[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 155 (Saturday, December 19, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H11975-H12042]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1030
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan), a distinguished member of the Committee on
the Judiciary.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, my God, what kind of country are we
becoming? What kind of institution are we becoming? This process of
impeaching the President of the United States has been partisan right
from the start. An Independent Counsel spends 4\1/2\ years
investigating a President and sends a one-sided report to the Committee
on the Judiciary, and the Republican members of that committee put
their stamp of approval on it in very, very partisan hearings and send
it to this body.
One party should not have the power to impeach a President of the
other party. It's wrong. How can they do it? Both parties have to
participate if we are going to impeach a President of this country. And
at the same time one party is going to impeach a President of the other
party, our men and women are engaged in active combat at this hour.
This couldn't wait until Monday? God help our country. God help
America.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Armey), the distinguished majority leader.
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, no Nation has been so blessed as America in
the 1990s. We enjoy a prosperity that our parents and our grandparents
could not even imagine. Each day we invent wonderful new things to make
life easier and more interesting. Our scientists are uncovering the
wonder of God's creation, from the secrets of our genes to the wonders
of the universe.
The social problems that have caused so much pain and worry are
diminishing. Crime is dropping. Welfare dependency has plummeted. Unwed
teenage pregnancy rates are finally dropping. Religious belief and
attention to decent moral values are on the rise in this great country.
Even abroad America is respected as the world's one remaining
superpower. We have triumphed over the vile tyrannies. Democratic
nations on six continents owe their elected governments to our example
and to our support. We have never been safer. Our brave armed forces,
though they certainly need more resources, are still unquestionably
second to none, a fact we can all agree is being demonstrated today in
the skies of the Persian Gulf.
How did this great Nation of the 1990s come to be? It all happened,
Mr. Speaker, because freedom works. As Americans, we know that when we
allow ordinary people the freedom to help each other for their common
benefit great things happen. And in this land they certainly have.
But freedom, Mr. Speaker, freedom depends upon something, the rule of
law, and that is why this solemn occasion is so important. For today we
are here to defend the rule of law.
[[Page H11976]]
According to the evidence presented by our fine Committee on the
Judiciary, the President of the United States has committed serious
transgressions. Among other things, he took an oath to God to tell the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and then he failed to
do so, not once but several times. If we ignore this evidence, I
believe we undermine the rule of law that is so important to all that
America is.
Mr. Speaker, a nation of laws cannot be ruled by a person who breaks
the law. Otherwise it would be as if we had one set of rules for the
leaders and another for the government. We would have one standard for
the powerful, the popular and the wealthy, and another for everyone
else. This would belie our ideal that we have equal justice under the
law. That would weaken the rule of law and leave our children and
grandchildren with a very poor legacy.
I do not know what challenges they will face in their time, but I do
know they need to face those challenges with the greatest
constitutional security and the soundest rule of fair and equal law
available in the history of the world, and I do not want us to risk
their losing that.
Mr. Speaker, none of us, not us Members of Congress, not the
President of the United States, are here by accident. We asked for
these jobs. We went before the American people and we asked for the
privilege and the honor to hold these offices. The American people gave
us their trust and they expect us to use it to serve the Nation, its
heritage and its future. We are not supposed to use it for ourselves.
Sadly, it seems that is exactly what the President has done. He
failed in his duty to comply with the law of the land, the law of the
land that he swore to uphold. He did that to protect his own person;
not his office; not the duties of his office. He then used the powers
of his office once again for his own purposes.
The President's defenders say it is wrong to pursue our duty here
because the President's transgressions, they say, which, incidentally,
they do not dispute, indeed, they even condemn, they say were personal,
private behavior. But, Mr. Speaker, perjury before a grand jury is not
personal and it is not private. Obstruction of justice is not personal
and it is not private. Abuse of the power of the greatest office in the
world is not personal and it is not private.
We cannot allow the President of the United States to abuse his trust
and the great authorities of his office. Not telling the truth about
some transgressions will spawn bigger transgressions, and they will
spread like a cancer across America's character. When those
transgressions come from the Presidency, only the Congress has the
constitutional authority and the responsibility to provide a check and
a balance, and that can only be done through impeachment. That is why
we must hold the President accountable today. If we fail to do our
duty, for whatever reason, but most of all for the reason that it is
uncomfortable or unpleasant, then we will be responsible for the cancer
spreading through the Nation. It will create a sickness in the everyday
lives of all Americans.
How will it appear? In contracts not honored; in a mother who loses
custody of her children in a divorce court because the father lied
under oath; in a business where the only witness to a vicious sexual
harassment is given a new job and hushed up by a generous bonus; in a
college where a grade is given for money; in our armed forces, where a
lack of integrity means people might die needlessly; in a family where
the children cannot tell the difference between a truth and a lie.
Mr. Speaker, today we have a responsibility to uphold our most sacred
principle and to fulfill the duties to which we swore an oath. My great
fear is that if for some reason we fail in this duty, we will be just
as responsible for degrading the rule of law as the President we failed
to hold accountable.
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Livingston) set before
us today an example. It breaks our heart. It breaks our heart for his
wife Bonnie, for his family. It confuses some of us. But the example is
that principle comes before person, and it is an example we must all
hold to ourselves.
There is no doubt about it, Mr. Speaker, this is a difficult day. And
yet it is really a day of affirmation, a day that says our system of
government works. We are showing the world that our democracy is
resilient. It deals fairly and it deals effectively with a leader who
fails in his responsibilities.
Mr. Speaker, today we are defending the rule of law and we are
letting freedom work in the lives of Americans. This is tough for all
of us. We are all saddened by it, but we will complete this work on
this day and then we will go on.
We will go on in a great Nation and we will go on in a government
that once again strives to hold and preserve and assert its integrity
along with its authority. For, Mr. Speaker, this vote today is not
about the character of a President, this vote is about the character of
a Nation. And, Mr. Speaker, I intend to vote for the articles of
impeachment and I intend to vote for the rule of law.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Charles Schumer), a senior member of the Committee on the
Judiciary who will be departing this House.
(Mr. SCHUMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
The argument made by the gentleman from Texas, the best argument that
the majority has made thus far, focused on upholding the rule of law.
But a hallmark of rule of law is proportionality of punishment.
If the President were caught, if any President were caught speeding
at a hundred miles an hour, he would have to be disciplined so that
others would not feel that reckless speeding was permissible. But we
certainly would not use the political equivalent of capital punishment,
impeachment, to discipline that President.
On the other hand, if the President accepted a bribe, there would be
no doubt he should be impeached, and all 435 of us would vote for it.
Lying under oath about an extramarital relationship requires
significant punishment, such as censure, but not the political version
of capital punishment, impeachment.
My colleagues, the rule of law requires that the punishment fit the
crime. Allow us to vote for censure, the appropriate punishment under
rule of law.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. McCollum), a member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
{time} 1045
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, there are three principal questions each
of us has to answer today:
First, did the President of the United States commit the felony
crimes with which he has been charged? Secondly, are they impeachable
offenses? And, third, should we impeach him?
My task is to explain how I believe and I think you should understand
these four articles of impeachment we have before us today and to walk
through the evidence of the crimes the President, I believe, committed.
First of all, the President was sued in a sexual harassment civil
rights lawsuit by Paula Jones. As a part of her case, she wanted to
prove her credibility by bringing forward evidence that the President
had engaged in a pattern of illicit relations with women in his
employment.
Long before the President and Monica Lewinsky were ever called as
witnesses in that lawsuit, they reached an understanding that they
would lie about their relationship if they were asked. One day in
December of last year, the President learned that Monica Lewinsky was
on the witness list in that case. He called her. He talked to her about
it. During that conversation they discussed the cover stories they had
previously discussed on other occasions. And the President suggested to
her that she could file an affidavit to avoid testifying in that suit.
Monica Lewinsky subsequently, as we all know, filed a false affidavit
that was perjurious in its own right. She testified before the grand
jury that the President did not tell her to lie in that affidavit but
she and he both understood from their conversations and previous
understandings that in fact she would lie.
[[Page H11977]]
The evidence is clear and convincing, I think beyond a reasonable
doubt, that at that moment the President committed the first of a
series of felony crimes that led us to here today. That was a crime of
obstructing justice in trying to get Monica Lewinsky to lie in an
affidavit and encouraging her to lie if she were called as a witness.
That is the heart and essence of the first of seven counts of
obstruction of justice in article 3. I would like to call my
colleagues' attention to the fact that the way that article reads, and
it is here for Members to look at in article 3. It says that the scheme
the President engaged in after that included one or more of the
following. There were seven of them.
I believe the hiding of the gifts, the effort to get a job for Ms.
Lewinsky, the efforts to get Ms. Currie, his secretary, to corroborate
his later false testimony and so forth are all proven by the evidence
in the 60,000 pages of sworn testimony that we have reviewed. But
whether you agree with all of them or not, all you have to do is to
believe there is clear and convincing evidence that one of them is
true, and certainly the affidavit is true, to send this article to the
Senate for trial.
Now, in January after this affidavit incident, once it was prepared
and it was filed and all of the sordid details we are aware of with
regard to it took place, the President testified under oath in a civil
deposition in that Jones case and he lied again and again and again.
The principal lie he told then and before the grand jury concerned the
question of whether or not he had sexual relations with Monica
Lewinsky. The definition that he was given by the court, however
convoluted people think, he did testify in the grand jury he did
understand. The words that were given to him, he knew what they meant.
And the actions that the President took on several occasions according
to Monica Lewinsky indeed were sexual relations according to that
definition.
There are more than six witnesses that Monica Lewinsky talked with
contemporaneously to the engaging in those activities that corroborate
what she has to say. She is very believable, unfortunately, and the
President is not.
It is not a question of having to fudge around with the definition.
Under the clear definition as he understood it, the President lied
before the Paula Jones case in his deposition and then under oath again
before the grand jury about that.
Not only that but in his deposition in the Jones case the President
swore he did not know that his personal friend, Vernon Jordan, had met
with Monica Lewinsky and talked about the case. The evidence indicates
that he lied. It also indicates that the President swore he could not
recall being alone with Monica Lewinsky. And in that case that he lied.
The President said he could not recall being in the oval office hallway
with Ms. Lewinsky except maybe when she was delivering pizza. The
evidence indicates that he lied. The President could not recall the
gifts exchanged between Monica Lewinsky and himself, and the evidence
indicates that he lied. And so on down the road. He lied then, he went
on to the grand jury and he lied again under oath, and that is articles
1, 2 and 3.
In article 4, he lied again to Congress. He told us the same things.
He said he did not engage in the sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. He
said that he was never alone with her. He repeated the same lies again
to this Congress, and that is a grave insult to the constitutional
system of government.
The President of the United States did commit impeachable offenses.
Perjury rises to the same level as bribery. Treason, bribery and other
high crimes and misdemeanors. That is what the Constitution says. I
would submit that he should be impeached, that the evidence is clear,
there is no question that he has subverted our system of government and
he should be impeached unfortunately.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from
Louisiana (Mr. John).
Mr. JOHN. Mr. Speaker, I beg of my colleagues to end this sad chapter
in America. We have damaged the fiber of our representative democracy.
We are tearing down the greatest country in the world by the
deliberations here and over the past few months.
I plead of you to stop. To stop. Please put an end to this madness.
You have lost two of your own. We have lost the bipartisan spirit. But
the real losers are the American people. Vote your conscience and your
beliefs. I will. But let us move on.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Edwards).
Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, as Speaker Jim Wright asked from the well
of this House in 1989, ``When will this mindless cannibalism end?'' How
many good public officials must be destroyed because of their private
sins and human imperfections? When will we stop using the fallibilities
of dedicated public servants to overturn the will of the American
people expressed in free elections? When will we stop the sin of
focusing on the faults of others while ignoring the faults of
ourselves? When will we recognize that the genius of our Founding
Fathers was that they designed a system of government two centuries ago
that would survive not because of the perfections of those who serve
but despite the imperfections of all of us who serve? When? When?
My colleagues, I would suggest only when we recognize these things
will the rule of law and equal justice under the law prevail in this
the people's House.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Doggett) a former member of his State's Supreme Court.
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, our democracy has flourished throughout
history because imperfect human beings have come together here to
resolve differences about how our nation should proceed, recognizing
that no individual, no political party has a monopoly on truth. How
tragic it is that we gather this week with so much talent and so much
creative energy and so many problems that the American people face and
are diverted to such unworthy purpose.
The real division that troubles me today is not the division that
will go along strictly party lines about how we will vote, but the
division that strikes through the heart and the spirit of America. What
we need to be doing is coming together, recognizing that today we have
a clear choice to punish individual wrongdoing--that we could come
together and censure and disapprove that wrongdoing--but we do not have
to censure and punish America.
In this new year, we will have a great choice--of coming together to
resolve the real problems of our country or continuing to destroy
individual lives. I hope we will make the right choice.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goode).
(Mr. GOODE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GOODE. Mr. Speaker, when the roll is called today I will vote
``yes'' on impeachment.
After assessing the evidence, testimony, and materials presented to
the House Judiciary Committee, I believe that the President lied under
oath in a grand jury proceeding and made false statements in a sworn
deposition after acknowledging that the testimony was subject to the
penalty of perjury.
In my judgment, these offenses are impeachable. They violate the rule
of law which is fundamental to our democracy. To me, the issue is not
what the lie was about, but the fact that the President made the choice
to lie, repeatedly, after having taken an oath to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth. Today there are hundreds of
people in the United States in jail because they lied under oath.
Today is a sad day for Congress, a sad day for the Presidency, and a
sad day for America.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui).
(Mr. MATSUI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose all four articles of
impeachment.
The articles allege conduct on the part of the President that is
undeniably distasteful and unbecoming of our Executive. The conduct
alleged, however, does not rise to the high standards of impeachment
spelled out in Art. II, Sec. 4 of the Constitution--``Treason, Bribery,
or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' This standard, as evidenced
through records from the Framers, history, and precedents,
[[Page H11978]]
clearly describe only offenses against our Constitutional system of
Government.
I wish to be clear that for purposes of evaluating the impeachability
of the allegations against the President, I have assumed they are
accurately characterized by the proponents of today's proceedings. It
is important to remember, however, that none of the material and
information contained in the referral from the Office of Independent
Counsel (OIC)--much of it inadmissible hearsay evidence--has been
subject to any sort of cross-examination.
the constitutional system of government
The United States is divided into three co-equal branches of
government. The Framers believed that the liberty of the nation would
best be assured by each branch jealously guarding its prerogatives,
thus ensuring that no branch would inappropriately extend its power
over the nation, or usurp the power of another.
Our Government is not a parliamentary system. The President does not
serve at the pleasure of the Legislature. The Executive is the only
branch representing the popular will of the entire American population,
to carry out the laws passed by the Congress. Correspondingly, the
Constitution sets a high bar for impeachment and removal of the
President. The invalidation of the popular will of the American public
as expressed by a Presidential election is not an act the Framers
wanted to make easy, or common. It is an act that was contemplated to
be undertaken only in the face of the most serious threat to the
nation. This is especially true because the Framers understood that the
Public would be able to express its displeasure with a President every
four years through the election process.
With this in mind, the Constitution affords the sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives. Because the Judiciary was
purposefully not given a role in the impeachment proceeding, the
Constitutional standard is greater--a tell tale indication that not
just any crime committed by the Executive warrants removal from office.
This is a solemn responsibility, and one that should not be entered
into lightly. In over 200 years of the Republic, the House has only
once fully utilized this proceeding.
The Constitutional Duty of the House of Representatives
The Constitution gives to the House of Representatives the ``sole
Power of Impeachment.'' The power of impeachment is not subject to
review or guidance by any other branch of government. While the
impeachment process has been casually analogized to the grand jury
process, with Members of the House simply acting as grand jurors
possibly sending an indictment to the Senate for trial, a careful
parsing of the analogy, suggests a more involved role for House
Members.
A grand jury is a mechanism by which the State may commence a
criminal proceeding against a criminal defendant. Both the Judiciary
and the Executive branch--Prosecutors--play significant roles in order
to guarantee fundamental fairness of the proceedings. However, in
impeachment proceedings, the Constitution envisions that these vital
roles will not be forfeited, but rather that House Members must combine
within themselves the role of judge, prosecutor and grand juror.
As Prosecutor, Members of the House must determine whether it is
appropriate to consider articles of impeachment. As has been often
noted, prosecutorial discretion is one of the benchmarks of fairness of
our criminal justice system. As grand juror, Members of the House must
act with personal and political impartiality towards the Executive in
deciding the issue. And as Judge, Members of the House must determine
the legal standards of impeachment--in other words, the Framers' intent
of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
In my review of the impeachment record, it is clear that the House
has not exercised the mandated prosecutorial discretion in determining
whether to proceed with the impeachment of the President nor acted with
the impartiality required of grand jurors. Furthermore, I conclude that
the House, as Judge, must conclude that the standards of high Crimes
and Misdemeanors has not been met. I would like to focus on this core
issue of whether the President's conduct is impeachable.
The Conduct Alleged Is Not Impeachable
The facts alleged on the part of the President by the OIC referral
are not impeachable because they do not rise to the high standards of
impeachment called for in the Constitution. The President shall be
removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
As the text of the impeachment clause makes clear, the Constitution
envisions impeachment for Presidential conduct that threatens the
Republic. Impeachment can be further differentiated from a criminal
penalty in that impeachment serves to protect the nation, not to punish
a wrongdoer. The high Crimes and Misdemeanors should be of the caliber
of Treason and Bribery to rise to the impeachment threshold. The
Constitution created the impeachment mechanism in order to punish
serious, official misconduct. Official misconduct on the part of the
Executive that was not serious could be punished by the election
process. The President, for private acts of misconduct, would be--like
any other American--subject to the normal judicial process.
Realizing that removal of a popularly elected Executive would be
traumatic for the nation, the Framers set a very high bar. Notably, the
Framers considered such a lower standard in drafting the Constitution--
``maladministration.'' James Madison objected to this impeachment
standard because it would imply that the President served at the
pleasure of Congress, thus threatening the co-equal status of the
Executive vis a vis the Legislature.
The core allegations contained in the articles of impeachment are
that the President lied in a civil deposition and before a grand jury
about a private, sexual affair, and that he obstructed justice and
abused Executive power in attempting to conceal and obfuscate the
embarrassing facts of this private affair. Further, even accepting the
argument of the proponents of the impeachment articles, that the
President's misstatements are perjury--a great leap of legal faith--the
Constitutional standard for impeachment would still not be met.
It is inconceivable that the Framers could have imagined that the
conduct alleged in the OIC referral threaten the Republic or our
Constitutional system of government. As George Mason wrote in the
Federalist Papers, impeachment was designed to remedy ``great and
dangerous offenses'' attempting ``to subvert the Constitution.'' The
President's sexual affair, and his subsequent attempts to conceal it,
were distasteful, and possibly illegal, but it strains credulity to
claim they were an attempt ``to subvert the Constitution.'' If they
were illegal, they can be punished by the normal criminal or civil
judicial process.
Conclusion
The House today ill serves the Constitution. The Framers set a very
high standard for impeachment. They did not intend that the will of the
people, as expressed in the election of a President, would be lightly
set aside. Nor did they create the mechanism of impeachment to punish
wrongdoing by the Executive. Impeachment was created to protect the
nation--indeed, the Constitutional system of government--from serious,
official misconduct by the President. There can be little doubt that
the President's conduct as alleged in the report from the office of the
Independent Counsel is reprehensible and embarrassing. History will
show, however, it did not rise to the high threshold called for by the
Constitution.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson).
(Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, I also rise to oppose all
four articles of impeachment.
From the outset, I believed that any action the Congress chose to
take to punish the President had to be bipartisan. If Republicans and
Democrats could put the best interests of the country ahead of their
personal political viewpoints, we could solve this problem honorably
and get on with the nation's business. We had the opportunity, but we
didn't take advantage of it.
I've been one of the people working for a bipartisan solution, trying
to build consensus for a fitting punishment, but this process has
degenerated into a purely partisan battle.
In some ways, this process has been unfair from the outset. No other
President in American history has been continuously investigated by a
Special Prosecutor throughout his terms of office. The President's
enemies have misused this process to undo the decision that the
American people made in two elections. The office of the Special
Prosecutor was not established to settle political differences, but
that is how it has been used in this case, and it sets a very bad
precedent for the future.
When I joined with 30 other Democrats to support the Republicans'
outline for inquiry by the House Judiciary Committee, I did so because
I thought Chairman Henry Hyde would conduct a thoughtful and honest
examination of the facts, with testimony from witnesses, and a chance
for cross-examination--but he chose not to take that course, and I have
been profoundly disappointed by what he did do. Instead of conducting
an investigation in the cooperative, bipartisan tradition of the
Watergate hearings, the Chairman directed hearings that were unfocused,
largely without any substantive examination of the facts or witnesses,
and designed to deliver a pre-ordained outcome.
When the Watergate-era Judiciary Committee considered the evidence
against President Nixon, it was clear that he had submitted false tax
returns, and broken the law by doing so. Nonetheless, Republicans and
Democrats on
[[Page H11979]]
the Committee voted 12 to 26 against bringing Articles of Impeachment
based on this charge. They determined, together that this did not rise
to the constitutional level of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
While I am deeply disappointed with the President's personal
behavior, in my view these charges do not rise to the constitutional
standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
The process conducted by the current House Judiciary Committee has
been politically driven from the outset, and in the end, the course
they decided to pursue will not serve the country. For their own
political purposes, they have decided to lower the constitutional
standard so that it can be used as a weapon in a political
disagreement.
The obvious course of action--supported by both Republicans and
Democrats--is that of censure. The President should be censured, fined
and be subject to prosecution when he is out of office.
Unfortunately, the Republican leadership refused to allow the House--
Republicans and Democrats--to debate and vote on this option. Instead
of allowing an honest vote of conscience, on a rational middle ground
solution, they decided to say to all of us, ``our way or no way.''
There was no room for discussion, and no effort to work with
conservative Democrats like myself.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Senate will not vote to remove the
President from office. From a practical standpoint, it serves no useful
purpose to put the country through more weeks and months, and maybe
even years, of this process. The smudge on this President's place in
history is already established. What we are about to do will spread
that same smudge to all of us, and it will not serve the country.
In the end, by choosing to pursue impeachment, the Republicans may
actually let the President off the hook all together. By pursuing
impeachment even though the Senate will not convict or remove the
President from office, and disdaining any effort to censure and fine
him, he may escape without paying any substantive price for his
actions.
I do not believe it is legitimate to settle political differences by
using the constitutional process designed to protect our country from
crimes that endanger the existence of this nation. In truth, none of
the President's reprehensible behavior threatens the nation, or our
individual freedom and liberty. We're setting a very dangerous
precedent for the future, and I shudder to think how this will come
back to haunt us.
I know that this has been a very difficult process to listen to and
raises unpleasant issues for the people I represent in Minnesota's 7th
District. I know that they will not all agree with me this day, but
having listened to their collective counsel, I believe that most of
them would do as I will do--support a resolution of censure, but vote
no on this tragic and obsessive effort to impeach the President.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon).
(Mr. DIXON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the impeachment of the
President of the United States.
I strongly believe that the allegations against him do not reach the
threshold of impeachable offenses. This is a sad day, Mr. Speaker. For
20 years, I have had the privilege of serving in this distinguished
body. Never in that 20 years have I seen a matter as grave as the issue
before us today treated in such an unfair manner. I truly believe that
the solemn duty of this body to check the power of the Executive has
been degraded by the partisanship that has marked every step of this
impeachment process.
What President Clinton did was wrong; I think we all agree on that
point. He had an extramarital affair with an employee--betraying the
trust of his family. He lied to conceal that shameful affairs--
betraying the trust of the nation. These actions are deeply
disappointing to me and are deeply disappointing to the nation.
President Clinton has admitted his wrongdoing and, it would appear, has
the forgiveness of most of the people in this nation.
Assuming that the referral from independent Counsel Starr is entirely
factually correct, I do not believe that President Clinton has
committed treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
Missing from this process is a sense of scale and context. A protracted
investigation by an Independent Counsel has produced charges that are
weakly supported by the evidence. Perjury is the most compelling charge
against the President, though I do not find the evidence to be
convincing. The alleged perjurious statements originate in immaterial
statements in the course of a dismissed civil suit. In an apolitical
environment, it is questionable that a person other than an elected
official would be prosecuted for such statements.
Some have tried to draw parallels between this impeachment inquiry
and the Nixon inquiry. However, the scope of the offenses is not
comparable, nor are the actions of the Judiciary Committee. The fact
that articles of impeachment were reported by the Judiciary Committee
on a series of partisan votes is deeply disheartening and underlines
the illegitimacy of today's process. Now that the issue has reached the
full House, members will not have the opportunity to vote their
consciences--a vote on censure has been ruled out by a Republican
leadership decree precisely because a bipartisan majority of members
would have supported that measured, responsible course of action.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to reject these
articles of impeachment.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Bonior) our distinguished minority whip.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, this House is shocked and saddened by the
Speaker-elect's announcement. The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr.
Livingston) is a respected member of this House who has served with
distinction and dedication for over 20 years. Now we find ourselves in
a destructive cycle that is eating away at our democracy. The politics
of personal smear is degrading the dignity of public office and we must
not let it continue.
{time} 1100
We must put an end to it, and the only way we will stop this vicious
cycle is if we stand up and refuse to give in to it, whether it is Bill
Clinton or Bob Livingston.
To the Speaker-elect I would say, ``This is your decision, the
decision of your family, the decision of your Conference.'' But for my
own part I would say, ``You should not allow a campaign of cynicism and
smear to force you to resign from office, and you should not have
called on the President to resign.''
Mr. Speaker, what we do here today will have long-lasting
consequences, not just in this House, but for our Constitution, for our
country, for our democracy. We are here to debate impeachment and
should not be distracted from that.
What does a vote for impeachment really mean? It is a vote to nullify
the most sacrosanct institution in any democracy: the ballot box.
What the President did is wrong, and he should be held accountable,
but the offenses he has committed do not rise to the historical
standards of impeachment set by our Founding Fathers. We must not lower
that standard today to suit the needs of angry partisans. We must not
let them accomplish through impeachment what they could not do at the
ballot box. They must not succeed.
Today we stand against those who would hijack an election and hound
the President out of office against the will of the American people.
The American people support this President's agenda, and they want us
to move forward for better health care, for stronger schools, for
retirement security for every American in this country.
A vote for impeachment today will only feed the corrosive and
destructive politics of personal attack. It will prolong and escalate
this whole sorry episode.
