his office and she 
     arrived shortly before 5 p.m., still extremely distraught. 
     Around this time, Mr. Jordan called the President and told 
     him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1815) (Exhibit 1) During the meeting with 
     Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan characterized as 
     ``disturbing'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 100; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
     1716), she talked about her infatuation with the President. 
     (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 150; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1724) Mr. Jordan 
     decided that he would call a lawyer for her. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, 
     p. 161; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1726)

                    Mr. Jordan Informs the President

       That evening, Mr. Jordan met with the President and relayed 
     his conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. The details are extremely 
     important because the President, in his deposition, did not 
     recall that meeting. Mr. Jordan told the President again that 
     Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, that he was concerned about 
     her fascination with the President, and that Ms. Lewinsky had 
     asked Mr. Jordan if he thought the President would leave the 
     First Lady. He also asked the President if he had sexual 
     relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 169; H.Doc 
     105-3316, p. 1727) The President was asked at his deposition:

       Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that 
     Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case?
       A. I don't think so.
       Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the 
     possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case?
       A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she 
     was, I think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I 
     want to be as accurate as I can.

     (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 68-69)
       In the grand jury, the President first repeated his denial 
     that Mr. Jordan told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. 
     (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 491) Then, when 
     given more specific facts, he admitted that he ``knows now'' 
     that he spoke with Mr. Jordan about the subpoena on the night 
     of December 19, but his ``memory is not clear. . . .'' (WJC 
     8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 41-42; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 493-494) In an 
     attempt to explain away his false deposition testimony, 
     the President testified in the grand jury that he was 
     trying to remember who told him first. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 
     41; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 492-493) But that was not the 
     question. So his answer was false and misleading. When one 
     considers the nature of the conversation between the 
     President and Mr. Jordan, the suggestion that it would be 
     forgotten defies common sense.

                           December 28, 1997

       December 28, 1997 is a crucial date, because the evidence 
     shows that the President made false and misleading statements 
     to the federal court, the federal grand jury and the Congress 
     of the United States about the events on that date. (Chart J) 
     It is also a date on which he obstructed justice.

                        The President's Account

       The President testified that it was ``possible'' that he 
     invited Ms. Lewinsky to the White House for this visit. (WJC 
     8/17/98 GJ, p. 33; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 485) He admitted that 
     he ``probably'' gave Ms. Lewinsky the most gifts he had ever 
     given her on that date, (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 35; H.Doc. 105-
     311, p. 487) and that he had given her gifts on other 
     occasions. (WJC 8/6/98 GJ, p. 35) (Chart D) Among the many 
     gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 was a 
     bear that he said was a symbol of strength. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
     176; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 896) Yet only two-and-a-half weeks 
     later, the President forgot that he had given any gifts to 
     Ms. Lewinsky.
       As an attorney, the President knew that the law will not 
     tolerate someone who says, ``I don't recall'' when that 
     answer is unreasonable under the circumstances. He also knew 
     that, under those circumstances, his answer in the deposition 
     could not be believed. When asked in the grand jury why he 
     was unable to remember, even though he had given Ms. Lewinsky 
     so many gifts only two-and-a-half weeks before the 
     deposition, the President put forth an obviously contrived 
     explanation.

       ``I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they 
     were, not that I don't recall whether I had given them.''

      (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 51; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 503)

                     Response to Committee Requests

       The President adopted that same answer in Response No. 42 
     to the House Judiciary Committee's Requests For Admission. 
     (Exhibit 18) He was not asked in the deposition to identify 
     the gifts. He was simply asked, ``Have you ever'' given gifts 
     to Ms. Lewinsky. The law does not allow a witness to insert 
     unstated premises or mental reservations into the question to 
     make his answer technically true, if factually false. The 
     essence of lying is in deception, not in words.
       The President's answer was false. The evidence also proves 
     that his explanation to the grand jury and to the Committee 
     is also false. The President would have us believe that he 
     was able to analyze questions as they were being asked, and 
     pick up such things as verb tense in an attempt to make his 
     statements at least literally true. But when he was asked a 
     simple, straightforward question, he did not understand it. 
     Neither his answer in the deposition nor his attempted 
     explanation is reasonable or true.

                       Testimony Concerning Gifts

       The President was asked in the deposition if Monica 
     Lewinsky ever gave him gifts. He responded, ``once or 
     twice.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 77) This is also false 
     testimony calculated to obstruct justice. He answered this 
     question in his Response to the House Judiciary Committee by 
     saying that he receives numerous gifts, and he did not focus 
     on the precise number. (Exhibit 18) The law again does not 
     support the President's position. An answer that baldly 
     understates a numerical fact in response to a specific 
     quantitative inquiry can be deemed technically true but 
     actually false. For example, a witness is testifying 
     falsely if he says he went to the store five times when in 
     fact he had gone fifty, even though technically he had 
     also gone five times. So too, when the President answered 
     once or twice in the face of evidence that Ms. Lewinsky 
     was frequently bringing gifts, he was lying. (Chart C)

                          Concealment of Gifts

       On December 28, one of the most blatant efforts to obstruct 
     justice and conceal evidence occurred. Ms. Lewinsky testified 
     that she discussed with the President the fact that she had 
     been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called for her to 
     produce gifts. She recalled telling the President that the 
     subpoena requested a hat pin, and that caused her concern. 
     (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 151-152; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 871-872) 
     The President

[[Page S67]]

     told her that it ``bothered'' him, too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 
     66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that 
     she take the gifts somewhere, or give them to someone, maybe 
     to Betty. The President answered: ``I don't know'' or ``Let 
     me think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 152-153; H.Doc. 
     105-311, pgs. 872-873) (Chart L) Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky 
     got a call from Ms. Currie, who said: ``I understand you have 
     something to give me'' or ``the President said you have 
     something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 
     105-311, pgs. 874-875) Ms. Currie has a fuzzy memory about 
     this incident, but says that ``the best she can remember,'' 
     Ms. Lewinsky called her. (Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 
     105-316, p. 581)

                         The Cell Phone Record

       There is key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection 
     is wrong. Ms. Lewinsky said that she thought Ms. Currie 
     called from her cell phone. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155) 
     (Chart K, Exhibit 2) Ms. Currie's cell phone record 
     corroborates Ms. Lewinsky and proves conclusively that Ms. 
     Currie called Monica from her cell phone several hours after 
     she had left the White House. Moreover, Ms. Currie herself 
     later testified that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than 
     hers on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
     584) The facts prove that the President directed Ms. Currie 
     to pick up the gifts.

                       Ms. Currie's Later Actions

       That conclusion is buttressed by Ms. Currie's actions. If 
     Ms. Lewinsky had placed the call requesting a gift exchange, 
     Ms. Currie would logically ask the reason for such a 
     transfer. Ms. Lewinsky was giving her a box of gifts from the 
     President yet she did not tell the President of this strange 
     request. She simply took the gifts and placed them under her 
     bed without asking a single question. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 
     57-58; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 557; BC 5/6/98 GJ, pgs. 105-108, 
     114; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 581-582)
       The President stated in his Response to questions No. 24 
     and 25 from the House Committee that he was not concerned 
     about the gifts. (Exhibit 18) In fact, he said that he 
     recalled telling Monica that if the Jones lawyers request 
     gifts, she should turn them over. The President testified 
     that he is ``not sure'' if he knew the subpoena asked for 
     gifts. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 42-43; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 494-
     495) Would Monica Lewinsky and the President discuss turning 
     over gifts to the Jones lawyers if Ms. Lewinsky had not told 
     him that the subpoena asked for gifts? On the other hand, if 
     he knew the subpoena requested gifts, why would he give Ms. 
     Lewinsky more gifts on December 28? Ms. Lewinsky's testimony 
     reveals the answer. She said that she never questioned ``that 
     we were ever going to do anything but keep this private'' and 
     that meant to take ``whatever appropriate steps needed to be 
     taken'' to keep it quiet. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 166; H.Doc. 
     105-311, p. 886) The only logical inference is that the 
     gifts--including the bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit 
     reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would deny the 
     relationship--even  in the face of a federal subpoena.

                  The President's Deposition Testimony

       Furthermore, the President, at various times in his 
     deposition, seriously misrepresented the nature of his 
     meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 in order to obstruct 
     the administration of justice. First, he was asked: ``Did she 
     tell you she had been served with a subpoena in this case?'' 
     The President answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she had 
     been.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68)
       He was also asked if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky 
     about the possibility of her testifying.'' ``I'm not sure . . 
     .,'' he said. he then added that he may have joked to her 
     that the Jones lawyers might subpoena every woman he has ever 
     spoken to, and that ``I don't think we ever had more of a 
     conversation than that about it. . . .'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., 
     p. 70) Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict this 
     testimony, but the President also directly contradicted 
     himself before the grand jury. Speaking of his December 28, 
     1997 meeting, he said that he ``knew by then, of course, that 
     she had gotten a subpoena'' and that they had a 
     ``conversation about the possibility of her testifying.'' 
     (WJC 8/17/98 Dep., pgs. 35-36) Remember, he had this 
     conversation about her testimony only two-and-a-half weeks 
     before his deposition. Again, his version is not reasonable.

   January 5-9, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky Signs the Affidavit and Gets a Job

       The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to 
     execute a false Affidavit. He was so certain of the content 
     that when she asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no, 
     that he had seen fifteen of them. (ML 8/2/98 Int., p. 3; 
     H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1489) He got his information from 
     discussions with Ms. Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan generally 
     about the content of the Affidavit. Moreover, the President 
     had suggested the Affidavit himself and he trusted Mr. Jordan 
     to be certain the mission was accomplished.

                     Additional Presidential Advice

       In the afternoon of January 5, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with 
     her lawyer, Mr. Carter, to discuss the Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 
     GJ, p. 192; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 912) Her lawyer asked her some 
     hard questions about how she got her job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
     195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) After the meeting, she called 
     Betty Currie and said that she wanted to speak to the 
     President before she signed anything. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; 
     H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
     discussed the issue of how she would answer under oath if 
     asked about how she got her job at the Pentagon. (ML 8/6/98 
     GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) The President told her: 
     ``Well, you could always say that the people in Legislative 
     Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, 
     p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) That, too, is false and 
     misleading.

                        Vernon Jordan's New Role

       The President was also kept advised as to the contents of 
     the Affidavit by Vernon Jordan. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 224; H.Doc. 
     105-316, p. 1828) On January 6, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky picked up 
     a draft of the Affidavit from Mr. Carter's office. (ML 8/6/98 
     GJ, p. 199; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 919) She delivered a copy to 
     Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, 
     p. 920) because she wanted Mr. Jordan to look at the 
     Affidavit in the belief that if Vernon Jordan gave his 
     imprimatur, the President would also approve. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, 
     pgs. 194-195; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 914, 915) (Chart M) Ms. 
     Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan conferred about the contents and 
     agreed to delete a paragraph inserted by Mr. Carter which 
     might open a line of questions concerning whether she had 
     been alone with the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 
     105-311, p. 920) (Exhibit 3) Mr. Jordan maintained that he 
     had nothing to do with the details of the Affidavit. (VJ 3/5/
     98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1735) He admits, though, 
     that he spoke with the President after conferring with Ms. 
     Lewinsky about the changes made to her Affidavit. (VJ 5/5/
     98 GJ, p. 218; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1827)

                 Ms. Lewinsky Signs the False Affidavit

       The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false 
     Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 204-205; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 
     924-925) (Chart N; Exhibit 12) She showed the executed copy 
     to Mr. Jordan that same day. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 
     105-316, p. 1828) (Exhibit 4) Mr. Jordan, in turn, notified 
     the President that she signed an affidavit denying a sexual 
     relationship. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 26; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1739)

                       Ms. Lewinsky Gets the Job

       On January 8, 1998, Mr. Jordan arranged an interview for 
     Ms. Lewinsky with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York. (ML 8/6/
     98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) The interview went 
     poorly, so Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. 
     (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) Mr. Jordan, 
     who had done nothing to assist Ms. Lewinsky's job search from 
     early November to mid December, then called MacAndrews and 
     Forbes CEO, Ron Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they 
     could happen.'' (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 231; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
     1829) Mr. Jordan called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to 
     worry. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 208-209; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 928-
     929) That evening, Ms. Lewinsky was called by MacAndrews and 
     Forbes and told that she would be given more interviews the 
     next morning. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 209; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 929)
       After a series of interviews with MacAndrews and Forbes 
     personnel, she was informally offered a job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, 
     p. 210; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 930) When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. 
     Jordan to tell him, he passed the good news on to Betty 
     Currie stating, ``Mission Accomplished.'' (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 
     39; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1898). Later, Mr. Jordan called the 
     President and told him personally. (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 41; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1899) (Chart P)

              The Reason for Mr. Jordan's Unique Behavior

       After Ms. Lewinsky had spent months looking for a job--
     since July according to the President's lawyers--Vernon 
     Jordan made the critical call to a CEO the day after the 
     false Affidavit was signed. Mr. Perelman testified that Mr. 
     Jordan had never called him before about a job 
     recommendation. (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 11; H.Doc. 105-
     316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan, on the other hand, said that he 
     called Mr. Perelman to recommend for hiring: (1) former Mayor 
     Dinkins of New York; (2) a very talented attorney from Akin 
     Gump; (3) a Harvard business school graduate; and (4) Monica 
     Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 58-59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1747) 
     Even if Mr. Perelman's testimony is mistaken, Ms. Lewinsky's 
     qualifications do not compare to those of the individuals 
     previously recommended by Mr. Jordan.
       Vernon Jordan was well aware that people with whom Ms. 
     Lewinsky worked at the White House did not like her (VJ 3/3/
     98 GJ, pgs. 43, 59) and that she did not like her Pentagon 
     job. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43-44; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1706, 
     1707) Mr. Jordan was asked if at ``any point during this 
     process you wondered about her qualifications for 
     employment?'' He answered: ``No, because that was not my 
     judgment to make.'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 44; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
     1707) Yet, when he called Mr. Perelman the day after she 
     signed the Affidavit, he referred to Ms. Lewinsky as a bright 
     young girl who is ``terrific.'' (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 
     10; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan testified that she 
     had been pressing him for a job and voicing unrealistic 
     expectations concerning positions and salary. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, 
     pgs. 37-38; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1742) Moreover, she narrated a 
     disturbing story about the President leaving the First Lady, 
     and how the President was not spending enough time with her. 
     Yet, none of that gave Mr. Jordan pause in making 
     the recommendation, especially after Monica was 
     subpoenaed. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 156-157; H.Doc. 105-316, 
     p. 1725)

[[Page S68]]

                 The Importance of the False Affidavit

       Monica Lewinsky's false Affidavit enabled the President, 
     through his attorneys, to assert at his January 17, 1998 
     deposition ``. . . there is absolutely no sex of any kind in 
     any manner, shape of form with President Clinton. . . .'' 
     (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) When questioned by his own 
     attorney in the deposition, the President stated specifically 
     that paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit was ``absolutely 
     true.'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) The President later 
     affirmed the truth of that statement when testifying before 
     the grand jury. (WJC, 8/17/98 GJ, p. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-311, 
     pg. 473) Paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit states:

       ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the 
     President, he did not propose that we have a sexual 
     relationship, he did not offer me employment or other 
     benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not 
     deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
     relationship.''

       Significantly, Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the draft Affidavit on 
     January 6, and signed it on January 7 after deleting a 
     reference to being alone with the President. She showed a 
     copy of the signed Affidavit to Vernon Jordan, who called the 
     President and told him that she had signed it. (VJ, 3/5/98 
     GJ, pgs. 24-26; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1728, 1739; VJ, 5/5/98 
     GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828)

                     The Rush To File the Affidavit

       For the affidavit to work for the President in precluding 
     questions by the Jones attorneys concerning Ms. Lewinsky, it 
     had to be filed with the Court and provided to the 
     President's attorneys in time for his deposition on January 
     17. On January 14, the President's lawyers called Ms. 
     Lewinsky's lawyer and left a message, presumably to find out 
     if he had filed the Affidavit with the Court. (Carrier 6/18/
     98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) (Chart O) On January 
     15, the President's attorneys called her attorney twice. When 
     they finally reached him, they requested a copy of the 
     Affidavit and asked him, ``Are we still on time?'' (Carter 6/
     18/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 423) Ms. Lewinsky's 
     lawyer faxed a copy on the 15th. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123, 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) The President's counsel was aware of 
     its contents and used it powerfully in the deposition.
       Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer called the court in Arkansas twice on 
     January 15 to ensure that the Affidavit could be filed on 
     Saturday, January 17. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, pgs. 124-125; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 423-424) (Exhibit 5) He finished the 
     Motion to Quash Ms. Lewinsky's deposition in the early 
     morning hours of January 16 and mailed it to the Court 
     with the false Affidavit attached, for Saturday delivery. 
     (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 134; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) The 
     President's lawyers left him another message on January 
     16, saying, ``You'll know what it's about.'' (Carter 6/18/
     98 GJ, p. 135; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) Obviously, the 
     President needed that Affidavit to be filed with the Court 
     to support his plans to mislead Ms. Jones' attorneys in 
     the deposition, and thereby obstruct justice.

                          The Newsweek Inquiry

       On January 15, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek called Betty 
     Currie and asked her about Ms. Lewinsky sending gifts to her 
     by courier. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584; ML 
     8/6/98 GJ, p. 228; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 948) Ms. Currie than 
     called Ms. Lewinsky and told her about it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
     228-229; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 948-949) The President was out 
     of town, so later, Betty Currie called Ms. Lewinsky back, and 
     asked for a ride to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
     229; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 949; Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 130-131; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 585) Mr. Jordan advised her to speak with 
     Bruce Lindsey and Mike McCurry. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 71) Ms. 
     Currie testified that she spoke immediately to Mr. Lindsey 
     about Isikoff's call. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 127; H.Doc. 105-316, 
     p. 584)

                 January 17, 1998, Deposition Aftermath

       By the time the President concluded his deposition on 
     January 17, he knew that someone was talking about his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He also knew that the only 
     person who had personal knowledge was Ms. Lewinsky herself. 
     The cover stories that he and Ms. Lewinsky created, and that 
     he used himself during the deposition, were now in jeopardy. 
     It became imperative that he not only contact Ms. Lewinsky, 
     but that he obtain corroboration of his account of the 
     relationship from his trusted secretary, Ms. Currie. At 
     around 7 p.m. on the night of the deposition, the President 
     called Ms. Currie and asked that she come in the following 
     day, Sunday. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
     701 (Exhibit 6) Ms. Currie could not recall the President 
     ever before calling her that late at home on a Saturday 
     night. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) (Chart 
     S) Sometime in the early morning hours of January 18, 1998, 
     the President learned of a news report concerning Ms. 
     Lewinsky released earlier that day. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 142-
     143; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 594-595) (Exhibit 14)

              The Tampering With the Witness, Betty Currie

       As the charts indicate, between 11:49 a.m. and 2:55 p.m., 
     there were three phone calls between Mr. Jordan and the 
     President. (Exhibit 7) At about 5 p.m., Ms. Currie met with 
     the President. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 558) 
     He told her that he had just been deposed and that the 
     attorneys asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. (BC 
     1/27/98 GJ, p. 69-70; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) He then made a 
     series of statements to Ms. Currie: (Chart T)

       (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
       (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
       (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
       (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
       (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

     (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 
     7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
       During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony, she was asked 
     whether she believed that the President wished her to agree 
     with the statements:

       Q. Would it be fair to say, then--based on the way he 
     stated [these five points] and the demeanor that he was using 
     at the time that he stated it to you--that he wished you to 
     agree with that statement?
       A. I can't speak for him, but----
       Q. How did you take it? Because you told us at these 
     [previous] meetings in the last several days that that is how 
     you took it.
       A. [Nodding.]
       Q. And you're nodding you head, ``yes,'' is that correct?
       A. That's correct.
       Q. Okay, with regard to the statement that the President 
     made to you, ``You remember I was never really alone with 
     Monica, right?'' Was that also a statement that, as far as 
     you took, that he wished you to agree with that?
       A. Correct.

     (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, 559)
       Though Ms. Currie would later intimate that she did not 
     necessarily feel pressured by the President, she did state 
     that she felt the President was seeking her agreement (or 
     disagreement) with those statements. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 27; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 669)

                    Was This Obstruction of Justice?

       The President essentially admitted to making these 
     statements when he knew they were not true. Consequently, he 
     had painted himself into a legal corner. Understanding the 
     seriousness of the President ``coaching'' Ms. Currie, the 
     argument has been made that those statements to her could not 
     constitute obstruction because she had not been subpoenaed, 
     and the President did not know that she was a potential 
     witness at the time. This argument is refuted by both the law 
     and the facts.
       The United States Court of Appeals rejected this argument, 
     and stated, ``[A] person may be convicted of obstructing 
     justice if he urges or persuades a prospective witness to 
     give false testimony. Neither must the target be scheduled to 
     testify at the time of the offense, nor must he or she 
     actually give testimony at a later time.'' United States v. 
     Shannon, 836 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing, e.g., 
     United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 931 (3rd Cir. 
     1981)).
       Of course Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and the 
     President clearly wanted her to be deposed to corroborate 
     him, as his testimony demonstrates. The President claims that 
     he called Ms. Currie into work on a Sunday night only to find 
     out what she knew. But the President knew the truth about his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and if he had told the truth 
     during his deposition the day before, then he would have no 
     reason to worry about what Ms. Currie knew. More importantly, 
     the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's reaction to his 
     demeanor, and the blatant lies that he suggested clearly 
     prove that the President was not merely interviewing Ms. 
     Currie. Rather, he was looking for corroboration for his 
     false cover-up, and that is why he coached her.

                January 18, the Search for Ms. Lewinsky

       Very soon after his Sunday meeting with Ms. Currie, at 5:12 
     p.m., the flurry of telephone calls in search of Monica 
     Lewinsky began. (Chart S) between 5:12 p.m. and 8:28 p.m., 
     Ms. Currie paged Ms. Lewinsky four times. ``Kay'' is a 
     reference to a code name Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie agreed 
     to when contacting one another. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 216; H.Doc. 
     105-311, pg. 936) At 11:02 p.m., the President called Ms. 
     Currie at home to ask if she had reached Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/
     98 GJ, p. 160; H. Doc. 105-316, p. 702)

                    January 19, the Search Continues

       The following morning, January 19, Ms. Currie continued to 
     work diligently on behalf of the President. Between 7:02 a.m. 
     and 8:41 a.m., she paged Ms. Lewinsky another five times. 
     (Chart S) (Exhibit 8) After the 8:41 page, Ms. Currie called 
     the President at 8:43 a.m. and said that she was unable to 
     reach Ms. Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 161-162; H.Doc. 105-
     316, p. 703) One minute later, at 8:44 a.m., she again paged 
     Ms. Lewinsky. This time Ms. Currie's page stated ``Family 
     Emergency,'' apparently in an attempt to alarm Ms. Lewinsky 
     into calling back. That may have been the President's idea, 
     since Ms. Currie had just spoken with him. The President was 
     obviously quite concerned because he called Betty Currie only 
     six minutes later, at 8:50 a.m. Immediately thereafter, at 
     8:51 a.m., Ms. Currie tried a different tact, sending the 
     message: ``Good news.'' Again, perhaps at the President's 
     suggestion. If bad news does not get her to call, try good 
     news. Ms. Currie said that she was trying to encourage Ms. 
     Lewinsky to call, but there was no sense of ``urgency.'' (BC 
     7/22/98 GJ, p. 165; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 704) Ms. Currie's 
     recollection of why she was calling was again fuzzy. She said 
     at one point that

[[Page S69]]

     she believes the President asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky, 
     and she thought she was calling just to tell her that her 
     name came up in the deposition. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 162; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed; 
     of course her name came up in the deposition. There was 
     obviously another and more important reason the President 
     needed to get in touch with her.

         Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky's Lawyers Join the Search

       At 8:56 a.m., the President telephoned Vernon Jordan, who 
     then joined in the activity. Over a course of twenty-four 
     minutes, from 10:29 to 10:53 a.m., Mr. Jordan called the 
     White House three times, paged Ms. Lewinsky, and called Ms. 
     Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter. Between 10:53 a.m. and 
     4:54 p.m., there are continued calls between Mr. Jordan, Ms. 
     Lewinsky's attorney and individuals at the White House.

                    Ms. Lewinsky Replaces Her Lawyer

       Later that afternoon, at 4:54 p.m., Mr. Jordan called Mr. 
     Carter. Mr. Carter relayed that he had been told he no longer 
     represented Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 141; H.Doc. 105-
     316, p. 1771) Mr. Jordan then made feverish attempts to reach 
     the President or someone at the White House to tell them the 
     bad news, as represented by the six calls between 4:58 p.m. 
     and 5:22 p.m. Vernon Jordan said that he tried to relay this 
     information to the White House because ``[t]he President 
     asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job,'' and he thought it 
     was ``information that they ought to have.'' (VJ 6/9/98 GJ, 
     pgs. 45-46; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1968) (Chart Q) Mr. Jordan 
     then called Mr. Carter back at 5:14 p.m. to go over what they 
     had already talked about. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 146; H.Doc. 104-
     316, p. 1772) Mr. Jordan finally reached the President at 
     5:56 p.m. and told him that Mr. Carter had been fired. (VJ 6/
     9/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1970)

                    The Reason for the Urgent Search

       This activity shows how important it was for the President 
     of the United States to find Monica Lewinsky to learn to whom 
     she was talking. Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Ms. 
     Lewinsky. The President had just completed a deposition in 
     which he provided false and misleading testimony about his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. She was a co-conspirator in 
     hiding this relationship from the Jones attorneys, and he was 
     losing control over her. The President never got complete 
     control over her again.

     Article I.--False and Misleading Statements to the Grand Jury

       Article I addresses the President's perjurious, false, and 
     misleading testimony to the grand jury. Four categories of 
     false grand jury testimony are listed in the Article. Some 
     salient examples of false statements are described below. 
     When judging the statements made and the answers given, it is 
     vital to recall that the President spent literally days 
     preparing his testimony with his lawyer. He and his attorney 
     were fully aware that the testimony would center around his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his deposition testimony 
     in the Jones case.

                          Grand Jury Testimony

       On August 17, after six invitations, the President of the 
     United States appeared before a grand jury of his fellow 
     citizens and took an oath to tell the complete truth. The 
     President proceeded to equivocate and engage in legalistic 
     fencing; he also lied. The entire testimony was calculated to 
     mislead and deceive the grand jury and to obstruct its 
     process, and eventually to deceive the American people. He 
     set the tone at the very beginning. In the grand jury a 
     witness can tell the truth, lie or assert his privileges 
     against self incrimination. (Chart Y) President Clinton was 
     given a fourth choice. The President was permitted to read a 
     statement. (Chart Z; WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 8-9)

                   The President's Prepared Statement

       That statement itself is demonstrably false in 
     many particulars. President Clinton claims that he engaged 
     in inappropriate conduct with Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain 
     occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.'' Notice he did 
     not mention 1995. There was a reason. On three 
     ``occasions'' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in 
     sexual contact with the President. Ms. Lewinsky was a 
     twenty-one year old intern at the time.
       The President unlawfully attempted to conceal his three 
     visits alone with Ms. Lewinsky in 1995 during which they 
     engaged in sexual conduct. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 27-28; H.Doc. 
     105-311, pgs. 747-748; ML 8/6/98 GJ, Ex. 7; H.Doc. 105-311, 
     p. 1251; Chart A) Under Judge Wright's ruling, this evidence 
     was relevant and material to Paula Jones' sexual harassment 
     claims. (Order, Judge Susan Webber Wright, December 11, 1997, 
     p. 3)
       The President specifically and unequivocally states, ``[The 
     encounters] did not constitute sexual relations as I 
     understood that term to be defined at my January 17, 1998 
     deposition.'' That assertion is patently false. It is 
     directly contradicted by the corroborated testimony of Monica 
     Lewinsky. (See eg: ML 8/20/98 GJ, pgs. 31-32; H.Doc. 311, p. 
     1174; ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25, 30; H.Doc. 311, pgs. 1357, 
     1358)
       Evidence indicates that the President and Ms. Lewinsky 
     engaged in ``sexual relations'' as the President understood 
     the term to be defined at his deposition and as any 
     reasonable person would have understood the term to have been 
     defined.
       Contrary to his statement under oath, the President's 
     conduct during the 1995 visits and numerous additional visits 
     did constitute ``sexual relations'' as he understood the term 
     to be defined at his deposition. Before the grand jury, the 
     President admitted that directly touching or kissing another 
     person's breast, or directly touching another person's 
     genitalia with the intent to arouse, would be ``sexual 
     relations'' as the term was defined. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 
     94-95; H.Doc 105-311, pgs. 546-547) However, the President 
     maintained that he did not engage in such conduct. (Id.) 
     These statements are contradicted by Ms. Lewinsky's testimony 
     and the testimony of numerous individuals with whom she 
     contemporaneously shared the details of her encounters with 
     the President. Moreover, the theory that Ms. Lewinsky 
     repeated and unilaterally performed acts on the President 
     while he tailored his conduct to fit a contorted definition 
     of ``sexual relations'' which he had not contemplated at the 
     time of the acts, defies common sense.
       Moreover, the President had not even formed the contorted 
     interpretation of ``sexual relations'' which he asserted in 
     the grand jury until after his deposition had concluded. This 
     is demonstrated by the substantial evidence revealing the 
     President's state of mind during his deposition testimony. 
     First, the President continuously denied at his deposition 
     any fact that would cause the Jones lawyers to believe that 
     he and Ms. Lewinsky had any type of improper relationship, 
     including a denial that they had a sexual affair, (WJC 1/17/
     98 Dep., p. 78) not recalling if they were ever alone, (WJC 
     1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53, 59) and not recalling whether Ms. 
     Lewinsky had ever given him gifts. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 75) 
     Second, the President testified that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit 
     denying a sexual relationship was ``absolutely true'' when, 
     even by his current reading of the definition, it is 
     absolutely false. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) Third, the White 
     House produced a document entitled ``January 24, 1998 Talking 
     Points,'' stating flatly that the President's definition of 
     ``sexual relations'' included oral sex. (Chart W) Fourth, the 
     President made statements to staff members soon after the 
     deposition, saying that he did not have sexual relations, 
     including oral sex, with Ms. Lewinsky, (Podesta 6/16/98 GJ, 
     pg. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) and that she threatened to 
     tell people she and the President had an affair when he 
     rebuffed her sexual advances. (Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJ, p. 59; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) Fifth, President Clinton's Answer 
     filed in Federal District Court in response to Paula Jones' 
     First Amended Complaint states unequivocally that ``President 
     Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with 
     respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' (Answer of 
     Defendant William Jefferson Clinton, December 17, 1997, p. 8, 
     para. 39) Sixth, in President Clinton's sworn Answers to 
     Interrogatories Numbers 10 and 11, as amended, he flatly 
     denied that he had sexual relations with any federal 
     employee. The President filed this Answer prior to his 
     deposition. Finally, as described below, the President sat 
     silently while his attorney, referring to Ms. Lewinsky's 
     affidavit, represented to the court that there was no sex of 
     any kind or in any manner between the President and Ms. 
     Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 54)
       This circumstantial evidence reveals the President's state 
     of mind at the time of the deposition: his concern was not in 
     technically or legally accurate answers, but in categorically 
     denying anything improper. His grand jury testimony about his 
     state of mind during the deposition is false.

                    Reasons for the False Testimony

       The President did not lie to the grand jury to protect 
     himself from embarrassment, as he could no longer deny the 
     affair. Before his grand jury testimony, the President's 
     semen had been identified by laboratory tests on Ms. 
     Lewinsky's dress, and during his testimony, he admitted an 
     ``inappropriate intimate relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky, 
     In fact, when he testified before the grand jury, he was 
     only hours away from admitting the affair on national 
     television. Embarrassment was inevitable. But, if he 
     truthfully admitted the details of his encounters with Ms. 
     Lewinsky to the grand jury, he would be acknowledging that 
     he lied under oath during his deposition when he claimed 
     that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. 
     Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 78, 109, 204) Instead, 
     he chose to lie, not to protect his family or the dignity 
     of his office, but to protect himself from criminal 
     liability for his perjury in the Jones case.

              Additional Falsity in the Prepared Statement

       The President's statement continued, ``I regret that what 
     began as a friendship came to include this conduct [.]'' (WJC 
     8/17/98 GJ, p. 9; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 461) The truth is much 
     more troubling. As Ms. Lewinsky testified, her relationship 
     with the President began with flirting, including Ms. 
     Lewinsky showing the President her underwear. (ML 7/30/98 
     Int., p. 5; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1431) As Ms. Lewinsky candidly 
     admitted, she was surprised that the President remembered her 
     name after their first two sexual encounters. (ML 8/26/98 
     Dep., p. 25; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1295)

                         Reason for the Falsity

       The President's prepared statement, fraught with untruths, 
     was not an answer the President delivered extemporaneously to 
     a particular question. It was carefully drafted testimony 
     which the President read and relied upon throughout his 
     deposition. The President attempted to use the statement to 
     foreclose questioning on an incriminating topic on nineteen 
     separate occasions. Yet,

[[Page S70]]

     this prepared testimony, which along with other testimony 
     provides the basis for Article I, Item 1, actually 
     contradicts his sworn deposition testimony.

                     Contrary Deposition Testimony

       In this statement, the President admits that he and Ms. 
     Lewinsky were alone on a number of occasions. He refused to 
     make this admission in his deposition in the Jones case. 
     During the deposition, the following exchange occurred:

       Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking about 
     Monica Lewinsky. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky 
     together alone in the Oval Office?
       A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked in the 
     legislative affairs office, they always had somebody there on 
     the weekends. I typically work some on the weekends. 
     Sometimes they'd bring me things on the weekends. She--it 
     seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the 
     weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be in there, 
     drop if off, exchange a few words and go, she was there. I 
     don't have any specific recollections of what the issues 
     were, what was going on, but when the Congress is there, 
     we're working all the time, and typically I would do some 
     work on One of the days of the weekends in the afternoon.
       Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was possible, 
     then, that you were alone with her, but you have no specific 
     recollection of that ever happening?
       A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, while 
     she was working there, brought something to me and that at 
     the time she brought it to me, she was the only person there. 
     That's possible.

     (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
       After telling this verbose lie under oath, the President 
     was given an opportunity to correct himself. This exchange 
     followed:

       Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone 
     together in any room in the White House?
       A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that there 
     is a, it is--I have no specific recollection, but it seems to 
     me that she was on duty on a couple of occasions working for 
     the legislative affairs office and brought me some things to 
     sign, something on the weekend. That's--I have a general 
     memory of that.
       Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of those 
     meetings?
       A. No. You know, we just had conversation, I don't 
     remember.

     (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
       Before the grand jury, the President maintained that he 
     testified truthfully at his deposition, a lie which provides, 
     in part, the basis for Article I, Item 2. He stated, ``My 
     goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not 
     particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through 
     the mind field of this deposition without violating the law, 
     and I believe I did.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 80; H.Doc. 105-
     311, p. 532) But contrary to his deposition testimony, he 
     certainly was along with Ms. Lewinsky when she was not 
     delivering papers, as the President conceded in his prepared 
     grand jury statement.
       In other words, the President's assertion before the grand 
     jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, but that he 
     testified truthfully in his deposition, in inconsistent. Yet, 
     to this day, both the President and his attorneys have 
     insisted that he did not lie at his deposition and that he 
     did not lie when he swore under oath that he did not lie at 
     his deposition.
       In addition to his lie about not recalling being alone with 
     Ms. Lewinsky, the President told numerous other lies at his 
     deposition. All of those lies are incorporated in Article I, 
     Item 2.

                Testimony Concerning the False Affidavit

       Article I, Item 3 charges the President with providing 
     perjurious, false and misleading testimony before a federal 
     grand jury concerning false and misleading statements his 
     attorney Robert Bennett made to Judge Wright at the 
     President's deposition. In one statement, while objecting to 
     questions regarding Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Bennett misled the 
     Court, perhaps knowingly, stating, ``Counsel [for Ms. Jones] 
     is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit 
     which they are in possession of saying that there is 
     absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, 
     with President Clinton[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 53-54) 
     When Judge Wright interrupted Mr. Bennett and expressed her 
     concern that he might be coaching the President, Mr. Bennett 
     responded, ``In preparation of the witness for this 
     deposition, the witness is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's 
     affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't 
     know[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) (Emphasis added)
       When asked before the grand jury about his statement to 
     Judge Wright, the President testified, ``I'm not even sure I 
     paid attention to what he was saying,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 
     24; H.Doc. 105-3131, p. 476) He added, ``I didn't pay much 
     attention to this conversation, which is why, when you 
     started asking me about this, I asked to see the 
     deposition.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 477) 
     Finally, ``I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. 
     Bennett said in the exact words he did until I started 
     reading this transcript carefully for this hearing. That 
     moment, the whole argument just passed me by.'' (WJC 8/17/98 
     GJ, p. 29; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 481)
       This grand jury testimony defies common sense. During his 
     deposition testimony, the President admittedly misled Ms. 
     Jones' attorneys about his affair with Ms. Lewinsky, which 
     continued while Ms. Jones' lawsuit was pending, because he 
     did not want the truth to be known. Of course, when Ms. 
     Lewinsky's name is mentioned during the deposition, 
     particularly in connection with sex, the President is going 
     to listen. Any doubts as to whether he listened to Mr. 
     Bennett's representations are eliminated by watching the 
     videotape of the President's deposition. The videotape shows 
     the President looking directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close 
     attention to his argument to Judge Wright.

           False Testimony Concerning Obstruction of Justice

       Article I, Item 4 concerns the President's grand jury 
     perjury regarding his efforts to influence the testimony of 
     witnesses and his efforts to impede discovery in the Jones  
     v. Clinton lawsuit. These lies are perhaps the most 
     troubling, as the President used them in an attempt to 
     conceal his criminal actions and the abuse of his office.
       For example, the President testified before the grand jury 
     that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' 
     lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky 
     and the President, she should provide them. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, 
     p. 43; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 495) He stated, ``And I told her 
     that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have to give them 
     whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' (Id.) This 
     testimony is false, as demonstrated by both Ms. Lewinsky's 
     testimony and common sense.
       Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she 
     discussed with the President the subpoena's request for her 
     to produce gifts, including a hat pin. She told the President 
     that it concerned her, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 151; H.Doc. 105-311, 
     p. 871) and he said that it ``bothered'' him too. (ML 8/20/98 
     GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then 
     suggested that she give the gifts to someone, maybe to Betty. 
     But rather than instructing her to turn the gifts over to Ms. 
     Jones' attorneys, the President replied, ``I don't know'' or 
     ``Let me think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 152; H.Doc. 
     105-311, p. 872) Several hours later, Ms. Currie called Ms. 
     Lewinsky on her cellular phone and said, ``I understand you 
     have something to give me'' or ``the President said you have 
     something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 
     105-311, pgs. 874-875)
       Although Ms. Currie agrees that she picked up the gifts 
     from Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie testified that ``the best'' she 
     remembers is that Ms. Lewinsky called her. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 
     105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581) She later conceded that Ms. 
     Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on this point. (BC 
     5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) A telephone record 
     corroborates Ms. Lewinsky, revealing that Ms. Currie did call 
     her from her cellular phone several hours after Ms. 
     Lewinsky's meeting with the President. The only logical 
     reason Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve gifts from 
     the President is that the President told her to do so. He 
     would not have given this instruction if he wished the gifts 
     to be given to Ms. Jones' attorneys.

                    Testimony Concerning Ms. Currie

       The President again testified falsely when he told the 
     grand jury that he was simply trying to ``refresh'' his 
     recollection when he made a series of statements to Ms. 
     Currie the day after his deposition. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; 
     H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) Ms. Currie testified that she met 
     with the President at about 5:00 P.M. on January 18, 1998, 
     and he proceeded to make these statements to her:

       (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
       (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
       (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
       (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
       (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

     (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 
     7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
       Ms. Currie testified that these were more like statements 
     than questions, and that, as far as she understood, the 
     President wanted her to agree with the statements. (BC 1/27/
     98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559)
       The President was asked specifically about these statements 
     before the grand jury. He did not deny them, but said that he 
     was ``trying to refresh [his] memory about what the facts 
     were.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) He 
     added that he wanted to ``know what Betty's memory was about 
     what she heard,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
     506) and that he was ``trying to get as much information as 
     quickly as [he] could.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105-
     311, p. 508) Logic demonstrates that the President's 
     explanation is contrived and false.
       A person does not refresh his recollection by firing 
     declarative sentences dressed up as leading questions to his 
     secretary. If the President was seeking information, he would 
     have asked Ms. Currie what she recalled. Additionally, a 
     person does not refresh his recollection by asking questions 
     concerning factual scenarios of which the listener was 
     unaware, or worse, of which the declarant and the listener 
     knew were false. How would Ms. Currie know if she was always 
     there when Ms. Lewinsky was there? Ms. Currie, in fact, 
     acknowledged during her grand jury testimony that Ms. 
     Lewinsky could have visited the President at the White House 
     when Ms. Currie was not there. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs.

[[Page S71]]

     65-66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 679) Ms. Currie also testified that 
     there were several occasions when the President and Ms. 
     Lewinsky were in the Oval Office or study area without anyone 
     else present. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 32-33, 36-38; H.Doc. 105-
     316, pgs. 552-553)
       More importantly, the President admitted in his statement 
     to the grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on 
     several occasions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 9-10; H.Doc. 105-
     311, pgs. 460-461) Thus, by his own admission, his statement 
     to Ms. Currie about never being alone with Ms. Lewinsky was 
     false. And if they were alone together, Ms. Currie certainly 
     could not say whether the President touched Ms. Lewinsky or 
     not.
       The statement about whether Ms. Currie could see and hear 
     everything is also refuted by the President's own grand jury 
     testimony. During his ``intimate'' encounters with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, he ensured everyone, including Ms. Currie, was 
     excluded. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 53; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 505) Why 
     would someone refresh his recollection by making a false 
     statement of fact to a subordinate? The answer is obvious--he 
     would not.
       Lastly, the President stated in the grand jury that he was 
     ``downloading'' information in a ``hurry,'' apparently 
     explaining that he made these statements because he did not 
     have time to listen to answers to open-ended questions. (WJC 
     8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 508) But, if he was in 
     such a hurry, why did the President not ask Ms. Currie to 
     refresh his recollection when he spoke with her on the 
     telephone the previous evening? He also has no adequate 
     explanation as to why he could not spend an extra five or 10 
     minutes with Ms. Currie on January 18 to get her version of 
     the events. In fact, Ms. Currie testified that she first met 
     the President on January 18 while he was on the White House 
     putting green, and he told her to go into the office and he 
     would be in in a few minutes. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 67-70; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 558-559) And if he was in such a hurry, 
     why did he repeat these statements to Ms. Currie a few days 
     later? (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 80-81; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 560-
     561) The reason for these statements had nothing to do with 
     time constraints or refreshing recollection; he had just 
     finished lying during the Jones deposition about these 
     issues, and he needed corroboration from his secretary.

                   Testimony About Influencing Aides

       Not only did the President lie about his attempts to 
     influence Ms. Currie's testimony, but he lied about his 
     attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top aides. 
     Among the President's lies to his aides, described in detail 
     later in this brief, were that Ms. Lewinsky did not perform 
     oral sex on him, and that Ms. Lewinsky stalked him while he 
     rejected her sexual demands. These lies were then 
     disseminated to the media and attributed to White House 
     sources. They were also disseminated to the grand jury.
       When the president was asked about these lies before the 
     grand jury, he testified:

       ``And so I said to them things that were true about this 
     relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, 
     there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I 
     have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And 
     did I hope that I never would have to be here on this day 
     giving this testimony? Of course.
       ``But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this 
     matter further. So I said things that were true. They may 
     have been misleading, and if they were I have to take 
     responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.''

     (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 106; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 558)
       To accept this grand jury testimony as truth, one must 
     believe that many of the President's top aides engaged in a 
     concerted effort to lie to the grand jury in order to 
     incriminate him at the risk of subjecting themselves to a 
     perjury indictment. We suggest that it is illustrative of the 
     President's character that he never felt any compunction in 
     exposing others to false testimony charges, so long as he 
     could conceal his own perjuries. Simply put, such a 
     conspiracy did not exist.
       The above are merely highlights of the President's grand 
     jury perjury, and there are numerous additional examples. In 
     order to keep these lies in perspective, three facts must be 
     remembered. First, before the grand jury, the President was 
     not lying to cover up an affair and protect himself from 
     embarrassment, as concealing the affair was now impossible. 
     Second, the President could no longer argue that the facts 
     surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were somehow 
     irrelevant or immaterial, as the Office of Independent 
     Counsel and the grand jury had mandates to explore them. 
     Third, he cannot claim to have been surprised or unprepared 
     for questions about Ms. Lewinsky before the grand jury, as he 
     spent days with his lawyer, preparing responses to such 
     questions.

                         The President's Method

       Again, the President carefully crafted his statements to 
     give the appearance of being candid, when actually his intent 
     was the opposite. In addition, throughout the testimony, 
     whenever the President was asked a specific question that 
     could not be answered directly without either admitting the 
     truth or giving an easily provable false answer, he said, ``I 
     rely on my statement.'' 19 times he relied on this false and 
     misleading statement; nineteen times, then, he repeated those 
     lies in ``answering'' questions propounded to him. (See eg. 
     WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pg. 139; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 591)

                     The House Committee's Request

       In an effort to avoid unnecessary work and to bring its 
     inquiry to an expeditious end, the Judiciary Committee of the 
     House of Representatives submitted to the President 81 
     requests to admit or deny specific facts relevant to this 
     investigation. (Exhibit 18) Although, for the most part, the 
     questions could have been answered with a simple ``admit'' or 
     ``deny,'' the President elected to follow the pattern of 
     selective memory, reference to other testimony, blatant 
     untruths, artful distortions, outright lies, and half truths. 
     When he did answer, he engaged in legalistic hair-splitting 
     in an obvious attempt to skirt the whole truth and to deceive 
     and obstruct the due proceedings of the Committee.

                  The President Repeats His Falsities

       Thus, on at least 23 questions, the President professed a 
     lack of memory. This from a man who is renowned for his 
     remarkable memory, for his amazing ability to recall details.
       In at least 15 answers, the President merely referred to 
     ``White House Records.'' He also referred to his own prior 
     testimony and that of others. He answered several of the 
     requests by merely restating the same deceptive answers that 
     he gave to the grand jury. We will point out several false 
     statements in this Brief.
       In addition, the half-truths, legalistic parsings, evasive 
     and misleading answers were obviously calculated to obstruct 
     the efforts of the House Committee. They had the effect of 
     seriously hampering its ability to inquire and to ascertain 
     the truth. The President has, therefore, added obstruction of 
     an inquiry and an investigation before the Legislative Branch 
     to his obstructions of justice before the Judicial Branch of 
     our constitutional system of government.

                    The Early Attack on Ms. Lewinsky

       After his deposition, the power and prestige of the Office 
     of President was marshaled to destroy the character and 
     reputation of Monica Lewinsky, a young woman that had been 
     ill-used by the President. As soon as her name surfaced, the 
     campaign began to muzzle any possible testimony, and to 
     attack the credibility of witnesses, in a concerted effort to 
     obstruct the due administration of justice in a lawsuit filed 
     by one female citizen of Arkansas. It almost worked.
       When the President testified at his deposition that he had 
     no sexual relations, sexual affair or the like with 
     Monica Lewinsky, he felt secure. Monica Lewinksy, the only 
     other witness was on board. She had furnished a false 
     affidavit also denying everything. Later, when he realized 
     from the January 18, 1998, Drudge Report that there were 
     taped conversations between Ms. Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, 
     he had to develop a new story, and he did. In addition, he 
     recounted that story to White House aides who passed it on 
     to the grand jury in an effort to obstruct that tribunal 
     too.
       On Wednesday, January 21, 1998, The Washington Post 
     published a story entitled ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aide 
     to Lie; Starr Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny 
     Alleged Affair to Jones' Lawyers.'' The White House learned 
     the substance of the Post story on the evening of January 20, 
     1998.

                          Mr. Bennett's Remark

       After the President learned of the existence of the story, 
     he made a series of telephone calls.
       At 12:08 a.m. he called his attorney, Mr. Bennett, and they 
     had a conversation. The next morning, Mr. Bennett was quoted 
     in the Washington Post stating:

       ``The President adamantly denies he ever had a relationship 
     with Ms. Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth of that.'' 
     He added, ``This story seems ridiculous and I frankly smell a 
     rat.''

                            Additional Calls

       After that conversation, the President had a half hour 
     conversation with White House counsel, Bruce Lindsey.
       At 1:16 a.m., the President called Betty Currie and spoke 
     to her for 20 minutes.
       He then called Bruce Lindsey again.
       At 6:30 a.m. the President called Vernon Jordan.
       After that, the President again conversed with Bruce 
     Lindsey.
       This flurry of activity was a prelude to the stories which 
     the President would soon inflict upon top White House aides 
     and advisors.

                  The President's Statements to Staff


                             ERSKINE BOWLES

       On the morning of January 21, 1998, the President met with 
     Whie House Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles, and his two 
     deputies, John Podesta and Sylvia Matthews.
       Erskine Bowles recalled entering the President's office at 
     9:00 a.m. that morning. He then recounts the President's 
     immediate words as he and two others entered the Oval Office:

       And he looked up at us and he said the same thing he said 
     to the American people.
       He said, ``I want you to know I did not have sexual 
     relationships with this woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask 
     anybody to lie. And when the facts come out, you'll 
     understand.''

     (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) After the 
     President made that blanket denial, Mr. Bowles responded:

       I said, ``Mr. President, I don't know what the facts are. I 
     don't know if they're good, bad, or indifferent. But whatever 
     they are, you ought to get them out. And you ought to get 
     them out rignt now.''

     (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)

[[Page S72]]

       When counsel asked whether the President responded to 
     Bowles' suggestion that he tell the truth, Bowles responded:

       I don't think he made any response, but he didn't disagree 
     with me.

     (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)


                              John Podesta

     January 21, 1998
       Deputy Chief John Podesta also recalled a meeting with the 
     President on the morning of January 21, 1998.
       He testified before the grand jury as to what occurred in 
     the Oval Office that morning:

       A. And we started off meeting--we didn't-- I don't think we 
     said anything. And I think the President directed this 
     specifically to Mr. Bowles. He said, ``Erskine, I want you 
     to know that this story is not true.''
       Q. What else did he say?
       A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual relationship 
     with her, and that he never asked anybody to lie.

     (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3310)
     January 23, 1998
       Two days later, on January 23, 1998, Mr. Podesta had 
     another discussion with the President:

       ``I asked him how he was doing, and he said he was working 
     on this draft and he said to me that he never had sex with 
     her, and that--and that he never asked--you know, he repeated 
     the denial, but he was extremely explicit in saying he never 
     had sex with her.''

     Then Podesta testified as follows:

       Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more 
     specific than sex, than the word ``sex.''
       A. Yes, he was more specific than that.
       Q. Okay, share that with us.
       A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some 
     spate. Of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said 
     that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever----
       Q. Okay.
       A. That they had not had oral sex.

     (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) 
     (Exhibit V)


                           sidney blumenthal

       Later in the day on January 21, 1998, the President called 
     Sidney Blumenthal to his office. It is interesting to note 
     how the President's lies become more elaborate and pronounced 
     when he has time to concoct this newest line of defense. When 
     the President spoke to Mr. Bowles and Mr. Podesta, he simply 
     denied the story. But, by the time he spoke to Mr. 
     Blumenthal, the President has added three new angles to his 
     defense strategy: (1) he now portrays Monica Lewinsky as the 
     aggressor; (2) he launches an attack on her reputation by 
     portraying her as a ``stalker''; and (3) he presents himself 
     as the innocent victim being attacked by the forces of evil.
       Note well this recollection by Mr. Blumenthal in his June 
     4, 1998 testimony: (Chart U)

       And it was at this point that he gave his account of what 
     had happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very 
     fast. He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual 
     demand on me.'' He rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down 
     that road before, I've caused pain for a lot of people and 
     I'm not going to do that again.'' She threatened him. She 
     said that she would tell people they'd had an affair, that 
     she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that she 
     hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair 
     then she wouldn't be the stalker anymore.

     (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 49; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
       And then consider what the President told Mr. Blumenthal 
     moments later:

       And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel 
     like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that 
     is creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I 
     feel like the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.
       And I said to him, ``When this happened with Monica 
     Lewinsky, were you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within 
     eyesight or earshot of someone.''

     (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 50; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
       At one point, Mr. Blumenthal was asked by the grand jury to 
     describe the President's manner and demeanor during the 
     exchange.

       Q. In response to my question how you responded to the 
     President's story about a threat or discussion about a threat 
     from Ms. Lewinsky, you mentioned you didn't 
     recall specifically. Do you recall generally the nature of 
     your response to the President?
       A. It was generally sympathetic to the President. And I 
     certainly believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, 
     he was pouring out his heart, and I believed him.

     (Blumenthal, 6/25/98 GJ, pgs. 16-17; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 
     192-193)


                              BETTY CURRIE

       When Betty Currie testified before the grand jury, she 
     could not recall whether she had another one-on-one 
     discussion with the President on Tuesday, January 20, or 
     Wednesday, January 21. But she did state that on one of those 
     days, the President summoned her back to his office. At that 
     time, the President recapped their now-infamous Sunday 
     afternoon post-deposition discussion in the Oval Office. It 
     was at that meeting that the President made a series of 
     statements to Ms. Currie, to some of which she could not 
     possibly have known the answers. (e.g. ``Monica came on to me 
     and I never touched her, right?'') (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-
     75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; 
     H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
       When he spoke to her on January 20 or 21, he spoke in the 
     same tone and demeanor that he used in his January 18 Sunday 
     session.
       Ms. Currie stated that the President may have mentioned 
     that she might be asked about Monica Lewinsky. (BC, 1/24/98 
     Int., p. 8; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 536)

                        Motive for Lies to Staff

       It is abundantly clear that the President's assertions to 
     staff were designed for dissemination to the American people. 
     But it is more important to understand that the President 
     intended his aides to relate that false story to 
     investigators and grand jurors alike. We know that this is 
     true for the following reasons: the Special Division had 
     recently appointed the Office of Independent Counsel to 
     investigate the Monica Lewinsky matter; the President 
     realized that Jones' attorneys and investigators were 
     investigating this matter; the Washington Post journalists 
     and investigators were exposing the details of the Lewinsky 
     affair; and, an investigation relating to perjury charges 
     based on Presidential activities in the Oval Office would 
     certainly lead to interviews with West Wing employees and 
     high level staffers. Because the President would not appear 
     before the grand jury, his version of events would be 
     supplied by those staffers to whom he had lied. The President 
     actually acknowledged that he knew his aides might be called 
     before the grand jury. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 105-109; H.Doc. 
     105-311, pgs. 557-557)
       In addition, Mr. Podesta testified that he knew that he was 
     likely to be a witness in the ongoing grand jury criminal 
     investigation. He said that he was ``sensitive about not 
     exchanging information because I knew I was a potential 
     witness.'' (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
     3332) He also recalled that the President volunteered to 
     provide information about Ms. Lewinsky to him even though Mr. 
     Podesta had not asked for these details. (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, 
     p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3332)
       In other words, the President's lies and deceptions to his 
     White House aides, coupled with his steadfast refusal to 
     testify had the effect of presenting a false account of 
     events to investigators and grand jurors. The President's 
     aides believed the President when he told them his contrived 
     account. The aides' eventual testimony provided the 
     President's calculated falsehoods to the grand jury which, in 
     turn, gave the jurors an inaccurate and misleading set of 
     facts upon which to base any decisions.

                             Win, Win, Win

       President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all-
     costs strategy calculated to obstruct the administration 
     of justice in the Jones case and in the grand jury. This 
     is demonstrated in testimony presented by Richard ``Dick'' 
     Morris to the federal grand jury.
       Mr. Morris, a former presidential advisor, testified that 
     on January 21, 1998, he met President Clinton and they 
     discussed the turbulent events of the day. The President 
     again denied the accusations against him. After further 
     discussions, they decided to have an overnight poll taken to 
     determine if the American people would forgive the President 
     for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When Mr. 
     Morris received the results, he called the President:

       ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just 
     too new, it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is 
     they're willing to forgive you for adultery, but not for 
     perjury or obstruction of justice or the various other 
     things.' ''

     (Morris 8/18/98 GJ. p. 28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2929)
       Morris recalls the following exchange:

       Morris: And I said, ``They're just not ready for it.'' 
     meaning the voters.
       WJC: Well, we just have to win, then.

     (Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 30; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 2930)
       The President, of course, cannot recall this statement, 
     (Presidential Responses to Questions, Numbers 69, 70, and 71)

                 The Plot to Discredit Monica Lewinsky

       In order to ``win,'' it was necessary to convince the 
     public, and hopefully the grand jurors who read the 
     newspapers, that Monica Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If 
     the account given by Ms. Lewinsky to Linda Tripp was 
     believed, then there would emerge a tawdry affair in and near 
     the Oval Office. Moreover, the President's own perjury and 
     that of Monica Lewinsky would surface. To do this, the 
     President employed the full power and credibility of the 
     White House and its press corps to destroy the witness. Thus 
     on January 29, 1998:

       Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best 
     way to destroy That Woman, as President Bill Clinton called 
     Monica Lewinsky. Should they paint her as a friendly 
     fantasist or a malicious stalker? (The Plain Dealer)

     Again:

       ``That poor child has serious emotional problems,'' Rep. 
     Charles Rangel, Democrat of New York, said Tuesday night 
     before the State of the Union. ``She's fantasizing. And I 
     haven't heard that she played with a full deck in her other 
     experiences.'' (The Plain Dealer)


[[Page S73]]


     From Gene Lyons, an Arkansas columnist on January 30:

       ``But it's also very easy to take a mirror's eye view of 
     this thing, look at this thing from a completely different 
     direction and take the same evidence and posit a totally 
     innocent relationship in which the president was, in a sense, 
     the victim of someone rather like the woman who followed 
     David Letterman around.'' (NBC News)

     From another ``source'' on February 1:

       ``Monica had become known at the White House, says one 
     source, as `the stalker.' ''

     And on February 4:

       ``The media have reported that sources describe Lewinsky as 
     `infatuated' with the president, `star struck' and even `a 
     stalker'.'' (Buffalo News)

     Finally, on January 31:

       ``One White House aide called reporters to offer 
     information about Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problems 
     and what the aide said was her nickname--`The Stalker.' ''
       ``Junior staff members, speaking on the condition that they 
     not be identified, said she was known as a flirt, wore her 
     skirts too short, and was `A little bit weird.' ''
       ``Little by little, ever since allegations of an affair 
     between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Lewinsky surfaced 10 
     days ago, White House sources have waged a behind-the-scenes 
     campaign to portray her as an untrustworthy climber obsessed 
     with the President.''
       ``Just hours after the story broke, one White House source 
     made unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the 
     `troubled' product of divorced parents and may have been 
     following the footsteps of her mother, who wrote a tell-all 
     book about the private lives of three famous opera 
     singers.''
       ``One story had Lewinsky following former Clinton aide 
     George Stephanopoulos to Starbucks. After observing what kind 
     of coffee he ordered, she showed up the next day at his 
     secretary's desk with a cup of the same coffee to `surprise 
     him.' '' (Toronto Sun)

       This sounds familiar because it is the exact tactic used to 
     destroy the reputation and credibility of Paula Jones. The 
     difference is that these false rumors were emanating from the 
     White House, the bastion of the free world, to protect one 
     man from being forced to answer for his deportment in the 
     highest office in the land.
       On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the 
     grand jury. He then was specifically asked whether he knew 
     that his aides (Blumenthal, Bowles, Podesta and Currie) were 
     likely to be called before the grand jury.

       Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, 
     after January 21st when the Post article broke and said that 
     Judge Starr was looking into this, you knew that they might 
     be witnesses. You knew that they might be called into a grand 
     jury, didn't you?
       WJC. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I said 
     after that. I may have said something to all these people to 
     that effect, but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any 
     details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I 
     turn you into a witness or give you information that would 
     get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, 
     didn't talk to people about it.
       Q. If all of these people--let's leave Mrs. Currie for a 
     minute. Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold 
     Ickes, Erskine Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story 
     broke, after Judge Starr's involvement was known on January 
     21st, have said that you denied a sexual relationship with 
     them. Are you denying that?
       WJC. No.
       Q. And you've told us that you----
       WJC. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told you 
     what I meant by it when they started this deposition.
       Q. You've told us now that you were being careful, but that 
     it might have been misleading. Is that correct?
       WJC. It must have been * * * So, what I was trying to do 
     was to give them something they could--that would be true, 
     even if misleading in the context of this deposition, and 
     keep them out of trouble, and let's deal--and deal with what 
     I thought was the almost ludicrous suggestion that I had 
     urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, in other 
     words.

     (WJC 8/17/97 GJ, pgs. 106-108; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 558-560)
       As the President testified before the grand jury, he 
     maintained that he was being truthful with his aides. 
     (Exhibit 20) He stated that when he spoke to them, he was 
     very careful with his wording. The President stated that he 
     wanted his statement regarding ``sexual relations'' to be 
     literally true because he was only referring to intercourse.
       However, recall that John Podesta said that the President 
     denied sex ``in any way whatsoever'' ``including oral sex.'' 
     The President told Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and 
     Harold Ickes that he did not have a ``sexual relationship'' 
     with that woman.
       Importantly, seven days after the President's grand jury 
     appearance, the White House issued a document entitled, 
     ``Talking Points January 24, 1998.'' (Chart W; Exhibit 16) 
     This ``Talking Points'' document outlines proposed questions 
     that the President may be asked. It also outlines suggested 
     answers to those questions. The ``Talking Points'' purport to 
     state the President's view of sexual relations and his view 
     of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. (Exhibit 17)
       The ``Talking Points'' state as follows:

       Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a sexual 
     relationship?
       A. I can't believe we're on national television discussing 
     this. I am not about to engage in an ``act-by-act'' 
     discussion of what constitutes a sexual relationship.
       Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating 
     that the President does not believe oral sex is adultery. 
     Would oral sex, to the President, constitute a sexual 
     relationship?
       A. Of course it would.

       The President's own talking points refute the President's 
     ``literal truth'' argument.

                   Effect of the President's Conduct

       Some ``experts'' have questioned whether the President's 
     deportment affects his office, the government of the United 
     States or the dignity and honor of the country.
       Our founders decided in the Constitutional Convention that 
     one of the duties imposed upon the President is to ``take 
     care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' Furthermore, he 
     is required to take an oath to ``Preserve, protect and defend 
     the Constitution of the United States.'' Twice this President 
     stood on the steps of the Capitol, raised his right hand to 
     God and repeated that oath.
       The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States provides that no person shall ``be deprived of life, 
     liberty or property without due process of law.``
       The Seventh Amendment insures that in civil suits ``the 
     right of trial by jury shall be preserved.''
       Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of 
     law and the equal protection of the laws.

                    The Effect on Ms. Jones' Rights

       Paula Jones is an American citizen, just a single citizen 
     who felt that she had suffered a legal wrong. More important, 
     that legal wrong was based upon the Constitution of the 
     United States. She claimed essentially that she was subjected 
     to sexual harassment, which, in turn, constitutes 
     discrimination on the basis of gender. The case was not 
     brought against just any citizen, but against the President 
     of the United States, who was under a legal and moral 
     obligation to preserve and protect Ms. Jones' rights. It is 
     relatively simple to mouth high-minded platitudes and to 
     prosecute vigorously right violations by someone else. It is, 
     however, a test of courage, honor and integrity to enforce 
     those rights against yourself. The President failed that 
     test. As a citizen, Ms. Jones enjoyed an absolute 
     constitutional right to petition the Judicial Branch of 
     government to redress that wrong by filing a lawsuit in the 
     United States District Court, which she did. At this point 
     she became entitled to a trial by jury if she chose, due 
     process of law and the equal protection of the laws no matter 
     who the defendant was in her suit. Due process contemplates 
     that right to a full and fair trial, which, in turn, means 
     the right to call and question witnesses, to cross-examine 
     adverse witnesses and to have her case decided by an unbiased 
     and fully informed jury. What did she actually get? None of 
     the above.
       On May 27, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a 
     nine to zero decision that, ``like every other citizen,'' 
     Paula Jones ``has a right to an orderly disposition of her 
     claims.`` In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, 
     United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright ruled on 
     December 11, 1997, that Ms. Jones was entitled to information 
     regarding state or federal employees with whom the President 
     had sexual relations from May, 1986 to the present. Judge 
     Wright had determined that the information was reasonably 
     calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
     Six days after this ruling, the President filed an answer to 
     Ms. Jones' Amended Complaint. The President's Answer stated: 
     ``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper 
     conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other woman.''
       Ms. Jones' right to call and depose witnesses was thwarted 
     by perjurious and misleading affidavits and motions; her 
     right to elicit testimony from adverse witnesses was 
     compromised by perjury and false and misleading statements 
     under oath. As a result, had a jury tried the case, it would 
     have been deprived of critical information.
       That result is bad enough, but it reaches constitutional 
     proportions when denial of the civil rights is directed by 
     the President of the United States who twice took an oath to 
     preserve, protect and defend those rights. But we now know 
     what the ``sanctity of an oath'' means to the President.

                 The Effect on the Office of President

       Moreover, the President is the spokesman for the government 
     and the people of the United States concerning both domestic 
     and foreign matters. His honesty and integrity, therefore, 
     directly influence the credibility of this country. When, as 
     here, that spokesman is guilty of a continuing pattern of 
     lies, misleading statements, and deceits over a long period 
     of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements is 
     seriously called into question. Indeed, how can anyone in or 
     out of our country any longer believe anything he says? And 
     what does that do to confidence in the honor and integrity of 
     the United States?
       Make no mistake, the conduct of the President is 
     inextricably bound to the welfare of the people of the United 
     States. Not only does it affect economic and national 
     defense, but even more directly, it affects the moral and 
     law-abiding fibre of the commonwealth,

[[Page S74]]

     without which no nation can survive. When, as here, that 
     conduct involves a pattern of abuses of power, of perjury, of 
     deceit, of obstruction of justice and of the Congress, and of 
     other illegal activities, the resulting damage to the honor 
     and respect due to the United States is, of necessity, 
     devastating.

                        The Effect on the System

       Again: there is no such thing as non-serious lying under 
     oath. Every time a witness lies, that witness chips a stone 
     from the foundation of our entire legal system. Likewise, 
     every act of obstruction of justice, of witness tampering or 
     of perjury adversely affects the judicial branch of 
     government like a pebble tossed into a lake. You may not 
     notice the effect at once, but you can be certain that the 
     tranquility of that lake has been disturbed. And if enough 
     pebbles are thrown into the water, the lake itself may 
     disappear. So too with the truth-seeking process of the 
     courts. Every unanswered and unpunished assault upon it has 
     its lasting effect and given enough of them, the system 
     itself will implode.
       That is why two women who testified before the Committee 
     had been indicted, convicted and punished severely for false 
     statements under oath in civil cases. And that is why only 
     recently a federal grand jury in Chicago indicted four former 
     college football players because they gave false testimony 
     under oath to a grand jury. Nobody suggested that they should 
     not be charged because their motives may have been to protect 
     their careers and family. And nobody has suggested that the 
     perjury was non-serious because it involved only lies about 
     sports; i.e., betting on college football games.

                      Disregard of the Rule of Law

       Apart from all else, the President's illegal actions 
     constitute an attack upon and utter disregard for the truth, 
     and for the rule of law. Much worse, they manifest an 
     arrogant disdain not only for the rights of his fellow 
     citizens, but also for the functions and the integrity of the 
     other two co-equal branches of our constitutional system. One 
     of the witnesses that appeared earlier likened the government 
     of the United States to a three-legged stool. The analysis is 
     apt, because the entire structure of our country rests upon 
     three equal supports: the Legislative, the Judicial, and the 
     Executive. Remove one of those supports, and the State will 
     totter. Remove two and the structure will collapse 
     altogether.

                     Effect on the Judicial Branch

       The President mounted a direct assault upon the truth-
     seeking process which is the very essence and foundation of 
     the Judicial Branch. Not content with that, though, Mr. 
     Clinton renewed his lies, half-truths and obstruction to this 
     Congress when he filed his answers to simple requests to 
     admit or deny. In so doing, he also demonstrated his lack of 
     respect for the constitutional functions of the Legislative 
     Branch.
       Actions do not lose their public character merely because 
     they may not directly affect the domestic and foreign 
     functioning of the Executive Branch. Their significance must 
     be examined for their effect on the functioning of the entire 
     system of government. Viewed in that manner, the President's 
     actions were both public and extremely destructive.

          The Conduct Charged Warrants Conviction and Removal

       The Articles state offenses that warrant the President's 
     conviction and removal from office. The Senate's own 
     precedents establish that perjury and obstruction warrant 
     conviction and removal from office. Those same precedents 
     establish that the perjury and obstruction need not have any 
     direct connection to the officer's official duties.

                               Precedents

       In the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed from office 
     three federal judges for making perjurious statements. 
     Background and History of Impeachment Hearings before the 
     Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
     Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 190-193 (Comm. Print 
     1998), (Testimony of Charles Cooper) (``Cooper Testimony'') 
     Although able counsel represented each judge, none of them 
     argued that perjury or making false statements are not 
     impeachable offenses. Nor did a single Congressman or 
     Senator, in any of the three impeachment proceedings, suggest 
     that perjury does not constitute a high crime and 
     misdemeanor. Finally, in the cases of Judge Claiborne and 
     Judge Nixon, it was undisputed that the perjury was not 
     committed in connection with the exercise of the judges' 
     judicial powers.

                              Judge Nixon

       In 1989, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was impeached, 
     convicted, and removed from office for committing perjury. 
     Judge Nixon's offense stemmed from his grand jury testimony 
     and statements to federal officers concerning his 
     intervention in the state drug prosecution of Drew Fairchild, 
     the son of Wiley Fairchild, a business partner of Judge 
     Nixon's.
       Although Judge Nixon had no official role or function in 
     Drew Fairchild's case (which was assigned to a state court 
     judge), Wiley Fairchild had asked Judge Nixon to help out by 
     speaking to the prosecutor. Judge Nixon did so, and the 
     prosecutor, a long-time friend of Judge Nixon's, dropped the 
     case. When the FBI and the Department of Justice interviewed 
     Judge Nixon, he denied any involvement whatsoever. 
     Subsequently, a federal grand jury was empaneled and Judge 
     Nixon again denied his involvement before that grand jury.
       After a lengthy criminal prosecution, Judge Nixon was 
     convicted on two counts of perjury before the grand jury and 
     sentenced to five years in prison on each count. Not long 
     thereafter, the House impeached Judge Nixon by a vote of 417 
     to 0. The first article of impeachment charged him with 
     making the false or misleading statement to the grand jury 
     that he could not ``recall'' discussing the Fairchild case 
     with the prosecutor. The second article charged Nixon with 
     making affirmative false or misleading statements to the 
     grand jury that he had ``nothing whatsoever officially or 
     unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild case.'' The third 
     article alleged that Judge Nixon made  numerous false 
     statements (not under oath) to federal investigators prior 
     to his grand jury testimony. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1802-03.
       The House unanimously impeached Judge Nixon, and the House 
     Managers' Report expressed no doubt that perjury is an 
     impeachable offense:

       ``It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the 
     legal process than lying from the witness stand. A judge who 
     violates his testimonial oath and misleads a grand jury is 
     clearly unfit to remain on the bench. If a judge's 
     truthfulness cannot be guaranteed, if he sets less than the 
     highest standard for candor, how can ordinary citizens who 
     appear in court be expected to abide by their testimonial 
     oath?''

     House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of 
     Impeachment at 59 (1989). House Manager Sensenbrenner 
     addressed the question even more directly:

       ``There are basically two questions before you in 
     connection with this impeachment. First, does the conduct 
     alleged in the three articles of impeachment state an 
     impeachable offense? There is really no debate on this point. 
     The articles allege misconduct that is criminal and wholly 
     inconsistent with judicial integrity and the judicial oath. 
     Everyone agrees that a judge who lies under oath, or who 
     deceives Federal investigators by lying in an interview, is 
     not fit to remain on the bench.''

     135 Cong. Rec. S14,497 (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)
       The Senate agreed, overwhelmingly voting to convict Judge 
     Nixon of perjury on the first two articles (89-8 and 78-19, 
     respectively). As Senator Carl Levin explained:

       ``The record amply supports the finding in the criminal 
     trial that Judge Nixon's statements to the grand jury were 
     false and misleading and constituted perjury. Those are the 
     statements cited in articles I and II and it is on those 
     articles that I vote to convict Judge Nixon and remove him 
     from office.''

     135 Cong. Rec. S14,637 (Statement of Sen. Levin).

                             Judge Hastings

       Also in 1989, the House impeached Judge Alcee L. Hastings 
     for, among other things, committing numerous acts of perjury. 
     The Senate convicted him, and he was removed from office. 
     Initially, Judge Hastings had been indicted by a federal 
     grand jury for conspiracy stemming from his alleged bribery 
     conspiracy with his friend Mr. William Borders to ``fix'' 
     cases before Judge Hastings in exchange for cash payments 
     from defendants. Mr. Borders was convicted, but, at his own 
     trial, Judge Hastings took the stand and unequivocally denied 
     any participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Borders. The jury 
     acquitted Judge Hastings on all counts. Nevertheless, the 
     House impeached Judge Hastings, approving seventeen articles 
     of impeachment, fourteen of which were for lying under oath 
     at his trial.
       The House voted 413 to 3 to impeach. The House Managers' 
     Report left no doubt that perjury alone is impeachable:

       ``It is important to realize that each instance of false 
     testimony charged in the false statement articles is more 
     than enough reason to convict Judge Hastings and remove him 
     from office. Even if the evidence were insufficient to prove 
     that Judge Hastings was part of the conspiracy with William 
     Borders, which the House in no way concedes, the fact that he 
     lied under oath to assure his acquittal is conduct that 
     cannot be tolerated of a United States District Judge. To 
     bolster one's defense by lying to a jury is separate, 
     independent corrupt conduct. For this reason alone, Judge 
     Hastings should be removed from public office.''

     The House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the 
     Articles of Impeachment at 127-28 (1989). Representative John 
     Conyers (D-Mich.) also argued for the impeachment of Judge 
     Hastings:

       ``[W]e can no more close our eyes to acts that constitute 
     high crimes and misdemeanors when practiced by judges whose 
     views we approve than we could against judges whose views we 
     detested. It would be disloyal . . . to my oath of office at 
     this late state of my career to attempt to set up a double 
     standard for those who share my philosophy and for those who 
     may oppose it. In order to be true to our principles, we must 
     demand that all persons live up to the same high standards 
     that we demand of everyone else.''

     134 Cong. Rec. H6184 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Conyers).

                            Judge Claiborne

       In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, 
     and removed from office for making false statements under 
     penalties

[[Page S75]]

     of perjury. In particular, Judge Claiborne had filed false 
     income tax returns in 1979 and 1980, grossly understating his 
     income. As a result, he was convicted by a jury of two 
     counts of willfully making a false statement on a federal 
     tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206 (a). 
     Subsequently, the House unanimously (406-0) approved four 
     articles of impeachment. The proposition that Claiborne's 
     perjurious personal income tax filings were not 
     impeachable was never even seriously considered. As the 
     House Managers explained:

       ``[T]he constitutional issues raised by the first two 
     Articles of Impeachment [concerning the filing of false tax 
     returns] are readily resolved. The Constitution provides that 
     Judge Claiborne may be impeached and convicted for ``High 
     Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article II, Section 4. The willful 
     making or subscribing of a false statement on a tax return is 
     a felony offense under the laws of the United States. The 
     commission of such a felony is a proper basis for Judge 
     Clairborne's impeachment and conviction in the Senate.''