Mr. Speaker, in this building are the marble halls where Daniel
Webster and Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln debated the fate of the
Union. Have we sunk so low that in these same halls we would allow the
likes of Ken Starr and Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp to ignite the
constitutional crisis of our age? Does such a spectacle really
strengthen our Nation? Does it dignify our democracy? Does it honor our
Constitution?
The American people sent a clear message this November. They want
this President to continue to do the job they elected him to do, and
yet this Congress is deliberately ignoring their will. Let me tell my
colleagues that people are angry, and they are frustrated, and they are
outraged and bewildered at what is happening here. Six days before
Christmas our troops are in battle, and a lame duck Congress is rushing
to overthrow the Commander in Chief.
Mr. Speaker, this is surreal. The scenario reads like the plot of a
cheap paperback novel, not the deliberation of the history's greatest
democracy.
Mr. Speaker, it is not too late to step back from the brink. The
American people desperately want us to restore some dignity and some
common sense
[[Page H11980]]
to our politics, some sense of proportion. They want us to come
together, they want us to move on. Has this House become so out of
control, so out of touch, so consumed that we will be denied the chance
to vote on the one option, the one option that commands the support of
the American people, the motion to censure?
We have heard a lot of talk around here about the rule of law, but
these partisan proceedings have made a mockery of our constitutional
process. Across the Nation they have been announced as, and let me
quote: a dreadful farce of partisan posturing; a soiling of the
Constitution; a circus; a kangaroo court; an attempted coup.
Today we are offering a way out of this morass, and one last time we
implore our colleagues to not use their power to block a motion to
censure. Do not deny us the right to vote our conscience. Do not
silence the voices of the American people. Do not let the politics of
cynicism and smear prevail.
Listen to the American people. Let us vote on censure, and let us
bring America together again.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the
gentlewoman from Missouri (Ms. Danner).
(Ms. DANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.
Ms. DANNER. Mr. Speaker, first, let me state that for anyone who
believes that my vote was made on a partisan basis, let me assure you
that if that had been the case, my decision could have and would have
been made long ago.
However, I can assure you that was not the case. I fully recognized
that this would be the most important vote in my career as an elected
official and that it merited my most careful and thoughtful
consideration. As late as 2:00 a.m. the morning prior to the vote I was
reading Rakove's Original Meanings--Politics and Ideas in the Making of
the Constitution. I have spent endless hours reading, studying and
evaluating other materials and information--the Independent Counsel's
Report, the Judiciary Committee Report, Committee testimony from legal
scholars on both sides of the issue, the views of my constituents and
the remarks of my colleagues.
After much deliberation, I came to the conclusion that since there
are other remedies that exist to address President Clinton's behavior,
impeachment was not the answer.
Impeachment, as defined by the Constitution, was designed to protect
our nation from ``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.'' Indeed, President Clinton can, after leaving office, be
indicted, tried and punished in the courts for any crimes he committed
while in office. This is for our judicial system to decide. Try him in
a federal court when his term of office ends and let a judge and jury
decide--free of partisan energy. This susceptibility to such a criminal
justice process proves that the rule of law applies to everyone. Not
even a President, is above the law.
The actions of President Clinton have been described in various
terms: reprehensible, inappropriate, embarrassing and others too
numerous to mention. All are applicable. The actions of the President
have demeaned him in innumerable ways. However, as terribly
inappropriate as his conduct was--that conduct did not threaten our
nation's security, nor did it undermine the Constitution. And, though
it may have hampered his performance, it did not prevent him from
executing his Constitutional duties as President.
Central to the Articles of Impeachment is the question with regard to
perjury on the part of the President. To determine if perjury is an
impeachable offense, we must look to the Constitution and to historical
precedent. In 1974, during the Watergate Inquiry, the Judiciary
Committee decided on a bi-partisan basis that only Presidential
misconduct which is ``seriously incompatible with either the
Constitutional form and principles of our government or the proper
performance of the constitutional duties of the Presidential office''
justifies impeachment. The Committee added, ``Not all presidential
misconduct is sufficient to constitute grounds for impeachment. There
is a further requirement--substantiality. . . . Because impeachment of
a President is a grave step for the nation, it is to be predicated only
upon the above criteria.
Indeed, a precedent was established that a crime committed in private
life (i.e. President Nixon's tax fraud) did not warrant impeachment.
The Committee was persuaded by the legal principles defining an
impeachable offense, not by the lack of factual evidence. Actually,
President Nixon, knowing that he was fraudulently claiming a $576,000
deduction, had signed his name under the words: ``Under penalty of
perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including
accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge
and belief it is true, correct and complete.'' Members of the Committee
determined that President Nixon's actions in this case were not
impeachable.
In addition, many Members felt impeachment of President Clinton was
inappropriate and there was a great deal of bi-partisan support for a
different option--censure. A Congressional censure would have allowed
the House of Representatives to officially express the condemnation
which the President deserved while also remaining true to long-
established Constitutional principles. Although some have argued that
censure is not Constitutional, the matter is not prohibited by the
Constitution and is, therefore permissible. In fact, three different
Presidents (Jackson, Tyler and Buchanan) have been censured in the
past. Unfortunately, despite the popularity of the censure option, the
House leadership did not allow a vote on this proposal. However, with
support for this measure by both Democrat and Republican members, it is
troubling that we were prohibited from voting on this measure.
In the final analysis, our responsibility as Members of the House of
Representatives was not to the President, but to the Presidency--one of
three co-equal branches of government. Impeaching President Clinton
would lower the standard for impeachment for future Presidents, and
would therefore necessarily weaken that branch of government.
Additionally, it would prevent Congress and the Supreme Court from
devoting full attention to our national and international
responsibilities, since a trial would require an unknown amount of time
and attention from all involved. It would prove to be the ultimate
distraction to our nation's business. And as distasteful as all have
found the hearings before the Judiciary Committee to be--I feared that
a Senate trial would be so salacious and sordid that all would be
appalled.
In closing I believe it is important to once again refer to the
intent of those who framed our Constitution. Impeachment, George Mason
proclaimed, was for ``crimes against the state.'' In the Federalist No.
65, Alexander Hamilton wrote that a clear sign of when not to impeach
was when the dispute between Congress and the president was ``connected
to pre-existing factions,'' Old World parlance for ``partisan.'' At the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, when George Mason proposed the
impeachment clause, he described it as the most drastic remedy to
``great and dangerous offenses''--to only ``the most extensive
injustice.''
Our Founding Fathers in their wisdom, and for the stability of our
nation, placed the bar for impeachment high: at high crimes and
misdemeanors. The President's actions, while worthy of contempt, do not
meet this threshold.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sandlin).
(Mr. SANDLIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SANDLIN. Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record certain
deliberations by the Committee on the Judiciary.
[From the Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1998]
Dec. 9: Fourth Panel of White House Witnesses
Rep. Hyde. Very well. Would the witnesses please stand and
take the oath? Thank you.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're
about to give to the committee is the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth?
All. I do.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Let the record show the witnesses
answered the question in the affirmative. We have a
distinguished panel today, as we have had all week. Thomas P.
Sullivan is a senior partner at Jenner (sp) & Block (sp) and
has practiced with that firm for the past 44 years. He's a
former United States attorney for the northern district of
Illinois. Mr. Sullivan specializes in civil and criminal
trial and appellate litigation, and he has served as an
instructor at Loyola University School of Law and for the
National Institute for Trial Advocacy.
Richard Davis is a partner with the New York law firm of
Weil, Gotschal and Manges. He clerked for the United States
District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein (sp) from 1969 to
1970. He also served as an assistant U.S. attorney in the
southern district of New York from 1970 through 1973 and was
task force leader for the Watergate special prosecution
force, 1973-1975. From 1977 to 1981, he served as assistant
secretary of the treasury for enforcement and operations.
Edward S.G. Dennis Jr. is a partner in the litigation
section of the Philadelphia law firm of Morgan, Lewis and
Bockius. He joined the firm after 15 years with the
Department of Justice, during which he held the following
positions: Acting deputy attorney general, assistant attorney
general for the criminal division, and U.S. attorney for the
eastern district of Pennsylvania. He is co-chairman of the
corporate investigations and criminal defense practice group.
William F. Weld is a former two-term governor of
Massachusetts, graduate of the Harvard Law School. Governor
Weld began his legal career as a counsel with the House
Judiciary Committee during the Watergate impeachment inquiry.
He then served as U.S.
[[Page H11981]]
attorney and as head of the criminal division at main Justice
under President Reagan before being elected governor of
Massachusetts in 1990. Governor Weld is currently a partner
in the Chicago law firm of McDermott (sp), Will (sp) & Emory
(sp), and he is also the author of the recently published
comic political crime novel, ``Macro by Moonlight.'' I hope
it's not a violation of any rule or regulation give a plug
for the governors book. (Laughter.)
Ronald Noble is associate professor of law at NYU Law
School. He served as undersecretary of the treasury for
enforcement, 1994-1996; as deputy assistant attorney general
and chief of staff in the criminal division of the Department
of Justice, 1988-1990; and as assistant United States
attorney in the eastern district of Pennsylvania, 1984-1988.
Before recognizing each of you, in whatever order you
choose to go, although it's probably just as simple to start
on my left to the right, I would like to recognize the
ranking minority member, John Conyers, for a statement if he
wishes to make one.
Rep. John Conyers (D-MI). Could I delay my statement, Mr.
Chairman?
Rep. Hyde. You surely could.
Rep. Conyers. Thank you.
Rep. Hyde. Very well. Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you.
Rep. Mr. Sullivan, turn the mike toward you and put the
switch on, please.
Mr. Sullivan. Thanks. Is that all right?
Members of the Judiciary Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
professional standards for obstruction of justice and
perjury. My qualifications to discuss this subject include
over 40 years of practice in federal criminal cases, chiefly
in Chicago but also in other cities.
During most of that time, I have acted as defense counsel
for persons accused of or under investigation for criminal
conduct. For four years, from 1977 to 1981, I served as the
United States attorney for the northern district of Illinois.
Chairman Hyde and Mr. Schippers are known to me from the
practice in Chicago, and I believe they can vouch for my
qualifications.
Rep. Hyde. Extraordinarily high.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, sir.
During the past 35 years, I have taken an interest in, but
no part in, politics. While I am a registered Democrat, I
consider myself independent at the ballot box and I've often
voted for Republican candidates. I have acted for the
Republican governor of Illinois, a Democratic senator, and
Mayor Harold Washington. I have prosecuted as well as
defended Democrat and Republican office holders. I appear
today not as an advocate or partisan for President Clinton or
the Democrat Party, but rather as a lawyer of rather
long experience who may be able to assist you in your
deliberations on the serious and weighty matters you now
have before you.
The topic of my testimony is prosecutorial standards under
which cases involving alleged perjury and obstruction of
justice are evaluated by responsible federal prosecutors. In
the federal criminal justice system, indictments for
obstruction of justice and perjury are relatively rare. There
are several reasons. One is that charges of obstruction and
perjury are not substantive crimes but rather have to do with
circumstances peripheral to underlying criminal conduct. The
facts giving rise to the obstruction or perjury arise during
the course of an investigation involving other matters, and,
when prosecuted, are usually tagged on as charges additional
to the underlying criminal conduct. Second, charges of
obstruction and perjury are difficult to prove because the
legislature and the courts have erected certain safeguards
for those accused of these ``ripple effect'' crimes, and
these safeguards act as hurdles for prosecutors.
The law of perjury can be particularly arcane, including
the requirements that the government prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his testimony to be
false at the time he or she testified, that the alleged false
testimony was material, and that any ambiguity or uncertainty
about what the question or answer meant must be construed in
favor of the defendant.
Both perjury and obstruction of justice are what are known
as specific intent crimes, putting a heavy burden on the
prosecutor to establish the defendant's state of mind,
Furthermore, because perjury and obstruction charges often
arise from private dealings with few observes, the court have
required either two witnesses who testified directly to the
facts establishing the crime, or, if only one witness
testifies to the facts constituting the alleged perjury that
there be substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt.
Responsible prosecutors do not bring these charges lightly.
There is another cautionary note, and this, I think, is
very significant here. Federal prosecutors do not use the
criminal process in connection with civil litigation
involving private parties. The reasons are obvious. If the
federal prosecutors got involved in charges and counter-
charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in discovery or
trial of civil cases, there would be little time left for the
kinds of important matters that are the major targets of the
Department of Justice criminal guidelines. Further, there are
well- established remedies available to civil litigants who
believe perjury or obstruction has occurred. Therefore, it is
rare that the federal criminal process is used with respect
to allegations of perjury or obstruction in civil matters.
The ultimate issue for a prosecutor deciding whether or not
to seek an indictment is whether he or she is convinced that
the evidence is sufficient to obtain a conviction; that is,
whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime. This is far more than a
probable-cause standard, which is the test by which grand
jury indictments are judged. Responsible prosecutors do not
submit cases to a grand jury for indictment based upon
probable cause. They do not run cases up the flagpole to see
how the jury will react. They do not use indictments for
deterrence or as a punishment.
Responsible prosecutors attempt to determine whether the
proof is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the answer is yes and there are no reasons to
exercise discretion in favor of levity, the case is submitted
to the grand jury for indictment, which, where I come from--
and everywhere else I know about--is routine and automatic.
if the answer is no--that is, even if the evidence
establishes probable cause, but, in the prosecutor's
judgment, will not result in a conviction--the responsible
prosecutor's will decline the case.
Some years ago, during the Bush administration, I was asked
by an independent counsel to act as a special assistant to
bring an indictment against and try a former member of
President Reagan's cabinet. Having looked at the evidence, I
declined to do so because I concluded that when all the
evidence was considered, the case for conviction was doubtful
and that there were innocent and reasonable explanations for
the allegedly wrongful conduct.
Having reviewed the evident here, I have reached the same
conclusion. It is my opinion that the case set out in the
Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a
responsible federal prosecutor.
Before addressing the specific facts of the several of the
charges, let me say that in conversations with many current
and former federal prosecutors in whose judgment I have great
faith, virtually all concur that if the president were not
involved, if an ordinary citizen were the subject of the
inquiry, no serious consideration would be given to a
criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in
discovery in the Jones civil case having to do with an
alleged cover-up of a private sexual affair with another
woman, or the follow-on testimony before the grand jury. This
case would simply not be given serious consideration for
prosecution. It wouldn't get in the door. It would be
declined out of hand.
A threshold question is whether, if the president is not
above the law, as he should not been, is he to be treated as
below the law? Is he to be singled out for prosecution
because of his office in a case in which, were he a private
citizen, no prosecution would result? I believe the president
should be treated in the criminal justice system in the same
way as any other United States citizen. If that were the case
here, it is my view that the alleged obstruction of justice
and perjury would not be prosecuted by a responsible United
States attorney.
Having said that, I would like to address several of the
specific charges in the Starr report. The first has to do
with perjury in the president's deposition and before the
grand jury about whether or not he had a sexual affair,
relationship or relations with Ms. Lewinsky. The president
denied that he did based on his understanding of the
definition of the term, quote, ``sexual relations,'' quote,
adopted by the court in the Jones case. That definition,
which you have before you in the papers, is difficult to
parse, and one can argue either side; but it is clear to me
that the president's interpretation is a reasonable one,
especially because----
Rep. Hyde. Mr. Sullivan, I hate to interrupt, but your time
has expired. Now, do you think in another three minutes you
could wind up?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes.
Rep. Hyde. Could you? Very well.
Mr. Sullivan. I will--I think I can.
Rep. Hyde. Then we'll continue it for three minutes.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you very much, Mr. Hyde.
It's clear to me that the president's interpretation is a
reasonable one, especially because the words which seem to
describe oral sex--the words which seem to describe directly
oral sex were stricken from the definition by the judge.
In perjury prosecution, the government must show beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew when he gave the
testimony, he was telling a falsehood. The lying must be
known and deliberate. It is not perjury for a witness to
evade or frustrate of answer non-responsibly. The evidence
simply does not support the conclusion that the president
knowingly committed perjury, and the case is so doubtful and
weak that a responsible prosecutor would not present it to
the grand jury.
Let me turn to the issue of obstruction through delivery of
gifts to Ms. Lewinsky by Mrs. Currie. Some of the evidence on
this subject is not recounted in the Starr Report, but a
responsible prosecutor will not ignore the proof consistent
with innocence, or which shows that an element--an essential
element of the case is absent.
The evidence is that when talking to the president, Ms.
Lewinsky brought up the subject of having Mrs. Currie hold
the gifts. And the president either failed to respond or said
``I don't know,'' or ``I'll think about it.'' According to
Mrs. Currie, Ms. Lewinsky called Mrs. Currie and asked Mrs.
Currie to come to Ms. Lewinsky's home to take the gifts and
[[Page H11982]]
Mrs. Currie did so. Ms. Lewinsky testified that Mrs. Currie
placed the call to Ms. Lewinsky. But the central point in
this is, that neither Mrs. Currie nor Ms. Lewinsky testified
that the president suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she had the
gifts, or that the president told Mrs. Currie to get the
gifts from Ms. Lewinsky.
Under these circumstances, it is my view that a responsible
prosecutor would not charge the president with obstruction,
because there is no evidence sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the president was involved. Indeed, it
seems likely that Ms. Lewinsky was the sole moving force,
having broached the idea to the president, but having
received no response or encouragement, she called Mrs. Currie
to take the gifts without the president's knowledge or
encouragement. That is not the stuff of which an obstruction
charge is made.
Because of time, I'm going to skip over my third example,
and go to my conclusion.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Which was about influencing Mrs. Currie's
testimony. Time does not permit me to go through all of the
allegations of misconduct in the Starr Report. Suffice it to
say, that in my opinion, none of them is of the nature which
a responsible federal prosecutor would present to a federal
grand jury for indictment. I will be pleased to respond to
your questions. Thank you very much, and particularly for the
extra time.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. This is a formal
proceeding. And in the chamber of Congress, we never--unlike
in certain state legislatures--introduce people in the
gallery. But this is a special day, and we have someone in
the audience that I think ought to be introduced. And with
the permission of the gentleman from Massachusetts, I'd like
to introduce Elsie Frank, Barney Frank's mother.
[Applause.]
Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, members of
the committee----
Rep. Coble. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Yes.
Rep. Coble. I'm reluctant to do this, but in the sense of
fairness, do you think that since Mr. Sullivan was afforded
an additional three minutes, that we should make that offer
to the other members of the panel, if it comes to that?
Rep. Hyde. I'd rather face that critical decision----
Rep. Coble. Very well. Very well.
Rep. Hyde [continuing.] On a piecemeal basis.
Rep. Coble. But for the remaining four, at least I tried.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you. I will try and summarize my longer,
written statement, which the committee has. There can be no
doubt that the decision as to whether to prosecute a
particular individual is an extraordinarily serious matter.
Good prosecutors thus approach this decision with a genuine
seriousness, carefully analyzing the facts in the law, and
setting aside personal feelings about the person under
investigation.
In making a prosecution decision, as recognized by Justice
Department policy, the initial question for any prosecutor,
is can the case be won at trial. Simply stated, no prosecutor
should bring a case if he or she does not believe that, based
upon the facts in the law, it is more likely than not that
they will prevail at trial. Cases that are likely to be lost,
cannot be brought simply to make a point, or to express a
sense of moral outrage, however justified such a sense of
outrage might be. You have to truly believe you will win the
case.
I would respectfully suggest that the same principle should
guide the House of Representatives as it determines to, in
effect, make the decision as to whether to commence a
prosecution by impeaching of the president. Indeed, if
anything, the strength of the evidence should be greater
to justify impeachment, than to try a criminal case.
In the context of perjury prosecutions, there are some
specific considerations which are present when deciding
whether such a case can be won. First, it is virtually
unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based solely on the
conflicting testimony of two people. The inherent problems in
bringing such a case are compounded to the extent that any
credibility issues exist as to the government's sole witness.
Second, questions and answers are often imprecise.
Questions sometimes are vague, or used summarily to define
terms, and interrogators frequently asked compound or
inarticulate questions, and fail to follow up imprecise
answerers. Witnesses often meander through an answer,
wandering around a question, but never really answering it.
In a perjury case, where the precise language of a question
and answer are so relevant, this makes perjury prosecutions
difficult, because the persecutor must establish that the
witness understood the question, intended to give a false,
not simply an evasive answer, and in fact did so. The problem
of establishing such intentional falsity is compounded, in
civil cases, by the reality that lawyers routinely counsel
their clients to answer only the question asked, not to
volunteer, and not to help out an inarticulate questioner.
Third, prosecutors often need to assess the veracity of an
``I don't recall'' answer. Like other answers, such a
response can be true or false, but it is a heavy burden to
prove that a witness truly remembered the fact at issue. The
ability to do so, will often depend on the nature of that
fact. Precise times of meetings, names of people one has met,
and details of conversations, and sequences of events,
indeed, even if those events are of fairly recent origin, are
often difficult to remember. Forgetting a dramatic event, is
however more difficult to justify.
The ability to win a trial is not however the only
consideration guiding a decision whether to prosecute. Other
factors reflected in the Justice Department guidelines
include federal law enforcement priorities, the nature and
seriousness of the offense, the impact of the offense on any
victim, whether there has been restitution, deterrence, in
the criminal history of the accused.
Before turning to the application of these principles to
the facts at hand, I should say that in my work at the
Watergate Special Prosecutor's office, I was involved in
applying these principle in extraordinarily high profile
cases. While we successfully prosecuted a number of matters,
we also declined to proceed in a number of close cases. We
did so even in circumstances where we believed in our heart
that a witness had deliberately lied under oath, or committed
some other wrongful act, but simply concluded that we were
not sufficiently so certain that we would prevail at trial.
I will not turn to the issue of whether, from the
perspective of a prosecutor, there exists a prosecutable case
for perjury in front of the grand jury. The answer to me is
clearly no. The president acknowledged to the grand jury the
existence of an improper intimate relationship with Monica
Lewinsky, but argued wit the prosecutors questioning him,
that his acknowledged was not a sexual relationship as he
understood the definition of that term being used in the
Jones deposition. Engaging in such a debate, whether wise or
unwise politically, simply does not form the basis for a
perjury prosecution.
Indeed, in the end, the entire basis for a grand jury
perjury prosecution comes down to Monica Lewinsky's assertion
that there was a reciprocal nature to their relationship, and
that the president touched her private parts with the intent
to arouse or gratify her, and the president's denial that he
did so.
Putting aside whether this is the type of difference of
testimony which should justify an impeachment of a president,
I do not believe that a case involving this kind of conflict
between two witnesses would be brought by a prosecutor, since
it would not be won at trial.
A prosecutor would understand the problem created by the
fact that both individuals had an incentive to lie--the
president to avoid acknowledging a false statement at his
civil deposition, and Miss Lewinsky to avoid the demeaning
nature of providing wholly unreciprocated sex. Indeed, this
incentive existed when Miss Lewinsky described the
relationship to the confidantes described in the independent
counsel's referral.
Equally as important, however, Mr. Starr has himself
questioned the veracity of his one witness, Miss Lewinsky, by
questioning her testimony that his office suggested she tape
record Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan, and potentially the president.
And in any trial, the independent counsel would also be
arguing that other key points in Miss Lewinsky's testimony
are false, including where she explicitly rejects the notion
that she was asked to lie and that assistance in her job
search was an inducement for her to do so.
It also was extraordinarily unlikely that in ordinary
circumstances a prosecutor would bring a prosecution for
perjury in the president's civil deposition in the Jones
case, First, while one could always find isolated contrary
examples, under the prosecution principles discussed above,
perjury prosecutions involving civil cases are rare and it
would be even more unusual to see such a prosecution where
the case had been dismissed on unrelated grounds and then
settled, particularly where the settlement occurred after
disclosure of the purported false testimony.
Second, perjury charges on peripheral issues are also
uncommon. Perjury prosecutions are generally filed where the
false statement goes to the core of the matter under inquiry.
Indeed, in order to prevail in a perjury prosecution, the
prosecutor must establish not only that the testimony was
false, but that the purported false testimony was material.
Here, the Jones case was about whether then-governor
Clinton sought unwanted sexual favors from a state employee
in Arkansas. Monica Lewinsky herself had nothing to do with
the actual facts at issue in that suit. This deposition was
about the Jones case. It was not part of a general
investigation into the Monica Lewinsky affair, and that is
important on the materiality issue. Given the lack of
connection between these two events, under the applicable
rules of evident, her purely consensual relationship with the
president half a decade later would, I believe, not have
even been admissible at any ultimate trial of the Jones
case.
While the court allowed questioning in the civil deposition
about this matter, the judge did so under the very broad
standard used in civil discovery. Indeed, while not dealing
with the admissibility issue, had there been no independent
counsel inquiry after the controversy about the President's
relationship with Miss Lewinsky arose, the court considered
this testimony sufficiently immaterial so as to preclude
testimony about it at the trial.
Finally, the ability to prove the intentional making of
false statements in the
[[Page H11983]]
civil deposition is compounded by inexact questions, evasive
and inconsistent answers, insufficient follow-up by the
questioner, and reliance by the examiner on a definition of
sexual relations rather than asking about specific acts. But
whatever the ability to meet the standard of proof on this
issue as to any particular question, this simply is not a
perjury case that would be brought. It involves difficult
proof issues as to, at best, peripheral issues where complete
and truthful testimony would be of doubtful admissibility, in
a settled civil case which had already been dismissed. This
simply is not the stuff of criminal prosecution.
Turning to the issues of obstruction of justice involving
the Paula Jones case, a prosecutor analyzing the case would
be effected by many of the same weaknesses that are discussed
above. These weaknesses, as well as additional problems with
such a case are discussed in my written statement and I will
not comment on them, you know, orally, in the interest of
time.
Before concluding, I would like to make two closing
observations, and I will be, with your permission, just a
minute or so. In August, 1974, prior to the pardon, the
Watergate special prosecution force commenced the
extraordinarily difficult process of whether--determining
whether--to indict then-former President Nixon. In my 1974
memorandum analyzing the relevant factors which should
ultimately affect such a decision, and proceeding in that
memorandum on the belief not present here that adequate
evidence clearly existed to support the bringing of such
criminal charges, I articulated two primary and competing
considerations which I believed it appropriate for us then,
as prosecutors, to consider.
The first factor was to avoid a sense of a double standard
by declining to prosecute a plainly guilty person because he
had been president. The second was that prosecutors should
not proceed with even provable charges if they conclude that
important and valid societal benefits would be sacrificed by
doing so. In the Nixon case, as articulated in my memorandum,
such a benefit was the desirability of putting the turmoil of
the past two years behind us so as to better be able to
proceed with the country's business.
The second was the prosecutor should not proceed with even
provable charges if they conclude that important and balanced
societal benefits would be sacrificed by doing so. In the
Nixon case, as I articulated in my memorandum, such a benefit
was the desirability of putting the turmoil of the past two
years behind us so as to better be able to proceed with the
country's business. I believe today, 25 years later, that it
is still appropriate for those deciding whether to bring
charges to consider these factors.
Finally, prosecutors often feel a sense of frustration if
they cannot express their sense that a wrong has been
committed by bringing charges. But not every wrong is a
crime, and wrongful noncriminal conduct sometimes can be
addressed without the commencing of any proceeding.
Apart from issues of censure, we live in a democracy, and
one sanction that can be imposed is by the voters acting
through the exercise of their right to vote. President
Clinton lied to the American people, and if they believe it
appropriate they were free to voice their approval by voting
against his party in 1998, and remain free to do so in 2000,
as occurred in 1974 when the Democrats secured major gains.
The answer to every wrongful act is not the invocation of
punitive legal processes. Thank you.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Dennis.
Mr. Dennis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Conyers, members of the House of Representatives committee on
the Judiciary, I am opposed to the impeachment of President
Clinton. My opposition is grounded in part in my belief that
a criminal conviction would be extremely difficult to obtain
in a court of law. There is very weak proof of the criminal
intent of the president.
The Lewinsky affair is of questionable materiality to the
proceedings in which it was raised. And I believe that a jury
would be sympathetic to any person charged with perjury for
dancing around questions put to them that demanded an
admission of marital infidelity; that is, unless the answers
were essential to the resolution of a very substantial claim.
On another level, I sense an impeachment under these
circumstances would prove extremely divisive for the country,
inflaming the passions of those who would see impeachment as
an attempt to thwart the election process for insubstantial
reasons. Perjury and obstruction of justice are serious
offenses. They are felonies. However, in my experience
perjury or obstruction of justice prosecutions of parties in
private civil litigation are rare. Rarer still are criminal
investigations in the course of civil litigation in
anticipation of incipient perjury or obstruction of justice.
In such circumstances prosecutors are justifiably concerned
about the appearance that government is taking the side of
one private party against another.
The oath taken by witnesses demands full and truthful
testimony at depositions and in grand jury proceedings--
excuse me, demands truthful testimony at depositions and in
grand jury proceedings. Nonetheless, imprecise, ambiguous,
evasive and even misleading responses to questions don't
support perjury prosecutions, even though such responses may
raise serious questions about the credibility of a witness on
a particular subject. Proof that a witness's testimony is
untrue is not sufficient alone to prove perjury, and to prove
that a witness is intentionally evasive or nonresponsive is
not sufficient to prove perjury either.
Courts are rigorously literal in passing on questions of
ambiguity in the questions and the responses of witnesses
under oath, and generally give the accused the benefit of any
doubt on possible interpretations of the questions and the
meaning of the allegedly perjurious response. Perjury cases
are very difficult to win under the most favorable
circumstances.
I believe the question of whether there were sexual
relations between the president and Ms. Lewinsky is
collateral to the harassment claim in the Jones case. The
president has confessed to an inappropriate relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky. The Jones case was dismissed and is now
settled. These circumstances simply would not warrant the
bringing of a criminal prosecution, and a criminal
prosecution would most likely fail. Certainly the exercise of
sound prosecutorial discretion would not dictate prosecuting
such a case.
The consequences of the impeachment of the president of the
United States are far reaching. These consequences are grave,
and they impact the entire nation. Impeachment in my view
should not serve as a punishment for a president who has
admittedly gone astray in his family life, as grave as that
might be in personal terms.
Where there is serious doubt, as there must be in this
case, prudence demands that Congress defer to the electoral
mandate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Dennis.
Mr. Noble.
Mr. Noble. I too will attempt to keep my remarks within 10
minutes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority
Member, and members of the committee, before I begin my
formal remarks, let me extend my thanks to the following
people who helped prepare me under these rushed
circumstances: my brother, James Noble, who is here with me
today; my research assistant, Russell Morris (sp), of NYU Law
School is here with me today; my students in my evidence
class, with whom I have spent the last two weeks talking
about impeachment, but not the impeachment of a president,
the impeachment of a witness. I have been trying to give them
hypotheticals with which they could learn or from which they
could learn. I told them I will be the best prop they will
have today.
I am honored to appear before you today. I will discuss the
factors ordinarily considered by federal prosecutors and
federal agents in deciding whether to investigate, indict and
prosecute allegations of violations of federal criminal law.
I submit that a federal prosecutor ordinarily would not
prosecute a case against a private citizen based on the facts
set forth in the Starr referral. My experience, which forms
the basis of my testimony, is as follows: I have served as an
assistant U.S. Attorney, a chief of staff and deputy
assistant attorney general in the Justice Department's
Criminal Division during the Reagan and Bush administrations,
and undersecretary of the Treasury for enforcement in the
Clinton administration, and I am currently a professor at the
New York University School of Law where I teach, as I said, a
course in evidence.
When investigating a possible violation of the law, every
federal prosecutor must heed the guidelines of the Department
of Justice. DOJ guidelines recognize that a criminal
prosecution entails profound consequences for the accused and
the family of the accused, whether or not a conviction
ultimately results. Career federal prosecutors recognize that
federal law enforcement resources and federal judicial
resources are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every
alleged offense over which federal jurisdiction exists.
Federal prosecutors are told to consider the nature and
seriousness of the offense, as well as available taxpayer
resources. Often these resources are scarce and influence the
decision to proceed or not to proceed and a decision how to
proceed. Federal prosecutors may properly weight such
questions as to whether the violation is technical or
relatively inconsequential in nature, and what the public
attitude is towards prosecution under the circumstances of
the case. What will happen in the public confidence and the
rule of law if no prosecution is brought, or if a prosecution
results in an acquittal?
Even before the Clinton-Lewinsky matter arose, DOJ
guidelines intimated that prosecutors should pause before
bringing a prosecution where the public may be indifferent or
even opposed to enforcement of a controlling statute, whether
on substantive grounds or because of a history of
nonenforcement, or because the offense involves essentially a
minor matter of private concern and the victim is not
interested in having it pursued.
Yet public sentiment against should not discourage
prosecutors from bring charges simply because a biased and
prejudiced public is against prosecution. For example, in a
civil rights case or a case involving an extremely popular
political figure, it might be clear that the evidence of
guilt viewed objectively and by an unbiased fact-finder would
be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction. Yet the
prosecutor might reasonably doubt whether the jury would
convict. In
[[Page H11984]]
such a case, despite his or her negative assessment of the
likelihood of a guilty verdict, based on factors extraneous
to an objective view of the law and facts, the prosecutors
may properly conclude that it is necessary and desirable to
commence of recommend prosecution, and allow the criminal
process to operate in accordance with its principles.
During the civil rights era many prosecutions were brought
against people for locally popular but no less heinous crimes
against blacks. However, prosecutors should not bring charges
on public sentiment in favor of prosecution when a decision
to prosecute cannot be supported on grounds deemed legitimate
by the prosecutor.
DOJ prosecutors are discouraged from pursuing criminal
prosecutions simply because probable cause exists. And a
number of the witnesses have already addressed this point.
Why? Because probable cause can be met in a given case, it
does not automatically warrant prosecution. Further
investigation may be warranted, and the prosecutor should
still take into account all relevant considerations in
deciding upon his or her course of actions. Prosecutors are
admonished not to recommend in an indictment charges that
they cannot reasonably expect to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt by the legally sufficient evidence at trial.
It is one of the most important criteria that prosecutors
must consider. Prosecution should never be brought where
probable cause does not exist, and both as a matter of
fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient
administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated
against any person unless the government believes that the
person will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.
Federal prosecutors and federal agents as a rule ought to
stay out of the private sexual lives of consenting adults.
Neither federal prosecutors nor federal investigators
consider it a priority to invest allegations of perjury in
connection with the lawful, extramarital, consensual, private
sexual conduct of citizens. In my view, this is a good thing.
From a proactive perspective, who among us would want the
federal government to initiate sting operations against
private citizens to see if we lie about our extramarital
affairs or the nature of our sexual conduct. Imagine a rule
that required all federal job applicants to answer the
following question under oath: ``Because we are concerned
about our employees being blackmailed about unusual or
inappropriate sexual conduct, and because we want to know
whether you would be at risk, please name every person with
whom you've had a sexual relationship or with whom you've had
sexual intercourse during your life. It certainly would be
relevant and it certainly might lead to blackmail.''
Such a question would naturally lead to allegations of
perjured responses. Irrespective of constitutional challenges
from a public policy standpoint, most Americans would object
to federal prosecutors and federal agents investigating and
prosecuting those cases that came to our attention. Could we
trust our government to make fair, equitable and restrained
decisions about how much to investigate any one of these
allegations?
The potential for abuse and violation of our right to
privacy would be great. Indeed, assigning federal agents to
interview witnesses, install wiretaps and insert bugs to
learn about the private, legal, sexual conduct of U.S.
citizens would concern us all. But aggressive prosecutors and
agents would do exactly that to make cases against those
citizens where prosecutions would garner publicity and
thereby act as a deterrent. In my view, the biggest target
would be politicians.
As a general matter, federal prosecutors are not asked to
bring federal criminal charges against individuals who
allegedly perjure themselves in connection with civil
lawsuits. As a rule, federal prosecutors on their own do not
seek to bring criminal charges against people who perjure
themselves in connection with civil depositions, for the
reasons that have already been articulated. in addition, this
would open a floodgate of referrals. Parties by definition
are biased, and it would be difficult to discount the
potential bias.
By their nature, lawsuits have remedies built into the
system. Lying litigants can be exposed as such and lose their
lawsuits. The judge overseeing the lawsuit is in the best
position to receive evidence about false statements,
deceitful conduct, and even perjured testimony. She can
sanction violating litigants by initiating civil or criminal
contempt proceedings.
Notwithstanding the reasons generally, there are 10 good
reasons, taken in combination, which support the view that a
career federal prosecutor asked to investigate allegations
like those in the Clinton-Lewinsky matter would not pursue
federal criminal prosecution to the indictment or trial
stage. One, the alleged perjury occurred in a civil
deposition and concerned private, lawful, sexual conduct
between consenting adults. Two, the alleged perjured
testimony was deemed inadmissible by the trial judge. Three,
that evidence arguably was dismissed as immaterial by the
trial judge. Four, in any event, the alleged perjured
testimony was, at most, marginally relevant. Five, the
alleged perjured testimony did not affect the outcome of the
case.
Six, the parties settled and a court dismissed the
underlying civil suit. Seven, the settlement of the suit
prevented the appellate court from ruling on a dismissal and
on the materiality of alleged perjured testimony. Eight, the
theoretically harmed party knew of the alleged perjury prior
to settlement. Nine, alleged--and I say alleged--political
enemies of the defendant funded it in a plaintiff's suit.
Ten, a federal government informant conspired with one of the
civil litigants to trap the alleged perjurer into perjuring
himself.
Given the above considerations, most federal prosecutors
would not want to use taxpayer dollars, federal agents and
sensitive federal investigative resources to uncover the most
intimate and embarrassing details of the private sexual lives
of consenting adults when there is a risk of bias and when
there is a judge in a position to address the alleged
criminal conduct.
The judgment that a career prosecutor might make about an
ordinary person might be very well affected by the knowledge
that the alleged perjury was committed by the president. That
is to be conceded. Even the most experienced, fair-minded
prosecutor will find it difficult not to pursue allegations
of criminal misconduct against a president, a senator, a
governor, any member of Congress. The interest in targeting,
threatening and harming the president, especially, can be
explained in part by the power and visibility of his office.
Even a prosecutor with exceptional judgment might be tempted
by the challenge of bringing down a president. A prosecutor
with unchecked power, unlimited resources and only one target
might find the temptation even stronger.
Mr. Chairman, I believe I can conclude in two minutes, with
the permission of the chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Two minutes?
Mr. Noble. Two minutes.
Rep. Hyde. Surely.
Mr. Noble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. (Off mike.)
Mr. Noble. Thank you, Mr. Coble.
It is difficult to think of a fail-safe structure that
could protect anyone from allegations of bias in a decision
to prosecute or not prosecute the president. Not the attorney
general, the independent counsel, the Justice Department, the
FBI, the Secret Service, the federal judiciary, the congress,
the bar and the academy can escape some person or act in
their background that could create a conflict or an
appearance of a conflict. No one for or against prosecution
would be safe from attack on the merits or from false
personal attacks. For this reason, a prosecutor or a
committee assigned such a case must strive to be objective,
knowing that criticism of bias will be unavoidable.
In a prosecutorial context, a 13-to-10 vote by the grand
jury constitutes enough votes to proceed, but reflects that
there must be, or might be, a serious problem with some
aspect of the case. Similarly, a vote for impeachment based
on a party-line vote or near party-line vote is a signal that
something is wrong or may be wrong with the case and that the
case may not be worth pursuing. This is particularly true
where the overwhelming majority of Americans appear to be
well-informed about the allegations and unbiased as a group,
yet they do not want this president impeached.
While indictments and impeachment proceedings are
different, they carry at least two similarities. One, most of
us know it when we see the clear cases for criminal
conviction and for impeachment. Two, public confidence in the
rule of law and our system of government would suffer if we
regularly indicted cases or impeached presidents, only to
have juries or the Senate vote to acquit.
In closing, I believe that the Justice Department got it
right and Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz got it wrong.
Indictments and impeachments that result in acquittal ought
to be avoided where possible. No prosecutor would be
permitted to bring a prosecution where she believed that
there was no chance that an unbiased jury would convict.
Almost no one in this country believes that the U.S. Senate
will convict the president on any potential article of
impeachment. Members of Congress should consider the impact
that a long and, no doubt, sensationalized trial will have on
the country, especially a trial that will not result in a
conviction.
In the end, I am confident that you will give the weighty
responsibility that you must discharge serious consideration.
A vote against impeachment need not be viewed as a vote
against punishment. As Professor Steve Saltzburg noted before
you earlier this week, Judge Susan Webber Wright retains
jurisdiction over the case wherein the allegedly perjured
testimony occurred. She can hold civil or criminal contempt
hearings. Of all the arbiters of justice in this matter, she
is perceived as being the least biased. She can punish the
president for false and misleading conduct even if it does
not rise to the level of perjury or obstruction of justice.
Trust her to mete out the appropriate punishment.
I thank you.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Noble.
Governor Weld.
Mr. Weld. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the
committee, my name is William Weld and I am sincerely honored
to appear before you this morning.
I'm no Tom Sullivan, but I have knocked around the criminal
justice world a little bit, from 1986 to 1988. Under
President Reagan I was the assistant attorney general in
charge of the criminal division in Washington, which is
relevant because that's the policy, or political appointment,
charged with ensuring the uniformity of charging decisions--
decisions of whether to seek an indictment
[[Page H11985]]
around the country, in various districts. Prior to that, for
five years I was the United States Attorney in Massachusetts.
And I became familiar, in the course of that seven years,
with the handbook, ``The Principles of Federal Prosecution,''
and with the United States attorneys manual and, when I was
in Washington, with the practices and procedures that also
have been developed over the years to try to ensure
uniformity in charging decisions.
It so happens that in 1974, for nine months, I also worked
for this committee under Chairman Rodino on the impeachment
inquiry into President Nixon. And I worked on the
constitutional and legal unit there, which was charged with
reading every precedent--in Britain (sp), in Heinz (sp), in
Cannon (sp), in reported cases in the records of the 1787
debate on the Constitution--having any relevance at all to
what high crimes and misdemeanors means in the United States
Constitution.
Like Mr. Sullivan, like many others, I do not consider
myself an advocate here before you. I do have a couple of
points of view that I would like to share with the members of
the committee, and you can take them for what they're worth.
Ordinarily, in a civil context, you don't qualify as an
expert on the basis of nine months' experience, but for
whatever they're worth.
I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that under the Reagan
administration it was not the policy of the U.S. Justice
Department to seek indictments solely on the basis that a
prospective defendant had committed adultery or fornication,
which are not lawful, but it simply wasn't the policy to go
there. It was also not the policy to seek an indictment based
solely on evidence that a prospective defendant had falsely
denied committing unlawful adultery or fornication.
And let me say a little bit about perjury cases. I don't
think they're all that rare, and I've prosecuted a lot of
them, but I do think that what one or two of the witnesses
said is true; there's usually something else involved in a
federal perjury prosecution. There's a pass-through aspect
here--you're really going to something else. I once
prosecuted a guy who stated that he was in Florida on
November 28th and 29th, 1981. You may say, that's kind of,
you know, stooping to pick up pins. Why would you prosecute
him for that? Well, that was the day the city of Lynn,
Massachusetts burned down, and this guy was an arsonist and
three people made him in the Porthole Pub in Lynn,
Massachusetts, that day, so--and we found his fingerprints on
a ticket to Florida the next day after the fire, so we
thought it would be a good idea to bring a perjury
prosecution there to rattle the cage a little bit, and we
did. And often, we brought them where we were trying to
penetrate a wall of silence, as in cases of public
corruption or narcotics, when you're trying to break
through this omerta, everyone's got to dummy up,
phenomenon. But there is something else that you're trying
to get at here.
Until this year, the policy of the Department of Justice
was that in cases of false statements they would not seek an
indictment solely on the basis of somebody denying that they
themselves had committed misconduct. This is called the
``exculpatory no'' doctrine, and it was adopted in a lot of
circuits. It was kicked out by the Supreme Court in a
decision by Justice Scalia early this year, based on bad
facts--you had a ranking union official who'd taken money
from employers in violation of an independent federal
statute--so that's the ``something else'' that the
prosecution was trying to get at. So, a very unsympathetic
case for the court applying the exculpatory no doctrine.
In my view, it would have been a handy idea to carve out an
exception to the abrogation of that doctrine for cases
involving personal misconduct as opposed to a violation of an
independent federal statute such as was involved there.
Certainly, a responsible prosecutor could apply that filter
in the exercise of his or her discretion.
The last thing, let me just say, on the law of impeachment,
I am pretty well convinced that adultery, fornication or even
a false denial--false--I'm assuming perjury here--false
denial of adultery or fornication, they do not constitute
high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the
impeachment clause of the U.S. Constitution. They're not
offenses against the system of government, they don't imperil
the structure of our government.
The remedy of impeachment is to remove the officeholder.
Get the worm out of the apple. It's a prophylactic--
prophylactic remedy, it is not punitive. If any of you are
thinking, we've got to vote yes on impeachment to tarnish the
president, he's already tarnished, and that's really not the
purpose of the impeachment mechanism.
Nobody's going to forget this stuff. This is a man who's
been elected president of the United States twice, and thus
entitled to this office, after allegations very similar to
those now before you.
I hate to open old wounds, but you remember back in 1992
and the Gennifer Flowers matter; if there are two people in a
room and they both deny that something happened, then you
can't prove that it happened. Well, that's very similar to
what we're talking about here, and this officeholder was
elected president of the United States twice after all those
facts were before the people.
So, I come out thinking that the most appropriate result is
something other than removing this person from his office,
taking his office away from him. There's a lot of talk about
censure. I think, personally, the dignity of Congress and the
dignity of the country demands something more than merely
censure here, and I would suggest, in conclusion, Mr.
Chairman, four things that you might want to think about, in
addition to censure.
Number one, it's not unknown for grand juries investigating
corruption in a city or a county, for example, to issue a
written, detailed report of their findings. That could easily
be done here, be entirely proper. Number two, there could be
a written acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the
president, and for reasons which will become evident in a
moment, I would not propose that there be insistence on the
use of the word ``lie'' or ``perjury'' there, but it's
something that could be negotiated to reflect the gravity of
what he has done.
Number three, there could be an agreement to pay a fine.
This is something tangible, more tangible than censure, and
it involves the respondent as well as the moving party, the
moving party here being the House.
And that would mark the moment. That would mark the
solemnity of the occasion. And the agreement would remove any
doubt about somebody going to court and saying there's no
basis for this. It would be thrown out on the basis of the
political question doctrine anyway, I think.
I'm not here to say what the fine should be, but if memory
serves, Speaker Gingrich had to pay quite a large fine not so
long ago because people didn't like either the content or the
market of a college course that he taught. The members might
wish to consider providing that the fine could not be paid
out of the proceeds of a legal defense fund, given all the
background circumstances.
Finally, what I am proposing, the final element would be
that the president would have to take his chances with
respect to the criminal justice process post his presidency.
I do not agree with those in the media who say that any deal
on censure has to protect the president against criminal
proceedings after he leaves office.
First of all, there doesn't have to be any deal on censure.
That's entirely within your power. The White House has no
leverage there. Second, the Constitution explicitly says that
even if a president or anybody is impeached, convicted and
removed from office, they remain liable to trial and
indictment. It's very explicit. It's right in the
Constitution. If the objection is that the spectacle of a
former president being prosecuted would be tawdry and
degrading, it really couldn't be much more tawdry and
degrading than what we've already been subjected to through
the constant daily reports of the Lewinsky affair.
Lastly, I agree with everyone who's spoken before about
whether a perjury prosecution here really lies. I think
there's quite a low risk of that from the point of view of
the president. So that's the suggestion. It's a political
suggestion, but this is in part a political process about a
five-part deal, if you will. And I think the dignity of the
House would be upheld if something like that were to be
approached, and everybody could perhaps get on more easily
with attending to the public's business.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Governor. Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As I'm sure all members of the panel know, the last
impeachment took place nine years ago, in 1989, against Judge
Walter Nixon of Mississippi. And in that impeachment, the
House of Representatives, by a vote of 417 to nothing,
declared that making false statements to a grand jury were
impeachable offenses. The Senate apparently agreed with the
House's judgment, because Judge Nixon was removed from office
on a 91-8 vote on both of those articles of impeachment.
I'm wondering if members of the panel think that the House
made a mistake nine years ago in unanimously declaring that
making false statements to a grand jury were impeachable
offenses.
Mr. Davis. One, I think you have to look at the proof. I
mean, first of all, I assume that there was proof as to what
the perjury that took place. I assume also that the perjury,
as I recall, went to the core issue in the matter in which
the perjury took place. So you had certain important factual
differences.
I also think that there's an important difference when one
is considering the issue of a judge versus the president;
that judges, as others have testified, sit in terms of good
behavior, and so the standard is not precisely the same as
would be in removing a president who's elected by the public
and sits for only four years.
And finally, I think that in terms of perjury, I do think
that one has to look a bit about what the underlying events
are. And I do think that since what we're talking about is a
private consensual relationship as being at the core of it,
that that affects the impeachability. But the bottom line is,
as I said in my statement, I don't think there's really the
proof, particularly as to grand jury perjury.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Well, just by way of background, the
events that led up to the Judge Nixon impeachment, which is
contrasted to the President Nixon impeachment--you've got to
be very particular here--involved a private affair, a
financial affair, where Judge Nixon allegedly accepted an
illegal gratuity of a sweetheart deal in an oil and gas
lease. He was acquitted of that charge by the jury at a
criminal trial.
[[Page H11986]]
So here we're saying that the jury made a determination
that Judge Nixon did nothing wrong in terms of entering into
this oil and gas lease, but he was convicted by the jury of
the two counts of making false statements. So while there are
some differences, there are also some similarities in that
private misconduct was alleged as a part of the grand jury
investigation.
I am concerned with the answers to your question, in that
you seem to be implying that the standard of truthfulness for
the president of the United States is less than a federal
judge someplace in the country because the president is
elected and the judge is appointed and holds office for good
behavior.
Mr. Davis. No, I'm not saying----
Rep. Sensenbrenner. You know, am I wrong on that?
Mr. Davis. I'm not really saying that. I'm saying that the
standard for truthfulness is really the same. I'm saying that
here I don't think there's the proof, particularly as to the
grand jury, that you can make the case of perjury. And
second, what I'm saying is the standard for impeachment, not
the standard for truthfulness, but there are differences in
the standard of impeachment for a judge as opposed to the
president. And I think there's a lot of scholarship (for
that?).
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Well, yesterday many of the president's
defenders were troubled about the alleged false statements to
the grand jury. And at least one of the witnesses that the
White House brought up here, former Congressman Owens, flat
out said that the president lied before the grand jury.
That's what the House found in terms of Judge Nixon. And, you
know, I'm concerned that if a judge lies to the grand jury,
we all agree that it's impeachable, and if the president lies
before the grand jury, then there is a huge debate about
whether or not that's impeachable. Now, who's going to stand
up for the truth here?
Mr. Davis. Well, respectfully, I don't think that the
evidence supports the perjury in the grand jury, as
articulated in my statement.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Okay, thank you. I yield back my time.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
Rep. Conyers. Gentlemen, I want to pay my highest
commendations to all of you here because you have now put on
the record, once and for all, all of these pestering
questions that have been tempting to be dealt with for so
many weeks and months now. You should, Ron, feel proud to go
back to your evidence class. You can hold your head high. And
I thank you all.
Now, the important thing about this was that, unless I
missed something, none of you contradicted each other--
nobody. And it seems to me that this testimony of you five
gentlemen ought to be bound up and delivered, which I would
elect to do. I need Pat Buchanan to get a copy of this, Tim
Russert, Cookie Roberts, George Will, Sam Donaldson and Ms.
Buchanan, Pat's sister, not because they object to all of
this, but because they are the ones that in the media
continue--with many others, of course--this nonsensical
debate about obvious legal questions that a first-year law
student could dispose of.
And so what you've done here is of signal importance, from
my point of view. This should be studied carefully by
everybody that makes public utterances about the questions of
perjury and obstruction and how and when materiality figures
into the prosecutorial role.
Now, this question has come up. I think I called it the
Scott question. Is there any case on record for a
prosecution, based on a case in which it was dismissed?
It was an immaterial statement. There was a settlement to
boot. I mean, we are going through everything--has anybody
ever heard of a case like this? We need the citation right
away if there is, because I'll stop making this assertion.
Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Conyers----
Rep. Conyers. [continuing]. I can't guarantee you that
there is no such case, but I doubt it. As I said in my
remarks, the--well, the thrust of what I'm saying is that the
federal criminal process is simply not used to determine
truth or falsity in statements in civil litigation. And it's
particularly true--I mean, that's true, and it's also even
more true when you take a situation, as you have here, that
the testimony is even peripheral to the civil case involved.