     Proceedngs of the United States Senate Impeachment Trial of 
     Judge Harry E. Clairborne, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 40 (1986) 
     (Claiborne Proceedings'') (emphases added).
       House Manager Rodino, in his oral argument to the Senate, 
     emphatically made the same point:

       ``Honor in the eyes of the American people lies in public 
     officials who respect the law, not in those who violate the 
     trust that has been given to them when they are trusted with 
     public office. Judge Harry E. Claiborne has, sad to say, 
     undermined the integrity of the judicial branch of 
     Government. To restore that integrity and to maintain public 
     confidence in the administration of justice, Judge Claiborne 
     must be convicted on the fourth Article of Impeachment [that 
     of reducing confidence in the integrity of the judiciary].''

     132 Cong. Rec. S15,481 (1986) (Statement of Rep. Rodino).
       The Senate agreed. Telling are the words of then-Senator 
     Albert Gore, Jr. In voting to convict Judge Claiborne and 
     remove him from office:

       ``The conclusion is inescapable that Clairborne filed false 
     income tax returns and that he did so willfully rather than 
     negligently. . . . Given the circumstances, it is incumbent 
     upon the Senate to fulfill its constitutional responsibility 
     and strip this man of his title. An individual who has 
     knowingly falsified tax returns has no business receiving a 
     salary derived from the tax dollars of honest citizens. More 
     importantly, an individual quality of such reprehensible 
     conduct ought not be permitted to exercise the awesome powers 
     which the Constitution entrusts to the Federal Judiciary.''

     Claiborne Proceedings, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 372 (1986).

                      Application to the President

       To avoid the conclusive force of these recent precedents--
     and in particular the exact precedent supporting impeachment 
     for, conviction, and removal for perjury--the only recourse 
     for the President's defenders is to argue that a high crime 
     or misdemeanor for a judge is not necessarily a high crime or 
     misdemeanor for the President. The arguments advanced in 
     support of this dubious proposition do not withstand serious 
     scrutiny. See generally Cooper Testimony, at 193.
       The Constitution provides that Article III judges ``shall 
     hold their Offices during good Behavior, U.S. Const. Art. 
     III, 1. Thus, these arguments suggest that judges are 
     impeachable for ``misbehavior'' while other federal officials 
     are only impeachable for treason, bribery, and other high 
     crimes and misdemeanors.
       The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and 
     the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in 
     the 1990s both issued reports rejecting these arguments. In 
     1974, the staff of the Judiciary Committee's Impeachment 
     Inquiry issued a report which included the following 
     conclusion:

       ``Does Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which 
     states that judges `shall hold their Offices during good 
     Behaviour,' limit the relevance of the ten impeachments of 
     judges with respect to presidential impeachment standards as 
     has been argued by some? It does not. The argument is that 
     `good behavior' implies an additional ground for impeachment 
     of judges not applicable to other civil officers. However, 
     the only impeachment provision discussed in the Convention 
     and included in the Constitution is Article II, Section 4, 
     which by its expressed terms, applies to all civil officers, 
     including judges, and defines impeachment offenses as 
     `Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.' 
     ''

     Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess., 
     Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (Comm. 
     Print 1974) (``1974 Staff Report'') at 17.
       The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 
     came to the same conclusion. The Commission concluded that 
     ``the most plausible reading of the phrase `during good 
     Behavior' is that it means tenure for life, subject to the 
     impeachment power. . . . The ratification debates about the 
     federal judiciary seem to have proceeded on the assumption 
     that good-behavior tenure meant removal only through 
     impeachment and conviction.'' National Commission on Judicial 
     Discipline and Removal, Report of the National Commission on 
     Judicial Discipline and Removal 17-18 (1993) (footnote 
     omitted).
       The record of the 1986 impeachment of Judge Claiborne also 
     argues against different impeachment standards for federal 
     judges and presidents. Judge Claiborne filed a motion asking 
     the Senate to dismiss the articles of impeachment against him 
     for failure to state impeachable offenses. One of the 
     motion's arguments was that ``[t]he standard for impeachment 
     of a judge is different than that for other officers'' and 
     that the Constitution limited ``removal of the judiciary to 
     acts involving misconduct related to discharge of office.'' 
     Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Articles of 
     Impeachment on the Grounds They Do Not State Impeachable 
     Offenses 4 (hereinafter cited as ``Claiborne Motion''), 
     reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial 
     Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986) (hereinafter cited 
     as ``Senate Claiborne Hearings'').
       Representative Kastenmeier responded that ``reliance on the 
     term `good behavior' as stating a sanction for judges is 
     totally misplaced and virtually all commentators agree that 
     that is directed to affirming the life tenure of judges 
     during good behavior. It is not to set them down, 
     differently, as judicial officers from civil officers.'' Id. 
     at 81-82. He further stated that ``[n]or . . . is there any 
     support for the notion that . . . Federal judges are not 
     civil officers of the United States, subject to the 
     impeachment clause of article II of the Constitution.'' Id. 
     at 81.
       The Senate never voted on Claiborne's motion. However, the 
     Senate was clearly not swayed by the arguments contained 
     therein because it later voted to convict Judge Claiborne. 
     132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The 
     Senate thus rejected the claim that the standard of 
     impeachable offenses was different for judges than for 
     presidents.
       Moreover, even assuming that presidential high crimes and 
     misdemeanors could be different from judicial ones, surely 
     the President ought not be held to a lower standard of 
     impeachability than judges. In the course of the 1980s 
     judicial impeachments, Congress emphasized unequivocally that 
     the removal from office of federal judges guilty of crimes 
     indistinguishable from those currently charged against the 
     President was essential to the preservation of the rule of 
     law. If the perjury of just one judge so undermines the rule 
     of law as to make it intolerable that he remain in office, 
     then how much more so does perjury committed by the President 
     of the United States, who alone is charged with the duty ``to 
     take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' See 
     generally, Cooper Testimony at 194)
       It is just as devastating to our system of government when 
     a President commits perjury. As the House Judiciary Committee 
     stated in justifying an article of impeachment against 
     President Nixon, the President not only has ``the obligation 
     that every citizen has to live under the law,'' but in 
     addition has the duty ``not merely to live by the law but to 
     see that law faithfully applied.'' Impeachment of Richard M. 
     Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 
     93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1974). The Constitution provides 
     that he ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
     executed.'' U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 3. When a President, as 
     chief law enforcement officer of the United States, commits 
     perjury, he violates this constitutional oath unique to his 
     office and casts doubt on the notion that we are a nation 
     ruled by laws and not men.

           Perjury and Obstruction Are as Serious as Bribery

       Further evidence that perjury and obstruction warrant 
     conviction and removal comes directly from the text of the 
     Constitution. Because the Constitution specifically mentions 
     bribery, no one can dispute that it is an impeachable 
     offense. U.S. Const., art. II, Sec. 4. Because the 
     constitutional language does not limit the term, we must take 
     it to mean all forms of bribery. Our statutes specifically 
     criminalize bribery of witnesses with the intent to influence 
     their testimony in judicial proceedings. 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 201(b)(3) & (4), (c)(2) & (3). See also 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 1503 (general obstruction of justice statute), 1512 
     (witness tampering statute). Indeed, in a criminal case, the 
     efforts to provide Ms. Lewinsky with job assistance in return 
     for submitting a false affidavit charged in the Articles 
     might easily have been charged under these statutes. No one 
     could reasonably argue that the President's bribing a witness 
     to provide false testimony--even in a private lawsuit--does 
     not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. The plain 
     language of the Constitution indicates that it is.
       Having established that point, the rest is easy. Bribing a 
     witness is illegal because it leads to false testimony that 
     in turn undermines the ability of the judicial system to 
     reach just results. Thus, among other things, the Framers 
     clearly intended impeachment to protect the judicial 
     system from these kinds of attacks. Perjury and 
     obstruction of justice are illegal for exactly the same 
     reason, and they accomplish exactly the same ends through 
     slightly different means. Simple logic establishes that 
     perjury and obstruction of justice--even in a private 
     lawsuit--are exactly the types of other high crimes and 
     misdemeanors that are of the same magnitude as bribery.

                      High Crimes and Misdemeanors

       Although Congress has never adopted a fixed definition of 
     ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' much of the background and 
     history of the impeachment process contradicts the 
     President's claim that these offenses are private and 
     therefore do not warrant conviction and removal. Two reports

[[Page S76]]

     prepared in 1974 on the background and history of impeachment 
     are particularly helpful in evaluating the President's 
     defense. Both reports support the conclusion that the facts 
     in this case compel the conviction and removal of President 
     Clinton.
       Many have commented on the report on ``Constitutional 
     Grounds for Presidential Impeachment'' prepared in February 
     1974 by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry. The 
     general principles concerning grounds for impeachment set 
     forth in that report indicate that perjury and obstruction of 
     justice are impeachable offenses. Consider this key language 
     from the staff report describing the type of conduct which 
     gives rise to impeachment:
       ``The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the 
     conduct--undermining the integrity of office, disregard of 
     constitutional duties and oath of office, arrogation of 
     power, abuse of the governmental process, adverse impact on 
     the system of government.''

     1974 Staff Report at 26 (emphasis added).
       Perjury and obstruction of justice clearly ``undermine the 
     integrity of office.'' They unavoidably erode respect for the 
     office of the President. Such offenses obviously involve 
     ``disregard of [the President's] constitutional duties and 
     oath of office.'' Moreover, these offenses have a direct and 
     serious ``adverse impact on the system of government.'' 
     Obstruction of justice is by definition an assault on the due 
     administration of justice--a core function of our system of 
     government.
       The thoughtful report on ``The Law of Presidential 
     Impeachment'' prepared by the Association of the Bar of the 
     City of New York in January of 1974 also places a great deal 
     of emphasis on the corrosive impact of presidential 
     misconduct on the integrity of office:
       It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for

     ``impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes . 
     . . Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the 
     integrity of government are appropriate grounds whether or 
     not they happen to constitute offenses under the general 
     criminal law. In our view, the essential nexus to damaging 
     the integrity of government may be found in acts which 
     constitute corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers of, 
     official position. It may also be found in acts which, 
     without directly affecting governmental processes, undermine 
     that degree of public confidence in the probity of executive 
     and judicial officers that is essential to the effectiveness 
     of government in a free society.''

     Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Law of 
     Presidential Impeachment, (1974) at 161 (emphasis added). The 
     commission of perjury and obstruction of justice by a 
     President are acts that without doubt ``undermine that degree 
     of public confidence in the probity of the [the President] 
     that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a 
     free society.'' Such acts inevitably subvert the respect for 
     law which is essential to the well-being of our 
     constitutional system.
       That the President's perjury and obstruction do not 
     directly involve his official conduct does not diminish their 
     significance. The record is clear that federal officials have 
     been impeached for reasons other than official misconduct. As 
     set forth above, two recent impeachments of federal judges 
     are compelling examples. In 1989, Judge Walter Nixon was 
     impeached, convicted, and removed from office for committing 
     perjury before a federal grand jury. Judge Nixon's perjury 
     involved his efforts to fix a state case for the son of a 
     business partner--a matter in which he had no official 
     role. In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, 
     convicted, and removed from office for making false 
     statements under penalty of perjury on his income tax 
     returns. That misconduct had nothing to do with his 
     official responsibilities.
       Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the 
     Constitution suggests that officials are subject to 
     impeachment only for official misconduct. Perjury and 
     obstruction of justice--even regarding a private matter--are 
     offenses that substantially affect the President's official 
     duties because they are grossly incompatible with his 
     preeminent duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully 
     executed.'' Regardless of their genesis, perjury and 
     obstruction of justice are acts of public misconduct--they 
     cannot be dismissed as understandable or trivial. Perjury and 
     obstruction of justice are not private matters; they are 
     crimes against the system of justice, for which impeachment, 
     conviction, and removal are appropriate.
       The record of Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings 
     affirms that conclusion. Representative Hamilton Fish, the 
     ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and one of the 
     House managers in the Senate trial, stated that 
     ``[i]mpeachable conduct does not have to occur in the course 
     of the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence 
     of misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can 
     be justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's 
     exercise of public office. That, of course, is the situation 
     in this case.'' 132 Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 
     1986).
       Judge Claiborne's unsuccessful motion that the Senate 
     dismiss the articles of impeachment for failure to state 
     impeachable offenses provides additional evidence that 
     personal misconduct can justify impeachment. One of the 
     arguments his attorney made for the motion was that ``there 
     is no allegation . . . that the behavior of Judge Claiborne 
     in any way was related to misbehavior in his official 
     function as a judge; it was private misbehavior.'' (Senate 
     Claiborne Hearings, at 77, Statement of Judge Claiborne's 
     counsel, Oscar Goodman). (See also Claiborne Motion, at 3)
       Representative Kastenmeier responded by stating that ``it 
     would be absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed 
     murder, mayhem, rape, or perhaps espionage in his private 
     life, could not be removed from office by the U.S. Senate.'' 
     (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 81) Kastenmeier's response was 
     repeated by the House of Representatives in its pleading 
     opposing Claiborne's motion to dismiss. (Opposition to 
     Claiborne Motion at 2)
       The Senate did not vote on Judge Claiborne's motion, but it 
     later voted to convict him. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily 
     ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus agreed with the House that 
     private improprieties could be, and were in this instance, 
     impeachable offenses.
       The Claiborne case makes clear that perjury, even if it 
     relates to a matter wholly separated from a federal officer's 
     official duties--a judge's personal tax returns--is an 
     impeachable offense. Judge Nixon's false statements were also 
     in regard to a matter distinct from his official duties. In 
     short, the Senate's own precedents establish that misconduct 
     need not be in one's official capacity to warrant removal.

                               Conclusion

       This is a defining moment for the Presidency as an 
     institution, because if the President is not convicted as a 
     consequence of the conduct that has been portrayed, then no 
     House of Representatives will ever be able to impeach again 
     and no Senate will ever convict. The bar will be so high that 
     only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to be 
     concerned.
       Experts pointed to the fact that the House refused to 
     impeach President Nixon for lying on an income tax return. 
     Can you imagine a future President, faced with possible 
     impeachment, pointing to the perjuries, lies, obstructions, 
     and tampering with witnesses by the current occupant of the 
     office as not rising to the level of high crimes and 
     misdemeanors? If this is not enough, what is? How far can the 
     standard be lowered without completely compromising the 
     credibility of the office for all time?
       Dated: January 11, 1999.
                                  ____


                                APPENDIX

 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

     In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

  Appendix to Trial Memorandum of the Managers Appointed by the U.S. 
                        House of Representatives

     The United States
     House of Representatives

     Henry J. Hyde,
     F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
     Bill McCollum,
     George W. Gekas,
     Charles T. Canady,
     Stephen E. Buyer,
     Ed Bryant,
     Steve Chabot,
     Bob Barr,
     Asa Hutchinson,
     Chris Cannon,
     James E. Rogan,
     Lindsey O. Graham.
     Managers on the Part of the House
                                  ____


                           Table of Contents


                                 charts

       A. The President's Contacts Alone With Lewinsky
       B. The President's Telephone Contacts With Lewinsky
       C. Lewinsky's Gifts to The President
       D. The President's Gifts to Lewinsky
       E. 12/5/97 Facsimile Transmission of Witness List in Jones 
     v. Clinton
       F. The December 19, 1997 Subpoena to Lewinsky in Jones v. 
     Clinton
       G. December 19, 1997 Activities Following Lewinsky's 
     Receipt of Subpoena
       H. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to 
     Interrogatory No. 10 in Jones v. Clinton
       I. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to 
     Interrogatory No. 11 in Jones v. Clinton
       J. December 28, 1997, The President's Final Meeting With 
     Lewinsky and Concealment of Gifts
       K. Currie's Cell Phone Records for 12/28/97
       L. The President's Statements About Concealing Gifts
       M. Lewinsky's Draft Affidavit
       N. Lewinsky Final Affidavit dated January 7, 1998 Paragraph 
     8, Jones v. Clinton
       O. Filing Lewinsky's Affidavit and Motion to Quash (1/14/
     98-1/17/98)
       P. Mission Accomplished: Lewinsky Signs Her Affidavit and 
     Is Hired By Revlon in New York (1/5/98-1/9/98)
       Q. The President's Involvement With Lewinsky's Job Search
       R. Jordan's Testimony About His Pre-Witness List Job Search 
     Efforts
       S. Activity Following The President's Deposition (1/17/98-
     1/1998)
       T. The President's Statements to Currie 1/18/98
       U. The President's Denial of Sexual Relations
       V. The President's 1/21/98 Denial of Sexual Relations to 
     Blumenthal, Podesta and Morris

[[Page S77]]

       W. The White House 1/24/98 ``Talking Points''
       X. The President's Claims That He Was Truthful With Aides
       Y. The Three Options of a Grand Jury Witness
       Z. The President's Grand Jury ``Statement''
                                  ____


                               [Chart A]

              THE PRESIDENT'S CONTACTS ALONE WITH LEWINSKY

               Lewinsky White House Employee (7/95-4/96)


                                  1995

     11/15/95 (Wed): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky 
           in Oval Office study and hallway outside the Oval 
           Office. (Sexual Encounter)
     11/17/95 (Fri): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky 
           in The President's private bathroom outside the Oval 
           Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
     12/5/95 (Tues): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in 
           the Oval Office and study. (No Sexual Encounter)
     12/31/95 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in 
           the Oval Office and Oval Office study. (Sexual 
           Encounter)


                                  1996

     1/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           bathroom outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual 
           Encounter)
     1/21/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           hallway outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual 
           Encounter)
     2/4/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office study and in the adjacent hallway. (Sexual 
           Encounter)
     2/19/96 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office. (No Sexual Encounter)
     3/31/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in 
           hallway outside the Oval Office. (Sexual Encounter)
     4/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           hallway outside the Oval Office study and in the Oval 
           Office study. (Sexual Encounter)


                                  1997

     2/28/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office private bathroom. (Sexual Encounter)
     3/29/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
     5/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office dining room, study and hallway. (No Sexual 
           Encounter)
     7/4/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office study and hallway. (No Sexual Encounter)
     7/14/97 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in 
           Heinreich's office. (No Sexual Encounter)
     7/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
     8/16/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
     10/11/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in 
           the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
     11/13/97 (Thurs): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in 
           the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
     12/6/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the 
           Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
     12/28/97 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in 
           the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
                                  ____


                               [Chart B]

            THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONTACTS WITH LEWINSKY

     1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--first call to ML's home.
     1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at office.
     1/15 or 1/16/96 (Mon or Tue): Conversation, approx. 12:30 
           a.m.--ML at home.*
     Approx. 1/28/96 (Sun): Caller ID on ML's office phone 
           indicated POTUS call.
     1/30/96 (Tues): Conversation--during middle of workday at 
           ML's office.
     2/4/96 (Sun): Conversations--ML at office--multiple calls.
     2/7 or 2/8/96 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
     2/8 or 2/9/96 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--ML at home.*
     2/19/96 (Mon): Conversation--ML at home.
     Approx. 2/28 2/28 or 3/5/96: Conversation--approx. 20 min.--
           after chance meeting in hallway--ML at home.
     3/26/96 (Tues): Conversation--approx. 11 a.m.--ML at office.
     3/29/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 8 p.m.--
           invitation to movie.
     3/31/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 1 p.m.--Pres. 
           ill.
     4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation----ML at home.
     4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation--ML at home--why ML 
           left.
     4/12/96 (Fri): Conversation--ML at home--daytime.
     4/12 or 4/13/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home--after 
           midnight.
     4/22/96 (Mon): Conversations--job talk--ML at home.
     4/29 or 4/30/96 (Mon or Tues): Message--after 6:30 a.m.
     5/2/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.*
     5/6/96 (Mon): Possible phone call.
     5/16/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
     5/21/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
     5/31/96 (Fri): Message.
     6/5/96 (Wed): Conversation--ML at home--early evening.
     6/23/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
     7/5 or 7/6/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
     7/19/96 (Fri): Conversation--6:30 a.m.--ML at home.*
     7/28/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.
     8/4/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
     8/24/96 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
     9/5/96 (Thur): Conversation--Pres. In Fla--ML at home.*
     9/10/96 (Tues): Message.
     9/30/96 (Mon): Conversation.*
     10/22/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
     10/23 or 10/24/96 (early am): Conversation--ML at home.
     12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--approx. 10-15 min.--ML at home.
     12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--later that evening--ML at home--
           approx. 10:30 p.m.--Pres fell asleep.*
     12/18/96 (Wed): Conversation--approx. 5 min.--10:30 p.m.--ML 
           at home.
     12/30/96 (Mon): Message.
     1/12/97 (Sun): Conversation--job talk--ML at home.*
     2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home--mid-day--11:30-12:00.
     2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--job talk--1:30 or 2:00 p.m.--ML 
           at home.*
     3/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--three minutes--ML at work.
     4/26/97 (Sat): Conversation--late afternoon--20 min.--ML at 
           home.
     5/17/97 (Sat): Conversations--multiple calls.
     5/18/97 (Sun): Conversations--multiple calls.
     7/15/97 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.
     8/1/97 (Fri): Conversation.
     9/30/97 (Tues): Conversation.*
     10/9 or 10/10/97 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--long, from 2 or 
           2:30 a.m. until 3:30 or 4:00 a.m.--job talk--argument--
           ML at home.
     10/23/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--end b/c HRC.
     10/30/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--interview prep.
     11/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--discuss re: ML visit.*
     12/6/97 (Sat): Conversation--approx. 30 min--ML at home.
     12/17/ or 12/18/97 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--b/t 2:00 a.m. 
           and 3:00 a.m.--ML at home--witness list.
     1/5/98 (Mon): Conversation.

     *Conversation that involved and may have involved phone sex.

                               [Chart C]

                    LEWINSKY GIFTS TO THE PRESIDENT

     10/24/95: Lewinsky (before the sexual relationship began) 
           gives her first gift to The President of a matted poem 
           given by her and other White House interns to 
           commemorate ``National Boss' Day''. It is the only gift 
           the President sent to the archives instead of keeping.
     11/20/95: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie.
     3/31/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Hugo Boss Tie.
     Christmas 1996: Lewinsky gives The President a Sherlock Homes 
           game and a glow in the dark frog.
     Before 8/16/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie 
           and a t-shirt from Bosnia.
     Early 1997: Lewinsky gives The President Oy Ve, a small golf 
           book, golf balls, golf tees, and a plastic pocket frog.
     3/97: Lewinsky gives The President a care package after he 
           injured his leg including a metal magnet with The 
           Presidential seal for his crutches, a license plate 
           with ``Bill'' for his wheelchair, and knee pads with 
           The Presidential seal.
     3/29/97: Lewinsky gives The President her personal copy of 
           Vox, a book about phone sex, a penny medallion with the 
           heart cut out, a framed Valentine's Day ad, and a 
           replacement for the Hugo Boss tie that had the bottom 
           cut off.
     5/24/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Banana Republic 
           casual shirt and a puzzle on gold mysteries.
     7/14/97: Lewinsky gives The President a wooden B, with a frog 
           in it from Budapest.
     Before 8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President The Notebook.
     8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique book on 
           Peter the Great, the card game ``Royalty'', and a book, 
           Disease and Misrepresentation.
     10/21/97 or 10/22/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Calvin 
           Klein tie, and pair of sunglasses.
     10/97: Lewinsky gives The President a package Before filled 
           with Halloween-related items, such as a Halloween 
           pumpkin lapel pin, a wooden letter opener with a frog 
           on the handle, and a plastic pumpkin filled with candy.
     11/13/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique paperweight 
           that depicted the White House.
     12/6/97: Lewinsky gives The President Our Patriotic 
           President: His Life in Pictures, Anecdotes, Sayings, 
           Principles and Biography; an antique standing cigar 
           holder; a Starbucks Santa Monica mug; a Hugs and Kisses 
           box; and a tie from London.
     12/28/97: Lewinsky gives The President a hand-painted Easter 
           Egg and ``gummy boobs'' from Urban Outfitters.

[[Page S78]]

     1/4/98: Lewinsky gives Currie a package with her final gift 
           to The President containing a book entitled The 
           Presidents of the United States and a love note 
           inspired by the movie Titanic.
                                  ____


                               [Chart D]

                   THE PRESIDENT'S GIFTS TO LEWINSKY

     12/5/95: The President gives Lewinsky an autographed photo of 
           himself wearing the Zenga necktie she gave him.*
     2/4/96: The President gives Lewinsky a signed ``State of the 
           Union'' Address.*
     3/31/96: The President gives Lewinsky cigars.
     2/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky a hat pin*, 
           ``Davidoff'' cigars, and the book the Leaves of Grass 
           by Walt Whitman as belated Christmas gifts.
               The President gives Lewinsky a gold brooch.*
               The President gives Lewinsky an Annie Lennox 
             compact disk.
               The President gives Lewinsky a cigar.
     7/24/97: The President gives Lewinsky an antique flower pin 
           in a wooden box, a porcelain object d'art, and a signed 
           photograph of the President and Lewinsky.*
     Early 9/97: The President brings Lewinsky several Black Dog 
           items, including a baseball cap*, 2 T-shirts*, a hat 
           and a dress.*
     12/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky the largest number of 
           gifts including:
               1. a large Rockettes blanket,*
               2. a pin of the New York skyline,*
               3. a marblelike bear's head from Vancouver,*
               4. a pair of sunglasses,*
               5. a small box of cherry chocolates,
               6. a canvas bag from the Black Dog,*
               7. a stuffed animal wearing a T-shirt from the 
             Black Dog.*

     (*Denotes those items Lewinsky produced to the OIC on 7/29/
     98).
                                  ____


[[Page S79]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.000
     


[[Page S80]]

                               [Chart F]

                           LEWINSKY SUBPOENA

                            Jones v. Clinton


                           December 19, 1997

       The Jones v. Clinton subpoena to Lewinsky called for:

     (1) Her testimony on January 23, 1998 at 9:30 a.m.;
     (2) Production of ``each and every gift including but not 
           limited to, any and all dresses, accessories, and 
           jewelry, and/or hat pins given to you by, or on behalf 
           of, Defendant Clinton;'' and
     (3) ``Every document constituting or containing 
           communications between you and Defendant Clinton, 
           including letters, cards, notes, memoranda and all 
           telephone records.''
                                  ____


                               [Chart G]

                           DECEMBER 19, 1997

                                (Friday)

         Lewinsky is Served with a Subpoena in Jones v. Clinton

     1:47-1:48 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan's office.
     3:00-4:00 p.m.: Lewinsky is served with a subpoena in Jones 
           v. Clinton.
     --: Lewinsky telephones Jordan immediately about subpoena.
     3:51-3:52 p.m.: Jordan telephones The President and talks to 
           Debra Schiff.
     4:17-4:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Social Office.
     4:47 p.m.: Lewinsky meets Jordan and requests that Jordan 
           notify The President about her subpoena.
     5:01-5:05 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan; Jordan 
           notifies The President about Lewinsky's subpoena.
     5:06 p.m.: Jordan telephones attorney Carter to represent 
           Lewinsky.
     Later that Evening: The President meets alone with Jordan at 
           the White House.
                                  ____


                               [Chart H]

                           DECEMBER 23, 1997

                 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 10

       Interrogatory No. 10: Please state the name, address, and 
     telephone number of each and every individual (other than 
     Hillary Rodham Clinton) whom you had sexual relations when 
     you held any of the following positions:

     a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
     b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
     c. President of the United States.

     (Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the 
     present involving state or federal employees.)
       Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 10 (as modified 
     by direction of the Court): None.
                                  ____


                               [Chart I]

                           DECEMBER 23, 1997

                 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 11

       Interrogratory No. 11: Please state the name, address, and 
     telephone number of each and every individual (other than 
     Hillary Rodham Clinton) with whom you sought to have sexual 
     relations, when you held any of the following positions:

       a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
       b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
       c. President of the United States.

     (Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the 
     present involving state or federal employees.)
       Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 11 (as modified 
     by direction of the Court): None.
                                  ____


                               [Chart J]

                           DECEMBER 28, 1997

                                (Sunday)

The President's Final Meeting with Lewinsky and The Concealment of the 
                           Gifts to Lewinsky

     8:16 a.m.: Lewinsky meets The President at the White House at 
           Currie's direction.

            The President gives Lewinsky numerous gifts.
            The President and Lewinsky discuss the 
             subpoena, calling for, among other things, the hat 
             pin. The President acknowledges ``that sort of 
             bothered [him] too.''
            Lewinsky states to The President: ``Maybe I 
             should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere 
             or give them to someone, maybe Betty [Currie].''

     3:32 p.m.: Currie telephones Lewinsky at home from Currie's 
           cell phone.

           ``I understand you have something to give me.'' or
           ``The President said you have something to give me.''

     Later that Day: Currie picks up gifts from Lewinsky.
                                  ____


[[Page S81]]

           [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.001
           


[[Page S82]]

                               [Chart L]

           THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT CONCEALING GIFTS

                                12/28/97

       ``[Lewinsky]: And then at some point I said to him [The 
     President], `Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the 
     gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
     someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he 
     responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And 
     left that topic.''--(Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 152)
                                  ____


                               [Chart M]

                        AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #

       1. My name is Jane Doe # . I am 24 years old and I 
     currently reside at 700 New Hampshire Avenue, NW., 
     Washington, DC 20037.
       2. On December 19, 1997, I was served with a subpoena from 
     the plaintiff to give a deposition and to produce documents 
     in the lawsuit filed by Paula Corbin Jones against President 
     William Jefferson Clinton and Danny Ferguson.
       3. I can not fathom any reason that the plaintiff would 
     seek information from me for her case.
       4. I have never met Ms. Jones, nor do I have any 
     information regarding the events she alleges occurred at the 
     Excelsior Hotel on May 8, 1991 or any other information 
     concerning any of the allegations in her case.
       5. I worked at the White House in the summer of 1995 as a 
     White House intern. Beginning in December, 1995, I worked in 
     the Office of Legislative Affairs as a staff assistant for 
     correspondence. In April, 1996, I accepted a job as assistant 
     to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at the U.S. 
     Department of Defense. I maintained that job until December 
     26, 1997. I am currently unemployed but seeking a new job.
       6. In the course of my employment at the White House, I met 
     President Clinton on several occasions. I do not recall ever 
     being alone with the President, although it is possible that 
     while working in the White House Office of Legislative 
     Affairs I may have presented him with a letter for his 
     signature while no one else was present. This would have 
     lasted only a matter of minutes.
       7. I have the utmost respect for the President who has 
     always behaved appropriately in my presence.
       8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the 
     President, he did not propose that we have a sexual 
     relationship, he did not offer me employment or other 
     benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not 
     deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
     relationship. I do not know of any other person who had a 
     sexual relationship with the President, was offered 
     employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual 
     relationship, or was denied employment or other benefits for 
     rejecting a sexual relationship. The occasions that I saw the 
     President, with crowds of other people, after I left my 
     employment at the White House in April, 1996 related to 
     official receptions, formal functions or events related to 
     the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was working at the 
     time. There were other people present on all of these 
     occasions.
       9. Since I do not possess any information that could 
     possibly be relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones 
     or lead to admissible evidence in this case, I asked my 
     attorney to provide this affidavit to plaintiff's counsel. 
     Requiring my deposition in this matter would cause 
     unwarranted attorney's fees and costs, disruption of my life, 
     especially since I am looking for employment, and constitute 
     an invasion of my right to privacy.
       I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing 
     is true and correct.
                                               Monica S. Lewinsky.
     DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:
       Monica S. Lewinsky, being first duly sworn on oath 
     according to law, deposes and says that she has read the 
     foregoing Affidavit of Jane Doe # by her subscribed, that the 
     matters stated herein are true to the best of her 
     information, knowledge and belief.
                                               Monica S. Lewinsky.

       Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______ day of 
     __________, 1998.
                                        __________________________
                                               Notary Public, D.C.
       My Commission expires: ________
                                  ____


                               [Chart N]

               FINAL AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #6 [LEWINSKY]

                                 1/7/98

     8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, 
           he did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, 
           he did not offer me employment or other benefits in 
           exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not deny me 
           employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
           relationship. I do not know of any other person who had 
           a sexual relationship with the President, was offered 
           employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual 
           relationship, or was denied employment or other 
           benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. The 
           occasions that I saw the President after I left my 
           employment at the White House in April, 1996, were 
           official receptions, formal functions or events related 
           to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was working 
           at the time. There were other people present on those 
           occasions.
                                  ____


                               [Chart O]

                    LEWINSKY'S AFFIDAVIT GETS FILED

                           (1/14/98-1/17/98)


                      January 14, 1998 (Wednesday)

     7:45 p.m.: Bennett's firm (Sexton) leaves Carter telephone 
           message.
     --: Carter faxes signed affidavit to Bennett's firm.


                      January 15, 1998 (Thursday)

     9:17 a.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
     12:59 p.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
     --: Currie called by Newsweek.
     --: Lewinsky drives Currie to meet Jordan.
     --: Sexton telephones Carter: ``STILL ON TIME?''
     --: Carter telephones Court Clerk for Saturday (1/17/98) 
           Filing of Affidavit and motion to quash.


                       January 16, 1998 (Friday)

     2 a.m. (Approx.): Carter completes motion to quash Lewinsky's 
           deposition.
               Carter sends by overnight mail motion to quash and 
             affidavit to Bennett's firm and to the Court.
     11:30 a.m.: Sexton message to Carter: ``Please call.''


                      January 17, 1998 (Saturday)

     --: Lewinsky Affidavit is submitted to the Court.
     --: The President is deposed.
                                  ____


                               [Chart P]

 MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: LEWINSKY SIGNS AFFIDAVIT AND GETS A NEW YORK JOB

                            (1/5/98-1/9/98)


                            January 5, 1998

     Lewinsky meets with attorney Carter for an hour; Carter 
           drafts an Affidavit for Lewinsky in an attempt to avert 
           her deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton scheduled 
           for January 23, 1998.
     Lewinsky telephones Currie stating that she needs to speak to 
           the President about an important matter; specifically 
           that she was anxious about something she needed to 
           sign--an Affidavit.
     The President returns Lewinsky's call; Lewinsky mentions the 
           Affidavit she'd be signing; Lewinsky offers to show the 
           Affidavit to The President who states that he doesn't 
           need to see it because he has already seen about 
           fifteen others.


                            january 6, 1998

     11:32 a.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank 
           Carter.'' Lewinsky meets Carter and receives draft 
           Affidavit.
     2:08-2:10 p.m.: Jordan calls Lewinsky. Lewinsky delivers 
           draft Affidavit to Jordan.
     3:14 p.m.: Carter again pages Lewinsky: ``Frank Carter at 
           [telephone number] will see you tomorrow morning at 
           10:00 in my office.''
     3:26-3:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
     3:38 p.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich, Deputy 
           Assistant to The President.
     3:48 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
     3:49 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky to discuss draft 
           Affidavit. Both agree to delete implication that she 
           had been alone with The President.
     4:19-4:32 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan.
     4:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
     4:34-4:37 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Carter.
     5:15-5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
     9:26-9:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
     10:00 a.m.: Lewinsky signs false Affidavit at Carter's 
           Office.
     --: Lewinsky delivers signed Affidavit to Jordan.
     11:58 a.m.-12:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
     5:46-5:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House 
           (Hernreich's Office).
     6:50-6:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House and tells 
           The President that Lewinsky signed an Affidavit.


                            january 8, 1998

     9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House Counsel's 
           Office.
     9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
     --: Lewinsky interviews in New York at MacAndrews & Forbes 
           Holdings, Inc. (MFH)
     11:50-11:51 a.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
     3:09-3:10 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
     4:48-4:53 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that 
           the New York MFH Interview went ``Very Poorly.''
     4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ronald Perelman in New York, CEO 
           of Revlon (subsidiary of MFH) ``to make things happen . 
           . . if they could happen.''
     4:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky stating, ``I'm doing 
           the best I can to help you out.''
     6:39 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Counsel's Office 
           (Cheryl Mills), possibly about Lewinsky.
     Evening: Revlon in New York telephones Lewinsky to set up a 
           follow-up interview.
     9:02-9:03 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan about Revlon 
           interview in New York.


                            january 9, 1998

     --: Lewinsky interviews in New York with Senior V.P. Seidman 
           of MacAndrews & Forbes and two Revlon individuals.

[[Page S83]]

               Lewinsky offered Revlon job in New York and 
             accepts.
     1:29 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
     4:14 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan to say that Revlon 
           offered her a job in New York.
               Jordan notifies Currie: ``Mission Accomplished'' 
             and requests she tell The President.
               Jordan notifies The President of Lewinsky's New 
             York job offer. The President replies ``Thank you 
             very much.''
     4:37 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Carter.
     5:04 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
     5:05 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
     5:08 p.m.: The President telephones Currie.
     5:09-5:11 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
     5:12 p.m.: Currie telephones The President.
     5:18-5:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
     5:21-5:26 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
                                  ____


                               [Chart Q]

          THE PRESIDENT'S INVOLVEMENT WITH LEWINSKY JOB SEARCH

     ``Q Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House 
           that this has happened [Carter had been fired]?
     [Jordan]: Thought they had a right to know.
     Q Why?
     [Jordan]: The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a 
           job. I got her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and 
           she has new counsel. I thought that was information 
           that they ought to have . . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 6/
           9/98 Tr. 45-46)
     ``Q Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank 
           Carter had been replaced?
     [Jordan]: Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, 
           he knew that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He 
           was interested in this matter. He is the source of it 
           coming to my attention in the first place . . . .'' 
           (Jordan Grand Jury 6/9/98 Tr. 58-59)
                                  ____


                               [Chart R]

              JORDAN'S PRE-WITNESS LIST JOB SEARCH EFFORTS

     ``[Jordan]: I have no recollection of an early November 
           meeting with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no 
           recollection of it and I have no record of it.'' 
           (Jordan Grand Jury 3/3/98 Tr. 50)

                           *   *   *   *   *

     ``Q Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica 
           Lewinsky a job on any fast pace was not any priority of 
           yours?
     [Jordan]: I think that's fair to say.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/
           5/98 Tr. 76)

                           *   *   *   *   *

     ``[Lewinsky]: [Referring to 12/6/97 meeting with the 
           President]. I think I said that . . . I was supposed to 
           get in touch with Mr. Jordan the previous week and that 
           things did not work out and that nothing had really 
           happened yet [on the job front].
     Q Did the President say what he was going to do?
     [Lewinsky]: I think he said he would--you know, this was not 
           sort of typical of him, to sort of say, `Oh, I'll talk 
           to him. I'll get on it.' '' (Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 
           Tr. 115-116)

                           *   *   *   *   *

     ``Q But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 
           11th, you are clear that at that point you had made a 
           decision that you would try to make some calls to help 
           get her a job.
     [Jordan]: There is no question about that.'' (Jordan Grand 
           Jury 5/5/98 Tr. 95)

                               [Chart S]

                            January 17, 1998


                                Saturday

      4:00 p.m. (approx): THE PRESIDENT finishes 
           testifying under oath in Jones v. Clinton, et al.
      5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
      5:38 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
      7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home 
           but does not speak with her.
      702: p.m.: THE PRESIDENT places a call to Jordan's 
           office.
      7:13 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home 
           and asks her to meet with him on Sunday.

                            January 18, 1998


                                 Sunday

      6:11 a.m.: Drudge Report Released.
      --: The President learns of the Drudge Report and 
           [Tripp] tapes.
      11:49 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
      12:30 p.m.: Jordan has lunch with Bruce Lindsey. 
           Lindsey informs Jordan about the Drudge Report and 
           [Tripp] tapes.
      12:50 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
      1:11 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
      2:15 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
      2:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones THE PRESIDENT.
      5:00 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT meets with Currie, 
           concerning his contacts with Lewinsky.
      5:12 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay 
           at home.''
      6:22 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay 
           at home.''
      7:06 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay 
           at home.''
      7:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills, White 
           House Counsel's Office.
      8:28 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Call Kay.''
      10:09 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie at home.
      11:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home 
           and asks if she reached Lewinsky.

                            January 19, 1998


                     Monday--Martin Luther King Day

      7:02 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay 
           at home at 8:00 this morning.''
      8:08 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay 
           .''
      8:33 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay 
           at home.''
      8:37 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay 
           at home. It's a social call. Thank you.''
      8:41 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Kay is at home. 
           Please call.''
      8:43 a.m.: Currie telephones The President from home 
           to say she has been unable to reach Lewinsky.
      8:44 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kate 
           re: family emergency.''
      8:50 a.m. THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
      8:51 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Msg. From Kay. 
           Please call, have good news.''
      8:56 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
      10:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from 
           his office.
      10:35 a.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich at the 
           White House.
      10:36 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. 
           Jordan at [number redacted].''
      10:44 a.m.: Jordan telephones Erskine Bowles at the 
           White House.
      10:53 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
      10:58 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his 
           office.
      11:04 a.m.: Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the 
           White House.
      11:16 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. 
           Jordan at [number redacted].''
      11:17 a.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey at the White 
           House.
      12:31 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a 
           cellular phone.
      --:Jordan lunches with Carter.
      1:45 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
      2:29 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a 
           celluar phone.
      2:44 p.m.: Jordan enters the White House and over 
           the course of an hour meets with THE PRESIDENT, Erskine 
           Bowles, Bruce Lindsay, Cheryl Mills, Charles Ruff, Rahm 
           Emanuel and others.
      2:46 p.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call 
           Frank Carter at [number redacted].''
      4:51 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
      4:53 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at home.
      4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at his office. 
           Carter informs Jordan that Lewinsky has replaced Carter 
           with a new attorney.
      4:58 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      4:59 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ruff, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      5:05 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Lindsey, White 
           House Counsel's Office.
      5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
      5:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      5:14 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter concerning his 
           termination as Lewinsky's attorney.
      5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House 
           Counsel's Office.
      5:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
      5:56 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his 
           office; Jordan informs The President that Carter was 
           fired.
      6:04 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
      6:26 p.m.: Jordan telephones Stephen Goodin, an aide 
           to THE PRESIDENT.
                                  ____


                               [Chart T]

          THE PRESIDENT'S POST-DEPOSITION STATEMENTS TO CURRIE

                                1/18/98

        ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
        ``You were always there when Monica was there, 
     right?''
        ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, 
     right?''
        ``You could see and hear everything, right?''
        ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do 
     that.''--(Currie Grand Jury 7/22/98 Tr. 6-7; Currie Grand 
     Jury 1/27/98 Tr. 70-75)
                                  ____


                               [Chart U]

                        THE PRESIDENT'S DENIALS

                                1/21/98

       ``And it was at that point that he gave his account of what 
     had happened to me [sic]

[[Page S84]]

     and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He said, 
     `Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.' 
     He rebuffed her. He said, `I've gone down that road before, 
     I've caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do 
     that again.'
       She threatened him. She said that she would tell people 
     they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among 
     her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or 
     said she had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker any 
     more.''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98 Tr. 49)
       ``And he said, `I feel like a character in a novel. I feel 
     like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that 
     is creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I 
     feel like the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.'
       And I said to him, I said, `When this happened with Monica 
     Lewinsky, were you alone? He said, `Well, I was within 
     eyesight or earshot of someone.'''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/
     4/98 Tr. 50)
                                  ____


                               [Chart V]

       ``Q. Okay. Share that with us.
       A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some 
     spate of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said 
     that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever--
       Q. Okay.
       A--that they had not had oral sex''--(John Podesta Grand 
     Jury 6/16/98 Tr. 92)

                           *   *   *   *   *

       ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just 
     too new, it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is 
     they're willing to forgive you [The President] for adultery, 
     but not for perjury or obstruction of justice or the various 
     other things.'''--(Dick Morris Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 10, 12, 
     20)

                           *   *   *   *   *

       ``And I said, `They're just not ready for it,' meaning the 
     voters.' And he [The President] said, `Well, we just have to 
     win, then.'''--(Dick Morris Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 30)
                                  ____


                               [Chart W]

                          ``TALKING POINTS'' *

January 24, 1998

                           *   *   *   *   *


       ``Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating 
     that the President does not believe oral sex is adultery. 
     Would oral sex, to the President, constitute a sexual 
     relationship?''
       ``A: Of course it would.''

                           *   *   *   *   *

     * Produced by the White House pursuant to OIC Subpoena.
                                  ____


                               [Chart X]

            THE PRESIDENT CLAIMS HE WAS TRUTHFUL WITH AIDES

       [President]: And so I said to them things that were true 
     about this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, 
     I said, there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I 
     said, I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was 
     true. And did I hope that I would never have to be here on 
     this day giving this testimony? Of course.
       But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this 
     matter further. So I said things that were true. They may 
     have been misleading, and if they were I have to take 
     responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.--(The President Grand 
     Jury 8/17/98 Tr. 106)
                                  ____


                               [Chart Y]

                          GRAND JURY WITNESSES

       A person testifying before a federal grand jury has three 
     options under the law:
       (1) To obey the oath and testify to the truth, the whole 
     truth and nothing but the truth;
       (2) To lie;
       (3) To assert the Fifth Amendment or another legally 
     recognized privilege.
                                  ____


                               [Chart Z]

               PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

       ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions 
     in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct 
     that was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual 
     intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I 
     understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
     deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate 
     contact.
       These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in 
     early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations 
     with Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter.
       I regret that what began as a friendship came to include 
     this conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
       While I will provide the grand jury whatever other 
     information I can, because of privacy considerations 
     affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an effort to 
     preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will 
     say about the specifics of these particular matters.
       I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other 
     questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky; questions about my understanding of the term 
     `sexual relations', as I understood it to be defined at my 
     January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions concerning 
     alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
     intimidation of witnesses. That, Mr. Bittman, is my 
     statement.''
                                  ____


                           Table of Contents


                                Exhibits

     Telephone records
       (1) Summary chart, 12/19/97
       (2) Currie Cell phone records, 12/28/97
       (3) Summary chart, 1/6/98
       (4) Summary chart, 1/7/98
       (5) Summary chart, 1/15/98-1/16/98
       (6) Summary chart, 1/17/98
       (7) Summary chart, 1/18/98
       (8) Summary chart, 1/19/98
     Court Documents
       (9) Jones v. Clinton. Jan. 29, 1998 District Court Order 
     regarding discovery
       (10) President Clinton's Answer to First Amended Complaint. 
     Jones v. Clinton
       (11) In re: Sealed Case, Nos. 98-3053 & 3059, U.S. court of 
     Appels, District of Columbia
       (12) Jane Doe #6 (Lewinsky) Affidavit filed in Jones v. 
     Clinton
       (13) ``Sexual Relations'' definition
     Miscellaneous
       (14) 1/18/98 Drudge Report
       (15) Jones' attorneys fax cover sheet of witness list to 
     Bennett
       (16) White House ``Talking Points,'' January 24, 1998
       (17) LA Times 1/25/98 Article regarding White House 
     ``Talking Points''
       (18) Response of William J. Clinton to Judiciary Committee 
     Questions
       (19) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 138 L. 16-23 (From GJ 
     Tape 2)
       (20) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 100 L. 20-25, Tr. 105 
     L. 19-25, Tr. 106 L. 1-12 (From GJ Tape 3)
       (21) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 75 L. 2-8, Tr. 76 L. 
     24-25, Tr. 77 L. 1-2, (From Dep. Tape 1)
       (22) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 52 L. 18-25, Tr. 53 
     L. 1-9, 10-18, Tr. 58 L. 22-25, Tr. 59 L. 1-3, 7-16, 17-20 
     (From Dep. Tape 3)
       (23) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 78 L. 4-23, (From 
     Dep. Tape 4)
       (24) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 53 L. 22-25, Tr. 54 
     L. 1-7, 20-25, Tr. 55 L. 1-3 (From Dep. Tape 5)
       (25) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 204 L. 5-14, (From 
     Dep. Tape 8)
       (26) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 9-11

[[Page S85]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.002
     


[[Page S86]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.003
     


[[Page S87]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.004
     


[[Page S88]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.005
     


[[Page S89]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.006
     


[[Page S90]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.007
     


[[Page S91]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.008
     


[[Page S92]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.009
     


[[Page S93]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.010
     


[[Page S94]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.011
     


[[Page S95]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.012
     


[[Page S96]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.013
     


[[Page S97]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.014
     


[[Page S98]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.015
     


[[Page S99]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.016
     


[[Page S100]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.017
     


[[Page S101]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.018
     


[[Page S102]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.019
     


[[Page S103]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.020
     


[[Page S104]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.021
     


[[Page S105]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.022
     


[[Page S106]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.023
     


[[Page S107]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.024
     


[[Page S108]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.025
     


[[Page S109]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.026
     


[[Page S110]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.027
     


[[Page S111]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.028
     


[[Page S112]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.029
     


[[Page S113]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.030
     


[[Page S114]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.031
     


[[Page S115]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.032
     


[[Page S116]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.033
     


[[Page S117]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.034
     


[[Page S118]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.035
     


[[Page S119]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.036
     


[[Page S120]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.037
     


[[Page S121]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.038
     


[[Page S122]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.039
     


[[Page S123]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.040
     


[[Page S124]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.041
     


[[Page S125]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.042
     


[[Page S126]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.043
     


[[Page S127]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.044
     


[[Page S128]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.045
     


[[Page S129]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.046
     


[[Page S130]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.047
     


[[Page S131]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.048
     


[[Page S132]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.049
     


[[Page S133]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.050
     


[[Page S134]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.051
     


[[Page S135]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.052
     


[[Page S136]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.053
     


[[Page S137]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.054
     


[[Page S138]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.055
     


[[Page S139]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.056
     


[[Page S140]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.057
     


[[Page S141]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.058
     


[[Page S142]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.059
     


[[Page S143]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.060
     


[[Page S144]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.061
     


[[Page S145]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.062
     


[[Page S146]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.063
     


[[Page S147]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.064
     


[[Page S148]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.065
     


[[Page S149]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.066
     


[[Page S150]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.067
     


[[Page S151]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.068
     


[[Page S152]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.069
     


[[Page S153]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.070
     


[[Page S154]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.071
     


[[Page S155]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.072
     


[[Page S156]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.073
     


[[Page S157]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.074
     


[[Page S158]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.075
     


[[Page S159]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.076
     


[[Page S160]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.077
     


[[Page S161]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.078
     


[[Page S162]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.079
     


[[Page S163]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.080
     


[[Page S164]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.081
     


[[Page S165]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.082
     


[[Page S166]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.083
     


[[Page S167]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.084
     


[[Page S168]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.085
     


[[Page S169]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.086
     


[[Page S170]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.087
     


[[Page S171]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.088
     


[[Page S172]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.089
     


[[Page S173]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.090
     


[[Page S174]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.091
     


[[Page S175]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.092
     


[[Page S176]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.093
     


[[Page S177]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.094
     


[[Page S178]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.095
     


[[Page S179]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.096
     


[[Page S180]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.097
     


[[Page S181]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.098
     


[[Page S182]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.099
     


[[Page S183]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.100
     


[[Page S184]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.101
     


[[Page S185]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.102
     


[[Page S186]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.103
     


[[Page S187]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.104
     


[[Page S188]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.105
     


[[Page S189]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.106
     


[[Page S190]]

     [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.107
     


[[Page S191]]


                                  ____
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

     In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
         the United States

        TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON


David E. Kendall                      Charles F.C. Ruff
Nicole K. Seligman                    Gregory B. Craig
Emmet T. Flood                        Bruce R. Lindsey
Max Stier                             Cheryl D. Mills
Glen Donath                           Lanny A. Breuer
Alicia L. Marti                       Office of the White House Counsel
Williams & Connolly                   The White House
725 12th Street, N.W.                 Washington, D.C. 20502
Washington, D.C. 20005
 

     January 13, 1999.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

       I. INTRODUCTION
       A. The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment Has Not Been 
     Satisfied
       B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice
       C. Compound Charges and Vagueness
       II. BACKGROUND
       A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End
       B. The Paula Jones Litigation
       C. The President's Grand Jury Testimony About Ms. Lewinsky
       D. Proceedings in the House of Representatives
       III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF FOR 
     DECISION
       A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the Constitutional 
     Standard of High Crimes and Misdemeanors
       1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the 
     Question Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
       2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of 
     ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
       a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an 
     Intentionally High Standard for Removal
       b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were 
     Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of 
     Government
       3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty 
     Do Not Alone State Impeachable Offenses
       a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President 
     Nixon
       b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander 
     Hamilton
       4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars 
     Confirm that Impeachable Offenses Are Not Present
       a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
       b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations Would 
     Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the Presidency and 
     to Our Government of Separated Powers
       5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
       B. The Standard of Proof
       IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE I
       A. Applicable Law
       B. Structure of the Allegations
       C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article I
       1. The President denies that he made materially false or 
     misleading statements to the grand jury about ``the nature 
     and details of his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
       2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
     misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony he 
     gave in the Jones case
       3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
     misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements 
     of his attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
       4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
     misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied 
     attempting ``to influence the testimony of witnesses and to 
     impede the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
       V. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE II
       A. Applicable Law
       B. Structure of the Allegations
       C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article II
       1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, 
     he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a 
     sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
     perjurious, false and misleading''
       2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, 
     he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give 
     perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called 
     to testify personally'' in the Jones litigation
       3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, 
     encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--
     gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
       a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
       b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
       c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds 
     With the President's Actions
       4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in 
     connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in 
     New York in an effort to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful 
     testimony'' in the Jones case
       a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This 
     Charge
       b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
       c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
       (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon 
     Jordan
       (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment 
     offer
       d. Conclusion
       5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his 
     attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal 
     judge'' concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
       6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by 
     relating ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential 
     witness,'' Betty Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence 
     [her] testimony''
       7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he 
     relayed allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his 
     aides
       VI. THE STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE ARTICLES PRECLUDE A 
     CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND VOTE
       A. The Articles Are Both Unfairly Complex and Lacking in 
     Specificity
       1. The Structure of Article I
       2. The Structure of Article II
       B. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate the 
     Constitutional Requirement That Two-Thirds of the Senate 
     Reach Agreement that Specific Wrongdoing Has Been Proven
       1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in 
     Violation of the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence 
     and Due Process
       a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds 
     Concurrence Requirement
       b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process 
     Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single 
     Accusation
       C. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate Due Process 
     Protections Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific Accusations
       1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific 
     Charges
       2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally 
     Vague
       D. The Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment 
     Must Speak Clearly and Intelligibly
       VII. THE NEED FOR DISCOVERY
       VIII. CONCLUSION

        TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                            I. Introduction

       Twenty-six months ago, more than 90 million Americans left 
     their homes and work places to travel to schools, church 
     halls and other civic centers to elect a President of the 
     United States. And on January 20, 1997, William Jefferson 
     Clinton was sworn in to serve a second term of office for 
     four years.
       The Senate, in receipt of Articles of Impeachment from the 
     House of Representatives, is now gathered in trial to 
     consider whether that decision should be set aside for the 
     remaining two years of the President's term. It is a power 
     contemplated and authorized by the Framers of the 
     Constitution, but never before employed in our nation's 
     history. The gravity of what is at stake--the democratic 
     choice of the American people--and the solemnity of the 
     proceedings dictate that a decision to remove the President 
     from office should follow only from the most serious of 
     circumstances and should be done in conformity with 
     Constitutional standards and in the interest of the Nation 
     and its people.
       The Articles of Impeachment that have been exhibited to the 
     Senate fall far short of what the Founding Fathers had in 
     mind when they placed in the hands of the Congress the power 
     to impeach and remove a President from office. They fall far 
     short of what the American people demand be shown and proven 
     before their democratic choice is reversed. And they even 
     fall far short of what a prudent prosecutor would require 
     before presenting a case to a judge or jury.
       Take away the elaborate trappings of the Articles and the 
     high-flying rhetoric that has accompanied them, and we see 
     clearly that the House of Representatives asks the Senate to 
     remove the President from office because he:
        used the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe 
     the frequency of his improper intimate contacts with Ms. 
     Monica Lewinsky. There were, according to the House Managers, 
     eleven such contacts over the course of approximately 500 
     days.
       Should the will of the people be overruled and the 
     President of the United States be removed from office because 
     he used the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe eleven 
     events over some 500 days? That is what the House of 
     Representatives asks the Senate to do.
        used the word ``occasional'' to describe the 
     frequency of inappropriate telephone conversations between he 
     and Monica Lewinsky. According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President 
     and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in between ten and fifteen such 
     conversations spanning a 23-month period.
       Should the will of the people be overruled and the 
     President of the United States be removed from office because 
     he used the word ``occasional'' to describe up to 15 
     telephone calls over a 23-month period? That is what the 
     House of Representatives asks the Senate to do.
        said the improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
     began in early 1996, while she recalls that it began in 
     November 1995. And he said the contact did not include 
     touching certain parts of her body, while she said it did.
       Should the will of the people be overruled and the 
     President of the United States be removed from office because 
     two people have a

[[Page S192]]

     different recollection of the details of a wrongful 
     relationship--which the President has admitted? That is what 
     the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do.
       The Articles of Impeachment are not limited to the examples 
     cited above, but the other allegations of wrongdoing are 
     similarly unconvincing. There is the charge that the 
     President unlawfully obstructed justice by allegedly trying 
     to find a job for Monica Lewinsky in exchange for her silence 
     about their relationship. This charge is made despite the 
     fact that no one involved in the effort to find work for Ms. 
     Lewinsky--including Ms. Lewinsky herself--testifies that 
     there was any connection between the job search and the 
     affidavit. Indeed, the basis for that allegation, Ms. 
     Lewinsky's statements to Ms. Tripp, was expressly repudiated 
     by Ms. Lewinsky under oath.
       There is also the charge that the President conspired to 
     obstruct justice by arranging for Ms. Lewinsky to hide gifts 
     that he had given her, even though the facts and the 
     testimony contain no evidence that he did so. In fact, the 
     evidence shows that the President gave her new gifts on the 
     very day that the articles allege he conspired to conceal his 
     gifts to her.
       In the final analysis, the House is asking the Senate to 
     remove the President because he had a wrongful relationship 
     and sought to keep the existence of that relationship 
     private.
       Nothing said in this Trial Memorandum is intended to excuse 
     the President's actions. By his own admission, he is guilty 
     of personal failings. As he has publicly stated, ``I don't 
     think there is a fancy way to say that I have sinned.'' He 
     has misled his family, his friends, his staff, and the Nation 
     about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
     hoped to avoid exposure of personal wrongdoing so as to 
     protect his family and himself and to avoid public 
     embarrassment. He has acknowledged that his actions were 
     wrong.
       By the same token, these actions must not be 
     mischaracterized into a wholly groundless excuse for removing 
     the President from the office to which he was twice elected 
     by the American people. The allegations in the articles and 
     the argument in the House Managers' Trial Memorandum do not 
     begin to satisfy the stringent showing required by our 
     Founding Fathers to remove a duly elected President from 
     office, either as a matter of fact or law.


 a. the constitutional standard for impeachment has not been satisfied

       There is strong agreement among constitutional and legal 
     scholars and historians that the substance of the articles 
     does not amount to impeachable offenses. On November 6, 1998, 
     430 Constitutional law professors wrote:

       ``Did President Clinton commit `high Crimes and 
     Misdemeanors' warranting impeachment under the Constitution? 
     We . . . believe that the misconduct alleged in the report of 
     the Independent Counsel . . . does not cross the threshold. . 
     . . [I]t is clear that Members of Congress could violate 
     their constitutional responsibilities if they sought to 
     impeach and remove the President for misconduct, even 
     criminal misconduct, that fell short of the high 
     constitutional standard required for impeachment.''

       On October 28, 1998, more than 400 historians issued a 
     joint statement warning that because impeachment had 
     traditionally been reserved for high crimes and misdemeanors 
     in the exercise of executive power, impeachment of the 
     President based on the facts alleged in the OIC Referral 
     would set a dangerous precedent. ``If carried forward, they 
     will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and 
     diminished, at the mercy as never before of caprices of any 
     Congress. The Presidency, historically the center of 
     leadership during our great national ordeals, will be 
     crippled in meeting the inevitable challenges of the 
     future.''
       We address why the charges in the two articles do not rise 
     to the level of `high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' in Section 
     III, Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof.


      B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice

       Article I alleges perjury before a federal grand jury. 
     Article II alleges obstruction of justice. Both perjury and 
     obstruction of justice are statutory crimes. In rebutting the 
     allegations contained in the articles of impeachment, this 
     brief refers to the facts as well as to laws, legal 
     principles, court decisions, procedural safeguards, and the 
     Constitution itself. Those who seek to remove the President 
     speak of the ``rule of law.'' Among the most fundamental 
     rules of law are the principles that those who accuse have 
     the burden of proof, and those who are accused have the right 
     to defend themselves by relying on the law, established 
     procedures, and the Constitution. These principles are not 
     ``legalisms'' but rather the very essence of the ``rule of 
     law'' that distinguishes our Nation from others.
       We respond, in detail, to those allegations whose substance 
     we can decipher in Section IV, The President Should Be 
     Acquitted on Article I, and in Section V, The President 
     Should Be Acquitted on Article II.


                   C. Compound Charges and Vagueness

       If there were any doubt that the House of Representatives 
     has utterly failed in its constitutional responsibility to 
     the Senate and to the President, that doubt vanishes upon 
     reading the Trial Memorandum submitted by the House Managers. 
     Having proferred two articles of impeachment, each of which 
     unconstitutionally combines multiple offenses and fails to 
     give even minimally adequate notice of the charges it 
     encompasses, the House--three days before the Managers are to 
     open their case--is still expanding, not refining, the scope 
     of those articles. In further violation of the most basic 
     constitutional principles, their brief advances, merely as 
     ``examples,'' nineteen conclusory allegations--eight of 
     perjury under Article I and eleven of obstruction of justice 
     under Article II, some of which have never appeared before, 
     even in the Report submitted by the Judiciary Committee 
     (``Committee Report''), much less in the Office of 
     Independent Counsel (``OIC'') Referral or in the articles 
     themselves.\1\ If the target the Managers present to the 
     Senate and to the President is still moving now, what can the 
     President expect in the coming days? Is there any point at 
     which the President will be given the right accorded a 
     defendant in the most minor criminal case--to know with 
     certainty the charges against which he must defend?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ For example, the House managers add a charge that the 
     President engaged in ``legalistic hair splitting [in his 
     response to the 81 questions] in an obvious attempt to skirt 
     the whole truth and to deceive and obstruct'' the Committee. 
     This charge was specifically rejected by the full House of 
     Representatives when it rejected Article IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Senate, we know, fully appreciates these concerns and 
     has, in past proceedings, dealt appropriately with articles 
     far less flawed than these. The constitutional concerns 
     raised by the House's action are addressed in Section VI, The 
     Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a 
     Constitutionally Sound Vote.

                             II. Background


                A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End

       The Lewinsky investigation emerged in January 1998 from the 
     long-running Whitewater investigation. On August 5, 1994, the 
     Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for 
     the District of Columbia Court Circuit appointed Kenneth W. 
     Starr as Independent Counsel to conduct an investigation 
     centering on two Arkansas entities, Whitewater Development 
     Company, Inc., and Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan 
     Association.
       In the spring of 1997, OIC investigators, without any 
     expansion of jurisdiction, interviewed Arkansas state 
     troopers who had once been assigned to the Governor's 
     security detail, and ``[t]he troopers said Starr's 
     investigators asked about 12 to 15 women by name, including 
     Paula Corbin Jones. . . .'' Woodward & Schmidt, ``Starr 
     Probes Clinton Personal Life,'' The Washington Post (June 25, 
     1997) at A1 (emphasis added). ``The nature of the questioning 
     marks a sharp departure from previous avenues of inquiry in 
     the three-year old investigation. . . . Until now, . . . what 
     has become a wide-ranging investigation of many aspects of 
     Clinton's governorship has largely steered clear of questions 
     about Clinton's relationships with women. . . .'' \2\ One of 
     the most striking aspects of this new phase of the Whitewater 
     investigation was the extent to which it focused on the Jones 
     case. One of the troopers interviewed declared, ``[t]hey 
     asked me about Paula Jones, all kinds of questions about 
     Paula Jones, whether I saw Clinton and Paula together and how 
     many times.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \2\ Ibid. Trooper Roger Perry, a 21-year veteran of the 
     Arkansas state police, stated that he ``was asked about the 
     most intimate details of Clinton's life: `I was left with the 
     impression that they wanted me to show he was a womanizer. . 
     . . All they wanted to talk about was women.' '' Ibid. 
     (Ellipsis in original).
     \3\ Ibid. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In his November 19, 1998, testimony before the House 
     Judiciary Committee, Mr. Starr conceded that his agents had 
     conducted these interrogations and acknowledged that at that 
     time, he had not sought expansion of his jurisdiction from 
     either the Special Division or the Attorney General.\4\ Mr. 
     Starr contended that these inquiries were somehow relevant to 
     his Whitewater investigation: ``we were, in fact 
     interviewing, as good prosecutors, good investigators do, 
     individuals who would have information that may be relevant 
     to our inquiry about the President's involvement in 
     Whitewater, in Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan and the 
     like.''\5\ It seems irrefutable, however, that the OIC was in 
     fact engaged in an unauthorized attempt to gather 
     embarrassing information about the President--information 
     wholly unrelated to Whitewater or Madison Guaranty Savings 
     and Loan, but potentially relevant to the lawsuit filed by 
     Paula Jones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \4\ Transcript of November 19, 1998 House Judiciary Committee 
     Hearing at 377-378.
     \5\ Ibid. at 378.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                     B. The Paula Jones Litigation

       The Paula Jones lawsuit made certain allegations about 
     events she said had occurred three years earlier, in 1991, 
     when the President was Governor of Arkansas. Discovery in the 
     case had been stayed until the Supreme Court's decision on 
     May 27, 1997, denying the President temporary immunity from 
     suit.\6\ Shortly thereafter, Ms. Jones' legal team began a 
     public relations offensive against the President, headed by 
     Ms. Jones' new spokesperson, Mr. Susan Carpenter-McMillan, 
     and her new counsel affiliated with the conservation 
     Rutherford Institute.\7\ ``I will

[[Page S193]]

     never deny that when I first heard about this case I said, 
     ``Okay, good. We're gonna get that little slimeball,' said 
     Ms. Carpenter-McMillan.''\8\ While Ms. Jones' previous 
     attorneys, Messrs. Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cammarata, had 
     largely avoided the media, as the Jones civil suit 
     increasingly became a partisan vehicle to try to damage the 
     President, public personal attacks became the order of the 
     day.\9\ As is now well known, this effort led ultimately to 
     the Jones lawyers being permitted to subpoena various women, 
     to discover the nature of their relationship, if any, with 
     the President, allegedly for the purpose of determining 
     whether they had information relevant to the sexual 
     harassment charge. Among these women was Ms. Lewinsky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \6\ Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
     \7\ Ms. Jones was described as having ``accepted financial 
     support of a Virginia conservative group,'' which intended to 
     ``raise $100,000 or more on Jones's behalf, although the 
     money will go for expenses and not legal fees.'' ``Jones 
     Acquires New Lawyers and Backing,'' The Washington Post 
     (October 2, 1998) at A1. Jones' new law firm, the Dallas-
     based Radar, Campbell, Fisher and Pyke, had ``represented 
     conservatives in antiabortion cases and other causes.'' Ibid. 
     See also Dallas Lawyers Agree to Take on Paula Jones' Case--
     Their Small Firm Has Ties to Conservative Advocacy Group,'' 
     The Los Angeles Times (Oct. 2, 1997) (Rutherford Institute a 
     ``conservative advocacy group.'').
     \8\ ``Cause Celebre: An Antiabortion Activist Makes Herself 
     the Unofficial Mouthpiece for Paula Jones.'' The Washington 
     Post (July 23, 1998) at C1. Ms. Carpenter-McMillan, ``a 
     cause-oriented, self-defined conservative feminist''', 
     described her role as `flaming the White House'' and declared 
     ```Unless Clinton wants to be terribly embarrassed, he'd 
     better cough up what Paula needs. Anybody that comes out and 
     testifies against Paula better have the past of a Mother 
     Teresa, because our investigators will investigate their 
     morality.''' ``Paula Jones' Team Not All About Teamwork,'' 
     USA Today (Sept. 29, 1997) at 4A.
     \9\ After Ms. Jones' new team had been in action for three 
     months, one journalist commented: ``In six years of public 
     controversy over Clinton's personal life, what is striking in 
     some ways is how little the debate changes. As in the 
     beginning, many conservatives nurture the hope that the past 
     will be Clinton's undoing. Jone's adviser, Susan Carpenter-
     McMillan, acknowledged on NBC's `Meet the Press' yesterday 
     that her first reaction when she first heard Jone's claims 
     about Clinton was, ``Good, we're going to get that little 
     slime ball.'' (Harris, ``Jones Case Tests Political 
     Paradox,'' The Washington Post (Jan. 19, 1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In January 1998, Mr. Linda Tripp notified the OIC of 
     certain information she believed she had about Ms. Lewinsky's 
     involvement in the Jones case. At that time, the OIC 
     investigation began to intrude formally into the Jones case: 
     the OIC met with Ms. Tripp through the week of January 12, 
     and with her cooperation taped Ms. Lewinsky discussing the 
     Jones case and the President. Ms. Tripp also informed the OIC 
     that she had been surreptitiously taping conversations with 
     Ms. Lewinsky in violation of Maryland law, and in exchange 
     for her cooperation, the OIC promised Ms. Tripp immunity from 
     federal prosecution, and assistance in protecting her from 
     state prosecution.\10\ On Friday, January 16, after Ms. Tripp 
     wore a body wire and had taped conversations with Ms. 
     Lewinsky for the OIC, the OIC received jurisdiction from the 
     Attorney General and formalized an immunity agreement with 
     Ms. Tripp in writing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \10\ Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the United 
     States House of Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United 
     States Code Section 595(C), H. Doc. 105-316 (hereinafter 
     ``Supp.'') at 3758-3759, 4371-4373 (House Judiciary 
     Committee) (Sept. 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The President's deposition in the Jones case was scheduled 
     to take place the next day, on Saturday, January 17. As we 
     now know, Ms. Tripp met with and briefed the lawyers for Ms. 
     Jones the night before the deposition on her perception of 
     the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky and the President--
     doing so based on confidences Ms. Lewinsky had entrusted to 
     her.\11\ She was permitted to do so even though she has been 
     acting all week at the behest of the OIC and was dependent on 
     the OIC to use its best efforts to protect her from state 
     prosecution. At the deposition the next day, the President 
     was asked numerous questions about his relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky by lawyers who already knew the answers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \11\ Baker, ``Linda Tripp Briefed Jones Team on Tapes: 
     Meeting Occurred Before Clinton Deposition,'' The Washington 
     Post (Feb. 14, 1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Jones case, of course, was not about Ms. Lewinsky. She 
     was a peripheral player and, since her relationship with the 
     President was concededly consensual, irrelevant to Ms. Jones' 
     case. Shortly after the President's deposition, Chief Judge 
     Wright ruled that evidence pertaining to Ms. Lewinsky would 
     not be admissible at the Jones trial because ``it is not 
     essential to the core issues in this case.'' \12\ The Court 
     also ruled that, given the allegations at issue in the Jones 
     case, the Lewinsky evidence ``might be inadmissible as 
     extrinsic evidence'' under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
     because it involved merely the ``specific instances of 
     conduct'' of a witness.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \12\ Order, at 2, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. 
     Ark.) (Jan. 29, 1998).
     \13\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On April 1, 1998, the Court ruled that Ms. Jones had no 
     case and granted summary judgment for the President. Although 
     Judge Wright ``viewed the record in the light most favorable 
     to [Ms. Jones] and [gave] her the benefit of all reasonable 
     factual inferences,'' \14\ the Court ruled that, as a matter 
     of law, she simply had no case against President Clinton, 
     both because ``there is no genuine issue as to any material 
     fact'' and because President Clinton was ``entitled to a 
     judgment as a matter of law.'' Id. at 11-12. After reviewing 
     all the proffered evidence, the Court ruled that ``the record 
     taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 
     find for'' Ms. Jones. Id. at 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \14\ Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), 
     Memorandum Opinion and Order (April 1, 1998), at 3 n.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


       c. the president's grand jury testimony about ms. lewinsky

       On August 17, 1998, the President voluntarily testified to 
     the grand jury and specifically acknowledged that he had had 
     a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky involving ``improper 
     intimate contact,'' and that he `'engaged in conduct that was 
     wrong.'' App. at 461.\15\ He described how the relationship 
     began and how he had ended it early in 1997--long before any 
     public attention or scrutiny. He stated to the grand jury 
     ``it's an embarrassing and personally painful thing, the 
     truth about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,'' App. at 533, 
     and told the grand jurors, ``I take full responsibility for 
     it. It wasn't her fault, it was mine.'' App. at 589-90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \15\ Appendices to the Referral to the United States House of 
     Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code 
     Section 595(c), H. Doc. 105-311 (hereinafter ``App.'') at 461 
     (House Judiciary Committee) (Sept. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The President also explained how he had tried to navigate 
     the deposition in the Jones case months earlier without 
     admitting what he admitted to the grand jury--that he had 
     been engaged in an improper intimate relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky. Id. a 530-531. He further testified that the 
     ``inappropriate encounters'' with Ms. Lewinsky had ended, at 
     his insistence, in early 1997. He declined to describe, 
     because of considerations of personal privacy and 
     institutional dignity, certain specifics about his conduct 
     with Ms. Lewinsky,\16\ but he indicated his willingness to 
     answer,\17\ and he did answer, the other questions put to him 
     about his relationship with her. No one who watched the 
     videotape of this grand jury testimony had any doubt that the 
     President admitted to having had an improper intimate 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \16\ ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other 
     information I can, because of privacy considerations 
     affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an effort to 
     preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will 
     say about the specifics of these particular matters.'' App. 
     at 461.
     \17\ ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other 
     questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, questions about my understanding of the term 
     `sexual relations,' as I understood it to be defined at my 
     January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions concerning 
     alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
     intimidation of witnesses.'' App. at 461.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


             d. proceedings in the house of representatives

       On September 9, 1998, Mr. Starr transmitted a Referral to 
     the House of Representatives that alleged eleven acts by the 
     President related to the Lewinsky matter that, in the opinion 
     of the OIC, ``may constitute grounds for an impeachment.'' 
     \18\ The allegations fell into three broad categories: lying 
     under oath, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \18\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in 
     Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States 
     Code, Section 595(c), at 1 (House Judiciary Committee) 
     (printed September 11, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The House Judiciary held a total of four hearings and 
     called but one witness: Kenneth W. Starr. The Committee 
     allowed the President's lawyers two days in which to present 
     a defense. The White House presented four panels of 
     distinguished expert witnesses who testified that the facts, 
     as alleged, did not constitute an impeachable offense, did 
     not reveal an abuse of power, and would not support a case 
     for perjury or obstruction of justice that any reasonable 
     prosecutor would bring. White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff 
     presented argument to the Committee on behalf of the 
     President, which is incorporated into this Trial Memorandum 
     by reference.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \19\ Also incorporated by reference into this Trial 
     Memorandum are the four prior submissions of the President to 
     the House of Representatives: Preliminary Memorandum 
     Concerning Referral of Office of Independent Counsel 
     (September 11, 1998) (73 pages); Initial Response to Referral 
     of Office of Independent Counsel (September 12, 1998) (42 
     pages); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment 
     (October 2, 1998) (30 pages); Submission by Counsel for 
     President Clinton to the Committee on the House Judiciary of 
     the United States House of Representatives (December 8, 1998) 
     (184 pages).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On December 11 and 12, the Judiciary Committee voted 
     essentially along party lines to approve four articles of 
     impeachment. Republicans defeated the alternative resolution 
     of censure offered by certain Committee Democrats. Almost 
     immediately after censure failed in the Committee, the House 
     Republican leadership declared publicly that no censure 
     proposal would be considered by the full House when it 
     considered the articles of impeachment.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \20\ See Baker & Eilperin, ``GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to 
     Debate Censure in House: Panel Votes Final, Trimmed Article 
     of Impeachment,'' The Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On December 19, 1998, voting essentially on party lines, 
     the House of Representatives approved two articles of 
     impeachment: Article I, which alleged perjury before the 
     grand jury, passed by a vote of 228 to 206 and Article III, 
     which alleged obstruction of justice, passed by a vote of 221 
     to 212. The full House defeated two other Articles: Article 
     II, which alleged that the President committed perjury in his 
     civil deposition, and Article IV, which alleged abuse of 
     power. Consideration of a censure resolution was blocked, 
     even though members of both parties had expressed a desire to 
     vote on such an option.
       From beginning to end the House process was both partisan 
     and unfair. Consider:
        The House released the entire OIC Referral to the 
     public without ever reading it, reviewing it, editing it, or 
     allowing the President's counsel to review it;

[[Page S194]]

        The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee said 
     he had ``no interest in not working in a bipartisan way''; 
     \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \21\ Associated Press (March 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Chairman also pledged a process the American 
     people would conclude was fair; \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \22\ ``This whole proceeding will fall on its face if it's 
     not perceived by the American people to be fair.'' Financial 
     Times (Sept. 12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Speaker-Designate of the House endorsed a vote 
     of conscience on a motion to censure;\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \23\ ``The next House Speaker, Robert Livingston, said the 
     coming impeachment debate should allow lawmakers to make a 
     choice between ousting President Clinton and imposing a 
     lesser penalty such as censure. The Louisiana Republican said 
     the House can't duck a vote on articles of impeachment if 
     reported next month by its Judiciary Committee. But an 
     `alternative measure is possible' he said, and the GOP 
     leadership should `let everybody have a chance to vote on the 
     option of their choice.' '' Wall Street Journal (Nov. 23, 
     1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Members of the House were shown secret 
     ``evidence'' in order to influence their vote--evidence which 
     the President's counsel still has not been able to review.