The federal criminal justice system is not designed or
intended to enforce a code of moral conduct. That's not what
we do, or what I used to do and what the good federal
prosecutors do. I'm not saying you can't find an errant one
somewhere that will bring charges. But so far as I know, this
would be totally unprecedented, if such a case were brought.
Rep. Conyers. Thank you.
Mr. Davis, Mr. Noble, Governor, any other comments on this,
this matter?
Mr. Dennis. Well, I agree. I mean, I do not disagree with
any of the statements that have been made by my colleagues
here on the panel. I have not considered the suggestions that
Governor Weld had made with regard to possible political
disposition of the matter. But I think that it's fairly clear
and that if a poll were taken of former U.S. attorneys from
any administration, you'd probably find the overwhelming
number of them would agree with the assessment that this case
is a loser and just would not be sustained in court.
Rep. Hyde. The----
Rep. Conyers. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that
this is one of the most important panels that we've had
before us in the course of these proceedings.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum.
Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL). Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Sullivan, have you had an opportunity to review the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision
regarding the question of materiality and the issue before
us, you know, and the question of the independent counsel and
Lewinsky?
Mr. Sullivan. I have read about it in the Starr report.
I don't think I read the opinion of----
Rep. McCollum. Well, it's--the decision just is unsealed
and available to us in the last week.
Mr. Sullivan. That's why I have not.
Rep. McCollum. And you may not be aware that the District
Court of Appeals opinion squarely addressed that issue of
materiality, and it found that her false sworn statement
would be material for the purposes of perjury law. In other
words, a false statement by the President in that case would
have been material. So I think we can put that materiality
question to rest that Mr. Conyers just raised.
I also want to make a comment to you, Governor Weld. You
said that ``I do not believe that adultery, fornication, or
false denial of adultery or fornication constitutes high
crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the impeachment
clause of the Constitution of the United States.'' I agree
with you. But in this case, we're not dealing simply with
false statements or fornication or adultery, we're dealing
with potentially perjury, obstruction of justice, witness
tampering, things of that nature. And there's where you and I
may differ. And I think it is significant, albeit a civil
case.
Mr. Sullivan, you and Mr. Davis and several others on the
panel pointed out how rare you think it for perjury cases to
be brought in federal court in civil cases, and yet we just
had Mary--Barbara Battalino, I should say, in here last week
as a witness, a very recent case in which a perjury case was
brought in a civil suit involving the Veterans'
Administration psychiatrist. And on August 4, 1998, a former
employee of the United States Postal Service, Diane Parker
(sp), was sentenced to 13 months in prison and three years of
supervised release for lying in a civil case regarding a
sexual relationship with a subordinate. And that, of course,
was a federal case. And I've got citations for 29 of these
cases, at least, sitting right here. There are 115 people,
minimally--maybe more than by now--serving in federal prison
today for perjury and, as I say, most of those or a great
many of those for civil perjury. So maybe the policy a few
years ago was different, but certainly prosecutors are
prosecuting in these sexual harassment-type cases and the
type of Battalino and Parker cases that we--that we're seeing
more of today than maybe we did back in 10 or 15 years ago.
I also want to address the question that, Mr. Sullivan, you
raised and, I think, Mr. Davis, you raised in particular,
about perjury with regard to a single witness. Section 1623,
as you've pointed out, rightfully, does allow prosecution
with a single witness. And I dare say that about 90 percent
of the cases brought today that have resulted in people going
to prison in the federal system have been brought under that.
I've looked at it, and that's who those 115 people
constitute.
Now I'll agree with you, I think your analysis is good. You
need corroborative witnesses, even though it may not be
required. But let me go through what's here in the grand jury
case with respect to the perjury charged, and it's the same
underlying main issue in the deposition. You have a situation
in which the President of the United States says that he did
not commit or have sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky
under the definition as given in the court in the Jones case.
That court included in its definition explicitly the touching
of breasts or genitalia.
Now, the president said, ``I didn't do that.'' He repeated
it very carefully in the grand jury testimony. Monica
Lewinsky said on nine occasions in her sworn testimony before
the grand jury the president touched her breast and on four
occasions, they had genital contact and that all of this was
to arouse.
Now, the issue of corroboration, there are 10 corroborative
witnesses. Interestingly enough, strangely enough, Monica
Lewinsky talked contemporaneously with family members,
friends and relatives about these matters in great detail.
And we have 10 of those whose testimony is before us in sworn
testimony. Seven of the 10 corroborate the explicit detail
with regard to this touching under the definition of sexual
relations that Monica Lewinsky describes.
Now, it seems to me that that kind of corroboration is
precisely the kind of corroboration that would in fact
engender a prosecution, would give confidence to a prosecutor
to take perjury cases forward, and would indeed give a high
probability of conviction if this were taken before a court
in any case--any court in this land. A jury would be hard
pressed not to convict under those circumstances.
Mr. Davis. Mr. McCollum, if I----
Rep. McCollum. So it strikes me as very strange that we're
dismissing this. Nobody, nobody on this panel and nobody
yesterday has mentioned the fact that these corroborating
witnesses exist. It seems to be something that the
president's advocates simply
[[Page H11987]]
want to ignore. It's a bottom-line question in here, Mr.
Davis.
Mr. Davis. I think I did address the----
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Gentleman's time has expired.
Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts is
recognized.
Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I----
Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, before the gentleman from
Massachusetts, I request recognition for a moment.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman
from New York seek----
Rep. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, the question that Mr. McCollum
just asked the witness is perhaps that central question of
this case.
Rep. Frank. I'll give them time to answer.
Rep. Nadler. And I'd ask that you give them time.
Rep. Frank. I was just about to do that.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The--with yielding to continue on the
debate, that's going to mean that we're going to be here
until midnight. The chair will enforce the clock and the
rules that were laid down by Mr. Hyde at the beginning of
this hearing. If further members down the list want to have
questions answered when the time has run out, they can decide
to use their time to do that.
The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized.
Rep. Frank. Anybody want to answer that question?
Mr. Davis. Yes, I'd like to answer that. I think the
reasons why that prosecution would not win is one, as I said
in my statement, that both witnesses, including Miss
Lewinsky, had an incentive to lie. And she had an incentive
to lie not only to the grand jury on this issue but to her
confidants, because otherwise she would be acknowledging an
unreciprocated sexual relationship.
But just as important, if you're talking about one witness
that Mr. Starr or any prosecutor is going to put forward, Mr.
Starr and his prosecutors themselves are going to have to
argue in this case that Miss Lewinsky's testimony in other
issues is not accurate. They're going to have to argue that.
They're going to be in a position where they're going to have
to say she's telling the truth as to this, not telling the
truth as to other things.
Also, Miss Lewinsky in her testimony various times said she
had a similar definition of sexual relations.
So I think that if you look at this from the perspective of
a trial lawyer, in terms of how this would play out, I think
this would be really an impossible case to develop.
Rep. Frank. Mr. David, you've convinced me. We'll go on to
the next issue. I think that's absolutely right. All those
corroborating witnesses corroborated only what Ms. Lewinsky
had told them. No one has yet alleged that there was a kind
of Peeping Tom slot outside the Oval Office, where they could
have made any observation that would have made them in any
way relevant to the trial.
We also ought to know telling the truth was not the most
noticeable characteristic of this set of interrelationships.
But I mean, I think, had the guy with the lamp been there,
he'd still be outside looking for someone to talk to if he
got involved with all of them.
Ms. Lewinsky was herself threatened with prison, as was her
mother. And I do think that Mr. Starr's penchant for
threatening people with prison if they did not say bad things
about the president has some credibility relevance.
But I wanted to just also talk about Judge Nixon. I'm
reading from the majority, and the gentleman from Wisconsin
said, ``Well, he perjured himself only about''--or he didn't
say ``only''--``he perjured himself about an oil and gas
deal.'' But I am reading from the majority's report, which
the majority issued earlier this year and staff kindly gave
to me, on pages 9 and 10, ``Judge Nixon lied about whether he
had discussed the case with the state prosecutor and had
influenced the state prosecutor to essentially drop the
case.'' In other words, the underlying issue here was not
simply a private oil and gas deal, but a federal judge
intervening with a state prosecutor to get him to drive
(sic) the case. And that's what I--I was particularly
interested in Mr. Weld's presentation and others.
One of the arguments we've had here is that looking at the
underlying issue in a perjury allegation is somehow a--to
traduce the law and to undercut it. And I would like to ask
all of you, because I think this becomes now a central issue
in this case--when you are deciding how to deal with
allegations of perjury--because I don't believe that anybody
would be able to prove grand jury perjury; I do think that
with regard to the deposition, it would be easier, and the
president did unfortunately, in my judgment, when he said he
couldn't remember being alone, transgress--but on the
question about whether or not you take into account the
underlying issue, in the case of Judge Nixon, the underlying
issue was talking to a state prosecutor and intervening to
get his partner's son's conviction lessened--I think very
different.
This is the central case--as prosecutors, all of you, is it
wrong to take into account the underlying cause where there
is a perjury allegation? Mr. Weld has said that in his
experience, perjury is usually a way to get at a broader
issue. So let me start with Mr. Weld.
Mr. Weld. Well, I agree, Mr. Congressman. I think the
underlying conduct is important. I mean, I would agree, in a
way, on the law, with Representative Sensenbrenner,
Representative McCollum; I do think that false statements to
a grand jury can easily be grounds for impeachment.
I think I had the Judge Nixon case for a while when I was
at Justice, and my recollection is that there was clouds of
corruption in the background of that----
Rep. [off mike]--foreground.
Mr. Weld [continuing]. And perhaps in the foreground, of
that case. So, you know, I think, looking at the underlying
conduct--and that's another way of saying what Mr. Dennis,
Mr. Noble, others have said, that there's a test of
substantiality--Mr. Davis said it, as well--in assessing the
totality of circumstances in making a charging decision
whether to go forward in a perjury case. And it's really more
substantiality than materiality that I think might be the
rock you run up against.
Rep. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Weld.
Let me just say in closing, there's a point I wanted to
make, and I was particularly grateful to the former governor
of my state for making it, as a man who understands the
broader democratic, with a small ``d,'' implications here. He
made a very important point when he acknowledged the
president has been tarnished. Bill Clinton is a man who
clearly thinks a lot about how he is going to be regarded,
and the argument that somehow he will be walking away
unpunished if he is censured and has had this and other
proceedings, I think, is very inaccurate, and I appreciate
Mr. Weld bringing that out.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas.
Rep. George Gekas (R-PA). I thank the chair.
Mr. Sullivan, you had repeated today what we have heard in
different ways over the months of this controversy, that the
president is neither above the law nor below the law,
implying, I believe, on your part that if it were an ordinary
citizen, not the president of the United States, that this
case would have been dismissed out of hand, and therefore,
the same premise should have been accorded to the president
because he's not below the standard or above the standard
that you would apply to an ordinary citizen.
I see such a big difference that it's hard for me to
articulate it, but suppose the ordinary citizen in your set
of circumstances had pleaded the Fifth Amendment. You would
have, undoubtedly, honored that and then we may never have
heard of it at all, that case, in the body politic. And I
would submit that the Fifth Amendment is pleaded regularly
across the land and we never get results from that kind of
case. But if the president of the United States had pleaded
the Fifth Amendment, you would agree that there would have
been headlines acorss the world and that there would have
been a shaken seat of government in Washington, D.C. Or don't
you think that would have been as dramatic as I think it
would have been?
Mr. Sullivan. Had the president, instead of testifying in
the grand jury, had taken the Fifth Amendment, I'm certain it
would result in a great deal of publicity, probably adverse.
I don't think that it changes the issue of whether he's
above or below the law.
Rep. Gekas. But my point is that you are asserting with me
that this high-profile case that would have been a result of
the president pleading Fifh Amendment makes it a different
situation. It is possible, I believe, that the Congress, that
the House, could begin impeachment proceedings if that alone
had happened--the pleading of the Fifth Amendment by the
presieent--as being a political problem, a political affront
to the system of government.
Mr. Sullivan. Do you think taking the Fifth Amendment is a
high crime or misdemeanor?
Rep. Gekas. No, no, no. No, I'm saying that it----
Mr. Sullivan. The Constitution gives everyone the right to
take the Fifth Amendment and the jury is instructed that they
are not to take any inference from that.
Rep. Gekas. No, no, no, no. What I'm saying is that it
could serve--it could--what I'm saying to you, sir, is that
in pleading the Fifth Amendment it becomes a high profile
case, and----
Mr. Sullivan. There's no doubt about that.
Rep. Gekas. And when----
Mr. Sullivan. I'm sorry if I interrupted.
Rep. Gekas. If the president did so, you can't argue that
case. It would be--you already admitted that it would be a
high-profile case.
Mr. Sullivan. I admit that, of course. But I don't think
it's relevant here.
Rep. Gekas. Well, I'm asking questions concerning it.
Mr. Sullivan. Go ahead.
Rep. Gekas. The fact that it becomes a high-profile case
means that when the president of the United States takes some
kind of legal action, like committing false or stating
falsehoods under oath, that we cannot treat it as just
another case, but whether or not the president attacks the
system of government that is so important to us. Governor
Weld makes a great deal out of the fact that what the
president did, no matter how we couch it, is not an attack on
the system of government.
Yet we submit, many of us, that when he undertakes to make
false statements under oath that he is directly attacking two
segments of our system of government: one, the
[[Page H11988]]
rights, the constitutional rights of a fellow American
citizen who has instituted a case in which he, if he did
those falsehoods, was trying to destroy that individual's
right to pursue a case. That is an attack, some of us might
conclude, against our system of government.
And secondly, in affronting the judicial system, the other
third branch of government by directly giving false
statements under oath could be considered, could it not, as
an attack on the delicate balance of separation of powers,
his disdain for the judicial system? We have to take that
into consideration, do we not, Governor?
Mr. Weld. It could be so considered, Mr. Congressman; those
arguments, while fair on their face, strike me as on the
technical side, but I understand what you're saying.
Rep. Gekas. I thank. I have no further questions.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr.
Schumer.
Rep. Charles Schumer (D-NY). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to compliment this panel. I think it was an
extremely strong and erudite presentation from all five of
you. It was an excellent panel, and I appreciate your putting
the time and effort into it.
When I look at where we're headed here, I think there are
sort of three levels of argument. The level we addressed
yesterday was dispositive for me and for some of us, and that
is that even if you assume all of Mr. Starr's facts to be
true and that the president did wrong, however one would
define that wrong, it does not rise to the level of high
crimes and misdemeanors and doesn't merit impeachment. I
think that case was made very well yesterday by the first
panel.
The second level of the case would be--the next two levels
relate to you folks, and that is, if you assume the opposite,
that if Starr's facts are correct, if Mr. Starr's facts are
correct, then impeachment is warranted, there are two parts
to that. One is the abuse of power and obstruction of justice
charges, which seem to most, myself included, to be at a
higher level, and the next go to the perjury charges. So let
me ask you about each of those.
First, on the abuse of power charge, which even many on
this committee feel went too far, do any of you think there's
any merit to that charge being filed, whether it be--well,
you can't even make the case to a citizen, because it relates
to the president being president. Do any of you feel that
charge has any merit whatsoever? (No audible response.) Okay.
Let the record show that nobody did. And I don't want to
spend much time on that.
On the obstruction of justice, there seem to be three
specific areas that at least Mr. Starr talked about. One was
the finding of the attempt to find Ms. Lewinsky a job; the
second, the discussions between Ms. Lewinsky and the
president about what they would say if confronted with their
relationship; and the third about Ms. Currie's testimony and
so-called being coached about that testimony.
When we examined that, and when I questioned actually Mr.
Starr himself about those and I asked him what greater
evidence did he have to the president making a determination
that he wished to influence the judicial process, as opposed
not having his wife, his friends, his staff, the nation find
out about his relationship, Starr didn't point to any
evidence. It was simply surmise.
Would any of you care to comment on that group of charges?
Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Schumer----
Rep. Schumer. Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Can I comment on the one about
Mrs. Currie?
Rep. Schumer. Yes.
Mr. Sullivan. Because that's the one I didn't allude to in
my statement.
Rep. Schumer. Correct.
Mr. Sullivan. Mrs. Currie testified that she did not feel
that the president came and asked her some questions in a
leading fashion--``Was this right? Is this right? Is this
right?''--after his deposition was taken in the Jones case.
And she testified that she did not feel pressured to agree
with him and that she believed his statements were correct--
--
Rep. Schumer. Correct, right.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. And agreed with him. He--the
quote is, ``He would say, `Right,' and I could have said,
`Wrong.'''
Now that is not a case for obstruction of justice. It is
very common for lawyers, before the witness gets on the
stand, to say, ``Now you're going to say this, you're going
to say this, you're going to say this.''
Rep. Schumer. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. Now it doesn't make a difference if you've
got two participants to an event and you try to nail it down,
so to say.
Rep. Schumer. Do you all of you agree with that, with the
Currie--the Currie----
Mr. ------. Yeah.
Rep. Schumer. And on the other two, the Lewinsky parts of
this, is there----
Mr. Davis. I think to some----
Rep. Schumer. I mean, I don't even understand how they
could--how Starr could think that he would have a case, not
with the president of the United States, but with anybody
here, when it seems so natural and so obvious that there
would be an overriding desire not to have this public and to
have everybody--have the two of them coordinate their
stories--that is, the president and Miss Lewinsky--if there
were not the faintest scintilla of any legal proceeding
coming about. It just strikes me as an overwhelming stretch.
Am I wrong to characterize it that way? You gentlemen all
have greater experience than I do.
Mr. Davis. I think you're right. And also, the problem a
prosecutor would face would be that in these cases, there is
relationship between these people unrelated to the existence
of the Paula Jones case--the relationship. And that's the
motivation----
Rep. Schumer. Correct.
And Mr. Weld, do you disagree with--do you agree with that?
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time--the gentleman's
time----
Rep. Schumer. Could I just ask Mr. Weld for a yes or no----
Rep. Sensenbrenner. I'm sorry, Mr. Schumer. Mr. Schumer----
Rep. Schumer [continuing]. For a yes or no answer on that?
Rep. ------. Can you answer that yes or no, Governor?
Mr. Weld. I think it's a little thin, Mr. Congressman.
Rep. Schumer. Thank you.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Coble.
Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to have you all with us.
Governor Weld, I have a handful of friends who reside in
your state, and Democrats and Republicans alike, without
exception, speak very favorably of you.
Mr. Weld. Well, I have friends in your state, too, Mr.
Congressman.
Rep. Coble. Do they speak favorably of me, governor?
[Laughter]
Governor, last fall, you appeared on the Today Show,
alluding to the possibility of resignation of the president,
I'm quoting in part here, you said, ``My sort of rule of
thumb here, I think it comes down to this: If when the
president goes to a high school and colleges and
universities, really his strongest point, if he looks out at
those kinds, those students and their teachers and sees a sea
of signs that says, ``liar, liar, pants on fire,'' it's time
to go. ``Do you think, Governor, at this late stage of the
game, what is your view on the possibility of resignation?
Mr. Weld. Well, in a way, I say this with a heavy heart,
because I was troubled by the conduct at issue here. But I
think that events have overtaken that possibility. I remember
saying and thinking that the president would be well advised,
when he looked in the mirror shaving every morning to say,
``Are people taking me seriously? Are they taking me
seriously at home? Are they taking me seriously abroad?''
I was concerned that some international events that were
happening around then were happening because of a perception
of weakness at the core of the executive of the U.S.
government. But what happens, you know, the week after I
deliver myself of these wise sentiments, the president goes
to the United Nations and gets a standing ovation. Then he
goes into the budget negotiation with members of the opposite
party, and by most accounts, gets, you know, better than half
a loaf. Then he has the Wye agreements on the Middle East.
So, it appears to me that people are taking him seriously.
Rep. Coble. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Davis, in a Washington Post interview comparing the
impeachment process with Watergate, you indicated that we're
in an uglier political time now. Now much has been said about
the late President Kennedy's sexual indiscretions that were
not publicized but however were commonly known. And many of
those same people insist that those indiscretions would be
publicized today. And I'm not convinced, sir, that we're in
an uglier political climate or a political time, I think,
rather, the members of the media are probing more thoroughly
and probing more consistently. And I think probably that may
be why more attention is focused today.
Now let me ask you this, Mr. Davis.
Would you--I started to say ``wouldn't you'' but I'd be
speaking for you. Would you acknowledge that this committee's
consideration of whether grand jury perjury and civil
deposition perjury and potential witness tampering by the
president--not saying it happened, but assuming that it did--
that it merits impeachment is a legitimate exercise for this
committee? Would you acknowledge that?
Mr. Davis. I think that it's appropriate for the committee
to be conducting a review. I think there are issues in terms
of whether the committee can meet what I believe is the
committee's burden, if it's going to decide that there should
be impeachment, without really itself satisfying itself as to
the credibility of some of the core witnesses, like Ms.
Lewinsky. But I think given--once you received the referral,
I think, obviously, it was appropriate for you to consider
that referral and consider it seriously.
Rep. Coble. Governor Weld, neither am I Tom Sullivan. But
Mr. Sullivan--this has been broached previously, but I want
to broach it as well. You indicated that it was your belief
that probably the average citizen probably would not be
prosecuted for similar circumstances that are now before us.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Rep. Coble. And it was referred that two average citizens
last week--one a physician, one a basketball coach appeared--
sat where you are sitting now, and they in fact were
prosecuted. I'm inclined to think, Mr. Sullivan--and I'm not
mad; by no means am I taking you to task for this, but I
think what you said may well be subject to interpretation. I
think perhaps--and maybe it's because of the uglier time or
the fact that the
[[Page H11989]]
media is more focused now, I think probably that you would
see more and more average citizens prosecuted for perjury.
But I'll be glad to hear from you in response to that.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, Mr. Coble, I'm aware of the fact that
there are some few prosecutions for perjury arising out of
civil matters when--but----
Rep. Coble. Mr. Sullivan, I hate to do it to you, but I see
time's up.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Time's up.
Rep. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr.
Berman.
Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually, the question I'm most curious about is whether,
Mr. Davis, if there had been a cooling-off period, and if
President Ford hadn't issued the pardon, what do you think
Mr. Jaworski would have done?
Mr. Davis. The answer is I don't know. Indeed, the reason
that in my memorandum I recommended a cooling-off period and
felt that we should defer that decision was because I thought
the emotions at the time were too high and one would have to
balance the factors very carefully including, as I said in my
statement, whether the public interest in saying, you know,
``we've had two years of this we need to get on to something
else, and shouldn't we do it'' and that a prosecution would
drag that out.
Rep. Berman. Well, I agree with the other comments. I think
this panel has presented some very compelling testimony on
all the pitfalls in pursuing a perjury prosecution in this
situation and raised doubts about whether all the elements of
perjury are present in this case. We're not a courtroom; some
people keep wanting to analogize us to that. I thought the
professors yesterday were a political body, and this is a
political process in many, many ways. The Founding Fathers
would have given this process to the Supreme Court if they
had wanted a strict legal analysis.
So your testimony perhaps on the question of whether there
would be a prosecution for perjury is less relevant to
whether there are high crimes and misdemeanors here than it
is to the question of whether one of the articles of
impeachment should actually assert the conclusion, the legal
conclusion, that perjury has been committed, and I would hope
the framers of these articles would look at this testimony
carefully in making that decision.
The point that does interest me--for those who want to
analogize it to a legal proceeding, this notion of--even if I
think, as a prosecutor, that I have probable cause and I
believe that the accused is guilty, that if I known I can't
get a conviction from an unbiased jury, I don't bring the
case. Develop that a little bit more. Is this some--is this
a--is this some formalized process that prosecutors use?
Where did you get this from?
Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Berman, I can only speak from my
experience as a prosecutor, but I have had situations where
not my assistants, but agents, have said to me after the
discussion about the evidence and we concluded that we cannot
get a conviction, or it's likely we'd lose, ``Let's indict
him anyhow to show him.'' My response to that is, ``Get out
of my office and never come back.''
Rep. Frank. But you might try to become an independent
counsel, you might tell that person. [Laughter.]
Rep. Berman. So, then, for those who want to--let me ask
you, are there any other comments on that? Yeah.
Mr. Weld. This is written into the principles of federal
prosecution, Mr. Congressman, which is the handbook that
guides federal prosecutors. And what it says about the
charging stage of the criminal justice process is that the
prosecutor has to believe that there's sufficient admissible
evidence--admissible evidence--to obtain from a reasonable,
unbiased jury a conviction and to sustain it on appeal.
Rep. Berman. Now, as I understand, though, in the Justice--
there is a second paragraph in the Justice Department
qualification. If you are bringing in the case in the South
involving civil rights with an all-white jury and where
certain practices were prevalent, you wouldn't refuse to
bring that case against some crimes against a black victim
simply because your fears in the 1960s or '50s that an all-
white jury might never convict. But--so if that's the--you
wouldn't--that wouldn't cause you to stop bringing in the
case, I assume.
Mr. Weld. That's why it says ``reasonable and unbiased.''
Rep. Berman. Right. And, of course, so you'd have to
conclude here that the United States Senate, by conclusion,
you'd have to reach a conclusion that they were somehow not a
reasoned and unbiased jury to apply that logic in this
situation.
Mr. Noble. May I just respond? And let me quote you from
the Department of Justice guidelines, because they use
precisely that example to make that point. And they say, and
I quote:
``For example, in a civil rights case or a case involving
an extremely popular political figure, it might be clear that
the evidence of guilt viewed objectively by an unbiased fact-
finder would be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction
if the prosecutor might reasonably doubt whether the jury
would convict. In such a case, despite his or her negative
assessment of the likelihood of a guilty verdict based on
factors extraneous to an objective view of the law and the
facts, the prosecutor may properly conclude that it is
necessary and desirable to commerce or recommend prosecution
and allow the criminal process to operate in accordance with
its principles.''
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.
Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, I have an observation and then a question for
Governor Weld.
I have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the
premise of this panel, which is that the President should be
considered, quote, ``an ordinary citizen.'' And therefore I
disagree with their conclusion.
To me, the president has a special responsibility that goes
beyond that of an ordinary citizen.
He holds the most powerful position in the world. He is the
number one law enforcement official of our country. He sets
an example for us all. Other people in other positions of
authority, such as a business executive or a professional
educator or a military officer, if they had acted as the
President is alleged to have acted, their careers would be
over, and yet they don't hold near the position of authority
that the President does.