   III. The Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof for Decision


A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the Constitutional Standard of High 
                        Crimes and Misdemeanors

     1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the 
         Question Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
       It is the solemn duty of the Senate to consider the 
     question whether the articles state an impeachable 
     offense.\24\ That Constitutional question has not, in the 
     words of one House Manager, ``already been resolved by the 
     House.'' \25\ To the contrary, that question now awaits the 
     Senate's measured consideration and independent judgment. 
     Indeed, throughout our history, resolving this question has 
     been an essential part of the Senate's constitutional 
     obligation to ``try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const. Art. 
     Sec. 3, cl.7. In the words of John Logan, a House Manager in 
     the 1868 proceedings:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \24\ In the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, the 
     President's counsel answered (to at least one article) that 
     the matters alleged ``do not charge or allege the commission 
     of any act whatever by this respondent, in his office of 
     President of the United States, nor the omission by this 
     respondent of any act of official obligation or duty in his 
     office of President of the United States.'' 1 Trial of Andrew 
     Johnson (1868) (``TAJ'') 53.
     \25\ See Statement of Rep. Bill McCollum: ``[A]re these 
     impeachable offenses, which I think has already been resolved 
     by the House. I think constitutionally that's our job to 
     do.'' Fox News Sunday (January 3, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       ``It is the rule that all questions of law or fact are to 
     be decided, in these proceedings, by the final vote upon the 
     guilt or innocence of the accused. It is also the rule, that 
     in determining this general issue senators must consider the 
     sufficiency or insufficiency in law or in fact of every 
     article of accusation.''\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \26\ Closing argument of Manager John H. Logan, 2 TAJ 18 
     (emphasis added). See also Office of Senate Legal Counsel, 
     Memorandum on Impeachment Issues at 25-26 (Oct. 7, 1988) 
     (``Because the Senate acts as both judge and jury in an 
     impeachment trial, the Senate's conviction on a particular 
     article of impeachment reflects the Senate's judgment not 
     only that the accused engaged in the misconduct underlying 
     the article but also that the article stated an impeachable 
     offense'').

     We respectfully suggest that the articles exhibited here do 
     not state wrongdoing that constitutes impeachable offenses 
     under our Constitution.
     2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of 
         ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
       a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an 
           Intentionally High Standard for Removal
       The Constitution provides that the President shall be 
     removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and 
     Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
     Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Constitution, Art. II, section 4. The 
     charges fail to meet the high standard that the Framers 
     established.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \27\ For a more complete discussion of the Standards for 
     Impeachment, please see Submission by Counsel for President 
     Clinton to the House Judiciary of the United States House of 
     Representatives at 24-43 (December 8, 1998); Memorandum 
     Regarding Standards of Impeachment (October 2, 1998); and 
     Impeachment of William Jefferson, President of the United 
     States, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany 
     H. Res. 611, H. Rpt. 105-830, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 332-39 
     (citing Minority Report). References to pages 2-203 of the 
     Committee Report will be cited hereinafter as ``Committee 
     Report.'' References to pages 329-406 of the Committee Report 
     will be cited hereinafter as ``Minority Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The syntax of the Constitutional standard ``Treason, 
     Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' (emphasis 
     added) strongly suggests, by the interpretive principle 
     noscitur a sociis,28 that, to be impeachable 
     offenses, high crimes and misdemeanors must be of the 
     seriousness of ``Treason'' and ``Bribery.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \28\ `` `It is known from its associates' . . . the meaning 
     of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words.'' 
     Black's Law Dictionary 1209 (4th ed. 1968).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Our Constitutional structure reaffirms that the standard 
     must be a very high one. Ours is a Constitution of separated 
     powers. In that Constitution, the President does not serve at 
     the will of Congress, but as the directly elected,\29\ 
     solitary head of the Executive Branch. The Constitution 
     reflects a judgment that a strong Executive, executing the 
     law independently of legislative will, is a necessary 
     protection for a free people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \29\ Of course, that election takes place through the 
     mediating activity of the Electoral College. See U.S. Const. 
     Art. II, Sec. 1, cl. 2-3 and Amend. XII.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       These elementary facts of constitutional structure 
     underscore the need for a very high standard for impeachment. 
     The House Managers, in their Brief, suggest that the failure 
     to remove the President would raise the standard for 
     impeachment higher than the Framers intended. They say that 
     if the Senate does not remove the President, ``The bar will 
     be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need 
     to be concerned.'' But that standard is just a modified 
     version of the plain language of Article II, Section 4 of the 
     Constitution, which says a President can only be impeached 
     and removed for ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
     Misdemeanors.'' The Framers wanted a high bar. It was not the 
     intention of the Framers that the President should be subject 
     to the will of the dominant legislative party. As Alexander 
     Hamilton said in a warning against the politicization of 
     impeachment: ``There will always be the greater danger that 
     the decision will be regulated more by comparative strength 
     of parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or 
     guilt.'' Federalist 65. Our system of government does not 
     permit Congress to unseat the President merely because it 
     disagrees with his behavior or his policies. The Framers' 
     decisive rejection of parliamentary government is one reason 
     they caused the phrase ``Treason, Bribery or other high 
     Crimes and Misdemeanors'' to appear in the Constitution 
     itself. They chose to specify those categories of offenses 
     subject to the impeachment power, rather than leave that 
     judgment to the unfettered whim of the legislature.
       Any just and proper impeachment process must be reasonably 
     viewed by the public as arising from one of those rare cases 
     when the Legislature is compelled to stand in for all the 
     people and remove a President whose continuation in office 
     threatens grave harm to the Republic. Indeed, it is not 
     exaggeration to say--as a group of more than 400 leading 
     historians and constitutional scholars publicly stated--that 
     removal on these articles would ``mangle the system of checks 
     and balances that is our chief safeguard against abuses of 
     public power.'' \30\ Removal of the President on these 
     grounds would defy the constitutional presumption that the 
     removal power rests with the people in elections, and it 
     would do incalculable damage to the institution of the 
     Presidency. If ``successful,'' removal here ``will leave the 
     Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the 
     mercy as never before of the caprices of any Congress.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \30\ Statement of Historians in Defense of the Constitution 
     (Oct. 28, 1998) (``Statement of Historians''); see also 
     Schmitt, ``Scholars and Historians Assail Clinton Impeachment 
     Inquiry,'' The New York Times (Oct. 19, 1998) at A18.
     \31\ Statement of Historians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Framers made the President the sole nationally elected 
     public official (together with the Vice-President), 
     responsible to all the people. Therefore, when articles of 
     impeachment have been exhibited, the Senate confronts this 
     inescapable question: is the alleged misconduct so profoundly 
     serious, so malevolent to our Constitutional system, that it 
     justifies undoing the people's decision? Is the wrong alleged 
     of a sort that not only demands removal of the President 
     before the ordinary electoral cycle can do its work, but also 
     justifies the national trauma that accompanies the 
     impeachment trial process itself? The wrongdoing alleged here 
     does not remotely meet that standard.
       b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were 
           Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of 
           Government
       ``[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors'' refers to nothing short 
     of Presidential actions that are ``great and dangerous 
     offenses'' or ``attempts to subvert the Constitution.'' \32\ 
     Impeachment was never intended to be a remedy for private 
     wrongs. It was intended to be a method of removing a 
     President whose continued presence in the Office would cause 
     grave danger to the Nation and our Constitutional system of 
     government.\33\ Thus, ``in all but the most extreme 
     instances, impeachment should be limited to abuse of public 
     office, not private misconduct unrelated to public office.'' 
     \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \32\ George Mason, 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal 
     Convention of 1787 550 (Rev. ed. 1966).
     \33\ As the 1975 Watergate staff report concluded 
     ``Impeachment is the first step in remedial process--removal 
     from office and possible disqualification from holding future 
     office. The purpose of impeachment is not personal 
     punishment; its function is primarily to maintain 
     constitutional government. . . . In an impeachment proceeding 
     a President is called to account for abusing powers that only 
     a President possesses.'' Constitutional Grounds for 
     Presidential Impeachment, Report by the Staff of the 
     Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d 
     Sess. at 24 (1974) (``Nixon Impeachment Inquiry'').
     \34\ Minority Report at 337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Impeachment was designed to be a means of redressing 
     wrongful public conduct. As scholar and Justice James Wilson 
     wrote, ``our President . . . is amendable to [the laws] in 
     his private character as a citizen, and in his public 
     character by impeachment.'' \35\ As such, impeachment is 
     limited to certain forms of wrongdoing. Alexander

[[Page S195]]

     Hamilton described the subject of the Senate's impeachment 
     jurisdiction as ``those offenses which proceed from the 
     misconduct of public men, or in other words from the abuse or 
     violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which 
     may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they 
     relate chiefly to injuries done to the society itself.'' 
     36
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \35\ 2 Elliot, The Debate in the Several State Conventions on 
     the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 480 (reprint of 2d 
     ed.)
     \36\ The Federalist No. 65 at 331 (Gary Wills ed. 1982). As 
     one of the most respected of the early commentators 
     explained, the impeachment ``power partakes of a political 
     character, as it respects injuries to the society in its 
     political character.'' Story, Commentaries on the 
     Constitution, Sec. 744. (reprint of 1st ed. 1833).

       The Framers ``intended that a president be removable from 
     office for the commission of great offenses against the 
     Constitution.'' \37\ Impeachment therefore addresses public 
     wrongdoing, whether denominated a ``political crime [  ] 
     against the state,'' \38\ or ``an act of malfeasance or abuse 
     of office,'' \39\ or a ``great offense [  ] against the 
     federal government.'' \40\ Ordinary civil and criminal wrongs 
     can be addressed through ordinary judicial processes. And 
     ordinary political wrongs can be addressed at the ballot box 
     and by public opinion. Impeachment is reserved for the most 
     serious public misconduct, those aggravated abuses of 
     executive power that, given the President's four-year term, 
     might otherwise go unchecked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \37\ John Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 94 (1978).
     \38\ Raoul Berger, Impeachment 61 (1973).
     \39\ Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of 
     Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707, 724 (1987/1988).
     \40\ Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and 
     Its Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do 
         Not Alone State Impeachable Offenses
       Because impeachment of a President nullifies the popular 
     will of the people, as evidence by an election, it must be 
     used with great circumspection. As applicable precedents 
     establish, it should not be used to punish private 
     misconduct.
       a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President 
           Nixon
       Five articles of impeachment were proposed against then-
     President Nixon by the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
     Representatives in 1974. Three were approved and two were 
     not. The approved articles alleged official wrongdoing. 
     Article I charged President Nixon with ``using the powers of 
     his high office [to] engage [  ] . . . in a course of conduct 
     or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct'' the 
     Watergate investigation.\41\ Article II described the 
     President as engaging in ``repeated and continuing abuse of 
     the powers of the Presidency in disregard of the fundamental 
     principle of the rule of law in our system of government'' 
     thereby ``us[ing] his power as President to violate the 
     Constitution and the law of the land.'' \42\ Article III 
     charged the President with refusing to comply with Judiciary 
     Committee subpoenas in frustration of a power necessary to 
     ``preserve the integrity of the impeachment process itself 
     and the ability of Congress to act as the ultimate safeguard 
     against improper Presidential conduct.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \41\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
     States, Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d 
     Sess, H. Rep. 93-1305 (Aug. 20, 1974) (hereinafter ``Nixon 
     Report'') at 133.
     \42\ Nixon Report at 180.
     \43\ Id. 212-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On article not approved by the House Judiciary Committee 
     charged that President Nixon both ``knowingly and 
     fraudulently failed to report certain income and claimed 
     deductions [for 1969-72] on his Federal income tax returns 
     which were not authorized by law.'' \44\ The President had 
     signed his returns for those years under penalty of 
     perjury,\45\ and there was reason to believe that the 
     underlying facts would have supported a criminal prosecution 
     against President Nixon himself.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \44\ Id. at 220. The President was alleged to have failed to 
     report certain income, to have taken improper tax deductions, 
     and to have manufactured (either personally or through his 
     agents) false documents to support the deductions taken.
     \45\ Given the underlying facts, that act might have provided 
     the basis for multiple criminal charges; conviction on, for 
     example, the tax evasion charge, could have subjected 
     President Nixon to a 5-year prison term.
     \46\ See Nixon Report at 344 (``the Committee was told by a 
     criminal fraud tax expert that on the evidence presented to 
     the Committee, if the President were an ordinary taxpayer, 
     the government would seek to send him to jail'') (Statement 
     of Additional Views of Mr. Mezvinsky, et al.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Specifying the applicable standard for impeachment, the 
     majority staff concluded that ``[b]ecause impeachment of a 
     President is a grave step for the nation, it is to be 
     predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible with 
     either the constitutional form and principles of our 
     government or the proper performance of constitutional duties 
     of the president office.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \47\ Nixon Impeachment Inquiry at 26 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       And the minority views of many Republican members were in 
     substantial agreement: ``the framers . . . were concerned 
     with preserving the government from being overthrown by the 
     treachery or corruption of one man. . . . [I]t is our 
     judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that the 
     Framers of the United States Constitution intended that the 
     President should be removable by the legislative branch only 
     for serious misconduct dangerous to the system of government 
     established by the Constitution.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \48\ Nixon Report at 364-365 (Minority Views of Messrs. 
     Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, 
     Moorhead, Maraziti and Latta).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The legal principle that impeachable offenses required 
     misconduct dangerous to our system of government provided one 
     basis for the Committee's rejection of the fraudulent-tax-
     return charge. As Congressman Hogan (R-Md.) put the matter, 
     the Constitution's phrase ``high crime signified a crime 
     against the system of government, not merely a serious 
     crime,''\49\ As noted, the tax-fraud charge, involving an act 
     which did not demonstrate public misconduct, was rejected by 
     an overwhelming (and bipartisan) 26-12 margin.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \49\ Id. (quoting with approval conclusion of Nixon 
     Impeachment Inquiry).
     \50\ Nixon Report at 220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander 
           Hamilton
       In 1792, Congress investigated Secretary of Treasury 
     Alexander Hamilton for alleged financial misdealings with a 
     convicted swindler. Hamilton had made payments to the 
     swindler and had urged his wife (Hamilton's paramour) to burn 
     incriminating correspondence. Members of Congress 
     investigated the matter and it came to the attention of 
     President Washington and future Presidents Adams, Jefferson, 
     Madison and Monroe.
       This private matter was not deemed worthy of removing Mr. 
     Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury.\51\ Even when it 
     eventually became public, it was no barrier to Hamilton's 
     appointment to high position in the United States Army. 
     Although not insignificant, Hamilton's behavior was 
     essentially private. It was certain not regarded as 
     impeachable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \51\ See generally Rosenfeld, ``Founding Fathers Didn't 
     Flinch,'' The Los Angeles Times (September 18, 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars 
         Confirm that Impeachable Offenses Are not Present
       a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
       There is strong agreement among consititutional scholars 
     and historians that the articles do not charge impeachable 
     offenses. As Professor Michael Gerhardt summarized in his 
     recent testimony before a subcommitte of the House of 
     Representatives, there is ``widespread recognition [of] a 
     paradigmatic case for impeachment.''\52\ In such a case, 
     ``there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an 
     impeachable official and the latter's official duties.''\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \52\ Statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt Before the 
     House Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary 
     Committee Regarding the Background and History of Impeachment 
     (November 9, 1998) at 13 (``Subcommittee Hearings'').
     \53\Ibid. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       There is no such nexus here. Indeed the allegations are so 
     far removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion 
     here threatens to weaken significantly the Presidency itself. 
     As the more than 400 prominent historians and constitutional 
     scholars warned in their public statement: ``[t]he theory of 
     impeachment underlying these efforts is unprecedented in our 
     history . . . [and is] are extremely ominous for the future 
     of our political insitutions. If carried forward, [the 
     current processes] will leave the Presidency permanently 
     disfigured and diminished, at the mercy as never before of 
     the caprices of any Congress.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \54\ Statement of Historians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Similarly, in a letter to the House of Representatives, an 
     extraordinary group of 430 legal scholars argued together 
     that these offenses, even if proven true, did not rise to the 
     level of an impeachable offense.\55\ The gist of these 
     scholarly objections is that the alleged wrongdoing is 
     insufficiently connected to the exercise of public office. 
     Because the articles charge wrongdoing of an essentially 
     private nature, any harm such behavior poses is too removed 
     from our system of government to justify unseating the 
     President. Numerous scholars, opining long before the current 
     controversy, have emphasized the necessary connection of 
     impeachable wrongs to threats against the state itself. They 
     have found that impeachment should be reserved for:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \55\ See Letter of 430 Law Professors to Messrs. Gingrich, 
     Gephardt, Hyde and Conyers (released Nov. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``offenses against the government'';\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \56\ Labovitx, Presidential Impeachment at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``political crime against the state''; \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \57\ Berger, Impeachment at 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``serious assaults on the integrity of the 
     processes of government''; \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \58\ Charles L. Black, Jr. Impeachment: A Handbook 38-39 
     (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``wrongdoing convincingly established [and] so 
     egregious that [the President's] continuation in office is 
     intolerable'';\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \59\ Labovitz Presidential Impeachment at 110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``malfeasance or abuse of office,''\60\ bearing a 
     ``functional relationship'' to public office; \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \60\ Rotunda, 76 Ky. L.J. at 726.
     \61\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``great offense[s] against the federal 
     government''; \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \62\ Gerhardt, 68 Tex. L. Rev. at 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``acts which, like treason and bribery, undermine 
     the integrity of government.'' 63
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \63\ Committee on Federal Legislation of the Bar Ass'n of the 
     City of New York, The Law of Presidential Impeachment 18 
     (1974).

     The articles contain nothing approximating that level of 
     wrongdoing. Indeed the House Managers themselves acknowledge 
     that ``the President's [alleged] perjury and obstruction

[[Page S196]]

     do not directly involve his official conduct.'' 64
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \64\ House Br. at 109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations would 
           Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the 
           Presidency and to Our Government of Separated powers
       These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) 
     statements about sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to 
     conceal the fact of sexual misbehavior. These kinds of wrongs 
     are simply not subjects fit for impeachment. To remove a 
     President on this basis would lower the impeachment bar to an 
     unprecedented level and create a devastating precedent. As 
     Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., addressing this problem, 
     has testified:
       ``Lowering the bar for impeachment creates a novel . . . 
     revolutionary theory of impeachment, [and] . . . would send 
     us on an adventure with ominous implications for the 
     separation of powers that the Constitution established as the 
     basis of our political order. It would permanently weaken the 
     Presidency.'' 65
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \65\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Arthur 
     Schlesinger, Tr. at 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The lowering of the bar that Professor Schlesinger 
     described must stop here. Professor Jack Rakove made a 
     similar point when he stated that ``Impeachment [is] a remedy 
     to be deployed only in . . . unequivocal cases where . . . 
     the insult to the constitutional system is grave.'' 
     66 Indeed, he said, there ``would have to be a 
     high degree of consensus on both sides of the aisle in 
     Congress and in both Houses to proceed.'' 67
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \66\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Professor 
     Jack Rakove at 4).
     \67\ Subcommittee Hearings (Oral Testimony of Professor 
     Rakove).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Bipartisan consensus was, of course, utterly lacking in the 
     House of Representatives. No civil officer--no President, no 
     judge, no cabinet member--has ever been impeached by so 
     narrow a margin as supported the articles exhibited 
     here.68 The closeness and partisan division of the 
     vote reflect the constitutionally dubious nature of the 
     charges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \68\ The present articles were approved by margins of 228-206 
     (Article I) and 221-212 (Article II). All prior resolutions 
     were approved by substantially wider margins in the House of 
     Representatives. See Impeachments of the following civil 
     officers: Judge John Pickering (1803) (45-8; Justice Samuel 
     Chase (1804) (73-32; Judge James Peck (1830) 143-49; Judge 
     West Humphreys (1862) (no vote available, but resolution of 
     impeachment voted ``without division,'' see 3 Hinds 
     Precedents of the House of Representatives Sec. 2386); 
     President Andrew Johnson (1868) (128-47; Judge James Belknap 
     (1876) (unanimous); Judge Charles Swayne (1903) (unanimous); 
     Judge Robert Archbald (1912) (223-1); Judge George English 
     (1925) (306-62); Judge Harold Louderback (1932) (183--143); 
     Judge Halsted Ritter (1933) (181-146); Judge Harry Claiborne 
     (1986) (406-0); Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. (1988) (417-0); 
     Judge Alcee L. Hastings (1988) (413-3). The impeachment 
     resolution against Senator William Bount in 1797 was by voice 
     vote and so no specific count was recorded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       When articles are based on sexual wrongdoing, and when they 
     have passed only by the narrowest, partisan margin, the 
     future of our constitutional politics is in the balance. The 
     very stability of our Constitutional government may depend 
     upon the Senate's response to these articles. Nothing about 
     this case justifies removal of a twice-elected President, 
     because no ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' are alleged.
     5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
       The House Managers suggest that perjury per se is an 
     impeachable offense because (1) several federal judges have 
     been impeached and removed for perjury, and (2) those 
     precedents control this case. See House Br. at 95-105. That 
     notion is erroneous. It is blind both to the qualitative 
     differences among different allegations of perjury and the 
     very basic differences between federal judges and the 
     President.
       First, the impeachment and removal of a Federal judge, 
     while a very solemn task, implicates very different 
     considerations than the impeachment of a president. Federal 
     judges are appointed without public approval and enjoy life 
     tenure without public accountability. Consequently, they hold 
     their offices under our Constitution only ``during good 
     behavior.'' Under our system, impeachment is the only way to 
     remove a Federal judge from office--even a Federal judge 
     sitting in jail.69 By contrast, a president is 
     elected by the Nation to a term, limited to a specified 
     number of years, and he faces accountability in the form of 
     elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \69\ Former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, 
     during a recent judicial impeachment proceeding, cogently 
     explained the unique position that Federal judges hold in our 
     Constitutional system:
     ``The judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position 
     of trust and responsibility in our government: They are the 
     only members of any branch that hold their office for life; 
     they are purposely insulated from the immediate pressures and 
     shifting currents of the body politic. But with the special 
     prerogative of judicial independence comes the most exacting 
     standard of public and private conduct . . . The high 
     standard of behavior for judges is inscribed in article III 
     of the Constitution, which provides that judges ``shall hold 
     offices during good behavior. . . .'' (132 Cong. Rec. H4712 
     (July 22, 1986) (impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne) 
     (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Second, whether an allegedly perjurious statement rises to 
     the level of an impeachable offense depends necessarily on 
     the particulars of that statement, and the relation of those 
     statements to the fulfillment of official responsibilities. 
     In the impeachment of Judge Harry Claiborne, the accused had 
     been convicted of filing false income tax returns.\70\ As a 
     judge, Claiborne was charged with the responsibility of 
     hearing tax-evasion cases. Once convicted, he simply could 
     not perform his official functions because his personal 
     probity had been impaired such that he could not longer be an 
     arbiter of others' oaths. His wrongdoing bore a direct 
     connection to the performance of his judicial tasks. The 
     inquiry into President Nixon disclosed similar wrongdoing, 
     but the House Judiciary Committee refused to approve an 
     article of impeachment against the President on that basis. 
     The case of Judge Walter Nixon is similar. He was convicted 
     of making perjurious statements concerning his intervention 
     in a judicial proceeding, which is to say, employing the 
     power and prestige of his office to obtain advantage for a 
     party.\71\ Although the proceeding at issue was not in his 
     court, his use of the judicial office for the private gain of 
     a party to a judicial proceeding directly implicated his 
     official functions. Finally, Judge Alcee Hastings was 
     impeached and removed for making perjurious statements at his 
     trial for conspiring to fix cases in his own court.\72\ As 
     with Judges Claiborne and Nixon, Judge Hastings' perjurious 
     statements were immediately and incurably detrimental to the 
     performance of his official duties. The allegations against 
     the President, which (as the Managers acknowledge) ``do not 
     directly involve his official conduct,'' House Br. at 109, 
     simply do not involve wrongdoing of gravity sufficient to 
     foreclose effective performance of the Presidential office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \70\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the 
     Impeachment Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, 99th Cong., 2d 
     Sess., S. Doc. 99-48 at 291-98 (1986) (``Claiborne 
     Proceedings'').
     \71\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the 
     Impeachment Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st 
     Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 at 430-440 (1989) (``Judge Nixon 
     Proceedings'').
     \72\ See Proceedings of the United States Senate in the 
     Impeachment Trial of Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st 
     Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Impeachment scholar John Labovitz, writing of the judicial 
     impeachment cases predating Watergate, observed that:

       ``For both legal and practical reasons, th[e] [judicial 
     impeachment] cases did not necessarily affect the grounds for 
     impeachment of a president. The practical reason was that it 
     seemed inappropriate to determine the fate of an elected 
     chief executive on the basis of law developed in proceedings 
     directed at petty misconduct by obscure judges. The legal 
     reason was that the Constitution provides that judges serve 
     during good behavior. . . . [T]he [good behavior] clause made 
     a difference in judicial impeachments, confounding the 
     application of these cases to presidential impeachment''.\73\

     \73\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 92-93 (emphasis 
     added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Thus, the judicial precedents relied upon by the House 
     Managers have only ``limited force when applied to the 
     impeachment of a President.''\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \74\ Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on 
     Impeachment Issues at 26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (summarizing view of 
     some commentators).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The most telling rejoinder to the House's argument comes 
     from President Ford. His definition of impeachable offenses, 
     offered as a congressman in 1970 in connection with an effort 
     to impeach Associate Justice William O. Douglas--that it is, 
     in essence, ``whatever the majority of the House of 
     Representatives considers it to be''--has been cited. Almost 
     never noted is the more important aspect of then-Congressman 
     Ford's statement--that, in contrast to the life-tenure of 
     judges, because presidents can be removed by the electorate, 
     ``to remove them in midterm . . . would indeed require crimes 
     of the magnitude of treason and bribery.''\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \75\ 116 Cong. Rec. 11912, 11913, (1970).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                        b. the standard of proof

       Beyond the question of what constitutes an impeachable 
     offense, each Senator must confront the question of what 
     standard the evidence must meet to justify a vote of 
     ``guilty.'' The Senate has, of course, addressed this issue 
     before--most recently in the trials of Judge Claiborne and 
     Judge Hastings. We recognize that the Senate chose in the 
     Claiborne proceedings, and reaffirmed in the Hastings trial, 
     not to impose itself any single standard of proof but, 
     rather, to leave that judgment to the conscience of each 
     senator. Many Senators here today were present for the debate 
     on this issue and chose a standard by which to test the 
     evidence. For many Senators, however, the issue is a new one. 
     And none previously has had to face the issue in the special 
     context of a Presidential impeachment.
       We argued before the House Judiciary Committee that it must 
     treat a vote to impeach as, in effect, a vote to remove the 
     President from office and that a decision of such moment 
     ought not to be based on anything less than ``clear and 
     convincing'' evidence. That standard is higher than the 
     ``preponderance of the evidence'' test applicable to the 
     ordinary civil case but lower than the beyond a reasonable 
     doubt test applicable to a criminal case. Nonetheless, we 
     felt that the clear and convincing standard was consistent 
     with the grave responsibility of triggering a process that 
     might result in the removal of a president. In fact, it had 
     been the standard agreed upon by both Watergate Committee 
     majority and minority counsel (as well as counsel for 
     President Nixon) twenty-four years ago.
       Certainly no lesser standard should be applied in the 
     Senate. Indeed, we submit that the gravity of the decision 
     the Senate must

[[Page S197]]

     reach should lead each Senator to go further and ask whether 
     the House has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Both lawyers and laymen too often treat the standard of 
     proof as meaningless legal jargon with no application to the 
     real world of difficult decisions. But it is much more than 
     that. In our system of justice, it is the guidepost that 
     shows the way through the labyrinth of conflicting evidence. 
     It tells the factfinder to look within and ask: ``Would I 
     make the most important decisions of my life based on the 
     degree of certainty I have about these facts?'' In the unique 
     legal-political setting of an impeachment trial, it protects 
     against partisan overreaching, and it assures the public that 
     this grave decision has been made with care. In sum, it is a 
     disciplining force to carry into the deliberations.
       This point is given added weight by the language of the 
     Constitution. Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the United 
     States Constitution gives to the Senate ``the Power to try 
     all Impeachments. . . . and no Person shall be convicted 
     without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members 
     present.'' (Emphasis added.) Use of the words ``try'' and 
     ``convicted'' strongly suggests that an impeachment trial is 
     akin to a criminal proceeding and that the beyond-a-
     reasonable-doubt standard of criminal proceedings should be 
     used. This position was enunciated in the Minority Views 
     contained in the Report of the House Judiciary Committee on 
     the impeachment proceedings against President Nixon (H.Rep. 
     93-1305 at 377-381) and has been espoused as the correct 
     standard by such Senators as Robert Taft, Jr., Sam Ervin, 
     Strom Thurmond and John Stennis.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \76\ Claiborne Proceedings at 106-107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Even if the clear and convincing standard nonetheless is 
     appropriate for judicial impeachments, it does not follow 
     that it should be applied where the Presidency itself is at 
     stake. With judges, the Senate must balance its concern for 
     the independence of the judiciary against the recognition 
     that, because judges hold life-time tenure, impeachment is 
     the only available means to protect the public against those 
     who are corrupt. On the other hand, when a President is on 
     trial, the balance to be struck is quite different. Here the 
     Senate is asked, in effect, to overturn the results of an 
     election held two years ago in which the American people 
     selected the head of one of the three coordinate branches of 
     government. It is asked to take this action in circumstances 
     where there is no suggestion of corruption or misuse of 
     office--or any other conduct that places our system of 
     government at risk in the two remaining years of the 
     President's term, when once again the people will judge who 
     they wish to lead them. In this setting, the evidence should 
     be tested by the most stringent standard we know--proof 
     beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then can the American people 
     be confident that this most serious of constitutional 
     decisions has been given the careful consideration it 
     deserves.

           IV. The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I

       The evidence does not support the allegations of Article I.


                           a. applicable law

       Article I alleges perjury, along with false and misleading 
     statements, before a federal grand jury. Perjury is a 
     statutory crime that is set forth in the United States Code 
     at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623.\77\ Before an accused may be found 
     guilty of perjury before a grand jury, a prosecutor most 
     prove all elements of the offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \77\ Section 1623 provides in relevant part:
     ``(a) Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or 
     ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States 
     knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or 
     uses any other information . . . knowing the same to contain 
     any false material declaration, shall be fined under this 
     title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'' (18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a) (1994)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In the criminal law context, Sec. 1623 requires proof 
     beyond a reasonable doubt of the following elements: that an 
     accused (1) while under oath (2) knowingly (3) made a false 
     statement as to (4) material facts. The ``materiality'' 
     element is fundamental: it means that testimony given to a 
     grand jury may be found perjurious only if it had a tendency 
     to influence, impede, or hamper the grand jury's 
     investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 
     1396, 1419 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 
     947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1997). If an answer provided to a grand 
     jury has no impact on the grand jury's investigation, or if 
     it relates to a subject that the grand jury is not 
     considering, it is incapable as a matter of law of being 
     perjurious. Thus, alleged false testimony concerning details 
     that a grand jury is not investigating cannot as a matter of 
     law constitute perjury, since such testimony by definition is 
     immaterial. See, e.g., United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 
     1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 1976) (where defendant admitted signing 
     letter and testified to its purpose, his denial of actually 
     writing letter was not material to grand jury investigation 
     and was incapable of supporting perjury charge); United 
     States v. Pyle, 156 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (details 
     such as whether defendant ``paid the rent on her Washington 
     apartment, as she testified that she did'' were ``not 
     pertinent to the issue being tried;'' therefore, ``the false 
     statement attributed to [defendant] was in no way material in 
     the case in which she made it and did not constitute perjury 
     within the meaning of the statute.'') In other words, mere 
     falsity--even knowing falsity--is not perjury if the 
     statement at issue is not ``material'' to the matter under 
     consideration.
       An additional ``element'' of perjury prosecutions, at least 
     as a matter of prosecutorial practice, is that a perjury 
     conviction cannot rest solely on the testimony of one 
     witness. In United States v. Weiler, 323 U.S. 606, 608-09 
     (1945), the Supreme Court observed that the ``special rule 
     which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the evidence of 
     a single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries.'' While 
     Sec. 1623 does not literally incorporate the so-called ``two-
     witness'' rule, the case law makes clear that perjury 
     prosecutions under this statute require a high degree of 
     proof, and that prosecutors should not, as a matter of reason 
     and practicality, try to bring perjury prosecutions based 
     solely on the testimony of a single witness. As the Supreme 
     Court has cautioned, perjury cases should not rest merely 
     upon ``an oath against an oath.'' Id. at 609.
       Indeed, that is exactly the point that experienced former 
     federal prosecutors made to the House Judiciary Committee. A 
     panel of former federal prosecutors, some Republican, 
     testified that they would not charge perjury based upon the 
     facts in this case. For example, Mr. Thomas Sullivan, a 
     former United States Attorney for the Northern District of 
     Illinois, told the Committee that ``the evidence set out in 
     the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case 
     by a responsible federal prosecutor.'' See Transcript of 
     ``Prosecutorial Standards for Obstruction of Justice and 
     Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998); see generally Minority 
     Report at 340-47. As Mr. Sullivan emphasized, ``because 
     perjury and obstruction charges often arise from private 
     dealings with few observers, the courts have required either 
     two witnesses who testified directly to the facts 
     establishing the crime, or, if only one witness testifies to 
     the facts constituting the alleged perjury, that there be 
     substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt.'' See 
     Transcript of ``Prosecutorial Standards for Obstruction of 
     Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998). The other 
     prosecutors on the panel agreed. Mr. Richard J. Davis, who 
     served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the 
     Southern District of New York and as a Task Force Leader for 
     the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, testified that ``it 
     is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based 
     solely on the conflicting testimony of two people.'' Id. A 
     review of the perjury alleged here thus requires both careful 
     scrutiny of the materiality of any alleged falsehood and 
     vigilance against conviction merely on an ``oath against an 
     oath.'' Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609.


                    b. structure of the allegations

       Article I charges that the President committed perjury when 
     he testified before the grand jury on August 17, 1998. It 
     alleges he ``willfully provided perjurious, false and 
     misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or 
     more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his 
     relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) 
     prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a 
     Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior 
     false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to 
     make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) 
     his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses 
     and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights 
     action.'' As noted above, the article does not provide 
     guidance on the particular statements alleged to be 
     perjurious, false and misleading. But by reference to the 
     different views in the House Committee Report, the 
     presentation of House Majority Counsel David Schippers, the 
     OIC Referral, and the Trial Memorandum of the House Managers, 
     we have attempted to identify certain statements from which 
     members of the House might have chosen.
       Subpart (1) alleges that the President committed perjury 
     before the grand jury about the details of his relationship 
     with Ms. Lewinsky--including apparently such insignificant 
     matters as mis-remembering the precise month on which certain 
     inappropriate physical contact started, understating as 
     ``occasional'' his infrequent inappropriate physical and 
     telephone contacts with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many 
     months, characterizing their relationship as starting as a 
     friendship, and touching Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways and for 
     certain purposes during their intimate encounters.
       Subpart (2) of Article I alleges that the President made 
     perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury 
     when he testified about certain responses he had given in the 
     Jones civil deposition. The House Managers erroneously 
     suggest that in the grand jury President Clinton was asked 
     about and reaffirmed his entire deposition testimony, 
     including his deposition testimony about whether he had been 
     alone with Ms. Lewinsky. See House Br. at 2, 60. That is 
     demonstrably false. Those statements that the President did 
     in fact make in the grand jury, by way of explaining his 
     deposition testimony, were truthful. Moreover, to the extent 
     this subpart repeats allegations of Article II of the 
     original proposed articles of impeachment, the full House of 
     Representatives has explicitly considered and specifically 
     rejected those charges, and their consideration would violate 
     the impeachment procedures mandated by the Constitution.
       Subparts (3) and (4) allege that the President lied in the 
     grand jury when he testified about certain activities in late 
     1997 and early

[[Page S198]]

     1998. They are based on statements about conduct that the 
     House Managers claim constitutes obstruction of justice under 
     Article II and in many respects track Article II. Compare 
     Article I (3) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged 
     ``prior false and misleading statements he allowed his 
     attorney to make to a Federal judge'') with Article II (5) 
     (obstructing justice by ``allow[ing] his attorney to make 
     false and misleading statements to a Federal judge) and 
     compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning 
     alleged ``corrupt efforts to influence testimony of witnesses 
     and to impede the discovery of evidence'') with Article II 
     (3), (6), (7) (obstructing justice when he (3) ``engaged in, 
     encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence,'' 
     i.e., gifts; (6) ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' of 
     Betty Currie; (7) ``made false and misleading statements to 
     potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in 
     order to corruptly influence the testimony of those 
     witnesses''). These perjury allegations are without merit 
     both because the obstruction charges upon which they are 
     based are wrong and because the statements that President 
     Clinton made in the grand jury about these charges are true. 
     Because of the close parallel, and for sake of brevity in 
     this submission, we have dealt comprehensively with these 
     overlapping allegations in the next section addressing 
     Article II (obstruction of justice), and address them only 
     briefly in this section.


         c. response to the particular allegations in article i

       The president testified truthfully before the grand jury. 
     There must be no mistake about what the President said. He 
     admitted to the grand jury that he had engaged in an 
     inappropriate intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky over a 
     period of many months. He admitted to the grand jury that he 
     had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He admitted to the grand 
     jury that he had mislead his family, his friends and staff, 
     and the entire Nation about the nature of that relationship. 
     No one who heard the President's August 17 speech or watched 
     the President's videotaped grand jury testimony had any doubt 
     that he had admitted to an ongoing physical relationship with 
     Ms. Lewinsky.
       The article makes general allegations about his testimony 
     but does not specify alleged false statements, so direct 
     rebuttal is impossible. In light of this uncertainty, we set 
     forth below responses to the allegations that have been made 
     by the House Managers, the House Committee, and the OIC, even 
     though they were not adopted in the article, in an effort to 
     try to respond comprehensively to the charges.
     1. The President denies that he made materially false or 
         misleading statements to the grand jury about ``the 
         nature and details of his relationship'' with Monica 
         Lewinsky
       (a) Early in his grand jury testimony, the President 
     specifically acknowleded that he had had a relationship with 
     Ms. Lewinsky that involved ``improper intimate contact.'' 
     App. at 461. He described how the relationship began and how 
     it ended early in 1997--long before any public attention or 
     scrutiny.
       In response to the first question about Ms. Lewinsky, the 
     President read the following statement:

       ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions 
     in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct 
     that was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual 
     intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I 
     understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
     deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate 
     contact.
       ``These inappropriate encounteres ended, at my insistence, 
     in early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations 
     with Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter.
       ``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include 
     this conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
       ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other 
     information I can, because of privacy considerations 
     affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an effort to 
     preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will 
     say about the specifics of these particular matters.
       ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other 
     questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky; questions about my understanding of the term 
     `sexual relations', as I understood it to be denied at my 
     January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions concerning 
     alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
     intimidation of witnesses.''

     App. at 460-62. The President occasionally referred back to 
     this statement--but only when asked very specific questions 
     about his physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--and he 
     otherwise responded fully to four hours of interrogation 
     about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, his answers in the 
     civil deposition, and his conduct surrounding the Jones 
     deposition.
       The articles are silent on precisely what statements the 
     President made about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that 
     were allegedly perjurious. But between the House Brief and 
     the Committee Report, both drafted by the Managers, it 
     appears there are three aspects of this prepared statement 
     that are alleged to be false and misleading because Ms. 
     Lewinsky's recollection differs--albeit with respect to 
     certain very specific, utterly immaterial matters: first, 
     when the President admitted that inappropriate conduct 
     occurred ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 
     1997,'' he allegedly committed perjury because in the 
     Managers' view, the first instance of inappropriate conduct 
     apparently occurred a few months prior to ``early 1996,'' see 
     House Br. at 53; second, when the President admitted to 
     inappropriate conduct ``on certain occasions in early 1996 
     and once in 1997,'' he allegedly committed perjury because, 
     according to the House Committee, there were eleven total 
     sexual encounters and the term ``on certain occasions'' 
     implied something other than eleven. see Committee Report at 
     34; and third, when the President admitted that he ``had 
     occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that 
     included sexual banter,'' he allegedly committed perjury 
     because, according to the House Committee (although not Ms. 
     Lewinsky), seventeen conversations may have included sexually 
     explicit conversation, ibid. Apart from the fact that the 
     record itself refutes some of the allegations (for example, 
     seven of the seventeen calls were only ``possible,'' 
     according even to the OIC, App. at 116-26, and Ms. Lewinsky 
     recalled fewer than seventeen, App. at 744), simply to state 
     them is to reveal their utter immateriality. \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \78\ Even the OIC Referral did not allege perjury based on 
     these latter two theories and mentioned the first only 
     briefly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The President categorically denies that his prepared 
     statement was perjurious, false and misleading in any 
     respect. He offered his written statement to focus the 
     questioning in a manner that would allow the OIC to obtain 
     the information it needed without unduly dwelling on the 
     salacious details of his relationship. It preceded almost 
     four hours of follow-up questions about the relationship. It 
     is utterly remarkable that the Managers now find fault even 
     with the President's very painful public admission of 
     inappropriate conduct.
       In any event, the charges are totally without merit. The 
     Committee Report takes issue with the terms ``on certain 
     occasions'' and ``occasional,'' but neither phrase implies a 
     definite or maximum number. ``On certain occasions''--the 
     phrase introducing discussion of the physical contacts--has 
     virtually no meaning other than ``it sometimes happened.'' It 
     is unfathomable what objective interpretation the Majority 
     gives to this phrase to suggest that it could be false. An 
     attack on the phrase ``occasional''--the phrase introducing 
     discussion of the inappropriate telephone contacts--is little 
     different. Dictionaries define ``occasional'' to mean 
     ``occurring at irregular or infrequent intervals'' or ``now 
     and then.'' \79\ It is a measure of the Committee Report's 
     extraordinary overreaching to suggest that the eleven 
     occasions of intimate contact alleged by the House Majority 
     over well more than a year did not occur, by any objective 
     reading, ``on certain occasions.'' And since even the OIC 
     Referral acknowledges that the inappropriate telephone 
     contact occurred not ``at least 17 times'' (as the Committee 
     Report and the Managers suggest, Committee Report at 8; House 
     Br. at 11) but between 10 and 15 times over a 23-month 
     period,\80\ ``occasional'' would surely seem not just a 
     reasonable description but the correct one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \79\ Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) p. 803; 
     see also Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary (1988) p. 812 
     (``occurring from time to time; infrequent''); Chambers 
     English Dictionary (1988 ed.) p. 992 (``occurring 
     infrequently, irregularly, now and then''); The American 
     Heritage Dictionary (2d Coll. ed.) (``occurring from time to 
     time''); Webster's New World Dictionary (3d Coll. ed.) p. 937 
     (``of irregular occurrence; happening now and then; 
     infrequent'').
     \80\ The OIC chart of contacts between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
     President identifies ten phone conversations ``including 
     phone sex'' and seven phone conversations ``possibly'' 
     including phone sex. App. at 116-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Finally, these squabbles are utterly immaterial. Even if 
     the President and Ms. Lewinsky disagreed as to the precise 
     number of such encounters, it is of no consequence whatsoever 
     to anything, given his admission of their relationship. This 
     is precisely the kind of disagreement that the law does not 
     intend to capture as perjury.
       The date of the first intimate encounter is also totally 
     immaterial. Having acknowledged the relationship, the 
     President had no conceivable motive to misstate the date on 
     which it began. The Managers assert that the President 
     committed perjury when he testified about when the 
     relationship began, but they offer no rationale for why he 
     would have done so.\81\ The President had already made a 
     painful admission. Any misstatement about when the intimate 
     relationship began (if there was a misstatement) cannot 
     justify a charge of perjury, let alone the removal of the 
     President from office. As Chairman Hyde himself stated in 
     reference to this latter allegation, ``It doesn't strike me 
     as a terribly

[[Page S199]]

     serious count.'' Remarks of Chairman Hyde at Perjury Hearing 
     of December 1, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \81\  The Committee Report did not adopt the baseless surmise 
     of the OIC Referral, i.e., that the President lied about the 
     starting date of his relationship because Ms. Lewinsky was 
     still an intern at the time, whereas she later became a paid 
     employee. For good reason. The only support offered by the 
     Referral for this conjecture is a comment Ms. Lewinsky 
     attributes to the President in which he purportedly said that 
     her pink ``intern pass'' ``might be a problem.'' Referral at 
     149-50. But even Ms. Lewinsky indicated that the President 
     was not referring to her intern status, but rather was noting 
     that, as an intern with a pink ``intern pass,'' she had only 
     limited access to the West Wing of the White House. App. at 
     1567 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98). Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky had 
     in fact become an employee by late 1995, so even under the 
     OIC theory the President could have acknowledged such 
     intimate contact in 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (b) The Managers also assert that the President lied when, 
     after admitting that he had an inappropriate sexual 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he maintained that he did not 
     touch Ms. Lewinsky in a manner that met the definition used 
     in the Jones deposition. See House Br. at 54. The President 
     admits that he engaged in appropriate physical contact with 
     Ms. Lewinsky, but has testified that he did not engage in 
     activity that met the convoluted and truncated definition he 
     was presented in the Jones deposition.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \82\ At the deposition, the Jones attorneys presented a 
     broad, three-part definition of the term ``sexual relations'' 
     to be used by them in the questioning. Judge Wright ruled 
     that two parts of the definition were ``too broad'' and 
     eliminated them. Dep. at 22. The President, therefore, was 
     presented with the following definition (as he understood it 
     to have been amended by the Court):
     Definition of Sexual Relations--
     For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in 
     ``sexual relations'' when the person knowingly engages in or 
     causes--
     (1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner 
     thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or 
     gratify the sexual desire of any person;
     (2) contact between any part of the person's body or an 
     object and the genitals and anus of another person; or
     (3) contact between the genitals or anus of the person and 
     any part of another person's body.
     ``Contact'' means intentional touching, either directly or 
     through clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       It is important to note that this Jones definition was not 
     of the President's making. It was one provided to him by the 
     Jones' lawyers for their questioning of him. Under that 
     definition, oral sex performed by Ms. Lewinsky on the 
     President would not constitute sexual relations, while 
     touching certain areas of Ms. Lewinsky's body with the intent 
     to arouse her would meet the definition. The President 
     testified in the grand jury that believed that oral sex 
     performed on him fell outside the Jones definition. App. at 
     544.\83\ As strange as this may sound, a totally reasonable 
     reading of the definition supports that conclusion, as many 
     commentators have agreed.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \83\ The Managers erroneously suggest that the President's 
     explanation of his understanding of the Jones deposition 
     definition of ``sexual relations'' is a recent fabrication 
     rather than an accurate account of his view at the time of 
     the deposition. House Br. at 54-55. To support this 
     contention, the Managers, among other meritless arguments, 
     point to a document produced by the White House entitled 
     ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' stating that oral sex 
     would constitute a sexual relationship for the President. Id. 
     at 55. This document, however, was not created, reviewed or 
     approved by the President and did not represent his views. It 
     is irrelevant to the issue at hand for the additional reason 
     that it does not speak by its own terms to the meaning of the 
     contorted definition of ``sexual relations'' used in the 
     Jones deposition.
     \84\ See, e.g., Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998 
     (Statement of Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg at 2) (``That 
     definition defined certain forms of sexual contact as sexual 
     relations but, for reasons known only to the Jones lawyers, 
     limited the definition to contact with any person for the 
     purpose of gratification.''); MSNBC Internight, August 12, 
     1998 (Cynthia Alksne) (``[W]hen the definition finally was 
     put before the president, it did not include the receipt of 
     oral sex''); ``DeLay Urges a Wait For Starr's Report,'' The 
     Washington Times (August 31, 1998) (``The definition of 
     sexual relations, used by lawyers for Paula Jones when they 
     questioned the president, was loosely worded and may not have 
     included oral sex''); ``Legally Accurate,'' The National Law 
     Journal (August 31, 1998) (``Given the narrowness of the 
     court-approved definition in [the Jones] case, Mr. Clinton 
     indeed may not have perjured himself back then if, say, he 
     received oral sex but did not reciprocate sexually'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       This claim comes down to an oath against an oath about 
     immaterial details concerning an acknowledged wrongful 
     relationship.
     2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
         misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony 
         he gave in the Jones case
       First, it is important to understand that the allegation of 
     Article I that the President ``willfully provided false and 
     misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning . . . prior 
     perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in'' the 
     Jones deposition is premised on a misunderstanding of the 
     President's grand jury testimony. The President was not asked 
     to, and he did not, reaffirm his entire Jones deposition 
     testimony during his grand jury appearance. For example, 
     contrary to popular myth and the undocumented assertion of 
     the House Managers, House Br. at 2, the President was never 
     even asked in the grand jury about his answer to the 
     deposition question whether he and Ms. Lewinsky had been 
     ``together alone in the Oval Office.'' Dep. at 52-53,\85\ and 
     he therefore neither reaffirmed it nor even addressed it. In 
     fact, in the grand jury he was asked only about a small 
     handful of his answers in the deposition. As is demonstrated 
     below, his explanation of these answers were not 
     reaffirmations or in any respect evasive or misleading--they 
     were completely truthful, and they do not support a perjury 
     allegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \85\ The only questions the OIC asked the President about 
     being alone with Ms. Lewinsky did not reference the 
     deposition at all. Instead, the OIC asked the President to 
     elaborate on his acknowledgement in his prepared statement 
     before the grand jury that he had been alone with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, App. at 481, and to explain why he made a 
     statement, ``I was never alone with her'' to Ms. Currie on 
     January 18th. See, e.g., App. at 583.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The extent to which this allegation of the House Majority 
     misses the mark is dramatically apparent when it is compared 
     with the OIC's Referral. The OIC did not charge that the 
     President's statements about his prior deposition testimony 
     were perjurious (apart from the charge discussed above 
     concerning the nature and details of his relationship with 
     Ms. Lewinsky).\86\ See OIC Ref. at 145. It would be 
     remarkable to contemplate charges beyond those brought by the 
     OIC, particularly in the context of a perjury claim where the 
     OIC chose what to ask the President and itself conducted the 
     grand jury session.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \86\ Specifically, the Referral alleges that the President 
     lied when he testified (1) that ``he believed that oral sex 
     was not covered by any of the terms and definitions for 
     sexual activity used at the Jones deposition''; (2) that 
     their physical contact was more limited than Ms. Lewinsky's 
     testimony suggests; and (3) that their intimate relationship 
     began in early 1996 and not late 1995. Id. at 148-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The House Managers point to a single statement made by 
     President Clinton in the grand jury to justify their 
     contention that every statement from his civil deposition is 
     now fair game. House Br. at 60. Specifically, the House 
     Managers rely on President Clinton's explanation in the grand 
     jury of his state of mind during the Jones deposition: ``My 
     goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not 
     particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through 
     the mine field of this deposition without violating the law, 
     and I believe I did.'' App. at 532. In addition to being a 
     true statement of his belief as to his legal position, this 
     single remark plainly was not intended as and was not a broad 
     reaffirmation of the accuracy of all the statements the 
     President made during the Jones deposition. Indeed, given 
     that he told the grand jury that he had an intimate 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky during which he was alone with 
     her, no one who heard the grand jury testimony could have 
     understood it to be the unequivocal reaffirmation that is 
     alleged.
       The Managers charge that the President did not really mean 
     it when he told the grand jury how he was trying to be 
     literally truthful in the Jones deposition without providing 
     information about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The 
     President had endeavored to navigate the deposition without 
     having to make embarrassing admissions about his 
     inappropriate, albeit consensual, relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky. And to do this, the President walked as close to 
     the line between (a) truthful but evasive or non-responsive 
     testimony and (b) false testimony as he could without 
     crossing it. He sought, as he explained to the grand jury, to 
     give answers that were literally accurate, even if, as a 
     result, they were evasive and thus misleading. We repeat: 
     what is at issue here is not the underlying statements made 
     by the President in the deposition, but the President's 
     explanations in the grand jury of his effort to walk a fine 
     line. Anyone who reads or watches that deposition knows the 
     President was in fact trying to do precisely what he has 
     admitted--to give the lawyers grudging, unresponsive or even 
     misleading answers without actually lying. However successful 
     or unsuccessful he might have been, there is no evidence that 
     controverts the fact that this was indeed the President's 
     intention.
       An examination of the statements that the President 
     actually did make in the grand jury about his deposition 
     testimony further demonstrates the lack of merit in this 
     article. In the grand jury, the President only was asked 
     about three areas of his deposition testimony that were 
     covered in the failed impeachment article alleging perjury in 
     the civil deposition.\87\ The first topic was the nature of 
     any intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky and has already been 
     addressed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \87\ The proposed article of impeachment alleging perjury in 
     the civil deposition, like the two that are before the 
     Senate, did not identity any specific instances of false 
     testimony, but we have made our comparison with the Committee 
     Report's elaboration of the deposition perjury article as it 
     undoubtedly represents the largest universe of alleged 
     perjurious statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The second topic was the President's testimony about his 
     knowledge of gifts he exchanged with Ms. Lewinsky. In his 
     grand jury testimony, the President had the following 
     exchange with the OIC:

       Q: When you testified in the Paula Jones case, this was 
     only two and a half weeks after you had given her these six 
     gifts, you were asked, at page 75 in your deposition, lines 2 
     through 5, ``Well, have you ever given any gifts to Monica 
     Lewinsky?'' And you answered, ``I don't recall.''
       And you were correct. You pointed out that you actually 
     asked them, for prompting, ``Do you know what they were?''
       A: I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they 
     were, not that I don't recall whether I had given them. And 
     then if you see, they did give me these specifics, and I gave 
     them quite a good explanation here. I remembered very clearly 
     what the facts were about The Black Dog. . . .

     App. at 502-03. The President's explanation that he could not 
     recall the exact gifts that he had given Ms. Lewinsky and 
     that he affirmatively sought prompting from the Jones lawyers 
     is entirely consistent with his deposition testimony. This 
     record plainly does not support a charge of perjury.
       The third and last topic was the President's deposition 
     testimony that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement denying 
     having a sexual relationship with the President was correct:

       Q: And you indicated that it [Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit 
     statement that she had no sexual relationship with him] was 
     absolutely correct.
       A: I did. . . . I believe at the time that she filled out 
     this affidavit, if she believed that

[[Page S200]]

     the definition of sexual relationship was two people having 
     intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe that this 
     is the definition that most ordinary Americans would give it. 
     . . .

     App. at 473. The President's grand jury testimony was 
     truthful. As Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp discussed long before 
     any of this matter was public, this was in fact Ms. 
     Lewinsky's definition of ``sex'' and apparently the 
     President's as well. See Supp. at 2664 (10/3/97 Tape); see 
     also App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). There is no 
     evidence whatever that the President did not believe this 
     definition of sexual relations, and his belief finds support 
     in dictionary definitions, the courts and commentators.\88\ 
     Moreover, the record establishes that Ms. Lewinsky shared 
     this view.\89\ Since the President's grand jury testimony 
     about his understanding is corroborated both by dictionaries 
     and by his prior statements to Ms. Lewinsky, it simply cannot 
     be labeled ``wrong'' or, more seriously, ``perjurious.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \88\ As one court has stated, ``[i]n common parlance the 
     terms `sexual intercourse' and `sexual relations' are often 
     used interchangeably.'' J.Y. v. D.A, 381 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 
     (Ind. App. 1978). Dictionary definitions make the same point:
      Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1st 
     ed. 1981) at 2082, defines ``sexual relations'' as 
     ``coitus;''
      Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1st ed. 
     1996) at 1229, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual 
     intercourse; coitus;''
      Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 
     1997) at 1074, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;''
      Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) at 
     560, defines ``intercourse'' as ``sexual relations;'' and
      Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 
     1996) at 1775, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual 
     intercourse; coitus.''
     \89\ Ms. Lewinsky took the position early on that her contact 
     with the President did not constitute ``sex'' and reaffirmed 
     that position even after she had received immunity and began 
     cooperating with the OIC. For example, in one of the 
     conversations surreptitiously taped by Ms. Tripp, Ms. 
     Lewinsky explained to Ms. Tripp that she ``didn't have sex'' 
     with the President because ``[h]aving sex is having 
     intercourse.'' Supp. at 2664; see also Supp. at 1066 (grand 
     jury testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stated that Ms. Lewinsky 
     had said that the President and she ``didn't have sex''). Ms. 
     Lewinsky reaffirmed this position even after receiving 
     immunity, stating in an FBI interview that ``her use of the 
     term `having sex' means having intercourse. . . .'' App. at 
     1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). Likewise, in her original 
     proffer to the OIC, she wrote, ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was 
     comfortable signing the affidavit with regard to the `sexual 
     relationship' because she could justify to herself that she 
     and the Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' App. 
     at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The President did not testify falsely and perjuriously in 
     the grand jury about his civil deposition testimony.
     3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
         misleading statements to the grand jury about the 
         statements of his attorney to Judge Wright during the 
         Jones deposition
       It is remarkable that Article I contains allegations such 
     as this one that even the OIC, which conducted the 
     President's grand jury appearance, chose not to include in 
     the Referral (presumably because there was no ``substantial 
     and credible information'' to support the claim). Subpart (3) 
     appears to allege that the President lied in his grand jury 
     testimony when he characterized his state of mind in his 
     civil deposition as his lawyer described the Lewinsky 
     affidavit as meaning ``there is no sex of any kind in any 
     manner, shape or form.'' Dep. at 53-54. Specifically, the 
     House Managers appear to base their perjury claim on 
     President Clinton's grand jury statement that ``I'm not even 
     sure I paid attention to what he [Mr. Bennett] was saying.'' 
     House Br. at 62.
       The House Brief takes issue with President Clinton's 
     statement that he was ``not paying a great deal of attention 
     to this exchange'' because, it alleges, the ``videotape [of 
     the deposition] shows the President looking directly at Mr. 
     Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to Judge 
     Wright.'' Ibid. While it is true that the videotape shows the 
     President staring in what is presumably Mr. Bennett's 
     direction, there is no evidence whatsoever that he was indeed 
     ``paying close attention'' to the lengthy exchange. Notably 
     absent from the videotape is any action on the part of the 
     President that could be read as affirming Mr. Bennett's 
     statement, such as a nod of the head, or any other activity 
     that could be used to distinguish between a fixed stare and 
     true attention to the complicated sparring of counsel. The 
     President was a witness in a difficult and complex deposition 
     and, as he testified, he was ``focussing on [his] answers to 
     the questions.'' App. at 477. It is a safe bet that the 
     common law has never seen a perjury charge based on so 
     little.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \90\ This allegation is nearly identical to the allegation of 
     Article II(5), and, for the sake of brevity, it is addressed 
     at greater length in the response to Article II, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
         misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied 
         attempting ``to influence the testimony of witnesses and 
         to impede the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
       The general language of the final proviso of Article I, 
     according to the House Managers, is meant to signify a wide 
     range of allegations, see House Br. at 60-69, although none 
     were thought sufficiently credible to be included in the OIC 
     Referral. These allegations were not even included in the 
     summary of the Starr evidence presented to the Committee on 
     October 5, 1998, by House Majority Counsel Schippers. They 
     are nothing more than an effort to inflate the perjury 
     allegations by converting every statement that the President 
     made about the subject matter of Article II into a new count 
     for perjury. As the discussion of Article II establishes, the 
     President did not attempt to obstruct justice. Thus, his 
     explanations of his statements in the grand jury were 
     truthful.
       The House Brief asserts that the President committed 
     perjury with respect to three areas of his grand jury 
     testimony about the obstruction allegations. These claims are 
     addressed thoroughly in the next section along with the 
     corresponding Article II obstruction claims, and they are 
     addressed in a short form here. The first claim is that the 
     President committed perjury ``when he testified before the 
     grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. 
     Jones' lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. 
     Lewinsky and the President, she should provide them.'' House 
     Br. at 63. The House Managers contest the truthfulness of 
     this statement by asserting that the President was 
     responsible for Ms. Lewinsky's transfer of gifts to Ms. 
     Currie in late December. In other words, if the obstruction 
     claim is true, they allege, this statement is not true. As is 
     laid out in greater detail in the next section, the House 
     Manager's view of this matter ignores a wealth of evidence 
     establishing that the idea to conceal some of the gifts she 
     had received originated with, and was executed by, Ms. 
     Lewinsky. See e.g., Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98); Supp. 
     at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98); Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/
     98); App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); see also App. at 
     1481 (``LEWINSKY . . . suggested to the President that Betty 
     Currie hold the gifts'') (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98).
       Second, the House Managers contend that the President 
     provided perjurious testimony when he explained to the grand 
     jury that he was trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when 
     he spoke with Betty Currie on January 18, 1998 about his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. House Br. at 65. The House 
     Managers completely ignore the numerous statements that Ms. 
     Currie makes in her testimony that support the President's 
     assertion that he was merely trying to gather information. 
     for example, Ms. Currie stated in her first interview with 
     the OIC that ``Clinton then mentioned some of the questions 
     he was asked at his deposition. Currie advised the way 
     Clinton phrased the queries, they were both statements and 
     questions at the same time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 1/
     24/98). Ms. Currie's final grand jury testimony on this issue 
     also supports the President' explanation of his questioning:

       Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you 
     testified the President made to you that were presented as 
     statements, did you feel pressured when he told you those 
     statements?
       A: None whatsoever.
       Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind 
     about what he was doing?
       A: At that time I felt that he was--I want to use the word 
     shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just 
     talking.
       Q: That was your impression that he wanted you to say--
     because he would end each of the statements with ``Right?,'' 
     with a question.
       A:  I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' 
     He would say ``Right'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
       Q: But he would end each of those questions with a 
     ``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or 
     not true?
       A: Correct.
       Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
       A: None.

     Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (emphasis added).
       Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's assertion 
     that he was looking for information as a result of his 
     deposition. There is no basis to doubt the President's 
     explanation that his expectation of a media onslaught 
     prompted the conversation. See App. at 583. Indeed, neither 
     the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the President--the 
     only two participants in this conversation--conceivably 
     supports the inference that he had any other intent. The 
     House Managers' contention that the President's explanation 
     to the grand jury was perjurious totally disregards the 
     testimony of the only two witnesses with first-hand knowledge 
     and has no basis in fact or in the evidence.
       Finally, the House Managers contend that President Clinton 
     ``lied about his attempts to influence the testimony of some 
     of his top aides.'' House Br. at 68. The basis for this 
     charge appears to be the President's testimony that, although 
     he said misleading things to his aides about his relationship 
     with Ms. Lewinsky, he tried to say things that were true. Id. 
     at 69. Once again, the record does not even approach a case 
     for perjury. The President acknowledged that he misled; he 
     tried, however, not to lie. It is a mystery how the Managers 
     could try to disprove this simple statement of intent.

           V. The President Should be Acquitted on Article II

       The evidence does not support the allegations of Article 
     II.


                           a. applicable law

       Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a statutory 
     crime that is set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, the ``Omnibus 
     Obstruction Provision.'' In the criminal law context, 
     Sec. 1503 requires proof of the following elements: (1) that

[[Page S201]]

     there existed a pending judicial proceeding; (2) that the 
     accused knew of the proceeding; and (3) that the defendant 
     acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct or 
     interfere with the proceeding or due administration of 
     justice. See, e.g., United States  v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 
     1314 (7th Cir. 1989). False statements alone cannot sustain a 
     conviction under Sec. 1503. See United States v. Thomas, 916 
     F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990).\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \91\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 covers witness tampering. It is 
     clear that the allegations in Article II could not satisfy 
     the elements of Sec. 1512. That provision requires proof that 
     a defendant knowingly engaged in intimidation, physical 
     force, threats, misleading conduct, or corrupt persuasion 
     with intent to influence, delay, or prevent testimony or 
     cause any person to withhold objects or documents from an 
     official proceeding. It is clear from the case law that 
     ``misleading conduct'' as contemplated by Sec. 1512 does not 
     cover scenarios where an accused urged a witness to give 
     false testimony without resorting to coercive or deceptive 
     conduct. See, e.g., United States  v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542, 
     547 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction under Sec. 1512 
     because ``there is simply no support for the argument that 
     [defendant] did anything other than ask the witnesses to 
     lie''); United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 
     1985) (``Since the only allegation in the indictment as to 
     the means by which [defendant] induced [a witness] to 
     withhold testimony was that [the defendant] misled [the 
     witness], and since the evidence failed totally to support 
     any inference that [the witness] was, or even could have 
     been, misled, the conduct proven by the government was not 
     within the terms of Sec. 1512.''). Deceit is thus the 
     gravamen of an obstruction of justice charge that is 
     predicated on witness tampering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                    B. Structure of the Allegations

       Article II exhibited by the House of Representatives 
     alleges that the President ``has prevented, obstructed, and 
     impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end 
     engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, 
     in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
     cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and 
     testimony'' in the Jones case. The Article alleges that the 
     President did so by engaging in ``one or more of the 
     following acts'': the President (1) corruptly encouraged Ms. 
     Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit . . . that he knew to 
     be perjurious, false and misleading''; (2) ``corruptly 
     encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give perjurious, false, and 
     misleading testimony if and when called to testify 
     personally'' in the Jones case; (3) ``corruptly engaged in, 
     encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that 
     had been subpoenaed'' in the Jones case, namely gifts given 
     by him to Ms. Lewinsky; (4) ``intensified and succeeded in an 
     effort to secure job assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky between 
     December 7, 1997 and January 14, 1998, ``in order to 
     corruptly prevent [her] truthful testimony'' in the Jones 
     case; (5) ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
     misleading statements'' to Judge Susan Webber Wright at the 
     Jones deposition; (6) ``related a false and misleading 
     account of events'' involving Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie, a 
     ``potential witness'' in the Jones case, ``in order to 
     corruptly influence'' her testimony; and (7) made false and 
     misleading statements to certain members of his staff who 
     were ``potential'' grand jury witnesses, in order to 
     corruptly influence their testimony.
       As noted above, this article essentially duplicates some of 
     the perjury allegations of Article I (4): Article II alleges 
     particular acts of obstruction while Article I (4) alleges 
     that the President lied in the grand jury when he discussed 
     those allegations.\92\ Both sets of allegations are 
     unsupported. Our discussion here of the details of these 
     charges will, as well, serve in part as our response to the 
     allegations in Article I (4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \92\ Compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury 
     concerning alleged ``corrupt efforts to influence testimony 
     of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence'') with 
     Article II (1)-(3), (6) (obstructing justice when he (1) 
     ``encouraged witness . . . to execute a [false] sworn 
     affidavit''; (2) ``encouraged a witness . . . to give 
     perjurious, false and misleading testimony''; (3) ``engaged 
     in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''; 
     (6) ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' of Betty 
     Currie). Compare also Article I (3) (perjury in the grand 
     jury concerning alleged ``prior false and misleading 
     statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal 
     judge'') with Article II (5) (obstructing justice by 
     ``allow[ing] his attorney to make false and misleading 
     statements to a Federal judge).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


        C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article II

     1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, 
         he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute 
         a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
         perjurious, false and misleading''
       Article II (1) alleges that the President ``corruptly 
     encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit 
     in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and 
     misleading.'' The House Managers allege that during a 
     December 17 phone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked the 
     President what she could do if she were subpoenaed in the 
     Jones case and that the President responded, ``Well, maybe 
     you can sign an affidavit.'' House Br. at 22. This admitted 
     statement by the President of totally lawful conduct is the 
     Managers' entire factual basis for the allegation in Article 
     II (1).
       The Managers do not allege that the President ever 
     suggested to Ms. Lewinsky she should file a false affidavit 
     or otherwise told her what to say in the affidavit. Indeed 
     they could not, because Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly and 
     forcefully denied any such suggestions:
        ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or 
     anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to 
     lie.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
        ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never 
     promised a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
     20/98).
        ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told 
     Lewinsky that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 
     302 7/27/98).
        ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed 
     Lewinsky to say anything or to lie. . . .'' App. at 1400 
     (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
        ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at 
     various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have 
     to lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
       In an attempt to compensate for the total lack of evidence 
     supporting their theory,\93\ the Managers offer their view 
     that ``both parties knew the affidavit would have to be false 
     and misleading in order to accomplish the desired result.'' 
     House Br. at 22; see also Committee Report at 65 (the 
     President ``knew [the affidavit] would have to be false for 
     Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying''). But there is no evidence 
     to support such bald conjecture, and in fact the opposite is 
     true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and the President testified that, 
     given the particular claims in the Jones  case, they thought 
     a truthful, limited affidavit might establish that Ms. 
     Lewinsky had nothing relevant to offer. The President 
     explained to the grand jury why he believed that Ms. Lewinsky 
     would execute a truthful but limited affidavit that would 
     have established that she was not relevant to the Jones 
     case:\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \93\ The myth that the President told Ms. Lewinsky to lie in 
     her affidavit springs not from the evidence but from the 
     surreptitiously recorded Tripp tapes. But as Ms. Lewinsky 
     explained to the grand jury, many of the statements she made 
     to Ms. Tripp--including on this subject--were not true: ``I 
     think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various times 
     the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That 
     wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
     \94\ Indeed, the Committee Report alleges without support 
     that the President lied to the grand jury when he indicated 
     his belief that Ms. Lewinsky could indeed have filed a 
     truthful but limited affidavit that might have gotten her out 
     of testifying in the Jones case. Article I (4). This claim 
     fails for the reasons discussed in the text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``But I'm just telling you that it's certainly 
     true what she says here, that we didn't have--there was no 
     employment, no benefit in exchange, there was nothing having 
     to do with sexual harassment. And if she defined sexual 
     relationship in the way I think most Americans do, meaning 
     intercourse, then she told the truth.'' App. at 474.
        ``You know, I believed then, I believe now, that 
     Monica Lewinsky could have sworn out an honest affidavit, 
     that under reasonable circumstances, and without the benefit 
     of what Linda Tripp did to her, would have given her a chance 
     not to be a witness in this case.'' App. at 521.
        ``I believed then, I believe today, that she could 
     execute an affidavit which, under reasonable circumstances 
     with fair-minded, nonpolitically-oriented people, would 
     result in her being relieved of the burden to be put through 
     the kind of testimony that, thanks to Linda Tripp's work with 
     you and with the Jones lawyers, she would have been put 
     through. I don't think that's dishonest. I don't think that's 
     illegal.'' App. at 529.
        ``But I also will tell you that I felt quite 
     comfortable that she could have executed a truthful 
     affidavit, which would not have disclosed the embarrassing 
     details of the relationship that we had had, which had been 
     over for many, many months by the time this incident 
     occurred.'' App. at 568-69.
        ``I've already told you that I felt strongly that 
     she could issue, that she could execute an affidavit that 
     would be factually truthful, that might get her out of having 
     to testify. . . . And did I hope she'd be able to get out of 
     testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to 
     execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.'' App. at 571.