Let me read a statement from the rules under which
President Nixon was tried for impeachment. It says, ``The
office of the President is such that--the office of the
President is such that it calls for a higher level of conduct
than the average citizen in the United States.'' Because of
the President's special authority, I think it makes the
charges against him more serious, and therefore, in my
judgment, at least, demands that any punishment be more
severe. the way there, let me compliment you for offering a
well thought-out alternative to impeachment. And that's
not to say I agree with it; it's just a well though-out
alternative, I think.
I want to read a couple of statements from students at
Roxbury Latin School, which is, I'm sure you know, a school
in Boston. This was a column that appeared in the Boston
Globe that was written by their headmaster. And apparently,
he conducted a couple of school forums, and these are for
students aged 12 to 18, and suggested to the students that
they accept the president's statement of regret. He said,
``They would have none of it,'' and then he generalized their
reactions, which I want to read. And these are quotes.
``You've got to be kidding. This wasn't some one-time lapse
in the face of sudden and unexpected temptation. The
president did this over and over, plotting meetings with
Monica Lewinsky in the White House, including one on Easter
just after he was pictured coming out of church, Bible in
hand.''
``Clinton lied passionately, looking us in the eye; then he
played word games; but he never told the truth until he was
caught.''
``Cheating by students usually results in suspension.
Repeat cheating brings expulsion. Clinton cheated repeatedly.
The only difference is that Clinton is a lot older than we
are, supposedly a lot wiser, and he holds the highest public
office there is.''
``Maybe we're naive, but people our age want to look up to
the president. What we see when we look at Clinton is someone
who can't control himself and lies to his fellow citizens.''
End quote.
Governor Weld, aren't those students generally right in
their assessment?
Mr. Weld. Well, Mr. Congressman, I don't think anybody's
saying this is a day at the beach or a walk in the park. This
is not a strong outing by the president, and I find those
statements as depressing as you do. And as I was discussing
with Mr. Coble a moment ago, if that kind of attitude and
reaction had persisted in the citizenry at large----
Rep. Smith. I understand your answer, and I appreciate it.
Thank you very much.
I'll yield back the balance of my time.
Rep. Hyde. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Boucher.
Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA). Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
I would like to join with you and the other members who
have congratulated this panel on what I think is the very
excellent presentation this morning. And I would like to join
in the welcome of these distinguished witnesses here.
Mr. Weld, I was very interested in your statement, with
which I would wholly concur, that the intent of the
impeachment power was to protect the public interest, and
that the standard that Congress should apply in determining
whether acts of the President constitute impeachable conduct
is the public interest; and your further statement that
impeachment should not be deemed to be punishment for that
individual misconduct, that the punishment can occur in the
regular course.
You cited the constitutional provision that says that for
any crimes that are committed during the tenure of the
presidency, the president can be indicted and tried, just as
any other American.
I gather, however, from the thrust of the testimony of this
panel of witnesses, that perjury prosecutions in civil
actions are rarely undertaken. I gather also that perjury
prosecutions generally, while undertaken on occasion, are not
the first resort of prosecutors in most cases. But in this
particular instance, there is yet another avenue in which the
president potentially could be sanctioned for any misconduct
that may have occurred in his testimony under oath, and that
is in the U.S. district court in Arkansas, which had
jurisdiction of the Jones case.
It has been suggested by a number of witnesses to this
committee that that judge retains jurisdiction even though
the case itself
[[Page H11990]]
has now been formally dismissed by the eighth circuit court
of appeals; that if she decides it is appropriate to do so,
that she could impose sanctions based on any misconduct that
may have occurred in the deposition that was taken in her
court.
I would like the opinion of these witnesses with regard to
whether or not that is an accurate statement of the
jurisdictional posture of that case. Does she have the
jurisdiction to do that? And based on your very extensive
experience with regard to criminal prosecutions, do you think
there is a probability or likelihood, or how would you rate
the chances that if she deems that misconduct occurred there
that she might be led to take actions and impose some
sanction? That might be the more probable way in which some
sanction occurs, as opposed to a criminal prosecution. So who
would like to answer? I'll ask you first, Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan. There is, under the United States Supreme
Court decisions, inherent power in the district court in
civil cases to impose sanctions for misconduct occurring
before the court. So there's no question about that. That
case was decided several years ago.
Your second part was, what would happen if she were to do
this? Not having brought my crystal ball with me, I can't
tell you. But she does have that power to pursue that, so far
as I know. I do not know whether the dismissal of the case
terminates that power. That's an issue I really haven't
looked at.
Rep. Boucher. Does anyone else have a comment on that
issue? Let me ask this additional question. Mr. Noble, I was
very interested in your saying that this Congress should
consider, in deciding whether or not to vote articles of
impeachment, the effect that the House voting articles of
impeachment and the Senate being put to trial would have on
the country, the further polarization that would occur, the
diversion of the President and the Congress from their
real responsibility, which is attending to our national
agenda, the potential immobilization of the Supreme Court
while the chief justice presides, the lowering of the
standard of impeachment in proceedings in future years.
I am concerned that, in fact, some members of this
Congress, not fully having considered those effects, may have
decided to apply a lower standard to determining whether or
not articles of impeachment should be approved and believe
that perhaps the House should act as a grand jury and simply
vote on probable cause. Do you agree that there ought to be a
higher standard than probable cause for us to consider this
weighty matter?
Mr. Noble. This follows on Mr. Smith's comments. It's clear
that before the public the President is not an ordinary
citizen. It's clear that before Congress the President is not
an ordinary citizen. It's clear that any rational criminal
investigator or federal agent investigating an allegation of
perjury by a president of the United States is not going to
treat it like the ordinary case. It's clear, based on
everything we've heard, that most of us believe, without
looking at specific evidence, that the President either did
perjure himself or didn't perjure himself.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. Do you have a
finishing sentence or two?
Mr. Noble. I can do it in one minute--or I'll just wait.
I'll wait.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you.
Rep. Boucher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr.
Gallegly.
Rep. Elton Gallegly (R-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. Mr.
Sullivan, for the record, do you believe that the knowing and
willful misleading of a judge or federal grand jury
represents an effort to thwart the judicial system from
discovering the truth?
Mr. Sullivan. Could you repeat the question, please?
Rep. Gallegly. Do you believe that willful misleading of a
judge or federal grand jury represents an effort to thwart
the judicial system from discovering the truth, for the
record?
Mr. Sullivan. It sounds like what you said is correct, if I
understand it.
Rep. Gallegly. [Laughs.] Thank you. You know, the evidence
indicates that the President and Mrs. Lewinsky, or Ms.
Lewinsky, had three conversations about her testifying in the
Jones case within one month before his deposition. When the
President was asked, ``Have you ever talked to Ms. Lewinsky
about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in
this lawsuit?'' he answered, ``I'm not sure.'' Governor Weld,
do you think it's reasonable--you know the president pretty
well--to believe that the President completely forgot
about these three conversations?
Mr. Weld. I really don't know, Mr. Congressman.
Rep. Gallegly. Thank you, Governor. When the president was
asked, ``At any time, were you and Monica Lewinsky together
alone in the Oval Office?'' he answered, ``I don't recall.''
The evidence indicates that he was, in fact, alone with Ms.
Lewinsky on many occasions, including the time that they
exchanged gifts less than 20 days before the deposition. Mr.
Sullivan, for this not to be perjury, the President must have
genuinely forgot his numerous encounters with Ms. Lewinsky.
Is that correct for it not to be perjury?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, the evidence in a perjury case requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant not only
made a false statement but knew it was false at the time it
was made. That's correct.
Rep. Gallegly. And if--and the test would be that he
genuinely forgot in order for that not to be perjury. Is that
correct?
Mr. Sullivan. That's my understanding.
Rep. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Sullivan. You know,
the president's action of being less than truthful has caused
and continues to cause serious problems. I'm concerned about
how his lying affects the ability of the American people to
trust the highest elected official in the land.
One of my constituents called me yesterday, a constituent
by the name of Les Savage (sp). I've never met this gentleman
before. But his question was very sincere. How do we know
when the president is telling the truth? And maybe even more
importantly, how do the leaders of other countries around the
world know when he's telling the truth?
President Clinton has had many occasions to come clean, and
to date I don't believe he has. The president's failure to
present any substantive evidence is consistent with his
obvious lack of concern about how serious the offense of
lying under oath truly is.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before
my five minutes beginning, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
Rep. Hyde. State your inquiry.
Rep. Nadler. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, a few weeks ago, when
Mr. Starr was here, in answer to a question I asked, he
referred to a court case which was then under seal, and I was
not able to characterize his--I felt myself unable to
characterize the accuracy of his statement about that case
lest I be accused of violating the seal.
A few moments ago, Mr. McCollum referred to the same court
case, which is no longer under seal, but which is within the
possession of this commmittee in executive session. Would
I be violating the confidentiality rule if I were to state
that Mr. McCollum misquoted and misstated what the court
found and that the court did not conclude that the
president's testimony about Lewinsky was material to the
Jones litigation, but rather found the truthfulness of
Monica Lewinsky's affidavit was material enough to her
motion to quash her subpoena in that case to justify the
OIC's issuance of a grand jury subpoena to her lawyer and
that this is a distinct issue from whether the president's
testimony in the Jones deposition was material to that
case? And if I were not permitted to state that, why is
Mr. McCollum permitted to quote this case?
Rep. Hyde. You will be provided with a copy of the opinion.
Rep. Nadler. But am I permitted to state this?
Rep. Hyde. Well, I'd ask you to read the opinion before you
make any statements. I'm told you have mischaracterized Mr.
McCollum's characterization.
Rep. Nadler. Well, whether I've mischaracterized it or
characterized it, since that is----
Rep. Hyde. You can say anything you want, Mr. Nadler.
Rep. Nadler. Thank you. Then I will simply----
Rep. Hyde. But I'm suggesting that you'll get a copy of the
opinion very shortly, and i'm suggesting you read it before
you make statements about it. But that's up to you. All
right, now your five minutes starts.
Rep. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
should note that I have written to the attorney general
asking that Mr. Starr be disciplined for breaking the
confidentiality of that case when he mischaracterized it two
or three weeks ago.
Let me ask Mr. Davis, I think, starting off. You stated
very carefully and clearly in your testimony that you
really--no prosecutor would prosecute a perjury case on the
basis of the evidence that we have before us from the Starr
referral, that there really holds--that it's not likely that
a jury would convict, that there is no real perjury case
there.
You said that, for example, that you wouldn't bring a
prosecution of perjury based on two conflicting statements of
two witnesses, one of whom disagrees with the other; that the
alleged corroboration that Mr. Starr cites for Monica
Lewinsky's testimony is not corroboration at all, because
that she told 10 or 11 friends of hers and relatives the same
thing, that she had a motive to embellish or falsify the
statement. And, in fact, I think law school tells us that
such a statement would be inadmissible in a court as hearsay
in prior consistent statements in any event.
I would simply--first of all, do I characterize your
testimony correctly?
Mr. Davis. Generally, yes.
Rep. Nadler. Okay. Thank you. Secondly, some people on the
other side here, have talked about the president being
impeachable, not only for perjury, but for a lesser crime,
that if perjury isn't a high crime and misdemeanor and a
great offense threatening the safety of the republic, that
maybe false statements under oath are.
Would the same or similar constraints prevent a successful
prosecution under these circumstances, with this evidence of
false statements under oath, as would prevent a successful
prosecution for perjury?
Mr. Davis. Yes. I mean, the false statement under oath
section of the U.S. Code really----
Rep. Nadler. Could you speak up, please?
Mr. Davis. The false statement under oath section of the
U.S. Code will formally eliminate the so-called two witness
rule, the same
[[Page H11991]]
prosecutorial judgment would come into play in which you'd
have to assess can you win the case, and for the reasons that
I articulated before, it seems to me that with the one-on-one
testimony, and as I said, the fact that Mr. Starr would have
to disassociate himself, and criticize Ms. Lewinsky's
testimony, and say that it's not true in various regards,
would make such a prosecution, in my view, doomed to failure.
Rep. Nadler. For false statements under oath as well as for
perjury.
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Rep. Nadler. All right. So there would be no successful
prosecutions for false statements under oath, and again, to
summarize, Ms. Lewinsky is a weak witness because the Special
Prosecutor would have to point out that she lied under oath
at some other place.
Mr. Davis. Yes. And in a grand jury context, that's really
the core perjury.
Rep. Nadler. And it's further weakened by the fact that the
alleged corroboration witnesses would be inadmissible in any
court as hearsay?
Mr. Davis. Well, they would probably be, you know,
inadmissible. There may be some arguments that they could
come in at some point, depending upon cross-examination. But
the point is, whatever motive she had to falsify in the grand
jury on this----
Rep. Nadler. The same motive.
Mr. Davis [continuing]. The same motive would exist.
Rep. Nadler. So in other words, if I want to falsify or
embellish my statement, or have a fantasy, or lie, the fact
that I lied to 12 people, doesn't make it any less of a lie
than if I lied only to one person.
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Rep. Nadler. And--yes, Mr. Noble.
Mr. Noble. Yes, can I talk about that for just a moment,
because it's very important. A good prosecutor is going to
try this case with the defense theory in mind. And the
defense theory is going to be: can I prove that the president
did what she said the president did? She's going to be
impeached for every prior inconsistent statement she has. But
the person's not going to cross-examine her, and make it seem
as though her testimony was recently fabricated. Because that
way, she can bring in every prior statement.
All of us ought to worry about someone lying about us to a
thousand people and having that come in as admissible
evidence, making what we lied about the first time was true,
if the motive to lie began in the very beginning.
So, for that reason, a smart----
Rep. Nadler. Her motive did begin at the very beginning.
Mr. Noble. And her motive arguably did begin at the
beginning.
Rep. Nadler. And that applies to false statements under
oath, as well as to prejury.
Rep. Noble. That applies to false statements under oath, as
well as perjury. I tried a case, a false statement case, I
convicted it at the jury level, was reversed on appeal
because of a literal truth defense, the same defense that----
Rep. Nadler. Thank you. I have one further question, if I
can quickly get it in. Mr. Smaltz, the special prosecutor in
the Espy case, said that an indictment is as much a deterrent
sometimes as a conviction, so you might as well get it----
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
Rep. Nadler. Do you agree with that?
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Canady.
Rep. Charles Canaday (R-FL). Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I'd
like to thank you all for being here today. You've done a
good job in presenting what I believe are some of the best
arguments in defense of the president, and I understand
that's why you're here, and we appreciate your perspective on
this.
I have agreed with some of the points that have been made.
Obviously, I disagree with some of the others. But when you
talk about prosecutorial discretion, and the question that a
prosecutor has to ask about whether he can have some
expectation of winning before a jury. I think that's right.
And I think that's an appropriate way for a prosecutor to
view the case.
Now, my judgment about the facts of this case, differ from
yours, based on what I've seen today, because I think there
is compelling evidence here that points to the conclusion
that the president engaged in a pattern of lying under oath
and other misconduct.
But on the standard for prosecution, I think you've raised
some good and valid points. But I want to quarrel a little
bit with the application of that in this context. The
argument has been made that in essence, we in the House
should, in carrying out our responsibility, look to the
Senate, and make a guess about how the proceedings would turn
out in the Senate, to determine how we exercise our
responsibility under the Constitution.
I would suggest to you, I don't think that's a proper way
for us to proceed. I believe that we have an independent
responsibility, under the Constitution, to make a judgment
concerning the conduct of the president, and whether he
should be impeached or not. And it would be in derogation of
our constitutional responsibility to attempt to count noses
in the Senate. I will have to say that it's a very difficult
thing to count noses in the Senate anyway, and in a
proceeding like this, it's hard to predict the outcome.
But aside from that, I just don't think that's a proper
undertaking for us to be involved in. And I'd also point out
that the very structure of the Constitution indicates that.
In the Constitution, the framers provided that the House
could impeach with a simple majority. They provided that
conviction in the Senate would have to be by a two-thirds
majority.
Now, I would suggest to you that that structural feature of
the Constitution suggests that the framers would have
contemplated circumstances in which the House might very well
impeach, but the Senate would not convict. Now, I think
that's obvious on the face of the documents. Some of these
arguments I think have to be brought back to the text of the
Constitution and evaluated in that light.
But on this issue of prosecutorial discretion, let me pose
a scenario here, which I think is very analogous to what we
have before us. Suppose the chief executive of a Fortune 500
corporation, a major national corporation in the United
States, was accused of sexual harassment, and the corporation
had been sued--sexual harassment or any other civil rights
offense. And in the course of the discovery in that case, the
chief executive of that major national corporation lied under
oath to impede that civil rights action.
Now, I believe that the fact that the chief executive of a
major national corporation was engaged in that type of
conduct, would be a relevant consideration for the
prosecutors who were evaluating the case and whether to bring
it, because of the impact of that conduct.
Now, I do believe that bringing prosecutions have a
deterrent impact. And that is one of the considerations that
has to be factored into prosecutorial discretion.
So, I think if we step back from this situation--and again,
we can argue about the weight of the facts, and I understand
you disagree with the evaluation some of us may have made
about the weight of the facts here. But if the president of
the United States did engage in obstruction of justice, and
committed multiple acts of lying under oath, I think that we
have to look at that conduct, in light of the consequences
that it has, and the message it sends, just as we would look
at the conduct of the chief executive of a major national
corporation who was the defendant in a civil rights case
brought against that corporation.
So, I think that's something to look at. There's really not
time for you to respond. But do you disagree, that that sort
of high-profile case has to be evaluated in light of those
circumstances?
Mr. Dennis. I think there's one point on this. I mean, the
analogy isn't quite there. I think if you were looking at
the--a president of a Fortune 500 corporation, you'd be
talking about a suit that was brought by, perhaps, someone
prior to them taking that position and----
Rep. Canady. Oh, no! No, no, absolutely not. He could have
been guilty of that in the course of his conduct as chief
executive. But thank you.
Mr. Dennis. Well, I think that the issue of materiality is
one that's been discussed here. And I think that's where the
nub of it is--that the Jones matter was something prior to
the president becoming president of the United States. We
weren't talking about issues of how the president deals with
subordinates in that respect. And I think that that really
makes a huge difference in terms of how that person should be
perceived insofar as these kinds of charges.
Rep. Canady. Thank you.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
Rep. Robert Scott (D-VA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sullivan, in your prepared testimony you said that no
serious consideration would be given to a criminal
prosecution rising from an alleged misconduct and discovery
in the Jones civil case, having to do with alleged cover-up
of a sexual affair with another woman, or the follow-up
testimony before the grand jury; it simply would not have
been given serious consideration for prosecution. It wouldn't
get in the door. It would be declined out of hand.
Are you aware that we are not straight as of now as to all
of the allegations, specific allegations of perjury, that
even yesterday that gentleman from Arkansas specified in a
different statement that he believed to be perjurious? ABC
News said that the Republicans--on December 7th said the
Republicans might shy away and come up with new charges from
the grand jury. Is it fair to have an accused respond to a
perjury charge without stating with specificity what the
statement is that was false?
Mr. Sullivan. No.
Rep. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Noble, in fact-finding, is there a problem using
conflicting grand jury testimony, copies of FBI interview
sheets, and prior consistent statements in order to make a
case against an accused?
Mr. Noble. I believe there's a problem using only those
bases for making prosecutive decisions, yes.
Rep. Scott. And why is conflicting grand jury testimony and
copies of FBI interview sheets inherently unreliable as
testimony?
Mr. Noble. Because our system of justice is based on
testing the testimony of someone, under oath, in front of the
finder of fact, subject to cross-examination, and in a grand
jury that doesn't exist.
For that reason, prosecutors, at the very least, interview
the principle witnesses themselves; try to test that witness
as much as they can in terms of deciding whether or not he or
she can withstand cross examination. Otherwise, you just have
hearsay.
[[Page H11992]]
Rep. Scott. And because of that unreliability, is it--you
can't make a case just using grand jury testimony to make a
case against someone?
Mr. Noble. I say this with all due respect: only a foolish
or inexperienced prosecutor would attempt to indict and
convict someone based on hearsay grand jury testimony.
Rep. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Davis, in your testimony, on
page 13 of your prepared testimony, right at the top--you
didn't have time to go through the specifics of why the
obstruction of justice case could not be made. Could you
start at the top of page 13--I assume you have--where it
says, ``But there are--,'' draw the factor----
Mr. Davis. Yes. Another complicating factor in the
obstruction of justice case which makes this such a difficult
case to bring is the reality that the principle players in
this drama, the president, Miss Lewinsky, and Ms. Currie, had
relationships and motivations to act, wholly unrelated to the
Jones case. This kind of thing would seriously complicate the
ability of a prosecutor to establish the intent to obstruct
some official proceeding, which is required to prevail in an
obstruction of justice case.
Examples: The job search began before Miss Lewinsky was on
the witness list, and frankly, there's nothing surprising
that someone who had an illicit relationship with a woman
would, when it was over, be willing and want to help her to
get a job in another city. Ms. Currie had her own
relationship with Miss Lewinsky. People who have an illicit
relationship often understand that they will lie about it
without regard to the existence of a litigation and here it
appears that such an understanding was discussed prior to
Miss Lewinsky being identified as a potential witness.
The evidence, you know, about retrieval of the gifts is
contradictory, with Ms. Currie and the president offering
versions of the events which exculpate the president and
which differs from Miss Lewinsky's testimony, and Miss
Lewinsky herself provided varying and sometimes exculpatory
interpretations of these very events in terms of her
testimony.
These are the kinds of things that make winning a case--and
I do think when you're talking about----
Rep. Scott. Let's--do you have the next paragraph, which I
think you can get in?
Mr. Davis. And the reality that at the time of the
president's conversation with Ms. Currie in the immediate
aftermath of his civil deposition, Ms. Currie was not a
witness in any proceeding. And given the status of the Jones
case, there was no reason to believe that she ever would be,
and that the president was likely focusing on the potential
public relations repercussions from his relationship.
You know, it isn't a question, I must say, of counting
votes in the Senate. The issue is in thinking through the
standard of whether to proceed at the House level, whether
you think you have adequate evidence to prevail. So you are
making the judgment.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair will declare a 10-minute recess, and it--and I
mean it, that it's 10 minutes! [Laughter.] Please come back.
Mr. ?. We won't move. [Laughs.]
Rep. Hyde. Thank you. Well, you're entitled to move; that's
why I'm calling the recess.
[A 10-minute recess is taken.]
Rep. Hyde. The committee will reconvene.
I must say, the panel looks refreshed. That's good.
Mr. ?. On behalf of the panel, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Mr. Watt, the gentleman from North Carolina.
Rep. Melvin Watt (D-NC). Mr. Inglis was next.
Rep. Hyde. All right, Mr. Inglis is next.
Rep. Bob Inglis (R-SC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank the panel for being here.
Mr. Sullivan, if this case, the facts of this case ever
resulted in a prosecution of Bill Clinton after leaving the
White House, would any of what we've heard this morning be
admissible as a fact in a case involving the prosecution of
Bill Clinton, the private citizen? Any of your testimony,
would any of that be admitted as a fact in that case?
Mr. Sullivan. On, no. Absolutely not.
Rep. Inglis. Would anything that anyone else has said here
this morning be admitted as a fact in that case?
Mr. Sullivan. Absolutely not.
Rep. Inglis. I'm keeping score, Mr. Chairman, as you know.
So this makes panel 4, Mr. Craig, the fourth panel--no facts.
And Mr. Craig said yesterday to us, ``In the course of our
presentation today''--that was yesterday--``and tomorrow''--
that's today--``we will address the factual''--underlined
factual--``and evidentiary issues directly.'' The score now
is zero to four; zero panels, zero witnesses dealing with
facts. Everybody that we've heard from in these four panels
has given conclusions, has given legal opinions. Not a single
person has presented a fact.
Mr. Sullivan, would a memorandum of law be considered a
fact in trial?
Mr. Sullivan. Not unless the--normally no, if the issue
arose out of that. But no.
Rep. Inglis. Right. Unless the memorandum of law itself was
an issue. Then it could be a fact, correct?
Mr. Sullivan. Right. Right.
Rep. Inglis. So this 184-page document--it really, I think,
can only be described as a memorandum of law, possibly a
brief--contains no facts--no facts in the case before us
today.
Mr. Sullivan. It's similar to the Starr report in that
regard. They're about equal. [Laughter.] I mean, they do deal
with the facts, but there are no witnesses that you've heard
to testify directly about the facts, whereas in a trial the
people would have to appear and give their testimony
personally.
Rep. Inglis. Right.
Mr. Sullivan. Yeah.
Rep. Inglis. Well, of course, the difference, would you
have to concur with me, is the Starr report is based on sworn
testimony gathered by an independent counsel, which are the
same facts that I guess are discussed here. It's just that
there you have a direct quotation of those facts and a
summary of those facts. Is that correct?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. And I think that the White House
submission, although I have not read all of it, I've read
part of it--the part I read did deal in great detail with a
great many of the facts, including a lot of the facts that
are not highlighted in the Starr report.
Rep. Inglis. Right. But none of those are facts in a case,
and the point that I'm making is that, again, Mr. Craig
yesterday made a very high bar for him to get over.
And the thing that I find wonderful about these proceedings
is that for the--really, it's a rare opportunity to bring
accountability to the White House spin machine. What happens,
I think, with the spin machine is the reporters get worn
down. They get tired of trying to pursue it, so they just
accept it. But here we have accountability.
Yesterday Mr. Craig said that in the course of the
presentation, we will address the factual evidentiary issues
directly. The score is zero to four; zero of these panels,
Mr. Craig, have addressed facts. All of them are doing what
the other panels have done in times past. In other words,
here again, very helpful discussion--I appreciate the time of
all these witnesses, but there's nothing new here, no new
facts, no new evidentiary issues that have been addressed
directly. And once again we do have that the president was--
had personally instructed you not to obscure the simple moral
truth. But all this 184-page document is, is more of the
hairsplitting, more of the legal technicalities that are so
maddening in what the president has to say to us. That's what
the 184 pages is.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
Rep. Melvin Watt (D-NC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We got a 445-page referral from independent counsel Starr.
Is there anything in that 445 pages that in that form would
be admitted in a criminal case.
Mr. Sullivan. No.
Rep. Watt. So I suppose that what Mr. Inglis is talking
about is the same thing that--what we've been talking about
all along. We keep waiting on some facts to be developed
here, and without that development, the score remains zero to
zero, I take it, with the presumption of innocence being in
favor of the president.
Mr. Noble, you had a response?
Mr. Noble. Yes, I would like to respond to the previous
congressman's comments.