     The Jones case involved allegations of a nonconsensual sexual 
     solicitation. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the President 
     was consensual, and she knew nothing about the factual 
     allegations of the Jones case.
       Ms. Lewinsky similarly recognized that an affidavit need 
     not be false in order to accomplish the purpose of avoiding a 
     deposition:
        LEWINSKY told TRIPP that the purpose of the 
     affidavit was to avoid being deposed. LEWINSKY advised that 
     one does this by giving a portion of the whole story, so the 
     attorneys do not think you have anything of relevance to 
     their case. App. at 1420 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis 
     added).
        LEWINSKY advised the goal of an affidavit is to be 
     as benign as possible, so as to avoid being deposed. App. at 
     1421 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis added).
        I thought that signing an affidavit could range 
     from anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to 
     prevent me from being deposed and so that that could range 
     from anywhere between maybe just somehow mentioning, you 
     know, innocuous things or going as far as maybe having to 
     deny any kind of a relationship. App. at 842 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
     6/98) (emphasis added).
       The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky must have 
     known that the President wanted her to lie because he never 
     told her to fully detail their relationship in her affidavit 
     and because an affidavit fully detailing the ``true nature'' 
     of their relationship would have been damaging to him in the 
     Jones case. Committee Report at 65. The Managers wisely 
     appear to have abandoned

[[Page S202]]

     this argument.\95\ Ms. Lewinsky plainly was under no 
     obligation to volunteer to the Jones lawyers every last 
     detail about her relationship with the President--and the 
     failure of the President to instruct her to do so is neither 
     wrong nor an obstruction of justice. A limited, truthful 
     affidavit might have established that Ms. Lewinsky was not 
     relevant to the Jones case. The suggestion that perhaps Ms. 
     Lewinsky could submit an affidavit in lieu of a deposition, 
     as the President knew other potential deponents in the Jones 
     case had attempted to do, in order to avoid the expense, 
     burden, and humiliation of testifying in the Jones case was 
     entirely proper. The notion that the President of the United 
     States could face removal from office not because he told 
     Monica Lewinsky to lie, or encouraged her to do so, but 
     because he did not affirmatively instruct her to disclose 
     every detail of their relationship to the Jones lawyers is 
     simply not supportable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \95\ The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky 
     ``contextually understood that the President wanted her to 
     lie'' because he never told her to file an affidavit fully 
     detailing the ``true nature'' of their relationship. 
     Committee Report at 65. The only support cited for this 
     ``contextual understanding'' obstruction theory advanced by 
     the Committee Report was a reference back to the OIC 
     Referral. The OIC Referral, in turn, advanced the same 
     theory, citing only the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky that, while 
     the President never encouraged her to lie, he remained silent 
     about what she should do or say, and by such silence, ``I 
     knew what that meant.'' App. at 954 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) 
     (cited in Referral at 174). It is extraordinary that the 
     President of the United States could face removal from office 
     not because he told Ms. Lewinsky to lie, or said anything of 
     the sort, but instead because he stayed silent--and Ms. 
     Lewinsky thought she ``knew what that meant.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that, 
     at the time she executed the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly 
     believed that her denial of a sexual relationship was 
     accurate given what she believed to be the definition of a 
     ``sexual relationship'':
        ``I never even came close to sleeping with [the 
     President] . . . We didn't have sex . . . Having sex is 
     having intercourse. That's how most people would--'' Supp. at 
     2664 (Lewinsky-Tripp tape 10/3/97).\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \96\ A friend of Ms. Lewinsky's also testified that, based on 
     her close relationship with her, she believed that Ms. 
     Lewinsky did not lie in her affidavit based on her 
     understanding that when Ms. Lewinsky referred to ``sex'' she 
     meant intercourse. Supp. at 4597 (6/23/98 grand jury 
     testimony of Ms. Dale Young). See also Supp. at 1066 (grand 
     jury testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stating that Ms. Lewinsky 
     had said that the President and she ``didn't have sex'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was comfortable signing the 
     affidavit with regard to the sexual relationship because she 
     could justify to herself that she and the Pres[ident] did not 
     have sexual intercourse.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
        ``Lewinsky said that her use of the term `having 
     sex' means having intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky 
     FBI 302 8/19/98).
       The allegation contained in Article II(1) is totally 
     unsupported by evidence. It is the product of a baseless 
     hypothesis, and it should be rejected.
     2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, 
         he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give 
         perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when 
         called to testify personally'' in the Jones litigation
       Article II (2) alleges that the President encouraged Ms. 
     Lewinsky to give false testimony if and when she was called 
     to testify personally in the Jones litigation. Again, Ms. 
     Lewinsky repeatedly denied that anyone told her or encouraged 
     her to lie:
        ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or 
     anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to 
     lie.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
        ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never 
     promised a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
     20/98).
        ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told 
     Lewinsky that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 
     302 7/27/98).
        ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed 
     Lewinsky to say anything or to lie. . . . App. at 1400 
     (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
        ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at 
     various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have 
     to lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) 
     (emphasis added).
       The Managers allege that the President called Ms. Lewinsky 
     on December 17 to inform her that she had been listed as a 
     potential witness in the Jones case, and that during this 
     conversation, he ``sort of said, `You know, you can always 
     say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me 
     letters.' '' House Br. at 22; App. at 843 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/
     98). Other than the fact that Ms. Lewinsky recalls this 
     statement being made in the same conversation in which she 
     learned that her name was on the Jones witness list, the 
     Managers cite no evidence whatsoever that supports their 
     claim that the President encouraged her to make such 
     statements ``if and when called to testify personally in the 
     Jones case.'' They claim simply that Ms. Lewinsky had 
     discussed such explanations for her visits with the President 
     in the past. Unremarkably, the President and Ms. Lewinsky had 
     been concerned about concealing their improper relationship 
     from others while it was ongoing.
       Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and proffered statements 
     undercut their case:
        When asked what should be said if anyone 
     questioned Ms. Lewinsky about her being with the President, 
     he said she should say she was bringing him letters (when she 
     worked in Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie 
     (after she left the WH). There is truth to both of these 
     statements. . . . [This] occurred prior to the subpoena in 
     the Paula Jones case. App. at 709 and 718 (2/1/98 Proffer) 
     (emphasis added).
        After Ms. Lewinsky was informed, by the 
     Pres[ident], that she was identified as a possible witness in 
     the Jones case, the Pres[ident] and Ms. L[ewinsky] discussed 
     what she should do. The President told her he was not sure 
     she would be subpoenaed, but in the event that she was, she 
     should contact Ms. Currie. When asked what to do if she was 
     subpoenaed, the Pres[ident] suggested she could sign an 
     affidavit to try to satisfy their inquiry and not be deposed. 
     In general, Ms. L[ewinsky] should say she visited the WH to 
     see Ms. Currie and, on occasion when working at the WH, she 
     brought him letters when no one else was around. Neither of 
     those statements untrue. App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) 
     (emphasis added).
        To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky]'s memory, she does 
     not believe they discussed the content of any deposition that 
     Ms. L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later date. App. at 
     712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added).
        LEWINSKY advised, though they did not discuss the 
     issue in specific relation to the JONES matter, she and 
     CLINTON had discussed what to say when asked about LEWINSKY's 
     visits to the White House. App. at 1466 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/
     31/98) (emphasis added).
       Ms. Lewinsky's statements indicate that she asked the 
     President what to say if ``anyone'' asked about her visits, 
     that the President said ``in general'' she could give such an 
     explanation, and that they ``did not discuss the issue in 
     specific relation to the Jones matter.''
       This is consistent with the President's testimony that he 
     and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do in a 
     non-legal context at some point in the past,'' although he 
     had no specific memory of that conversation. App. at 569. The 
     President also stated in his grand jury testimony that he did 
     not recall saying anything like that in connection with Ms. 
     Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones case:

       Q. And in that conversation, or in any conversation in 
     which you informed her she was on the witness list, did you 
     tell her, you know, you can always say that you were coming 
     to see Betty or bringing me letters? Did you tell her 
     anything like that?
       A. I don't remember. She was coming to see Betty. I can 
     tell you this. I absolutely never asked her to lie.

     App. at 568. Ms. Lewinsky does not testify that this 
     discussion was had in reference to testimony she may or may 
     not have been called to give personally, and the Managers' 
     implication is directly contradicted by Ms. Lewinsky's 
     statement that she and the President did not discuss her 
     deposition testimony in that conversation. See App. at 712 
     (2/1/98 Proffer) (``To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky's] memory, 
     she does not believe they discussed [in the December 17 
     conversation] the content of any deposition that Ms. 
     L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later date.'').
       In support of this allegation, the Managers also cite Ms. 
     Lewinsky's testimony that she told the President she would 
     deny the relationship and that the President made some 
     encouraging comment. House Br. at 23. Ms. Lewinsky never 
     stated that she told the President any such thing on December 
     17, or at any other time after she had been identified as a 
     witness. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified that that discussion 
     did not take place after she learned she was a witness in the 
     Jones case:

       Q: It is possible that you also had these discussions 
     [about denying the relationship] after you learned that you 
     were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
       A: I don't believe so. No.
       Q: Can you exclude that possibility?
       A: I pretty much can. I really don't remember it. I mean, 
     it would be very surprising for me to be confronted with 
     something that would show me different, but I--it was 2:30 in 
     the--I mean, the conversation I'm thinking of mainly would 
     have been December 17th, which was----
       Q: The telephone call.
       A: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning. 
     I remember the gist of it and I--I really don't think so.

     App. at 1119-20 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
       Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that 
     neither of these so-called ``cover stories'' was untrue. In 
     her handwritten proffer, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she asked 
     the President what to say if anyone asked her about her 
     visits to the Oval Office and he said that she could say 
     ``she was bringing him letters (when she worked in 
     Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie (after she left 
     the White House).'' App. at 709 (Lewinsky 2/1/98 Proffer). 
     Ms. Lewinsky expressly stated: ``There is truth to both of 
     these statements.'' Id.  (emphasis added); see also App. at 
     712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (``[n]either of those statements [was] 
     untrue.'') (emphasis added). Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified 
     to the grand jury that she did in fact bring papers to the 
     President and that on some occasions, she visited the Oval 
     Office only to see Ms. Currie:

       Q: Did you actually bring [the President] papers at all?
       A: Yes.
       Q: All right. Tell us a little about that.
       A: It varied. Sometimes it was just actual copies of 
     letters. . . .


[[Page S203]]


     App. at 774-75 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).

     ``I saw Betty on every time that I was there . . . most of 
     the time my purpose was to see the President, but there were 
     some times when I did just go see Betty but the President 
     wasn't in the office.''

     App. at 775 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The Managers assert that 
     those stories were misleading. House Br. at 23; see also 
     Committee Report at 66 (delivering documents to the President 
     was a ``ruse that had no legitimate business purpose.''). In 
     other words, while the so-called ``cover stories'' were 
     literally true, such explanations might have been misleading. 
     But literal truth is a critical issue in perjury and 
     obstruction cases, as is Ms. Lewinsky's belief that the 
     statements were, in fact, literally true.
       The allegation contained in Article II (2) is unsupported 
     by the evidence and should be rejected.
     3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, 
         encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--
         gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
       This allegation charges that the President participated in 
     a scheme to conceal certain gifts he had given to Monica 
     Lewinsky. It apparently centers on two events allegedly 
     occurring in December 1997: (a) a conversation between the 
     President and Ms. Lewinsky in which the two allegedly 
     discussed the gifts the President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and 
     (b) Ms. Currie's receipt of a box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky 
     and storage of them under her bed. The evidence does not 
     support the charge.
       a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
       Monica Lewinsky met with the President on December 28, 
     1997, sometime shortly after 8:00 a.m. to pick up Christmas 
     presents. App. at 868 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). According to Ms. 
     Lewinsky, she raised the subject of gifts she had received 
     from the President in relation to the Jones subpoena, and 
     this was the first and only time that this subject arose. 
     App. at 1130 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1338 (Lewinsky 
     Depo. 8/26/98).
       The House Trial Brief and the Committee Report quote one 
     version of Ms. Lewinsky's description of that December 28 
     conversation:

     ``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I--
     maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere 
     or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I 
     think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about 
     that.' And left that topic.'' App. at 872 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/
     98).

       In fairness, the Senate should be aware that Ms. Lewinsky 
     has addressed this crucial exchange with prosecutors on at 
     least ten different occasions, which we lay out in the margin 
     for review.\97\ The accounts varied--in some Ms. Lewinsky 
     essentially recalled that the President gave no response, but 
     the House Managers, like the Committee Report and the OIC 
     Referral, cite only the account most favorable to their case, 
     failing even to take note of the other inconsistent 
     recollections. But the important fact about Ms. Lewinsky's 
     various descriptions of this conversation is that, at the 
     very most, the President stated ``I don't know'' or ``Let me 
     think about it'' when Ms. Lewinsky raised the issue of the 
     gifts. Even by the account most unfavorable to the President, 
     the record is clear and unambiguous that the President never 
     initiated any discussion about the gifts nor did he tell or 
     even suggest to Ms. Lewinsky that she should conceal the 
     gifts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \97\ Those statements, from earliest to latest in time:
     1. Proffer (2/1/98): ``Ms. L then asked if she should put 
     away (outside her home) the gifts he had given her or, maybe, 
     give them so someone else.'' App. at 715.
     2. FBI 302 (7/27/98): ``LEWINSKY expressed her concern about 
     the gifts that the President had given LEWINSKY and 
     specifically the hat pin that had been subpoenaed by PAULA 
     JONES. The President seemed to know what the JONES subpoena 
     called for in advance and did not seem surprised about the 
     hat pin. The President asked LEWINSKY is she had told anyone 
     about the hat pin and LEWINSKY denied that she had, but may 
     have said that she gave some of the gifts to FRANK CARTER. . 
     . . LEWINSKY asked the President if she should give the gifts 
     to someone and the President replied `I don't know.' '' App. 
     at 1395.
     3. FBI 302 (8/1/98): ``LEWINSKY said that she was concerned 
     about the gifts that the President had given her and 
     suggested to the President that BETTY CURRIE hold the gifts. 
     The President said something like, `I don't know,' or `I'll 
     think about it.' The President did not tell LEWINSKY what to 
     do with the gifts at that time.'' App. at 1481.
     4. Grand Jury (8/6/98): ``[A]t some point I said to him, 
     `Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away 
     outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe 
     Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I don't 
     know' or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.'' 
     App. at 872.
     5. FBI 302 (8/13/97): ``During their December 28, 1997 
     meeting, CLINTON did not specifically mention which gifts to 
     get rid of.'' App. at 1549.
     6. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``It was December 28th and I was 
     there to get my Christmas gifts from him. . . And we spent 
     maybe about five minutes or so, not very long, talking about 
     the case. And I said to him, `Well, do you think' . . . And 
     at one point, I said, `Well do you think I should--' I don't 
     think I said `get rid of,' I said, `But do you think I should 
     put away or maybe give to Betty or give someone the gifts?' 
     And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was 
     something like, `I don't know,' or `Hmm,' or--there really 
     was no response.'' App. at 1121-22.
     7. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: Now, did you bring up 
     Betty's name [at the December 28 meeting during which gifts 
     were supposedly discussed] or did the President bring up 
     Betty's name? THE WITNESS: I think I brought it up. The 
     President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he 
     really didn't--he really didn't discuss it. . .'' App. at 
     1122.
     8. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: You had said that the 
     President had called you initially to come get your Christmas 
     gift, you had gone there, you had a talk, et cetera, and 
     there was no--you expressed concern, the President really 
     didn't say anything.'' App. at 1126.
     9. FBI 302 (8/24/98): ``LEWINSKY advised that CLINTON was 
     sitting in the rocking chair in the Study. LEWINSKY asked 
     CLINTON what she should do with the gifts CLINTON had given 
     her and he either did not respond or responded `I don't 
     know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what was said, but she is 
     certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not have a clear 
     image in her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566.
     10. FBI 302 (9/3/98): ``On December 28, 1997, in a 
     conversation between LEWINSKY and the President, the hat pin 
     given to Lewinsky by the President was specifically 
     discussed. They also discussed the general subject of the 
     gifts the President had given Lewinsky. However, they did not 
     discuss other specific gifts called for by the PAULA JONES 
     subpoena. LEWINSKY got the impression that the President knew 
     what was on the subpoena.'' App. at 1590.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Indeed, on several occasions, Ms. Lewinsky's accounts of 
     the President's reaction depict the President as not even 
     acknowledging her suggestion. Among those versions, ignored 
     by the Committee Report and the Managers, are the following:
        ``And he--I don't remember his response. I think 
     it was something like, `I don't know,''' or `Hmm,' or--there 
     really was no response.'' App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) 
     (emphasis added).
        ``[The President] either did not respond or 
     responded `I don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what 
     was said, but she is certain that whatever CLINTON said, she 
     did not have a clear image in her mind of what to do next.'' 
     App. at 1566 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98) (emphasis added).
        ``The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's 
     name, because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it . 
     . .'' App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
        ``A JUROR: You had said that the President had 
     called you initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had 
     gone there, you had a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you 
     expressed concern, the President didn't really say 
     anything.'' App. at 1126 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis 
     added).\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \98\ Here a grand juror is restating Ms. Lewinsky's earlier 
     testimony, with which Ms. Lewinsky appeared to agree (she did 
     not dispute the accuracy of the grand juror's 
     recapitulation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Thus, the evidence establishes that there was essentially 
     no discussion of gifts. That December 28 meeting provides no 
     evidence of any ``scheme . . . designed to . . . conceal the 
     existence'' of any gifts.
       b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
       Because the record is devoid of any evidence of obstruction 
     by the President at his December 28 meeting with Monica 
     Lewinsky, Article II (3) necessarily depends on the added 
     assumption that, after the December 28 meeting, the President 
     must have instructed his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to 
     retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, thereby consummating 
     the obstruction of justice. As the following discussion will 
     demonstrate, the record is devoid of any direct evidence that 
     the President discussed this subject with Ms. Currie. At 
     most, it conflicted on the question of whether Ms. Currie or 
     Ms. Lewinsky initiated the gift retrieval.
       We begin with what is certain. The record is undisputed 
     that Ms. Currie picked up a box containing gifts from Ms. 
     Lewinsky and placed them under her bed at home. The primary 
     factual dispute, therefore, is which of the two initiated the 
     pick-up. According to the logic of the Committee Report, if 
     Ms. Currie initiated the retrieval, she must have been so 
     instructed by the President. Committee Report at 69 (``there 
     is no reason for her to do so unless instructed by the 
     President'').
       But the facts are otherwise. Both Ms. Currie and the 
     President have denied ever having any such conversation 
     wherein the President instructed Ms. Currie to retrieve the 
     gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. App. at 502 (President Clinton GJ 8/
     17/98); Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). In other words, the 
     only two parties who could have direct knowledge of such an 
     instruction by the President have denied it took place.
       In the face of this direct evidence that the President did 
     not ask Ms. Currie to pick up these gifts, the Committee 
     Report's obstruction theory hinges on the inference that Ms. 
     Currie called Ms. Lewinsky and must have done so at the 
     direction of the President. To be sure, Ms. Lewinsky has 
     stated on several occasions that Ms. Currie initiated a call 
     to her to inquire about retrieving something. The Managers 
     and the Committee Report cited the following passage from Ms. 
     Lewinsky's grand jury testimony:

       Q: What did [Betty Currie] say?
       A: She said, ``I understand you have something to give 
     me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something to give 
     me.'' Along those lines. . . .
       Q: When she said something along the lines of ``I 
     understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The 
     President says you have something for me,'' what did you 
     understand her to mean?
       A: The gifts.
     App. at 874 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). See also App. at 715 (2/1/
     98 Proffer) (``Ms. Currie called Ms. L later that afternoon 
     and said that the Pres. had told her Ms. L wanted her to hold 
     onto something for her.'').

[[Page S204]]

       However, Ms. Lewinsky acknowledged that it was she who 
     first raised the prospect of Ms. Currie's involvement in 
     holding the gifts:

       A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the 
     President bring up Betty's name?
       [MS. LEWINSKY]: I think I brought it up. The President 
     wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he really 
     didn't--he really didn't discuss it.

     App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98). And contrary to the 
     Committee Report's suggestion that Lewinsky's memory of these 
     events has been ``consistent and unequivocal'' and she has 
     ``recited the same facts in February, July, and August,'' 
     Committee Report at 69, Ms. Lewinsky herself acknowledged at 
     her last grand jury appearance that her memory of the crucial 
     conversation is less than crystal clear:

       A JUROR: . . . Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the 
     President had told her to call?
       [MS. LEWINSKY]: Right now. I don't. I don't remember. . . .

     App. at 1141 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
       Moreover, Ms. Currie has repeatedly and unvaryingly stated 
     that it was Ms. Lewinsky who contacted Ms. Currie about the 
     gifts, not the other way around. A few examples include:
        ``LEWINSKY called CURRIE and advised she had to 
     return all gifts CLINTON had given LEWINSKY as there was talk 
     going around about the gifts.'' Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 
     1/24/98);
        ``Monica said she was getting concerned, and she 
     wanted to give me the stuff the President had given her--or 
     give me a box of stuff. It was a box of stuff.'' Supp. at 557 
     (Currie GJ 1/27/98);
        Q: . . . Just tell us for a moment how this issue 
     first arose and what you did about it and what Ms. Lewinsky 
     told you.
        A: The best I remember it first arose with a 
     conversation. I don't know if it was over the telephone or in 
     person. I don't know. She asked me if I would pick up a box. 
     She said Isikoff had been inquiring about gifts.'' Supp. at 
     582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
        ``The best I remember she said that she wanted me 
     to hold these gifts--hold this--she may have said gifts, I'm 
     sure she said gifts, box of gifts--I don't remember--because 
     people were asking questions. And I said, `Fine.' '' Supp. at 
     581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
        ``The best I remember is Monica calls me and asks 
     me if she can give me some gifts, if I'd pick up some gifts 
     for her.'' Supp. at 706 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).
       The Committee Report attempts to portray Ms. Currie's 
     memory as faulty on the key issue of whether Ms. Lewinsky 
     initiated the gift retrieval by unfairly referencing Ms. 
     Currie's answer to a completely different question. Ms. 
     Currie was asked whether she had discussed with the President 
     Ms. Lewinsky's ``turning over to [her]'' the gift he had 
     given her. Ms. Currie indicated that she could remember no 
     such occasion. ``If Monica said [Ms. Currie] talked to the 
     President about it,'' she was then asked, ``would that not be 
     true?'' Then, only on the limited question of whether Ms. 
     Currie ever talked to the President about the gifts--wholly 
     separate from the issue of who made the initial contact--did 
     Ms. Currie courteously defer, ``Then she may remember better 
     than I. I don't remember.'' Supp. at 584 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). 
     Ironically, it is the substance of this very allegation--
     regarding conversations between Ms. Currie and the 
     President--that Ms. Lewinsky told the grand jury she could 
     not recall. (In later testimony, referring to a conversation 
     she had with the President on January 21, Ms. Currie 
     testified that she was ``sure'' that she did not discuss the 
     fact that she had a box of Ms. Lewinsky's belongings under 
     her bed. Supp. at 705 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).)
       To support its theory that Ms. Currie initiated a call to 
     Ms. Lewinsky, the House Managers place great reliance on a 
     cell phone record of Ms. Currie, calling it ``key evidence 
     that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection is wrong'' and which 
     ``conclusively proves'' that ``the President directed Ms. 
     Currie to pick up the gifts.'' House Br. at 33. There is 
     record of a one-minute call on December 28, 1998 from Ms. 
     Currie's cell phone to Ms. Lewinsky's home at 3:32 p.m. Even 
     assuming Ms. Lewinsky is correct that Ms. Currie picked up 
     the gifts on December 28, her own testimony refutes the 
     possibility that the Managers' mysterious 3:32 p.m. telephone 
     call could have been the initial contact by Ms. Currie to 
     retrieve the gifts. To the contrary, the timing and duration 
     of the call strongly suggest just the opposite. It is 
     undisputed that Ms. Lewinsky entered the White House on the 
     morning of December 28 at 8:16 a.m. App. at 111 (White House 
     entry records). While no exit time for Ms. Lewinsky was 
     recorded because she inadvertently left her visitor badge in 
     the White House, she has testified that the visit lasted 
     around an hour. App. at 870-72 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). 
     Consistent with this timing, records also indicate that the 
     President left the Oval Office at 9:52 a.m., thus placing Ms. 
     Lewinsky's exit around 9:30 to 9:45 a.m. App. at 111. Ms. 
     Lewinsky has indicated on several occasions that her 
     discussion with Betty Currie occurred just ``several hours'' 
     after she left. App. at 875 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); App. at 
     1395 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). Ms. Lewinsky three times 
     placed the timing of the actual gift exchange with Ms. Currie 
     ``at about 2:00 p.m.'' App at 1127 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); 
     App. at 1396 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98); App. at 1482 
     (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98). This, in light of undisputed 
     documentary evidence and Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony, it 
     becomes clear that the 3:32 p.m. telephone record relied upon 
     by the Committee Report in fact is unlikely to reflect a call 
     placed to initiate the pick-up.
       Apart from this conspicuous timing defect, there is 
     another, independent reason to conclude that the 3:32 p.m. 
     telephone call could not have been the conversation Ms. 
     Lewinsky describes. The 3:32 p.m. call is documented to have 
     lasted no longer than one minute, and because such calls are 
     rounded up to the nearest minute, it quite conceivably could 
     have been much shorter in duration. It is difficult to 
     imagine that the conversation reflected in Ms. Lewinsky's 
     statements could have taken place in less than one minute. 
     Both Ms. Currie and Ms. Lewinsky have described the various 
     matters that were discussed in their initial conversation: 
     not only was this the first time the topic of returning gifts 
     was discussed, which quite likely generated some discussion 
     between the two, but they also had to discuss and arrange a 
     convenient plan for Ms. Currie to make the pick-
     up.99
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \99\ The OIC Referral, which took great pains to point out 
     every allegedly incriminating piece of evidence, made no 
     reference to this telephone record, perhaps because the OIC 
     knew it tended not to corroborate Ms. Lewinsky's time line. 
     In its place, the Referral rested its corroboration hopes in 
     the following bizarre analysis: ``More generally, the person 
     making the extra effort (in this case, Ms. Currie) is 
     ordinarily the person requesting the favor.'' Referral at 
     170. Wisely, the House Managers chose not to pursue this 
     groundless speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       What, then, to make of this call so heavily relied upon by 
     the House Managers? The record is replete with references 
     that Ms. Currie and Ms. Lewinsky communicated very 
     frequently, especially during this December 1997-January 1998 
     time period. See, e.g., Supp. at 554 (Currie GJ 1/27/98) 
     (many calls around Christmas-time). They often called or 
     paged each other to discuss a host of topics, including Ms. 
     Lewinsky's pending job search, Ms. Currie's mother's illness, 
     and her contacts with Mr. Jordan. There is simply no reason 
     to believe this call was anything other than one of the many 
     calls and exchanges of pages that these two shared during the 
     period.
       c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds 
           With the President's Actions
       Ultimately, and irrespective of the absence of evidence 
     implicating the President in Ms. Lewinsky's gift concealment, 
     the charge fails because it is inconsistent with other events 
     of the very same day. There is absolutely no dispute that the 
     President gave Ms. Lewinsky numerous additional gifts during 
     their December 28 meeting. It must therefore be assumed that 
     on the very day the President and Ms. Lewinsky were 
     conspiring to hide the gifts he had already given to her, the 
     President added to the pile. No stretch of logic will support 
     such an outlandish theory.
       From the beginning, this inherent contradiction has puzzled 
     investigators. If there were a plot to conceal these gifts, 
     why did the President give Ms. Lewinsky several more gifts at 
     the very moment the concealment plan was allegedly hatched? 
     The House Managers OIC prosecutors, grand jurors, and even 
     Ms. Lewinsky hopelessly searched for an answer to that 
     essential question:

       Q: Although, Ms. Lewinsky, I think what is sort of--it 
     seems a little odd and, I guess really the grand jurors 
     wanted your impression of it, was on the same day that you're 
     discussing basically getting the gifts to Betty to conceal 
     them, he's giving you a new set of gifts.
       A: You know, I have come recently to look at that as sort 
     of a strange situation, I think, in the course of the past 
     few weeks. . . .

     App. at 887-88 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added). See 
     House Br. at 34.
       The Committee Report fails to resolve this significant flaw 
     in its theory.100 The report admits that Ms. 
     Lewinsky ``can't answer'' why the President would in one 
     breath give her gifts and in the next hatch a plan to take 
     them back. But it cites only to Ms. Lewinsky's understanding 
     of the relationship's pattern of concealment and how she 
     contemplated it must apply to the gifts. It creates the 
     erroneous impression that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky 
     instructions to conceal the gifts in the December 28 meeting 
     by quoting her testimony that ``from everything he said to 
     me'' she would conceal the gifts. But we know that Ms. 
     Lewinsky has

[[Page S205]]

     repeatedly testified that no such discussion ever occurred. 
     Her reliance on ``everything he said to me'' must, therefore, 
     reflect her own plan to implement discussions the two had had 
     about concealing the relationship long before her role in the 
     Jones litigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \100\ Incredibly, not only does the Committee Report fail to 
     offer a sensible answer to this perplexity, but without any 
     factual or logical support it accuses the President of lying 
     to the grand jury when he testified that he was not 
     particularly concerned about the gifts he had given Ms. 
     Lewinsky and thus had no compunction about giving her 
     additional gifts on December 28. Article I (4). For whatever 
     reason, neither the Committee Report nor the OIC Referral 
     acknowledges the most reasonable explanation for these 
     events: as the President has testified repeatedly, he was not 
     concerned about the gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky.
      ``I was never hung up about this gift issue. Maybe 
     it's because I have a different experience. But, you know, 
     the President gets hundreds of gifts a year, maybe more. I 
     have always given a lot of gifts to people, especially if 
     they give me gifts. And this was no big deal to me.'' App. at 
     495.
      ``this gift business . . . didn't bother me.'' App. 
     at 496.
      ``I wasn't troubled by this gift issue.'' App. at 
     497.
      ``I have always given a lot of people gifts. I have 
     always been given gifts. I do not think there is anything 
     improper about a man giving a woman a gift, or a woman giving 
     a man a gift, that necessarily connotes an improper 
     relationship. So, it didn't bother me.'' App. at 498.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       What this passage confirms is that Ms. Lewinsky had very 
     much in her mind that she would do what she could to conceal 
     the relationship--a modus operandi she herself acknowledged 
     well pre-dated the Jones litigation. That she took such steps 
     does not mean that the President knew of or participated in 
     them. Indeed, it appears that the entire gift-concealment 
     plan arose not from any plan suggested by the President--
     which the Committee Report so desperately struggles to 
     maintain--but rather more innocently from the actions of a 
     young woman taking steps she thought were best.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \101\ As the President has stated about this potentiality, 
     ``I didn't then, I don't now see this [the gifts] as a 
     problem. And if she thought it was a problem, I think it--it 
     must have been from a, really a misapprehension of the 
     circumstances. I certainly never encouraged her not to, to 
     comply lawfully with a subpoena.'' App. at 497-98 (emphasis 
     added.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In any event, the record evidence is abundantly clear that 
     the President has not obstructed justice by any plan or 
     scheme to conceal gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky, and 
     logic and reason fully undercut any such theory.
     4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in 
         connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job 
         in New York in an effort to ``corruptly prevent'' her 
         ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case
       Again, in the absence of specifics in Article II itself, we 
     look to the Committee Report for guidance on the actual 
     charges. The Committee Report would like to portray this 
     claim in as sinister a light as possible, and it alleges that 
     the President of the United States employed his close friend 
     Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a job in New York to 
     influence her testimony or perhaps get her away from the 
     Jones lawyers. To reach this conclusion, and without the 
     benefit of a single piece of direct evidence to support the 
     charge, it ignores the direct testimony of several witnesses, 
     assigns diabolical purposes to a series of innocuous events, 
     and then claims that ``[i]t is logical to infer from this 
     chain of events'' that the job efforts ``were motivated to 
     influence the testimony of'' Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report 
     at 71. Again, the evidence contradicts the inferences the 
     Committee Report strives to draw. Ms. Lewinsky's New York job 
     search began on her own initiative long before her 
     involvement in the Jones case. By her own forceful testimony, 
     her job search had no connection to the Jones case.
       Mr. Jordan agreed to help Ms. Lewinsky not at the direction 
     of the President but upon the request of Betty Currie, Mr. 
     Jordan's long-time friend. And bizarrely, the idea to involve 
     Mr. Jordan (which arose well before Ms. Lewinsky became a 
     possible Jones witness) came not from the President but 
     apparently emanated from Ms. Tripp. In short, the facts 
     directly frustrate the House Majority's theory.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \102\ This allegation has gone through several iterations. As 
     initially referred to the House of Representatives, the 
     charge was that the President ``help[ed] Ms. Lewinsky obtain 
     a job in New York at a time when she would have been a 
     witness against him'' in the Jones case. OIC Referral at 181. 
     Faced with the significant evidence that Ms. Lewinsky's job 
     efforts had originated long before she became involved in the 
     Jones case and were in fact entirely unrelated to the Jones 
     case, the Judiciary Committee Majority was forced to recraft 
     this claim. Instead of implying a complete connection between 
     the job search and the Jones ligitation, the article now 
     oddly charges that the President intensified and succeeded in 
     an effort to secure job assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky ``at a 
     time when the truthful testimony of [Ms. Lewinsky] would have 
     been harmful to him,'' Article II (5) (emphasis added)--
     thereby admitting that the initial effort was motivated by 
     appropriate concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This 
           Charge
       It is hard to overstate the importance of the fact that--by 
     the House Managers', the Committee Report's and the OIC's own 
     admission--there is not one single piece of direct evidence 
     to support this charge. Not one. Indeed, just the contrary is 
     true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan have repeatedly 
     testified that there was never an explicit or implicit 
     agreement, suggestion, or implication that Ms. Lewinsky would 
     be rewarded with a job for her silence or false testimony. 
     One need look no further than their own testimony:

       Lewsinky: ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never 
     promised a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
     20/98);
       ``There was no agreement with the President, JORDAN, or 
     anyone else that LEWINSKY had to sign the Jones affidavit 
     before getting a job in New York. LEWINSKY never demanded a 
     job from Jordan in exchange for a favorable affidavit. Nether 
     the President nor JORDAN ever told LEWINSKY that she had to 
     lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
       Jordan: ``As far as I was concerned, [the job and the 
     affidavit] were two very separate matters.'' Supp. at 1737 
     (Jordan GJ 3/5/98).
       ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no''--in response to the 
     question whether the job search and the affidavit were in any 
     way connected. Supp. at 1827 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \103\ The only person who suggested any such quid pro quo was 
     Ms. Tripp, who repeatedly urged Ms. Lewinsky to demand such 
     linkage. App. at 1493 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/2/98 (``TRIPP told 
     LEWINSKY not to sign the affidavit until LEWINSKY had a 
     job.''). To appease Linda Tripp's repeated demands on this 
     point, Ms. Lewinsky ultimately told Ms. Tripp that she had 
     told Mr. Jordan she wouldn't sign the affidavit until she had 
     a job. But as she later emphasized to the grand jury, ``That 
     was definitely a lie, based on something Linda had made me 
     promise her on January 9th.'' App. at 1134 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/
     98).

       This is the direct evidence. The House Managers' 
     circumstantial ``chain of events'' case, House Br. 39-41, 
     cannot overcome the hurdle the direct evidence presents.
       b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
       By its terms, Article II(4) would have the Senate evaluate 
     Ms. Lewinsky's job search by considering only the 
     circumstances ``[b]eginning on or about December 7, 1977.'' 
     Article II(4). Although barely mentioned in the Committee 
     Report's ``explanation'' of Article II(4), the significant 
     events occurring before December 7, 1997 cannot simply be 
     ignored because they are inconsistent with the Majority's 
     theory. Without reciting every detail, the undisputed record 
     establishes that the following facts occurred long before Ms. 
     Lewinsky was involved in the Jones case:
       First, Ms. Lewinsky had contemplated looking for a job in 
     New York as early as July 1997. App. at 1414 (Lewinsky FBI 
     302 7/29/98) (July 3 letter ``first time [Lewinsky] mentioned 
     the possibility of moving to New York''); App. at 787-788 (On 
     July 4, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky wrote the President a letter 
     describing her interest in a job ``in New York at the United 
     Nations''); Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had been 
     searching for a highly paid job in New York since the 
     previous July.'') She conveyed that prospect to a friend on 
     September 2, 1997. App. at 2811 (Lewinsky e-mail).
       Second, in early October, at the request of Ms. Currie, 
     then-Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta asked U.N. Ambassador 
     Bill Richardson to consider Ms. Lewinsky for a position at 
     the U.N. Supp. at 3404 (Richardson GJ 4/3/98). Ms. Currie 
     testified that she was acting on her own in this effort. 
     Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98).
       Third, around October 6, Ms. Tripp told Ms. Lewinsky that 
     an acquaintance in the White House reported that it was 
     unlikely Ms. Lewinsky would ever be re-employed at the White 
     House. After this disclosure, Ms. Lewinsky ``was mostly 
     resolved to look for a job in the private sector in New 
     York.'' App. at 1543-44 (Lewinsky FBI 302) 8/13/98; see also 
     App. at 1460 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (remarks by the Linda 
     Tripp acquaintance were the ``straw that broke the camel's 
     back'').
       Fourth, sometime prior to October 9, 1997, Ms. Tripp and 
     Ms. Lewinsky discussed the prospect of enlisting Mr. Vernon 
     Jordan to assist Ms. Lewinsky in obtaining a private sector 
     job in New York. App. at 822-24 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); see 
     also App. at 1079 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (``I don't remember . 
     . . if [enlisting Jordan] was my idea or Linda's idea. And I 
     know that that came up in discussions with her, I believe, 
     before I discussed it with the President''). On either 
     October 9 or 11, Ms. Lewinsky conveyed to the President this 
     idea of asking Mr. Jordan for assistance. Id.
       Fifth, in mid-October, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky purchased a book 
     on jobs in New York. App. at 1462 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). 
     Ms. Lewinsky completed and sent to Betty Currie at the White 
     House a packet of jobs-related materials on October 15 or 16. 
     Supp. at 735 (Lewinsky Tripp tape of 10/15/97 conversation).
       Sixth, on October 31, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed for a 
     position with Ambassador Bill Richardson at the United 
     Nations in New York. Ambassador Richardson was ``impressed'' 
     with Ms. Lewinsky and, on November 3, offered her a position, 
     which she ultimately rejected. Supp. at 3411 (Richardson GJ 
     4/30/98); Supp. at 3731 (Sutphen GJ 5/27/98). Ms. Currie 
     informed the President that Ms. Lewinsky had received a job 
     offer at the U.N. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). Ambassador 
     Richardson never spoke to the President or Mr. Jordan about 
     Ms. Lewinsky, and he testified emphatically and repeatedly 
     that no one pressured him to hire her. Supp. at 3422-23 
     (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); Supp. at 3418 (same); Supp. at 3429 
     (same).
       Seventh, as of late October or November, Ms. Lewinsky had 
     told Mr. Kenneth Bacon, her boss at the Pentagon, that she 
     wanted to leave the Pentagon and move to New York. In a 
     series of conversations, she enlisted his assistance in 
     obtaining a private sector job in New York. Supp. at 11 
     (Kenneth Bacon FBI 302 2/26/98). In response, Mr. Bacon 
     contacted Howard Paster, CEO of the public relations firm 
     Hill & Knowlton about Ms. Lewinsky. Id.
       Eighth, in November, Ms. Lewinsky gave notice to the 
     Pentagon that she would be leaving her Pentagon job at year's 
     end. Supp. at 116 (Clifford Bernath GJ 5/21/98).
       Ninth, Ms. Lewinsky apparently had a preliminary meeting 
     with Mr. Jordan on November 5, 1997 to discuss her job 
     search. During this twenty-minute meeting, Ms. Lewinsky and 
     Mr. Jordan discussed a list of potential employers she had 
     compiled. App. at 1464-65 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). In that 
     meeting, Ms. Lewinsky never informed Mr. Jordan of any time 
     constraints on her need for job assistance. Supp. at 2647 
     (Lewinsky-Tripp Tape of 11/8/97 conversation). Mr. Jordan had 
     to leave town the next day. App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 
     Form 7/31/98). Ms. Lewinsky had a follow-up telephone 
     conversation with Mr. Jordan around Thanksgiving wherein he 
     advised her that he was ``working on her job search'' and 
     instructed

[[Page S206]]

     her to call him again ``around the first week of December.'' 
     App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98); see also App. at 825 
     (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (``And so Betty arranged for me to speak 
     with [Jordan] again and I spoke with him when I was in Los 
     Angeles before--right before Thanksgiving.'') \104\ 
     Inexplicably, the Committee Report, the presentation by its 
     chief counsel, and the Starr Referral all choose to ignore 
     this key piece of testimony--that contact resumed in early 
     December because Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan agreed (in 
     November) that it would. See Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. 
     Lewinsky had no further contacts with Mr. Jordan at that time 
     [early November to mid December].''); Schippers Dec. 10, 1998 
     Presentation at 38 (``Vernon Jordan, who, by the way, had 
     done nothing from early November to mid-December.''); 
     Referral at 182 (``Ms. Lewinsky had no contact with . . . Mr. 
     Jordan for another month [after November 5].'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \104\ Mr. Jordan was then out of the country from the day 
     after Thanksgiving until December 4. Supp. at 1804 (Jordan GJ 
     5/5/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In sum, the record is clear that Ms. Lewinsky decided on 
     her own to seek a job in New York many months before her 
     involvement in the Jones case. She had asked her Pentagon 
     boss to help, as well as Ms. Currie, who arranged indirectly 
     for Ms. Lewinsky to interview with Ambassador Richardson at 
     the United Nations. Mr. Jordan became involved in the job 
     search at the request of Ms. Currie (apparently at the 
     suggestion of Ms. Tripp) and, notwithstanding his travels in 
     November, Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98), kept in contact 
     with Ms. Lewinsky with plans to reconvene early in December.
       c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
       Article II ignores this background and merely alleges that 
     efforts to aid Ms. Lewinsky's job search ``intensified and 
     succeeded'' in December 1997. While not adopted in the 
     article, the House Brief, the Committee Report, and the 
     accompanying final presentation by Majority Counsel Schippers 
     offer some guidance as to the meaning of the actual charge. 
     They cite three events--Mr. Jordan's December 11 meeting with 
     Ms. Lewinsky to discuss job prospects in New York, Ms. 
     Lewinsky's execution of her Jones affidavit, and her receipt 
     of a job--in an effort to portray Ms. Lewinsky's job search 
     as sinister. But the full record easily dispels any 
     suggestion that there were any obstructive or improper acts.

      (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan

       The House Managers and the Committee Report suggest that 
     Mr. Jordan took action on Ms. Lewinsky's job search request 
     only after, and because, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the 
     witness list on December 5 and only after, and because, Judge 
     Wright ordered the President to answer certain questions 
     about ``other women'' on December 11. See House Br. at 21. 
     Consider the Committee Report portrayal:

       ``[T]he effort to obtain a job for Monica Lewinsky in New 
     York intensified after the President learned, on December 6, 
     1997, that Monica Lewinsky was listed on the witness list for 
     the case Jones v. Clinton.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \105\ Committee Report at 70. That portrayal flatly 
     contradicts the Committee Report's earlier statement that on 
     December 6 ``there was still no urgency to help Lewinsky.'' 
     Committee Report at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On December 7, 1997, President Clinton met with Vernon 
     Jordan at the White House. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan 
     on December 11 to discuss specific job contacts in New York. 
     Mr. Jordan then made calls to certain New York companies on 
     Ms. Lewinsky's behalf. Jordan telephoned President Clinton to 
     keep him informed of the efforts to get Ms. Lewinsky a job.'' 
     Committee Report at 70.
       ``Something happened that changed the priority assigned to 
     the job search. On the morning of December 11, 1997, Judge 
     Susan Webber Wright ordered President Clinton to provide 
     information regarding any state or federal employee with whom 
     he had, proposed, or sought sexual relations. To keep Ms. 
     Lewinsky satisfied was now of critical importance.'' 
     Committee Report at 11.

       The unmistakable intention of this narrative is to suggest 
     that, after the President learned Ms. Lewinsky's name was on 
     the witness list on December 6, he (1) contacted Mr. Jordan 
     on December 7 to engage his assistance for Ms. Lewinsky, and 
     only then did Mr. Jordan agree to meet with Ms. Lewinsky, and 
     further, that (2) Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky on 
     December 11 and took concrete steps to help Ms. Lewinsky only 
     after and as a result of Judge Wright's December 11 order. 
     Both suggestions are demonstrably false.
       The President had nothing to do with arranging the December 
     11 meeting between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. As the record 
     indicates, after receiving a request from Ms. Currie on 
     December 5 that he meet with Ms. Lewinsky, and telling Ms. 
     Currie to have Ms. Lewinsky call him, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. 
     Jordan on December 8. Supp. at 1705 (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). As 
     noted above, that call had been presaged by a conversation 
     between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky around Thanksgiving in 
     which Jordan told her ``he was working on her job search'' 
     and asked her to contact him again ``around the first week of 
     December.'' App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). In the 
     December 8 call, the two arranged for Ms. Lewinsky to come to 
     Mr. Jordan's office on December 11; on the same day, Ms. 
     Lewinsky sent Mr. Jordan via courier a copy of her resume. 
     Supp. at 1705 (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). At the time of that 
     contact, Mr. Jordan did not even know that Ms. Lewinsky knew 
     President Clinton. Id.
       In the intervening period before Ms. Lewinsky's December 11 
     meeting with Mr. Jordan, the President met with Mr. Jordan on 
     December 7. As the Committee Report acknowledges, that 
     meeting had nothing to do with Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report 
     at 11. Yet the House Managers' Brief, like the Committee 
     Report before it, states that ``the sudden interest [in 
     helping Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job] was inspired by a court 
     order entered on December 11, 1997'' in the Jones case.\106\ 
     House Br. at 21. No evidence supports that supposition. The 
     December 11 meeting had been scheduled on December 8. Neither 
     the OIC Referral nor the Committee Report nor the Managers' 
     Brief cites any evidence that the President or Mr. Jordan had 
     any knowledge of the contents of that Order at the time of 
     the December 11 meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \106\ That Order authorized Paula Jones' attorneys to obtain 
     discovery relating to certain government employees ``with 
     whom the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual 
     relations, or sought to have sexual relations.'' House Br. at 
     21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky shortly after 1:00 p.m. on 
     December 11. Supp. at 1863 (Akin Gump visitor log); Supp. at 
     1809 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). In anticipation of that meeting, Mr. 
     Jordan had made several calls to prospective employers about 
     Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). Mr. Jordan 
     spoke about Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. Peter Georgescu of Young & 
     Rubicam at 9:45 a.m. that morning, and with Mr. Richard 
     Halperin of Revlon around 1:00 p.m., immediately before 
     meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/
     98). Again, there is no evidence that any of this occurred 
     after Mr. Jordan learned of Judge Wright's order.
       Although the Committee Report claims that a heightened 
     sense of urgency attached in December which ``intensified'' 
     the job search efforts, it ignores the sworn testimony of Mr. 
     Jordan denying any such intensification: ``Oh, no. I do not 
     recall any heightened sense of urgency [in December]. What I 
     do recall is that I dealt with it when I had time to do it.'' 
     Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \107\ Mr. Jordan explained that not much activity occurred in 
     November because ``I was traveling.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan 
     GJ 9/5/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The ``heightened urgency'' theory also is undermined by the 
     simple fact that Mr. Jordan indisputably placed no pressure 
     on any company to give Ms. Lewinsky a job and suggested no 
     date by which Ms. Lewinsky had to be hired. The first person 
     Mr. Jordan contacted, Mr. Georgescu of Young & Rubicam/
     Burson-Marsteller, told investigators that Mr. Jordan did not 
     engage in a ``sales pitch'' for Lewinsky. Supp. at 1222 
     (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). Mr. Georgescu told Mr. Jordan 
     that the company ``would take a look at [Ms. Lewinsky] in the 
     usual way,'' Supp. at 1219 (Georgescu FBI 302 1/29/98), and 
     that once the initial interview was set up, Ms. Lewinsky 
     would be ``on [her] own from that point.'' Supp. at 1222 
     (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). The executive who interviewed 
     Ms. Lewinsky at Burson-Marsteller stated that Ms. Lewinsky's 
     recruitment process went ``by the book'' and, ``while 
     somewhat accelerated,'' the process ``went through the normal 
     steps.'' Supp. at 111 (Berk FBI 302 3/31/98).
       At American Express, Mr. Jordan contacted Ms. Ursula 
     Fairbairn, who stated that Mr. Jordan exerted ``no . . . 
     pressure'' to hire Lewinsky. Supp. at 1087 (Fairbairn FBI 302 
     2/4/98). Indeed, she considered it ``not unusual for board 
     members'' like Mr. Jordan to recommend talented people for 
     employment and noted that Mr. Jordan had recently recommended 
     another person just a few months earlier. Id. The person who 
     interviewed Ms. Lewinsky stated that he felt ``absolutely no 
     pressure'' to hire her and indeed told her she did not have 
     the qualifications necessary for the position. Supp. at 3521 
     (Schick FBI 302 1/29/98).
       Perhaps most telling of the absence of pressure applied by 
     Mr. Jordan is the fact that neither Young & Rubicam/Burson-
     Marsteller or American Express offered Ms. Lewinsky a job.
       Similarly, at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon, where Ms. 
     Lewinsky ultimately was offered a job (see below), Mr. Jordan 
     initially contacted Mr. Halperin, who has stated that it was 
     not unusual for Mr. Jordan to make an employment 
     recommendation. Supp. at 1281 (Halperin FBI 302 1/26/98). 
     Moreover, he emphasized that Mr. Jordan did not ``ask [him] 
     to work on any particular timetable,'' Supp. at 1294 
     (Halperin GJ 4/23/98), and that ``there was no implied time 
     constraint or requirement for fast action.'' Supp. at 1286 
     (Halperin FBI 3/27/98.)
       (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment 
           offer
       The Committee Report attempts to conflate separate and 
     unrelated acts--the signing of the affidavit and the Revlon 
     job offer--to sustain its otherwise unsustainable obstruction 
     theory. The Committee Report's description of these events is 
     deftly misleading:

       ``The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false 
     affidavit. She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that 
     same day. She did this so that Mr. Jordan could report to 
     President Clinton that it had been signed and another mission 
     had been accomplished.

[[Page S207]]

       On January 8, Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. 
     Jordan with MacAndrews & Forbes in New York. The interview 
     went poorly. Afterwards, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and 
     informed him. Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing from early 
     November to mid-December, then called the chief executive 
     officer of MacAndrews & Forbes, Ron Perelman, to ``make 
     things happen, if they could happen.'' Mr. Jordan called Ms. 
     Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. That evening, 
     MacAndrews & Forbes called Ms. Lewinsky and told her that she 
     would be given more interviews the next morning.
       The next morning, Ms. Lewinsky received her reward for 
     signing the false affidavit. After a series of interviews 
     with MacAndrews & Forbes personnel, she was informally 
     offered a job. Committee Report at 18 (citations omitted).

       By this portrayal, the Committee Report suggests two 
     conclusions: first, that Ms. Lewinsky was ``reward[ed]'' with 
     a job for her signing of the affidavit; second, that the only 
     reason Ms. Lewinsky was given a second interview and 
     ultimately hired at Revlon was Mr. Jordan's intervention with 
     Mr. Perelman. Once again, both conclusions are demonstrably 
     false.
       Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky have testified under oath that 
     there was no causal connection between the job search and the 
     affidavit. The only person to draw (or, actually, recommend) 
     any such linkage was Ms. Tripp. The factual record easily 
     debunks the second insinuation--that Ms. Lewinsky was hired 
     as a direct result of Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman. One 
     fact is virtually dispositive: the Revlon executive who 
     scheduled Ms. Lewinsky's January 9 interview and decided to 
     hire her that same day never even knew about Mr. Jordan's 
     call to Mr. Perelman, or any interest Mr. Perelman might have 
     in Ms. Lewinsky, and thus could not have been acting in 
     furtherance of such a plan.
       Ms. Lewinsky initially interviewed with Mr. Halperin of 
     MacAndrews & Forbes (Revlon's parent company) on December 18, 
     1997. (Mr. Jordan had spoken with Mr. Halperin on December 
     11.) Prior to interviewing Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin 
     forwarded a copy of her resume to Mr. Jaymie Durnan, also of 
     MacAndrews & Forbes, for his consideration. Supp. at 1286-87 
     (Halperin FBI 302 3/27/98). Following his interview of Ms. 
     Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin thought that she would likely be 
     ``shipped to Revlon'' for consideration. Id.
       Mr. Durnan received Ms. Lewinsky's resume from Mr. Halperin 
     in mid-December and, after reviewing it, decided to interview 
     Ms. Lewinsky after the first of the year. (He was going on 
     vocation the last two weeks of December). Supp. at 1053 
     (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). When he returned from vacation, his 
     assistant scheduled an interview with Ms. Lewinsky for 
     January 7, 1998, but, because of scheduling problems, he 
     rescheduled the interview for the next day, January 8, 1998. 
     Supp. at 1049 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Durnan's decision 
     to interview Ms. Lewinsky was made independently of the 
     decision by Mr. Halperin to interview her. Indeed, only when 
     Mr. Durnan interviewed Ms. Lewinsky in January did he 
     discover that she had had a December interview with Mr. 
     Halperin. Id.
       It was this interview with Mr. Durnan that Ms. Lewinsky 
     later described as having gone poorly in her view. App. at 
     926 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The House Managers (``[t]he 
     interview went poorly,'' House Br. at 38), the Committee 
     Report (``The interview went poorly'', id. at 21), and the 
     OIC Referral (``The interview went poorly,'' id. at 184) all 
     emphasize only Ms. Lewinsky's impression of the job 
     interview--for obvious reasons: it tends to heighten the 
     supposed relevance of the Jordan call to Mr. Perelman. In 
     other words, under this theory, Ms. Lewinsky had no prospect 
     of a job at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon until Mr. Jordan 
     resurrected her chances with Mr. Perelman.
       Unfortunately, like so much other ``evidence'' in the 
     obstruction case, the facts do not bear out this sinister 
     theory. Mr. Durnan had no similar impression that his 
     interview with Ms. Lewinsky had gone ``poorly.'' In fact, 
     just the opposite was true: he was ``impressed'' with Ms. 
     Lewinsky and thought that she would ``fit in'' with 
     MacAndrews & Forbes but ``there was nothing available at that 
     time which suited her interests.'' Supp. at 1054 (Durnan FBI 
     302 3/27/98). Mr. Durnan therefore decided to forward Ms. 
     Lewinsky's resume to Ms. Allyn Seidman of Revlon. After the 
     interview, he called Ms. Seidman and left her a voicemail 
     message about his interview with Ms. Lewinsky and explained 
     that, while there was no current opening at MacAndrews & 
     Forbes, ``perhaps there was something available at Revlon.'' 
     Id.
       In the meantime, Mr. Jordan had called Mr. Perelman about 
     Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Perelman described this conversation as 
     ``very low key and casual.'' Supp. at 3273 (Perelman FBI 302 
     1/26/98). Mr. Jordan ``made no specific requests and did not 
     request'' him ``to intervene''; nonetheless, Mr. Perelman 
     agreed to ``look into it.'' Id. Later that day, Mr. Durnan 
     spoke to Mr. Perelman, who mentioned that he had received a 
     call from Mr. Jordan about a job candidate. Mr. Perelman told 
     Mr. Durnan ``let's see what we can do,'' Supp. at 3276 
     (Perelman FBI 302 3/27/98), but Mr. Durnan never concluded 
     that hiring Ms. Lewinsky was ``mandatory.'' Supp. at 1055 
     (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. Perelman later called Mr. 
     Jordan and said they would do what they could; Mr. Jordan 
     expressed no urgency to Mr. Perelman. Supp. at 3276 (Perelman 
     FBI 302 3/27/98).
       By the time Mr. Durnan had discussed Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. 
     Perelman, he had already forwarded her resume to Ms. Seidman 
     at Revlon. Supp. at 1049-50 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). After 
     speaking with Mr. Perelman, Mr. Durnan spoke with Ms. 
     Seidman, following up on the voicemail message he had left 
     earlier that day. Supp. at 1055 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). 
     Upon speaking to Ms. Seidman about Ms. Lewinsky, however, Mr. 
     Durnan did not tell Ms. Seidman that CEO Perelman has 
     expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky. Id. Rather, he simply 
     said that if she liked Ms. Lewinsky, she should hire her. 
     Supp. at 1050 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98).
       For her part, Ms. Seidman has testified that she had no 
     idea that Mr. Perelman had expressed interest in Ms. 
     Lewinsky:

       Q: Did [Mr. Durnan] indicate to you that he had spoken to 
     anyone else within MacAndrews or Revlon about Monica 
     Lewinsky?
       A: Not that I recall, no.
       Q: Do you have knowledge as to whether or not Mr. Perelman 
     spoke with anyone either on the MacAndrews & Forbes side or 
     the Revlon side about Monica Lewinsky?
       A: No.

     Supp. at 3642 (Seidman Depo. 4/23/98). Rather, Ms. Seidman's 
     consideration of Ms. Lewinsky proceeded on the merits. 
     Indeed, as a result of the interview, Ms. Seidman concluded 
     that Ms. Lewinsky was ``bright, articulate and polished,'' 
     Supp. at 3635 (Seidman FBI 302 1/26/98), and ``a talented, 
     enthusiastic, bright young woman'' who would be a ``good fit 
     in [her] department.'' Supp. at 3643 (Seidman Depo. 4/23/98). 
     She decided after the interview to hire Ms. Lewinsky, and 
     thereafter called Mr. Durnan ``and told him I thought she was 
     great,'' Id.
       In sum, Ms. Seidman made the decision to grant an interview 
     and hire Ms. Lewinsky on the merits. She did not even know 
     that Mr. Perelman had expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky 
     or that Mr. Jordan had spoken to Mr. Perelman the day before. 
     As amply demonstrated, the House Managers' Jordan-Perelman 
     intervention theory just doesn't hold water.
       d. Conclusion
       From the preceding discussion of the factual record, two 
     conclusions are inescapable. First, there is simply no direct 
     evidence to support the job-for-silence obstruction theory. 
     From her initial proffer to the last minutes of her grand 
     jury appearance, the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky has been clear 
     and consistent: she was never asked or encouraged to lie or 
     promised a job for her silence or for a favorable affidavit. 
     Mr. Jordan has been equally unequivocal on this point. 
     Second, the ``chain of events'' circumstantial case upon 
     which this obstruction allegation must rest falls apart after 
     inspection of the full evidentiary record. Ms. Lewinsky's job 
     search began on her own volition and long before she was ever 
     a witness in the Jones case. Mr. Jordan's assistance 
     originated with a request from Ms. Currie, which had no 
     connection to events in the Jones litigation. No pressure was 
     applied to anyone at any time. And Ms. Lewinsky's ultimate 
     hiring had absolutely no connection to her signing of the 
     affidavit in the Jones case. Viewed on this unambiguous 
     record, the job-search allegations are plainly unsupportable.
     5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his 
         attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
         Federal judge'' concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
       Article II (5) charges that the President engaged in an 
     obstruction of justice because he ``did not say anything'' 
     during his Jones deposition when his attorney cited the 
     Lewinsky affidavit to Judge Wright and stated that ``there is 
     no sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form.'' Committee 
     Report at 72. The rationale underlying this charge of 
     obstruction of justice hinges on an odd combination of a 
     bizarrely heightened legal obligation, a disregard of the 
     actual record testimony, and a good does of amateur 
     psychology. This claim is factually and legally baseless.
       The law, of course, imposes no obligation on a client to 
     monitor every statement and representation made by his or her 
     lawyer. Particularly in the confines of an ongoing civil 
     deposition, where clients are routinely counseled to focus on 
     the questions posed of them and their responses and ignore 
     all distractions, it is totally inappropriate to try to 
     remove a President from office because of a statement by his 
     attorney. Indeed, the President forcefully explained to the 
     grand jury that he was not focusing on the exchange between 
     lawyers but instead concentrating on his own testimony:
        ``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what 
     he was saying. I was thinking, I was ready to get on with my 
     testimony here and they were having these constant 
     discussions all through the deposition.'' App. at 476;
        ``I was not paying a great deal of attention to 
     this exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.'' App. at 
     510;
        ``I'm quite sure that I didn't follow all the 
     interchanges between the lawyers all that carefully.'' App. 
     at 510;
        ``I am not even sure that when Mr. Bennett made 
     that statement that I was concentrating on the exact words he 
     used.'' App. at 511;
        ``When I was in there, I didn't think about my 
     lawyers. I was, frankly, thinking about myself and my 
     testimony and trying to answer the questions.'' App. at 512;
        ``I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that 
     went on. I was waiting for my instructions as a witness to go 
     forward. I was

[[Page S208]]

     worried about my own testimony.'' App. at 513.
       The Committee Report ignores the President's repeated and 
     consistent description of his state of mind during the 
     deposition exchange. Instead, the Committee Report and 
     majority counsel's final presentation undertake a novel 
     exercise in video psychology, claiming that by studying the 
     President's facial expressions and by noting that he was 
     ``looking in Mr. Bennett's direction' during the exchange, it 
     necessarily follows that the President was in fact listening 
     to and concentrating on every single word uttered by his 
     attorney \108\ and knowingly made a decision not to correct 
     his attorney.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \108\ It is upon this same fanciful methodology that the 
     Committee Report premises the allegation of Article I (3) 
     that the President lied to the grand jury in providing these 
     responses. Citing the President's oft-criticized response 
     about Mr. Bennett's use of the present tense in his statement 
     ``there is no sex of any'' (``It depends on what the meaning 
     of the word `is' is.'' App. at 510), the Committee Report 
     claims that such parsing contradicts the President's claim 
     that he was not paying close attention to the exchange. But 
     contrary to the Committee Report's suggestion, the 
     President's response to this question did not purport to 
     describe the President's contemporaneous thinking at the 
     deposition, but rather only in retrospect whether he agreed 
     with the questioner that it was ``an utterly false 
     statement.'' Id. The President later emphasized that he 
     ``wasn't trying to give . . . a cute answer'' in his earlier 
     explanation, but rather only that the average person thinking 
     in the present tense would likely consider that Mr. Bennett's 
     statement was accurate since the relationship had ended long 
     ago. App. at 513.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The futility of such an exercise is manifest. It is 
     especially unsettling when set against the President's 
     adamant denials that he harbored any contemporaneous or 
     meaningful realization of his attorney's colloquy with the 
     Judge. The theory is factually flimsy, legally unfounded, and 
     should be rejected.
     6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by 
         relating ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a 
         potential witness,'' Betty Currie, ``in order to 
         corruptly influence [her] testimony''
       There is no dispute that the President met with his 
     secretary, Ms. Currie, on the day after his Jones deposition 
     and discussed questions he had been asked about Ms. Lewinsky. 
     The Managers cast this conversation in the most sinister 
     light possible and alleges that the President attempted to 
     influence the testimony of a ``witness'' by pressuring Ms. 
     Currie to agree with an inaccurate version of facts about Ms. 
     Lewinsky. The Managers claim that ``the President essentially 
     admitted to making these statements when he knew they were 
     not true.'' House Br. at 47. That is totally false. The 
     President admitted nothing of the sort and the Managers cite 
     nothing in support. The President has adamantly denied that 
     he had any intention to influence Ms. Currie's recollection 
     of events or her testimony in any manner. The absence of any 
     such intention is further fortified by the undisputed factual 
     record establishing that to the President's knowledge, Ms. 
     Currie was neither an actual nor contemplated witness in the 
     Jones litigation at the time of the conversation. And 
     critically, Ms. Currie testified that, during the 
     conversation, she did not perceive any pressure 
     ``whatsoever'' to agree with any statement made by the 
     President.
       The President's actions could not as a matter of law 
     support this allegation. To obstruct a proceeding or tamper 
     with a witness, there must be both a known proceeding and a 
     known witness. In the proceeding that the President certainly 
     knew about--the Jones case--Ms. Currie was neither an actual 
     nor prospective witness. As for the only proceeding in which 
     Ms. Currie ultimately became a witness--the OIC 
     investigation--no one asserts the President could have known 
     it existed at that time.
       At the time of the January 18 conversation.\109\ Ms. Currie 
     was not a witness in the Jones case, as even Mr. Starr 
     acknowledged: ``The evidence is not that she was on the 
     witness list, and we have never said that she was.'' 
     Transcript of November 19, 1998 Testimony at 192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \109\ Ms. Currie remembers a second conversation similar in 
     substance a few days after the January 18 discussion, but 
     still in advance of the public disclosure of this matter on 
     January 21, 1998. Supp. at 561 (Currie GJ 1/27/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Nor was there any reason to suspect Ms. Currie would play 
     any role in the Jones case. The discovery period was, at the 
     time of this conversation, in its final days, and a 
     deposition of Ms. Currie scheduled and completed within that 
     deadline would have been highly unlikely.
       Just as the President could not have intended to influence 
     the testimony of ``witness'' Betty Currie because she was 
     neither an actual nor a prospective witness, so too is it 
     equally clear that the President never pressured Ms. Currie 
     to alter her recollection. Such lack of real or perceived 
     pressure also fatally undercuts this charge. Despite the 
     prosecutor's best efforts to coax Ms. Currie into saying she 
     was pressured to agree with the President's statements, Ms. 
     Currie adamantly denied any such pressure. As she testified:

       Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you 
     testified the President made to you that were presented as 
     statements, did you feel pressured when he told you those 
     statements?
       A: None whatsoever.
       Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind 
     about what he was doing?
       A: At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word 
     shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just 
     talking.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Q: That was your impression, that he wanted you to say--
     because he would end each of the statements with ``Right?'', 
     with a question.
       A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He 
     would say ``Right'' and I could have said. ``Wrong.''
       Q: But he would end each of those questions with a 
     ``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or 
     not true?
       A: Correct.
       Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
       A: None.

     Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). Ms. Currie explained that 
     she felt no pressure because she basically agreed with the 
     President's statements:

       Q: You testified with respect to the statements as the 
     President made them, and, in particular, the four statements 
     that we've already discussed. You felt at the time that they 
     were technically accurate? Is that a fair assessment of your 
     testimony?
       A: That's a fair assessment.
       Q: But you suggested that at the time. Have you changed 
     your opinion about it in retrospect?
       A: I have not changed my opinion, no.

     Supp. at 667 (Currie GJ 7/22/98); see also Supp. at 534 
     (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98) (``Currie advised that she responded 
     ``right'' to each of the statements because as far as she 
     knew, the statements were basically right.''); Supp. at 665 
     (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (``I said `Right' to him because I 
     thought they were correct, `Right, you were never really 
     alone with Monica, right' '').
       What, then, to make of this conversation if there was no 
     effort to influence Ms. Currie's testimony? Well, to 
     understand fully the dynamic, one must remove the memory of 
     all that has transpired since January 21 and place oneself in 
     the President's position after the Jones deposition. The 
     President had just faced unexpectedly detailed questions 
     about Ms. Lewinsky. The questions addressed, at times, minute 
     details and at other times contained bizarre inaccuracies 
     about the relationship. As the President candidly admitted in 
     his grand jury testimony, he had long thought the day would 
     come when his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky would become 
     public:

       ``I formed an opinion early in 1996, once I got into this 
     unfortunate and wrong conduct, that when it stopped, which I 
     knew I'd have to do and which I should have done long before 
     I did, that she would talk about it. Not because Monica 
     Lewinsky is a bad person. She's basically a good girl. She's 
     a good young woman with a good heart and a good mind. . . . 
     But I knew that the minute there was no longer any contact, 
     she would talk about this. She would have to. She couldn't 
     help it. It was, it was part of her psyche.''

     App. at 575-76 (emphasis added). Now, with the questioning 
     about Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case and the publication of 
     the first internet report article about Ms. Lewinsky, the 
     President knew that a media storm was about to erupt. And 
     erupt it did.
       So it was hardly surprising that the President reached out 
     to Ms. Currie at this time. He was trying to gather all 
     available information and assess the political and personal 
     consequences that this revelation would soon have. Though he 
     did not confide fully in Ms. Currie, he knew Ms. Currie was 
     Ms. Lewinsky's main contact and thus could have additional 
     relevant information to help him assess and respond to the 
     impending media scrutiny. As the President testified:

       ``I do not remember how many times I talked to Betty Currie 
     or when. I don't. I can't possibly remember that. I do 
     remember, when I first heard about this story breaking, 
     trying to ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain 
     what Betty's perception was. I remember that I was highly 
     agitated, understandably, I think.''

     App. at 593. And further, ``[W]hat I was trying to determine 
     was whether my recollection was right and that she was always 
     in the office complex when Monica was there. . . . I thought 
     what would happen is that it would break in the press, and I 
     was trying to get the facts down.'' App. at 507-08 (emphasis 
     added). As the President concluded: ``I was not trying to get 
     Betty Currie to say something that was untruthful. I was 
     trying to get as much information as quickly as I could.'' 
     App. at 508.
       Ms. Currie's grand jury testimony confirms the President's 
     ``agitated'' state of mind and information-gathering purpose 
     for the discussion. She testified that the President 
     appeared, in her words, to be ``shocked or surprised that 
     this was an issue, and he was just talking.'' Supp. at 668 
     (Currie GJ 7/22/98). She described the President's remarks as 
     ``both statements and questions at the same time.'' Supp. at 
     534 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98).
       Finally, the inference that the President intended to 
     influence Ms. Currie's testimony before she ever became a 
     witness is firmly undercut by the advice the President gave 
     to her when she ultimately did become a witness in the OIC 
     investigation:

       ``And then I remember when I knew she was going to have to 
     testify to the grand jury, and I, I felt terrible because she 
     had been through this loss of her sister, this horrible 
     accident Christmas that killed her

[[Page S209]]

     brother, and her mother was in the hospital. I was trying to 
     do--to make her understand that I didn't want her to, to be 
     untruthful to the grand jury. And if her memory was different 
     than mine, it was fine, just go in there and tell them what 
     she thought. So, that's all I remember.''

     App. at 593; see also App. at 508 (``I think Ms. Currie would 
     also testify that I explicitly told her, once I realized you 
     were involved in the Jones case--you, the Office of 
     Independent Counsel--and that she might have to be called as 
     a witness, that she should just go in there and tell the 
     truth, tell what she knew, and be perfectly 
     truthful.'').\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \110\ Only groundless speculation and unfounded inferences 
     support the Committee Report's mirror allegation of Article I 
     (4) that the President lied to the grand jury when he 
     described his motivation in discussing these matters with Ms. 
     Currie. That allegation should be rejected for the same 
     reasons discussed more fully in the text of this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In sum, neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the 
     President--the only two participants in this conversation--
     supports the inference that the conversation had an insidious 
     purpose. The undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Currie was 
     neither an actual nor contemplated witness in the Jones case. 
     And when Ms. Currie did ultimately become a witness in the 
     Starr investigation, the President told her to tell the 
     truth, which she did.
     7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he 
         relayed allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to 
         his aides
       This final allegation of Article II should be rejected out 
     of hand. The President has admitted misleading his family, 
     his staff, and the Nation about his relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, and he has expressed his profound regret for such 
     conduct. But this Article asserts that the President should 
     be impeached and removed from office because he failed to be 
     candid with his friends and aides about the nature of his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. These allegedly impeachable 
     denials took place in the immediate aftermath of the Lewinsky 
     publicity--at the very time the President was denying any 
     improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in nearly identical 
     terms on national television. Having made this announcement 
     to the whole country on television, it is simply absurd to 
     believe that he was somehow attempting corruptly to influence 
     the testimony of aides when he told them virtually the same 
     thing at the same time.\111\ Rather, the evidence 
     demonstrates that the President spoke with these individuals 
     regarding the allegations because of the longstanding 
     professional and personal relationships he shared with them 
     and the corresponding responsibility he felt to address their 
     concerns once the allegations were aired. The Managers point 
     to no evidence--for there is none--that the President spoke 
     to these individuals for any other reason, and certainly not 
     that he spoke with them intending to obstruct any 
     proceeding.\112\ They simply assert that since he knew there 
     was an investigation, his intent had to be that they relate 
     his remarks to the investigators and grand jurors. House Br. 
     at 80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \111\ As the Supreme Court has held, to constitute 
     obstruction of justice such actions must be taken `'with an 
     intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings.'' 
     United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 592, 599 (1995).
     \112\ The Committee Reports's allegation under Article I (4) 
     that the President committed perjury before the grand jury 
     when, in the course of admitting that he misled his close 
     aides, he stated that he endeavored to say to his aides 
     ``things that were true,'' App. at 557-60, without disclosing 
     the full nature of the relationship is simply bizarre.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       However, there is no allegation that the President 
     attempted to influence these aides' testimony about their own 
     personal knowledge or observations. Nor is there any evidence 
     that the President knew any of these aides would ultimately 
     be witnesses in the grand jury when he spoke with them. None 
     was under subpoena at the time the denials took place and 
     none had any independent knowledge of any sexual activity 
     between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, the only 
     evidence these witnesses could offer on this score was the 
     hearsay repetition of the same public denials that the 
     members of the grand jury likely heard on their home 
     television sets. Under the strained theory of this article, 
     every person who heard the President's public denial could 
     have been called to the grand jury to create still additional 
     obstructions of justice.
       To bolster this otherwise unsupportable charge, the 
     Managers point to an excerpt of the President's testimony 
     wherein he acknowledged that, to the extent he shared with 
     anyone any details of the facts of his relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, they could conceivably be called before the grand 
     jury--which for the sake of his friends the President wanted 
     to avoid:

       ``I think I was quite careful what I said after [January 
     21]. I may have said something to all of these people to that 
     effect [denying an improper relationship], but I'll also--
     whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't 
     want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give 
     you information that could get you in trouble. I just 
     wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about 
     this.''

     App. at 647. The point was not that the President believed 
     these people would be witnesses and so decided to mislead 
     them, but rather that he decided to provide as little 
     information as possible (consistent with his perceived 
     obligation to address their legitimate concerns) in order to 
     keep them from becoming witnesses solely because of what he 
     told them.
       In conclusion, this Article fails as a matter of law and as 
     a matter of common sense. It should be soundly rejected.

      VI. The Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a 
                      Constitutionally Sound Vote

       The Constitution prescribes a strict and exacting standard 
     for the removal of a popularly elected President. Because 
     each of the two articles charges multiple unspecified wrongs, 
     each is unconstitutionally flawed in two independent 
     respects.
       First, by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the 
     House of Representatives has made it impossible for the 
     Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandate that any 
     conviction be by the concurrence of two-thirds of the 
     members. Since Senate Rules require that an entire article be 
     voted as a unit, sixty-seven Senators could conceivably vote 
     to convict while in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong 
     committed--for example, they could completely disagree on 
     what statement they believe is false--in direct violation of 
     the Constitutional requirements of ``Concurrence'' and due 
     process.
       Second, by charging perjury without identifying a single 
     allegedly perjurious statement, and charging obstruction of 
     justice without identifying a single allegedly obstructive 
     action by the President, the House of Representatives has 
     failed to inform the Senate either of the statements it 
     agreed were perjurious (if it agreed), or of the actual 
     conduct by the President that it agreed constituted 
     obstruction of justice (again, if it agreed). The result is 
     that the President does not have the most basic notice of the 
     charges against him required by due process and fundamental 
     fairness. He is not in a position to defend against anything 
     other than a moving target. The guesswork involved even in 
     identifying the charges to be addressed in this Trial 
     Memorandum highlights just how flawed the articles are.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \113\ The House Managers cannot constitutionally unbundle the 
     charges in the articles or provide the missing specifics. 
     This is because the Constitution provides that only the House 
     of Representatives can amend articles of impeachment, and 
     judicial precedent demonstrates that unduly vague indictments 
     cannot be cured by a prosecutor providing a bill of 
     particulars. Only the charging body--here, the House--can 
     particularize an impermissibly vague charge.
     Indeed, Senate precedent confirms that the entire House must 
     grant particulars when articles of impeachment are not 
     sufficiently specific for a fair trial. During the 1933 
     impeachment trial of Judge Harold Louderback, counsel for the 
     Judge filed a motion to make the original Article V, the 
     omnibus or ``catchall'' article, more definite. 77 Cong Rec. 
     1852, 1854 (1933). The House Managers unanimously consented 
     to the motion, which they considered to be akin to a motion 
     for a bill of particulars, and the full House amended Article 
     V to provide the requested specifics. Id. Thereafter, the 
     Clerk of the House informed the Senate that the House had 
     adopted an amendment to Article V. Id. Judge Louderback was 
     then tried on the amended article. Judge Louderback was 
     subsequently acquitted on all five articles. Impeachment of 
     Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Report by 
     Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on the 
     Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix B at 55 (Feb. 1974).
     The power to define and approve articles of impeachment is 
     vested by the Constitution exclusively in the House of 
     Representatives. U.S. Const. Art I, Sec. 2, cl. 5. It follows 
     that any alteration of an Article of Impeachment can be 
     performed only by the House. The House cannot delegate (and 
     has not delegated) to the Managers the authority to amend or 
     alter the Articles, and Senate precedent demonstrates that 
     only the House (not the Managers unilaterally) can effect an 
     amendment to articles of impeachment.
     Case law is consistent with this precedent. When indictments 
     are unconstitutionally vague, they cannot be cured by a 
     prosecutor's provision of a bill of particulars, because only 
     the charging body can elaborate upon vague charges. As the 
     Supreme Court noted in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 
     749, 771 (1962):
     ``It is argued that any deficiency in the indictments in 
     these cases could have been cured by bills of particulars. 
     But it is a settled rule that a bill of particular cannot 
     save an invalid indictment . . . To allow the prosecutor, or 
     the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the 
     minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the 
     indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection 
     which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was 
     designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted 
     on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even 
     presented to, the grand jury which indicted him. This 
     underlying principle is reflected by the settled rule in the 
     federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except 
     by resubmission to the grand jury. . . .''
     See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 214, 216 
     (1960) quoting Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (``If it lies 
     within the province of a court to charging part to an 
     indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have 
     been or what they grand jury would probably have made it if 
     their attention had been called to suggested changes, the 
     great importance which the common law attaches to an 
     indictment by a grand jury . . . may be frittered away until 
     its value is almost destroyed.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The result is a pair of articles whose structure does not 
     permit a constitutionally sound vote to convict. If they were 
     counts in an indictment, these articles would not survive a 
     motion to dismiss. Under the unique circumstances of an 
     impeachment trial, they should fail:


  A. The Articles Are Both Unfairly Complex and Lacking in Specificity

       A cursory review of the articles demonstrates that they 
     each allege multiple and unspecified acts of wrongdoing.
     1. The Structure of Article I
       Article I accuses the President of numerous different 
     wrongful actions. The introductory paragraph charges the 
     President with (i) violating his constitutional oath 
     faithfully to execute his office and defend the

[[Page S210]]

     Constitution; (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take 
     care that the laws be faithfully executed; (iii) willfully 
     corrupting and manipulating the judicial process; and (iv) 
     impeding the administration of justice.
       The second paragraph charges the President with (a) 
     perjurious, (b) false, and (c) misleading testimony to the 
     grand jury concerning ``one or more'' of four different 
     subject areas:
       (1) the nature and details of this relationship with a 
     subordinate government employee;
       (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he 
     gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him;
       (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his 
     attorney to make to a federal judge in that action;
       (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
     witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that 
     civil rights action.
       The third paragraph alleges that, as a consequence of the 
     foregoing, the President has, to the manifest injury of the 
     people of the United States:
        undermined the integrity of his office;
        brought disrepute on the Presidency;
        betrayed his trust as President; and
        acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law 
     and justice.
       It is imperative to note that although Article I alleges 
     ``perjurious, false and misleading'' testimony concerning 
     ``one or more'' of four general subject areas, it does not 
     identify the particular sworn statements by the President 
     that were allegedly ``perjurious,'' (and therefore 
     potentially illegal), or ``false'' or ``misleading'' (and 
     therefore not unlawful). In fact, contrary to the most basic 
     rules of fairness and due process, Article I does not 
     identify a single specific statement that is at issue.
       In sum, Article I appears to charge the President with four 
     general forms of wrongdoing (violations of two oaths, 
     manipulation of legal process, impeding justice), involving 
     three (perjurious, false, misleading) distinct types of 
     statements, concerning different subjects (relationship to 
     Ms. Lewinsky, prior deposition testimony, prior statements of 
     his attorney, obstruction of justice),\114\ resulting in four 
     species of harms either to the Presidency (undermining its 
     integrity, bringing it into disrepute) or to the people 
     (acting in a manner subversive of the rule of law and to the 
     manifest injury of the people). And it alleges all of this 
     without identifying a single, specific perjurious, false or 
     misleading statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \114\ It appears that each of these topic areas includes 
     various, unspecified allegedly perjurious, false and 
     misleading statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Absent a clear statement of which statements are alleged to 
     have been perjurious, and which specific acts are alleged to 
     have been undertaken with the purpose of obstructing the 
     administration of justice, it is impossible to prepare a 
     defense. It is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence that 
     an accused must be afforded notice of the specific charges 
     against which he must defend. Neither the Referral of the 
     Office of the Independent Counsel, nor the Committee Report 
     of the Judiciary Committee, nor the House Managers' Trial 
     Memorandum was adopted by the House, and none of them can 
     provide the necessary particulars. It is impossible to know 
     whether the different statements and acts charged in the 
     Referral, or the Report, or the Trial Memorandum, or all, or 
     none, are what the House had in mind when it passed the 
     Articles.
     2. The Structure of Article II
       Article II accuses the President of a variety of wrongful 
     acts. The introductory paragraph charges the President with 
     (i) violating his constitutional oath faithfully to execute 
     his office and defend the Constitution and (ii) violating his 
     constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
     executed by (iii) preventing, obstructing and impeding the 
     administration of justice by engaging (personally and through 
     subordinates and agents) in a scheme designed to delay, 
     impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and 
     testimony related to a Federal civil rights action.
       The second paragraph specifies the various ways in which 
     the violations in the first paragraph are said to have 
     occurred. It states that the harm was effectuated by 
     ``means'' that are not expressly defined or delimited, but 
     rather are said to include ``one or more'' of seven ``acts'' 
     attributed to the President:
       (1) corruptly encouraging a witness to execute a 
     perjurious, false and misleading affidavit;
       (2) corruptly encouraging a witness to give perjurious, 
     false and misleading testimony if called to testify;
       (3) corruptly engaging in, encouraging or supporting a 
     scheme to conceal evidence;
       (4) intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure job 
     assistance to a witness in order to corruptly prevent the 
     truthful testimony of that witness at a time when that 
     witness's truthful testimony would have been harmful;
       (5) allowing his attorney to make false and misleading 
     statements to a federal judge in order to prevent relevant 
     questioning;
       (6) relating a false and misleading account of events to a 
     potential witness in a civil rights action in order to 
     corruptly influence the testimony of that person;
       (7) making false and misleading statements to potential 
     witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to 
     corruptly influence their testimony and causing the grand 
     jury to receive false and misleading information.
       The third paragraph alleges that, as a result of the 
     foregoing, the President has, to the manifest injury of the 
     people of the United States:
        undermined the integrity of his office;
        brought disrepute on the Presidency;
        betrayed his trust as President; and
        acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law 
     and justice.
       As with the first article, Article II does not set forth a 
     single specific act alleged to have been performed by the 
     President. Instead, it alleges general ``encourage[ment]'' to 
     execute a false affidavit, provide misleading testimony, and 
     conceal subpoenaed evidence. This Article also includes 
     general allegations that the President undertook to 
     ``corruptly influence'' and/or ``corruptly prevent'' the 
     testimony of potential witnesses and that he ``engaged in . . 
     . or supported'' a scheme to conceal evidence. Again, the 
     Senate and the President have been left to guess at the 
     charges (if any) actually agreed upon by the House.


   b. conviction on these articles would violate the constitutional 
requirement that two-thirds of the senate reach agreement that specific 
                       wrongdoing has been proven

     1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in 
         Violation of the Constitution's Requirements of 
         Concurrence and Due Process
       a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds 
           Concurrence Requirement
       Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that ``no 
     person shall be convicted [on articles of impeachment] 
     without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members 
     present.'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3, cl. 6. The 
     Constitution's requirement is plain. These must be 
     ``Concurrence,'' which is to say genuine, reliably 
     manifested, agreement, among those voting to convict. Both 
     the committing of this task to the Senate and the two-thirds 
     requirement are important constitutional safeguards 
     reflecting the Framers' intent that conviction not come 
     easily. Conviction demands real and objectively verifiable 
     agreement among a substantial supermajority.
       Indeed, the two-thirds supermajority requirement is a 
     crucial constitutional safeguard. Supermajority provisions 
     are constitutional exceptions \115\ to the presumption that 
     decisions by legislative bodies shall be made by majority 
     rule.\116\ These exceptions serve exceptional ends. The two-
     thirds concurrence rule serves the indispensable purpose of 
     protecting the people who chose the President by election. By 
     giving a ``veto'' to a minority of Senators, the Framers 
     sought to ensure the rights of an electoral majority--and to 
     safeguard the people in their choice of Executive. Only the 
     Senate and only the requirement of a two-thirds concurrence 
     could provide that assurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \115\ See e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2 (two thirds 
     vote required to override Presidential veto); U.S. Const. 
     Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2 (two thirds required for ratification 
     of treaties); U.S. Const. Art. V (two thirds required to 
     propose constitutional amendments); U.S. Const. Art. I, 
     Sec. 5, cl. 2 (two thirds required to expel members of 
     Congress).
     \116\ Madison referred to majority voting as ``the 
     fundamental principal of free government.'' Federalist No. 58 
     at 248 (G. Wills ed. 1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The ``Concurrence'' required is agreement that the charges 
     stated in specific articles have in fact been proved, and the 
     language of those articles is therefore critical. Since the 
     House of Representatives is vested with the ``sole Power of 
     Impeachment,'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5, the form of 
     those articles cannot be altered by the Senate. And Rule 
     XXIII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate 
     when Sitting on Impeachment Trials (``Senate Rules'') 
     provides that ``[a]n article of impeachment shall not be 
     divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time 
     during the trial.''
       It follows that each Senator may vote on an article only in 
     its totality. By the express terms of Article I, a Senator 
     may vote for impeachment if he or she finds that there was 
     perjurious, false and misleading testimony in any ``one or 
     more'' of four topic areas. But that prospect creates the 
     very real possibility that ``conviction'' could occur even 
     though fewer than two-thirds of the Senators actually agree 
     that any particular false statement was made.\117\ Put 
     differently, the article's structure presents the possibility 
     that the President could be convicted on Article I even 
     though he would have been acquitted if separate votes were 
     taken on individual allegedly perjurious statements. To 
     illustrate the point, consider that it would be possible for 
     conviction to result even with as few as seventeen Senators 
     agreeing that any single statement was perjurious, because 
     seventeen votes for one statement in each of four categories 
     would yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict. The 
     problem is even worse if Senators agree that there is a 
     single perjurious statement but completely disagree as to 
     which statement within the 176 pages of transcript they 
     believe is perjurious. Such an outcome would plainly violate 
     the Constitution's requirement that there be conviction only 
     when a two-thirds majority agrees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \117\ There remains the additional problem that the articles 
     allege not specific perjurious statements, but perjury within 
     a topic area. Perjury as to a category (rather than as to 
     specific statements) is an incomprehensible notion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The very same flaw renders Article II unconstitutional as 
     well. That Article alleges a

[[Page S211]]

     scheme of wrongdoing effected through ``means'' including 
     ``one or more'' of seven factually and logically discrete 
     ``acts.'' That compound structure is fraught with the 
     potential to confuse. For example, the Article alleges both 
     concealment of gifts on December 28, 1997, and false 
     statements to aides in late January 1998. These two 
     allegations involve completely different types of behavior. 
     They are alleged to have occurred in different months. They 
     involved different persons. And they are alleged to have 
     obstructed justice in different legal proceedings. In light 
     of Senate Rule XXIII's prohibition on dividing articles, the 
     combination of such patently different types of alleged 
     wrongdoing in a single article creates the manifest 
     possibility that votes for conviction on this article would 
     not reflect any two-third agreement whatsoever.
       The extraordinary problem posed by such compound articles 
     is well-recognized and was illustrated by the proceedings in 
     the impeachment of Judge Walter Nixon. Article III of the 
     Nixon proceedings, like the articles here, was phrased in the 
     disjunctive and charged multiple false statements as grounds 
     for impeachment. Judge Nixon moved to dismiss Article III on 
     a number of grounds, including on the basis of its compound 
     structure.\118\ Although that motion was defeated in the full 
     Senate by a vote of 34-63,\119\ the 34 Senators who voted to 
     dismiss were a sufficient number to block conviction on 
     Article III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \118\ See Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on 
     the Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Walter L. Nixon, 
     Jr., Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 
     101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 257, 281-84 (1989).
     \119\ Judge Nixon Proceedings at 430-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Judge Nixon (although convicted on the first two articles) 
     was ultimately acquitted on Article III by a vote of 57 
     (guilty) to 40 (not guilty).\120\ Senator Biden, who voted 
     not guilty on the article, stated that the structure of the 
     article made it ``possible . . . for Judge Nixon to be 
     convicted under article III even though two-thirds of the 
     members present did not agree that he made any one of the 
     false statements.'' \121\ Senator Murkowski concurred: ``I 
     don't appreciate the omnibus nature of article III, and I 
     agree with the argument that the article could easily be used 
     to convict Judge Nixon by less than the super majority vote 
     required by the Constitution.'' Id. at 464.\122\ And Senator 
     Dole stated that ``Article III is redundant, complex and 
     unnecessarily confusing. . . . It alleges that Judge Nixon 
     committed five different offenses in connection with each of 
     fourteen separate events, a total of seventy charges. . . . 
     [I]t was virtually impossible for Judge Nixon and his 
     attorney's to prepare an adequate defense.'' \123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \120\ Id. at 435-36.
     \121\ Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., id. at 459.
     \122\ See also Statement of Senator Bailey, Impeachment of 
     Judge Harold Louderback, 77 Cong. Rec. 4238 (May 26, 1933) 
     (respondent should be tried on individual articles and not on 
     all of them assembled into one article).
     \123\ Statement of Senator Robert Dole, Judge Nixon 
     Proceedings at 457.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In his written statement filed after the voting was 
     completed, Senator Kohl pointed out the dangers posed by 
     combining multiple accusations in a single article:

       ``Article III is phrased in the disjunctive. It says that 
     Judge Nixon concealed his conversations through `one or more' 
     of 14 false statements.
       ``This wording presents a variety of problems. First of 
     all, it means that Judge Nixon can be convicted even if two 
     thirds of the Senate does not agree on which of his 
     particular statements were false. . . .
       ``The House is telling us that it's OK to convict Judge 
     Nixon on Article III even if we have different visions of 
     what he did wrong. But that's not fair to Judge Nixon, to the 
     Senate, or to the American people. Let's say we do convict on 
     Article III. The American people--to say nothing of history--
     would never know exactly which of Judge Nixon's statements 
     were regarded as untrue. They'd have to guess. What's more, 
     this ambiguity would prevent us from being totally 
     accountable to the voters for our decision.'' \124\

     \124\ Statement of Senator Herbert H. Kohl, id. at 449 
     (emphasis added). Senator Kohl did not believe that the 
     constitutional question concerning two-thirds concurrence had 
     to be answered in the Judge Nixon proceedings because he 
     believed that the bundling problem created an unfairness (in 
     effect, a due process violation) that precluded conviction. 
     Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     As noted, the Senate acquitted Judge Nixon on the omnibus 
     article--very possible because of the constitutional and 
     related due process and fairness concerns articulated by 
     Senator Kohl and others.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \125\ See also Constitutional Grounds for Presidential 
     Impeachment: Modern Precedents, Report by the Staff of the 
     Impeachment Inquiry, Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d 
     Sess. at 12 (1998) (discussing Sen. Kohl's position).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The constitutional problems identified by those Senators 
     are significant when a single federal judge (one of roughly 
     1000) is impeached. But when the Chief Executive and sole 
     head of one entire branch of our government stands accused, 
     those infirmities are momentous. Fairness and the appearance 
     of fairness require that the basis for any action this body 
     might take be clear and specific. The Constitution clearly 
     forbids conviction unless two thirds of the Senate concurs in 
     a judgment. Any such judgment would be meaningless in the 
     absence of a finding that specific, identifiable, wrongful 
     conduct has in fact occurred. No such conclusion is possible 
     under either article as drafted.
       b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process 
           Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single 
           Accusation
       Even apart from the Constitution's clear requirement of 
     ``Concurrence'' in Article I, section 3, the fundamental 
     principles of fairness and due process that underlie our 
     Constitution and permeate our procedural and substantive law 
     compel the same outcome. In particular, the requirement that 
     there be genuine agreement by the deciding body before an 
     accused is denied life, liberty or property is a cornerstone 
     of our jurisprudence.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \126\ Judicial precedent is persuasive here on these due 
     process and fairness questions. Indeed, in prior impeachment 
     trials, the Senate has been guided by decisions of the 
     courts, because they reflect cumulative wisdom concerning 
     fairness and the search for justice. During the impeachment 
     trial of Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Senator Specter stated:
     ``[T]he impeachment process relies in significant measure on 
     decisions of the court and the opinion of judges . . . [T]he 
     decisions and interpretations of the courts should be highly 
     instructive to us. In our system of Government, it has been 
     the courts that through the years have been called upon to 
     construe, define and apply the provisions of our 
     Constitution. Their decisions reflect our values and our 
     evolving notions of justice . . . Although we are a branch of 
     Government coequal with the judiciary, and by the 
     Constitution vested with the `sole' power to try 
     impeachments, I believe that the words and reasoning of 
     judges who have struggled with the meaning and application of 
     the Constitution and its provisions ought to be given great 
     heed because that jurisprudence embodies the values of 
     fairness and justice that ought to be the polestar of our own 
     determinations.'' (S. Doc. 101-18, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 
     740-41.)
     (As Senator Specter observed, judicial rules have been 
     developed and refined over the years to assure that court 
     proceedings are fair, and that an accused is assured the 
     necessary tools to prepare a proper defense, including proper 
     notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       While in the federal criminal context due process requires 
     that there be genuine agreement among the entire jury, see 
     United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 470 (7th Cir. 1998), 
     Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (plurality), in the 
     impeachment context, that requirement of genuine agreement 
     must be expressed by a two-thirds supermajority. But the 
     underlying due process principles is the same in both 
     settings. This basic principle is bottomed on two fundamental 
     notions: (1) that there be genuine agreement--mutuality of 
     understanding--among those voting to convict, and (2) that 
     the unanimous verdict be understood (by the accused and by 
     the public) to have been the product of genuine agreement.
       This principle is given shape in the criminal law in the 
     well-recognized prohibition on ``duplicitous'' charges. 
     ``Duplicity is the joining in a single count of two or more 
     distinct and separate offenses.'' United States v. UCO Oil, 
     546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1976.) In the law of criminal 
     pleading, a single count that charges two or more separate 
     offenses is duplicitous. See United States v. Parker, 991 
     F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hawkes, 
     753 F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1985).\127\ A duplicitous charge 
     in an indictment violates the due process principle that 
     ``the requisite specificity of the charge may not be 
     compromised by the joining of separate offenses.'' Schad v. 
     Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991) (plurality).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \127\ See also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
     8(a): ``Two or more offenses may be charged in the same 
     indictment or information in a separate count for each 
     offense if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or 
     similar charter or are based on the same act or transaction 
     or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or 
     constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.'' (emphasis 
     added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       More specifically, a duplicitous charge poses the acute 
     danger of conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury; some 
     jurors may find the defendant guilty of one charge but not 
     guilty of a second, while other jurors find him guilty of a 
     second charge but not the first. See United States v. Saleh, 
     875 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Stanley, 
     597 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 1979); Bins v. United States, 331 
     F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1964).\128\ Our federal system of 
     justice simply does not permit conviction by less than 
     unanimous agreement concerning a single, identified charge. 
     See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 1998) 
     (conviction requires unanimous agreement as to particular 
     statements); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 929 (5th 
     Cir. 1991) (reversal required where no instruction was given 
     to ensure that all jurors concur in conclusion that at least 
     one particular statement was false); see also United States 
     v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (right to 
     unanimous verdict violated by instruction authorizing 
     conviction if jury found defendant committed any one of six 
     acts proscribed by statute).\129\ The protection against 
     conviction by less than full agreement by the factfinders is 
     enshrined in Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
     Procedure which dictates that ``[t]he verdict shall be 
     unanimous.'' \130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \128\ Each of the four categories charged here actually 
     comprises multiple allegedly perjurious statements. Thus, the 
     dangers of duplicitousness are increased exponentially.
     \129\ The Supreme Court has stated that ``[u]nanimity in jury 
     verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments 
     apply.'' Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); 
     Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (same).
     \130\ That rule gives expression to a criminal defendant's 
     due process right to a unanimous verdict. See United States 
     v. Fawley, 137 F.2d 458, 4771 (7th Cir. 1988). Because the 
     Constitution does not tolerate the risk of a less than 
     unanimous verdict in the criminal setting, ``where the 
     complexity of a case or other factors create the potential 
     for confusion as to the 

[[Page S212]]

     legal theory or factual basis which sustains a defendant's 
     conviction, a specific unanimity instruction is required.'' 
     United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989) 
     (citing United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 
     1987)). Such instructions are required where the government 
     charges several criminal acts, any of which alone could have 
     supported the offense charged, because of the need to provide 
     sufficient guidance to assure that all members of the jury 
     were unanimous on the same act or acts of illegality. Id. at 
     88. As the Seventh Circuit recently concluded in a case 
     alleging multiple false statements, ``the jury should have 
     been advised that in order to have convicted [the defendant], 
     they had to unanimously agree that a particular statement 
     contained in the indictment was falsely made.'' Fawley, 137 
     F.2d at 470.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Thus, where the charging instrument alleges multiple types 
     of wrongdoing, the unanimity requirement ``means more than a 
     conclusory agreement that the defendant has violated the 
     statute in question; there is a requirement of substantial 
     agreement as to the principal factual elements underlying a 
     specified offense.'' United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 
     1407 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). Accordingly, although 
     there need not be unanimity as to every bit of underlying 
     evidence, due process ``does require unanimous agreement as 
     to the nature of the defendant's violation, not simply that a 
     violation has occurred.'' McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 
     433, 449 n.5 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Such 
     agreement is necessary to fulfill the demands of fairness and 
     rationality that inform the requirement of due process. See 
     Schad, 501 U.S. at 637.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \131\ In our federal criminal process, a duplicitous pleading 
     problem may sometimes be cured by instructions to the jury 
     requiring unanimous agreement on a single statement, see 
     Fawley, supra, but that option is not present here. Not only 
     do the Senate Rules not provide for the equivalent of jury 
     instructions, they expressly rule out the prospect of 
     subdividing an article of impeachment for purposes of voting. 
     See Senate Impeachment Rule XXIII. Nor is the duplicitousness 
     problem presented here cured by any specific enumeration of 
     elements necessary to be found by the factfinder. See, e.g., 
     Santarpio v. United States, 560 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1977) 
     (duplicitous charge harmless because indictments adequately 
     set out the elements of the federal crime; appellants were 
     not misled or prejudiced). Article I does not enumerate 
     specific elements to be found by the factfinder. To the 
     contrary, the Article combines multiple types of wrong, 
     allegedly performed by different types of statements, the 
     different types occurring in multiple subject matter areas, 
     and all having a range of allegedly harmful effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Where multiple accusations are combined in a single charge, 
     neither the accused nor the factfinder can know precisely 
     what that charge means. When the factfinder body cannot agree 
     upon the meaning of the charge, it cannot reach genuine 
     agreement that conviction is warranted. These structural 
     deficiencies preclude a constitutionally sound vote on the 
     articles.


 C. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections 
             Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific Accusations

     1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific 
         Charges
       Impermissibly vague indictments must be dismissed, because 
     they ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the defendant `of what 
     he must be prepared to meet.' '' United States v. Russell, 
     369 U.S. 749, 764 (1962) (internal quotation omitted). In 
     Russell, the indictment at issue failed to specify the 
     subject matter about which the defendant had allegedly 
     refused to answer questions before a Congressional 
     subcommittee. Instead, the indictment stated only that the 
     questions to which the answers were refused ``were pertinent 
     to the question then under inquiry'' by the Subcommittee. Id. 
     at 752. The Court held that because the indictment did not 
     provide sufficient specificity, it was unduly vague and 
     therefore had to be dismissed. Id. at 773. The Supreme Court 
     explained that dismissal is the only appropriate remedy for 
     an unduly vague indictment, because only the charging body 
     can elaborate upon vague charges:

       ``To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a 
     subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand 
     jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive 
     the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the 
     intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a 
     defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not 
     found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grant jury 
     which indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected by 
     the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may 
     not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury . . 
     .''

     Id. at 771. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 
     216 (1960); see also United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 
     (D.C. Cir. 1954) (perjury count too vague to be valid cannot 
     be cured even by bill of particulars); United States v. 
     Tonelli, 557 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1978) (vacating perjury 
     conviction where ``the indictment . . . did not `set forth 
     the precise falsehood[s] alleged' '').
       Under the relevant case law, the two exhibited Articles 
     present paradigmatic examples of charges drafted too vaguely 
     to enable the accused to meet the accusations fairly. More 
     than a century ago, the Supreme Court stated that ``[i]t is 
     an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the 
     definition of an offence, whether it be at common law or by 
     statute, includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that 
     the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic 
     terms as in the definition; but it must state the species--it 
     must descend to particulars.'' United States v. Cruikshank, 
     92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875). The Court has more recently 
     emphasized the fundamental ``vice'' of nonspecific 
     indictments: that they ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the 
     defendant `of what he must be prepared to meet.' '' Russell, 
     369 U.S. at 764.
       The Supreme Court emphasized in Russell that specificity is 
     important not only for the defendant, who needs particulars 
     to prepare a defense, but also for the decision-maker, ``so 
     it may decide whether [the facts] are sufficient in law to 
     support a conviction, if one should be had.'' Id. at 768 
     (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). An 
     unspecific indictment creates a ``moving target'' for the 
     defendant exposing the defendant to a risk of surprise 
     through a change in the prosecutor's theory. ``It enables his 
     conviction to rest on one point and the affirmance of the 
     conviction to rest on another. It gives the prosecution free 
     hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by surmise and 
     conjecture.'' Russell, 369 U.S. at 766. Ultimately, an 
     unspecific indictment creates a risk that ``a defendant could 
     . . . be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and 
     perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted 
     him.'' Id. at 770.
     2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally 
         Vague
       Article I alleges that in his August 17, 1998 grand jury 
     testimony, President Clinton provided ``perjurious, false and 
     misleading'' testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or 
     more'' of four subject areas. Article I does not, however, 
     set forth a single specific statement by the President upon 
     which its various allegations are predicated. The Article 
     haphazardly intermingles alleged criminal conduct with 
     totally lawful conduct, and its abstract generalizations 
     provide no guidance as to actual alleged perjurious 
     statements.
       Aritcle I thus violates the most fundamental requirement of 
     perjury indictments. It is fatally vague in three distinct 
     respects: (1) it does not identify any statements that form 
     the basis of its allegations,\132\ (2) it therefore does not 
     specify which of the President's statements to the grand jury 
     were allegedly ``perjurious,'' which were allegedly 
     ``false,'' and which were allegedly ``misleading,'' and (3) 
     it does not even specify the subject matter of any alleged 
     perjurious statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \132\ One of the cardinal rules of perjury cases is that 
     ``[a] conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623 may not stand 
     where the indictment fails to set forth the precise falsehood 
     alleged and the factual basis of its falsity with sufficient 
     clarity to permit a jury to determine its verity and to allow 
     meaningful judicial review of the materiality of those 
     falsehoods.'' United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d 
     Cir. 1977). Courts have vacated convictions for perjury in 
     instances where ``the indictment . . . did not `set forth the 
     precise falsehood(s) alleged.'' Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The first defect is fatal, because it is axiomatic that if 
     the precise perjurious statements are not identified in the 
     indictment, a defendant cannot possibly prepare his defense 
     properly. See, e.g., Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 
     1977). Indeed, in past impeachment trails in the Senate where 
     articles of impeachment alleged the making of false 
     statements, the false statements were specified in the 
     Articles. For example, in the impeachment trial of Alcee L. 
     Hastings, Articles of Impeachment II-XIV specified the exact 
     statements that formed the bases of the false statement 
     allegations against Judge Hastings.\133\ Similarly, in the 
     impeachment trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Articles of 
     Impeachment I-III specified the exact statements that formed 
     the bases of their false statement allegations.\134\ In this 
     case, Article I falls far short of specificity standards 
     provided in previous impeachment trials in the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \133\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the 
     Impeachment Trial Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess., 
     S. Doc. 101-18 at 4-7 (1989). See, e.g., Id. at 2 (Article II 
     alleging that the false statement was ``that Judge Hastings 
     and Wiliam Borders, of Washington, D.C., never made any 
     agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in United States 
     v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings'').
     \134\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the 
     Impeachment Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st 
     Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 at 430-32 (1989). See, e.g., Id., at 
     432 (Article I alleging that the false statement was 
     ``Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes never 
     discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       As to the second vagueness defect, there is a significant 
     legal difference between, on the one hand, statements under 
     oath which are ``perjurious,'' and those, on the other hand, 
     which are simply ``false'' or misleading.'' Only the former 
     could form the basis of a criminal charge. The Supreme Court 
     has emphatically held that ``misleading'' statements alone 
     cannot form the basis of a prejury charge. In Bronston v. 
     United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the Court held that 
     literally true statements are by definition non-perjurious, 
     and ``it is no answer to say that here the jury found that 
     [the defendant] intended to mislead his examiner,'' since 
     ``[a] jury should not be permitted to enage in conjecture 
     whether an unresponsive answer. . . was intended to mislead 
     or divert the examiner.'' Id. at 358-60 (emphasis added). The 
     Court emphasized that ``the perjury statute is not to be 
     loosely construed, nor the statue invoked simply because a 
     wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner so long as 
     the witness speakes the literal truth.'' Id. Thus, 
     specification of the exact statements alleged to be 
     prejurious is required, because ``to hold otherwise would 
     permit the trial jury to inject its inferences into the grand 
     jury's indictment, and would allow defendants to be convicted 
     for immaterial falsehoods or for `intent to mislead' or 
     `perjury by implication,' which Bronston specifically 
     prohibited.'' Slawik, 538 F.2d at 83-84 (emphasis added). 
     Thus, if the House meant that certain statements were 
     misleading but literally truthful, they might be subject to a

[[Page S213]]

     motion to dismiss on the ground that the offense was not 
     impeachable.
       The same is true for allegedly ``false'' answers, because 
     it is clear that mere ``false'' answers given under oath, 
     without more, are not criminal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the 
     statute proscribing perjury before a federal grand jury, 
     requires additional elements beyond falsity, including the 
     defendant's specific intent to testify falsely and the 
     statement's materiality to the proceeding. A defense to a 
     perjury charge is therefore tied directly to the specific 
     statement alleged to have been perjurious. Did the defendant 
     know the particular answer was false? Was it material? \135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \135\ Not surprisingly, courts have specifically held that 
     because of these additional elements (the lack of which may 
     undermine a perjury prosecution), a defendant must know 
     exactly which statements are alleged to form the basis of a 
     perjury indictment to test whether the requisite elements are 
     present. See, e.g., United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 
     850 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (``The accused is entitled under the 
     Constitution to be advised as to every element in respect to 
     which it is necessary for him to prepare a defense''). For 
     example, because of the intent requirement, one potential 
     defense to a perjury prosecution is that the question to 
     which the allegedly perjurious statement was addressed was 
     fundamentally ambiguous, as courts have held that 
     fundamentally ambiguous questions cannot as a matter of law 
     produce perjurious answers. See, e.g., Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 
     199; United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1967). A 
     separate defense to a perjury prosecution is that the 
     statement alleged to have been perjurious was not material to 
     the proceeding. Thus, ``false'' statements alone are not 
     perjurious if they were not material to the proceeding. By 
     not specifying which statements are alleged to be ``false'' 
     or ``misleading,'' Article I precludes the President from 
     preparing a materiality defense, and it also fails to 
     distinguish allegedly criminal conduct from purely lawful 
     conduct. As one court explained,
     ``It is to be observed that * * * it is not sufficient to 
     constitute the offense that the oath shall be merely false, 
     but that it must be false in some `material matter.' Applying 
     that definition to the facts stated in either count of this 
     indictment, and it would seem that there is an entire lack in 
     any essential sense to disclose that the particulars as to 
     which the oath is alleged to have been false were material in 
     the essential sense required for purposes of an indictment 
     for this offense.'' (United States v. Cameron, 282 F. 684, 
     692 (D. Ariz. 1922).).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Article I's third vagueness defect is that it does not 
     specify the subject matter of the alleged perjurious 
     statements. Instead, it simply alleges that the unspecified 
     statements by the President to the grand jury were concerning 
     ``one or more'' of four enumerated areas. The ``one or more'' 
     language underscores the reality that the President--and, 
     critically, the Senate--cannot possibly know what the House 
     majority had in mind, since it may have failed even to agree 
     on the subject matter of the alleged perjury. The paramount 
     importance of this issue may be seen by reference to court 
     decisions holding that a jury has to ``unanimously agree that 
     a particular statement contained in the indictment was 
     falsely made.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 
     (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also discussion of 
     unanimity requirement in Section VI.B, supra.
       Article II is also unconstitutionally vague. It alleges 
     that the President ``obstructed and impeded the 
     administration of justice * * * in a course of conduct or 
     scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up and conceal'' 
     unspecified evidence and testimony in the Jones case. It sets 
     forth seven instances in which the President allegedly 
     ``encouraged'' false testimony or the concealment of 
     evidence, or ``corruptly influenced'' or ``corruptly 
     prevented'' various other testimony, also unspecified. In 
     fact, not only does Article II fail to identify a single 
     specific act performed by the President in this alleged 
     scheme to obstruct justice, it does not even identify the 
     ``potential witnesses'' whose testimony the President 
     allegedly sought to ``corruptly influence.''
       The President cannot properly defend against Article II 
     without knowing, at a minimum, which specific acts of 
     obstruction and/or concealment he is alleged to have 
     performed, and which ``potential witnesses'' he is alleged to 
     have attempted to influence. For example, it is clear that, 
     in order to violate the federal omnibus obstruction of 
     justice statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, an accuser must prove 
     that there was a pending judicial proceeding, that the 
     defendant knew of the proceeding, and that the defendant 
     acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct or 
     interfere with the proceeding or due administration of 
     justice. See, e.g., United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 
     1314 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 729 F. Supp. 
     1380, 1383-84 (D.D.C. 1990). Without knowing which 
     ``potential witnesses'' he is alleged to have attempted to 
     influence, and the precise manner in which he is alleged to 
     have attempted to obstruct justice, the President cannot 
     prepare a defense that would address the elements of the 
     offense with which he has been charged--that he had no intent 
     to obstruct, that there was no pending proceeding, or that 
     the person involved was not a potential witness.
       It follows that the requisite vote of two-thirds of the 
     Senate required by the Constitution cannot possibly be 
     obtained if there are no specific statements whatsoever 
     alleged to be perjurious, false or misleading in Article I or 
     no specific acts of obstruction alleged in Article II. 
     Different Senators might decide that different statements or 
     different acts were unlawful without any concurrence by two-
     thirds of the Senate as to any particular statement or act. 
     Such a scenario is antithetical to the Constitution's due 
     process guarantee of notice of specific and definite charges 
     and it threatens conviction upon vague and uncertain grounds. 
     As currently framed, neither Article I nor Article II 
     provides a sufficient basis for the President to prepare a 
     defense to the unspecified charges upon which the Senate may 
     vote, or an adequate basis for actual adjudication.


  D. The Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment Must Speak 
                        Clearly and Intelligibly

       An American impeachment trial is not a parliamentary 
     inquiry into fitness for office. It is not a vote of no 
     confidence. It is not a mechanism whereby a legislative 
     majority may oust a President from a rival party on political 
     grounds. To the contrary, because the President has a limited 
     term of office and can be turned out in the course of 
     ordinary electoral processes, a Presidential impeachment 
     trial is a constitutional measure of last resort designed to 
     protect the Republic.
       This Senate is therefore vested with an extremely grave 
     Constitutional task: a decision whether to remove the 
     President for the protection of the people themselves. In the 
     Senate's hands there rests not only the fate of one man, but 
     the integrity of our Constitution and our democratic process.
       Fidelity to the Constitution and fidelity to the electorate 
     must converge in the impeachment trial vote. If the Senate is 
     to give meaning to the Constitution's command, any vote on 
     removal must be a vote on one or more specifically and 
     separately identified ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' as 
     set forth in properly drafted impeachment articles approved 
     by the House. If the people are to have their twice-elected 
     President removed by an act of the Senate, that act must be 
     intelligible. It must be explainable and justifiable to the 
     people who first chose the President and then chose him 
     again. The Senate must ensure that it has satisfied the 
     Constitution's requirement of a genuine two-thirds 
     concurrence that specific, identified wrongdoing has been 
     proven. The Senate must also assure the people, through the 
     sole collective act the Senate is required to take, that its 
     decision has a readily discernible and unequivocal meaning.
       As matters stand, the Senate will vote on two highly 
     complex Articles of Impeachment. Its vote will not be shaped 
     by narrowing instructions. Its rules preclude a vote on 
     divisible parts of the articles. There will be no judicial 
     review, no correction of error, and no possibility of 
     retrial. The Senate's decision will be as conclusive as any 
     known to our law--judicially, politically, historically, and 
     most literally, irrevocable.
       Under such circumstances, the Senate's judgment must speak 
     clearly and intelligibly. That cannot happen if the Senate 
     votes for conviction on these articles. Their compound 
     structure and lack of specificity make genuine agreement as 
     to specific wrongs impossible, and those factors completely 
     prevent the electorate from understanding why the Senate as a 
     whole voted as it did. As formulated, these articles satisfy 
     neither the plain requirement of the Constitution nor the 
     rightful expectations of the American people. The articles 
     cannot support a constitutionally sound vote for conviction.

                      VII. The Need for Discovery

       The Senate need not address the issue of discovery at this 
     time, but because the issue may arise at a later date, it is 
     appropriate to remark here on its present status. Senate 
     Resolution 16 provides that the record for purposes of the 
     presentation by the House Managers and the President is the 
     public record established in the House of 
     Representatives.\136\ Since this record was created by the 
     House itself and is ostensibly the basis for the House's 
     impeachment vote, and because this evidence has been publicly 
     identified and available for scrutiny, comment, and rebuttal, 
     it is both logical and fair that this be the basis for any 
     action by the Senate. Moreover, Senate Resolution 16 
     explicitly prohibits the President and the House Managers 
     from filing at this time any ``motions to subpoena witnesses 
     or to present any evidence not in the record.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \136\ S. Res. 16 defined the record for the presentations as 
     ``those publicly available materials that have been submitted 
     to or produced by the House Judiciary Committee, including 
     transcripts of public hearings or mark-ups and any materials 
     printed by the House of Representatives or House Judiciary 
     Committee pursuant to House Resolutions 525 and 581.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In the event, however, that the Senate should later decide, 
     pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, to allow 
     the House Managers to expand the record in some way, our 
     position should be absolutely clear. At such time, the 
     President would have an urgent need for the discovery of 
     relevant evidence, because at no point in these proceedings 
     has he been able to subpoena documents or summon and cross-
     examine witnesses. He would need to use the compulsory 
     process authorized by Senate Impeachment Rules V and VI\137\ 
     to obtain documentary evidence and witness depositions. While 
     the President has access to some of the grand jury 
     transcripts and FBI interview memoranda of witnesses called 
     by the OIC, the President's own lawyers were not entitled to 
     be present when these witnesses were examined. The grand jury 
     has historically been the engine of the prosecution, and it 
     was used in that fashion in this case. The OIC sought 
     discovery of evidence with the single goal of documenting 
     facts that it believed were prejudicial to the President. It 
     did not examine witnesses with a view toward establishing 
     there was no justification for impeachment; it did not follow 
     up obvious leads when they might result in evidence helpful 
     to the President; and it did not seek out and document 
     exculpatory evidence. It did not undertake to disclose 
     exculpatory information it might have identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \137\ Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When 
     Sitting on Impeachment Trials (Senate Manual 99-2, as revised 
     by S. Res. 479 (Aug. 16, 1986)). There is ample precedent for 
     liberal discovery in Senate impeachment trials. For example, 
     in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, the Senate issued 
     numerous orders addressing a range of pretrial issues over 
     several months including:
      requiring the parties to provide witness lists along 
     with a description of the general nature of the testimony 
     that was expected from each witness months in advance of the 
     scheduled evidentiary hearing;
      requiring the House Managers to turn over 
     exculpatory materials, certain prior statements of witnesses, 
     and documents and other tangible evidence they intended to 
     introduce into evidence;

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page S214]]

      requiring the production from the House Managers of 
     other documents in the interest of allowing the Senate to 
     develop ``a record that fully illuminates the matters that it 
     must consider in rendering a judgment;''
      setting a briefing schedule for stipulations of 
     facts and documents;
      setting a number of pretrial conferences;
      designating a date for final pretrial statements; 
     and
      permitting a number of pre-trial depositions.
      Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on 
     the Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, 
     Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st 
     Cong. 1st Sess. at 281, 286-87, 342-43, 606-07, 740.
     The need for discovery in this case is in fact greater than 
     in prior impeachment proceedings. In all other impeachment 
     trials, there were either substantive investigations by the 
     House or prior judicial proceedings in which the accused had 
     a full opportunity to develop the evidentiary record and 
     cross-examine witnesses. See Id. at 163-64 (pretrial 
     memorandum of Judge Hastings).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Nor did the House of Representatives afford the President 
     any discovery mechanisms to secure evidence that might be 
     helpful in his defense. Indeed, the House called no fact 
     witnesses at all, and at the few depositions it conducted, 
     counsel for the President were excluded. Moreover, the House 
     made available only a selected portion of the evidence it 
     received from the OIC. While it published five volumes of the 
     OIC materials (two volumes of appendices and three volumes of 
     supplements), it withheld a great amount of evidence, and it 
     denied counsel for the President access to this material. It 
     is unclear what the criterion was for selecting evidence to 
     include in the published volumes, but there does not appear 
     to have been an attempt to include all evidence that may have 
     been relevant to the President's defense. The President has 
     not had access to a great deal of evidence in the possession 
     of (for example) the House of Representatives and the OIC 
     which may be exculpatory or relevant to the credibility of 
     witnesses on whom the OIC and the House Managers rely.
       Should the Senate decide to authorize the House Managers to 
     call witnesses or expand the record, the President would be 
     faced with a critical need for the discovery of evidence 
     useful to his defense--evidence which would routinely be 
     available to any civil litigant involved in a garden-variety 
     automobile accident case. The House Managers have had in 
     their possession or had access at the OIC to significant 
     amounts of non-public evidence, and they have frequently 
     stated their intention to make use of such evidence. 
     Obviously, in order to defend against such tactics, counsel 
     for the President are entitled to discovery and a fair 
     opportunity to test the veracity and reliability of this 
     ``evidence,'' using compulsory process as necessary to obtain 
     testimony and documents. Trial by surprise obviously has no 
     place in the Senate of the United States where the issues in 
     the balance is the removal of the one political leader who, 
     with the Vice-President, is elected by all the citizens of 
     this country.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \138\ In another context, the Supreme Court has observed that 
     ``the ends of justice will best be served by a system of 
     liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum 
     possible amount of information from which to prepare their 
     cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at 
     trial.'' Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The need for discovery does not turn on the number of 
     witnesses the House Managers may be authorized to 
     depose.\139\ If the House Managers call a single witness, 
     that will initiate a process that leaves the President 
     potentially unprepared and unable to defend adequately 
     without proper discovery. The sequence of discovery is 
     critical. The President first needs to obtain and review 
     relevant documentary evidence not now in his possession. He 
     then needs to be able to depose potentially helpful 
     witnesses, whose identity may only emerge from the documents 
     and from the depositions themselves. Obviously, he also needs 
     to depose potential witnesses identified by the House 
     Managers. Only at that point will the President be able 
     intelligently to designate his own trial witnesses. This is 
     both a logical procedure and one which is the product of long 
     experience designed to maximize the search for truth and 
     minimize unfair surprise. There is no conceivable reason it 
     should not be followed here--if the evidentiary record is 
     opened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \139\ It is not sufficient that counsel for the President 
     have the right to depose the witnesses called by the 
     Managers, essential as that right is. The testimony of a 
     single witness may have to be refuted indirectly, 
     circumstantially, or by a number of witnesses; it is often 
     necessary to depose several witnesses in order to identify 
     the one or two best.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Indeed, it is simply impossible to ascertain how a witness 
     designated by the House Managers could fairly be rebutted 
     without a full examination of the available evidence. It is 
     also the case that many sorts of helpful evidence and 
     testimony emerge in the discovery process that may at first 
     blush appear irrelevant or tangential. In any event, the 
     normal adversarial process is the best guarantor of the 
     truth. The President needs discovery here not simply to 
     obtain evidence to present a trial but also in order to make 
     an informed judgment about what to introduce in response to 
     the Managers' expanded case. The President's counsel must be 
     able to make a properly knowledgeable decision about what 
     evidence may be relevant and helpful to the President's 
     defense, both in cross-examination and during the President's 
     own case.
       The consequences of an impeachment trial are immeasurably 
     grave: The removal of a twice-elected President. Particularly 
     given what is at stake, fundamental fairness dictates that 
     the President be given at least the same right as an ordinary 
     litigant to obtain evidence necessary for his defense, 
     particularly when a great deal of that evidence is presently 
     in the hands of his accusers, the OIC and the House Managers. 
     The Senate has wisely elected to proceed on the public record 
     established by the House of Representatives, and this 
     provides a wholly adequate basis for Senate decision-making. 
     In the event the Senate should choose to expand this record, 
     affording the President adequate discovery is absolutely 
     essential.

                            VIII. Conclusion

       As the Senate considers these Articles of Impeachment and 
     listens to the arguments, individual Senators are standing in 
     the place of the Framers of the Constitution, who prayed that 
     the power of impeachment and removal of a President would be 
     invoked only in the gravest of circumstances, when the 
     stability of our system of government hung in the balance--to 
     protect the Republic itself from efforts to subvert our 
     Constitutional system.
       The Senate has an obligation to turn away an unwise and 
     unwarranted misuse of the awesome power of impeachment. If 
     the Senate removes this President for a wrongful relationship 
     he hoped to keep private, for what will the House ask the 
     Senate to remove the next President, and the next? Our 
     Framers wisely gave us a constitutional system of checks and 
     balances, with three co-equal branches. Removing this 
     President on these facts would substantially alter the 
     delicate constitutional balance, and move us closer to a 
     quasi-parliamentary system, in which the President is elected 
     to office by the choice of people, but continues in office 
     only at the pleasure of Congress.
       In weighing the evidence and assessing the facts, we ask 
     that Senators consider not only the intent of the Framers but 
     also the will and interests of the people. It is the citizens 
     of these United States who will be affected by and stand in 
     judgment of this process. It is not simply the President--but 
     the vote the American people rendered in schools, church 
     halls and other civic centers all across the land twenty-six 
     months ago--that is hanging in the balance.
       Respectfully submitted.

David E. Kendall                      Charles F.C. Ruff
Nicole K. Seligman                    Gregory B. Craig
Emmet T. Flood                        Bruce R. Lindsey
Max Stier                             Cheryl D. Mills
Alicia L. Marti                       Lanny A. Breuer
Williams & Connolly                   Office of the White House Counsel
725 12th Street, N.W.                 The White House
Washington, D.C. 20005                Washington, D.C. 20502
 

       January 13, 1999.
                                  ____


 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

     In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

REPLICATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ANSWER OF PRESIDENT 
        WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

       The House of Representatives, through its Managers and 
     counsel, replies to the Answer of President William Jefferson 
     Clinton to the Articles of Impeachment (``Answer''), as 
     follows:

                                Preamble

       The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
     allegation in the Preamble to the Answer, including the 
     sections entitled ``The Charges in the Articles Do Not 
     Constitute High Crimes or Misdemeanors'' and ``The President 
     Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice.'' With respect to 
     the allegations in the Preamble, the House of Representatives 
     further states that each and every allegation in Articles I 
     and II is true and that Articles I and II properly state 
     impeachable offenses, are not subject to a motion to dismiss, 
     and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate 
     sitting as a Court of Impeachment.

                               Article I

       The House of Representatives denies each and every 
     allegation in the Answer to Article I that denies the acts, 
     knowledge, intent, or wrongful conduct charged against 
     President William Jefferson Clinton. With respect to the 
     allegations in the Answer to Article I, the House of 
     Representatives further states that each and every allegation 
     in Article I is true and that Article I properly states an 
     impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, 
     and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate 
     sitting as a Court of Impeachment.

[[Page S215]]

                 First Affirmative Defense to Article I

       The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
     allegation in this purported defense. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article I properly states 
     an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to 
     dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the 
     Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of 
     Representatives further states that the offense stated in 
     Article I warrants the conviction, removal from office, and 
     disqualification from holding further office of President 
     William Jefferson Clinton.

                Second Affirmative Defense to Article I

       The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
     allegation in this purported defense. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article I properly states 
     an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to 
     dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the 
     Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article I is not 
     unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William 
     Jefferson Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged 
     against him.

                 Third Affirmative Defense to Article I

       The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
     allegation in this purported defense. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article I properly states 
     an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to 
     dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the 
     Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article I does not charge 
     multiple offenses in one article.

                               Article II

       The House of Representatives denies each and every 
     allegation in the Answer to Article II that denies the acts, 
     knowledge, intent, or wrongful conduct charged against 
     President William Jefferson Clinton. With respect to the 
     allegations in the Answer to Article II, the House of 
     Representatives further states that each and every allegation 
     in Article II is true and that Article II properly states an 
     impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, 
     and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate 
     sitting as a Court of Impeachment.

                First Affirmative Defense to Article II

       The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
     allegation in this purported defense. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article II properly 
     states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to 
     dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the 
     Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of 
     Representatives further states that the offense stated in 
     Article II warrants the conviction, removal from office, and 
     disqualification from holding further office of President 
     William Jefferson Clinton.

                Second Affirmative Defense to Article II

       The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
     allegation in this purported defense. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article II properly 
     states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to 
     dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the 
     Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article II is not 
     unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William 
     Jefferson Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged 
     against him.

                Third Affirmative Defense to Article II

       The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
     allegation in this purported defense. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article II properly 
     states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to 
     dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the 
     Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of 
     Representatives further states that Article II does not 
     charge multiple offenses in one article.

               Conclusion of the House of Representatives

       The House of Representatives further states that it denies 
     each and every material allegation of the Answer not 
     specifically admitted in this Replication. By providing this 
     Replication to the Answer, the House of Representatives 
     waives none of its rights in this proceeding. Wherefore, the 
     House of Representatives states that both of the Articles of 
     Impeachment warrant the conviction, removal from office, and 
     disqualification from holding further office of President 
     William Jefferson Clinton. Both of the Articles should be 
     considered and adjudicated by the Senate.
       Respectfully submitted,
       The United States House of Representatives.
     Henry J. Hyde,
     F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
     Bill McCollum,
     George W. Gekas,
     Charles T. Canady,
     Stephen E. Buyer,
     Ed Bryant,
     Steve Chabot,
     Bob Barr,
     Asa Hutchinson,
     Chris Cannon,
     James E. Rogan,
     Lindsey O. Graham,
                                Managers on the Part of the House.

     Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                  General Counsel.

     David P. Schippers,
     Chief Investigative Counsel.
                                  ____


 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

     In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

   REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE TRIAL 
           MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                            I. Introduction

       The President's Trial Memorandum contains numerous factual 
     inaccuracies and misstatements of the governing law and the 
     Senate's precedents. These errors have largely been addressed 
     in the Trial Memorandum of the House of Representatives filed 
     with the Senate on January 11, 1999, and given the 24-hour 
     period to file this reply, the House cannot possibly address 
     them all here. The House of Representatives will address them 
     further in its oral presentation to the Senate, and it 
     reserves the right to address these matters further in the 
     briefing of any relevant motions. However, President Clinton 
     has raised some new issues in his Trial Memorandum, and the 
     House of Representatives hereby replies to those issues.

                               II. Facts

       The President's Trial Memorandum outlines what he claims 
     are facts showing that he did not commit perjury before the 
     grand jury and did not obstruct justice. The factual issues 
     President Clinton raises are addressed in detail in the Trial 
     Memorandum of the House.
       A complete and impartial review of the evidence reveals 
     that the President did in fact commit perjury before the 
     grand jury and that he obstructed justice during the Jones 
     litigation and the grand jury investigation as alleged in the 
     articles of impeachment passed by the House of 
     Representatives. The House believes a review of the complete 
     record, including the full grand jury and deposition 
     testimony of the key witnesses in this case, will establish 
     that.
       The evidence which President Clinton claims demonstrates 
     that he did not commit the offenses outlined in the Articles 
     of Impeachment are cited in Sections IV and V of his 
     Memorandum. Regarding Article I, President Clinton maintains 
     that his testimony before the grand jury was entirely 
     truthful. At the outset of his argument, he states that he 
     told the truth about the nature and details of his 
     relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he insists that any false 
     impressions that his deposition testimony might have created 
     were remedied by his admission of ``improper intimate 
     contact'' with Ms. Lewinsky. However, his subsequent 
     testimony demonstrates that this admission is narrowly 
     tailored to mean that Ms. Lewinsky had ``sexual relations'' 
     with him, but he did not have ``sexual relations'' with her, 
     as he understood the term to be defined. In other words, he 
     admitted only what he knew could be conclusively established 
     through scientific tests. He denied what the testimony of Ms. 
     Lewinsky, the testimony of a number of her confidantes, and 
     common sense proves: that while she engaged in sexual 
     relations with him, he engaged in sexual relations with her, 
     regardless of how President Clinton attempts to redefine the 
     term.
       Following this pattern, President Clinton discounts 
     substantial evidence as well as common sense when he 
     maintains that he testified truthfully in the grand jury 
     about, among other things, his prior deposition testimony, 
     his attorney's statements to Judge Wright during his 
     deposition, and his intent in providing a series of false 
     statements to his secretary after his deposition. Again, a 
     complete review of the record and witness testimony reveals 
     that President Clinton committed perjury numerous times in 
     his grand jury testimony.
       In regard to Article II, President Clinton extracts 
     numerous items of evidence from the record and analyzes them 
     in isolation in an effort to provide innocent explanations 
     for the substantial amount of circumstantial evidence proving 
     his guilt. Yet when the record is viewed in its entirely, 
     including the portions of President Clinton's deposition 
     testimony concerning Ms. Lewinsky and his grant jury 
     testimony, it demonstrates that President Clinton took a 
     number of actions designed to prevent Paula Jones's 
     attorneys, the federal district court, and a federal grand 
     jury from learning the truth. These actions are described in 
     detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House.
       To the extent that President Clinton's Trial Memorandum 
     raises issues of credibility, those issues are best resolved 
     by live testimony subject to cross-examination. The Senate, 
     weighing the evidence in its entirety, will make an 
     independent assessment of the facts as they are presented, 
     and a detailed, point-by-point argument of these matters is 
     best resolved on the Senate floor. The House is confident 
     that a thorough factual analysis will not only refute 
     President Clinton's contentions, but will prove the very 
     serious charges contained in the articles.

[[Page S216]]

           III. The Articles Properly State Removal Offenses


        A. The Offenses Alleged Are High Crimes And Misdemeanors

     1. The Senate Has Never Exercised Its Power To Dismiss an 
         Article of Impeachment Except When the Official Impeached 
         Has Resigned
       The House acknowledges that the Senate has the power to 
     dismiss an article of impeachment on the ground that it does 
     not state a removable offense. Beyond that, however, 
     President Clinton completely ignores the Senate's precedents 
     concerning the use of that power. In the fifteen cases in 
     which the House has forwarded articles of impeachment to 
     the Senate, the Senate has never granted a dispositive 
     motion to preclude a trial on the articles with one 
     exception. In the 1926 case of Judge George English, the 
     Senate granted a motion to adjourn after Judge English 
     resigned from office making a trial moot on the issue of 
     removal. See Impeachment of George W. English, U.S. 
     District Judge, Eastern District of Illinois, 68 Cong. 
     Rec. 347-48 (1926). The Senate also granted a motion to 
     adjourn in the 1868 trial of President Andrew Johnson, but 
     only after a full trial and votes to acquit on three 
     articles. III Cannon's Precedents of the House of 
     Representatives Sec. 2443.
       In addition, the Senate has never granted a motion to 
     dismiss or strike an article of impeachment. However, in the 
     1936 case of Judge Halsted Ritter, the House managers 
     themselves moved to strike two counts of a multi-count 
     article to simplify the trial, and the motion was granted. 80 
     Cong. Rec. 4898-99 (April 3, 1936). However, the remainder of 
     the article was fully considered, and Judge Ritter was 
     convicted on that article. The House managers in the 1986 
     Judge Harry Claiborne case made the only motion for summary 
     judgment in the history of impeachment. Hearings of the 
     Senate Impeachment Trial Committee (Judge Harry Claiborne), 
     99th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1986). They did so on the basis 
     that Judge Claiborne had already been convicted of the 
     charges in a criminal trial. Id. The Senate postponed a 
     decision on the motion and never ruled on it, but it 
     ultimately convicted Judge Claiborne. In short, the Senate 
     precedents firmly establish that the Senate has always 
     fulfilled its responsibility to give a full and fair hearing 
     to articles of impeachment voted by the House of 
     Representatives.
     2. The Constitutional Text Sets One Clear Standard for 
         Removal
       a. There is Only One Impeachment Standard
       The Constitution sets one clear standard for impeachment, 
     conviction, and removal from office: the commission of 
     ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' 
     U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 4. The Senate has repeatedly 
     determined that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor. 
     Simple logic dictates that obstruction of justice which has 
     the same effect as perjury and bribery of witnesses must also 
     be a high crime and misdemeanor. Endless repetition of the 
     claim that this standard is a high one does not change the 
     standard.
       President Clinton claims that to remove him on these 
     articles would permanently disfigure and diminish the 
     Presidency and mangle the system of checks and balances. 
     President's Trial Memorandum at 18. Quite the contrary, 
     however, it is President Clinton's behavior as set forth in 
     the articles that has had these effects. Essentially, 
     President Clinton argues that the Presidency and the system 
     of checks and balances can only be saved if we allow the 
     President to commit felonies with impunity. To state that 
     proposition is to refute it. Convicting him and thereby 
     reaffirming that criminal behavior that strikes at the heart 
     of the justice system will result in removal will serve to 
     strengthen the Presidency, not weaken it.
       b. Impeachment and Removal Are Appropriate for High Crimes 
           and Misdemeanors Regardless of Whether They Are 
           Offenses Against the System of Government
       President Clinton argues that impeachment may only be used 
     to redress wrongful public misconduct. The point is academic. 
     Perjury and obstruction of justice as set forth in the 
     articles are, by definition, public misconduct. See generally 
     House Trial Memorandum at 107-12. Indeed, it is precisely 
     their public nature that makes them offenses--acts that are 
     not crimes when committed outside the judicial realm become 
     crimes when they enter that realm. Lying to one's spouse 
     about an extramarital affair, although immoral, is not a 
     crime. Telling the same lie under oath in a judicial 
     proceeding is a crime. Hiding gifts given to an adulterous 
     lover to conceal the affair, although immoral, is not a 
     crime. When those gifts become potential evidence in a 
     judicial proceeding, the same act becomes a crime. One who 
     has committed these kinds of crimes that corrupt the judicial 
     system simply is not fit to serve as the nation's chief law 
     enforcement officer.
       Apart from that, the notion that high crimes and 
     misdemeanors encompass only public misconduct will not bear 
     scrutiny. Numerous ``private'' crimes would obviously require 
     the removal of a President. For example, if he killed his 
     wife in a domestic dispute or molested a child, no one would 
     seriously argue that he could not be removed. All of these 
     acts violate the President's unique responsibility to take 
     care that the laws be faithfully executed.
     3. President Clinton Cites Precedents That Do Not Apply 
         Rather Than Relying on the Senate's Own Precedents 
         Clearly Establishing Perjury as a Removable Offense
       a. President Clinton Continues To Misrepresent the 
           Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President 
           Nixon
       In his trial memorandum, President Clinton argues that the 
     failure in 1974 of the House Judiciary Committee to adopt an 
     article of impeachment against President Nixon for tax fraud 
     supports the claim that current charges against President 
     Clinton do not rise to the level of impeachable and removable 
     offenses. President's Trial Memorandum at 21. The President's 
     lawyers acknowledge the charge in the article against 
     President Nixon of ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to 
     report certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on 
     his Federal income tax returns which were not authorized by 
     law.'' Id. The President's lawyers go on to state that 
     ``[t]he President had signed his returns for those years 
     under penalty of perjury,'' Id., trying to distinguish 
     away the Claiborne impeachment and removal precedent from 
     1986, and by extension all the judicial impeachments from 
     the 1980s which clearly establish perjury as an 
     impeachable and removable offense.
       President Clinton's argument that a President was not and 
     should not be impeached for tax fraud because it does not 
     involve official conduct or abuse of presidential powers 
     simply is unfounded based on the 1974 impeachment proceedings 
     against President Nixon. Moreover, the fact that the 
     President and his lawyers make this argument in defense of 
     the President is telling. He effectively claims that a large 
     scale tax cheat could be a viable chief executive.
       It is undisputed that the Judiciary Committee rejected the 
     proposed tax fraud article against President Nixon by a vote 
     of 26 to 12. A slim minority of Committee members stated the 
     view that tax fraud would not be an impeachable offense. That 
     minority view is illustrated by the comments of Rep. Waldie 
     that in the tax fraud article there was ``not an abuse of 
     power sufficient to warrant impeachment. . . .'' Debate on 
     Article of Impeachment 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the 
     Judiciary Pursuant H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 548 
     (1974) (Statement of Rep. Waldie). Similar views were 
     expressed by Rep. Hogan and Rep. Mayne. Rep. Railsback took 
     the position that there was ``a serious question,'' id. at 
     524 (Statement of Rep. Railsback), whether misconduct of the 
     President in connection with his taxes would be impeachable.
       Other members who opposed the tax fraud article based their 
     opposition on somewhat different grounds. Rep. Thornton based 
     his opposition to the tax fraud article on the ``view that 
     these charges may be reached in due course in the regular 
     process of law.'' Id. at 549 (Statement of Rep. Thornton). 
     Rep. Butler stated his view that the tax fraud article should 
     be rejected on prudential grounds: ``Sound judgment would 
     indicate that we not add this article to the trial burden we 
     already have.'' Id. at 550 (Statement of Rep. Butler).
       The record is clear, however, that the overwhelming 
     majority of those who expressed a view in the debate in 
     opposition to the tax fraud article based their opposition on 
     the insufficiency of the evidence, and not on the view that 
     tax fraud, if proven, would not be an impeachable offense.
       The comments of then-Rep. Wayne Owens in the debate in 1974 
     directly contradict the view that Mr. Owens has expressed in 
     recent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee. 
     Although Mr. Owens in 1974 expressed his ``belief'' that 
     President Nixon was guilty of misconduct in connection with 
     his taxes, he clearly stated his conclusion that ``on the 
     evidence available'' Mr. Nixon's offenses were not 
     impeachable. Id. at 549 (Statement of Rep. Owens). Mr. Owens 
     spoke of the need for ``hard evidence'' and discussed his 
     unavailing efforts to obtain additional evidence that would 
     tie ``the President to the fraudulent deed'' or that would 
     otherwise ``close the inferential gap that has to be closed 
     in order to charge the President.'' Id. He concluded his 
     comments in the 1974 debate by urging the members of the 
     Committee ``to reject this article . . . based on that lack 
     of evidence.'' Id.
       In addition to Mr. Owens, eleven members of the Committee 
     stated the view that there was not sufficient evidence of tax 
     fraud to support the article against President Nixon. 
     Wiggins: ``fraud . . . is wholly unsupported in the 
     evidence.'' Id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Wiggins). McClory: 
     ``no substantial evidence of any tax fraud.'' Id. at 531 
     (Statement of Rep. McClory). Sandman: ``There was absolutely 
     no intent to defraud here.'' Id. at 532 (Statement of Rep. 
     Sandman). Lott: ``mere mistakes or negligence by the 
     President in filing his tax returns should clearly not be 
     grounds for impeachment.'' Id. at 533 (Statement of Rep. 
     Lott). Maraziti: discussing absence of evidence of fraud. 
     Id. at 534 (Statement of Rep. Maraziti). Dennis: ``no 
     fraud has been found.'' Id. at 538 (Statement of Rep. 
     Dennis). Cohen: questioning whether ``in fact there was 
     criminal fraud involved.'' Id. at 548 (Statement of Rep. 
     Cohen). Hungate: ``I think there is a case here but in my 
     judgment I am having trouble deciding if it has as yet 
     been made.'' Id. at 553 (statement of Rep. Hungate). 
     Latta: only ``bad judgment and gross negligence.'' Id. at 
     554 (Statement of Rep. Latta). Fish: ``There is not to be 
     found before us evidence that the President acted wilfully 
     to evade his taxes.'' Id. at 556 (Statement of Rep. Fish). 
     Moorhead: ``there is no

[[Page S217]]

     showing that President Nixon in any way engaged in any 
     fraud.'' Id. at 557 (Statement of Rep. Moorhead).
       The group of those who found the evidence insufficient 
     included moderate Democrats like Rep. Hungate and Rep. Owens, 
     as well as Republicans like Rep. Fish, Rep. Cohen, and Rep. 
     McClory, all of whom supported the impeachment of President 
     Nixon.
       In light of all these facts, it is not credible to assert 
     that the House Judiciary Committee in 1974 determined that 
     tax fraud by the President would not be an impeachable 
     offense. The failure of the Committee to adopt the tax fraud 
     article against President Nixon simply does not support the 
     claim of President Clinton's lawyers that the offenses 
     charged against him do not rise to the level of impeachable 
     offenses.
       In the Committee debate in 1974 a compelling case was made 
     that tax fraud by a President--if proven by sufficient 
     evidence--would be an impeachable offense. Rep. Brooks, who 
     later served as chairman of the Committee, said:

       ``No man in America can be above the law. It is our duty to 
     establish now that evidence of specific statutory crimes and 
     constitutional violations by the President of the United 
     States will subject all Presidents now and in the future to 
     impeachment.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       ``No President is exempt under our U.S. Constitution and 
     the laws of the United States from accountability for 
     personal misdeeds any more than he is for official misdeeds. 
     And I think that we on this Committee in our effort to fairly 
     evaluate the President's activities must show the American 
     people that all men are treated equally under the law.''

     (Debate on Articles of Impeachment, 1974: Hearings of the 
     Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 
     2nd Sess., at 525, 554.)
       Professor Charles Black stated it succinctly: ``A large-
     scale tax cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.'' Charles 
     Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, (Yale University Press, 1974) 
     at 42. What is true of tax fraud is also true of a persistent 
     pattern of perjury by the President. An incorrigible perjurer 
     is not a viable chief magistrate.
       b. President Clinton Continues to Misrepresent The 
           Allegations Against Alexander Hamilton.
       President Clinton continues to try to persuade the American 
     public that the House of Representatives has impeached him 
     for having an extramarital affair. See Answer of President 
     William Jefferson Clinton to the Articles of Impeachment at 1 
     (``The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not 
     permit the conviction and removal from office of a duly 
     elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct 
     with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper.'') (emphasis added). In 
     doing so, the President's lawyers refer to an incident 
     involving then Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton 
     being blackmailed by the husband of a woman named Maria 
     Reynolds with whom he was having an adulterous affair. 
     However, the President's lawyers omit the relevant 
     distinguishing facts even as they cast aspersions upon 
     Alexander Hamilton: none of Hamilton's ``efforts'' to cover 
     up his affair involved the violation of any laws, let alone 
     felonies. Indeed, the fact of the matter is that Hamilton was 
     the victim of the crime of extortion.
       Never did Hamilton raise his right hand to take a sacred 
     oath and then willfully betray that oath and the rule of law 
     to commit perjury. Never did Alexander Hamilton obstruct 
     justice by tampering with witnesses, urging potential 
     witnesses to sign false affidavits, or attempt to conceal 
     evidence from a Federal criminal grand jury.
       Again, the significance of the distinctions are glaringly 
     obvious: it is apparent from the Hamilton case that the 
     Framers did not regard private sexual misconduct as an 
     impeachable offense. It is also apparent that efforts to 
     cover up such private behavior outside of a legal setting, 
     including even paying hush money to induce someone to destroy 
     documents, did not meet the standard. Neither Hamilton's high 
     position, nor the fact that his payments to a securities 
     swindler created an enormous appearance problem, were enough 
     to implicate the standard. These wrongs were real, and they 
     were not insubstantial, but to the Framers they were 
     essentially private and therefore not impeachable. David 
     Frum, ``Smearing Alexander Hamilton,'' The Weekly Standard 
     (Oct. 19, 1998) at 14.
       But the Alexander Hamilton incident President Clinton cites 
     actually clarifies the precise point at which personal 
     misconduct becomes a public offense. Hamilton could keep his 
     secret only by a betrayal of public responsibilities. 
     Hamilton came to that point and, at immense personal cost, 
     refused to cross the line. President Clinton came to that 
     point and, fully understanding what he was doing, knowingly 
     charged across the line. President Clinton's public  acts of 
     perjury and obstruction of justice transformed a personal 
     misconduct into a public offense.
     4. The Views of the Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars 
         the President Cites Do Not Stand Up to Careful Scrutiny.
       It speaks volumes that the most distinguished of the 400 
     historians referred to in President Clinton's trial brief is 
     Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Professor Schlesinger had a different 
     view of impeachment 25 years ago. President Clinton himself 
     asserts that ``the allegations are so far removed from 
     official wrongdoing that their assertion here threatens to 
     weaken significantly the Presidency itself.'' President's 
     Trial Memorandum at 24. However, Schlesinger has written 
     that:

       ``The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could 
     punish the man without the punishing the office. For, in the 
     Presidency as elsewhere, power was ambiguous: the power to go 
     good meant also the power to do harm, the power to serve the 
     republic also the power to demand and defile it.''

     (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Easton 
     Press edit. 1973) (hereinafter ``Schlesinger'') at 415.)
       The statement of the 400 historians cited with approval in 
     the President's trial memorandum makes the following 
     statement: ``[t]he Framers explicitly reserved that step for 
     high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive 
     power.'' Statement of Historians in Defense of the 
     Constitution, The New York Times (Oct. 30, 1998) at A15. The 
     400 historians then believe that commission of a murder or 
     rape by the President of the United States in his personal 
     capacity is not subject to the impeachment power of Article 
     II, Section 4.
       President Clinton in his trial memorandum asserts that this 
     case does not fit the paradigmatic case for impeachment. 
     President's Trial Memorandum at 24. However, none of his 
     predecessors ever faced overwhelming evidence of repeatedly 
     lying under oath before a federal court and grand jury and 
     otherwise seeking to obstruct justice to benefit himself--
     directly contradicting his oath to ``take care that the laws 
     are faithfully executed.'' But as former Attorney General 
     Griffin Bell, who served under President Carter, said before 
     the House Judiciary Committee recently, ``[a] President 
     cannot faithfully execute the laws if he himself is breaking 
     them.'' Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings 
     Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on 
     the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 203 (Comm. Print 
     1998) (Testimony of Judge Griffin B. Bell).
       President Clinton goes on to state that to make the 
     offenses alleged against him impeachable and removable 
     conduct ``would forever lower the bar in a way inimical to 
     the Presidency and to our government of separated powers. 
     These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) statements 
     about sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the fact 
     of sexual misbehavior.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26. 
     While President Clinton and his able counsel would like to 
     define the case this way, what is at issue in the articles of 
     impeachment before the Senate is clear: perjury and 
     obstruction of justice committed by the President of the 
     United States in order to thwart a duly instituted civil 
     rights sexual harassment lawsuit against him as well as a 
     subsequent grand jury investigation. While the President may 
     think such allegations would forever lower the bar in terms 
     of the conduct we expect from our public officials, we must 
     square his opinion and that of his lawyers with the fact that 
     his Justice Department puts people in prison for similar 
     conduct. While the President's brief again quotes Arthur 
     Schlesinger, Jr. for the proposition that we must not ``lower 
     the bar,'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26, Schlesinger 
     held a different view during the impeachment of President 
     Nixon:

       ``If the Nixon White House escaped the legal consequences 
     of its illegal behavior, why would future Presidents and 
     their associates not suppose themselves entitled to do what 
     the Nixon White House had done? Only condign punishment would 
     restore popular faith in the Presidency and deter future 
     Presidents from illegal conduct.''
     (Schlesinger at 418.)
     5. The President and Federal Judges are Impeached, Convicted, 
         and Removed From Office Under the Same Standard
       President Clinton's argument that Presidents are held to a 
     lower standard of behavior than federal judges completely 
     misreads the Constitution and the Senate's precedents. See 
     generally House Trial Brief at 101-06. The Constitution 
     provides one standard for the impeachment, conviction, and 
     removal from office of ``[t]the President, the Vice 
     President, and all civil officers of the United States.'' 
     U.S. Const. art II, Sec. 4. It is the commission of 
     ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' 
     Id.  The Senate has already determined that perjury is a high 
     crime and misdemeanor in the cases of Judge Nixon, Judge 
     Hastings, and Judge Claiborne.
       President Clinton argues that the standard differs because 
     judges have life tenure whereas Presidents are accountable to 
     the voters at elections. That argument fails on several 
     grounds. The differing tenures are set forth in the 
     Constitution, and there is simply no textual support for the 
     idea that they affect the impeachment standard at all. If 
     electoral accountability were a sufficient means of remedying 
     presidential misconduct, the framers would not have 
     explicitly included the President in the impeachment clause. 
     Finally, even if this argument were otherwise valid, it does 
     not apply to President Clinton because he will never face the 
     voters again. U.S. Const. amend. XXII. Indeed, all of the 
     conduct charged in the Articles occurred after the 1996 
     election.
       Then President Clinton rejects the Senate's own precedents 
     showing that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the 
     three judicial impeachments of the 1980s arguing that all of 
     the lying involved there concerned the judges' official 
     duties. That is true with respect to Judge Hastings, but 
     completely false with respect to Judge Claiborne and Judge 
     Nixon. Judge Claiborne was

[[Page S218]]

     impeached and convicted for lying on his income tax returns, 
     an entirely personal matter. President Clinton tries to 
     explain this away by saying: ``Once convicted, [Judge 
     Claiborne] simply could not perform his official functions 
     because his personal probity had been impaired such that he 
     could not longer be an arbiter of others' oaths.'' 
     President's Trial Memorandum at 29. The same is true of 
     President Clinton. He ultimately directs the Department of 
     Justice which must decide whether people are prosecuted for 
     lying. If he has committed perjury and obstructed justice, 
     how can he be the arbiter of other's oaths? As Professor 
     Jonathan Turley put it:

       ``As Chief Executive the President stands as the ultimate 
     authority over the Justice Department and the 
     Administration's enforcement policies. It is unclear how 
     prosecutors can legitimately threaten, let alone prosecute, 
     citizens who have committed perjury or obstruction of justice 
     under circumstances nearly identical to the President's. Such 
     inherent conflict will be even greater in the military cases 
     and the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.''

     (Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the 
     Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
     Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 274 (Comm. Print 1998) 
     (Testimony of Professor Jonathan Turley).)
       In the same vein, President Clinton claims that Judge Nixon 
     ``employ[ed] the power and prestige of his office to obtain 
     advantage for a party.'' President's Trial Brief at 29. In 
     fact, Judge Nixon intervened in a state criminal case in 
     which he had no official role. His ability to persuade the 
     prosecutor to drop the case rested on his friendship with the 
     state prosecutor--not his official position. President 
     Clinton argues that it was Judge Nixon's intervention in a 
     judicial proceeding that ties it to his official position. 
     The same is true of President Clinton. He intervened in two 
     judicial proceedings and his actions had the same effect as 
     Judge Nixon's--to defeat a just result.
       As the person who ultimately directs the Justice 
     Department--the federal government's prosecutorial 
     authority--the President must follow his constitutional duty 
     to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. U.S. 
     Const. art II, Sec. 3. His special constitutional duty is at 
     least as high, if not higher, than the judge's. Indeed, 
     President Clinton acknowledged as much early in his 
     Administration when controversy arose about the nomination of 
     Zoe Baird and the potential nomination of Judge Kimba Wood to 
     be Attorney General. Questions were raised about whether they 
     had properly complied with laws relating to their hiring of 
     household help. At that time, President Clinton said the 
     Attorney General ``should be held to a higher standard than 
     other Cabinet members on matters of this kind [i.e. strictly 
     complying with the law].'' Remarks of President Clinton with 
     Reporters Prior to a Meeting with Economic Advisers, February 
     8, 1993, 29 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 160. 
     If the Attorney General is held to a higher standard of 
     compliance with the law, then her superior, President 
     Clinton, must be also.