Rep. Watt. Before you go there, let me----
Mr. Noble. But the direct response to your comment, and
that is, if it was a trial and the prosecution presented no
admissible evidence, zero, not guilty, there would be no
defense case.
Rep. Watt. That's right.
Okay. Now that brings me to the point that I wanted to
make, because I got a call from--everybody seems to be
getting calls from constituents; I got mine last week from a
constituent who started out by saying that the president was
engaging in a legal attempt to distinguish what he had said
in some way. And I reminded the caller that this in fact is a
legal proceeding that we are involved in. Is there anybody on
this panel that disagrees with that? (No audible response.)
Okay.
So the standards that are applicable in a legal proceeding,
Mr. Sullivan, you referred to that--on the first page of your
testimony you said, ``The topic of my testimony is
prosecutorial standards under which cases involving alleged
perjury and obstruction of justice are evaluated by
responsible federal prosecutors.'' I take it that you are
equating this panel to responsible federal prosecutors and
what you're saying, I guess--I take it from your testimony
this morning, is if a responsible federal prosecutor
wouldn't prosecute this case, then we ought not be moving
it along to the Senate--or to the House floor. Is that--is
that the essence of where you come down?
Mr. Sullivan. I'm not sure I would presume on the--that
issue of what your responsibility is. I'm only saying that
since your judgment here is high crimes and misdemeanors--
that's the test--in my opinion, a responsible federal
prosecutor would not bring a case based on these charges in
the Starr report. Now, you can draw whatever conclusions you
wish politically from that conclusion.
Rep. Watt. All right. So, Mr. Noble, what would be your
response to that, and in the context of what some of my
Republican colleagues on the committee have suggested ought
be the standard under which we are evaluating this evidence?
Mr. Noble. I believe that--and I'm not one--I was not
elected by anyone, not by prosecutors or by citizens, to
comment. But
[[Page H11993]]
my best advice would be that there's a lesson to be learned
from the Justice Department. The parallels are quite
striking. In the Justice Department, before bringing a
criminal prosecution, the hurdle is very low--probable cause.
However, before getting a conviction, you need proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Here, in order for it to get voted out of this House,
you'll need a majority. However, in order for a conviction to
occur, you need two-thirds of the Senate. I believe you ought
to look and think about what a rational, fair-minded senator
would do, how he or she would vote. If you conclude they
would not convict, think about the precedent you would have
set if after two, three, four, five, six, seven impeachments
and no convictions. You would not restore public confidence;
if anything, you will have started to undermine public
confidence in the impeachment proceedings.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
Rep. Robert Goodlatte (R-VA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Mr. Goodlatte, would you yield to me for just a
question?
Rep. Goodlatte. Sure.
Rep. Hyde. Maybe, Mr. Sullivan----
Rep. Watt. Mr. Chairman, on whose time are we operating?
Rep. Hyde. Pardon? [Off mike response.] I'm sorry. I asked
staff to do that, and sometimes they forget. They're
enchanted by my question. [Laughter.]
Rep. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you.
The question I was going to ask, when someone is granted
immunity, as Ms. Lewinsky was done, is it customary--and of
course we could get the answer by looking at the immunity
agreement--but is it customary that they are obliged to tell
the truth thereafter, and if they lie or tell a falsehood
about some substantial issue that they forfeit their
immunity? Is that the custom?
Mr. Sullivan. There are two kinds of immunity. But the
normal immunity--and I haven't seen her agreement--is what's
called ``use immunity'' which means that any testimony that
she gives that is not truthful could be used against her in a
subsequent perjury prosecution. If she gets ``transactional
immunity'' she's entirely free. But that's not normally the
case; it's usually use immunity. However, in my experience,
when the federal prosecutors give use immunity to a witness,
it is--I don't like to say never happens, because that's
usually wrong, but I just don't know of a case in which
they've brought prosecution for perjury.
Rep. Hyde. I think the thing to do is to see what the
agreement held.
Mr. Sullivan. Right. But generally, the agreement requires
truthful testimony--
Rep. Hyde. Right.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. And you are subject to perjury
prosecution if you do not give truthful testimony.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
I thank you, Mr. Goodlatte.
Rep. Goodlatte. Gentlemen, welcome.
Governor Weld, when you were governor of Massachusetts, if
you were convicted of a felony that was serious that included
jail time, what would happen to you as governor of the state
of Massachusetts?
Weld. I think you're out automatically, but I never got
close enough to the border to focus on that question--
[Laughter]--Mr. Congressman.
Rep. Goodlatte. We hope not. We hope not. But the point is,
I think that's true not only in Massachusetts, but in
virtually every other state in the country, that if the chief
executive is convicted of a felony, that they are
automatically removed from office. And I do have the
annotated laws of Massachusetts here in front of me, and that
is exactly what they provide.
In addition, it's my understanding that you would not be
exempt from prosecution during the time that you served as
governor. In other words, the prosecution could go forward,
you could be tried and convicted during that time, unlike the
prevailing opinion with regard to the President of the United
States.
Mr. Weld. Well, sure. I think that's true.
Rep. Goodlatte. And if that were to occur, that would be a
serious disruption of your duties as governor of
Massachusetts, to go through a--what could conceivably be a
lengthy trial. But nonetheless, the laws of that state and
virtually every other state, provide for that to be done to
protect the public trust and the interest of the public in
not having someone with a serious charge and then
subsequently a felony conviction serving in the office of
highest trust of that state. Is that correct?
Mr. Weld. That's right. That's right. Actually, one of the
reasons I resigned in '97 was because the Mexico
ambassadorship was taking up so much of my time I didn't
think it was fair to the people to continue drawing a full
salary. So a lengthy criminal proceeding would be problematic
also.
Rep. Goodlatte. Now, also, if the judgment against he
governor is reversed at a later time, the governor can be
restored to that position according to Massachusetts law
unless it is so expressly ordered by the terms of a pardon.
The President of the United States has the power to pardon,
and the prevailing opinion is that the president can pardon
himself. Are we all in agreement that the likelihood of any
kind of subsequent prosecution of this case, regardless of
your opinions of the merits, is not going to take place
because of the reality of the circumstances, that either for
practical reasons after the president leaves office or
because he could bestow a pardon upon himself that that would
take place?
Mr. Weld. Well, I can't imagine the president pardoning
himself, Mr. Congressman.
When I said I thought that the post-term risk was low,
that's because of my assessment of the merits of the
prosecution case.
Rep. Goodlatte. Be nonetheless, he has that power, and the
Constitution is very explicit about the one exception to the
use of that power, and that is in circumstances where the
president is impeached. He cannot then pardon himself and
restore himself to office as a result of impeachment,
obviously.
Mr. Noble, in my last question, if I may, would you be able
to keep your job as professor of law at New York University
if these charges were brought forward before you and made
known to the public and to your employer?
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
Rep. Goodlatte. The activities that we know the president--
--
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Noble, you don't have to answer
that, because time is up.
[Remarks off mike.]
Rep. Conyers. Could he answer it if he wanted to?
Rep. Sensenbrenner. I think so. [Mild laughter.]
Rep. Conyers. Okay.
Mr. Noble. I can't even imagine me being accused of
anything along these lines. [Laughter.]
Rep. Goodlatte. Professor Noble, I can't imagine your being
accused of anything as heinous as this, either, but
nonetheless, I think you would agree that you would not be
able to hold that position.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Thank you. The gentlewoman from
California, Ms. Lofgren.
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA). I am someone who believes that the
issue before the Congress is whether behavior of the chief
executive is so severely threatening to our Constitutional
system of government that it requires us to undo the popular
will of the people and remove the executive and go through
that trauma--that that's the issue that faces us.
However, not every person is analyzing this in the same
way, the appropriate way. There are some who say that lying
about sex, although deplorable, is not enough to impeach, but
it's the crime that causes them to think that there ought to
be an impeachment. Unfortunately for the president, there's
no forum, really, to address the issue--to defend against
allegations of crime. People say, well, those are
technicalities, but that's what the criminal law is all
about.
I've been thinking about my old, my late professor, Graham
Douthwaite (sp), my crimes professor, who told us all that in
order to convict of a crime you had to prove every element of
a crime, and that, necessarily becomes technical. And in the
case of perjury you have to have the person under oath and it
has to be a statement about a material fact in the case and
it has to be an unambiguous question, and it has to be a
knowingly false answer, and it has to be actually false and
it has to be competent evidence for all of those elements, to
get a conviction.
For example, I recently--and I'm not arguing this case, but
I read an article in the Legal Times and also the American
Lawyer Today that points out that the president was
probably--well, he was not under oath when he testified
before the grand jury because the oath was administered by an
officer who did not have the capacity to administer the oath,
to wit, a prosecutor. And there is a case on that, U.S. v.
Doshen (sp) that requires that in such a case, the case must
be dismissed. So if it was not William Clinton but John Smith
in court, any courtroom in America, that case of perjury
would have to be dismissed. It's a technicality, but that's
what the criminal law is about.
I went home this weekend and asked a friend who is a deputy
district attorney whether a conviction could be had in this
case, and the answer I got was, no way, this could never
yield a conviction if it were John Smith.
And so I'm wondering, Mr. Sullivan, could you help the
American people who have had the benefit of not going to law
school to understand and to appreciate why we have these
technicalities, and why it could be possible, if it was John
Smith in court, to sday something was obviously, you know,
misleading but it would not yield actually a criminal
conviction? How could that be, and what's the point of that,
Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. The law has raised very, very high barriers
against any citizen being convicted of a crime, the
presumption of innocence. We have it in the United States. It
is not common throughout the world. We are very privileged in
many ways, and this is one of them.
In perjury cases, you must prove that the person who made
the statement made a knowingly false statement. Now, where I
think the defect in this prosecution is, among others--and I
don't think it would be brought, because it's ancillary to a
civil deposition--is to establish that the president knew
what he said was false. When he testified in his grand jury
testimony, he explained what his mental process was in the
Jones deposition, and he said the two definitions that would
describe oral sex had been deleted by the trial judge from
the definition
[[Page H11994]]
of sexual relations and I understood the definition to mean
sleeping with somebody.
I don't want to get to particular here.
Rep. Lofgren. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. But that is were the case, in my opinion,
wouldn't go forward even if you found an errant prosecutor
who would want to prosecute somebody for being a peripheral
witness in a civil case that had been settled. That's my
answer to that.
Rep. Lofgren. Let me ask you, Mr. Nobel. You're an evidence
professor. It's been all sorts of--oop, my time is up. Well,
perhaps someone else can ask you about hearsay. And I will
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. I thank the gentleman from California
for watching the red light.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Buyer.
Rep. Steve Buyer (R-IN). I would like to respond to this
frivolous argument about the oath that we just now heard. The
president's deposition oath was administered in a civil
deposition by Judge Susan Webber Wright, according to the
court reporter who recorded the deposition. The Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 28 specifies three types of persons before
who depositions may be taken within the United States; before
an officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the
United States or place--or of the place where the examination
is held, or before a person----
Rep. ?. Will the gentleman yield?
Rep. Buyer. No, I will not.--or before a person appointed
by the court to administer oaths and take testimony.
There is no dispute that Judge Wright has the authority to
give the oath in the civil deposition.
Note also in addition 5 U.S.C. 2903 provides, quote, ``an
oath authorized or required under the laws of the United
States may be administered by the vice president or an
individual authorized by local law to administer oaths in
that state, district, or territory, or possession of the
United States where an oath is administered.''
Now before the grand jury, Rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules
provides that the foreperson of the grand jury, quote,
``shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations,
and shall sign all indictments,'' end quote. This does not
mean that the foreperson is the only person who administers
oaths in the grand jury. In the District of Columbia, a
notary public could administer an oath and affirmation. In
the president's grand jury testimony, the oath was
administered by the court reporter/notary public, who's
authorized to administer oaths by the federal law and
District of Columbia. The District of Columbia Code provides
that a notary public shall have the power to administer oaths
and affirmations. That's Chapter 8, D.C. Code 1-810.
I have a question for you, Mr. Noble, with regard to----
Rep. Scott. Mr. Chairman, could--was the reading off--from
a document?
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Time belongs to the gentleman from
Indiana.
Rep. Scott. Well, if he was reading off a document, we'd
like to see what he was reading.
Rep. ? [Off mike.]
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman from
Indiana. He will proceed.
Rep. Buyer. Mr. Noble, with regard to prosecutorial
discretion, I was pleased to hear some of your testimony. As
I am referring here to the principles of federal prosecution,
I have a series--a couple questions I'd like to ask.
Prosecutors end up having to exercise discretions a lot of
times because--sometimes there's more crime that occurs, and
you have less resources, so you have to exercise good
judgment. Is that correct?
Mr. Noble. That's correct.
Rep. Buyer. And there are many different factors that you
need to take into consideration, and that's why you also have
these guidelines in the federal sector, correct?
Mr. Noble. Correct.
Rep. Buyer. And one other factor that you even talked about
here today is the strength of evidence, right?
Mr. Noble. Yes, sir.
Rep. Buyer. Another factor would be--is the gravity of the
offense, correct?
Mr. Noble. That's correct.
Rep. Buyer. And the other is the deterrence, the deterrent
effect----
Mr. Noble. Correct. Correct.
Rep. Buyer [continuing]. By prosecuting or not prosecuting.
Is that correct?
Mr. Noble. Correct, yes.
Rep. Buyer. Now, in this case, when I refer to the
guidelines under the section of the nature and the
seriousness of the offense, I thing it is somewhat
informative, it says in here, it even states, ``The public
may be indifferent or even opposed to the enforcement of a
controlling statute whether on substantive grounds or because
of the history of non-enforcement or because the offense
involves essentially a minor matter of private concern.'' And
that's what you--some of you have tried to articulate here
today.
Mr. Noble. I believe I quoted that in my prepared remarks.
That's correct.
Rep. Buyer. Right. But if you go down further, it reads,
``While public interest or lack thereof deserves the
prosecutor's careful attention, it should not be used to
justify a decision to prosecute or to take other action that
cannot be supported on other grounds. Public and professional
responsibilities sometimes require the choosing of a
particularly unpopular course.'' Do you agree with that?
Mr. Noble. Again, I've quoted most of what you've said,
yes.
Rep. Buyer. Well, we've had other panels come in and
testify, and they like to cite public opinion polls. And they
say, ``Well, you know, you need to listen to public will here
and exercise, you know, sound public discretion here and go
with the polls.'' But as in the prosecution of cases, you
don't have that luxury, do you?
Mr. Noble. I believe that what one is supposed to do is try
to make one's best judgment in terms of what an unbiased
decider of fact would decide. If the public polls are deemed
to be based on unbiased opinion, then that should be
considered. But if they're deemed to be based on bias, then I
think they should be ignored.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee.
Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX). I thank the chairman very
much, and I think it is important as these days come to a
close to make all of ourselves clear.
Let me again clearly state that I find the president's
behavior unacceptable and morally wrong. But I take issue
with my colleague from South Carolina, who continues to
restate the premise that there are no new facts.
Unfortunately, what I would offer to say is there's been no
new thinking in this room, because as I read the provision
``treason and bribery and other high crimes and
misdemeanors,'' I do not hear the claim ``treason and bribery
and unfit morally.''
So we're discussing actuality apples and oranges for the
American people. That confusion causes the divide and the
inability for us to come together in a collaborative and
bipartisan manner.
I would offer to say that maybe the panel that is missing
here are spiritual leaders who might address the question of
the schoolhouse in Texas; to be able to talk about redemption
or the fact that ``no, liars are not excused and it is
wrong''; to teach parents how to teach their children; church
houses and synagogues and parishes how to lead America
morally.
But the impeachment process is not a spiritual process, it
is a process, in fact, that we must deal with one, the
farmers's intent, and as these gentlemen, who I applaud for
your presence, your intellect and your experience, have come
to answer concerns as put forward by the president's defense,
so I would like to get to what you're here for--to present
information that is relevant to the impeachment question.
That is not a spiritual question, it's not a moral question,
but we condemn morally the behavior of the president.
Now, my friends say there's no new evidence. If they would
turn to page 93 in the president's presentation, there's a
statement that say there is no evidence that the president
obstructed evidence in connection with gifts. But the point
is, the independent counsel, Mr. Starr, said the president
and Ms. Lewinsky met and discussed what should be done with
the gifts subpoenaed by Ms. Lewinsky (sic). Here, the
answer--here is Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, not ever put
forward: ``He really didn't. He really didn't discuss it.''
And so you have it where there is an absolute new fact, of
which my friends seem to reject.
Another point is, in the Paula Jones deposition, Mr.
Bennett objected to the definition this is a sexual relations
or sexual affairs. He was on the record saying, ``I think
this could really lead to confusion. I think it's important
that the record is clear. I do not want my client answering
questions not understanding exactly what these folks are
talking about.''
Another co-defendant, Danny Ferguson's lawyer said,
``Frankly, I think it's a political trick definition--the
definition, and I've told you before how I feel about the
political character of this lawsuit.''
Let me ask, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Davis and Mr. Noble, as my
time eases on, one, Mr. Davis, give the American people, most
of whom have not been charged with crime, never been inside
of a grand jury, as to what it is like; whether it ends there
with the probative value of that.
Mr. Sullivan, if you would, if you could remember the
question so I could quickly get it answered, you mentioned
the fact that it is unlikely to prosecute for these issues
for perjury. Say that again for us quickly.
Mr. Noble, do we have the authority in this proceeding not
to go foward if we don't think we have a case?
Mr. Davis, inside the grand jury room.
Mr. Davis. The grand jury is really the instrument of the
prosecutor, or they may ask some of their own questions. It
really is the agenda of the prosecutor. And what it is not is
a vehicle for getting an assessment of the credibility of
witnesses that appear there. There is no cross-examination.
It is the prosecutor's presentation and really is not
sufficient to determine what ultimately will happen in a
trial.
Rep. Jackson Lee. Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. The reason, I think, a perjury prosecution on
the sexual-relations issue would fail is that the President
has clearly explained in detail, and repeatedly, in his grand
jury testimony what his understanding of the term meant, when
he gave his testimony in the Jones case. And I do not think,
in light of the obscure definition and in light of what
happened, that it can be said that there is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did not honestly have that
interpretation.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
[[Page H11995]]
Rep. Jackson. Sorry, Mr. Noble.
Thank you.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Bryant.
Rep. Ed Bryant (R-TN). I thank the chair, and I thank the
distinguished panel.
I always want to remind those that might be watching that
this is the President's defense. And the witnesses who have
been testifying the last two days, are all called by his
lawyers to testify in his favor.
I want to commend Mr. Craig for the outstanding strategy he
has presented today. He is truly a very fine lawyer. He has
brought a defense to us today that this President should not
be impeached because he almost committed perjury, obstructed
justice, tampered with witnesses, caused someone to false
affidavit, but because he didn't actually cross that line
exactly, then he should not be impeached.
This extraordinarily talented wordsmiths, or the
extraordinarily talented wordsmiths, and people who can make
those extremely sharp distinctions for the President allow
him to redefine such words as ``sexual relationships,'' the
word ``is,'' the word ``alone'' and defend this cover-up
story with such statements that, actually in this 184-page
report, that the cover story of Monica could be that she was
delivering papers. And that's because she did, maybe two
times of the numerous times that she went there, and she said
there was a lot of truth in there.
Well, there was also a lot of lies in there, in addition to
that truth, but again, this is good wordsmanship and I have
to commend, again, the counsel for the President for the
defense that's been so crafted carefully, and say it is
consistent with the President's statement so far.
Summarizing, though, I would say that the defense of today
that he almost did these things is like saying close only
counts in horseshoes. I don't think, though, and let me say,
I think like Mr. Canady and so many others on this committee,
that I think the proof is there that he is--didn't almost
commit these offenses, that in fact, he crossed that line.
There's compelling evidence of that.
But for those who don't agree, who might accept your view,
I want to remind the people of the other witnesses who said
that you don't have to have a crime to impeach. I think
that's unanimous among all the experts who've testified, and
as a Congress, if we accept your view, I think we have to be
careful that you don't box us in to the Nixon standards or
that you don't box us in that there has to be a crime with--
and that a technical defense would escape impeachment.
I think what we have to look at and what is so important to
me was Mr. Craig's statement yesterday, admission on the part
of the President that the President, under oath, the chief
law enforcement officer, the President who appointed all of
us as U.S. attorneys, who appoints the attorney general, the
commander in chief, evades the truth, gives incomplete
answers to the truth, gives misleading testimony, and he says
it's maddening. It's maddening. I think it's sickening. I
think it's sickening that the President does this. And for us
to allow this President to do that and do damage in a civil
rights lawsuit I think is improper, and for Congress to turn
the other way and look the other side, I don't think we can
do that.
Now, we all, in the end, have to vote our conscience, but
we should not continue to hear about Nixon is the standard,
is the threshold. That's not the case. But in the end, I do
want to thank you for your able presentation. You've done,
again, what you were supposed to do as part of this
presentation. I think you've done a good job at it. But
again, I think--I would address my colleagues, let's don't
get boxed in this idea that he almost did it, in your view,
and we can't impeach. I also, again, would give the
disclaimer that I do believe he committed these crimes and I
think the evidence is there to show that. And I thank you
again.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters.
Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA). Thank you very much.
I'd like to thank our panelists for being here today. I am
extremely impressed with the way that they have used their
very limited time. And I am extremely frustrated. I would
like to see each of you take one aspect of these allegations
and present a summation about why they're not impeachable,
but this process doesn't allow for it, and you're not able to
do what you have shown you could do so well because you don't
have the time.
You're setting here with so-called legal minds and lawyers
talking about they want to impeach the President because they
are sickened by his actions, they feel his actions are
reprehensible, they don't--they feel they are
unacceptable. And we keep trying to make the case they
have a righ to feel anything they'd like to feel, but just
becasue they are sickened by this actions does not mean
they're impeachable. I don't know how we're going to get
that message through.
I think you did a fine job, Mr. Sullivan, of talking about
the state of mind of the president and why he could
rationally say that he did not have sexual relations, based
on the definitions and his belief. He did not consummate the
sexual act that he thought was central to sexual relations.
And simply because he got on television and said, ``I did not
have sexual relations,'' somehow these would-be lawyers on
this committee think that he has done something that's
impeachable.
Let's move on to the gifts, Mr. Davis. Betty Currie did not
say that she was instructed to go get gifts and burn them up
or dump them in the river. If she wanted to obstruct justice,
do you think she could not have found a better hiding place
than putting them under her bed? Would you illuminate on that
as obstruction of justice for us--just for a minute. And then
I've got one more.
Mr. Davis. I think there would be both a better hiding
place, and in terms of obstruction of justice, I think
there's also the significant issue as to the lack of evidence
as to the president's real role in that whole process, even
when you look at a lot of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, Betty
Currie's testimony, and the president's testimony.
Rep. Waters. Mr. Dennis, this business about bribery--
somehow there's an attempt to make the case that because
there were discussions about jobs, that Miss Lewinsky was
trying very much to get a lot of help from anybody she could
get it from, to get a job, that somehow there's some bribery
involved here and obstruction of justice, because they would
like to make the leap that there was an exchange of some kind
of informaiton or communication that said, ``If you give me
this job, I will not''--or an offer, ``If I get you a job,
will you not--?'' Will you help us with that?
Mr. Dennis. Well, two things I recall--one from President
Clinton's grand jury testimony, which was not challenged, I
don't believe, that issues related to her employment were
taken up long before she became a witness in ths case. It's
also my understanding that Miss Lewinsky herself denied that
there was any attempt to use help with her employment in
order to get her to testify one way or the other. I would
think that that would basically close the whole issue.
Rep. Waters. Exculpatory information that was never
presented to us----
Mr. Dennis. It's right in the record.
Rep. Waters [continuing]. In this so-called case.
Mr. Dennis. That's correct.
Rep. Waters. In addition to that, there were some
discussions about conversations with the president and Ms.
Currie about trying to remember what was said or what took
place. Is there anything in that exchange that would cause us
to move toward impeachment because the president said, ``Were
we ever alone? Do you remember what''--give us--would you
illuminate on that somewhat, Mr. Noble?
Mr. Noble. Again, it's a specific-intent crime, and the
question is, what was the president thinking when he said
this? We can look at his words and try and analyze his words.
But Ms. Currie says that she didn't believe he was trying
to influence her and that if she'd said something different
from him, if she believed something different from him, she
would have felt free to say it. So for that reason, I beliee,
you just don't have the specific intent necessary to prove
obstruction of justice with regard to the comment that you
just asked me.
Rep. Waters. Thank you very much.
Mr. Weld, someone offered that there were other people
serving time for perjury, and they gave these piddling little
numbers, despite--we have the kind of population that we have
in the country. they did not give you facts in the case of
the woman who came before us. Dr. Battalino, I think, is her
name. And I think it was not fair to use that and say to you,
``See, she was prosecuted. How can you not say the president
should be prosecuted?''
Do you know the facts of that case? If so, could you
illuminate on them?
Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Governor, you got a quick answer to that one? [Laughter.]
Mr. Weld. [Chuckles]. Saved by the bell, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Sensenbrenner. Okay. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Chabot.
Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dennis, in your statement you said, and I quote: ``I
sense an impeachment would prove extremely divisive for the
country, inflaming the passions of those who would see
impeachment as an attempt to thwart the election process for
insubstantial reasons.''
I can assure you that there are many citizens who feel just
as passionately that this president deserves to be impeached.
Would you acknowledge that that is true?
Mr. Dennis. I'm sure that passions do run in both
directions, high in both directions.
Rep. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Davis, let me quote from your opening statement as
well. You said, and I quote: ``Prosecutors often need to
assess the veracity of an `I don't recall'' ' question--or
``answer. The ability to do so will often depend on the
nature of the facts at issue. Precise times of meetings,
names of people one has met and details of conversations and
sequences of events, even if fairly recent, are often
difficult to remember.''
Let me ask you this. In your experience, is it common for
people to forget things such as whether or not they had sex
with somebody or whether or not they were alone with someone?
Just yesterday, we were presented with the president's 184-
page defense report and were told that the world ``alone'' is
a vague term unless a particular geographic space is
identified. Do you find that sort of legal hair-splitting
defense helpful? Don't you think we ought to at least be able
to
[[Page H11996]]
agree that ``alone'' means you're by yourself, not with
anybody?
Mr. Davis. I think ``alone'' in essence means that you're
by yourself; but I think that, while you don't forget that
you had sex with somebody, I think you have to go back and
look at the confusing nature of the answers. What basically
was going on, there's no question the president was trying
his best to avoid and was playing word games in his
deposition.