  B. The Individual Consciences of Senators Determines the Burden of 
                      Proof in Impeachment Trials.

       The Constitution does not discuss the standard of proof for 
     impeachment trials. It simply states that ``the Senate shall 
     have the Power to try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const., Art I, 
     Sec. 3, clause 5. Because the Constitution is silent on the 
     matter, it is appropriate to look at the past practice of the 
     Senate. Historically, the Senate has never set a standard of 
     proof for impeachment trials. ``In the final analysis the 
     question is one which historically has been answered by 
     individual Senators guided by their own consciences.'' 
     Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Standard 
     of Proof in Senate Impeachment Proceedings, Thomas B. Ripy, 
     Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (January 7, 
     1999).
       President Clinton argues that the impeachment trial is 
     similar to a criminal trial and that the appropriate standard 
     should therefore be ``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' That 
     argument is not new: it has been made in the past, and the 
     Senate has rejected it, as indeed, President Clinton 
     acknowledges. He asserts, however, that the impeachment trial 
     of a President should proceed under special procedures that 
     do not apply to the trial of other civil officers. His 
     arguments are unpersuasive.
     1. The Senate has Never Adopted the Criminal Standard of 
         ``Beyond a Reasonable Doubt'' or Any Other Standard of 
         Proof for Impeachment Trials.
       The Senate has never adopted the standard of ``beyond a 
     reasonable doubt'' in any impeachment trial in U.S. history. 
     In fact, the Senate has chosen not to impose a standard at 
     all, preferring to leave to the conscience of each senator 
     the decision of how best to judge the facts presented.
       In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, counsel 
     for the respondent moved to designate ``beyond a reasonable 
     doubt'' as the standard of proof for conviction. Gray & 
     Reams, The Congressional Impeachment Process and the 
     Judiciary: Documents and Materials on the Removal of Federal 
     District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Volume 5, Document 41, X 
     (1987). The Senate overwhelmingly rejected the motion by a 
     vote of 17-75. In the floor debate on the motion, House 
     Manager Kastenmeier emphasized that the Senate has 
     historically allowed each member to exercise his personal 
     judgment in these cases. 132 Cong. Rec. S15489-S15490 
     (daily ed. October 7, 1986).
       The question of the appropriate standard of proof was also 
     raised in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings. In the Senate 
     Impeachment Trial Committee, Senator Rudman said in response 
     to a question about the historical practice regarding the 
     standard of proof that there has been no specific standard, 
     ``you are not going to find it. It is what is in the mind of 
     every Senator. . . . I think it is what everybody decides for 
     themselves.'' Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial 
     Committee on the Articles Against Judge Alcee Hastings: 
     Hearings before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee (Part 
     1) 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-75, (discussion involving 
     Senator Lieberman and Senator Rudman).
     2. The Criminal Standard of Proof is Inappropriate for 
         Impeachment Trials.
       President Clinton argues that an impeachment trial is akin 
     to a criminal trial and that, therefore, the criminal 
     standard should apply. That assertion is, of course, at 
     direct odds with his apparent opposition to the presentation 
     of evidence through witnesses, another normal criminal trial 
     procedure. The Senate Rules Committee rejected this analogy 
     in 1974, stating, ``an impeachment trial is not a criminal 
     trial,'' and advocating a clear and convincing evidence 
     standard. Executive Session Hearings, U.S. Senate Committee 
     on Rules and Administration, ``Senate Rules and Precedents 
     Applicable to Impeachment Trials'' 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 
     (August 5-6, 1974). Indeed, it is undisputed that impeachable 
     offenses need not be criminal offenses. See Submission by 
     Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 
     105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14 (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998) 
     (``Impeachable acts need not be criminal acts.'')
       Moreover, the result of conviction in an impeachment trial 
     is removal from office, not punishment. As the House argued 
     in the Claiborne trial, the reasonable standard was designed 
     to protect criminal defendants who risked ``forfeitures of 
     life, liberty and property'' (quoting Brinegar v. United 
     States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949)). This standard is 
     inappropriate here because the Constitution limits the 
     consequences of a Senate impeachment trial to removal from 
     office and disqualification from holding office in the 
     future, explicitly preserving the option for a subsequent 
     criminal trial in the courts. U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 3, 
     cl. 6.
       In addition, as the House argued in the Claiborne trial, 
     the criminal standard is inappropriate because impeachment 
     is, by its nature, a proceeding where the public interest 
     weighs more heavily than the interest of the individual 
     defendant. Gray & Reams, The Congressional Impeachment 
     Process and the Judiciary: Documents and Materials on the 
     Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Volume 
     5, Document 41, X (1987). During the course of the floor 
     debate on this motion in the Claiborne trial, Representative 
     Kastenmeier argued for the House that the use of the criminal 
     standard was inappropriate where the public interest in 
     removing corrupt officials was a significant factor. 132 
     Cong. Rec. S15489-S15490 (daily ed. October 7, 1986).
     3. A President Who Is Impeached Should Not Receive Special 
         Procedural Benefits That Do Not Apply in the Impeachment 
         Trials of Other Civil Officers.
       President Clinton argues that he should be exempted from 
     the weight of historical practice and precedent and be given 
     a special rule on the standard of proof. This argument is 
     based on fallacious assertions, the first of which is that 
     different constitutional standards apply to the impeachment 
     of judges and presidents. See above at 14-16 and House Trial 
     Memorandum at 101-06.
       President Clinton also employs inflammatory rhetoric to 
     suggest that a presidential impeachment trial ought to be 
     treated differently, explaining that the criminal standard is 
     needed because ``the Presidency itself is at stake'' and 
     because conviction would ``overturn the results of an 
     election.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 32-33. The 
     presidency is, of course, not at stake, though the tenure of 
     its current office holder may be. The 25th Amendment to the 
     Constitution ensures that impeachment and removal of a 
     President would not overturn an election because it is the 
     elected Vice President who would replace the President not 
     the losing presidential candidate.
       Finally, President Clinton argues that the evidence should 
     be tested by the most stringent standard because ``there is 
     no suggestion of corruption or misuse of office--or any other 
     conduct that places our system of government at risk in the 
     two remaining years of the President's term.'' President's 
     Trial Memorandum at 33. While the President might be expected 
     to argue that he did not act corruptly, he cannot credibly 
     assert that ``there is no suggestion of corruption,'' because 
     ``corrupt'' conduct is precisely what he is charged with in 
     the articles of impeachment. Though not persuasive as an 
     argument, this statement is significant in what it concedes--
     that corruption is among the ``conduct that places our system 
     of government at risk.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 33. 
     Having acknowledged this, President Clinton cannot be heard 
     to complain that the House has failed to charge him with 
     conduct which rises to the level of an impeachable offense.

[[Page S219]]

       IV. The Structure of the Articles is Proper and Sufficient


            a. the articles are not unconstitutionally vague

       President Clinton's trial memorandum argues that the two 
     articles of impeachment are unfairly complex. To the 
     contrary, the articles present the misdeeds of President 
     Clinton and their consequences in as transparent and 
     understandable a manner as possible.
       The first article of impeachment charges that President 
     Clinton violated his enumerated constitutional 
     responsibilities by willfully corrupting and manipulating the 
     judicial process. He did this by providing perjurious, false 
     and misleading testimony to a grand jury in regard to one or 
     more of four matters. The deleterious consequences his 
     actions had for the people of the United States are then 
     described. The second article charges that President Clinton 
     violated his enumerated constitutional responsibilities by a 
     course of conduct that prevented, obstructed, and impeded the 
     administration of justice. One or more of seven listed acts 
     constitute the particulars of President Clinton's course of 
     conduct. As in the first article, the deleterious 
     consequences his actions had for the people of the United 
     States are then described.
       To do as President Clinton requests would require 
     separating out into a unique article of impeachment each 
     possible combination of (a) a particular violation of his 
     duties, (b) a particular wrongful act, and (c) a particular 
     consequence of his actions. This would require 48 different 
     articles in the case of the first article and 84 in the case 
     of the second. Such a multiplicity of articles is not 
     required and would assist no one. Of course, if the president 
     had violated fewer presidential duties, committed fewer 
     misdeeds, and been responsible for fewer harmful consequences 
     to the American people, the articles could have been drafted 
     more simply.
       The trial memorandum then makes the contention that the two 
     articles of impeachment are impermissibly vague and lacking 
     in specificity in that they do not meet the standards of a 
     criminal indictment. This contention clearly misses the mark. 
     Impeachment is a political and not a criminal proceeding, 
     designed, as recognized by Justice Joseph Story, the 
     Constitution's greatest nineteenth century interpreter, ``not 
     . . . to punish an offender'' by threatening deprivation of 
     his life or liberty, but to ``secure the state'' by 
     ``divest[ing] him of his political capacity''. J. Story, 
     Commentaries on the Constitution (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 
     1987) Sec. 803. Justice Story thus found the analogy to an 
     indictment to be invalid:

       ``The articles . . . need not, and indeed do not, pursue 
     the strict form and accuracy of an indictment. They are 
     sometimes quite general in the form of the allegations; but 
     always contain, or ought to contain, so much certainty, as to 
     enable the party to put himself upon the proper defense, and 
     also, in case of an acquittal, to avail himself of it, as a 
     bar to another impeachment.''

     (Id. at Sec. 806).
       In explaining the impeachment process to the citizens of 
     New York in Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton stated in 
     more general terms that impeachment ``can never be tied down 
     by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the 
     offense by the prosecutors or in the construction of it by 
     the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion 
     of courts in favor of personal security.'' The Federalist No. 
     65, at 398 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
       Can the president legitimately argue that he is unable to 
     put on a proper defense? President Clinton has committed a 
     great number of impeachable misdeeds. The House Judiciary 
     Committee's committee report requires 20 pages just to list 
     the most glaring instances of the president's perjurious, 
     false, and misleading testimony before a federal grand jury 
     and it requires 13 pages just to list the most glaring 
     incidents in the president's course of conduct designed to 
     prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of justice. 
     The House believes that President Clinton's attorneys have 
     reviewed the committee report. They know exactly what he is 
     being charged with, as is acknowledged in the president's 
     trial memorandum. The memorandum states in its introduction 
     that ``[t]ake away the elaborate trappings of the Articles 
     and the high-flying rhetoric that accompanied them, and we 
     see clearly that the House of Representatives asks the Senate 
     to remove the President from office because he . . .'' 
     President's Trial Memorandum at 2. In addition, in the House 
     proceedings, the President filed three documents: a 
     Preliminary Memorandum, an Initial Response, and a Submission 
     by Counsel. The first two documents were printed together and 
     ran to 57 pages. Preliminary Memorandum of the President of 
     the United States Concerning Referral of the Office of the 
     Independent Counsel and Initial Response of the President of 
     the United States to Referral of the Office of the 
     Independent Counsel, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Doc. No. 105-
     317 (1998). The third was printed and ran to 404 pages. 
     Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the United States House of 
     Representatives, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Ser. No. 
     16 1998). He was also given 30 hours to present his case 
     before the House Committee on the Judiciary, during which he 
     called numerous witnesses. The Committee repeatedly asked 
     President Clinton to provide it with any exculpatory 
     evidence, an offer which he never accepted. Now President 
     Clinton's Trial Memorandum to the Senate runs to 130 pages. 
     Clearly, President Clinton has not suffered from any lack of 
     specificity in the articles of impeachment.
       If he had, he would have availed himself of the opportunity 
     to file a motion for a bill of particulars. He had that 
     opportunity on January 11, 1999, and he waived it. He should 
     not now be heard to claim that he does not know what the 
     charges are.
       Unlike the judicial impeachments of the 1980s, President 
     Clinton has not committed a handful of specific misdeeds that 
     can easily be listed in separate articles of impeachment. 
     In order to encompass the whole melange of misdeeds that 
     caused the House of Representatives to impeach President 
     Clinton, the Judiciary Committee looked to the only 
     analogous case--that of President Nixon. In 1974, the 
     Committee was also faced with drafting articles of 
     impeachment of a reasonable length against a president who 
     had committed a long series of improper acts designed to 
     achieve an illicit end.
       The first article of impeachment against President Nixon 
     charged that in order to cover up an unlawful entry into the 
     headquarters of the Democratic National Committee and to 
     delay, impede, and obstruct the consequent investigation (and 
     for certain other purposes), he engaged in a series of acts 
     such as ``making or causing to be made false or misleading 
     statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers'', 
     ``endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency'', 
     and ``endeavoring to cause prospective defendants and 
     individuals duly tried and convicted, to expect favored 
     treatment and consideration to return for their silence or 
     false testimony.'' Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President 
     of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93rd Cong., 2d 
     Sess. 2 (1974). The article did not list each false or 
     misleading statement, did not list each misuse of the CIA, 
     and did not list each prospective defendant and what they 
     were promised.
       In like fashion, the articles of impeachment against 
     President Clinton charge him with providing perjurious, 
     false, and misleading testimony concerning four subjects, 
     such as an his relationship with a subordinate government 
     employee, and engaging in a course of conduct designed to 
     prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of justice, 
     such course including four generals acts such as an effort to 
     secure job assistance for that employee. An argument can be 
     made that the articles of impeachment against President 
     Clinton were drafted with more specificity than those against 
     President Nixon. Unless President Clinton is arguing that the 
     Senate should have dismissed the first article of impeachment 
     against President Nixon (had the president not resigned), he 
     has little ground to complain about the articles against 
     himself. In short, President Clinton knows exactly what the 
     charges are, and the Senate should now require him to account 
     for his behavior.


   B. The Articles Do Not Improperly Charge Multiple Offenses in One 
                                Article.

       President Clinton argues unpersuasively that the articles 
     of impeachment are ``unconstitutionally flawed'' in two 
     respects. First, he argues that ``by charging multiple wrongs 
     in one article, the House of Representatives has made it 
     impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional 
     mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of two-
     thirds of the members.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 101. 
     Second, he argues that the articles do not provide him ``the 
     most basic notice of the charges against him required by due 
     process and fundamental fairness.'' Id. Both arguments are 
     factually deficient, ignore Senate precedent and procedure, 
     and are constitutionally flawed.
       The articles of impeachment allege that the President made 
     ``one or more'' ``perjurious, false and misleading statements 
     to the grand jury'' and committed ``one or more'' acts in 
     which he obstructed justice. H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd 
     Sess. (1998). The articles of impeachment are modeled after 
     those adopted by the House Committee on the Judiciary against 
     President Nixon and were drafted with the rules of the Senate 
     in mind. Senate Rules specifically contemplate that the House 
     may draft articles of impeachment in this manner and prior 
     rulings of the Senate have held that such drafting is not 
     deficient and will not sustain a motion to dismiss.
       In 1986, the United States Senate amended the Rules of 
     Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
     Impeachment Trials. S. Res. 479, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
     (1986). As part of the reform, Rules XXIII, which deals 
     generally with voting the final question, was amended to 
     clarify the articles of impeachment are not divisible. Rule 
     XXIII provides in relevant part that:

       ``An article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the 
     purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial. Once 
     voting has commenced on an article of impeachment, voting 
     shall be continued until voting has been completed on all 
     articles of impeachment unless the Senate adjourns for period 
     not to exceed one day or adjourns sine die.''

       The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, after 
     thoroughly reviewing the impeachment rules, prior articles of 
     impeachments, and prior Senate trials, decided that articles 
     of impeachment should not be divisible. In drafting the 
     amendment to Rule XXIII providing that articles of 
     impeachment not be divided, the Senate was aware that the 
     House may combine multiple counts

[[Page S220]]

     of impeachable conduct in one article of impeachment. The 
     Committee report explains the Senate's position:

       ``The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the 
     divisions of an article into separate specifications is 
     proposed to permit the most judicious and efficacious 
     handling of the final question both as a general manner and, 
     in particular, with respect to the form of the articles that 
     proposed the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon. The 
     latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of embodying 
     an impeachable offense in an individual article but, in 
     respect to the first and second of those articles, set out 
     broadly based charges alleging constitutional improprieties 
     followed by a recital of transactions illustrative or 
     supportive of such charges. The wording of Articles I and II 
     expressly provided that a conviction could be had thereunder 
     if supported by ``one or more of the'' enumerated 
     specifications. The general review of the Committee at that 
     time was expressed by Senators Byrd and Allen, both of whom 
     felt that division of the articles in question into 
     potentially 14 separately voted specifications might ``be 
     time consuming and confusing, and a matter which could create 
     great chaos and division, bitterness, and ill will * * *.'' 
     Accordingly, it was agreed to write into the proposed rules 
     language which would allow each Senator to vote to convict 
     under either the first or second articles if he were 
     convinced that the person impeached was ``guilty'' or one or 
     more of the enumerated specifications.''

     Amending the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate 
     When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, Report of the Comm. on 
     Rules and Administration, S. Rept. 99-401, 99th Cong., 2nd 
     Sess., at 8 (1986) (emphasis added). Because the Senate was 
     aware that multiple specifications of impeachment conduct may 
     be contained in an article of impeachment, the Senate's rules 
     implicitly countenance such drafting.
       The issue regarding whether articles of impeachment are 
     divisible is not new to the Senate. In fact, the Senate's 
     Committee on Rules and Administration reviewed the Senate's 
     impeachment procedures in 1974 to prepare for a possible 
     trial of President Richard Nixon. The Committee passed the 
     exact same language as the Committee did in 1986 prohibiting 
     the division of an article of impeachment. Because President 
     Nixon resigned, the full Senate never considered the 
     amendments.
       Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York submitted a statement 
     to the Committee in 1974 addressing the divisibility issue 
     and advised that Rule XXIII be amended to prohibit the 
     division of an article of impeachment. His comments, as 
     follows, are instructive:

       ``Rule XXIII provides for the yeas and nays to be taken on 
     each article separately but does not set any order for a vote 
     when there are several articles. In the [President] Johnson 
     trial, this was done by order of the Senate and several votes 
     were taken on the order. This procedure, setting a vote for 
     final consideration, should be stated in the rules. Also the 
     rule is silent about the division of any article. In the 
     Johnson trial a division was requested and the Chief Justice 
     attempted to devise one, but could not, and the article as a 
     whole was submitted for a vote to the Senate. I believe 
     articles should not be divided because this raises a further 
     question of whether a two-thirds vote is required on each 
     part of an article and whether the House action on the 
     construction of a particular article can be changed without 
     further action by the House. Thus the rule should provide for 
     no division of an article by the Senate.''

     (Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment 
     Trials, Executive Session Hearings before the Comm. on 
     Standing Rules and Administration, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 
     116 (August 5th and 6th, 1974) (emphasis added).)
       In addition to implicitly recognizing that articles of 
     impeachment may contain multiple specifications of 
     impeachable offenses, the Senate has convicted a number of 
     judges on such ``omnibus'' articles, including Judges 
     Archbald, Ritter, and Claiborne. In the case of Judge Nixon, 
     the Senate acquitted on the article, but refused to dismiss 
     it.
       The most recent example, that of Judge Nixon in 1989, is 
     instructive. Judge Walter L. Nixon filed a motion to dismiss 
     on the grounds that Article III was duplicative, among other 
     things. Senator Fowler, the chairman of the committee 
     appointed to take evidence in the impeachment trial of Judge 
     Nixon explained the reasons for denying Nixon's motion to 
     refer the motion to dismiss to the full Senate:

       ``To the extent that the motion rests on the House's 
     inclusion of fourteen distinct allegations of false 
     statements in one article, we believe that Article III states 
     an intelligible and adequately discrete charge of an 
     impeachable offense by alleging that Judge Nixon concealed 
     information concerning several conversations in which he had 
     engaged by making ``one or more'' false statements to a grand 
     jury. The House has substantial discretion in determining how 
     to aggregate related alleged acts of misconduct in framing 
     Articles of Impeachment and has historically frequently 
     chosen to aggregate multiple factual allegations in a single 
     impeachment article. The House's itemization of the fourteen 
     particular statements whose knowing falsity it is alleging 
     serves to give Judge Nixon fair notice of the contours of the 
     charge against him without reducing the intelligibility of 
     the article's essential accusation that Judge Nixon knowingly 
     concealed material information from the government's law 
     enforcement agents. Because the Committee believes that 
     evidentiary proceedings may fairly be conducted on Article 
     III as it is presently drafted, Judge Nixon's motion to refer 
     his motion to dismiss Article III to the Senate at this time 
     is denied.''

     (135 Cong. Rec. 19635-36 (September 6, 1989).)
       The full Senate eventually rejected Judge Nixon's motion to 
     dismiss by a vote of 34 to 63. Mr. Manager Cardin 
     persuasively summed up the argument against the motion to 
     dismiss as follows:

       ``Judge Nixon argues, in his brief, that you must find all 
     14 statements to be false to vote guilty on article III. But 
     that is untrue. Read the article closely. The question posed 
     by article III is, did Judge Nixon conceal information? Did 
     he conceal information, first by one or more false or 
     misleading statements in his interview, and then by one or 
     more false and misleading statements in his grand jury 
     testimony?
       ``You need not find all 14 statements to be false. The 
     House is unanimously convinced that all 14 are complete and 
     utter lies. We hope you will agree. But after considering the 
     evidence, perhaps you will conclude that only 12 of the 
     statements are false. It really does not matter. Just one 
     intentionally false and misleading statement in the 
     interview, or one in the grand jury, should be enough. 
     Because if you conclude that Judge Nixon concealed 
     information, whether by 1 false statement or 14, he should be 
     removed from the bench. You should vote guilty on article 
     III.
       ``And you need not necessarily agree on which statements 
     are false, if you reach the conclusion that he concealed 
     information. If two-thirds of the Senators present believe 
     Judge Nixon lied, regardless of how each individual Senator 
     reached that conclusion, he will properly be removed from 
     office.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       ``This is by no means unfair to Judge Nixon, for even if 
     you might differ on which particular statements are lies, the 
     bottom line is that two-thirds of you will have agreed that 
     he concealed information, rendering him unfit for office. 
     That is what the Constitution requires.''

     (Id. at 26751.)
       Given the clear Senate precedent permitting articles of 
     impeachment containing multiple specifications of impeachable 
     offenses, the President's attack on the construction of the 
     articles is an attack on Senate rules and precedent. The 
     President's concerns, if assumed to be valid, could be 
     addressed simply by permitting a division of the question. 
     Under the standing rules of the Senate, any Senator may have 
     the same divided if ``the question in debate contains 
     several propositions.'' Senate Rule XV. A question is 
     divisible if it contains two or more separate and distinct 
     propositions. The Senate, however, has made an affirmative 
     decision to dispense with the regular order which governs 
     bills, resolutions, and amendments thereto, and instead 
     adopted a different procedure not permitting the division 
     of articles of impeachment. The Senate has not acted 
     unconstitutionally in the past regarding prior 
     impeachments, and is not on a course to do so in the trial 
     of President Clinton.
       The claim that President Clinton is not on notice regarding 
     the charges is ludicrous. The Lewinsky matter is arguably the 
     most reported and scrutinized story of 1998 and possibly of 
     1999. The facts of the case are contained in numerous 
     documents, statements, reports, and filings. Specifically, 
     President Clinton has had the following documents, among 
     others, containing the facts and specifics of the case: (1) 
     Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in 
     Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States 
     Code, Section 595(c), H. Doc. 105-310, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
     (1998); (2) Investigatory Powers of the Comm. on the 
     Judiciary with Respect to its Impeachment Inquiry, H. Rept. 
     105-795, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 7, 1998); (3) 
     Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
     United States, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. Rept. 105-830 
     (Dec. 16, 1998); and (4) Trial Memorandum of the United 
     States House of Representatives. If all of these reports and 
     the thousands of pages of documents are not enough, President 
     Clinton will have the opportunity to review the presentation 
     of the Managers on the Part of the House for up to twenty-
     four hours.

    V. President Clinton Completely Misstates the Record as to the 
    Discovery Procedures That Were Available to Him in the House of 
                            Representatives

       President Clinton's trial memorandum claimed to the Senate 
     that, should it decide ``to allow the House managers to 
     expand the record in some way . . . the President would have 
     an urgent need for the discovery of relevant evidence, 
     because at no point in these proceedings has been able to 
     subpoena documents or summon or cross-examine witnesses.'' 
     President's Trial Memorandum at 125 (emphasis added). The 
     President also states that ``the House of Representatives 
     [did not] afford the President any discovery mechanisms to 
     secure evidence that might be helpful in his defense.'' Id.
       We will not address every discovery issue here since those 
     issues will be resolved in the coming days; however, the 
     Senate should know that these claims are absolutely false. In 
     fact, the President's own brief refutes his claims. ``The 
     Committee allowed the President's lawyers two days in which 
     to present a defense. The White House presented four panels 
     of distinguished expert witnesses. . . .'' White House 
     Counsel Charles

[[Page S221]]

     F.C. Ruff presented argument to the Committee on behalf of 
     the President. . . .'' Id. at 13.
       The House Committee on the Judiciary repeatedly asked the 
     President's attorneys to supply any exculpatory evidence to 
     the Committee, both orally and in writing. They never did. 
     When, at the last minute, the President's counsel requested 
     witnesses, the Committee invited to testify every witness 
     they requested. Aside from this, President Clinton nor his 
     attorneys never asked to ``subpoena documents'' or ``summon 
     or cross-examine witnesses.'' If President Clinton's argument 
     is that the Committee did not provide his staff a stack of 
     blank subpoenas, that is correct. However, neither the House 
     of Representatives, nor the Senate, has the ability to ``turn 
     over'' its constitutionally based subpoena power to the 
     executive branch.
       President Clinton's attorneys never asked to do the things 
     they now claim they never had the ability to do. In fact, 
     when minority members of the Committee publicly asked that 
     Judge Starr be called as a witness, Judge Starr was called. 
     In fact, President Clinton's attorney and minority counsel 
     questioned Judge Starr for over two hours. Every Member of 
     the Committee questioned him for at least five minutes each. 
     Judge Starr was a witness, and he was cross-examined by David 
     Kendall, President Clinton's private attorney. President 
     Clinton's claims are just not accurate.
       President Clinton's attorneys raise the issue of fairness. 
     They are entitled to their own opinion about the House's 
     proceedings, but they are not entitled to rewrite history. 
     The truth is that the Committee's subpoena power could have 
     been used to subpoena documents or witnesses on behalf of the 
     President if they had so requested. They did not. All they 
     requested, is that lawyers, law professors, and historians 
     testify before the Committee. In short, President Clinton's 
     statements about what happened in the House completely 
     misstate what occurred.

                             VI. Conclusion

       For the reasons stated herein and in the Trial Memorandum 
     of the United States House of Representatives, the House 
     respectfully submits that the articles properly state 
     impeachable offenses, that the Senate should proceed to a 
     full trial on the articles, and that after trial, the Senate 
     should vote to convict President William Jefferson Clinton, 
     remove him from office, and disqualify him from holding 
     further office.
           Respectfully submitted,

     The United States
     House of Representatives.

     Henry J. Hyde,
     F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
     Bill McCollum,
     George W. Gekas,
     Charles T. Canady,
     Stephen E. Buyer,
     Ed Bryant,
     Steve Chabot,
     Bob Barr,
     Asa Hutchinson,
     Chris Cannon,
     James E. Rogan,
     Lindsey O. Graham,
                                Managers on the Part of the House.

                                                 Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                  General Counsel.
                                               David P. Schippers,
                                      Chief Investigative Counsel.
       Dated: January 14, 1999.

  The CHIEF JUSTICE. I would like to inform Members of the Senate and 
the parties in this case of my need to stand on occasion to stretch my 
back. I have no intention that the proceedings should be in any way 
interrupted when I do so.
  The Presiding Officer notes the presence in the Senate Chamber of the 
managers on the part of the House of Representatives and counsel for 
the President of the United States.
  Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the managers for 
the House of Representatives have 24 hours to make the presentation of 
their case. The Senate will now hear you.
  The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde to begin the 
presentation of the case for the House of Representatives.
  Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel for the 
President, and Senators.
  We are brought together on this solemn and historic occasion to 
perform important duties assigned to us by the Constitution.
  We want you to know how much we respect you and this institution and 
how grateful we are for your guidance and your cooperation.
  With your permission, we the managers of the House are here to set 
forth the evidence in support of two articles of impeachment against 
President William Jefferson Clinton. You are seated in this historic 
Chamber not to embark on some great legislative debate, which these 
stately walls have so often witnessed, but to listen to the evidence, 
as those who must sit in judgment.
  To guide you in this grave duty, you have taken an oath of 
impartiality. With the simple words ``I do,'' you have pledged to put 
aside personal bias and partisan interest and to do ``impartial 
justice.'' Your willingness to take up this calling has once again 
reminded the world of the unique brilliance of America's constitutional 
system of Government. We are here, Mr. Chief Justice and distinguished 
Senators, as advocates for the rule of law, for equal justice under the 
law and for the sanctity of the oath.
  The oath. In many ways the case you will consider in the coming days 
is about those two words ``I do,'' pronounced at two Presidential 
inaugurations by a person whose spoken words have singular importance 
to our Nation and to the great globe itself.
  More than 450 years ago, Sir Thomas More, former Lord Chancellor of 
England, was imprisoned in the Tower of London because he had, in the 
name of conscience, defied the absolute power of the King. As the 
playwright Robert Bolt tells it, More was visited by his family, who 
tried to persuade him to speak the words of the oath that would save 
his life, even while, in his mind and heart, he held firm to his 
conviction that the King was in error. More refused. As he told his 
daughter, Margaret, ``When a man takes an oath, Meg, he's holding his 
own self in his hands. Like water. And if he opens his fingers then--he 
needn't hope to find himself again . . .'' Sir Thomas More, the most 
brilliant lawyer of his generation, a scholar with an international 
reputation, the center of a warm and affectionate family life which he 
cherished, went to his death rather than take an oath in vain.
  Members of the Senate, what you do over the next few weeks will 
forever affect the meaning of those two words ``I do.'' You are now 
stewards of the oath. Its significance in public service and our 
cherished system of justice will never be the same after this. 
Depending on what you decide, it will either be strengthened in its 
power to achieve justice or it will go the way of so much of our moral 
infrastructure and become a mere convention, full of sound and fury, 
signifying nothing.
  The House of Representatives has named myself and 12 other Members as 
Managers of its case. I have the honor of introducing those 
distinguished Members and explaining how we will make our initial 
presentation. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Representative Jim 
Sensenbrenner, will begin the presentation with an overview of the 
case. Representative Sensenbrenner is the ranking Republican member of 
the House Judiciary Committee, and has served for 20 years. In 1989, 
Representative Sensenbrenner was a House manager in the impeachment 
trial of Judge Walter L. Nixon who was convicted on two articles of 
impeachment for making false and misleading statements before a federal 
grand jury.
  Following Representative Sensenbrenner will be a team of managers who 
will make a presentation of the relevant facts of this case. From the 
very outset of this ordeal, there has been a great deal of speculation 
and misinformation about the facts. That has been unfortunate for 
everyone involved. We believe that a full presentation of the facts and 
the law by the House managers--will be helpful.
  Representative Ed Bryant, from Tennessee was a United States Attorney 
from the Western District of Tennessee. As a captain in the Army, 
Representative Bryant served in the Judge Advocate General Corps and 
taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point. 
Representative Bryant will explain the background of the events that 
led to the illegal actions of the President. Following Representative 
Bryant,  Representative Asa Hutchinson from Arkansas will give a 
presentation of the factual basis for article II, obstruction of 
justice. Representative Hutchinson is a former United States Attorney 
for the Western District of Arkansas. Next, you will hear from 
Representative Jim Rogan of California. Representative Rogan is a 
former California State judge and Los Angeles County Deputy District 
Attorney. Representative Rogan will give a presentation of the factual 
basis for article I, grand jury perjury. This should conclude our 
presentation for today.

  Tomorrow, Representative Bill McCollum of Florida will tie all of the 
facts together and give a factual summation. Representative McCollum is

[[Page S222]]

the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, a former Naval Reserve 
Commander and member of the Judge Advocate General Corps.
  Following the presentation of the facts, a team of managers will 
present the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of justice and 
how it applies to the articles of impeachment before you. While the 
Senate has made it clear that a crime is not essential to impeachment 
and removal from office, these managers will explain how egregious and 
criminal the conduct alleged in the articles of impeachment is. This 
team includes Representative George Gekas of Pennsylvania, 
Representative Steve Chabot of Ohio, Representative Bob Barr of 
Georgia, and Representative Chris Cannon of Utah. Representative Gekas 
is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative 
Law. And in 1989, Representative Gekas served as a manager of the 
impeachment trial of Judge Alcee Hastings who the Senate convicted on 
eight articles for making false and misleading statements under oath 
and one article of conspiracy to engage in a bribery. Representative 
Gekas is a former assistant district attorney. Representative Chabot 
serves on the Subcommittee on Crime and has experience as a criminal 
defense lawyer. Representative Barr is a former United States Attorney 
for the Northern District of Georgia, where he specialized in public 
corruption. He also has experience as a criminal defense attorney. 
Representative Cannon has had experience as the Deputy Associate 
Solicitor General of the Department of the Interior and as a practicing 
attorney. That should conclude our presentation for Friday.
  On Saturday, three managers will make a presentation on 
Constitutional law as it relates to this case. There has been a great 
deal of argument about whether the conduct alleged in the articles 
rises to the level of removable offenses. This team's analysis of the 
precedents of the Senate and application of the facts of this case will 
make it clear that the Senate has established the conduct alleged in 
the articles to be removable offenses. In this presentation you will 
hear from Representative Charles Canady of Florida, Representative 
Steve Buyer of Indiana and Representative Lindsey Graham of South 
Carolina. Representative Canady is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
the Constitution and one of the leading voices on constitutional law in 
the House. Representative Buyer served in the United States Army as a 
member of the Judge Advocate General Corps where he was assigned as 
Special Assistant to the United States Attorney in Virginia. He also 
served as a deputy to the Indiana Attorney General. Representative 
Graham served in the Air Force as a member of the Judge Advocate 
General Corps and as a South Carolina Assistant Attorney.
  Following the presentation of the facts, the law of perjury and 
obstruction of justice and constitutional law, Mr. Rogan and myself 
will give you a final summation and closing to our initial 
presentation.
  Mr. Sensenbrenner.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Manager Sensenbrenner is recognized.
  Mr. Manager SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel 
to the President, and Senators, in his third annual message to Congress 
on December 7, 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt said:

       No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we 
     ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it. 
     Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a 
     favor.

  We are here today because President William Jefferson Clinton decided 
to put himself above the law, not once, not twice, but repeatedly. He 
put himself above the law when he engaged in a multifaceted scheme to 
obstruct justice during the Federal civil rights case of Paula Corbin 
Jones versus William Jefferson Clinton, et. al. He put himself above 
the law when he made perjurious, false and misleading statements under 
oath during his grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998. In both 
instances, he unlawfully attempted to prevent the judicial branch of 
Government--a coequal branch--from performing its constitutional duty 
to administer equal justice under law.
  The United States House of Representatives has determined that the 
President's false and misleading testimony to the grand jury and his 
obstruction of justice in the Jones lawsuit are high crimes and 
misdemeanors within the meaning of the Constitution. Should the Senate 
conduct a fair and impartial trial which allows each side to present 
its best case, then the American public can be confident that justice 
has been served, regardless of the outcome.
  We hear much about how important the rule of law is to our Nation and 
to our system of government. Some have commented this expression is 
trite. But, whether expressed by these three words, or others, the 
primacy of law over the rule of individuals is what distinguishes the 
United States from most other countries and why our Constitution is as 
alive today as it was 210 years ago.
  The Framers of the Constitution devised an elaborate system of checks 
and balances to ensure our liberties by making sure that no person, 
institution, or branch of Government became so powerful that a tyranny 
could ever be established in the United States of America.
  We are the trustees of that sacred legacy and whether the rule of law 
and faith in our Nation emerges stronger than ever, or are diminished 
irreparably, depends upon the collective decision of the message each 
Senator chooses to send forth in the days ahead.
  The evidence you will hear relates solely to the President's 
misconduct, which is contrary to his constitutional public 
responsibility to ensure the laws be faithfully executed. It is not 
about the President's affair with a subordinate employee, an affair 
that was both inappropriate and immoral. Mr. Clinton has recognized 
that this relationship was wrong. I give him credit for that. But he 
has not owned up to the false testimony, the stonewalling and legal 
hairsplitting, and obstructing the courts from finding the truth. In 
doing so, he has turned his affair into a public wrong. And for these 
actions, he must be held accountable through the only constitutional 
means the country has available--the difficult and painful process of 
impeachment.
  Impeachment is one of the checks the Framers gave to Congress to 
protect the American people from a corrupt or tyrannical executive or 
judicial branch of Government. Because the procedure is cumbersome and 
because a two-thirds vote in the Senate is required to remove an 
official following an impeachment trial, safeguards are there to stop 
Congress from increasing its powers at the expense-of the other two 
branches. The process is long. It is difficult. It is unpleasant. But, 
above all, it is necessary to maintain the public's trust in the 
conduct of their elected officials--elected officials, such as myself 
and yourselves, who through our oaths of office have a duty to follow 
the law, fulfill our constitutional responsibilities, and protect our 
Republic from public wrongdoing.

  The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a separate and distinct 
process in the House and in the Senate. They did not expect the House 
and Senate to conduct virtually identical proceedings with the only 
difference being that conviction in the Senate requires a two-thirds 
vote. That is why the Constitution reserves the sole power of 
impeachment to the House of Representatives and the sole power to try 
all impeachments to the Senate. History demonstrates different 
processes were adopted to reflect very different roles.
  In the case of President Andrew Johnson, no hearings were held or 
witnesses called by the House on the President's decision to remove 
Secretary of War Stanton from office. The House first approved a 
general article of impeachment that simply stated that President 
Johnson was impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors. Five days 
later, a special House committee drew up specific articles. Eleven 
articles were passed by the House, all but two of which were based upon 
President Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act by 
his actions in removing Secretary of War Stanton. The trial was then 
conducted with witnesses in the Senate.
  In the case of President Nixon, the House Judiciary Committee passed 
three articles of impeachment based not upon their own investigation, 
but upon the evidence gathered by the Ervin Committee, the Patman 
Committee, the Joint Tax Committee and

[[Page S223]]

material from the special prosecutor and various court proceedings. 
Nine witnesses were called at the end of the impeachment inquiry, five 
of them at the request of the White House, and their testimony was not 
at the center of the impeachment articles.
  In the Judge Walter Nixon impeachment in 1989, a trial with live 
witnesses was held even after the Senate rejected by less than a two-
thirds vote a defense motion to dismiss one article of impeachment on 
the grounds that it did not constitute an impeachable offense.
  The House managers submit witnesses are essential to give heightened 
credence to whatever judgment the Senate chooses to make on each of the 
articles of impeachment against President Clinton.
  The matter of how this proceeding will be conducted remains somewhat 
unsettled. Senate impeachment precedent has been to hold a trial. And, 
in every impeachment case, the Senate has heard from live witnesses. 
Should the President's counsel dispute the facts as laid out by the 
House of Representatives, the Senate will need to hear from live 
witnesses in order to reach a proper and fair judgment as to the 
truthful facts of this case.
  The House concluded the President made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements before the grand jury, which the House believes 
constitutes a high crime and misdemeanor. Our entire legal system is 
based upon the courts being able to find the truth. That's why 
witnesses must raise their right hand and swear to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. That's why there are criminal 
penalties for perjury and making false statements under oath. The need 
for obtaining truthful testimony in court is so important that the 
Federal sentencing guidelines have the same penalties for perjury as 
for bribery.
  The Constitution specifically names bribery as an impeachable 
offense. Perjury is the twin brother of bribery. By making the penalty 
for perjury the same as that for bribery, Congress has acknowledged 
that both crimes are equally serious. It follows that perjury and 
making false statements under oath, which is a form of perjury, be 
considered among the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' the Framers 
intended to be grounds for impeachment.
  The three judicial impeachments of the 1980's were all about lies 
told by a federal judge. Judge Claiborne was removed from office for 
lying on his income tax returns. Judge Hastings was removed for lying 
under oath during a trial, and Judge Nixon was removed for making false 
statements to a grand jury. In each case, the Senate showed no leniency 
to judges who lie. Their misconduct was deemed impeachable and more 
than 2/3rds of the Senate voted to convict.
  If the Senate is convinced that President Clinton lied under oath and 
does not remove him from office, the wrong message is given to our 
courts, those who have business before them, and to the country as a 
whole. That terrible message is that we as a nation have set a lower 
standard for lying under oath for Presidents than for judges. Should 
not the leader of our country be held to at least as high a standard as 
the judges he appoints? Should not the President be obliged to tell the 
truth when under oath, just as every citizen must? Should not our laws 
be enforced equally? Your decision in this proceeding will answer these 
questions and set the standard of conduct of public officials in town 
halls and courtrooms everywhere and the Oval Office for generations.
  Justice is never served by the placing of any public official above 
the law. The framers rejected the British law of, ``The King can do no 
wrong'', when they wrote our basic law in 1787. Any law is only as good 
as its enforcement, and the enforcement of the law against the 
President was left to Congress through the impeachment process.
  A Senate conviction of the President in this matter will reaffirm the 
irrefutable fact that even the President of the United States has no 
license to lie under oath. Deceiving the courts is an offense against 
the public. It prevents the courts from administering justice and 
citizens from receiving justice. Every American has the right to go to 
court for redress of wrongs, as well as the right to a jury trial. The 
jury finds the facts. The citizens on the jury cannot correctly find 
the facts absent truthful testimony. That's why it's vital that the 
Senate protect the sanctity of the oath to obtain truthful testimony, 
not just during judicial proceedings but also during legislative 
proceedings as well.
  Witnesses before Congress, whether presidential nominees seeking 
Senate confirmation to high posts in the executive or judicial 
branches, federal agency heads testifying during investigative 
hearings, or witnesses at legislative hearings giving their opinions on 
bills are sworn to tell the truth. Eroding the oath to tell the truth 
means that Congress loses some of its ability to base its decisions 
upon truthful testimony. Lowering the standard of the truthfulness of 
sworn testimony will create a cancer that will keep the legislative 
branch from discharging its constitutional functions as well.
  Mr. Chief Justice, we are here today because William Jefferson 
Clinton decided to use all means possible--both legal and illegal--to 
subvert the truth about his conduct relevant to the federal civil 
rights suit brought against President Clinton by Mrs. Paula Jones. 
Defendants in civil lawsuits cannot pick and choose which laws and 
rules of procedure they will follow and which they will not. That's for 
the trial judge to decide, whether the defendant be President or 
pauper.
  In this case, a citizen claimed her civil rights were violated when 
she refused then Governor Clinton's advances and was subsequently 
harassed at work, denied merit pay raises, and finally forced to quit. 
The court ruled she had the right to obtain evidence showing other 
women including Miss Lewinsky, got jobs, promotions, and raises after 
submitting to Mr. Clinton, and whether other women suffered job 
detriments after refusing similar advances.
  When someone lies about an affair and tries to hide the fact, they 
violate the trust their spouse and family put in them. But when they 
lie about it during a legal proceeding and obstruct the parties from 
obtaining evidence, they prevent the courts from administering justice.
  That is an offense against the public, made even worse when a poor or 
powerless person seeks the protections of our civil rights from the 
rich or powerful.
  When an American citizen claims his or her civil rights have been 
violated, we must take those claims seriously. Our civil rights laws 
have remade our society for the better. The law gives the same 
protections to the child denied entry to a school or college based upon 
race as to an employee claiming discrimination at work. Once a hole is 
punched in civil rights protections for some, those protections are not 
worth as much for all. Many in the Senate have spent their lives 
advancing individual rights. Their successful efforts have made America 
a better place. In my opinion, this is no time to abandon that 
struggle--no matter the public mood or the political consequence.
  Some have said that the false testimony given by the President 
relating to sex should be excused, since as the argument goes, 
``Everyone lies about sex.'' I would ask the Senate to stop to think 
about the consequences of adopting that attitude. Our sexual harassment 
laws would become unenforceable since every sexual harassment lawsuit 
is about sex, and much of domestic violence litigation is at least 
partly about sex. If defendants in these types of suits are allowed to 
lie about sex, justice cannot be done, and many victims, mostly women, 
will be denied justice.
  Mr. Chief Justice, the House has adopted two articles of impeachment 
against President William Jefferson Clinton. Each meets the standard of 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' and each is amply supported by the 
evidence.
  Article 1 impeaches the President for ``perjurious, false and 
misleading'' testimony during his August 17, 1998, appearance before a 
grand jury of the United States in four areas.
  First, the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate 
government employee.
  Second, prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a 
federal civil rights action brought against him.
  Third, prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney 
to make to a federal judge in that federal civil rights lawsuit.
  Fourth, his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses 
and to

[[Page S224]]

impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
  The evidence will clearly show that President Clinton's false 
testimony to the grand jury was not a single or isolated instance which 
could be excused as a mistake, but rather a comprehensive and 
calculated plan to prevent the grand jury from getting the accurate 
testimony in order to do its job. Furthermore, it is important to 
dispel the notion that the President's false testimony before the grand 
jury simply relates to details of the relationship between President 
Clinton and Miss Lewinsky. These charges only make up a small part of 
Article 1. The fact is, the evidence will show that President Clinton 
made numerous perjurious, false and misleading statements regarding his 
efforts to obstruct justice.
  Before describing what the evidence in support of Article 1 shows, it 
is also important to clearly demonstrate that the Senate has already 
decided that making false statements under oath to a federal grand jury 
is an impeachable offense.
  The last impeachment decided by the Senate, that of United States 
District Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, involved the Judge's 
making false statements under oath to a federal grand jury, precisely 
the same charges contained in Article 1 against President Clinton. 
Following an unanimous 417 to 0 vote in the House, the Senate conducted 
a full trial and removed Judge Nixon from office on the two articles 
charging false statements to a grand jury by votes of 89 to 8 and 78 to 
19. The Senate was clear that the specific misconduct, that is, making 
false statements to a grand jury, which was the basis for the Judge's 
impeachment, warranted his removal from office and the Senate proceeded 
to do just that.
  These votes, a little more than nine years ago on November 3, 1989, 
set a clear standard that lying to a grand jury is grounds for removal 
from office. To set a different standard in this trial is to say that 
the standard for judicial truthfulness during grand jury testimony is 
higher than that of presidential truthfulness.
  That result would be absurd. The truth is the truth and a lie is a 
lie. There cannot be different levels of the truth for judges than for 
presidents.
  The President's perjurious, false and misleading statements regarding 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began early in his grand jury 
testimony. These statements included parts of the prepared statement 
the President read at the beginning of his testimony. He referred or 
reverted to his statement at least 19 times during the course of his 
testimony.
  Further, the evidence will show the President made other false 
statements to the grand jury regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at times when he did not refer to his 
prepared statement.
  Second, the evidence will show that the President piled perjury upon 
perjury when he provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to 
the grand jury concerning prior perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony given in Ms. Paula Jones' case.
  On two occasions, the President testified to the grand jury that his 
deposition testimony was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, and that he was required to give a complete answer to each 
question asked of him during the deposition. That means he brought to 
the grand jury his untruthful answers to questions at the deposition.
  Third, the evidence will show the President provided perjurious, 
false and misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury regarding his 
attorney's use of an affidavit he knew to be false during the 
deposition in Ms. Paula Jones' case before Federal Judge Susan Webber 
Wright.
  The President denied that he even paid attention to Mr. Bennett's use 
of the affidavit. The evidence will show he made this denial because 
his failure to stop his attorney from utilizing a false affidavit at a 
deposition would constitute obstruction of justice. The evidence will 
also show the President did not admit that Mr. Bennett's statement was 
false because to do so would be to admit that he had perjured himself 
earlier that day during the grand jury testimony, as well as at the 
deposition.
  Fourth, the evidence will show that the President provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning 
his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to 
impede the discovery of evidence in Ms. Paula Jones' civil rights 
action.
  The evidence will show that these statements related to at least four 
areas:
  First, his false statements relating to gifts exchanged between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky. The subpoena served on Ms. Lewinsky in the 
Jones case required her to produce each and every gift she had received 
from the President. These gifts were not turned over as required by the 
subpoena, but ended up under Ms. Betty Currie's bed in a sealed 
container. The President denied under oath that he directed Ms. Currie 
to get the gifts, but the evidence will show that Ms. Currie did call 
Ms. Lewinsky about them and that there was no reason for her doing so 
unless directed by the President.
  Second, the President made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements to the grand jury regarding his knowledge that the Lewinsky 
affidavit submitted at the deposition was untrue. The evidence will 
show that the President testified falsely on this issue on at least 
three separate occasions during his grand jury testimony. He also 
provided false testimony on whether he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file 
a false affidavit.
  Third, the President made false and misleading statements to the 
grand jury by reciting a false account of the facts regarding his 
interactions with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie, who was a potential 
witness against him in Ms. Jones' case.

  The record reflects the President tried to coach Ms. Currie to recite 
inaccurate answers to possible questions should she be called as a 
witness. The evidence will show the President testified to the grand 
jury that he was trying to figure out what the facts were, but in 
reality the conversation with Ms. Currie consisted of a number of very 
false and misleading statements.
  Finally, the President made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements to aides regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. In 
his grand jury testimony, the President tried to have it both ways on 
this issue. He testified that his statements to aides were both true 
and misleading--true and misleading.
  The evidence will show that he met with four aides who would later be 
called to testify before the grand jury. They included Mr. Sidney 
Blumenthal, Mr. John Podesta, Mr. Erskine Bowles, and Mr. Harold Ickes. 
Each of them related to the grand jury the untruths they had been told 
by the President. I have recited this long catalogue of false 
statements to show that the President's false statements to the grand 
jury were neither few in number nor isolated, but rather pervaded his 
entire testimony.
  There can be no question that the President's false statements to the 
grand jury were material to the subject of the inquiry. Grand juries 
are utilized to obtain sworn testimony from witnesses to determine 
whether a crime has been committed. The Attorney General and the 
Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit appointed an independent counsel pursuant to law 
and added areas of inquiry because they believed there was evidence 
that the President may have committed crimes. Grand jury testimony 
relevant to the criminal probe is always material to the issue of 
whether someone has committed a crime.
  Based upon the precedent in the Judge Nixon impeachment, the law, the 
facts, and the evidence, if you find the President made perjurious, 
false and misleading statements under oath to the grand jury, I 
respectfully submit that your duty will be to find William Jefferson 
Clinton guilty with respect to article I and to remove him from office.
  Article II impeaches William Jefferson Clinton for preventing, 
obstructing and impeding the administration of justice in the Jones 
case by either directly or through subordinates and agents engaging in 
a scheme to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of 
evidence and testimony relating to Ms. Jones' Federal civil rights 
action.

[[Page S225]]

  As in the case of article I, the President's direct and indirect 
actions were not isolated mistakes, but were multifaceted actions 
specifically designed to prevent Ms. Paula Jones from having her day in 
court.
  While the Senate determined in the Judge Nixon trial that the making 
of false statements to a Federal grand jury warranted conviction and 
removal from office, no impeachment on an obstruction of justice charge 
has ever reached the Senate.
  Therefore, this article is a matter of first impression. However, the 
impeachment inquiry of the House Judiciary Committee into the conduct 
of President Richard Nixon, as well as the relevant Federal criminal 
statutes, clearly show President Clinton's actions to be within the 
definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' contained in the 
Constitution.

  The first article of impeachment against President Nixon approved by 
the Judiciary Committee charged Mr. Nixon with ``engag(ing) personally 
and through his subordinates and agents in a course of conduct or plan 
designed to delay, impede and obstruct the investigation of such 
unlawful entry; to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible and 
to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful activities.''
  The article charged that the implementation of the plan included nine 
separate areas of misconduct. Included among these were, one, making or 
causing to be made false and misleading statements to investigative 
officers and employees of the United States; two, withholding relevant 
and material evidence from such persons; three, approving, condoning, 
acquiescing in and counseling witnesses with respect to the giving of 
false and misleading statements to such persons as well as in judicial 
and congressional proceedings.
  History shows us that President Nixon's resignation was the only act 
that prevented the Senate from voting on this article, and that the 
President's conviction and removal from office were all but certain.
  There are two sections of the Federal Criminal Code placing penalties 
on those who obstruct justice. Title 18, United States Code, section 
1503, punishes ``(whoever * * * corruptly, or by threats or force * * * 
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede the 
due administration of justice.''
  The courts have held that this section relates to pending judicial 
process, which can be a civil action. Ms. Jones' case fits that 
definition at the time of the President's actions as alleged in article 
II, as does the Office of Independent Counsel's investigation.
  Title 18, United States Code, section 1512, punishes, ``Whoever * * * 
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in 
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to * * * 
influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official 
proceeding * * * (or) cause or induce any person to * * * withhold 
testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object from an 
official proceeding * * *.''
  The evidence will show that President Clinton's actions constituted 
obstruction of justice in seven specific instances as alleged in 
Article II. Paragraph one alleges that on or about December 17, 1997, 
the President encouraged Miss Lewinsky, who would be subpoenaed as a 
witness in Mrs. Jones' case two days later, to execute a sworn 
affidavit that he knew would be perjurious, false, and misleading.
  The evidence will show the President's actions violated both federal 
criminal obstruction statutes.
  Second, Article II alleges that on or about that same day, the 
President corruptly encouraged Miss Lewinsky to give perjurious, false, 
and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally in 
that proceeding. Miss Lewinsky, on the witness list at that time, could 
have been expected to be required to give live testimony in the Jones 
case and in fact she was subsequently subpoenaed for a deposition in 
that case.
  The evidence will show the President's actions violated both federal 
criminal obstruction statutes.
  Third, Article II alleges on or about December 28, 1997, the 
President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to 
conceal evidence which had been subpoenaed in Mrs. Jones' civil rights 
case. He did so by asking Ms. Betty Currie to retrieve evidence from 
Miss Lewinsky that had been subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. Clinton.
  The evidence will show the President's actions violated the second 
federal criminal obstruction statute.
  Fourth, Article II alleges that beginning on or about December 7, 
1997, and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, the 
President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance to Miss Lewinsky in order to corruptly prevent her truthful 
testimony in the Jones case at a time when her truthful testimony would 
have been harmful to him.
  While Miss Lewinsky had sought employment in New York City long 
before the dates in question, helping her find a suitable job was 
clearly a low priority for the President and his associates until it 
became obvious she would become a witness in the Jones case. The 
evidence will clearly show an intensification of that effort after her 
name appeared on the witness list. This effort was ultimately 
successful and the evidence will show that the President's actions 
violated both federal obstruction statutes.
  Fifth, Article II alleges on January 17, 1998, the President 
corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements 
to Judge Wright characterizing the Lewinsky affidavit in order to 
prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. The President's 
attorney, Robert Bennett, subsequently acknowledged such false and 
misleading statements in a communication to Judge Wright.
  The evidence will show the President's actions clearly violate the 
second federal criminal obstruction statute.
  Sixth, Article II alleges that on or about January 18, 20, and 21, 
1998, the President related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to Mrs. Jones' civil rights suit to Ms. Betty Currie, a 
potential witness in the proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
her testimony.
  The evidence will show that President Clinton attempted to influence 
the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie, his personal secretary, by coaching 
her to recite inaccurate answers to possible questions that might be 
asked of her if called to testify in Mrs. Paula Jones' case. The 
President did this shortly after he had been deposed in the civil 
action.
  During the deposition, he frequently referred to Ms. Currie and it 
was logical that based upon his testimony, Ms. Currie would be called 
as a witness.
  The evidence will show that two hours after the completion of the 
deposition, the President called Ms. Currie to ask her to come to the 
office the next day, which was a Sunday.
  When Ms. Currie testified to the grand jury, she acknowledged the 
President made a series of leading statements or questions and 
concluded that the President wanted her to agree with him.
  The evidence will show the President's actions violated both 
statutes, but most particularly section 1512.
  In United States v. Rodolitz 786 F2d 77 at 82 (2nd Cir 1986) cert. 
Den. 479 US 826 (1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd 
Circuit said,

       The most obvious example of a sec. 1512 violation may be 
     the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a 
     false story as if the story were true, intending that the 
     witness believes the story and testify to it before the grand 
     jury.

  If the President's actions do not fit this example, I'm at a loss to 
know what actions do.
  Seventh, and last, Article II alleges on or about January 21, 23, and 
26, 1998, the President made false and misleading statements to 
potential witnesses in a federal grand jury proceeding in order to 
corruptly influence this testimony of those witnesses. The articles 
further alleges these false and misleading statements were repeated by 
the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive 
false and misleading information.
  The evidence will show that these statements were made to 
presidential aides Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. Erskine Bowles, Mr. John 
Podesta and Mr. Harold Ickes. They all testified to the grand jury. By 
his own admission seven months later, on August 17, 1998, during his 
sworn grand jury testimony, the President said that he told a number of 
aides that he did not have an affair with Ms. Lewinsky and did not

[[Page S226]]

have sex with her. He told one aide, Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, that Miss 
Monica Lewinsky came on to him and he rebuffed her. President Clinton 
also admitted that he knew these aides might be called before the grand 
jury as witnesses. The evidence will show they were called; they 
related the President's false statements to the grand jury; and that by 
the time the President made his admission to the grand jury, the damage 
had already been done.
  This is a classic violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512.
  The seven specific, allegations of obstruction of justice contained 
in Article II were designed to prevent the judicial branch of 
government, a separate and coequal branch, from doing its work in Ms. 
Paula Jones' lawsuit. Based upon the allegation of Article 1 against 
President Nixon in 1974, as well as repeated and calculated violations 
of two key criminal obstruction statutes, William Jefferson Clinton 
committed an impeachable offense.
  In Article II, the evidence is conclusive that President Clinton put 
himself above the law in obstructing justice, not once, not just a few 
times, but as a part of a extensive scheme to prevent Ms. Jones from 
obtaining the evidence she thought she needed to prove her civil rights 
claims.
  Complying with the law is the duty of all parties to lawsuits and 
those who are required to give truthful testimony. A defendant in a 
federal civil rights action does not have the luxury to choose what 
evidence the court may consider. He must abide by the law and the rules 
of procedure. William Jefferson Clinton tried to say that the law did 
not apply to him during his term of office in civil cases were 
concerned. He properly lost that argument in the Supreme Court in a 
unanimous decision.
  Even though the Supreme Court decided that the President wasn't above 
the law and that Ms. Jones' case could proceed, William Jefferson 
Clinton decided--and decided alone--to act as if the Supreme Court had 
never acted and that Judge Wright's orders didn't apply to him. What he 
did was criminal time and time again. These criminal acts were in 
direct conflict with the President's obligation to take care the laws 
be faithfully executed.
  Based upon the repeated violations of federal criminal law, its 
effect upon the courts to find the truth, and the President's duty to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, if you find that the 
President did indeed obstruct the administration of justice through his 
acts, I respectfully submit your duty will be to find William Jefferson 
Clinton guilty with respect to Article II and to remove him from 
office.
  It is truly sad when the leader of the greatest nation in the world 
gets caught up in a series of events where one inappropriate and 
criminal act leads to another, and another and another.
  Even sadder is that the President himself could have stopped this 
process simply by telling the truth and accepting the consequences of 
his prior mistakes. At least six times since December 17, 1997, William 
Jefferson Clinton could have told the truth and suffered the 
consequences. Instead he chose lies, perjury, and deception. He could 
have told the truth when he first learned that Ms. Lewinsky would be a 
witness in the Ms. Jones' case. He could have told the truth at his 
civil deposition. He could have told the truth to Betty Currie. He 
could have told the truth when the news media first broke the story of 
his affair. He could have told the truth to his aides and cabinet. He 
could have told the truth to the American people. Instead, he shook his 
finger at each and every American and said, ``I want you to listen to 
me,'' and proceeded to tell a straight-faced lie to the American 
people. Finally, he had one more opportunity to tell the truth. He 
could have told the truth to the grand jury. Had he told the truth last 
January, there would have been no independent counsel investigation of 
this matter, no grand jury appearance, no impeachment inquiry and no 
House approval of articles of impeachment. And, we would not be here 
today fulfilling a painful but essential constitutional duty. Instead, 
he chose lies and deception, despite warnings from friends, aides, and 
members of the House and Senate that failure to tell the truth would 
have grave consequences.
  When the case against him was being heard by the House Judiciary 
Committee, he sent his lawyers, who did not present any new evidence to 
rebut the facts and evidence sent to the House by the Independent 
Counsel. Rather, they disputed the Committee's interpretation of the 
evidence by relying on tortured, convoluted, and unreasonable 
interpretations of the President's words and actions.
  During his presentation to the House Judiciary Committee, the 
President's very able lawyer, Charles Ruff, was asked directly, ``Did 
the President lie?'' during his sworn grand jury testimony.
  Mr. Ruff could have answered that question directly. He did not, and 
his failure to do so speaks a thousand words.
  Is there not something sacred when a witness in a judicial proceeding 
raises his or her right hand and swears before God and the public to 
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Do we want 
to tell the country that its leader gets a pass when he is required to 
give testimony under oath? Should we not be concerned about the effect 
of allowing perjurious, false, and misleading statements by the 
President to go unpunished on the truthfulness of anyone's testimony in 
future judicial or legislative proceedings? What do we tell the 
approximately 115 people now in federal prison for the crime of 
perjury?
  The answers to all these questions ought to be obvious.
  As elected officials, our opinions are frequently shaped by 
constituents telling us their own stories. Let me tell you one related 
to me about the poisonous results of allowing false statements under 
oath to go unpunished.
  Last October while the Starr report was being hotly debated, one 
circuit court judge for Dodge County, Wisconsin approached me on the 
street in Mayville, Wisconsin. He said that some citizens had business 
in his court and suggested that one of them take the witness stand and 
be put under oath to tell the truth. The citizen then asked if he could 
tell the truth, ``just like the President.''
  How many people who have to come to court to testify under oath about 
matters they would like to keep to themselves think about what that 
citizen asked Judge John Storck? And, how will the courts be able to 
administer the, ``equal justice under law'' we all hold so dear if we 
do not enforce the sanctity of that oath even against the President of 
the United States?
  When each of us is elected or chosen to serve in public office, we 
make a compact with the people of the United States of America to 
conduct ourselves in an honorable manner, hopefully setting a higher 
standard for ourselves than we expect of others. That should mean we 
are careful to obey all the laws we make, execute and interpret.

  There is more than truth in the words, ``A public office is a public 
trust.''
  When someone breaks that trust, he or she must be held accountable 
and suffer the consequences for the breach. If there is no 
accountability, that means that a President can set himself above the 
law for four years, a Senator for six, a Representative for two, and a 
judge for life. that, Mr. Chief Justice, poses a far greater threat to 
the liberties guaranteed to the American people by the Constitution 
that anything imaginable.
  For the past 11 months, the toughest questions I've had to answer 
have come from parents who want to know what to tell their children 
about what President Clinton did.
  Every parent tries to teach their children to know the difference 
between right and wrong, to always tell the truth, and when they make 
mistakes, to take responsibility for them and to face the consequences 
of their actions.
  President Clinton's actions at every step since he knew Ms. Lewinsky 
would be a witness in Mrs. Jones' case have been completely opposite to 
the values parents hope to teach their children.
  But being a poor example isn't grounds for impeachment. Undermining 
the rule of law is. Frustrating the courts' ability to administer 
justice turns private misconduct into an attack upon the ability of one 
of the three branches of our government to impartially administer 
justice. This is a direct attack upon the rule of law in our country 
and a very public wrong

[[Page S227]]

that goes to the constitutional workings of our government and its 
ability to protect the civil rights of even the weakest American.
  What is on trial here is the truth and the rule of law. Failure to 
bring President Clinton to account for his serial lying under oath and 
preventing the courts from administering equal justice under law will 
cause a cancer to be present in our society for generations.
  Those parents who have asked the questions should be able to tell 
their children that even if you are the President of the United States, 
if you lie when sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, you will face the consequences of that action even when 
you won't accept the responsibility for it.
  How those parents will answer those questions is up to the United 
States Senate.
  While how today's parents answer those questions is important, 
equally important is what parents tell their children in the 
generations to come about the history of our country and what has set 
our government in the United States of America apart from the rest of 
the world.
  Above the President's dais in this Senate chamber appears our 
national motto. ``E pluribus unum''--``out of many, one.'' When that 
motto was adopted more than two hundred years ago, the First Congress 
referred to how thirteen separate colonies turned themselves into one, 
united nation.
  As the decades have gone by, that motto has taken an additional 
meaning. People of all nationalities, faiths, creeds, and values have 
come to our shores, shed their allegiances to their old countries and 
achieved their dreams to become Americans.
  They came here to flee religious persecution, to escape corrupt, 
tyrannical and oppressive governments, and to leave behind the economic 
stagnation and endless wars of their homelands.
  They came here to be able to practice their faiths as they saw fit--
free of government dictates and to be able to provide better lives for 
themselves and their families by the sweat of their own brows and the 
use of their own intellect.
  But they also came here because they knew America has a system of 
government where the Constitution and laws protect individual liberties 
and human rights. Everyone--yes, everyone--can argue that this country 
has been a beacon for individual citizen's ability to be what he or she 
can be.
  They fled countries where the rulers ruled at the expense of the 
people, to America, where the leaders are expected to govern for the 
benefit of the people.
  And, throughout the years, America's leaders have tried to earn the 
trust of the American people, not by their words, but by their actions.
  America is a place where government exists by the consent of the 
governed. And, that means our Nation's leaders must earn and re-earn 
the trust of the people with every thing they do.
  Whenever an elected official stumbles, that trust is eroded and 
public cynicism goes up. The more cynicism that exists about 
government, its institutions, and those chosen to serve in them, the 
more difficult the job is for those who are serving.
  That's why it is important, yes vital, that when a cancer exists in 
the body politic, our job--our duty--is to excise it. If we fail in our 
duty, I fear the difficult and dedicated work done by thousands of 
honorable men and women elected to serve not just here in Washington, 
but in our State capitals, city halls, courthouses and school board 
rooms will be swept away in a sea of public cynicism. We must not allow 
the beacon of America to grow dim, or the American dream to disappear 
with each waking morning.
  In 1974, the Congress did its painful public duty when the President 
of the United States broke the public trust.
  During the last decade, both Houses impeached and removed three 
Federal judges who broke their trust with the people.
  During the last 10 years, the House of Representatives disciplined 
two Speakers for breaking the rules and their trust with the public.
  And, less than 6 years ago, this honorable Senate did the same to a 
senior Senator whose accomplishments were widely praised.
  In each case, Congress did the right thing to help restore the vital 
trust upon which our Government depends. It wasn't easy, nor was it 
always popular, but Congress did the right thing. Now, this honorable 
Senate must do the right thing. It must listen to the evidence; it must 
determine whether William Jefferson Clinton repeatedly broke our 
criminal laws and thus broke his trust with the people--a trust 
contained in the Presidential oath put into the Constitution by the 
Framers--an oath that no other Federal official must take--an oath to 
insure that the laws be faithfully executed.
  How the Senate decides the issues to be presented in this trial will 
determine the legacy we pass to future generations of Americans.
  The Senate can follow the legacy of those who have made America what 
it is.
  The Senate can follow the legacy of those who put their ``lives, 
fortunes and Sacred Honor'' on the line when they signed the 
Declaration of Independence.
  The Senate can follow the legacy of the Framers of the Constitution 
whose preamble states that one of its purposes is, ``to establish 
justice.''
  The Senate can follow the legacy of James Madison and the Members of 
the First Congress who wrote and passed a Bill of Rights to protect and 
preserve the liberties of the American people.
  The Senate can follow the legacy of those who achieved equal rights 
for all Americans during the 1960s in Congress, in the courts, and on 
the streets and in the buses and at the lunch counters.
  The Senate can follow the legacy of those who brought President Nixon 
to justice during Watergate in the belief that no President can place 
himself above the law.
  The Senate can follow the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt who lived and 
governed by the principle that no man is above the law.
  Within the walls of the Capitol and throughout this great country 
there rages an impassioned and divisive debate over the future of this 
presidency. This Senate now finds itself in the midst of the tempest. 
An already immense and agonizing duty is made even more so because the 
whims of public opinion polls, the popularity and unpopularity of 
individuals, even questions over the strength of our economy, risk 
subsuming the true nature of this grave and unwelcome task.
  We have all anguished over the sequence of events that have led us to 
this, the conclusive stage in the process. We have all identified in 
our own minds where it could have, and should have stopped. But we have 
ended up here, before the Senate of the United States, where you, the 
Senators, will have to render judgment based upon the facts.
  A scientist in search of the basic nature of a substance begins by 
boiling away what is not of the essence. Similarly, the Senate will 
sift through the layers of debris that shroud the truth. The residue of 
this painful and divisive process is bitter, even poisonous at times. 
But beneath it lies the answer. The evidence will show that at its 
core, the question over the President's guilt and the need for his 
conviction will be clear. Because at its core, the issues involved are 
basic questions of right versus wrong--deceptive, criminal behavior 
versus honesty, integrity and respect for the law.
  The President engaged in a conspiracy of crimes to prevent justice 
from being served. These are impeachable offenses for which the 
President should be convicted. Over the course of the days and weeks to 
come, we, the House managers, will endeavor to make this case.
  May these proceedings be fair and thorough. May they embody our 
highest capacity for truth and mutual respect. With these principles as 
our guides, we can begin with the full knowledge our democracy will 
prevail and that our Nation will emerge a stronger, better place.
  Our legacy now must be not to lose the trust the people should have 
in our Nation's leaders.
  Our legacy now must be not to cheapen the legacies left by our 
forebearers.
  Our legacy must be to do the right thing based upon the evidence.
  For the sake of our country, the Senate must not fail. Thank you.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.

[[Page S228]]

  Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, and my 
distinguished colleagues from the bar, I am Ed Bryant, the 
Representative from the Seventh District of Tennessee. During this 
portion of the case, I, along with Representative Asa Hutchinson of 
Arkansas, Representative James Rogan of California, and Representative 
Bill McCollum of Florida, will present the factual elements of this 
case. Our presentation is a very broad roadmap with which first I will 
provide the history and background of the parties, followed by Mr. 
Hutchinson and Mr. Rogan, who will review the articles of impeachment. 
Mr. McCollum will close with a summation of these facts and evidence.
  It is our intent to proceed in a chronological fashion, although by 
necessity, there will be some overlap of the facts and circumstances 
arising from what I have called ``the four-way intersection collision'' 
of President William Jefferson Clinton, Ms. Paula Corbin Jones, Monica 
Lewinsky, and the U.S. Constitution.
  As a further preface to my remarks, permit me to say that none of us 
present here today in these hallowed Chambers relishes doing this job 
before us. But we did not choose to be involved in that reckless 
misconduct, nor did we make those reasoned and calculated decisions to 
cover up that misconduct which underlies this proceeding. However, this 
collision at the intersection, if you will, of the President, Ms. 
Jones, and Ms. Lewinsky, is not in and of itself enough to bring us 
together today. No. Had truth been a witness at this collision, and 
prevailed, we would not be here. But when it was not present, even 
under an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth in a judicial matter, the impact of our Constitution must be 
felt. Hence, we are together today--to do our respective duties.

  By voting these articles of impeachment, the House is not attempting 
to raise the standard of conduct to perfection for our political 
leadership. Such a person does not walk the world today. Everyone falls 
short of this mark everyday.
  But political life is not so much about how an individual fails, but 
rather how the person reacts to that failure. For example, a person 
campaigning for a political office admits wrongdoing in his past and 
says he will not do that again. Most people accept that commitment. He 
is elected. Thereafter, he repeats this wrongdoing and is confronted 
again. What does he do? He takes steps to cover up this wrongdoing by 
using his workers and his friends. He lies under oath in a lawsuit 
which is very important to the person he is alleged to have harmed. He 
then takes a political poll as to whether he should tell the truth 
under oath. The poll indicates the voters would not forgive him for 
lying under oath. So he then denies the truth in a Federal grand jury. 
If this person is the President of the United States, the House of 
Representatives would consider articles of impeachment. It did and 
voted to impeach this President.
  But do not let it be argued in these chambers that ``We are not 
electing Saints, we are electing Presidents.'' Rather, let it be said 
that we are electing people who are imperfect and who have made 
mistakes in life, but who are willing to so respect this country and 
the Office of the President that he or she will now lay aside their own 
personal shortcomings and have the inner strength to discipline 
themselves sufficiently that they do not break the law which they 
themselves are sworn to uphold.
  Every trial must have a beginning and this trial begins on a cold day 
in January 1993.
  [Video presentation.]
  Mr. Manager Bryant. I had expected a video portion, but all of you 
heard the audio portion. As you can hear from the audio portion--
perhaps some of you can see--William Jefferson Clinton, placed his left 
hand on the Bible in front of his wife, the Chief Justice and every 
American watching that day and affirmatively acknowledged his oath of 
office. On that every day and again in January of 1997, the President 
joined a privileged few. He became only the 42nd person in our Nation 
to make the commitment to ``faithfully execute'' the office of the 
President and to ``preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.'' He 
has the complete executive power of the Nation vested in him by virtue 
of this Constitution.
  As we progress throughout the day, I would ask that you be reminded 
of the importance of this oath. Before you is a copy of it and 
certainly available as anyone would like to look at it on breaks.
  William Jefferson Clinton is a man of great distinction. He is well-
educated with degrees from Georgetown University and Yale Law School. 
He has taught law school courses to aspiring young lawyers. He served 
as Governor and Attorney General for the State of Arkansas, enforcing 
the laws of that state. The President now directs our great Nation. He 
sets our agenda and creates national policy in a very public way--he is 
in fact a role model for many.
  President Clinton also serves as the Nation's chief law enforcement 
officer.
  It is primarily in this capacity that the President appoints Federal 
judges. Within the executive branch, he selected Attorney General Janet 
Reno and appointed each of the 93 United States Attorneys who are 
charged with enforcing all Federal, civil and criminal law in Federal 
courthouses from Anchorage, Alaska to Miami, Florida and from San 
Diego, California to Bangor, Maine.
  Before you we have another chart which shows the schematics of the 
Department of Justice and how it is under the direct control of the 
President through his Cabinet, Attorney General and then down to such 
functions as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Immigration, U.S. Marshals Office, Bureau of Prisons 
and so many other very important legal functions this Federal 
Government performs.
  As protectors of our Constitution, the U.S. Attorneys and their 
assistants prosecute more than 50,000 cases per year.
  Through these appointments and his administration's policies, the 
President establishes the climate in this country for law and order. 
Each and every one of these 50,000 cases handled by his United States 
Attorneys is dependent upon the parties and witnesses telling the truth 
under oath. Equally as important in these proceedings is that justice 
not be obstructed by tampering with witnesses nor hiding evidence.
  Quoting from the November 9, 1998 Constitution Subcommittee testimony 
of attorney Charles J. Cooper, a Washington, DC attorney, he states:

       The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice, like the 
     crimes of treason and bribery, are quintessentially offenses 
     against our system of government, visiting injury immediately 
     upon society itself, whether or not committed in connection 
     with the exercise of official government powers. Before the 
     framing of our Constitution and since, our law has 
     consistently recognized that perjury primarily and directly 
     injures the body politic, for it subverts the judicial 
     process and this strikes at the heart of the rule of law 
     itself.

  Professor Gary McDowell, the Director at the Institute for United 
States Studies at the University of London, also testified in the same 
hearing in reference to the influential writer William Paley, and this 
is also in chart form for those who would like review it later. Paley 
saw the issue of oaths and perjury as one of morality as well as law. 
Because a witness swears that he will speak the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, a person under oath cannot cleverly lie and 
not commit perjury. If the witness conceals any truth, Paley writes, 
that relates to the matter in adjudication, that is as much a violation 
of the oath, as to testify a positive falsehood. Shame or embarrassment 
cannot justify his concealment of truth, linguistic contortions with 
the words used cannot legitimately conceal a lie, or if under oath, 
perjury.
  Professor McDowell concludes with a quote from Paley which accurately 
provides, I believe the essence of a lie or perjurious statement. ``It 
is willful deceit that makes the lie; and we willfully deceive, where 
our expressions are not true in the sense in which we believe the 
hearer apprehends them.''
  Neither has this United States Senate been silent on the issue of 
perjury. You have rightfully recognized through previous impeachment 
proceedings the unacceptable nature of a high government official lying 
under oath, even in matters initially arising from what some would 
argue here are merely personal. In 1989, many of you present

[[Page S229]]

today, using the very same standard which is section 4 of the 
Constitution, which is set forth there, for impeaching a federal judge 
or the President, many of you actually voted in support of a conviction 
and the removal of a U.S. District judge under oath.
  Indeed, truth-telling is the single most important judicial precept 
underpinning this great system of justice we have, a system which 
permits the courthouse doors to be open to all people, from the most 
powerful man in America to a young woman from Arkansas.
  On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones attempted to open that courthouse 
door when she filed a Federal sexual harassment lawsuit against 
President Clinton. The case arose from a 1991 incident when she was a 
State employee and he was the Governor. Further details of the 
underlying allegations are not important to us today, but Ms. Jones' 
pursuit for the truth is worth a careful study.
  The parties first litigated the question of whether Ms. Jones' 
lawsuit would have to be deferred until after the President left 
office. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the President's 
contention and allowed the case to proceed without further delay.
  Ms. Jones sought and, appropriately, won ``her day in court.'' 
Incumbent with this victory, however, was the reasonable expectation 
that President Clinton would tell the truth.
  After all, this was the most important case in the whole world to 
Paula Corbin Jones.
  Notwithstanding this, that fact didn't happen, that the President 
told the truth. Even after the President was ordered to stand trial, 
pursuing the truth for Ms. Jones remained an elusive task. The evidence 
will indicate that President Clinton committed perjury and orchestrated 
a variety of efforts to obstruct justice, all of which--all of which--
had the effect of preventing the discovery of truth in the Paula Jones 
case.
  During the discovery phase, Judge Susan Webber Wright of the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District Court of Arkansas ordered the 
President to answer certain historical questions about his sexual 
relations with either State or Federal employees.
  In part, Judge Wright said:

       The Court finds, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled 
     to information regarding any individuals with whom the 
     President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have 
     sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame 
     state or federal employees.

  Judge Wright validated Ms. Jones' right to use this accepted line of 
questioning in sexual harassment litigation. More often than not, these 
cases involve situations where ``he said/she said,'' and they produce 
issues of credibility and are often done in private. Because of this, 
they are really difficult for a victim to prove.
  Such standard questions are essential in establishing whether the 
defendant has committed the same kind of acts before or since--in other 
words, a pattern or practice of harassing conduct. The existence of 
such corroborative evidence, or the lack thereof, is likely to be 
critical in these types of cases. Both the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission guidelines and the Federal Rules of Evidence permit this 
type of evidence. In short, a defendant's sexual history, at least with 
respect to other employees, is ordinarily discoverable in a sexual 
harassment lawsuit.
  To not expect a defendant in this type of litigation to speak the 
truth creates, in its worst case, a very real danger to the entire area 
of sexual harassment law which would be irreparably damaged and, in its 
best case, sends out a very wrong message. As such, the will and intent 
of Congress with regard to providing protection against sexual 
harassment in the workplace would be effectively undermined.
  The ``pattern and practice'' witnesses whom Paula Corbin Jones was 
entitled to discover should have included the name of Monica Lewinsky. 
But before I discuss the Ms. Lewinsky matter, I want to offer three 
matters of cause to each of you as jurors in this very important 
matter.
  No. 1, I do not intend to discuss the specific details of the 
President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky. However, I do not want to 
give the Senate the impression that those encounters are irrelevant or 
lack serious legal implications. In fact, every day in the courtrooms 
all across America, victims of sexual harassment, of rape, assault, and 
abuse must testify, in many public cases, in order to vindicate their 
personal rights and society's right to be free of these intolerable 
acts.
  The President's lies about his conduct in the Oval Office with Ms. 
Lewinsky also make these unseemly details highly relevant. If you are 
to accept the President's version about the relationship, you must in 
effect say to Ms. Lewinsky that she is the one who is disregarding the 
truth. But beyond this, his denials also directly contradict Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony, not only directly contradict Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony, but also contradict eight of her friends and the statements 
by two professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared 
details of her relationship. By law, their testimony may serve as 
proper and admissible evidence to corroborate her side of this 
important story.
  No. 2, the evidence and testimony in this proceeding must be viewed 
as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. Please do not be misled 
into considering each event in isolation and then treating it 
separately. Remember, events and words that may seem innocent or even 
exculpatory in a vacuum may well take on a sinister or even criminal 
connotation when observed in the context of the whole plot.
  For example, we all agree that Ms. Lewinsky testified, ``No one ever 
told me to lie . . .'' When considered alone, this statement would seem 
exculpatory. In the context of other evidence, however, we see that 
this one statement gives a misleading inference. Of course no one said, 
``Now, Monica, you go down there and lie.'' They didn't have to. Based 
upon their previous spoken and even unspoken words, Ms. Lewinsky knew 
what was expected of her. Surely, if the President were to come on to 
the Senate floor and give testimony during this proceeding, he would 
not tell you that he honestly expected her to tell the truth about 
their personal relationship. After all, the purpose of her filing the 
false affidavit was to avoid testifying in the Jones case and 
discussing the nature of their relationship. If she had told the truth 
in that affidavit, instead of lying, she would have been invited to 
testify immediately, if not sooner.
  No. 3, throughout our presentation of the facts, especially as it 
relates to the various illegal acts, I ask you to pay particular 
attention to what I call the big picture. Look at the results of those 
various acts as well as who benefited. Please make a mental note now, 
if you can, and ask yourself always, as you look at each one of these 
illegal acts that are presented to you: A, What was the result of that 
illegal act? and, B, Who benefited from that illegal act?
  I believe you will find that the evidence will show that while the 
President's ``fingerprints'' may not be directly on the evidence 
proving these illegal acts, the result of the acts usually inures to 
the benefit of the President, and the President alone. Subordinates and 
friends alike are drawn into this web of deceit. The President is 
insulated. Crimes are committed. Justice is denied. The rule of law is 
suspended. And this President is the beneficiary.
  Some examples:
  No. 1, subpoenaed evidence disappears from Ms. Lewinsky's apartment 
and reappears under Ms. Currie's bed. What was the result of that? Who 
had the benefit of that?
  No. 2, Ms. Lewinsky files a false affidavit in the Jones case. What 
is the result of filing that false affidavit and who benefited from 
that?
  No. 3, the President's attorney files the Lewinsky affidavit, not 
knowing it was false, representing to the Court that ``there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form,'' while 
the President sits in the deposition and does not object to that--very 
silently sits in the deposition. What was the result of that? And who 
benefited from that filing of the affidavit?
  No. 4, and finally, Ms. Lewinsky, after months of job searching in 
New York City, is offered a job with a Fortune 500 company in New York 
City within 48 hours of her signing this false affidavit. Who shared 
the results of that with Ms. Lewinsky? And who obtained the benefit of 
that?
  Another example occurred in a meeting between the President and Ms.

[[Page S230]]

Lewinsky in July--on July 4, 1997, to be specific--when, as a part of 
their conversation, she mentioned she heard someone from Newsweek was 
working on a story about Kathleen Willey. The President has Ms. 
Lewinsky back for a visit on July 14, some 10 days later, following his 
return from an overseas trip. She was questioned about the Willey 
story, and specifically if Linda Tripp had been her source.
  Important to this point--important to this point--the President then 
asked Ms. Lewinsky to try to persuade Ms. Tripp to call White House 
Legal Counsel Bruce Lindsey. The President told her to notify Ms. 
Currie the following day, ``without getting into the details with her, 
even mentioning names with her,'' whether Ms. Lewinsky had ``mission 
accomplished'' with Linda. And as you will learn from Mr. Hutchinson, 
who will follow me with his presentation, this is very similar to the 
method of operation with another job the President requested be done, 
which in that case succeeded with a ``mission accomplished.'' I ask you 
to watch for that in Mr. Hutchinson's presentation.
  I want to now rewind the clock back to November of 1995. We are here 
in Washington where Ms. Lewinsky has been working at the White House 
since July of 1995.
  As you continue to listen to the evidence, from this point on 
November 15 forward, remember that Ms. Lewinsky and the President were 
alone in the Oval Office workplace area at least 21 times. And I have a 
list of these, in chart form, beginning in November of 1995, and going 
through 1996 and into the early part of 1997, continuing through the 
year. During that time, they had at least 11 of the so-called salacious 
encounters there in the workplace at various times during the day and 
night: Three in 1995, five in 1996, and three in 1997.
  They also had in excess of 50 telephone conversations, most of which 
appear to have been telephone calls to and from Ms. Lewinsky's home. 
And I have a schedule of all these telephone calls to show you, the 50-
plus telephone calls. Also, they exchanged some 64 gifts, with the 
President receiving 40 of these gives and Ms. Lewinsky receiving 24 of 
these gifts. And again we have charts that reflect the receipt of both 
sets of gifts. And again these charts will be here in the front, always 
available for your inspection.
  We also note that their affair began on November 15th. Interestingly, 
there is even a conflict here with the President. According to Ms. 
Lewinsky, they had never spoken to each other up to that point. Yet, he 
asked an unknown intern into the Oval Office and kissed her and then 
invited her back to return later that day, when the two engaged in the 
first of the 11 acts of misconduct.
  The contradiction is in the statement that the President relied upon 
in his grand jury testimony that has been referenced earlier--very 
carefully worded--and that statement, the President gave in testimony 
before the grand jury about meeting in this relationship. And he says, 
``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct 
. . .'' Almost as if it had evolved over a period of time. So there is 
very clearly a conflict there.
  As Ms. Lewinsky's internship was ending that year, she did apply and 
receive a paying job with the White House Office of Legislative 
Affairs. This position allowed her even more access to the Oval Office 
area. She remained a White House employee until April 1996 when she was 
reassigned to the Pentagon. The proof will show that Ms. Evelyn 
Lieberman, Deputy Chief of Staff at the time, believed that the 
transfer was necessary because Ms. Lewinsky was so persistent in her 
efforts to be near the President. Although Ms. Lieberman could not 
recall hearing any rumors linking her and the President, she 
acknowledged the President was vulnerable to these kinds of rumors. 
While Ms. Lewinsky tried to return to work in the White House, her 
absence was appreciated by those on the President's staff who wanted to 
protect him.
  After she began her job at the Pentagon in April, there was no 
further physical contact with the President through the 1996 election 
and the remainder of that year. The two communicated by telephone and 
on occasion saw each other at public events. Their only attempt at a 
private visit in the Oval Office was thwarted because Ms. Lieberman was 
nearby. On December 17, she attended a holiday celebration at the White 
House and had a photograph made shaking hands with the President.
  However, the evidence establishes that in 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was more 
successful in arranging visits to the White House. This was because she 
used the discreet assistance of Ms. Currie, the President's secretary, 
to avoid the likes of Ms. Lieberman. Ms. Currie indicated she did not 
want to know the details of this relationship. Ms. Currie testified on 
one occasion when Ms. Lewinksy told her, ``As long as no one saw us--
and no one did--then nothing happened.'' Ms. Currie responded, ``Don't 
want to hear it. Don't say any more. I don't want to hear any more.''
  Early on during their secret liaisons, the two concocted a cover 
story to use if discovered. Ms. Lewinksy was to say she was bringing 
papers to the President. The evidence will show that statement to be 
false. The only papers that she ever brought were personal messages 
having nothing to do with her duties or the President's. The cover 
story plays an important role in the later perjuries and the 
obstruction of justice.
  Ms. Lewinksy stated that the President did not expressly instruct her 
to lie. He did, however, suggest, indeed, the ``misleading'' cover 
story. When she assured him that she planned to lie about the 
relationship, he responded approvingly. On the frequent occasions that 
she promised that she would ``always deny'' the relationship and 
``always protect him,'' for example, the President responded, in her 
recollection, ``That's good,'' or something affirmative. Not ``Don't 
deny it.''
  The evidence will establish further that the two of them had, in her 
words, ``a mutual understanding'' that they would ``keep this private, 
so that meant deny it and . . . take whatever appropriate steps needed 
to be taken.'' When she and the President both were subpoenaed in the 
Jones case, Ms. Lewinksy anticipated that ``as we had on every other 
occasion and every other instance of this relationship, we would deny 
it.''
  In his grand jury testimony, President Clinton acknowledged that he 
and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do in a nonlegal 
context'' to hide their relationship and that he ``might well have 
said'' that Ms. Lewinsky should tell people she was bringing letters to 
him or coming to visit Ms. Currie. He always stated that ``I never 
asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie.''
  But neither did the President ever say that they must now tell the 
truth under oath; to the contrary, as Ms. Lewinsky stated: ``It wasn't 
as if the President called me and said, `You know, Monica, you're on 
the witness list, this is going to be really hard for us, we're going 
to have to tell the truth and be humiliated in front of the entire 
world about what we've done,' which I would have fought him on 
probably,'' she said. ``That was different. By not calling me and 
saying that, you know, I knew what that meant,'' according to Monica 
Lewinsky.
  In a related but later incident that Mr. Hutchinson may refer to, 
Monica Lewinsky testified that President Clinton telephoned her at home 
around 2 o'clock or 3 o'clock one morning on December 17, 1997--2:00 or 
2:30 a.m. He told her that her name was on the list of possible 
witnesses to be called in the Paula Jones lawsuit. When asked what to 
do if she was subpoenaed, the President suggested that she could sign 
an affidavit. Ms. Lewinsky indicated that she was 100 percent sure that 
he had suggested that she might want to sign an affidavit. She 
understood his advice to mean that she might be able to execute an 
affidavit that would not disclose the true nature of their 
relationship.

  When Ms. Lewinsky agreed to that false affidavit, she told the 
President by telephone that she would be signing it and asked if he 
wanted to see it before she signed it. According to Ms. Lewinsky, the 
President responded that he did not, as he had already seen about 15 
others.
  Concurrent with these events I just described, the evidence will 
further demonstrate that as Ms. Lewinsky attempted to return to work at 
the White House after the 1996 elections, she

[[Page S231]]

spoke with the President. According to Betty Currie, the President 
instructed Betty Currie and Marsha Scott, Deputy Director of Personnel, 
to assist in her return to the White House. In the spring of 1997, she 
met with Ms. Scott. She complained in subsequent notes to Ms. Scott and 
the President about no progress being made with her getting back to the 
White House. On July 3rd of that year, she dispatched a more formal 
letter to the President--in fact, using the salutation, ``Dear Sir,''--
and raising a possible threat that she might have to tell her parents 
about why she no longer had a job at the White House if they don't get 
her another job. She also indicated a possible interest in a job in New 
York at the United Nations. The President and Ms. Lewinsky met the next 
day in what Ms. Lewinsky characterized as a ``very emotional'' visit, 
including the President scolding her that it was illegal to threaten 
the President of the United States. Their conversation eventually moved 
on to other topics, though primarily her complaining about his failure 
to get her a job at the White House.
  Continuing with Ms. Lewinsky's effort to return to work near the 
President, there was a July 16th meeting and September 3rd telephone 
call with Ms. Scott. On the evening of September 30, the President 
advised Ms. Lewinsky that he would have Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles 
help with a job search, and Bowles later passed this on to John 
Podesta, although each recalled their involvement occurring earlier in 
the year.
  A few days later, however, her hopes of a job at the White House 
quickly ended. On October 6, she had a conversation with Linda Tripp 
who told her that she would never return to the White House, according 
to a friend of hers on the staff. Learning this ``secondhand'' was, 
according to Ms. Lewinsky, the ``straw that broke the camel's back.'' 
She decided to ask the President for a job in New York with the United 
Nations and sent him a letter to that effect on October 7.
  During an October 11 meeting with the President, he suggested that 
she give him a list of New York companies which interested her. She 
asked if Vernon Jordan might also help. Five days later, she provided 
the President with her ``wish list'' and indicated that she was no 
longer interested in the U.N. position, although she did receive an 
offer on November 24th and declined it on January 5, 1998.
  After this meeting with the President, arrangements were made through 
the President and Ms. Currie for Ms. Lewinsky to meet with Mr. Jordan. 
On the morning of November 5, 1997, Mr. Jordan spoke by telephone with 
the President about 5 minutes and later met with Ms. Lewinsky for the 
first time for about 20 minutes. According to Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan 
told her he had spoken with the President, that she came highly 
recommended and that ``We're in business.''
  However, the evidence reflects that Mr. Jordan took no steps to help 
Ms. Lewinsky until early December of that year after she appeared on 
the witness list in the Jones case. Actually, Mr. Jordan testified in 
his grand jury testimony that he had no recollection of even having met 
Ms. Lewinsky on November 5.
  When he was shown documentary evidence demonstrating that his first 
meeting with Ms. Lewinsky occurred in early November, he acknowledged 
that such meeting ``was entirely possible.'' You can see that was not 
to be a high priority for Mr. Jordan at that time, until December.
  For many months, Ms. Lewinsky had not been able to find a job to her 
satisfaction--even without the perceived ``help'' of various people. 
Then in December of 1997, something happened which caused those 
interested in finding Ms. Lewinsky a job in New York to intensify their 
search. Within 48 hours of her signing this false affidavit in the 
Paula Jones case, Ms. Lewinsky had landed a job with a prestigious 
Fortune 500 Company.
  It is anticipated that attorneys for the President will present 
arguments which will contest much of the relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. The President has maintained throughout the last several 
months that while there was no sexual relationship or sexual affair, in 
fact, there was some type of inappropriate, intimate contact with her. 
What has now been dubbed as ``legal gymnastics'' on the part of the 
President has made its appearance.
  Other examples followed. Within his definition of the word ``alone,'' 
he denies being alone with Ms. Lewinsky at any time in the Oval Office. 
He also questions the definition of the word ``is.'' ``It depends on 
what the word `is' means in how you answer a particular question.'' 
Further, we would expect the President to continue to disavow knowledge 
of why evidence detrimental to his defense in the Jones case was 
removed from Ms. Lewinsky's apartment and hidden beneath Ms. Currie's 
bed or knowledge of how Ms. Lewinsky found herself with an employment 
offer in New York virtually at the same time she finally executed an 
affidavit in the Jones case.
  Unfortunately, for your search for the truth in these proceedings, 
the President continues today to parse his words and use ``legal 
hairsplitting'' in his defense. I cite for your consideration his 
Answer filed with this body just days ago. For instance:
  1. Responding in part to the impeachment article I, the President 
persists in a wrongheaded fashion with his legal hairsplitting of the 
term ``sexual relations,'' which permits him to define that term in 
such a way that in the particular salacious act we are talking about 
here, one person has sex and the other person does not. As a graduate 
of one of the finest law schools in America and as a former law 
professor and attorney general for the State of Arkansas, the President 
knows better. I have this statement here extracted out of the 
President's Answer to this proceeding.
  2. Responding to both articles of impeachment, the President now 
would have you believe that he ``was not focusing'' when his attorney, 
Bob Bennett, was objecting during the deposition and attempting to cut 
off a very important line of questioning of the President by 
representing to Judge Wright that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit proved that 
there is no need to go into this testimony about the President's life. 
He said that this affidavit proves that ``there is absolutely no sex of 
any kind, in any manner, shape or form.'' Remember that this is the 
same President who now pleads that he lost his focus during this very 
important part of this deposition. This is the very same President who 
is renowned for his intelligence and his ability ``to 
compartmentalize,'' to concentrate and focus on whatever matter is at 
hand. And now he comes before this Senate, to each one of you, in his 
Answer, by and through his attorneys, and pleads that he simply wasn't 
paying attention at this very important point during his own 
deposition. In Tennessee, we have a saying for situations like that: 
``That dog won't hunt.''
  3. In his further response to article I, the President effectively 
admits guilt to obstruction. As I read this, his pleadings refer to the 
President himself, and he states that he, the President, ``truthfully 
explained to the grand jury his efforts to answer the questions in the 
Jones deposition without disclosing his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.'' So he said he did answer the questions in the Jones 
deposition in a way so as not to disclose his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. At the bottom of the same page, he denies that he attempted 
``to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case.'' Think about 
this with me for a minute. Basically, the purpose of the Jones 
deposition of the President was to secure truthful testimony about 
these kinds of ``pattern and practice'' witnesses, and therein discover 
the likes of Monica Lewinsky. That is the purpose of being there. The 
President admitted in his Answer that he purposely answered questions 
so as not to disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Said another 
way, he intentionally answered questions to avoid the discovery of one 
of these female employees with whom he was sexually involved. That is 
precisely, folks, what impeding the discovery of evidence is.
  I ask you, if you get an opportunity, to look at this very closely.
  4. In his answer to article II, the President ``denies that he 
encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute a false affidavit in the Jones 
case.'' When everything is said and done, Ms. Lewinsky had no 
motivation, no reason whatsoever to want to commit a crime by willfully 
submitting a false affidavit with a court of law. She really did not

[[Page S232]]

need to do this at that point in her life, but this 20-something-year-
old young lady was listening to the most powerful man in the United 
States, whom she greatly admired, hearing him effectively instruct her 
to file a false affidavit to avoid having to testify about their 
relationship. And in order to do that, she had to lie about the 
physical aspects of their relationship. According to her, the President 
didn't even want to see that actual affidavit because he had seen 15 
more just like it and as such he knew what it would be.

  5. In an additional response to article II, the President answers and 
asserts that ``he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could have filed a limited 
and truthful affidavit that might have enabled her to avoid having to 
testify in the Jones case.'' That is an incredible statement. That is 
an incredible statement given the fact that the President knew 
firsthand of the extent of their sexual relationship, and he also knew 
that the Jones discovery efforts were specifically after that type of 
conduct. Even with the best of the legal hairsplitting, it is still 
difficult to envision a truthful affidavit from Ms. Lewinsky that could 
have skirted this issue enough to avoid testifying.
  And if you really think the President had this belief, don't you 
think he would have accepted Ms. Lewinsky's offer to review her 
affidavit and perhaps share this bit of wisdom he had with her before 
she signed it and lied? After all, in this answer he just filed, he 
says he had an out for her, a way for her to have the best of both 
worlds--not to have to lie and still avoid testifying in the Jones 
case. Why didn't he share that with her when she gave him the 
opportunity if he in fact had such an idea? I suggest that perhaps that 
is a recent idea.
  Even if, for some reason, you don't believe Ms. Lewinsky offered to 
share that affidavit with him, don't you think it still would have been 
in the President's best interest to give Ms. Lewinsky his thoughts 
before she violated the law with a completely false affidavit?
  Now, indeed, is the time to stop the legal gymnastics and 
hairsplitting and deal with these charges and facts appropriately.
  As a House manager, I believe I can speak for all of us out of a 
sense of fairness, and again request that we and the President be 
permitted to call witnesses. I submit that the state of the evidence is 
such that unless and until the President has the opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky, and himself, to 
testify if he desires, there could not be any doubt of his guilt on the 
facts. A reasonable and impartial review of the record as it presently 
exists demands nothing less than a guilty verdict.
  While it has been the consistent defense of the White House to be 
inconsistent, it still comes as something of a surprise that the 
President has not made a stronger case for the calling of witnesses. 
Before now, he has aggressively sought the opportunity to challenge the 
truth and veracity of witnesses in these impeachment proceedings. 
During the hearings in the House, which many believe are analogous to a 
grand jury proceeding, the President's defenders and his attorneys 
consistently complained of the failure to call witnesses and the lack 
of fairness and due process. Almost every day, there were partisan 
attacks from the White House and its emissaries who were dispatched 
throughout the media talk shows with the same complaints of no 
witnesses.
  And always, our measured response was a calm assurance that there 
would be witnesses called during the trial phase in the Senate. Is 
there any doubt that our forefathers intended a two-step impeachment 
proceeding?
  The House would function as the Grand Jury and determine whether to 
charge--to impeach. Then you, as the trier of fact, would function as 
the jury to try the case and weigh the testimony of the fact witnesses. 
In recent days, some have publically asserted that the House is 
hypocritical because it didn't call some of the fact witnesses it now 
asks to call in the Senate. For the record, it must be noted that the 
House Judiciary Committee, out of an abundance of fairness, did allow 
the President's defense team 30 hours in which to present any witnesses 
that they could have chosen and they could have examined.
  But any allegation of hypocrisy certainly appears to miss the point 
that the writers of our Constitution never contemplated two separate 
trials for an impeachment proceeding. But now we would respectfully 
suggest is the time for witnesses.
  All Americans, including the President, are entitled to enjoy a 
private family life, free from public or governmental scrutiny. But the 
privacy concerns raised in this case are subject to limits, three of 
which I will briefly discuss here.
  First. The first limit was imposed when the President was sued in 
federal court for alleged sexual harassment. The evidence in such 
litigation is often personal. At times, that evidence is highly 
embarrassing for both plaintiff and defendant. As Judge Wright noted at 
the President's January 1998 deposition, ``I have never had a sexual 
harassment case where there was not some embarrassment.'' Nevertheless, 
Congress and the Supreme Court have concluded that embarrassment-
related concerns must give way to the greater interest in allowing 
aggrieved parties to pursue their claims. Courts have long recognized 
the difficulties of proving sexual harassment in the work place, 
inasmuch as improper or unlawful behavior often takes place in private. 
To excuse a party who lied or concealed evidence on the ground that the 
evidence covered only ``personal'' or ``private'' behavior would 
frustrate the goals that Congress and the courts have sought to achieve 
in enacting and interpreting the Nations's sexual harassment laws. That 
is particularly true when the conduct that is being concealed--sexual 
relations in the workplace between a high official and a young 
subordinate employee--itself conflicts with those goals.

  Second. The second limit was imposed when Judge Wright required 
disclosure of the precise information that is in part the subject of 
this hearing today. A federal judge specifically ordered the President, 
on more than one occasion, to provide the requested information about 
relationships with other women, including Ms. Lewinsky. The fact that 
Judge Wright later determined that the evidence would not be admissible 
at trial, and still later granted judgment in the President's favor, 
does not change the President's legal duty at the time he testified. 
Like every litigant, the President was entitled to object to the 
discovery questions, and to seek guidance from the court if he thought 
those questions were improper. But having failed to convince the court 
that his objections were well founded, the President was duty bound to 
testify truthfully and fully. Perjury and attempts to obstruct the 
gathering of evidence can never be an acceptable response to a court 
order, regardless of the eventual course or outcome of the litigation.
  The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully about perjury and other forms 
of obstruction of justice: ``In this constitutional process of securing 
a witness' testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured 
testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of 
judicial proceedings. Effective restraints against this type of 
egregious offense are therefore imperative.''
  The insidious effects of perjury occur whether the case is civil or 
criminal. Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court considered a false 
statement made in a civil administrative proceeding: ``False testimony 
in a formal proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor 
condone such a `flagrant affront' to truth-seeking function of 
adversary proceedings * * * Perjury should be severely sanctioned in 
appropriate cases.'' Stated more simply, ``perjury is an obstruction of 
justice.''
  Third. The third limit is unique to the President. ``The Presidency 
is more than an executive responsibility. It is the inspiring symbol of 
all that is highest in American purpose and ideals.'' As the head of 
the Executive Branch, the President has the constitutional duty to 
``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' The President gave 
his testimony in the Jones case under oath and in the presence of a 
federal judge, a member of a co-equal branch of government; he then 
testified before a federal grand jury, a body of citizens who had 
themselves taken an oath to seek the truth. In view of the enormous 
trust and responsibility attendant to his high Office, the President 
has a manifest duty to ensure that

[[Page S233]]

his conduct at all times complies with the law of the land.
  In sum, perjury and acts that obstruct justice by any citizen--
whether in a criminal case, a grand jury investigation, a congressional 
hearing, a civil trial or civil discovery--are profoundly serious 
matters. When such acts are committed by the President of the United 
States, those acts are grounds for conviction and removal from his 
Office.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that there now 
be a recess of the proceedings for 15 minutes.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
  Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have just about 1 minute, 
and I will conclude.
  Mr. LOTT. I withhold my request.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
  Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you.
  As I reach the conclusion of my presentation, the time line is now in 
December of 1997. Following her November 5th meeting with Mr. Jordan, 
Ms. Lewinsky had no communication with him or the President for a 
month. Then in early December, the parties in the Jones case exchanged 
witness lists and Ms. Lewinsky was scheduled as a potential witness by 
the Jones' attorneys. On or about that same day, Ms. Lewinsky attempted 
to make an uninvited visit to the White House and later that day, was 
allowed in by the President. But it was during this time, in December 
of 1997, that some of the seams began to unravel for the President.
  I will conclude my remarks at this point and thank the Chief Justice 
and the Members of the Senate for their careful attention. My colleague 
from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson will follow me now or at the end of any 
recess as may be necessary.


                                 RECESS

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, my apologies to the manager for the 
interruption at the end of his remarks.
  I renew my request of unanimous consent to take a 15-minute recess.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of an objection, it is so ordered.
  (Thereupon, the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, at 3:07 
p.m., recessed until 3:30 p.m.)
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, we are prepared now to go 
forward with the next manager's presentation.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well, the Chair recognizes Manager 
Hutchinson.
  Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I am Asa 
Hutchinson, a Member of Congress from the Third Congressional District 
of Arkansas. I am grateful for this opportunity, although it comes with 
deep regret, to be before you. I do want to tell you in advance that we 
have presented to you, on your tables, a selection of charts that I 
will be referring to here so everyone will have the advantage of being 
able to see at least in some fashion the charts to which I will be 
referring. And we will have the charts here as well.
  This is certainly a humbling experience for a smalltown lawyer. I 
learned to love and to respect the law trying cases in the courtrooms 
of rural Arkansas. The scene is different in this setting, in this 
historic Chamber with the Chief Justice presiding and Senators sitting 
as jurors. But what is at stake remains the same.
  In every case heard in every courtroom across this great country, it 
is the truth, it is justice, it is the law that are at stake. In this 
journey on Earth, there is nothing of greater consequence for us to 
devote our energies than to search for the truth, to pursue equal 
justice and to uphold the law. It is for those reasons that I serve as 
a manager. And as you, I hope that I can help in some way to bring this 
matter to a conclusion for our country. This afternoon I will be 
discussing the evidence and the testimony from witnesses that we do 
hope to call, and during my presentation I will be focusing on the 
evidence that demonstrates obstruction of justice under article II.
  You might wonder, well, why are we going to article II before we have 
covered article I on perjury? And the answer is that in a chronological 
flow, article II, the obstruction facts, precede much of the perjury 
allegations. And so, following my presentation, Manager Rogan will 
present article I on perjury.
  The presentation I make will be based upon the record, the evidence, 
the facts that have been accumulated, and I want you to know that I am 
going to be presenting those facts, and from time to time I will argue 
those facts. I believe they are well supported in the record, but I 
urge each of you, if you ever find anything that you question, to 
search the record and verify the facts, because I do not intend to 
misrepresent anything to this body. In fact, we will be submitting to 
each of your offices my presentation with annotations to the record, to 
the grand jury transcripts which will tie in the facts that I present 
to you. Again, I believe and trust that you will find that they are 
well supported.
  So let's start with obstruction of justice. Later on, there will be a 
full discussion of the law on obstruction of justice, but for our 
purposes, it is simply any corrupt act or attempt to influence or 
impede the proper functioning of our system of justice. It is a 
criminal offense, a felony, and it has historically been an impeachable 
offense.
  Let me first say, it is not a crime nor an impeachable offense to 
engage in inappropriate personal conduct. Nor is it a crime to obstruct 
or conceal personal embarrassing facts or relationships. It might be 
offensive, but there are no constitutional consequences. But as we go 
through the facts of the case, the evidence will show in this case that 
there was a scheme that was developed to obstruct the administration of 
justice, and that is illegal. And the obstruction of justice is of 
great consequence and significance to the integrity of our Nation when 
committed by anyone, but particularly by the Chief Executive of our 
land, the President of the United States.
  Mr. Bryant took us factually up to a certain point pertaining to the 
job search. This is chart No. 1 that you have before you. This puts it 
in perspective a little bit, and just for a brief review. You go back 
in the calendar, back into October. That is when Ms. Lewinsky sends the 
President her wish list for a list of jobs. And then shortly after 
that, Ms. Currie faxes Lewinsky the resume to Ambassador Richardson, 
and Ambassador Richardson gets involved in the job search.
  October 30, the President promised to arrange a meeting between 
Lewinsky and Jordan. This was set up in November. It was actually 
November 5. But preceding that, there was a job offer at the United 
Nations extended to Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky decided that she was not 
interested in a job at the United Nations, she wanted to go into the 
private sector. And so that was the purpose on November 5 of the 
meeting between Jordan and Lewinsky. That is when Mr. Jordan says, 
``We're in business.'' But the facts will show that there was nothing 
really done in November, and that is when I will get in a little bit 
more to my presentation, and then I will get into December when some 
things happened there that picked up speed on this issue.
  The obstruction, for our purposes, started on December 5, 1997, and 
that is when the witness list from the Paula Jones case was faxed to 
the President's lawyers. At that point, the wheels of obstruction 
started rolling, and they did not stop until the President successfully 
blocked the truth from coming out in the civil rights case.
  These acts of obstruction included attempts to improperly influence a 
witness in a civil rights case--that is Monica Lewinsky--the 
procurement and filing of a false affidavit in the case; unlawful 
attempts to influence the testimony of a key witness, Betty Currie; the 
willful concealment of evidence under subpoena in that case, which are 
the gifts of December 28; and illegally influencing the testimony of 
witnesses--that is the aides who testified before the grand jury--
before the grand jury of the United States. Each of these areas of 
obstruction will be covered in my presentation today.
  As I said, it began on Friday, December 5, when the witness list came 
from the Paula Jones case. Shortly thereafter, the President learned 
that the list included Monica Lewinsky. This had to be startling news 
to the President, because if the truth about his relationship with a 
subordinate employee

[[Page S234]]

was known, the civil rights case against him would be strengthened and 
it might have totally changed the outcome.
  But to compound the problem, less than a week later, Judge Wright, 
Federal district judge in Arkansas, on December 11, issued an order, 
and that order directed that the President had to answer questions 
concerning other relationships that he might have had during a 
particular timeframe with any State or Federal employee. And when I say 
``relationships,'' I am speaking of sexual relationships. So Judge 
Wright entered the order that is not in your stack, but I have it here. 
It was filed on December 11 in the district court in Arkansas and 
directs the President that he has to answer those questions within a 
timeframe, as Mr. Bryant said, which is typical in a civil rights case 
of this nature.
  The White House knew that Monica was on the witness list. The 
President knew that it was likely that she would be subpoenaed as a 
witness and that her truthful testimony would hurt his case.
  What did the President do? What he had to do was he made sure that 
Monica Lewinsky was on his team and under control. And then on December 
17, the President finally called Ms. Lewinsky to let her know she was 
on the list. This was a call between 2 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. in the 
morning.
  Now, what happened in the time between the President learning Monica 
Lewinsky was on the list and when he notified her of that fact on 
December 17 is very important. The President, during that timeframe, 
talked to his friend, his confidante and his problem-solver, Vernon 
Jordan. Mr. Jordan had come to the President's rescue on previous 
occasions. He was instrumental in securing consulting contracts for Mr. 
Webb Hubbell while Mr. Hubbell was under investigation by the 
independent counsel.
  Let me parenthetically go to that point, right before Mr. Hubbell 
announced his resignation from the Justice Department.
  During that timeframe, there was a meeting at the White House in 
which the President, the First Lady and others were present. After that 
meeting, Vernon Jordan agreed to help obtain financial assistance for 
Mr. Hubbell. Mr. Jordan then introduced Mr. Hubbell to the ``right 
people.'' The introduction was successful, and Mr. Hubbell obtained a 
$100,000 contract. The ``right people'' that Mr. Jordan contacted 
happened to be the same right people for both Mr. Hubbell and 
ultimately for Monica Lewinsky, which is the parent company of Revlon. 
So the President was aware that Mr. Jordan had the contacts and the 
track record to be of assistance to the President in delicate matters.
  Now let's go back a little. Monica Lewinsky had been looking for a 
good-paying and high-profile job in New York, since the previous July, 
as I pointed out.
  She had been offered a job at the United Nations, but she wanted to 
work in the private sector. She was not having much success, and then 
in early November it was Betty Currie who arranged a meeting with 
Vernon Jordan, which was ultimately on November 5. At this meeting, Ms. 
Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan for about 20 minutes.
  Now, let's refer to Mr. Vernon Jordan's grand jury testimony on that 
meeting that occurred on November 5. And you have that, and it should 
be your chart No. 2, or exhibit 2.
  As Mr. Jordan testified before the Federal grand jury on March 3, 
1998, in reference to the November 5 meeting, he testifies:

       I have no recollection of an early November meeting with 
     Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of it 
     and I have no record of it.

  He goes on to testify, at page 76 of the grand jury testimony. 
Question:

       Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica 
     Lewinsky a job on any fast pace was not any priority of 
     yours?

  His answer:

       I think that's fair to say.

  Now, let's stop there for a moment. What happened as a result of this 
meeting? No action followed whatsoever. No job interviews were arranged 
and there were no further contacts with Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jordan made no 
effort to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky for over a month. Indeed, it was 
so unimportant to him that he ``had no recollection of an early 
November meeting,'' and, in fact, he testified finding her a job was 
not a priority. And then you will see that during this timeframe the 
President's attitude was exactly the same.
  And so look at the same exhibit 2, the last item on that chart, where 
it refers to Monica Lewinsky's grand jury testimony. And there she is 
referring to a December 6 meeting with the President.

       I think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch 
     with Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not 
     work out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job 
     front].

  And the question was:

       Did the President say what he was going to do?

  The answer:

       I think he said he would--you know, this was sort of 
     typical of him, to sort of say, ``Oh I'll talk to him. I'll 
     get on it.''

  So you can see from that that it was not a high priority for the 
President, either. It was: Sure, I'll get to that. I will do that.
  It was clear from Monica Lewinsky that nothing was happening.
  But then the President's attitude suddenly changed. What started out 
as a favor for Betty Currie dramatically changed after Ms. Lewinsky 
became a witness, and the judge's order was issued, again, on December 
11. And at that time, the President talked personally--personally--to 
Mr. Jordan and requested his help in getting Ms. Lewinsky a job. And 
that would be, again, back on exhibit 2 on that chart, the third item 
of testimony there; back to Mr. Jordan, his grand jury testimony, May 
5, 1998.
  The question is:

       But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 
     11th, you are clear that at that point you had made a 
     decision that you would try to make some calls to help get 
     her a job.

  His answer:

       There is no question about that.

  And so what triggered--let's look at the chain of events. The witness 
list came in. The judge's order came in. That triggered the President 
to action. And the President triggered Vernon Jordan into action. That 
chain reaction here is what moved the job search along.
  Now, if we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--which I hope to be 
able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his loyalties 
lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his eyes and determine 
the truthfulness of his statements. You must decide whether he is 
telling the truth or withholding information.
  And so let's go to exhibit 3 in your booklet. Again, recalling Mr. 
Jordan, he testifies about that meeting. He testifies, in his March 3, 
1998, grand jury testimony:

       I am certain after the 11th that I had a conversation with 
     the President and as a part of that conversation I said to 
     him that Betty Currie had called me about Monica Lewinsky. 
     And the conversation was that he knew about her situation 
     which was that she was pushed out of the White House, that 
     she wanted to go to New York and he thanked me for helping 
     her.

  Remember what else happened on that day, again, the same day that 
Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other relationships could 
be asked by the Jones' attorneys.
  Now, let's go back again to Mr. Jordan's testimony. What does he say 
about the involvement of the President of the United States in regard 
to these jobs? You look at exhibit 4. That is in your booklet. This is, 
again, Vernon Jordan's grand jury transcript of June 9, 1998.

  Now, the question is on a different issue. The question is about why 
did he tell the White House that Frank Carter--Frank Carter was the 
attorney for Monica Lewinsky that Vernon Jordan arranged and introduced 
to Monica Lewinsky. He was hired. And at whatever point he was 
terminated, then Vernon Jordan notified the President. So the question 
relates to that:

       Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that 
     this has happened, [Carter had been fired]?

  Answer:

       Thought they had a right to know.

  Question:

       Why?

  And here is the answer that is critical for my point:

       The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got 
     her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new 
     counsel. I thought that was information that they ought to 
     have. . . .


[[Page S235]]


  ``The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job.'' Clear, 
straightforward testimony; no doubt about it.
  Then go on down to page 58 of his grand jury testimony of June 9.
  The question:

       Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank 
     Carter had been replaced?

  Answer:

       Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew 
     that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was 
     interested in this matter. He is the source of it coming to 
     my attention in the first place.

  ``He is the source of it coming to my attention in the first place.'' 
Remember he had already met with Betty Currie. Nothing was happening in 
the November timeframe. Nothing was happening. Vernon Jordan--it was 
not a priority. Then the President of the United States called him, and 
it became a priority. And that is who he was acting for in trying to 
get Monica Lewinsky a job.
  At this point we do not know all that the President was telling 
Vernon Jordan, but we do know that there were numerous calls back and 
forth between Mr. Jordan and the President. There were numerous calls 
being made by Mr. Jordan on behalf of Monica Lewinsky searching for a 
job, and that despite the fact that Monica Lewinsky did not know that 
she was witnessed--she did not know she was a witness--the President 
knew that she was a witness during his intensified efforts to get her a 
job.
  Now, the President's counselors have made a defense that the job 
search started before Monica Lewinsky was a witness and there was 
nothing wrong with that. My response to that is, it is true there is 
nothing wrong with a public official, under the right circumstances, 
helping someone get a job. And what might have started out being 
innocent, if you accept that argument, crossed the line--crossed the 
line--whenever it was tied and interconnected with the President's 
desire to get a false affidavit from Monica Lewinsky, and whenever the 
job is out there and preparing the false affidavit, you will see that 
they are totally interconnected, intertwined, interrelated; and that is 
where the line has crossed into obstruction.
  For example, when the President was waiting on Ms. Lewinsky to sign 
the false affidavit in the Jones case during the critical time in 
January a problem developed. The job interviews were unproductive, 
despite the numerous calls by Mr. Jordan. On one particular day, Monica 
called Mr. Jordan and said the interview with Revlon did not go well. 
Mr. Jordan, what did he do? He picked up the phone to the CEO of--the 
president of the company, Mr. Perlman, to, as Vernon Jordan testified, 
``make things happen--if they could happen.'' That is the request from 
Mr. Jordan to the CEO of a company, after a job interview with Monica 
Lewinsky did not go well.
  What happened? Things happened. He did, he made things happen. Monica 
Lewinsky got a job. The affidavit was signed and the President was 
informed by Mr. Jordan, through Betty Currie, that the mission was 
accomplished.
  The question here is not why did the President do a favor for an ex-
intern, but why did he use the influence of his office to make sure it 
happened? The answer is that he was willing to obstruct, impede justice 
by improperly influencing a witness in order to protect himself in a 
civil rights case.
  The next step in the obstruction is the false affidavit. This is 
directly related to the job mission. The President needed the signature 
of Monica Lewinsky on the false affidavit, and that was assured by the 
efforts to secure her a job. Again, the President brought Ms. Lewinsky 
into the loop on December 17. Over 10 days after the witness list was 
received by the President, the President was ready to tell Monica the 
news.
  That timeframe is important. He gets the witness list. He could have 
called Monica Lewinsky immediately, but he needed 7 days because he 
needed to make sure the job situation was in gear. And in fact, the day 
after, if you look back on exhibit 1, you will see that the day after 
the December 17 timeframe that she was informed that she was on the 
witness list, the next day she already had lined up job interviews for 
her. So she felt confident. But she was notified on December 17. 
Between 2 and 2:30 a.m., her phone rang. It was the President of the 
United States. The President said that he had seen the witness list in 
the case and her name was on it. Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do 
if subpoenaed, and the President responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign 
an affidavit.''
  Well, how would this work? Both parties knew that the affidavit would 
need to be false and misleading in order to accomplish the desired 
result. Clearly, truthful testimony by Monica Lewinsky would make her a 
witness, would not keep her away from testifying. Only a false 
affidavit would avoid the deposition.
  So look at what I have marked as exhibit 4.1, which is just a review 
of the key dates on this job search. Again, November 5 was the first 
meeting between Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. In November nothing happened. 
According to Jordan, ``not a high priority.'' December 5, the President 
receives the witness list. The 11th, things intensify with Judge 
Wright's order. The 11th, the President talks to Mr. Jordan about the 
job for Monica. He gets into action. On the 17th, they are ready to 
tell Monica that she is on the witness list. And then, on the 19th, she 
is actually served with a subpoena. Again, remember, after she was 
finally notified, it was the next day that she had the job interviews.
  Now, still we will spend some time on the December 17 conversation, 
the day that Monica Lewinsky was notified that she was on the witness 
list. During that conversation, the President had a very pointed 
suggestion for Ms. Lewinsky in a suggestion that left no doubt about 
his purpose and the intended consequences. He did not say specifically, 
``Go in and lie.'' This is something that you will hear, and Monica 
Lewinsky testified in her grand jury testimony: ``The President never 
told me to lie.''
  How do you tell people to lie? You can tell them the facts that they 
can use that would, in substance, be a false statement; or you can say, 
``Go in and lie and make up your own false testimony.'' The President 
chose to give her the ideas as to what she could testify to that would 
be false, but he never said the words, ``You need to go in and lie.'' 
So what he did say to her was, ``You know, you can always say you were 
coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
  That, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, is a false representation, 
is a false statement that he is telling Ms. Lewinsky to utter. 
Remember, at this point the President knows she is a witness, and what 
does he do? As evidenced by the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, he 
encourages her to lie, to say, ``You can always say you were coming to 
see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
  It should also be remembered that the President, when questioned 
about encouraging Monica Lewinsky to lie, has denied these allegations, 
and therefore there is certainly a conflict in the testimony. It is our 
belief that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is credible and she has the motive 
to tell the truth because of her immunity agreement with the 
independent counsel, where she gets in trouble only if she lies; 
whereas the President has the motive to cover up and to testify 
falsely.
  In order to understand the significance of this statement made by the 
President, it is necessary to recall the cover stories that the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky had previously concocted in order to deceive 
those people who might inquire. It was to deceive those people that 
they worked with. The difference in the initial cover stories, though, 
to protect the President and Monica from an embarrassing personal 
relationship, from friends and coworkers and the media, now it is in a 
different arena, with the pending civil rights case and Ms. Lewinsky 
being on the witness list.
  Despite the legal responsibilities, the President made the decision 
to continue the pattern of lying which ultimately became an obstruction 
of the administration of justice. We are still on December 17, when the 
President called Monica at 2 a.m. on that particular day to tell her 
she was on the witness list, to remind her of the cover stories. Monica 
Lewinsky testified, when the President brought up the cover story, she 
understood that the

[[Page S236]]

two of them would continue their preexisting pattern of deception and 
it became clear that the President had no intention of making his 
relationship with a subordinate Federal employee an issue in that civil 
rights case, no matter what the Federal courts told him he needed to 
answer. And he used lies, deceit, and deception to carry out that 
purpose.

  It is interesting to note that the President, when he was asked by 
the grand jury whether he remembered calling Monica Lewinsky at 2 a.m. 
on that December 17th day, responded, ``No, sir, I don't, but it is 
quite possible that that happened.'' When he was asked whether he 
encouraged Monica Lewinsky to continue the cover stories of coming to 
see Betty or bringing letters, he answered, ``I don't remember exactly 
what I told her that night.''
  This is not a denial, and therefore I believe you should accept the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky. If you say in your mind, well, I'm not 
going to believe her, then you should first give us the opportunity to 
present this witness so that you as jurors can fairly and honestly 
determine her credibility.
  As expected, 2 days later, on December 19, Ms. Lewinsky received a 
subpoena to testify in the Jones case. This sets about an immediate 
flurry of activity. There are a series of telephone calls between Ms. 
Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, the President, and his staff. You will see 
this pattern of telephone calls repeated and generated at any point in 
time when it appears that the truth may be told in the civil rights 
case.
  Now, let's look at exhibit 5, which is the activity on Friday, 
December 19. This is the day that Monica Lewinsky is served with a 
subpoena. Now, after Mr. Jordan is notified that Monica Lewinsky is 
served with a subpoena, what does he do? In the 3:51-3:52 notation, 
Jordan telephones the President and talks to Debra Schiff, his 
assistant. The subpoena is issued. Monica calls Jordan and Jordan 
immediately calls the President. ``Lewinsky meets with Jordan and 
requests that Jordan notify the President about her subpoena''--this is 
at 4:47 p.m.
  Presumably in the middle of that meeting, at 5:01 p.m., the President 
of the United States telephones Mr. Jordan and Jordan notifies the 
President about Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena.
  Then that is whenever he arranged for Ms. Lewinsky's attorney--
``Jordan telephones attorney Carter''--for representation, and that 
night, Vernon Jordan goes to the White House to meet privately with the 
President on these particular issues.
  Now, in that meeting--and I am speaking of the meeting that happened 
late that night at the White House--Mr. Jordan told the President again 
that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed and related to the President the 
substance and details of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. It wasn't a 
casual consideration; the details were discussed, including her 
fascination with the President and other such issues.
  This led Mr. Jordan to ask the President about his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky, and the response by the President of the United States 
was the first of many denials to his friends and aides. The President 
stated in his deposition that he does not recall that meeting. But you 
should remind yourselves of the testimony and the description provided 
by Vernon Jordan when he said, ``The President has an extraordinary 
memory.'' In fact, we all know that he is world famous for that memory.

  Now, the subpoena had been delivered, but the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky was not scheduled until January 23, and the President's 
deposition, which was even more critical, was not scheduled until 
January 17. So the President and his team had some time to work. The 
work was not the business of the Nation, it was the distraction and 
self-preservation in the civil rights case.
  Under the plan, Mr. Jordan would be the buffer; he would obtain an 
attorney--Mr. Carter--and that attorney would keep Mr. Jordan informed 
on the progress of the representation, including reviewing any copy of 
the affidavit, knowing about the motion to quash, and the general 
progress of the representation. All along the way, when Mr. Jordan gets 
information, what does he do with that? Mr. Jordan keeps the President 
informed both about the affidavit and the prospects of the job in New 
York, for which Ms. Lewinsky was totally dependent on the help of her 
friends in high places.
  Let me go back again. There is nothing wrong with helping somebody 
get a job. But we all know there is one thing forbidden in public 
office: We must avoid quid pro quo, which is: This is for that. But 
Vernon Jordan testified he kept the President informed on the status of 
the false affidavit, the job search, and the status of Ms. Lewinsky's 
representation. Why? Is this just idle chatter with the President of 
the United States, or are these matters the President is vitally 
interested in and, in fact, coordinated? Mr. Jordan answers this 
question himself on page 25 of his grand jury testimony, where he 
testified, ``I knew the President was concerned about the affidavit and 
whether or not it was signed. He was obviously.'' That was his March 5, 
1998, grand jury testimony. The President was concerned not just about 
the affidavit but specifically about whether it was signed.
  The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to make a false 
affidavit. He was so certain of the contents that when Monica Lewinsky 
asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no, that he had seen 15 of 
them. Besides, the President had suggested the affidavit himself, and 
he trusted Mr. Jordan to be certain to keep things under control. In 
fact, that was one of the main purposes of Mr. Jordan's continued 
communication with Monica Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter.
  Even though Mr. Jordan testifies at one point he never had any 
substantive discussions on the representation with Mr. Carter, he 
contradicts himself in his March 3 grand jury testimony where he 
states: ``Mr. Carter at some point told me--this is after January--that 
she had signed the affidavit, that he had filed a motion to quash her 
subpoena and that--I mean, there was no reason for accountability, but 
he reassured me that he had things under control.''
  Mr. Jordan was aware of the substance of the drafting of the 
affidavit, the representation, the motion to quash, and even had a part 
in the redrafting. This was clearly important to Mr. Jordan and clearly 
important to the President.
  Now, let's go to the time when the false affidavit was actually 
signed, January 5, 1998. These will be exhibits 7, 8, and 9 in front of 
you. Let's go to January 5. This is sort of a summary of what happened 
on that day. Ms. Lewinsky meets with her attorney, Mr. Carter, for an 
hour. Carter drafts the affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky on the deposition. 
In the second paragraph, Ms. Lewinsky telephones Betty Currie, stating 
that she needs to speak to the President, that this is about an 
important matter; specifically, that she was anxious about something 
she needed to sign--an affidavit. Frank Carter drafts the affidavit she 
is concerned about. She calls the President. The President returns Ms. 
Lewinsky's call.

  Big question: Should the President return Ms. Lewinsky's call? He 
does, that day, quickly. Ms. Lewinsky mentions the affidavit she is 
signing and offers to show it to the President. That is where he says 
no, he had seen 15 others.
  Let's go to the next day. The next exhibit is January 6. On this 
particular day, Ms. Lewinsky picks up the draft affidavit. At 2:08 to 
2:10 p.m., she delivers that affidavit. To whom? Mr. Jordan. That is 
after she got it. She delivers it to Jordan. And then, at 3:26 p.m., 
Mr. Jordan telephones Mr. Carter. At 3:38, Mr. Jordan telephones Nancy 
Hernreich of the White House. At 3:48, he telephones Ms. Lewinsky about 
the draft affidavit, and, at 3:49, you will see in red that both agree 
to delete a portion of the affidavit that created some implication that 
maybe she had been alone with the President.
  So Mr. Jordan was very involved in drafting the affidavit and the 
contents of that.
  And then at 4:19, presumably in response to some of the calls by 
Jordan earlier in the day, the President telephones Mr. Jordan and they 
have a discussion. And then Mr. Jordan telephones Carter and the 
conversations go back and forth. At the end of the day, Mr. Jordan 
telephones the White House. So the affidavit is still in the drafting 
process.
  Let's go to the next day, exhibit 9. Monica signs the affidavit here. 
At 10

[[Page S237]]

a.m., Ms. Lewinsky signs a false affidavit in Mr. Carter's office. Then 
she delivers the signed affidavit to Mr. Jordan. And then what does he 
do? The usual. At 11:58, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. At 
5:46, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. At 6:50, Mr. Jordan 
telephones the White House and tells the President that Ms. Lewinsky 
signed the affidavit.
  Is this important information for the President, to know he was 
vitally interested in it?
  The next day, exhibit 10, January 8. After it is signed, what is 
important the next day? It was the other part of the arrangement, that 
she has the job interview with MacAndrews in New York. She had that job 
interview. The only problem was that it went poorly, very poorly. So at 
4:48 p.m. on this particular day, Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan and 
advises that the New York interview went ``very poorly.''
  What does Mr. Jordan do? He telephones Ron Perelman, the CEO of 
Revlon, the subsidiary of MFH, to make things happen if they could 
happen. What does he do next? Jordan telephones Ms. Lewinsky, saying, 
``I'm doing the best I can to help you out.'' And they set up another 
interview for the next day. Jordan telephones the White House Counsel's 
Office, and, in the evening, Revlon in New York telephones Ms. Lewinsky 
to set up a follow-up interview. They said the first interview didn't 
go well, but because Mr. Jordan intercedes--and why? Because the false 
affidavit has been signed and he wants to make sure this is carried 
out. At 9:02 p.m., Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan about the Revlon 
interview in New York, and presumably it went better on that particular 
day.
  Then on January 9--exhibit 11--Monica is confirmed that she has the 
job. Lewinsky is offered the Revlon job in New York, and accepts.
  Lewinsky telephones Jordan. And then, at 4:14, Jordan notifies 
Currie, calls Betty Currie, and says ``Mission accomplished,'' and 
requests that she tell the President. Jordan notifies the President of 
Lewinsky's job offer, and says, ``Thank you, very much, Mr. 
President.'' And then, that evening, the President telephones Currie, 
and so on. But the President is notified that the job has been secured, 
``mission accomplished.''
  Let me ask you a question, after I have gone through these exhibits. 
Would Mr. Jordan have pushed for a second interview without cooperation 
on the affidavit? Would Monica Lewinsky have received the support and 
secured the job if she had said ``I don't want to sign an affidavit; I 
am just going to go in there and tell the truth; whatever they ask me, 
I am going to answer; I am going to tell the truth?'' Does anyone in 
this room believe that she would have been granted the job--if Mr. 
Jordan had made that call to get that second interview--that she would 
ever have had the help from her friend in high places? Now the 
affidavit has been signed. The job is secure. Monica Lewinsky is on the 
team, and the President of the United States is armed for the 
deposition.
  So let's move there.
  Just how important was Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit to the 
President's deposition? Let's look. What did the President's attorney, 
Robert Bennett, say about that affidavit to the Federal judge during 
the deposition? That false affidavit allowed Mr. Bennett, the attorney 
for Mr. Clinton, when talking about the question of whether the 
relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky--it allowed him to 
assert that `` . . . there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form with President Clinton * * *.''
  That is a statement of Robert Bennett--his representation to the 
court about that relationship. It is a representation that he had to 
later, probably based upon his own professional embarrassment, 
withdraw, and to correct that inaccurate part of the record.
  When questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the President 
stated specifically the key paragraph of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was 
``absolutely true.''
  Paragraph 8 of her affidavit states:

       I have never had a sexual relationship with the President. 
     . . .

  If it enters your mind at this point as to what was meant by ``sexual 
relationship,'' please remember that this affidavit was drafted upon a 
common understanding of that phrase at that point, and not based upon 
any definition used in the deposition of the President.
  I am sure it was the President's hope and belief that the false 
affidavit used in the deposition to bolster his own testimony would be 
the end of the matter. But that was not the case. We know in life that 
one lie leads to another. And so it is when we attempt to thwart the 
administration of justice--one obstruction leads to another.
  Now we move to another key witness, Betty Currie.
  By the time the President concluded his deposition, he knew there 
were too many details out about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
knew that the only person who would probably be talking was Ms. 
Lewinsky herself. He knew the cover story that he had carefully created 
and that was converted into false statements in the affidavit was now 
in jeopardy and had to be backed at this point by the key witnesses, 
Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie. After the deposition, the President 
needed to do two things: He had to contact Ms. Lewinsky to see if she 
was still on the team, but he also had to make sure that his secretary, 
Betty Currie was lying to protect him. So let's look at how the concern 
became a frenzied and concerted effort to keep the holes plugged in the 
dike.
  Let's look at exhibits 12 and 13.
  What happened on the day the deposition--really the night of the 
deposition--on January 17. The President finishes testifying in the 
deposition around 4 p.m. At 5:38 p.m., the President telephones Mr. 
Jordan at home. And then, at 7:13, the President telephones Ms. Currie 
at home. At 7:02, the President places a call to Mr. Jordan's office. 
And then, at 7:13, he gets Ms. Currie at home finally, and asks her to 
meet with him on Sunday. It is vitally important that he meet with Ms. 
Currie at this point because he knows his whole operation is coming 
unglued.
  So the next day, on January 18, which is exhibit 13, there is a whole 
flurry of activity here.
  I am not going to go through all of them. You can see the frantic 
pace at the White House because at 6:11 in the morning, the President 
had some more bad news. The Drudge Report was released. And that 
created a greater flurry. Then between 11:49 and 2:55 p.m., two phone 
calls were made between Mr. Jordan and the President.
  Then, at 5 p.m., we see the meetings. That is on the second page. At 
5 p.m., Ms. Currie meets with the President. And the President then 
tells Ms. Currie to find Monica Lewinsky. The telephone calls were 
generated, and there was no success in that.

  Then, that evening the President calls Ms. Currie at home to try once 
again to see if she had found Monica.
  But it was on that day that there was that critical meeting on that 
Sunday in the Oval Office between Betty Currie and the President of the 
United States.
  For that reason, we need next to hear from Betty Currie, the 
President's personal secretary, as to what occurred during that most 
unusual meeting on Sunday following the deposition.
  Betty Currie testified in the grand jury that the President said that 
he had just been deposed and that the attorneys had asked several 
questions about Monica Lewinsky. This is a violation of the judge's gag 
order. And the President, you know, made some comments that were not in 
line. But he had some choices to make, and he made the wrong choices.
  But let's look at exhibit 14, which covers the series of statements 
made to Ms. Currie. At this point there is the testimony of Betty 
Currie. She is reciting to the grand jury each of the statements the 
President made to her after his grand jury testimony.
  The first: ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
  Second: ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
  ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
  I am not going to read each one of those. You can read them. You have 
heard those as well.
  But the President is making those simple declaratory statements to 
her.
  There are three areas that are covered.
  First of all, the President makes a case that he was never alone with 
Monica Lewinsky.
  Second, he is making a point to her that ``she was the aggressor, not 
me.''

[[Page S238]]

  The third point he is making, ``I did nothing wrong.''
  Those are the basic three points of those five statements that the 
President made to Betty Currie.
  During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony she was asked whether she 
believed that the President wished her to agree to the statements.
  Let's look at Betty Currie for a second. She is the classical 
reluctant witness. Where are her loyalties? How would you examine her 
testimony? Where is she uncomfortable in her testimony when she is 
asked the question? How does she shift in the chair? Those are the kind 
of ways you have to evaluate the truthfulness of the testimony, where 
their loyalties lie, and their demeanor.
  During the questioning she was clearly reluctant.
  She was asked a series of questions, and she finally acknowledges 
that the President was intending for her to agree with the statements 
that were made. She says, ``That is correct.'' And that is page 74 of 
Betty Currie's grand jury testimony.
  When the President testified in the August 17 grand jury, he was 
questioned about his intentions when he made those five statements to 
Ms. Currie in his office on that Sunday. And the President's 
explanation is as follows to the grand jury:
  The President:

       . . . I thought we were going to be deluged by the press 
     comments. And I was trying to refresh my memory about what 
     the facts were.

  Then he goes on to testify:

       So, I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something 
     that was untruthful. I was trying to get as much information 
     as quickly as I could.

  Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you have to determine what the 
purpose of those five statements to Betty Currie were. Were they to get 
information, or were they to get her to falsely testify when she was 
called as a witness? Logic tells us that the President's argument was 
that he was just trying to refresh his memory. Well, so much of a novel 
legal defense argument.
  First, consider the President's options after he left the deposition.
  He could have abided by the judge's gag order and not say anything.
  Second, he could have called Betty Currie in and asked her an open-
ended question: Ms. Currie, or Betty, what do you remember happened?
  The third option was to call her in and to make these declaratory 
statements, violate the judge's order, and tamper with the anticipated 
testimony of Betty Currie.
  That is the course that the President chose. He made sure it was a 
face-to-face meeting, not a telephone call. He made sure that no one 
else was present. He made sure that the meeting was on his territory 
and in his office where he could feel comfortable and he could utilize 
the power and prestige of his office to have the greatest influence on 
her future testimony.
  After Ms. Currie was in the President's office, he made short, clear, 
understandable, declarative statements telling Ms. Currie what the 
story was. He was not interested in what she knew. Why? Because he knew 
the truth, but he did not want Ms. Currie to tell the truth. The only 
way to ensure that was by telling her what to say, not asking her what 
she remembered. You do not refresh someone's memory by telling that 
person what he or she remembers, and you certainly do not make the 
declarative statements to someone regarding factual scenarios of which 
the listener was unaware.
  The statements that were made to her, Betty Currie could not have any 
possible knowledge about as to whether they were ever alone, as to 
whether she came on to him. No. This was not any attempt for the 
President to refresh his recollection. It was witness tampering, pure 
and simple.
  Understanding the seriousness of the President's attempting to 
influence the testimony of Ms. Currie, his attorneys have tried to 
argue that those statements could not constitute obstruction of justice 
because she had not been subpoenaed and the President did not know that 
she was a potential witness at this time. Well, the argument is refuted 
by both the law and the facts.
  The law is clear that a person may be convicted of obstructing 
justice if he corruptly influenced the testimony of a prospective 
witness. The witness does not actually have to give testimony. The 
witness does not have to be under any subpoena. The witness does not 
have to be on any witness list. And so the law is clear.
  Secondly, let's examine the defense in light of the facts. The 
President himself brought Ms. Currie into the civil rights case as a 
corroborating witness when he repeatedly used her name in the 
deposition, and just as significantly the President had to be concerned 
about a looming perjury charge against him in light of his false 
testimony in the deposition. At least six times in that deposition the 
President challenged the plaintiff's attorneys to question Ms. Currie 
about the particular issue.
  You don't have it in front of you, but you will see it when we 
distribute the copies of my remarks. I will go through those six times.
  At page 58 of the deposition, the President, when asked whether he 
was alone with Ms. Lewinsky said that he was not alone with her or that 
Betty Currie was there with Monica.
  At page 70, when asked about the last time the President saw Ms. 
Lewinsky, he falsely testified he only recalled that she was there to 
see Betty.
  At page 64, he told the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty'' whether 
Lewinsky was alone with him in the White House or not or with Betty in 
the White House between the late hours.
  At page 65 of the deposition, the President was asked whether Ms. 
Lewinsky sent packages to him, and he stated that Betty handled the 
packages.
  At page 72, the President was asked whether he may have assisted in 
any way with a job search. He said he thought Betty suggested Vernon 
Jordan talk to her.
  At page 74, he said Monica asked Betty to ask someone to talk to 
Ambassador Richardson. He asserted Betty as a corroborating witness at 
least six times in the deposition.
  There is no question that Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and 
the President clearly wanted her to be deposed as a witness as his 
``ask Betty'' testimony demonstrates.
  But there is another fact that, thus far, has been overlooked, and 
let me draw your attention to this.
  Two days before the President's deposition, Betty Currie receives a 
call from Michael Isikoff, a reporter with Newsweek magazine, inquiring 
about the records, the courier records of gifts going from Ms. Lewinsky 
to the President.
  You've got a news reporter for a national publication two days before 
the President's deposition talking to the President's secretary, 
saying, ``I need to see the courier records at the White House.'' What 
does Betty Currie do? She testified that she probably told the 
President this. Then she tells Bruce Lindsey, but she also goes to see 
Vernon Jordan. Why? Why would the secretary go see Vernon Jordan 
because she had a press inquiry? The reason is, as we see later on, 
remember, this is January 15th. What happened on December 28th that we 
will get to a little bit later? December 28th Betty Currie went and put 
those gifts under her bed. Why is she nervous? Because Mike Isikoff is 
calling about the gifts that are presently under her bed, and she is 
nervous. I would be nervous. And so she goes to see Bruce Lindsey. She 
goes to see Vernon Jordan. ``I need help. What do I do?'' And she 
probably told the President.
  It is all breaking loose, the house of cards is falling down, and she 
is either going to report to Mr. Jordan or to seek advice from him. 
Either way, she knows it is serious, and it all has legal consequences. 
And she is a witness to it all.
  And not only does Betty Currie's testimony talk about this call from 
Michael Isikoff and going to see Vernon Jordan, but Vernon Jordan's 
testimony confirms the visit as well.
  The President claims he called Ms. Currie in to work on that Sunday 
night only to find out what she knew, but the President knew the truth 
about the relationship, and if he told the truth in deposition the day 
before, he would have had no reason to be refreshed by Betty Currie.
  More importantly, the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's reaction and 
the suggested lies clearly prove that the President was not merely 
interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he was

[[Page S239]]

looking for corroboration for his false coverup, and that is why he 
coached her. He needed a witness for him, not against him.
  Now, let's go to exhibit 5, Betty Currie's testimony--excuse me, 
exhibit 15.
  This is Betty Currie's testimony before the grand jury on January 27, 
1998. And Betty Currie is asked about this. Now, remember, it was on a 
Sunday that Betty Currie was first called into the White House to go 
through these five statements, this coaching by the President. And then 
she testified to the grand jury:

       Question: Did there come a time after that that you had 
     another conversation with the President about some other news 
     about what was going on? That would have been Tuesday or 
     Wednesday--when he called you into the Oval Office?

  Betty Currie's answer:

       It was Tuesday or Wednesday. I don't remember which one 
     this was, either. But the best I remember, when he called me 
     in the Oval Office, it was sort of a recapitulation of what 
     we had talked about on Sunday--you know, ``I was never alone 
     with her''--that sort of thing.
       Question: Did he pretty much list the same----
       Answer: To my recollection, sir, yes.
       Question: And did he say it in sort of the same tone and 
     demeanor that he used the first time he told you on Sunday?
       Answer: The best I remember, yes, sir.

  And this needs to be emphasized. Not only was that witness coaching 
taking place on Sunday, but it took place a couple days later. It was 
twice repeated by the President to Betty Currie. He needed to have her 
good and in line.
  This is more than witness tampering. It is witness compulsion of 
false testimony by an employer to a subordinate employee. This has 
nothing to do with facts, nothing to do with media inquiries. It has to 
do with keeping his team on board, keeping the ship from sinking, and 
hiding the facts that are important. At this point we are not talking 
about hiding personal facts from inquiring minds but an effort to 
impede the legitimate and necessary functioning of our court system.
  And now let's go to the Martin Luther King holiday, almost exactly a 
year ago, Monday, January 19. Again, you will see the example of the 
frantic search for Monica Lewinsky did continue.
  Exhibit 16. I am not going to go through all of this, but I just want 
to briefly show the frantic activity on this particular day.
  First of all, you will see Betty Currie is trying to fulfill her 
responsibility to get ahold of Ms. Lewinsky. She uses the pager system, 
and she says, ``Please call Kay at home.'' Now ``Kay'' is the code name 
that is used for Betty Currie. That is the agreed upon signal. And she 
uses three messages: ``Please call Kay. Please call Kay. Please call 
Kay.''
  Then she starts using different techniques to get her attention. 
``It's a social call.'' And then she later uses it's a ``family 
emergency.'' Then she later uses it's ``good news.'' She is using every 
means possible to get the attention of Monica Lewinsky. And then at 
8:50 a.m. the President telephones Currie at home. At 8:56 a.m. the 
President telephones Jordan at home.
  Go on down to 10:56 a.m. ``The President telephones Jordan at his 
office.'' And so what is going on here? They are nervous; they are 
afraid; it is all breaking loose. They are trying to get ahold of 
Monica Lewinsky to find out what is going on, who she is talking to.
  Later that day things continued to destabilize for the President. At 
4:54 p.m. Mr. Jordan learned from the attorney, Frank Carter, that he 
no longer represented Ms. Lewinsky, and so Mr. Jordan's link had been 
cut off. Mr. Jordan continued to attempt to reach the President or 
someone at the White House. Between 4:58 and 5:22 p.m., he made six 
calls trying to get ahold of someone at the White House, the President.
  When Mr. Jordan was asked about why he was urgently trying to get 
ahold of the White House, he responded, ``Because the President asked 
me to get Monica Lewinsky a job'' and he thought it was ``information 
they ought to have.'' Jordan finally reaches the President about 6 p.m. 
and tells him that [Mr.] Carter had been fired.

  Why this flurry of activity? It shows how important it was for the 
President of the United States to find Ms. Lewinsky. Betty Currie was 
in charge of contacting Monica, and it could not happen, it did not 
happen. Ms. Lewinsky was a co-conspirator in hiding this relationship 
from the Federal court and he was losing control over her. In fact, she 
ultimately agreed to testify truthfully, under penalty of perjury, in 
this matter. This was trouble for the President.
  And, so, now let's continue; let's continue exploring the web of 
obstruction. But to do this, we have to backtrack to what I have 
already referred to, and that was the incident on December 28, the 
episode with the gifts.
  On December 28, another brick in the wall of obstruction was laid. It 
was the concealment of evidence. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she 
discussed with the President the fact that she had been subpoenaed and 
that the subpoena called for her to produce gifts. And this is what Ms. 
Lewinsky was telling the President at the meeting with him on December 
28. She testified before the grand jury that she recalled telling the 
President that the subpoena in question had requested a hatpin and 
other items, and this concerned her--the specificity of it. And the 
President responded it ``bothered'' him, too.
  Well, let's look at the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, which is exhibit 
17. This is Lewinsky testifying about the meeting.

       And then at some point I said to him [the President], 
     ``Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away 
     outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe 
     Betty.'' And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't 
     know,'' or, ``Let me think about that,'' and left that topic.

  Not exactly the response you would hope for or expect from the 
President. But the answer led to action. Later that day Ms. Lewinsky 
got a call from Ms. Currie, who said, ``I understand you have something 
to give to me,'' or, according to Ms. Lewinsky, ``The President said 
you have something to give me.'' She wasn't exactly sure of the phrase 
but it was either, ``I understand you have something to give me,'' what 
Betty Currie said, or Betty Currie said, ``The President said you have 
something to give to me.''
  And so, ladies and gentlemen, if you accept the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky on that point, you must conclude that the directive to 
retrieve the gifts came from the President. I will concede that there 
is a conflict in the testimony on this point with the testimony of 
Betty Currie. Ms. Currie, in her grand jury testimony, had a fuzzy 
memory, a little different recollection. She testified that, ``the best 
she can remember,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. But whenever she was asked 
further, she said that maybe Ms. Lewinsky's memory is better than hers 
on that issue. But there is helpful evidence to clear up this 
discrepancy, or this inconsistency. Monica, you will recall, in her 
deposition said she thought that Betty had called her and she thought 
that the call came from her cell phone number.
  Well, it was not known at the time of the questioning of Monica 
Lewinsky, but since then the cell phone record was retrieved. And you 
don't have it in front of you, but it will be available. The cell phone 
record was retrieved that showed, on Betty Currie's cell phone calls, 
that a call was made at 3:32, from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky. And 
this confirms the testimony of Monica Lewinsky that the followup to get 
the gifts came from Betty Currie. The only way she would know about it 
is if the President directed her to go retrieve the gifts, as was 
discussed with Monica earlier.
  Now, the President will argue that Monica's timeline does not fit 
with the time of the cell phone call. But remember, the cell phone 
record was retrieved subsequent to both the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky and Betty Currie before the grand jury, and therefore the 
record was not available to refresh the recollection or to make inquiry 
with him about that. Monica Lewinsky's time estimates as to when Betty 
Currie arrived to pick up the gifts was based upon her memory without 
the benefit of records.
  The questions raised by the President on this issue are legitimate 
and demonstrate the need to call the key witnesses to a trial of this 
case and to assess which version of the events is believable and 
substantiated by the corroborating evidence. This is certainly an area 
of testimony where the juror needs to hear from Betty Currie and Monica 
Lewinsky and to examine all of

[[Page S240]]

the circumstantial evidence and documentary evidence to determine the 
truth. It is my belief, based upon common sense and based upon the 
documentary evidence, that the testimony of Monica Lewinsky is 
supported in the record and it leads to the conclusion that it was the 
President who initiated this retrieval of the gifts and the concealment 
of the evidence.
  Now, there are many lawyers here in this room, and you know that in 
Federal cases all across this country judges instruct juries on 
circumstantial evidence. We have presented to you a great amount of 
direct evidence, grand jury testimony, eyewitness testimony, 
documentary evidence. But juries can use circumstantial evidence as 
well. And a typical line from the instruction that is given in Federal 
courts to Federal juries all across the land:

       The law makes absolutely no distinction between the weight 
     or value to be given either to direct or circumstantial 
     evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of 
     circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.