Rep. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Davis. He shouldn't have been doing it, and he was
doing it. The issue is, what is the legal consequences now?
And that's what we're all struggling with.
Rep. Chabot. Thank you. I think the president should set a
standard for all the citizens in this country, and I think we
all ought to be able to agree on what the word ``alone''
means.
Mr. Sullivan, in your opening statement, in discussing how
much evidence a prosecutor should have before he brings a
case to a grand jury, you stated that they should not run
cases up the flagpole to see how a jury will react. Do you
think it's responsible for a president to take a poll, to, in
a sense, run something up a flagpole to see whether or not he
ought to tell the truth or lie?
Mr. Sullivan. No.
Rep. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Noble, in your statement you said ``Members of Congress
should consider the impact of a long and no doubt
sensationalized trial, what effect that will have on the
country.'' Should we also consider what the impact that a
president committing perjury, obstructing justice, tampering
with witnesses, and getting away with it might have on the
country, particularly when that president is the chief law
enforcement officer and is sworn to uphold the laws in this
country and, in fact, is sworn and took an oath himself that
he would uphold the laws?
Mr. Noble. I believe you ought to consider whether or not
you could prove those allegations that you've just made. From
my review of the evidence, I don't believe you could prove
any of the allegations that you just articulated in front of
a jury, and I think you ought to take into account in
deciding whether or not you want to base your impeachment, as
I've read, on perjury. You can base your impeachment on
whatever you want. But if it's on perjury, I believe you
would not be able to sustain a conviction for perjury before
a jury in this country.
Rep. Chabot. Thank you very much. And I--the final time
that I have here, I think as Mr. Bryant just said, it's very
important for all of those folks that may be watching the
testimony today not to forget that these witnesses were sent
here, and I think they've done a very good job. But they're
witnesses on behalf of the president, not impartial
witnesses. They're advocates. And I think that the president
should set a standard that our kids in this country ought to
be able to look up to, and we ought to know that the chief
law enforcement officer, the president of this country, is
somebody that we can respect and who actually tells the
truth.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.
Rep. Martin T. Meehan (D-MA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, Mr. McCollum earlier referred to a case from the
United States Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia
circuit and seemed to indicate that that case, the ruling in
the case, which had been sealed, put to rest the issue of
whether or not the president's testimony was material in the
Paula Jones case. Well, it just so happens that I got a copy
of that ruling that was under seal, and this is not a ruling
on that at all. This is a ruling on a motion to quash by Ms.
Lewinsky's attorney because Ms. Lewinsky did't want to
testify. This ruling in no way, shape or manner says that the
president's testimony was material to the underlying civil
case in the Paula Jones-filed lawsuit. So just to set the
record straight, and I would ask that this be submitted for
the record that members might want to read it.
Rep. Hyde. Without objection, so ordered.
Rep. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In any event, I'm delighted to see the former Masschusetts
governor here back in the public arena--on the right side.
[Laughter.]
I heard my friend from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, talk
about the high bar over the last few days. The high bar, that
Mr. Craig has to make sure that Mr. Craig has to make sure
that he gets over that high bar, because it's a very high
bar. They're prepared to vote for impeachment of the
President of the United States on Saturday. It's the second
time we'll have a trial in the United States Senate if the
full House goes along with it. And he's talking about the
high bar that Mr. Craig has to pass, to get witnesses before
this committee to prove the president's innocence.
Now, Governor Weld, you're a former prosecutor.
I am sure that you have heard many on the other side say
that this is sort of like a grand jury proceeding.
Now, have you ever had a case where you as the prosecutor
appeared before a grand jury and gave your presentation as to
why you thought a defendant had committed crime yet called no
material witnesses--no witnesses--yet, nonetheless, you got
an indictment?
I don't subscribe to this theory, but let's assume we are
in the grand jury system. Have you----
Mr. Weld. I have had cases where the case went in through
an agent at the grand jury and a lot of the agent's testimony
would be hearsay. He would be a cumulative witness.
Rep. Meehan. But you have never had a case where you didn't
appear--where you didn't present basically a forensic case--
you never went in, said, ``We should indict this person''?
Mr. Weld. I don't think you'd get too far that way, Mr.
Congressman.
Rep. Meehan. Right.
But apparently though, Governor Weld, you do here is the
point because we haven't heard from a material witness yet.
And I hear the other side saying: ``Wait a minute. The
Democrats, the president, they haven't brought a material
witness here. They should prove the president's innocence.''
Isn't the fact of the matter in a judicial proceeding, any
judicial proceeding, that the prosecution or the person
seeking to pass that high bar has the obligation to provide
the material witnesses? Mr. Sullivan, isn't that the way our
system works?
Mr. Sullivan (?). Yes.
Mr. Davis. It clearly works and must. And indeed, I think
that the burden to proceed with an impeachment should have a
higher evidentiary threshold than the burden for a prosecutor
to bring a criminal case, because of the consequences of
impeachment--are such more important national----
Rep. Meehan. Let me go on to another instance. There is all
of this obstruction of justice that is being thrown around
here, as if we had a case of obstruction of justice.
And there is a talk about who initiated the events relative
to the gifts, who transferred the gifts? Betty Currie
testified before the grand jury that Ms. Lewinsky called her
and asked her to come over and pick up the gifts. Monica
Lewinsky claimed that Ms. Currie made the initial phone call.
Now, I know this is probably hard to believe. But one of
the Articles of Impeachment are going to be on obstruction of
justice, but this committee has never called either one of
them to try to determine what the truth is.
Now, Mr. Sullivan, have you ever heard of drafting an
Article of Impeachment where there is a conflict in the
facts, like on this particular instance, and we didn't call
either one of the witnesses to try to correct what the grant
jury testimony says?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, no, but let me----
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time ha expired. Can you answer
briefly?
Mr. Sullivan. Yeah, I can, Mr. Hyde. Even if you take what
Miss Lewinsky said when she talked to the President about
what to do with the gifts, you wouldn't have a case, because
she says he said, ``I don't know,'' or ``Let me think about
it.'' That's all. That's the total sum of what Lewinsky said
Mr. Clinton said.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Georgia. Mr. Barr. And, Mr.
Barr, would you yield to me just briefly.
Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga). Certainly.
Rep. Hyde. Mr. Davis, in law, if you have a prima facia
case, the burden then shifts to the other side to come
forward with some evidence, does it not?
Mr. Davis. Well, not really. In order--the burden in a
criminal case always remains on the prosecutor to show proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. And that burden stays with the
prosecutor from beginning to end.
Rep. Hyde. Well, I understand that, but can you be critical
of not producing witnesses when you have 60,000 pages of
under-oath testimony, deposition testimony, grand jury
testimony? Are you not entitled to take that into
consideration? And then if you reject that, if you think
that's wrong, don't you have some obligation to come forward
yourself with a scintilla--by the way, what is a scintilla?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Davis. A scintilla is very little. But I think----
Rep. Hyde. Well, don't you think you'd have an obligation
to come forth with a scintilla of evidence invalidating the
60,000 pages that the independent counsel has developed?
Mr. Davis. It's not a question of the number of pages. The
real issue is whether those pages were uncontradicted facts
is to which there's not factual issue. The problem here is
that when you have----
Rep. Barr. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to reclaim my
time. I have some matters to go over here, with all due
respect. [Laughter.]
[Cross talk.]
Rep. Rothman. Mr. Chairman, let the witness finish his
answer please.
Rep. Hyde. Well, he's been very generous, please.
Rep. Barr. Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I'd ask unanimous consent that
you be allowed to finish and Mr. Barr's time be restored.
Rep. Barr. Mr. Chairman, could we restart the clock then?
If they want to give this gentleman time to answer the
question, let him answer and then restart the time for me.
That's fine with me.
Rep. Hyde. Please, please. On nobody's time but the chair's
time, the gentleman may finish his answer. And it's not--
we'll start again with Mr. Barr. I want to be fair.
Rep. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. And I really intruded in his questioning. Go
ahead, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. I think it does depend upon what's in those
60,000 pages.
Rep. Hyde. Of course.
[[Page H11997]]
Mr. Davis. If there are conflicts that are revealed so that
there are factual issues, the issues then becomes
credibility. And credibility is important.
Rep. Hyde. Sure.
Mr. Davis. And even as Mr. Starr recognized, he didn't want
to give immunity to Miss Lewinsky unless he saw her. Of
course, actually he didn't see her. He wanted his office to
see her.
So if you're going to make credibility judgments, and as to
a number of these issues, there are credibility issues,
that's when it becomes important for the person with the
responsibility for making the decision--and that is in this
case this committee--in my view to actually test the
credibility of the witnesses.
Rep. Hyde. And of course, where there's no conflict, that
isn't an issue; isn't that so?
Mr. Davis. If there is no conflict----
Rep. Hyde. Yes, no conflict.
Mr. Davis [continuing]. Then it's a question of the
significance of what is said and understanding that.
Rep. Hyde. Right. Thank you.
Now, forgive me, Mr. Barr. I won't do that again. You'll
start all over.
Rep. Barr. [chuckles] Mr. Chairman, if you can ask
questions and then start the time for me, you can do that
anytime you want.
Rep. Hyde. All right!
Rep. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know Mr. Craig is here. And I don't know whether he is
delighted or dismayed by the panel today, because after
promising us yesterday that we would not be hearing
technicalities and legalities, that's all we hear today. And
that's fine. We have a panel of very distinguished criminal
attorneys here, and that is the essence of criminal law,
finding clever ways to parse words and definitions, and so
forth, and determine why certain principles don't apply, and
I understand that.
But we really have gone, Mr. Chairman, today from the
technical to the absurd. From the technical, we have lawyers
here that would apparently agonize greatly over a definition
of ``sexual relations'' that is very, very broad, uses terms
that are deliberately broad to encompass a whole range of
activities--using the term ``any person''. Now, to Mr.
Sullivan, ``any person'' may not mean any person, but I think
to the average person of common sense it would. So we still
have this legal, technical parsing over definitions and words
that really leaves us precisely where we were before Mr.
Craig made a promise yesterday that we would have no more
technicalities and legalities to hang our hats on.
We have gone then to the absurd, Mr. Chairman, and that is
the preposterous presumption or scenario that the president,
in talking with Ms. Currie the day after he gave his grand
jury testimony--or his testimony in his deposition before the
court, was really acting as her attorney. Because according
to Mr. Sullivan, it is entirely proper for an attorney to go
over somebody's testimony in advance of that testimony to
make sure that it fits. I don't think the president was
contemplating serving as her attorney, nor do I think that
Ms. Currie was contemplating hiring the president for that
purpose.
Therefore, we'd have to look elsewhere, and the elsewhere
is that he was trying to coach her and that fits within the
definition, in the statute, of tampering.
For those on this panel, all of whom have tremendous and
very noted experience in dealing with criminal law, many
including dealing with very serious drug cases, I would ask
them rhetorically, since they seem so enamored of the
propriety of evasive and crafty answers being the tools in
trade of an attorney, why they would find it interesting--or
maybe they wouldn't--that the acting deputy administrator of
the Drug Enforcement Administration--for whom, I would
presume, you would all agree it is important to have agents
testifying in court, testify truthfully--why that deputy
administrator believed it necessary on September 15th of this
year in a memo to all DEA personnel admonishing them--and
I've never seen a memo like this before--admonishing them,
quote, ``Evasive or craftily worded phrases, testimony or
documents designed to omit or distort key facts are similarly
unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Making false
statements in any matter or context is completely
unacceptable and will not be tolerated.''
That, I think, Mr. Noble--and I noticed you did not answer
the specific question put to you, by, I think it was my
colleague and another former U.S. attorney, Mr. Bryant--that
is why this case is so important. Not necessarily that we
know for a fact that there are DEA agents out there
developing crafty or evasive answers to be used in court, but
apparently the head of one of our preeminent law enforcement
agencies, because of the president, the chief law
enforcement officer, using crafty and evasive answers in
court before judges, because that sets a certain standard.
That is why it's important that we are here today, that is
why it's important why we're here today, not to argue over
the technicalities, niceties and legalities of whether or not
a specific case of perjury can be made, but because of the
damage that is already being done to our law enforcement by
having a president who excels at evasive and crafty answers
that, in the case of the average DEA agent, would be
unacceptable, would get them thrown out of court and probably
cashiered from the government. That's why this is important,
and Mr. Craig, shame on you for putting together a panel here
of technicalities and legalities when you promised us
yesterday there'd be no more of that.
[Groans, faint applause.]
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
would appreciate no demonstrations, although we've had them,
but we can get along better without them.
Mr. Delahunt.
Rep. Bill Delahunt (D-MA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I want to speak to the issues of technicalities
and legalities and what have you because I think it's
important, when we speak about the rule of law, oftentimes
we're talking about technicalities and questionable
legalities because it's embedded in our constitution that
there are certain standards and requirements. Is that a fair
statement, Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, and it's----
Rep. Delahunt. This is not about technicalities.
Mr. Sullivan. It is--in response to what Mr. Barr said, and
somewhat----
Rep. Delahunt. Mr. Sullivan, I'm just going to speak to you
because I want to have a little----
Mr. Sullivan. It is interesting to me because in my
experience, persons who make such statements, when they
become the subject or the object of investigation----
Rep. Delahunt. Correct.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Are the first ones to get the
mantle of the constitutional protections, wrap them around
them----
Rep. Delahunt. Right, and start yelling about
technicalities and legalities.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Insisting on their rights. And
you don't hear that kind of a speech from them anymore when
they hire me to defend them; I can guarantee you that.
[Laughter.]
Rep. Delahunt. Right. Thank you.
Let's talk about perjury. To evade is not to perjure, is
it, Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. No.
Rep. Delahunt. To obfuscate is not to perjure.
Mr. Sullivan. No.
Rep. Delahunt. To be non-responsive is not to perjure
either; it's not a crime, is it?
Mr. Sullivan. No, it is not. The definition of perjury and
the proof required to prove perjury is very specific, very
technical, and properly so.
Rep. Delahunt. Right. However it might be maddening, it
might be frustrating, it might not be right, it might very
well be immoral, but it's not a crime.
Mr. Sullivan. The criminal code is not enacted to enforce a
code of morality.
Rep. Delahunt. You know, I was listening to my friend from
Tennessee, Mr. Bryant, and I thought his comments were
interesting. You know, the ``almost did it'' theory. You
know, I don't think he and I disagree all that much. I do
think, however, that there are ways to deal with a president
who has evaded, who has been non-responsive and who has
obfuscated the truth. And I suggest that there are
alternatives that are open to this Congress to deal with that
particular issue.
You know, I think it was Mr. Chabot that raised the issue
about recollection and forgetfulness. You're all experienced
trial lawyers. We know as human beings that memories--people
can answer in good faith and memories can fail.
Is that a fair statement, Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. Of course it is.
Rep. Delahunt. Well, I just want to submit this for the
record, because hearing the issue being raised yesterday or
several days ago, I went back to the testimony that was
provided by Kenneth Starr. And according to my review, the
independent counsel expressed difficulties in recalling
information at least 30 times during the course of his
testimony. And it's fully detailed here, and I want to submit
it, Mr. Chairman, for the record.
Rep. Hyde. Without objection, may be received.
Rep. Delahunt. You know, I think it's important to--also to
note that credibility is an issue here, Mr. Davis. It's a
real issue. And I think it's important to note too that the
majority, represented by Mr. Schippers, has acknowledged that
in their report to this committee.
I'm going to read to you his statement. ``Monica Lewinsky's
credibility may be subject to some skepticism. At an
appropriate stage of the proceedings, that credibility will,
of necessity, be assessed, together with the credibility of
all witnesses in the light of all the other evidence.''
I would suggest that it's an obligation of this committee
to make that assessment before we proceed?
Mr. Davis. I believe it is, because you're the people who
have to be comfortable that there is sufficient evidence to
establish what is put in a piece of paper----
Rep. Delahunt. Miss Lewinsky has on numerous occasions
lied, if you have read the--if you accept the transmittal by
Mr. Starr.
Mr. Davis. I think Mr. Starr's transmittal references that.
Rep. Delahunt. And earlier Mr. McCollum talked about nine
corroborative witnesses. My memory of the Starr communication
is that she told different stories to different people.
Mr. Davis. I think they're set out there, and as I said
before, it's also just the same--if she had a preconception
or motivation to tell a false statement in the grand jury, it
was the same with those people, in any event.
[[Page H11998]]
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.
Rep. Bill Jenkins (R-TN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me say to this panel, thanks. Mr. Chairman, I
regard this as a very able panel, and I suppose you saved,
Mr. Craig, the best till last, a very bright panel.
And I certainly--I feel like I would be unarmed to get
engaged in any mental gymnastics with any member of the
panel.
But you've all announced that you're here as witnesses, not
advocates. You are advocates in a sense as witnesses. And I
suppose the tendency for all of us who practice law or been
judges is to get back in the arena.
The last two or three panel members I think have gone in
the direction that we need to continue to go in. They've
talked about getting away from legalistics, talked about
getting away from lawyer talk, and talked about talking about
things that the American public would understand. Now, I've
got a question along those lines. I'd like to ask Mr.
Sullivan.
Mr. Sullivan, you testified that you have read from the
president's deposition that he had denied that he had sex
with somebody based on the interpretation of sex----
Mr. Sullivan. In the grand jury testimony.
Rep. Jenkins [continuing]. In the grand jury testimony.
Mr. Sullivan. Right. The grand jury testimony about his
deposition testimony.
Rep. Jenkins. And you commented that you thought the
president's interpretation was reasonable. Is that----
Mr. Sullivan. No. No, I said it is not--yeah, I think it's
a reasonable interpretation, and that it was--he insists that
that is his interpretation. And it seemed to me, given the
necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he thought
he was telling a lie, that you could not make a criminal case
against him.
Rep. Jenkins. Well, now, this is a solemn matter, and I
want to keep it that way. But for those people across this
land who are viewing this, now, I want to ask you if--you've
come down here and testified. And actually what--when it
comes down, when you pull the shuck back and look at the
corn, what you're asking the American people to believe is
that we've got a guy down at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue who's
smart enough to get himself elected, who's smart enough to
serve as President of the United States, and he doesn't know
what sex is.
Mr. Sullivan. No, I'm not suggesting that at all. It's
absolutely not what I'm saying. I have said it three or four
times. The judge in the Jones case gave a specific definition
of the term ``sexual relations.'' She deleted two sentences
that specifically read on, as the patent lawyers say, oral
sex. The president said in his mind that took oral sex out of
it, and that what was left was, we would call it normal
sexual intercourse. And he said ``That is the definition I
was responding to.'' Now, you can say ``That's silly, that's
ridiculous, I don't believe it,'' but that's what he says.
And it seems to me that if you were to bring this as a
criminal case with that background in mind and what was left
in that definition, you can't make a case. That's all I'm
saying.
Rep. Jenkins. Well, you and Mr. Noble have both indicated
that you don't believe--and perhaps other--I guess other
panel members have indicated that----
Mr. Noble [off mike].
Rep. Jenkins. Well I haven't asked you to, Mr. Noble.
Mr. Noble. I thought you just mentioned my name. I'm sorry.
I apologize.
Rep. Jenkins. Wait just a minute and I'll try to give you
an opportunity. I'm about to burn up all the time I have.
But do you know anything, Mr. Sullivan, about the Battalino
case, the lady who came here and testified?
Mr. Sullivan. Just what I've read in the newspapers about
it. I did not----
Rep. Jenkins. So you're not--you're not able to compare----
Mr. Sullivan. No--well, I could compare it this way, that
in the cases that have been referred to--I have not heard of
any in which it is analogous to this case where the witness's
testimony was peripheral to the issues in the case, the
alleged perjury was not dealing with the specific facts like
of the Jones case, but of some other peripheral case that
might not even be admissible in evidence.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time----
Rep. Jenkins. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. My time has expired.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wexler.
Rep. Robert Wexler (D-FL). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sullivan, I was very struck by your testimony in terms
of your examination of the allegations against the president
because it seems to me one of the most critical elements
against the president's and the president's lawyers' in this
process is that they have engaged in legal hair-splitting,
and they have been condemned for it, and in some cases maybe
appropriately so.
But as you analyzed the nature of the case against the
president with respect to perjury, what struck me was it
seems that in order to make that same very case against the
president, you have to engage in legal hair-splitting to do
so. Because when it all comes down to that very essence of
the case against the president on perjury, it comes down to a
discrepancy--a discrepancy between the testimony of the
president and Ms. Lewinsky over the precise nature of the
physical contact involved in their relationship. The
president, on the one hand, at the grand jury says, ``I had
an intimate relationship, an inappropriate intimate
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was physical in nature.''
And he goes on to say it was wrong, and then, of course, as
you have pointed out here today on several occasions, he
denied, in essence, having sexual relations as it was defined
by the judge. Miss Lewinsky, on the other hand, in response
to the independent counsel's several questions, goes into
graphic detail in recollection of her encounters with the
president. That's what it seems the perjury is all about.
But let's take the advice of the members on the other side.
Throw away the legal technicalities, throw away the
requirements that the law provides we prove for perjury.
Forget all about that. Tell the American people what is the
false statement that the president allegedly made to the
grand jury? Forget the consequences, forget the law. What is
the false statement?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, if you--it could be one of two. It
could be when he denied having sexual relations and I've
already addressed that, because he said, ``I was defining the
term as the judge told me to define it and as I understood
it,'' which I think is a reasonable explanation. The other is
whether or not he touched her--touched her breast or some
other part of her body, not through her clothing, but
directly. And he says, ``I didn't,'' and she said, ``I (sic)
did,'' so it's who-shot-John. It's, it's, you know, it's one
on one.
The corroborative evidence that the prosecutor would have
to have there, which is required in a perjury case--you can't
do it one on one, and no good prosecutor would bring a case
with, you know, I say black, you say white--would be the fact
that they were together alone and she performed oral sex on
him. I think that is not sufficient under the circumstances
of this case to demonstrate that there was any other touching
by the president and therefore he committed this--you know,
he violated this--and committed perjury.
Rep. Wexler. Well, Mr. Sullivan, I only hope that a vast
majority of Americans have heard your answer right now. What
this is about, at its worst, is the president making false
statements about sexual relations and about where he touched
Monica Lewinsky?
That's what the alleged perjury is about. I hope I am not
misstating what your answer was.
Mr. Sullivan. No, you're not. What the other side is saying
is that perjury in any regard is so important that the
president oughtn't to engage in it, and we can all probably
agree with that. The issue for you is whether or not it
justifies impeachment.
Rep. Wexler. I agree. I agree.
So it's about sexual relations, and it's about touching.
And now we are about to impeach a president because we think
he gave false answers about sexual relations and about
touching. How many times does it have to be said? How many
times do we, the Congress of the United States, have to now
set up a standard that says the president may have falsely
told us an answer about sexual relations and about touching,
and now we are going to impeach him?
Thank you.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.
Rep. Asa Hutchinson (R-AR). The investigation was opened up
because of a concern about an attempt to obstruct and suborn
perjury in a civil proceeding in which a plaintiff that had a
right to bring a suit, that the courts determined had a right
to bring a suit, was pursuing that. And our review is looking
into those allegations of obstruction of justice and perjury.
There are some questions raised about whether Monica
Lewinsky is truthful or not, and I think that's a legitimate
question that can be raised. But I think she does have an
incentive for telling the truth.
I have here before me the immunity agreement, which I have
seen before, and these witnesses have seen before, as well,
that said that if Ms. Lewinsky has intentionally given false,
incomplete or misleading information or testimony, she would
be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation.
And so certainly she has immunity, would you agree, Mr.
Sullivan, but if she does not tell the truth, then she would
be subject to prosecution?
Mr. Sullivan. If that's the standard use-immunity
agreement, that is correct.
Rep. Hutchinson. Now, I believe, Mr. Sullivan, going to
your testimony, you talked about prosecutions for perjury are
relatively rare, difficult to prove, and the United States
does not do it generally in pursuit of civil litigation.
And we got the statistics for federal prosecutions. And I
think Governor Weld mentioned this, that he didn't believe
that they were that rare.
And in fact, in 1993 there were more federal perjury
prosecutions by United States attorney than there were
kidnapping prosecutions. I don't think that means that
kidnapping is not significant. In '94, the same fact was
true; there were more perjury prosecutions--('93/93?)--than
there were kidnapping prosecutions. The same in '95. It's
really a pattern that goes back to the 1960s. And I wish I
could give credit to all of my staff that did such great
work, but talking about United States attorneys prosecuting
perjury
[[Page H11999]]
in civil litigation, here's a stack of cases. Now, I could go
through them, but I only have five minutes. And so I won't
take advantage of that. I did find one in Illinois and in
different parts of the country. But a rather impressive arena
of cases in which U.S. attorneys prosecute perjury in civil
cases.
Now, I agree with your point that sometimes there's a
history behind it, but I think there's a history here in this
case, as well. There's an investigation of obstruction of
Justice.
Now Mr. Sullivan, you mentioned that it was in a peripheral
matter. Am I correctly----
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. Yes.
Rep. Hutchinson. Has anyone on this panel ever represented
a woman as a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case? (Pause.)
If you have, raise your hand. Well, I have. And whenever you
look at the most difficult thing in a sexual harassment case,
it would be to prove who's telling the truth. And many times
you have to go to a pattern of conduct because there's a
denial. And so if you try to prove a pattern of conduct,
you've got to ask questions in a deposition as to what has
happened in the past. And I don't think that's a peripheral
matter. I don't think you can make sexual harassment cases if
you do not ask those questions. And when the president in
that deposition denied ever having in his lifetime sexually
harassed a woman, is that a material statement in the civil
deposition? And I invite your answers.
Mr. Davis. Well, I think, you know, the issue is--I don't
think, I don't think--believe it is, because----
Rep. Hutchinson. The question is, is it material?
Mr. Davis. No, I don't think it's material, because you're
entitled to ask the question under the broad discovery rules,
but the question is--was, if a truthful answer here would
have revealed the true facts, would it have been admissible
in that Jones case?
Rep. Hutchinson. If he had admitted he had sexually
harassed someone, you don't think that----
Mr. Davis. No, no. Actually, the truth is it would not have
been because it would not have been admissible in the Jones
case.
Rep. Hutchinson. Does anyone disagree that that would be a
material statement?
Do you disagree, Mr. Noble?
Mr. Noble. I'm sorry, maybe I misunderstood the question.
But--and I don't know the record to reflect this question,
but if your hypothetical question is: In a sexual harassment
suit, if a person is asked ``Have you ever sexually harassed
someone?'' would that be material, I believe it would be
material.