  So I think it is incumbent upon you to evaluate the circumstances 
very carefully in addition to the testimony.
  Now, let's examine the key question for a moment. Why did Betty 
Currie pick up the gifts from Monica Lewinsky? Monica Lewinsky states 
that she did not request this and the retrieval was initiated by the 
call from Betty Currie. This was after the meeting with the President. 
Monica Lewinsky's version is corroborated by the cell phone record and 
the pattern of conduct on the part of Betty Currie. What do I mean by 
that? As a loyal secretary to the President, it is inconceivable that 
she would go to retrieve gifts that she knows the President is very 
concerned about and could bring down the whole house. Betty Currie, a 
subordinate employee, would not engage in such activity on such a 
sensitive matter without the approval and direction of the President 
himself.
  In addition, let's look further to the actions of Betty Currie. It 
becomes clear that she understands the significance of these gifts, 
their evidentiary value in a civil rights case, and the fact that they 
are under subpoena. She retrieves these items, and where does she place 
them? She hides them under her bed--significantly, a place of 
concealment.
  Now, let's look at the President's defense. The President stated in 
his response to questions 24 and 25, that were submitted from the House 
to the President, he said he was not concerned about the gifts. In 
fact, he recalled telling Monica that if the Jones lawyers request the 
gifts, she should just turn them over to them. The President testified 
he is ``not sure'' if he knew the subpoena asked for gifts.
  Now, why in the world would Monica and the President discuss turning 
over gifts to the Jones lawyer if Ms. Lewinsky had not told him that 
the subpoena asked for gifts? On the other hand, if he knew the 
subpoena requested gifts, why would he give Monica more gifts on 
December 28? This seems odd. But Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals the 
answer. She said that she never questioned ``that we were ever going to 
do anything but keep this private,'' and that means to take ``whatever 
appropriate steps need to be taken.'' That is from Monica's grand jury 
testimony of August 6.
  Why would the President even meet with Monica Lewinsky on December 28 
when their relationship was in question and he had a deposition coming 
up? Certainly he knew he would be questioned about it. Certainly if 
Monica became a witness she would be questioned about the relationship, 
that she would be asked when was the last time you met with the 
President, and now they have to say December 28, if they were going to 
tell the truth.
  The answer is, the President knew that he had to keep Monica Lewinsky 
on the team and he was willing to take more risks so that she would 
continue to be a part of the conspiracy to obstruct the legitimate 
functions of the Federal court in a civil rights case.
  It should be remembered that the President has denied each and every 
allegation of the two articles of impeachment, he has denied each 
element of the obstruction of justice charges, including this 
allegation that he encouraged a scheme to conceal evidence in a civil 
rights case. This straightforward denial illustrates the dispute in the 
evidence and testimony. It sets the credibility of Monica Lewinsky, the 
credibility of Betty Currie, the credibility of Vernon Jordan, and 
others against the credibility of the President of the United States.
  How can you, as jurors, determine who is telling the truth? I have 
pointed to the corroborating evidence, the circumstantial evidence, as 
well as common sense supporting the testimony of Monica Lewinsky. But 
let me ask you two questions: Can you convict the President of the 
United States without hearing personally the testimony of one of the 
key witnesses? The second question is: Can you dismiss the charges 
under this strong set of facts and circumstances without hearing and 
evaluating the credibility of key witnesses?
  Let me take this a step further and evaluate the credibility of the 
President. Let's first look back at his testimony on the December 28 
meeting that he gave in his deposition. In that case, he seriously 
misrepresented the nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, and that 
was the gift exchange. First he was asked:

       Question: Did she tell you that she had been served with a 
     subpoena in this case?

  The President answered flatly, ``No. I don't know if she had been.''
  Again, this is his testimony in the deposition. He was also asked in 
the deposition if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky about the 
possibility of her testifying.'' His answer: ``I'm not sure * * *,'' he 
said. He then added that he may have joked that the Jones lawyers might 
subpoena every woman he has ever spoken to, and that ``I don't think we 
ever had more of a conversation than that about it * * *.''
  Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict his testimony, but 
the President later had to answer questions in the grand jury about 
these same set of circumstances and the President directly contradicted 
himself. Speaking of this December 28 meeting, he said that he ``knew 
by then, of course, that she had gotten a subpoena'' and they had a 
``conversation about the possibility of her testifying.''
  I submit to this body that the inconsistencies of the President's own 
testimony, as well as common sense, seriously diminish his credibility 
on this issue.
  Now let's go forward, once again, to the time period in which the 
President gave his deposition in the Paula Jones case. The President 
testified under oath on January 17, and immediately thereafter, 
remember, he brought Betty Currie in to present a set of false facts to 
her, seeking her agreement and coaching her.
  But the President is fully convinced that he can get by with his 
false denials because no one will be able to prove what did or did not 
happen in the Oval Office. There were no witnesses, and it boils down 
to a ``he said, she said'' scenario, and as long as that is the case, 
he believes he can win. If the President can simply destroy Monica 
Lewinsky's credibility in public and before the grand jury, then he 
will escape the consequences for his false statements under oath and 
obstruction in the civil rights case. Now, remember, this viewpoint, 
though, is all before the DNA tests were performed on the blue dress, 
forcing the President to acknowledge certain items.
  In order to carry out this coverup and obstruction, the President 
needed to go further. He needed not only Betty Currie to repeat his 
false statements, but also other witnesses who would assuredly be 
called before the Federal grand jury and who would be questioned by the 
news media in public forums. And this brings us to the false statements 
that the President made to his White House staff and Presidential 
aides.
  Let's call Sydney Blumenthal and John Podesta to the witness stand. I 
concede they would be adverse witnesses. This is referred to in exhibit 
18 that you have in front of you.
  First, the testimony of Sydney Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal, to put 
this in perspective, is testifying about his conversations when the 
President called him in to go through these facts of what happened. So 
Mr. Blumenthal testified that ``it was at that point that he''--
referring to the President--``gave his account as to what happened to 
me and he said that Monica--and it came

[[Page S241]]

very fast. He said, `Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual 
demand on me.' He rebuffed her. He said, `I've gone down that road 
before, I've caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do 
that again.' ''
  Look at this next line. ``She threatened him. She said that she would 
tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker 
among her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or said 
she had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker any more.''
  He talks about this character in a novel, and I haven't read that 
book. But the last line: ``And I said to him, I said, ``When this 
happened with Monica Lewinsky, were you alone?' He said, `Well, I was 
within eyesight or earshot of someone.' ''

  Let's go to John Podesta's testimony where he was called in the same 
fashion. The President talked to him about what is happening:

       Question: Okay. Share that with us.
       Answer: Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some 
     spate of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said 
     that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever.
       Question: Okay.
       Answer: --that they had not had oral sex.

  Very briefly, Dick Morris. You have heard this. I will refer to the 
last line: `` `They're just not ready for it,' meaning the voters. And 
he [The President] said, `Well, we just have to win, then.' ''
  As the President testified before the grand jury, he knew these 
witnesses would be called before the grand jury. At page 106 of the 
President's testimony before the grand jury--I just want to confirm 
this point because it is important--he testified--the question was: 
``You know that they''--and this is referring to John Podesta, Sydney 
Blumenthal and his aides-- ``that they might be witnesses, you knew 
they might be called into the grand jury, didn't you?''
  His answer: ``That's right.''
  So there is no question these were witnesses going to testify before 
the grand jury. He was giving them false information, and he did not 
limit it to that. The false statements to them constitute witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice.
  I think there are two significant points in the statements the 
President made to his aides.
  First of all, the President who wants to do away with the politics of 
personal destruction indicates a willingness to destroy the credibility 
and reputation of a young person who worked in his office for what 
reason? In order to preserve not only his Presidency but, more 
significantly, to defeat the civil rights case against him. It is not a 
matter of saying he didn't do it, because he could have simply uttered 
a denial, but he engaged in character assassination that he knew would 
be repeated to the Federal grand jury and throughout the public--she 
was a stalker, she threatened me, she came on to me, and it was--it was 
repeated.
  Secondly, he makes it clear in his statements to John Podesta that he 
denies any sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, including oral sex. 
There is no quibbling about definitions in this statement. It clearly 
reflects an attempt to deceive, lie and obstruct our system of justice.
  In this case, at every turn, he used whatever means available to 
evade the truth, destroy evidence, tamper with witnesses and took any 
other action required to prevent evidence from coming forward in a 
civil rights case that would prove a truth contrary to the President's 
interest. He had obstructed the administration of justice before the 
U.S. district court in a civil rights case and before the Federal grand 
jury. But as we move toward a conclusion, let's not focus just on the 
supporting cast we talked about, but we need to look at the direct and 
personal actions of the President.
  I want to look at exhibit 20. This just summarizes the seven pillars 
of obstruction. What did the President do that constitutes evidence of 
obstruction?
  No. 1, he personally encouraged a witness, Monica Lewinsky, to 
provide false testimony.
  No. 2, the President had direct involvement in assuring a job for a 
witness--underlining direct involvement. He made the calls, Vernon 
Jordan did, and it is connected with the filing of the false affidavit 
by that witness.
  No. 3, the President personally, with corrupt intentions, tampered 
with the testimony of a prospective witness, Betty Currie.
  No. 4, the President personally provided false statements under oath 
before a Federal grand jury.
  No. 5, by direct and circumstantial evidence the President personally 
directed the concealment of evidence under subpoena in a judicial 
proceeding.
  No. 6, the President personally allowed false representations to be 
made by his attorney, Robert Bennett, to a Federal district judge on 
January 17.
  No. 7, the President intentionally provided false information to 
witnesses before a Federal grand jury knowing that those statements 
would be repeated with the intent to obstruct the proceedings before 
that grand jury and that is the statements that he made to the aides.
  The seven pillars of this obstruction case were personally 
constructed by the President of the United States. It was done with the 
intent that the truth and evidence would be suppressed in a civil 
rights case pending against him. The goal was to win, and he was not 
going to let the judicial system stand in his way.

  At the beginning of my presentation, I tried to put this case into 
perspective for myself by saying that this proceeding is the same as to 
what takes place in every courtroom in America--the pursuit of truth, 
seeking equal justice, and upholding the law. All of that is true. But 
we know there is even more at stake in this trial. What happens here 
affects the workings of our Constitution, it will affect the Presidency 
in future decades, and it will have an impact on a whole generation of 
Americans. What is at stake is our Constitution and the principle of 
equal justice for all.
  I have faith in the Constitution of the United States, but the checks 
and balances of the Constitution are carried out by individuals--
individuals who are entrusted under oath with upholding the trust given 
to us by the people of this great land. If I believe in the 
Constitution, that it will work, then I must believe in you.
  Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I trust the Constitution of the 
United States. But today it is most important that I believe in you. I 
have faith in the U.S. Senate. You have earned the trust of the 
American people, and I trust each of you to make the right decision for 
our country.
  Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.


                                 Recess

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that we take 
another 15-minute break in the proceedings. And I urge the Senators to 
return promptly to the Chamber so we can begin after the 15-minute 
break.
  There being no objection, at 4:51 p.m., the Senate recessed until 
5:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by 
the Chief Justice.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to resume final 
presentation of the afternoon. Several Senators have inquired what will 
happen the balance of the day. I believe the presentation by 
Congressman Rogan will be the last of the day. It is anticipated we 
will complete today's presentation around 6:30 or 6:45.
  I yield the floor.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Rogan.
  Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the President, 
Members of the United States Senate, my name is Congressman James E. 
Rogan. I represent the 27th District of California.
  May I say at the outset that some of the facts and evidence you will 
hear in my presentation may sound familiar in light of the last 
presentation. Although at times the facts may appear to be a crossover, 
the relevance will be presented in a different light.
  Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation offered the evidence as it 
relates to the obstruction of justice charge against the President in 
article II. I will be inviting this body to view the evidence within 
the framework of article I, perjury before the grand jury.
  On behalf of the House of Representatives and in the name of the 
people of the United States, I will be presenting

[[Page S242]]

to the Senate evidence against the President to demonstrate he 
committed perjury before a Federal grand jury as set forth in article I 
of the articles of impeachment.
  Article I of the impeachment resolution against President Clinton 
alleges that he committed perjury before the grand jury.
  On August 17, 1998, President Clinton swore to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence shows that 
contrary to that oath, the President willfully provided perjurious, 
false, and misleading statements to the grand jury in four general 
areas:
  First, he perjured himself when he gave a false accounting to the 
grand jury about the nature and details of his relationship with a 21-
year-old intern, Ms. Monica Lewinsky, who was a subordinate Federal 
Government employee.
  Second, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he repeated 
previous perjured answers he gave under oath in a sexual harassment 
suit, which was a Federal civil rights action brought against him by 
Paula Jones.
  Third, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he repeated 
previous perjured answers to justify his attorney's false 
representations to a Federal judge in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
lawsuit against him.
  Finally, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he testified 
falsely about his attempts to get other potential grand jury witnesses 
to tell false stories to the grand jury, and to prevent the discovery 
of evidence in Paula Jones' sexual harassment lawsuit against him.
  In a judicial proceeding, a witness has a very solemn obligation to 
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Perjury is a 
serious crime because our judicial system can only succeed if citizens 
are required to tell the truth in court proceedings. If witnesses may 
lie with impunity for personal or political reasons, ``justice'' is no 
longer the product of the court system, and we descend into chaos. That 
is why the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a premium on truthful 
testimony and shows no tolerance for perjury.
  More than 20 years ago, the Supreme Court addressed this very concept 
of perjury and its dangerous effect on our system of law. Listen to the 
words of the U.S. Supreme Court:

       In this constitutional process of securing a witness' 
     testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured 
     testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic 
     concepts of judicial proceedings. . . . Congress has made the 
     giving of false answers a criminal act punishable by severe 
     penalties; in no other way can criminal conduct be flushed 
     into the open where the law can deal with it.

  That is the framework under which the House of Representatives acted 
in impeaching the President of the United States, and now respectfully 
urges this body to call the President to constitutional accountability.
  The key to understanding the facts of this case is to understand why 
the President was asked, under oath, questions about his private life 
in the first place.
  Despite the popular spin, it wasn't because Members of Congress or 
lawyers from the Office of the Independent Counsel, or a gaggle of 
reporters suddenly decided to invade the President's privacy. No. This 
all came about because of a claim against the President from when he 
was the Governor of Arkansas.
  During the discovery phase of the Paula Jones sexual harassment case 
against the President, Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered him to 
answer questions under oath relating to any sexual relationship he may 
have had while Governor and President with subordinate female 
Government employees. These orders are common in similar cases, and the 
questions posed to President Clinton are questions routinely posed to 
defendants in civil rights sexual harassment cases every single day in 
courthouses throughout the land.
  During the President's deposition in the Paula Jones case, he was 
asked questions about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The judge 
allowed these questions because they possibly could lead Mrs. Jones to 
discover if there was any pattern of conduct to help prove her case. 
The President repeatedly denied that he had a sexual relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky.
  A few days later, the story about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
broke in the press. A criminal investigation began to determine whether 
the President perjured himself in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
case and obstructed justice by trying to defeat her claim against him 
by corrupt means.
  On the afternoon of August 17, 1998, President Clinton raised his 
right hand and took an oath before the grand jury in their criminal 
investigation.
  (Text of Videotape presentation:)

       William Jefferson Clinton, Do you solemnly swear that the 
     testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the 
     truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
     you God?

  Note the incredibly solemn obligation of the oath the President took:

       Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 
     give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
     nothing but the truth?

  When the President made that solemn pledge, he was not obliging 
himself to tell the grand jury the partial truth, he was not obliging 
himself to tell the ``I didn't want to be particularly helpful'' truth; 
he was not obliging himself to tell the ``this is embarrassing so I 
think I'll fudge on it a little bit'' truth. He was required to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and he made that 
pledge in the name of God.
  The attorneys for the Office of the Independent Counsel showed great 
deference to the President when they questioned him that day. The 
President's attorneys were allowed to be there with him during the 
entire proceeding so that he could confer with them at his leisure if 
he was unsure of how to respond to a question. As a matter of fact, the 
attorney who questioned the President encouraged him to confer with his 
lawyers if there arose in the President's mind any reason to hesitate 
before answering a question.
  The following exchange occurred at the beginning of the President's 
testimony. The President was told:

       Normally, grand jury witnesses, while not allowed to have 
     attorneys in the grand jury room with them, can stop and 
     consult with their attorneys. Under our arrangement today, 
     your attorneys are here and present for consultation and you 
     can break to consult them as necessary. . . . Do you 
     understand that, sir?

  The President responded: ``I do understand that.''
  As a practical matter, the President had three options as he appeared 
before the grand jury to testify.
  First, the President could tell the truth about his true relationship 
with Miss Lewinsky.
  However, the evidence will clearly show that the president rejected 
the option of telling the truth.
  Second, the President knew he could invoke his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.
  The independent counsel's attorney explicitly reminded the President 
about his right to refuse to answer any question that might tend to 
incriminate him.
  The President was asked:

       You have a privilege against self-incrimination. If a 
     truthful answer to any question would tend to incriminate 
     you, you can invoke the privilege and that invocation will 
     not be used against you. Do you understand that?

  The President's response was: ``I do.''
  The President knew he had the right to refuse to answer any 
incriminating questions and that no legal harm would have come to him 
for doing so.
  But he rejected this option, just as he rejected the option of 
telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
  Instead, he selected a third path.
  He continued to lie about corrupt efforts to destroy Paula Jones' 
civil rights lawsuit against him.
  If a trial is permitted before this body where live witnesses can be 
called, and where their credibility can be scrutinized, the evidence 
will show this distinguished body that the course the President charted 
was a course of perjury.
  Despite the president's unique level of judicial sophistication and 
expertise, the attorneys at the grand jury were careful to make sure 
the president understood his responsibilities to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
  They did this at the outset of his testimony, before any questions 
were asked that might tempt the president to lie under oath.

[[Page S243]]

  And they specifically warned him that if he were to lie or 
intentionally mislead the grand jury, he could face perjury and 
obstruction of justice charges, both of which are felonies under 
federal law.
  This exchange occurred before the President's testimony:

       Q: Mr. President, you understand that your testimony here 
     today is under oath?
       A: I do.
       Q: And you understand that because you have sworn to tell 
     the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that 
     if you were to lie or intentionally mislead the grand jury, 
     you could be prosecuted for perjury and/or obstruction of 
     justice?
       A: I believe that's correct.
       Q: Is there anything that . . . I've stated to you 
     regarding your rights and responsibilities that you would 
     like me to clarify or that you don't understand?
       A: No, sir.

  Despite this ominous warning, the prosecutors continued emphasizing 
the need for the President to resist lying to the grand jury.
  Still intent on making sure the President understood his obligations, 
the attorneys further advised him:

       Q: Mr. President, I would like to read for you a portion of 
     Federal Rule of Evidence 603, which discusses the important 
     function the oath has in our judicial system.
       It says that the purpose of the oath is . . . calculated to 
     awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind 
     with the duty to tell the truth.
       Could you please tell the grand jury what that oath means 
     to you for today's testimony?
       A: I have sworn an oath to tell the grand jury the truth, 
     and that's what I intend to do.
  When the President said in that very last answer I just read that he 
swore an oath to tell the grand jury ``the truth,'' the prosecutor 
immediately followed up with this question. Here is what he was told.
  Question to the President:

       Q: You understand that [the oath] requires you to give the 
     whole truth, that is, a complete answer to each question, 
     sir?
       A: I will answer each question as accurately and fully as I 
     can.

  One would think these repetitive explanations would be enough to warn 
even the most legally unsophisticated witness about the need to treat a 
grand jury criminal investigation seriously, and the need to tell the 
whole truth at any cost.
  No reasonable person could believe at this point that the President 
did not understand his obligations.
  Yet, just to be sure, the attorneys again impressed on the President 
his solemn duty to tell the truth:
  Question to the President:

       Q: Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole 
     truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a 
     deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, 
     sir?
       A: I did take an oath then.
       Q: Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to 
     you then as it does today?
       A: I believed then that I had to answer the questions 
     truthfully. That is correct.  . . .
       Q: And it meant the same to you then as it does today?
       A: Well, no one read me a definition then and we didn't go 
     through this exercise then.
       I swore an oath to tell the truth, and I believed I was 
     bound to be truthful and I tried to be.

  Having just received his ``refresher course'' on either ``taking the 
Fifth'' and remaining silent, or telling the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth, the president acknowledged he was required to tell the 
truth when he gave answers to questions 8 months earlier in the Paula 
Jones sexual harassment civil rights lawsuit.
  Question to the President:

       Q: At the Paula Jones deposition, you were represented by 
     Mr. Robert Bennett, your counsel, is that correct?
       A: That is correct.
       Q: He was authorized by you to be your representative 
     there, your attorney, is that correct?
       A: That is correct.
       Q: Your counsel, Mr. Bennett, indicated . . . and I'm 
     quoting, ``The President intends to give full and complete 
     answers as Ms. Jones is entitled to have.''
       My question to you is, do you agree with your counsel that 
     a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is, to use his words, 
     entitled to have the truth?
       A: I believe that I was bound to give truthful answers, 
     yes, sir.
       Q: But the question is, sir, do you agree with your counsel 
     that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is entitled to 
     have the truth?
       A. I believe when a witness is under oath in a civil case, 
     or otherwise under oath, the witness should do everything 
     possible to answer the questions truthfully.

  Thus, the groundwork was laid for the President to testify under 
oath.
  He knew how the rules worked respecting testimony before the grand 
jury.
  If a question was vague or ambiguous, the President could ask for a 
clarification.
  If he was unsure how to answer, or indeed whether to answer a 
question, he could stop the questioning, take a break, and consult 
privately with his attorneys who were present with him.
  If giving an answer would tend to incriminate him, he could refuse to 
answer the question by claiming his Fifth Amendment rights.
  But if, after all of this, he decided to give an answer, the answer 
he gave was required to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth. And it was no different than the obligation when he 
testified in the Paula Jones deposition--the same oath, the same 
obligation.

  Let's look at how the President chose to meet his obligation.
  As noted in my opening remarks, the President's grand jury perjury is 
the basis for article I of the impeachment resolution. The evidence 
shows, and live witnesses clearly will demonstrate, that the President 
repeatedly committed perjury before the grand jury when he testified as 
a defendant in a sexual harassment civil rights lawsuit against him.
  He intentionally failed in his lawful obligation to tell the truth in 
four general areas. First, the President committed perjury before the 
grand jury when he testified about the nature of his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky, a 21-year-old White House intern who, by definition, 
was a subordinate Government employee.
  On December 5, 1995, Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the Paula 
Jones witness list. Later, the President was ordered by Federal Judge 
Susan Webber Wright to answer questions about Monica Lewinsky because 
the President was a defendant in a sexual harassment case.
  At his deposition in the Paula Jones case, the President was shown a 
definition approved by Judge Wright of what constitutes sexual 
relations. I am going to read the definition that was presented to the 
President.
  And let me say at the outset that I am going to slightly sanitize it. 
You have in your materials, Members of this body, a copy of the actual 
definition that was given to you, so you will be able to understand 
precisely what was put before the President.
  Definition of sexual relations: ``For the purposes of this 
deposition, a person engages in sexual relations when the person 
knowingly engages in or causes contact with the [certain enumerated 
body parts] of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the 
sexual desire of any person.''
  Members of the Senate, just for clarification, I did not feel the 
need to actually relate to this body what those enumerated body parts 
are.
  After reviewing the deposition, the President then denied that he 
ever had a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. As we have already 
seen, from the day in January when the President testified in the Jones 
deposition until the day he appeared in August for his grand jury 
testimony, he vehemently denied ever having a sexual relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky.
  Listen to the President addressing the American people on the subject 
of his credibility. The date is January 26, 1998, 5 days after the 
Lewinsky story broke in the press.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)

       ``But I want to say one thing to the American people. I 
     want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again.''
       ``I did not have sexual relations with that woman--Miss 
     Lewinsky.''
       ``I never told anybody to lie--not a single time. Never. 
     These allegations are false. And I need to go back to work 
     for the American people.''
       ``Thank you.''

  Beginning in January 1998, the President went on an 8-month campaign, 
both under oath and in the press, denying any sexual relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky in any way, shape, or form. But 8 months after his 
deposition testimony and these passionate denials, the tide had turned 
against his story. By August, Monica Lewinsky was now cooperating with 
the office of the independent counsel. If she was telling the truth in 
her sworn testimony, then the President's January denial in the Paula 
Jones case would

[[Page S244]]

have been a clear case of him committing perjury and obstructing 
justice.
  Why? Because she was describing, in very graphic detail, conduct 
occurring between her and the President that clearly fit the definition 
of ``sexual relations'' as used in the Paula Jones deposition--conduct 
that he repeatedly denied under oath.
  So by the time the President sat down for his grand jury testimony to 
answer these questions under oath, he had put himself in a huge box. He 
could not continue the outright lie because Ms. Lewinsky had turned 
over her blue dress for DNA testing, and at the time of his grand jury 
testimony he didn't know what the results were of that FBI test. Under 
such circumstances, continuing the lie was too risky of a strategy even 
for the most accomplished of gamblers. But if he told the truth, his 
earlier perjury and obstruction of justice would have ended his 
Presidency. He was sure he would have been driven from office.
  Remember that the President had actually authorized that a poll be 
taken for him by Dick Morris, and the poll wasn't just taken on whether 
the American people would forgive him for adultery; the President asked 
Dick Morris to poll in two other areas. He asked Dick Morris to poll 
whether the American people would forgive him for perjury and 
obstruction of justice. When he got the poll results back, he learned 
that the American people would forgive him for the adultery but they 
would not forgive him for perjury or for obstruction of justice.
  Once he got the bad news from Dick Morris that his political career 
was over if he perjured himself, he told Dick Morris, ``We'll just have 
to win.'' So at his grand jury testimony, once the first question was 
asked about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the President 
produced a prepared statement and read from it. This prepared statement 
he read to the grand jury on August 17, 1998, was the linchpin in his 
plan to ``win.''
  (Text of videotape presentation:)
       Q. Mr. President, were you physically intimate with Monica 
     Lewinsky?
       A. Mr. Bittman, I think maybe I can save you and the grand 
     jurors a lot of time if I read a statement, which I think 
     will make it clear what the nature of my relationship with 
     Ms. Lewinsky was and how it related to the testimony I gave, 
     what I was trying to do in that testimony. And I think it 
     will perhaps make it possible for you to ask even more 
     relevant questions from your point of view. And, with your 
     permission, I'd like to read that statement.
       Q. Absolutely. Please, Mr. President.
       A. When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions 
     in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct 
     that was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual 
     intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I 
     understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
     deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate 
     contact.
       These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in 
     early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations 
     with Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter.
       I regret that what began as a friendship came to include 
     this conduct. I take full responsibility for my actions. 
     While I will provide the grand jury whatever other 
     information I can, because of privacy considerations 
     affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an effort to 
     preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will 
     say about the specifics of these particular matters.
       I will try to answer to the best of my ability other 
     questions, including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, questions about my understanding of the term of 
     sexual relations, as I understood it to be defined at my 
     January 17th, 1998, deposition, and questions concerning 
     alleged subordination of perjury, obstruction of justice and 
     intimidation of witnesses.
       That . . . is my statement.

  Beyond that statement, the President generally refused to answer 
specific questions about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The 
President used that prepared statement as a substitute answer for 
specific questions about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky 19 separate 
times during his testimony before the grand jury. The purpose of the 
prepared statement was to avoid answering the types of specific 
harassment lawsuit questions for which the U.S. Supreme Court and Judge 
Susan Webber Wright had earlier cleared the way. The evidence shows the 
President used this prepared statement in order to justify the 
perjurious answers he gave at his deposition which were intended to 
affect the outcome of the Paula Jones case. The fact that this 
statement was prepared in advance shows his intent to mislead the grand 
jury in this very area. Ironically, this prepared statement was 
supposed to inoculate the President from perjury. Instead, it opened 
him up to 19 more examples of giving perjurious, false, and misleading 
answers under oath.

  For example, in that prepared statement, the President said his 
sexual contact with Ms. Lewinsky began in 1996, and not in 1995, as Ms. 
Lewinsky had testified. This was not a mere slip of memory over a 
meaningless timeframe; there is a discrepancy in the dates for a 
reason. You see, under the President's version, in 1996 Monica Lewinsky 
was a paid White House employee. Under the facts as testified to by Ms. 
Lewinsky, when the relationship really began in 1995, she was not a 
paid employee at the White House, she was a young, 21-year-old White 
House intern.
  The concept of a President having a sexual relationship in the White 
House with a young intern less than half his age was a public relations 
disaster for the President, as everyone vividly remembers. It is clear 
that the President somehow viewed the concept as less combustible if he 
could take the ``young intern'' phrase out of the public lexicon. Yet, 
in his deposition testimony, the President admitted he met her and saw 
her when she was an intern working in the White House in November 1995, 
during the Government shutdown. Monica Lewinsky confirmed this. In 
fact, she testified that the first time she ever spoke to the President 
was on November 15, 1995, during the Government shutdown. And she also 
said that the very first time that she ever spoke to the President was 
the same day he invited her back to the Oval Office and began a sexual 
relationship with her.
  It is obvious that the reference in the President's prepared 
statement to the grand jury that this relationship began in 1996 was 
intentionally false.
  The President's statement was intentionally misleading when he 
described being alone with Ms. Lewinsky only on certain occasions. 
Actually, they were alone in the White House at least 20 times and had 
at least 11 sexual encounters at the White House. The President 
attempted to use language that subtly minimized the number of times 
they were alone.
  The President's statement was intentionally misleading when he 
described his telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky as 
``occasional.'' In fact, there are at least 55 documented telephone 
conversations between the President of the United States and the young 
intern. And, without going into further graphic detail, the evidence 
shows that, at least on 17 of those occasions, those conversations 
included much more than mere sexual banter, as the President described 
it.
  The most unsettling part of that statement was uttered near the 
close. Listen to what the President said: ``I regret that what began as 
a friendship came to include this conduct.'' ``Friendship.'' The very 
day the President met and spoke with a young White House intern for the 
first time was the day he invited her back to the Oval Office to 
perform sex acts on him.
  In fact, Monica Lewinsky said that after their sexual relationship 
was over a month old, she didn't even think the President knew her 
name. The President's statement about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky beginning as a friendship is a callous and deceptive 
mischaracterization of how his relationship with this young woman 
really began.
  Thus, the President began his deposition testimony by reading a false 
and misleading statement to the grand jury. He then used that statement 
as an excuse not to answer specific questions that were directly 
relevant to allowing the grand jury to complete its criminal 
investigation. Had he given specific answers to specific questions 
about the true nature of his relationship, the grand jury would have 
been able to learn the whole truth about whether the President perjured 
himself and obstructed justice in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
civil rights lawsuit.
  Paula Jones had a legal and constitutional right to learn if the 
President, while as President or Governor, used his position of power 
and influence to get sexual favors from subordinate female employees in 
the workplace or to reward subordinate female employees

[[Page S245]]

for granting such favors to him. Instead, the President intentionally 
provided on 19 separate occasions a misleading statement instead of 
giving a true characterization of his conduct, as required by his oath.
  He had no legal or constitutional right to refuse to answer such 
questions without claiming a fifth amendment privilege and then 
allowing Judge Wright to make a determination as to whether the 
privilege applied. The President's preliminary statement delivered 19 
times was an initial shot across the perjury bow offered by the 
President throughout his grand jury testimony. It showed a premeditated 
effort to thwart the grand jury's criminal investigation, to justify 
his prior wrongdoing, and to deny Paula Jones her constitutional right 
to bring forward her claim in a court of law.
  The President gave further perjurious, false, and misleading 
testimony regarding the nature and details of his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky. One of the ways the President tried to justify his 
perjurious answers in the Jones deposition about his relationship was 
to deconstruct the English language. Remember, the President was shown 
a copy of the definition of ``sexual relations'' that Judge Wright 
approved in his January deposition. This definition was directed by 
Judge Wright to be used as the guide under which the President was to 
answer questions about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. After 
carefully reviewing that definition, the President said under oath that 
it did not apply to his relationship with her.

  It is important to remember that at the time the President testified 
that he never had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, this was not a 
risky perjury strategy. After all, he had successfully used Vernon 
Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a good job in New York, despite her 
questionable qualifications. She had filed a false affidavit in the 
Jones case denying a sexual relationship with the President. She and 
the President had previously agreed to comprehensive cover stories to 
deny the truth of their relationship if anyone ever confronted them 
about it. And the bevy of gifts the President had given to Monica were 
now nestled safely under Betty Currie's bed so that they would never be 
produced to or discovered by Mrs. Jones' attorneys in compliance with 
their subpoena to have those gifts produced.
  The perjury strategy was a safe bet in January at his deposition, but 
it soon turned upside-down for the President. By the time of his grand 
jury testimony in August, the President knew things had changed 
drastically, but not in his favor. In light of Ms. Lewinsky's 
cooperation with the independent counsel, the impending FBI report on 
the DNA testing on the blue dress, and the President's decision not to 
confess to his crime, the President needed to come up with some excuse. 
Here is how the President, at his August grand jury appearance, tried 
to explain away his January deposition denial of engaging in sexual 
relations with Monica Lewinsky.
  (Text of video tape presentation:)

       Q. Did you understand the words in the first portion of the 
     [Jones deposition] exhibit, Mr. President, that is, ``For the 
     purposes of this deposition, a person engages in `sexual 
     relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes . . 
     .''?
       Did you understand, do you understand the words there in 
     that phrase?
       A. Yes . . . I can tell you what my understanding of the 
     definition is, if you want . . . My understanding of this 
     definition is it covers contact by the person being deposed 
     with the enumerated areas, if the contact is done with an 
     intent to arouse or gratify. That's my understanding of the 
     definition.
       Q. What did you believe the definition to include and 
     exclude? What kinds of activities?
       A. I thought the definition included any activity by the 
     person being deposed, where the person was the actor and came 
     into contact with those parts of the bodies with the purpose 
     or intent of gratification, and excluded any other activity. 
     For example, kissing's not covered by that, I don't think.
       Q. Did you understand the definition to be limited to 
     sexual activity?
       A. Yes, I understood the definition to be limited to 
     physical contact with those areas of the body with the 
     specific intent to arouse or gratify. That's what I 
     understood it to be.
       Q. What specific acts did the definition include, as you 
     understood the definition on January 17th, 1998?
       A. Any contact with the areas that are mentioned, sir. If 
     you contacted those parts of the body with an intent to 
     arouse or gratify, that is covered.
       Q. What did you understand . . .
       A. The person being deposed. If the person being deposed 
     contacted those parts of another person's body with an intent 
     to arouse or gratify, that was covered.

  If that answer sounds confusing to you, there is a reason for that. 
It was meant to be.
  What the President now was saying to the grand jury is that during 
their intimate relationship in the Oval Office, Monica Lewinsky had 
sexual relations with him; he didn't have sexual relations with her.
  Consider that for a minute.
  The President is asking everyone to believe that between the years 
1995 and 1997, while Monica Lewinsky was engaged in a pattern of 
explicit availability for him as she described in her testimony, the 
President carefully avoided having any intimate contact with her as 
described in Judge Wright's very detailed definition.
  And, according to the President, since he never intimately touched 
her as described in the definition--she only touched him--then he was 
under no obligation to answer questions in the harassment suit about 
Monica Lewinsky as Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered him to do 
under oath.
  Not only does the President's claim strain all boundaries of common 
sense, it is directly in conflict with Monica Lewinsky's detailed and 
corroborated accounts of their relationship.
  As if this ridiculous expansion of Judge Wright's definition of what 
constituted sexual relations wasn't enough, the President then decided 
to take his interpretation of the judge's definition one step further. 
He added a new element as to why he claimed the definition didn't apply 
to him.
  When asked again, at his grand jury testimony, what he thought the 
definition of sexual relations meant, here is the new twist that the 
President came up with.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)

       A. As I remember from the previous discussion this was some 
     kind of definition that had something to do with sexual 
     harassment. So, that implies it's forcing to me. And I--there 
     was never any issue of forcing in the case involving--well, 
     any of these questions they were asking me. They made it 
     clear in this discussion I just reviewed that what they were 
     referring to was intentional sexual conduct, not some sort of 
     forcible abusive behavior.
       So I basically--I don't think I paid any attention to it 
     because it appeared to me that that was something that had no 
     reference to the facts that they admitted they were asking me 
     about.

  The President now took the position that the definition didn't apply 
to him because it would only have applied if he forced himself on 
Monica Lewinsky. Remember the definition. And I will read it again:

       For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in 
     sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or 
     causes--
       (1) contact with the [certain enumerated body parts] of any 
     person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire 
     of any person[.]

  As you can see, this straightforward definition did not include the 
subject of force or harassment.
  Yet when the independent counsel's attorney tried to clarify the 
President's newfound position, the President gave no ground. He simply 
plowed ahead with his new interpretation.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)

       Q. I'm just trying to understand, Mr. President. You 
     indicated that you put the definition in the context of a 
     sexual harassment case . . .
       A. No, no, I think it was not in the context of sexual 
     harassment. I just re-read those four pages, which obviously 
     the grand jury doesn't have. But there was some reference to 
     the fact that this definition apparently bore some--had some 
     connection to some definition in another context and that 
     this was being used not in that context, not necessarily in 
     the context of sexual harassment.
       So I would think that this causes would be--means to force 
     someone to do something. That's what I read it. That's the 
     only point I'm trying to make. Therefore, I did not believe 
     that any one had ever suggested that I had forced anyone to 
     do anything and I did not do that. And so, that could not 
     have had any bearing on any questions relating to Ms. 
     Lewinsky.

  The evidence clearly shows from Monica Lewinsky's sworn testimony 
that the President deconstructed the English language to deny Paula 
Jones the opportunity to find out if other witnesses were out there who 
would help bolster her case against the President, and she was legally 
entitled to do that under our sexual harassment laws.
  No reasonable interpretation of the President's testimony could be 
made

[[Page S246]]

that he fulfilled his legal obligation to testify to the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth.
  His statements were perjurious. They were designed to defeat Paula 
Jones' right to pursue her sexual harassment civil rights lawsuit 
against this President.
  And by the way, in his testimony, the President conceded that if 
Monica Lewinsky's recitation of the facts was true, he would have 
perjured himself both in his deposition testimony and in repeating his 
denials before the grand jury. Listen to this.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)

       Q. And you testified that you didn't have sexual relations 
     with Monica Lewinsky in the Jones deposition under that 
     definition, correct?
       A. That's correct, sir.
       Q. If the person being deposed touched the genitalia of 
     another person, would that be in--with the intent to arouse 
     the sexual desire, arouse or gratify, as defined in 
     definition one, would that be, under your understanding, then 
     and now, sexual relations?
       A. Yes, sir.
       Q. Yes, it would?
       A. Yes, it would if you had a direct contact with any of 
     these places in the body, if you had direct contact with 
     intent to arouse or gratify, that would fall within the 
     definition.
       Q. So you didn't do any of those three things with Monica 
     Lewinsky?
       A. You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did 
     not have sexual relations as I understood this term to be 
     defined.
  So, who is telling the truth? The only way to really know is to bring 
forth the witnesses, put them under oath and give each juror, each 
Member of this body the opportunity to make that determination of 
credibility, because the record shows that Monica Lewinsky delivered 
consistent and detailed testimony under oath regarding many specific 
encounters with the President that clearly fell within the definition 
of sexual relations from the Jones deposition.
  Monica Lewinsky's memory and accounts of these incidents are 
amazingly corroborated by her recollection of dates, places and phone 
calls which correspond with the official White House entrance logs and 
phone records.
  Monica Lewinsky's testimony is further corroborated through DNA 
testing and the testimony of her friends and family members, to whom 
she made near contemporaneous statements about the relationship.
  Most importantly, Monica Lewinsky had every reason to tell the truth 
to the grand jury. She was under a threat of prosecution for perjury, 
not only for her grand jury testimony, but also for the false affidavit 
she filed on behalf of the President in the Jones case.
  She knew then and she knows today that her immunity agreement could 
be revoked at any time if she lies under oath or if she lied under oath 
in the past. Truthful testimony was and remains a condition for her 
immunity from prosecution.
  By way of contrast, the President was under obligation to give 
complete answers. Instead, he offered false answers that violated his 
oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. And 
incidentally, during his grand jury testimony, the President actually 
suggested that he had a right to give less than complete answers. Why? 
Because he questioned the motives of Ms. Jones in bringing her lawsuit.

  If this standard is acceptable, what does that do to the search for 
the truth when an oath is administered in a courtroom to one who claims 
to question the ``motives'' of their opponent in a trial? This 
suggestion has no basis in law. And it is destructive to the truth-
seeking function of the courts.
  The President's perjurious legal hairsplitting used to bypass the 
requirement of telling the complete truth denied Paula Jones her 
constitutional right to have her day in court and an orderly 
disposition of her claim in the sexual harassment case against the 
President.
  To dismiss this conduct with a shrug because it is ``just about sex'' 
is to say that the sexual harassment laws protecting women in the 
workplace do not apply to powerful employers or others in high places 
of privilege. As one wag recently noted, if this case is ``just about 
sex,'' then robbery is just a disagreement over money.
  Next, the President perjured himself before the grand jury when he 
repeated previous perjured answers he gave in the deposition of the 
Paula Jones case. In his grand jury testimony in August, the President 
admitted he had to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth when he testified in the Paula Jones deposition.
  The question to the President:

       Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole 
     truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a 
     deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, 
     sir?

  Answer:

       I did take an oath then.

  Question:

       Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to you 
     then as it does today?

  Answer:

       I believe then that I had to answer the questions 
     truthfully; that is correct.

  When the President testified in his January deposition, he knew full 
well that Monica Lewinsky's affidavit she filed in the case stating 
that they never had sexual relations was false. Yet, when this 
affidavit was shown to him at the deposition, he testified that her 
false claim was, in his words, ``absolutely true.''
  He knew that the definition of ``sexual relations'' used in the 
earlier Jones deposition was meant to cover the same activity that was 
mentioned in Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit. Rather than tell the 
complete truth, the President lied about the relationship, the cover 
stories, the affidavit, the subpoena for gifts, and the search for a 
job for Ms. Lewinsky.
  Later he denied to the grand jury in August that he committed any 
perjury during his January deposition. This assertion before the grand 
jury that he testified truthfully in the Jones case is in and of itself 
perjurious testimony because the record is clear he did not testify 
truthfully in January in the Paula Jones case. He perjured himself.
  Thus, when the President testified before the grand jury in August, 
he knew he had given perjurious answers in the January deposition. If 
the President really thought, as he testified, that he had told the 
truth in his January deposition testimony, he would not have related a 
false account of events to his secretary, Betty Currie, whom he knew, 
by his own admission, might be called as a witness in the Jones case; 
he would not have repeatedly denied he was unable to recall being alone 
with Monica Lewinsky; and he would not have told false accounts to his 
aides whom he knew, by his own admission, were potential witnesses in 
later proceedings.
  The evidence of perjury and obstruction of justice is overwhelming in 
this case. He continued to use illegal means to defeat Ms. Jones' 
constitutional right to bring her harassment case against him.
  Next, the President committed perjury before the grand jury when he 
testified that he did not allow his attorney to make false 
representations while referring to Monica Lewinsky's affidavit before 
the judge in the Jones case, an affidavit that he knew was false.
  Remember, at the Jones deposition in January 1998, Monica Lewinsky 
previously had filed a false affidavit that said, ``I have never had a 
sexual relationship with the President'' and that she had no relevant 
information to provide on the subject to Ms. Jones.
  When Ms. Jones' attorneys attempted to question the President about 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, the President's attorney, Mr. 
Bennett, objected to him even being questioned about the relationship.
  Mr. Bennett claimed that in light of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit 
saying that there was no sexual relationship between the two, and there 
never had been, that Paula Jones' lawyer had no good faith belief even 
to question the President about a relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
  Listen to what Mr. Bennett told Judge Wright in the deposition.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)
       Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need 
     some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to 
     object to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will 
     leak. I don't question the predicates here. I question the 
     good faith of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel 
     is fully aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has 
     filed, has an affidavit which they are in possession of 
     saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any 
     manner, shape or form, with President Clinton, and yet 
     listening to the innuendo in the questions----
       Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I 
     do not know whether

[[Page S247]]

     counsel is basing this question on any affidavit, but I will 
     direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on other evidence that 
     might be pertinent and could be arguably coaching the witness 
     at this juncture. Now, Mr. Fisher is an officer of this 
     court, and I have to assume that he has a good faith basis 
     for asking the question. If in fact he has no good faith 
     basis for asking this question, he could later be sanctioned. 
     If you would like, I will be happy to review in camera any 
     good faith basis he might have.
       Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I 
     would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness. 
     In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the 
     witness is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica 
     Lewinsky's) affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing 
     he doesn't know, but I think when he asks questions like this 
     where he's sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he 
     should at least have a good faith proffer.
       Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a 
     good faith basis for asking the question.
       Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
       Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be 
     willing to review this in camera if he does not want to 
     reveal it to counsel.
       Mr. Bennett. Fine.
       Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to 
     the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera 
     hearing.
       Judge Wright. All right.
       Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do 
     that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there 
     is substantial basis.
       Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question. 
     He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett, 
     this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith 
     basis can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, 
     of the deponent, and the other party.

  May I say as an aside that by presenting that, I am in no way 
questioning the quality or the integrity of the President's attorney, 
Mr. Bennett, on that day. Mr. Bennett was doing his job as the 
President's lawyer. He had an affidavit from Monica Lewinsky that said 
none of this ever happened. And so I hope that none of you will assume 
that by my showing this deposition tape today that I am trying to draw 
any unfair inference against the President's attorney on that date. But 
you can tell from what you have just observed that Mr. Bennett was 
using Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit in an attempt to stop 
questioning of the President about Ms. Lewinsky.
  What did the President do during that exchange? He sat mute. He did 
not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even though the President knew 
that the affidavit upon which Mr. Bennett was relying was utterly 
false.
  Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection and allowed the 
questioning about Monica Lewinsky to proceed.
  Later in the deposition, Mr. Bennett read to the President the 
portion of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in which she denied having a sexual 
relationship with the President. Mr. Bennett then asked the President, 
who was under oath, if Ms. Lewinsky's statement that they never had a 
sexual relationship was true and accurate.
  Listen to the President as he responds.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)

       Q: In paragraph eight of her affidavit, she says this, ``I 
     have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he 
     did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did 
     not offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a 
     sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other 
     benefits for reflecting a sexual relationship.''
       Is this a true and accurate statement as far as you know 
     it?
       A: That is absolutely true.

  The President's answer: ``That is absolutely true.''
  When President Clinton was asked during his grand jury testimony 8 
months later how he could have sat silently at his earlier deposition 
while his attorney made the false statement that ``there is no sex of 
any kind,'' in any manner, shape, or form, to Judge Wright, the 
President first said that he was not paying ``a great deal of 
attention'' to Mr. Bennett's comments.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)
       Q. Mr. President, I want to--before I go into a new subject 
     area, briefly go over something you were talking about with 
     Mr. Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at 
     the Paula Jones deposition--counsel is fully aware--it's page 
     54, line 5. ``Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky is 
     filing, has an affidavit, which they were in possession of, 
     saying that there was absolutely no sex of any kind in any 
     manner, shape or form with President Clinton.'' That 
     statement was made by your attorney in front of Judge Susan 
     Webber Wright.
       A. That's correct.
       Q. Your--that statement is a completely false statement. 
     Whether or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind 
     in any manner, shape or form with President Clinton'' was an 
     utterly false statement. Is that correct?
       A. It depends upon what the meaning of the word ``is'' 
     means. If ``is'' means is, and never has been, that's one 
     thing. If it means, there is none, that was a completely true 
     statement. But as I have testified--I'd like to testify 
     again--this is --it is somewhat unusual for a client to be 
     asked about his lawyer's statements instead of the other way 
     around. I was not paying a great deal of attention to this 
     exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.

  The President added to this explanation he was giving to the attorney 
questioning him. This is what the President said: ``And I'm not sure . 
. . as I sit here today that I sat there and followed all these 
interchanges between the lawyers. I'm quite sure that I didn't follow 
all the interchanges between the lawyers all that carefully. And I 
don't really believe, therefore, that I can say Mr. Bennett's testimony 
or statement is testimony and is imputable to me. I didn't--I don't 
know that I was really paying attention, paying that much attention to 
him.''
  This denial of the President while his attorney was proffering a 
false statement to Judge Wright in an effort to keep the Paula Jones 
lawyers from even questioning the President about his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky simply does not withstand the test of truth. The 
videotape of the President's January deposition shows the President 
paying very close attention to Mr. Bennett when Mr. Bennett was making 
the statement about ``no sex of any kind.''
  View again the video clip of the President during Mr. Bennett's 
argument that the Jones lawyers have no right to ask questions about 
Monica Lewinsky, only this time watch the President as he focuses on 
his lawyer speaking about one of the most important subjects he has 
ever faced in his entire life--the survival of his Presidency.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)

       Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need 
     some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to 
     object to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will 
     leak. I don't question the predicates here. I question the 
     good faith of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel 
     is fully aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has 
     filed, has an affidavit which they are in possession of 
     saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any 
     manner, shape or form, with President Clinton, and yet 
     listening to the innuendo in the questions----
       Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I 
     do not know whether counsel is basing this question an any 
     affidavit, but I will direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on 
     other evidence that might be pertinent and could be arguably 
     coaching the witness at this juncture. Now, I Mr. Fisher is 
     as officer of this court, and I have to assume that he has a 
     good faith basis for asking the question. If in fact he has 
     no good faith basis for asking this question, he could later 
     be sanctioned. If you would like, I will be happy to review 
     in camera any good faith basis he might have.
       Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I 
     would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness. 
     In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the 
     witness is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica 
     Lewinsky's) affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing 
     he doesn't know, but I think when he asks questions like this 
     where he's sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he 
     should at least have a good faith proffer.
       Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a 
     good faith basis for asking the question.
       Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
       Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be 
     willing to review this in camera if he does not want to 
     reveal it to counsel.
       Mr. Bennett. Fine.
       Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to 
     the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera 
     hearing.
       Judge Wright. All right.
       Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do 
     that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there 
     is substantial basis.
       Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question. 
     He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett, 
     this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith 
     basis can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, 
     of the deponent, and the other party.

  By the way, lest there be any doubt in the minds of any Member of 
this body as to whom the President was

[[Page S248]]

looking at and focusing at, we are fully prepared to bring in a witness 
for you who was present at the deposition and who will draw a map for 
every Member of this body and show the location of the President and 
every other person around the table.
  Just in case the President's ``I wasn't paying any attention'' excuse 
didn't fly, the President, in his grand jury testimony, decided to try 
another argument on for size. He suggested that when Mr. Bennett made 
his statement about ``there is no sex of any kind,'' the President was 
focusing on the meaning of the word ``is.''
  He then said that when Mr. Bennett made the assertion that ``there is 
no sex of any kind,'' Mr. Bennett was speaking only in the present 
tense, as if the President understood that to mean ``there is no sex'' 
because there was no sex occurring at the time Mr. Bennett's remark was 
made.
  The President stated, ``It depends on what the meaning of the word 
`is' is.''
  And that if it means there is none, that was a completely true 
statement. Listen and watch again to the same video clip from the 
President's grand jury testimony that we saw a few moments ago. Only 
this time, pay close attention to the President's excuse as to why he 
did not have to comply with the truth, because in his mind there is 
some question as to what the meaning of the word ``is'' is.
  (Text of videotape presentation:)

       Q. Mr. President, I want to, before I go into a new subject 
     area, briefly go over something you were talking about with 
     Mr. Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at 
     the Paula Jones deposition ``counsel is fully aware''--it's 
     page 54 line 5.--``counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky 
     has filed, has an affidavit which they were in possession of 
     saying that there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape 
     or form, with President Clinton?'' That statement is made by 
     your attorney in front of Judge Susan Webber Wright, correct?
       A. That's correct.
       Q. That statement is a completely false statement. Whether 
     or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. 
     Lewinsky, the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind 
     in any manner, shape or form, with President Clinton,'' was 
     an utterly false statement. Is that correct?
       A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If 
     ``is'' means is, and never has been, that is one thing. If it 
     means there is none, that was a completely true statement. 
     But, as I have testified, and I'd like to testify again, this 
     is--it is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about his 
     lawyer's statements, instead of the other way around. I was 
     not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was 
     focusing on my own testimony.

  In essence, here is what the President says in his own defense: I 
wasn't paying any attention to what my lawyer was saying when he 
offered the false affidavit on my behalf to the judge. However, if I 
was paying attention, I was focusing on the very narrow definition of 
what the word ``is'' is and the tense in which that was presented.
  Now, I am a former prosecutor, and that is like the murderer who 
says: I have an ironclad alibi. I wasn't at the crime scene, I was home 
with my mother eating apple pie. But if I was there, it is a clear case 
of self-defense.
  The President now asks this body of lawmakers to give acceptance to 
these ludicrous definitions of ordinary words and phrases. He asks you 
to believe this is what he really thought when he was asked if he ever 
had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, and when he was asked about 
her false affidavit.
  By the way, as to the President's ``tense'' argument that he 
presented about what the meaning of the word ``is'' is, this fails to 
take into account another important fact. The false affidavit of Monica 
Lewinsky that Mr. Bennett was waiving that day before the judge made no 
such distinction. Her affidavit never said in the present tense, ``I am 
not now having a sexual relationship with the President.'' Her 
affidavit said, ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the 
President.''
  The President perjured himself when he said that Mr. Bennett's 
statement that there was no sex of any kind was ``absolutely true,'' 
depending on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is.
  The President did not admit to the grand jury that Mr. Bennett's 
statement was false, because to do so would have been to admit that the 
term ``sexual relations'' as used in Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit meant 
``no sex of any kind.'' Admitting that would be to admit that he 
perjured himself previously in his grand jury testimony and in his 
deposition.

  Now, interestingly, Ms. Lewinsky doesn't bother attempting to match 
the President's linguistic deconstructions of the English language. 
After she was granted immunity, Monica Lewinsky testified under oath 
that the part of her affidavit denying a sexual relationship with the 
President was a lie.
  I read from page 204 of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony:

       Question: Let me ask you a straightforward question. 
     Paragraph 8--

  Referring to her affidavit--

     at the start says, ``I have never had a sexual relationship 
     with the President.'' Is that true?
       Answer: No.

  Thus, the President engaged in an evolving series of lies during his 
sworn testimony in order to cover previous lies he told in sworn 
testimony, and to conceal his conduct that obstructed justice in the 
Paula Jones sexual harassment suit against him. He did this to deny 
Paula Jones her constitutional right to bring a case of sexual 
harassment against him, and to sidetrack the investigation of the 
Office of Independent Counsel into his misconduct.
  Finally, the President committed perjury before the grand jury when 
he testified falsely about his blatant attempts to influence the 
testimony of potential witnesses and his involvement in a plan to hide 
evidence that had lawfully been subpoenaed in the civil rights action 
brought against him.
  This perjurious testimony breaks down into four categories:
  First, he made false and misleading statements to the grand jury 
concerning his knowledge of Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit.
  Second, he made false and misleading statements to the grand jury 
when he related a false account of his interaction with his secretary, 
Betty Currie, when he reasonably knew she might later be called before 
the grand jury to testify.
  Third, he made perjurious and misleading statements to the grand jury 
when he denied engaging in a plan to hide evidence that had been 
subpoenaed in the Jones civil rights case against him.
  Finally, he made perjurious and misleading statements to the grand 
jury concerning statements he made to his aides about Monica Lewinsky 
when he reasonably knew these aides might be called later to testify.
  Let's look briefly at the first area.
  The President made false and misleading statements before the grand 
jury regarding his knowledge of the contents of Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit.
  As we now know conclusively, Monica Lewinsky filed an affidavit in 
the Jones case in which she denied ever having a sexual relationship 
with the President, and that was a lie when it was filed.
  Remember--during his deposition in the Jones case, the President said 
that Ms. Lewinsky's denial of ever having a sexual relationship was 
``absolutely true.''
  Monica Lewinsky later testified that she is ``100 percent sure'' that 
the President suggested she might want to sign an affidavit to avoid 
testifying in the case of Jones versus Clinton. In fact, the President 
gave the following testimony before the grand jury:

       And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an 
     affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false 
     affidavit? No, I did not.

  This testimony is false because it could not be possible that Monica 
Lewinsky could have filed a truthful affidavit in the Jones case, an 
affidavit acknowledging a sexual relationship with the President, that 
would have helped her to avoid having to appear as a witness in the 
Paula Jones case.
  The attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking evidence of sexual 
relationships with the President, and ones that the President might 
have had with other State or Federal employees.
  This information was legally obliged to be produced by the President 
to Paula Jones in her sexual harassment lawsuit against him to help 
prove her claim.
  Judge Susan Webber Wright had already ruled that Paula Jones was 
entitled to this information from the President for purposes of 
discovery.
  If Monica Lewinsky had filed a truthful affidavit that acknowledged a 
sexual relationship with the President,

[[Page S249]]

then she certainly could not have avoided having to testify in a 
deposition.
  The President knew this.
  His grand jury testimony on this subject is perjury.
  Next, the President provided false testimony concerning his 
conversations with his personal secretary Betty Currie about Monica 
after he testified in the Jones deposition.
  Recall Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation a short time ago. The 
President had just testified on January 17, 1998, in the Paula Jones 
deposition. He said he could not recall being alone with Monica 
Lewinsky and that he did not have a sexual relationship with her.
  After his testimony, on the very next day and in a separate 
conversation with her a few days later, President Clinton made 
statements to Ms. Currie that he knew were false.
  He made them to coach Ms. Currie and to influence her potential 
future testimony.
  He coached her by reciting inaccurate answers to possible questions 
that she might be asked if she were called to testify in the Paula 
Jones case.
  By the way: the President discussed his deposition testimony with Ms. 
Currie in direct violation of Judge Wright's order that he not discuss 
his testimony with anyone. Judge Wright warned the President at the 
deposition:

       Before he leaves, I want to remind him, as the witness in 
     this matter, . . . that this case is subject to a Protective 
     Order regarding all discovery, . . . [A]ll parties present, 
     including . . . the witness are not to say anything 
     whatsoever about the questions they were asked, the substance 
     of the deposition, . . ., any details . . .

  After he coached her, the President wanted Betty Currie to be a 
witness.
  During his deposition testimony, the President did everything he 
could to suggest to the Jones lawyers they needed to depose Betty 
Currie. He did this by referring to her over and over again as the one 
with the information they need for information about him and Monica 
Lewinsky.
  He stated to the Jones lawyer in his deposition, for example, that:

     . . . the last time he had seen Ms. Lewinsky was when she had 
     come to the White House to see Ms. Currie; that Ms. Currie 
     was present when the President had made a joking reference 
     about the Jones case to Ms. Lewinsky; that Ms. Currie was his 
     source of information about Vernon Jordan's assistance to Ms. 
     Lewinsky; and that Ms. Currie had helped set up the meetings 
     between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan regarding her move to New 
     York.

  Because the President referred so often to Ms. Currie, it is obvious 
he wanted her to become a witness in the Jones matter, particularly if 
specific allegations of the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
came to light.
  According to Ms. Currie, President Clinton even told her at some 
point that she might be asked about Monica Lewinsky.
  Two and a half hours after he returned from the Paula Jones 
deposition, President Clinton called Ms. Currie at home and asked her 
to come to the White House the next day, a Sunday.
  Ms. Currie testified that it was rare for the President to ask her to 
come in on a Sunday.
  At about 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, January 18, Ms. Currie went to meet 
with President Clinton at the White House.
  Listen to what Betty Currie told the grand jury:

       He said that he had had his deposition yesterday, and they 
     had asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. And I was 
     a little shocked by that or--(shrugging). And he said--I 
     don't know if he said--I think he may have said, ``There are 
     several things you may want to know,'' or ``There are 
     things--'' He asked me some questions.

  According to Ms. Currie, the President then said to her in rapid 
succession:

       You were always there when she was there, right? We were 
     never really alone.
       You could see and hear everything.
       Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
       She wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do that.

  Ms. Currie indicated that these remarks were ``more like statements 
than questions.''
  Ms. Currie concluded that the President wanted her to agree with him.
  Ms. Currie also said that she felt the President made these remarks 
to see her reaction.
  Ms. Currie said that she indicated her agreement with each of the 
President's statements, although she knew that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky had in fact been alone in the Oval Office and in the 
President's study.
  Ms. Currie also knew that she could not, and did not hear or see the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky while they were alone.
  Ms. Currie testified that two or three days after her conversation 
with the President at the White House, he again called her into the 
Oval Office to discuss this.
  She described their conversation as, quote, ``sort of a 
recapitulation of what we had talked about on Sunday--you know, I was 
never alone with her''--that sort of thing.''

       Q: [To Ms. Currie] Did he pretty much list the same?
       A. To my recollection, sir, yes.

  In his grand jury testimony, the president was asked why he might 
have said to Ms. Currie in their meeting on that Sunday ``we were never 
alone together, right?'' and ``you could see and hear everything.''
  Here is how the President testified:

       [W]hat I was trying to determine was whether my 
     recollection was right and that she was always in the office 
     complex when Monica was there, and whether she thought she 
     could hear any conversations we had, or did she hear any--I 
     was trying to--I knew . . . to a reasonable certainty that I 
     was going to be asked more questions about this. I didn't 
     really expect you to be in the Jones case at the time. I 
     thought what would happen is that it would break in the 
     press, and I was trying to get the facts down. I was trying 
     to understand what the facts were.

  The President told the grand jury that he was putting those questions 
to Betty Currie on that Sunday to refresh his recollection and trying 
to pin down what the facts were.
  Later, the President stated that he was referring to a larger area 
than simply the room where he and Ms. Lewinsky were located. He also 
testified that his statements to Ms. Currie were intended to cover a 
limited range of dates.
  Listen to the President's answer.

       A. [W]hen I said, we were never alone, right, I think I 
     also asked her a number of other questions, because there 
     were several times, as I'm sure she would acknowledge, when I 
     either asked her to be around. I remember once in particular 
     when I was talking with Ms. Lewinsky when I asked Betty to be 
     in the, actually, in the next room in the dining room, and, 
     as I testified earlier, once in her own office. But I meant 
     that she was always in the Oval Office complex, in that 
     complex, while Monica was there. And I believe that this was 
     part of a series of questions I asked her to try to quickly 
     refresh my memory. So, I wasn't trying to get her to say 
     something that wasn't so. And, in fact, I think she would 
     recall that I told her to just relax, go in the grand jury 
     and tell the truth when she had been called as a witness.

  Now the President was treating the grand jury to his construction of 
what the word ``alone'' means to him.
  When asked he answered:

       it depends on how you define alone, and ``there were a lot 
     of times when we were alone, but I never really thought we 
     were.

  The President also was asked about his specific statement to Betty 
Currie that ``you could see and hear everything.'' He testified that he 
was uncertain what he intended by that comment:
  Question to the President:

       Q: When you said to Mrs. Currie, you could see and hear 
     everything, that wasn't true either, was it, as far as you 
     knew. . . .
       A. My memory of that was that, that she had the ability to 
     hear what was going on if she came in the Oval Office from 
     her office. And a lot of times, you know, when I was in the 
     Oval Office, she just had the door open to her office. Then 
     there was--the door was never completely closed to the hall. 
     So I think there was--I'm not entirely sure what I meant by 
     that, but I could have meant that she generally would be able 
     to hear conversations, even if she couldn't see them. And I 
     think that's what I meant.

  The President also was asked about his comment to Ms. Currie that Ms. 
Lewinsky had ``come on'' to him, but that he had ``never touched her.''
  Question to the President:

       Q: [I]f [Ms. Currie] testified that you told her, Monica 
     came on to me and I never touched her, you did, in fact, of 
     course, touch Ms. Lewinsky, isn't that right, in a physically 
     intimate way?
       A. Now, I've testified about that. And that's one of those 
     questions that I believe is answered by the statement that I 
     made.
       Q: What was your purpose in making these statements to 
     Mrs. Currie, if it weren't for the purpose to try to 
     suggest to her what she should say if ever asked?

[[Page S250]]

       A. Now, Mr. Bittman, I told you, the only thing I remember 
     is when all this stuff blew up, I was trying to figure out 
     what the facts were. I was trying to remember. I was trying 
     to remember every time I had seen Ms. Lewinsky. . . . I knew 
     this was all going to come out. . . . I did not know [at the 
     time] that the Office of Independent Counsel was involved. 
     And I was trying to get the facts and try to think of the 
     best defense we could construct in the face of what I thought 
     was going to be a media onslaught.

  Finally, the President was asked why he would have called Ms. Currie 
into his office a few days after the Sunday meeting and repeated the 
statements about Ms. Lewinsky to her.
  The President testified that although he would not dispute Ms. 
Currie's testimony to the contrary, he did not remember having a second 
conversation with her along these lines.
  Thus, the president referred to Ms. Currie many times in his 
deposition when describing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
  He himself admitted that a large number of questions about Ms. 
Lewinsky were likely to be asked in the very near future.
  The President reasonably could foresee that Ms. Currie either might 
be deposed or questioned, or might need to prepare an affidavit.
  When he testified he was only making statements to Ms. Currie to 
``ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's 
perception was,'' this statement was false, and it was perjurious.
  We know it was perjury, because the President called Ms. Currie into 
the White House the day after his deposition to tell her--not ask her, 
to tell her--that

       he was never alone with Ms. Lewinsky;
       to tell her that Ms. Currie could always hear or see them
       and to tell her that he never touched Ms. Lewinsky.

  These were false statements, and he knew that the statements were 
false at the time he made them to Betty Currie.
  The President's suggestion that he was simply trying to refresh his 
memory when talking to Betty Currie is nonsense.
  What if Ms. Currie had confirmed these statements--statements the 
president knew were false? It could not in any way remind the President 
of what really happened in the Oval Office with Monica Lewinsky because 
the President already knew he was alone with Monica Lewinsky. The 
President already knew that obviously Ms. Currie could not always see 
him back in the Oval Office area with Monica Lewinsky. And the 
President already knew that he had an intimate sexual relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky.

  There is no logical way to justify his claim that he made these 
statements to Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection.
  The only reasonable inference from the President's conduct is that he 
tried to enlist a potential witness to back up his perjury from the day 
before at the deposition.
  The circumstances surrounding the president's statements clearly 
show, clearly show that he improperly sought to influence Ms. Currie's 
potential future testimony.
  His actions were an obstruction of justice, and a blatant attempt to 
illegally influence the truthful testimony of a potential witness.
  And his later denials about it under oath were perjurious.
  Next, the President gave perjurious, false and misleading testimony 
before the grand jury when he denied he was engaged in a plot to hide 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in the Paula Jones case.
  On December 19, 1997, Monica Lewinsky was served with a subpoena in 
the Paula Jones case.
  The subpoena required her to testify at a deposition in January, and 
the subpoena required her to produce each and every gift President 
Clinton had given her.
  Nine days after she received this subpoena, Ms. Lewinsky met with the 
President for about 45 minutes in the Oval Office.
  By this time, President Clinton knew that she had been subpoenaed in 
the case.
  At this meeting they discussed the fact that the gifts that he had 
given Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, including a hat pin--the 
first gift the president had ever given Ms. Lewinsky.
  Monica Lewinsky testified that at some point in this meeting she said 
to the President,

       Well, you know, I--maybe I should put the gifts away 
     outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe 
     Betty.
       And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't know'' 
     or ``Let me think about that.'' And left that topic.

  President Clinton provided the following explanation to the grand 
jury and to the House Judiciary Committee regarding this conversation:

       Ms. Lewinsky said something to me like, ``what if they ask 
     me about the gifts you've given me,'' but I do not know 
     whether that conversation occurred on December 28, 1997, or 
     earlier.
       Whenever this conversation occurred, I testified, I told 
     her ``that if they [the Jones Lawyers] asked her for gifts, 
     she'd have to give them whatever she had. . . .''
       I simply was not concerned about the fact that I had given 
     her gifts. Indeed, I gave her additional gifts on December 
     28, 1997.

  The President's statement that he told Ms. Lewinsky that if the 
attorneys for Paula Jones asked for the gifts, then she had to provide 
them, is perjurious.
  It strains all logic to believe the President would encourage Monica 
Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. To do so would have raised questions 
about their relationship and would go against all of their other 
efforts to conceal the relationship, including filing a false affidavit 
about their relationship. The fact that the President gave Monica 
Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, 1998, doesn't exonerate the 
President. It demonstrates that the President never believed that 
Monica Lewinsky in light of all of their relationship, all of the cover 
stories, all of the plans that they had put forward, her willingness to 
subject herself to a perjury prosecution by filing a false affidavit, 
all of that was because he knew that Monica Lewinsky would never turn 
those gifts over pursuant to the subpoena. And as Ms. Lewinsky 
testified, she never questioned, as she said, ``that we were ever going 
to do anything but keep this quiet.''
  This meant that they would take, in her words, ``whatever steps 
needed to be taken'' to keep it quiet.
  By giving more gifts to Monica Lewinsky after she received a subpoena 
to appear in the Jones case, the President believed that Monica 
Lewinsky would never testify truthfully about their relationship.
  Additionally, Ms. Lewinsky said she could not answer why the 
President would give her more gifts on the 28th when he knew she had to 
produce gifts in response to the subpoena. She did testify, however, 
that----

       To me it was never a question in my mind and I--from 
     everything he said to me, I never questioned him, that we 
     were never going to do anything but keep this private, so 
     that meant deny it and that meant do--take whatever 
     appropriate steps needed to be taken, you know, for that to 
     happen. . . . So by turning over these gifts, it would at 
     least prompt [the Jones attorneys] to question me about what 
     kind of friendship I had with the President. . . .

  After this meeting on the morning of December 28, Betty Currie called 
Monica Lewinsky and made arrangements to pick up gifts the President 
had given to Ms. Lewinsky.
  Monica Lewinsky testified under oath before the grand jury that a few 
hours after meeting with the President on December 28, 1997, where they 
discussed what to do about the gifts he gave to her, Betty Currie 
called Monica Lewinsky.
  Monica Lewinsky explained it to the grand jury as follows:

       Question: What did [Betty Currie] say?
       Answer: She said, ``I understand you have something to give 
     me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something to give 
     me.'' Along those lines. . . .
       Question: When she said something along the lines of ``I 
     understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The 
     President says you have something for me,'' what did you 
     understand her to mean?
       Answer: The gifts.

  Later in the day on December 28, Ms. Currie drove to Monica 
Lewinsky's home.
  Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a sealed box that contained several 
gifts Ms. Lewinsky had received from the President, including the hat 
pin that was specifically named in the Jones subpoena.
  As further corroboration, Monica Lewinsky had told the FBI earlier 
that when Betty Currie called her about these gifts, it sounded like 
Betty Currie was calling on her cell phone.

[[Page S251]]

 Ms. Lewinsky gave her best guess on the time of day the call came on 
December 28.
  Although Ms. Lewinsky's guess on the hour the call came was a bit 
off, phone records were later produced revealing that Betty Currie in 
fact called Monica Lewinsky on her cell phone, just as Ms. Lewinsky had 
described it. The only logical conclusion is that Betty Currie called 
Monica Lewinsky about retrieving the President's gifts. There would 
have been no reason for Betty Currie, out of the blue, to return gifts 
unless instructed to do so by the President. Betty Currie didn't know 
about the gift issue ahead of time. Only the President and Monica 
Lewinsky had discussed it. There is no other way Ms. Currie could have 
known to call Monica Lewinsky about the gifts unless the President told 
her to do it.
  President Clinton perjured himself when he testified before the grand 
jury on this issue and reiterated to the House Judiciary Committee that 
he did not recall any conversation with Ms. Currie around December 28. 
He also perjured himself when he testified before the grand jury that 
he did not tell Betty Currie to take possession of the gifts that he 
had given Ms. Lewinsky.
  Question to the President:

       After you gave her the gifts on December 28th, did you 
     speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and ask her to pick up 
     a box of gifts that were some compilation of gifts that Ms. 
     Lewinsky would have----
       Answer: No, sir, I didn't do that.
       Question: --to give to Ms. Currie?
       Answer: I did not do that.

  The President had a motive to conceal the gifts because both he and 
Ms. Lewinsky were concerned that the gifts might raise questions about 
their relationship. By confirming that the gifts would not be produced, 
the President ensured that these questions would never arise. The 
concealment of these gifts from Paula Jones' attorneys allowed the 
President to provide perjurious statements about the gifts at his 
deposition in the Jones case.
  Finally, the President gave perjurious testimony to the grand jury 
concerning statements he gave to his top aides regarding his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Here is a portion of his grand jury 
transcript, when the President testified about his conversation with 
key aides, once the Monica Lewinsky story became public.
  Question to the President:

       Question: Did you deny to them or not, Mr. President?
       Answer: . . . I did not want to mislead my friends, but I 
     want to define language where I can say that. I also, 
     frankly, do not want to turn any of them into witnesses 
     because I--and sure enough, they all became witnesses.
       Question: Well, you knew they might be witnesses, didn't 
     you?
       Answer: And so I said to them things that were true about 
     this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I 
     said, there is nothing go[ing] on between us. That was true. 
     I said, I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was 
     true. And did I hope that I would never have to be here on 
     this day giving this testimony? Of course. But I also didn't 
     want to do anything to complicate this matter further. So, I 
     said things that were true. They may have been misleading, 
     and if they were, I have to take responsibility for it, and 
     I'm sorry.

  The President's testimony that day that he said things that were true 
to his aides is clearly perjurious. Just as the President predicted, 
several of the President's top aides were later called to testify 
before the grand jury as to what the President told them. And when they 
testified before the grand jury they passed along the President's false 
account, just as the President intended them to do.
  I will not belabor the point any further with the Members of this 
body because I think Mr. Manager Hutchinson ably presented that 
testimony.
  But we know from the evidence that Erskine Bowles, John Podesta, 
Sidney Blumenthal, all came before the grand jury. They all provided 
testimony to the grand jury establishing that the President's comments 
to them were the truth. The President had them go in. The President 
gave them that information so false information would be shared with 
the grand jury so that the grand jury would never be armed with the 
truth. And when witnesses are called to come before this body, you will 
have an opportunity to make that determination.
  Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the United States Senate, posterity 
looks to this body to defend in a courageous way the public trust and 
take care that the basis of our Government is not undermined. On 
January 17, 1998, President Clinton, while a defendant in a civil 
rights sexual harassment lawsuit, gave sworn testimony in a deposition 
presided over by a Federal judge. In this deposition he raised his hand 
and he swore to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth.
  On August 17th, President Clinton testified before a Federal grand 
jury in a criminal investigation. At this appearance he raised his hand 
and he swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth. The evidence conclusively shows that the President rejected his 
obligations under oath on both occasions. He engaged in a serial 
pattern of perjury and obstruction of justice. These corrupt acts were 
done so he could deny a U.S. citizen, Mrs. Paula Jones, her 
constitutional right to bring her claim against him in a court of law. 
In so doing, he intentionally violated his oath of office, his 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, 
and his solemn obligation to respect Mrs. Jones' rights by providing 
truthful testimony under oath.
  The evidence reviewed by the House of Representatives and relied upon 
by our body in bringing articles of impeachment against the President 
was not political. It was overwhelming. He has denied all allegations 
set forth in these articles. Who is telling the truth? There is only 
one way to find out.
  On behalf of the House of Representatives, we urge this body to bring 
forth the witnesses and place them all under oath. If the witnesses can 
make the case against the President, if the witnesses that make the 
case against the President who, incidentally, are his employees, his 
top aides, his former interns, and his close friends--if all of these 
people in the President's universe are lying, then the President has 
been done a grave disservice. He deserves not just an acquittal, he 
deserves the most profound of apologies.
  But, if they are not lying, if the evidence is true, if the Chief 
Executive Officer of our Nation used his power and his influence to 
corruptly destroy a lone woman's right to bring forth her case in a 
court of law, then there must be constitutional accountability, and by 
that I mean the kind of accountability the framers of the Constitution 
intended for such conduct and not the type of accountability that 
satisfies the temporary mood of the moment.
  Our Founders bequeathed to us a Nation of laws, not of polls, not of 
focus groups, and not of talk show habitues. America is strong enough 
to absorb the truth about their leaders when those leaders act in a 
manner destructive to their oath of office. God help our country's 
future if we ever decide otherwise.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.


                              Adjournment

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that the court 
stand in adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow, and that all Members remain 
standing at their desks as the Chief Justice departs the Chamber. I 
further ask that after the court adjourns in a moment, the Senate will, 
while in legislative session, stand in recess subject to the call of 
the Chair.
  The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Thereupon, at 6:59 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, adjourned.

                          ____________________