Rep. Hutchinson. Okay. Would anybody else agree with Mr.
Noble, who gave a very straightforward answer? I know you all
haven't handled sexual harassment cases; perhaps that's a
little bit of a disadvantage. But I thank you for your
testimony.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Rothman.
Rep. Steve Rothman (D-NJ). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start off by saying that with respect to my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I don't think it
aids the search for truth to demonize the White House
counsel. Mr. Craig said that he was going to be presenting us
with some factual rebuttal to the factual arguments made by
Mr. Starr. As I've read the 184 pages of the White House
submission, there are pages 70 through 89 and pages 93
through 182 which address each and every one of the factual
charges made by Mr. Starr.
So what we now have is Mr. Starr, who was a witness to no
facts, making his statements, 450 pages in writing and then
2\1/2\ hours in his initial testimony, and we have Mr.
Kendall, who made several written rebuttals, and now this
184-page rebuttal to all the facts, neither of which are
admissible in a court of law, as we all know and have
accepted the testimony of these experts. And we're left
without one single fact-witness to help us clarify when
Monica Lewinsky was telling the truth and when she wasn't,
because Mr. Starr said--Judge Starr said sometimes she was
telling the truth and sometimes she wasn't. But no fact
witnesses have yet been called to aid us in finding the
truth.
But we all agree that there is a basic, fundamental
American notion of due process and fairness; that those
bringing charges must bear the burden of proof, and in this
instance, it is a clear and convincing standard of proof. Yet
not one single fact-witness has yet been presented. That will
be telling, unless it's remedied, my friends.
But I understand, though, that my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle, despite the fact that these distinguished
prosecutors have said they would never bring a criminal
indictment on these matters--and remember the standard is
``treason, bribery or other high crimes or
misdemeanors''--they wouldn't bring an indictment on these
alleged crimes. But my colleagues say that, well, even if
it wasn't a crime, it's a pattern of lying, it violates--
it's not right. Well, I'm not sure that the standard is
``treason, bribery, high crimes, misdemeanors, evasiveness
and lack of respectability.'' Although some might argue
that ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' should say that, it
doesn't say that.
With regards to the rule of law, we've said many times
President Clinton has already paid or will pay an $850,000
fine, or settled his case for $850,000.
In a civil case, that's not an incentive to lie in a civil
case. He can be sued criminally once he leaves office and go
to prison if the charges against him were proven true. That's
certainly no incentive to anyone to lie under oath in a
criminal--in any proceeding. And the rule of law is upheld
because the president is not above the law. He can be sued
civilly and criminally, and our kids know that. And this
whole process has demonstrated that.
The question for our committee and for all of America is to
decide, if no reasonable prosecutor would bring these matters
up for a crime, how could it be a high crime or misdemeanor?
Should we interpret, say the Founders got it wrong, that they
should have added ``evasiveness'' as a high crime or
misdemeanor, or ``lack of respectability'' as a high crime
and misdemeanor? Some might argue yes, some might argue no.
What we have to be aware of is the consequences to our nation
if we expand on that definition when we already know the
president can be punished civilly, as he has been in the
settlement, and criminally by going to prison if the charges
are proven against him.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Rep. Hyde. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pease.
Rep. Ed Pease (R-IN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few
questions and then an observation.
I wanted to--well, first of all, let me say I have found
this panel very helpful on the questions dealing with
criminal prosecutions. I understand that there is a
difference between criminal prosecutions and impeachment. But
on the questions of criminal prosecutions and the parallels
that may be argued, I am grateful.
I wanted to be certain--let me back up. I especially--
without diminishing the work done by any of you, I especially
want to thank Mr. Noble, whose presentation was most helpful
to me, and I had some follow-up questions I wanted to ask you
based on questions that you were asked by other panelists but
didn't get the chance to conclude. And the first deals with
questions from Mr. Boucher on the standards that are used, or
the--the standards that are used in assessing when to
prosecute cases where there is a high profile potential
defendant. Can you share with us the standards in
the Department of Justice in those cases?
Mr. Noble. I must say I'm humbled to answer this, because
on my left was the assistant attorney general from the
Criminal Division when I was an assistant U.S. attorney and
on my right was a U.S. attorney and the assistant attorney
general for the Criminal Division. So I will see if I learned
anything from these two wise fellows.
As soon as you get an allegation that there is a political
figure who has engaged in criminal activity, as a U.S.
attorney or as a prosecutor, one of the first things you will
think about is: Will people have confidence that my office's
investigation of this will be deemed independent and
unbiased? You ask yourself that before you do anything. Can
my office handle this? Or should I send it to the criminal
justice--to the Justice Department's Criminal Division in
Washington and have Mr. Weld or people from Public Integrity
handle it?
And then you want to know who is the person bringing it.
Does he or she have a bias, a stake in this--the outcome of
this matter? And if it's a matter involving parties that are
already involved in a dispute, you've got to worry about
that.
And how did this person become aware of this information,
if--in the case of someone cooperating with you, one of your
informants, giving information to someone and having that
information lead to possible criminal activity, like a
perjury trap? All of the considerations, so that after all is
said and done, a rational citizen who's looking at you--I
can't help the fact that I was asked by the Democrats to be
here; if the Republicans had asked me to come, I would have
come willingly--but that a rational, independent person would
say, ``Yes, I can look at the evidence and see why this
prosecution's brought.''
No rational, seasoned prosecutor would bring any criminal
prosecution against any person for perjury or obstruction of
justice, based on the evidence I've seen. And I'm thankful of
that, and we should all be thankful of that, because if you
want to prosecute me, prosecute me for something I did, but
not for something you thought I did. If I've got a weird
thought process, don't prosecute me criminally for it; say
that I'm a weird person and disassociate yourself from me.
Rep. Pease. Thank you, Mr. Noble. And I appreciate your
efforts to be concise.
I don't know if this question was directed to you or to the
panel, but Mr. Boucher was getting into the question of
whether dismissal of a case terminates the authority of a
court to sanction parties or witnesses. And I don't know that
that was addressed, and I would appreciate it if someone
could.
Mr. Sullivan. I addressed that. I said that there is
inherent power under the Supreme Court decision and that I do
not know that--whether or not the dismissal of the case
terminates----
Rep. Pease. That's my question. So you don't know----
Mr. Sullivan. I do not know.
Rep. Pease. Does anybody else have a response or a thought
on that?
Mr. Noble. I believe that she does not lose jurisdiction to
investigate and recommend the prosecution or hold criminal
contempt hearings for anyone that might have engaged in
criminal conduct during the time period that she had this
matter.
[[Page H12000]]
Rep. Pease. I also, as I began, want to thank all of you.
It's been--your presentation has been very helpful in
understanding the issues surrounding charging and conviction
in criminal matters. I'm concerned, though, that we not
assume that either the standards in a criminal prosecution or
the burden of proof or the procedures employed are the same
as those which face this committee.
A criminal prosecution is not the same as an impeachment
and we should not succumb to an argument that because a
criminal prosecution might not succeed that Congress is
unable to act under its constitutional obligation regarding
impeachment. No matter my eventual conclusion on the matters
before us, I'm not prepared to say that the expected standard
of conduct for an American president is simply that he or she
may not be indictable.
I yield the balance of my time.
Rep. Hyde. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from
Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.
Rep. Thomas Barrett (D-WI). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Sullivan, you indicated in your testimony that you did not
think that this would be a case that would be brought by a
United States attorney for perjury. We have heard many--many
witnesses and many members saying that the president, when he
leaves office, is open to criminal prosecution. The sense of
the American people, I think, remains that the president did
something wrong, that he should be held accountable for his
actions and that he should not be impeached.
So in your discussion, where is the justice? In this case,
in the civil suit, since every one of us would explore not
telling the truth, or lying, where is the justice, in your
analysis here?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, we live in an imperfect world, and
justice is not always achieved in this world. We sometimes
have to wait and hope. But all I'm saying is that the law--
you have to follow the law. If the law provides that the
president can be indicated after he leaves office, and if
some prosecutor wants to take this up who has jurisdiction
over it, they may--they may reach a different conclusion than
I do. I doubt that a responsible prosecutor would bring a
perjury case against the president on these facts. Now, I
think that the--I mean, look what the man has already gone
through, though. I mean we're sitting here, the third time in
the history of the country that they're considering removing
a president from office.
It seems to me that there's been terrible retribution on
this man for what he did.
Rep. Barrett. Well, let's take the president out of it, and
let's leave it as a civil case where a person has lied.
Where's the justice system work in this case if a person in
the civil case has lied under oath or misrepresented
themselves or obfuscated the facts? Tell me where the justice
comes into the system, if there is not going to be perjury.
There has to be justice. We can't just say, well, that's the
way it goes.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, in the--we're talking about the Jones
civil case. And in that case, after the president made his
disclosures and Monica Lewinsky made her disclosures and the
cases had been dismissed, but before it was decided by the
Court of Appeals Ms. Jones settled the case. So it seems to
me it's washed away, because she, then, knew at the time she
settled that if that evidence was going to be admissible, you
know, she would take that into consideration in determining
the amount of her settlement. The case was thrown out, as I
understand, for reasons entirely different, that she couldn't
demonstrate that there was any connection between what may
have happened in her--detriment to her in any employment.
Rep. Barrett. Do you think that the amount of the
settlement reflects some of that? It was----
Mr. Sullivan. Well, I think that Ms. Jones, she voluntarily
took that settlement in light of all the facts, including the
facts that we are now talking about today.
Rep. Barrett. Okay.
Mr. Weld, you've offered some interesting observations, I
think, one of which was the notion of a fine. And I've heard
commentators talk about a plea bargain or a deal. And I
bristle when I hear those words, because I do think that this
is a vote of conscience and that every member on both sides
of the aisle should be listening to their conscience and be
guided by that.
I also am mindful of the fact that we cannot impose a fine
on the President of the United States, that there are bill of
attainer problems. How conceivable do you think it is that
the president, if we were to censure him, would come forward
and say ``I recognize that as part of the process I should
reimburse the Treasury for part of this investigation''?
Mr. Weld. Well, politically, I guess, I had anticipated
that all that might be the subject of negotiation before the
votes were taken. I was trying to think of things that would
mark the solemnity of the occasion, do justice to the dignity
of the House and its role, having the sole power of
impeachment. And it would say to the American people there
has been justice here, this person, this president has paid a
penalty here short of being removed from office, which I
think we've kind of slid by that one.
But the fine, the written acknowledgment of wrongdoing and
the exposure to future criminal prosecution, as well as a
censure, and a Starr report as the committee or the House
wished to put on the public record in perpetuity, those are
the five things I could think of to mark the events.
Rep. Barrett. Okay. My time has expired.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired.
Rep. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
Mr. Christopher B. Cannon (R-UT). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin by thanking this panel today. This is
an important issue, and I think your presence has added
weight to the issue. And I appreciate your comments and
testimony.
I would also like to just point out at the very beginning
that, without any parsing of words or equivocation, I agree
with my frind Mr. Delahunt and with the comments by Mr.
Sullivan, that the essence of the rule of law lies in the
technicalities, and the technicalities are very, very
important to us here.
Now, I'd like to refer to some of the things that my good
friend Ms. Lofgren commented on earlier. Ms. Lofgren and I
are on two subcommittees of this committee, together, and I
have the greatest respect for the way she thinks.
She said or pointed out that perjury about sex is relevant
essentially--and I am paraphrasing--is relevant to this side
because it's a crime, and then went on to point out some of
the technical elements of the crime that may in fact be
missing here.
And the first is that--there was the suggestion that the
person who administered the oath to the president may not
have been authorized to do so. I think that was rebutted
fairly effectively by Mr. Buyer, and I agree with his
responses.
Secondly, she said that the question must be unambiguous.
Now, I don't read the statute as requiring an unambiguous
question, but I think the perjury ultimately has to be quite
clear.
Later, Mr. Sullivan, I think in response to some of this
questioning, suggested that the president can defend on the
basis that the definition was changed--that is, the
definition of ``sex''--and that the new definition may
somehow have excluded a certain act or type of sex.
Let me just suggest in response to that, that I have read
that definition very carefully, as I think many of the
members of this committee have. The president pointed out
that he answered the question very carefully, because he
answered the question in the context of the definition that
he read very carefully. And obviously, minds can disagree on
this sort of thing, but I just don't see how you could
exclude that particular act from the definition that remained
after the striking of the two sentences.
Now a lot has been said about whether or not the president
could be prosecuted for this crime, where these technical
defenses may be relevant. But I think the real potential
for understanding the likelihood of a criminal prosecution
actually lies in the president's own actions. He refuses
to acknowledge or deny the underlying facts of the case,
and it's like there's an allergy to the L-word. Mr. Crain,
yesterday said, in answer to a question, ``No, he
deceived, he misled, but he did not lie.'' Later, ``No, he
was technically accurate, but he did not disclose
information.''
This--I mean, I think all the commentators in the editorial
pages have pointed out that the president is caught between
the Fifth Amendment and coming clean with the American
public. And I think it's his actions, the fact that he won't
deal with the facts of the case, that make it clear to me
that there may actually be, in another context, rather than
this one, a criminal problem that he's concerned about.
But unlike Mr. Wexler, who says that this is about sexual--
lying about sexual relations and touching, let me suggest
that I believe that this--that this proceeding is really
about--not about crime--I believe that it's about the
government's ability to secure the----
Rep. [off mike].
Rep. Cannon. I have to protect my mike frommy compatriot on
this side.
This is about the government's ability to secure the rights
of the governed. And John Jay was quoted yesterday. Let me
just repeat part of that quote. ``If oaths cease to be
sacred, our dearest and most valuable rights become
insecure.''
I know, Mr. Weld, you've actually governed, and you're a
person for whom I have the greatest respect. Would you mind
responding? What do you think those rights are? And if we can
be very particular, because my time is almost up, what are
those rights that Mr. Jay is concerned about keeping secure?
Mr. Weld. I think it's the rights to life, liberty,
property, and the pursuit of happiness.
Rep. Cannon. Thank you. I view property and the pursuit of
happiness as the same right--life, liberty, and property. And
since my time is gone, I would love to hear a little bit
about that.
I believe that John Jay was right. What this panel is all
about doing is maintaining for Americans for generations and
centuries to come the security of those basic rights of life,
liberty, and property, or the pursuit of happiness. That's
what we're about here. And I yield back the balance of my
time, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rogan.
Rep. James Rogan (R-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join my colleague from Utah in welcoming the panel, and
particularly in welcoming
[[Page H12001]]
the distinguished former governor of Massachusetts, whose
service to our country I have long admired and thank you for
to this day.
Gentlemen, let me start off by saying that I've noticed a
recurring theme among most of the panelists over the last few
hours. The first one, with the exception of Governor Weld, is
that perjury generally is a crime not prosecuted. The second
one is the statement made over and over that somehow the
statements made by the president were not material, even if
they were lying under oath. And I must tell you, I take
exception to both of those claims.
In the federal government since Bill Clinton became
president, according to the Offenders Sentenced Under the
Guidelines table, just during the Clinton administration,
almost 700 people have not only been convicted for perjury in
federal court, they've been sentenced for perjury. In my own
state of California, since Bill Clinton became president,
some 16,000 perjury prosecutions have occurred. And so I just
don't know where this novel claim comes from that this is a
crime that is ignored by the courts. The record simply does
not reflect that.
A couple of members raised the name of Dr. Battalino and
there were some blank stares by members of the committee. Let
me share with you briefly the story of Dr. Battalino. She was
here a week or so ago and testified before this committee.
She was a doctor who worked for the Veterans Administration.
She is also an attorney. In her capacity as a V.A. physician,
she had a one-time consensual relationship, sexual
relationship with a male patient of the hospital, but not her
patient. He later sued the hospital for a sexual harassment
claim and named her in the claim. She was asked in a civil
deposition whether she had ever had a sexual relationship, a
one-time sexual encounter with this patient. Out of
embarrassment and out of concern for her job and her career,
she denied it.
The civil case was later dismissed--the gentleman's case
against the hospital and the doctor was later dismissed.
Despite that dismissal, the Clinton Justice Department filed
perjury charges against her. She is now precluded form
practicing law as a result of her conviction. She lost her
medical license and she is under incarceration. She appeared
before us with an ankle bracelet because she is under house
arrest.
You might imagine that Dr. Battalino has some grave
concerns over the incredible double standard as to her loss
of livelihood and the shame that she's had to face as a
result of the Clinton Justice Department prosecuting her for
this, and the claim now being proffered by some of the
president's supporters that this is all much ado about
nothing.
I have to also say that I take very grave exception to some
of my beloved colleagues on the other side who keep insisting
to the American people that this is simply about sex. That
just is not true. Governor Weld is absolutely right.
Fornication, adultery not only are not impeachable offenses,
they clearly, they patently are not the business of the House
Judiciary Committee. But that is not what was at stake here.
The president was a defendant in a federal sexual harassment
civil rights case. And as a result of that case, a federal
judge ordered him to tell under oath whether in his capacity
as governor or president he had ever had sexual relations
with subordinate female employees. And the judge specifically
found that was relevant to show a pattern of conduct.
That's how sexual harassment cases are proven. And so this
idea among some folks that if they just say it enough and
if their histrionics are dramatic or theatrical enough, if
the volume is raised enough, that somehow we can reduce
this to being just a case about sex may play well for the
talk show circuit, but it doesn't play well for the truth.
And I want to make that observation before my time
expires.
I thank the chair, and I yield back my time.
Rep. Hyde. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Lindsey
Graham.
Rep. Lindsey Graham (R-SC). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have
a couple observations and some questions for the panelists
here. And I, too, have appreciated your being here.
Please understand that when I vote, I will look at it in a
very legal sense. I don't believe due to the nature of what's
going on that we should send a case forward that doesn't meet
certain legal standards. And I just happen to disagree with
you about whether or not this is a provable case of perjury.
I think this is a very clear case of perjury, and it's not
just about intimate touching. It goes much further. And I
can't explain all that in five minutes. I've seen the
president's deposition in Paula Jones where he testified. I
saw Mr. Bennett lay the affidavit of Monica Lewinsky in front
of the president. I saw the president's eyes follow the
affidavit, his head nod, and I believe his grand jury
testimony where he said he wasn't paying any attention is a
lie. And I believe I could convict him with fair-minded
people.
But this is really more than just about the law. It's about
the national interest. And I'm a politician. And there's a
unique political aspect to this case that's probably good.
I've said before, impeachment without outrage should be
difficult. And it should be, in a democratic society. But let
me tell you the mood of my district to let you know a little
bit about what I'm up against here.
The Washington Post sent, apparently, four reporters to the
four corners of the country, and they happened to pick my
district to feel out how people feel about the president and
his misconduct. There is a portion of my district, very good
friends of mine, who want to get this over with and
understand this. In their mind, it doesn't rise to the level
of overturning an election. That's a real dynamic. Very nice,
rational people. But that's the minority opinion.
You can take the pools and reverse them. The reporters said
``I think I need to come home now'' because they never got
out of the clothing department of Wal-Mart to figure out what
people thought about the president. It wasn't good. Being
evasive, deceptive, immoral and non-responsive are not
resume-builders in my district. Forget about perjury.
So I'm a congressman that comes from an area--[laughs]--of
the country that's got no use for this kind of stuff. But I
have publicly said that we're going to play it straight with
the president, we're not going to take our emotions and our
political disagreements and try to use that in the
impeachment process. And I'm going to stand by that.
I've said to Mr. Craig and others I believe the president
committed serious crimes, but if he would reconcile himself
with the law so that we could end this thing on a note of
honor, I may consider a different disposition than
impeachment. But if he continues to flout the law, I don't
think he should be the president for the next century. I
stand by that statement.
But there's another aspect to this that I think we need to
talk about. Ms. Waters has--I really do--have gotten to know
my colleagues on the other side, and we do get along pretty
well. She says, well, it's really silly to believe the
president would have his secretary hide gifts under her bed.
Well, that sounds silly, but the day that people stop doing
silly stuff is the day all of us as lawyers go out of
business. [Laughter.] I think it's silly to fool around with
an intern while you're being sued. But those things happen.
And they happen to smart people like Bill Clinton. And if we
impeach people for being silly and doing inappropriate things
we'll wipe the Congress out.
So I'm not saying that those type things ought to be the
reason we get rid of the president. But don't underestimate
what people can do that really is inappropriate and defies
understanding. And I believe that's a lot of what Bill
Clinton's problems really are at the end of the day.
And if I've got to cast my vote based on knowing what the
Senate's going to do, I'd never vote in the House, because I
can't tell you what they're going to do half the time. And I
think what they ought to do is wait `til they get a case
before they decide it. And everybody in Congress ought to let
this committee do its work, whether you like us or not,
before you decide what you're going to do, because the day
you start deciding the case before the case is over is the
day we lose a lot in this country.
Governor Weld, hypothetically, you're the governor. There's
a person out there that possesses damaging information about
you. You're in a consentual relationship that's wrong. That
person, you know, if asked to testify, could hurt you legally
and politically. If you used the resources of the
governorship, if you got people in your office to plant lies,
flasehoods, malicious rumors, and tried to use your office as
governor to trash out that potential witness against you,
what should be your fate?
Mr. Weld. Well, in a clear enough case, my fate should be
``out of here''.
Rep. Graham. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Rep. Hyde. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Bono.
Rep. Mary Bono (R-CA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to my
panel, thank you, first and foremost, for your patience. I
woke up this morning and I thought, What do I get to do
today? And question top--five of the top attorneys in the
entire country. What a great way to start off my day.
I want to ask you a question, Governor Weld, to begin with,
and it's a follow-up to something that Congressman Coble has
asked earlier on. You discussed how you had changed your
position, your initial reaction in February was that you
said the president should resign. And you indicated that
you've changed your thinking because of events during the
past year and the general reaction to the president. As a
congresswoman I also sit on the National Security
Committee, and so issues concerning our military readiness
and standing around the world greatly concern me.
Earlier this year, the United States engaged in some
military activity. Many people accused the White House of
following a wag-the-dog strategy. It troubles me that the
president may be in some ways hamstrung to lead and act
decisively and swiftly on the international military state
without the complete trust of the American people. In other
words, if the office of the president does not enjoy the
complete public trust this might affect our national
security.
So governor, if there is new evidence that the president
does not have the trust of the international community or of
our armed forces--and I'm not talking about polls, but more
specific evidence from leaders around the world, would you
revisit your February advice that the president should resign
for the good of the country?
Mr. Weld. Yes. I think actually it was September, Madame
Congresswoman. And as I indicated or alluded to earlier, one
of the things I was troubled by in September was we'd had,
frankly, some acts--some bombings and similar actions abroad
which coincided with the Lewinsky matter really coming to a
head. And that's precisely what I
[[Page H12002]]
was worried about. So I think, you know, anybody on an
ongoing basis has got to ask themselves the question, Can I
do the job? And if you can't do the job, you shouldn't do the
job.
Rep. Bono. So will your opinion vacillate, though,
depending on what is happening with attacks on us, or if----
Mr. Weld. Well, you know, we don't have a parliamentary
system here, we have presidents who are mighty unpopular.
Harry Truman was mighty unpopular even when he was by and
large, you know, in retrospect people think, doing the right
thing on a lot of stuff. So I don't think it should be
following the public opinion polls. It's a question of
ability to discharge the duties of the office, and I will
confess that I was somewhat surprised at the alacrity with
which all seemed to be forgiven and forgotten in terms of
people saddling up and doing business with the president and
taking him seriously.
Rep. Bono. Well, my point, sort of, here, is, is that, you
know, the public trust, though, is something you also have to
anticipate and its's easy to have it now, today, while the
economy is strong, the stock market is great, although some
of us still can't get Furbys-- [laughing]--so it's not strong
enough. But how about tomorrow? Will we have it tomorrow?
Will the public trust be there tomorrow? It cannot change.
It's something that we can't--we have to sort of guess. Will
it be there? And I'm sort of hearing, as you're saying, too,
I guess you're echoing with me that here today, gone
tomorrow. And we on this committee cannot have that. We have
to decide, will the public trust be there a month from now
when Osama bin Laden rears his ugly head again?
Mr. Weld. Well, I don't think you want to go the removal
route because of a concern that the trust might not be there.
It would have to be a little bit more solid than that.
Rep. Bono. There is a concern, right? Thank you. And I
guess--I still have a green light--this is a miracle. I have
a question based on Mr. Sullivan's testimony, but I'll leave
it open to the whole panel, but first I want to--oh, it's
yellow, so I'll just comment briefly.
Mr. Sullivan, I had a fun moment earlier; it's not a
comment or anything, but, you know, we're here because of the
president's, sort of, dancing on the head of a pin, as
Lindsey (sp) would say, over the definition of sex, and oral
sex was omitted from the description before the Paula Jones
testimony. But then here in this room you've changed it to
sleeping with somebody, and I know you were trying to sort of
elude references to salacious materials again, but isn't that
what got us in this whole mess? And now you're changing the
wording--and I'm not a lawyer so I'm getting used to
listening to every word we're saying--that you did the very
thing that got us in this whole mess to begin with. And I
just thought it was a fun moment, so I wanted to leave you
with a good experience here with the House Judiciary
Committee. So thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Thank you very much. We are going to take a
break. I'll yield to Mr. Conyers.
Rep. Conyers. Well, I wanted to take a few minutes on the
reservation that I had earlier.
Rep. Hyde. All right, well, you're recognized for----
Rep. Conyers. I'll move as quickly as I can, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you. I first wanted to let Sheila Jackson Lee
utilize 30 seconds of the time.
Rep. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Conyers.
Just very briefly, there was a comment on the presentation
of the witnesses. Let me assume that you can come forward
here because you are fact or expert witnesses. But I did want
to very quickly comment on Dr. Battalino's case and Ms.
Parsons's case.
Dr. Battalino's case, the issue of perjury went to the fact
that she was attempting to reclaim monies for litigation
costs. It was insurance fraud, if you will. That went to the
question; that's why the Department of Justice prosecuted
her. And you were unfairly asked about it.
Pam Parsons, she was accused of being a lesbian. She was a
plaintiff and sued the newspaper that accused her of such and
lied that she was not. And there was definite or definitive
proof--otherwise.
And so it went to the heart of the cases. And I think it's
important that we clarify the record on those grounds. I
thank the gentleman. I yield back my time.
Rep. Conyers. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
and to this very-much-appreciated panel; this is a critical
phase of the hearings. And it's helping us to recognize how
the experts on this panel, seasoned and experienced
prosecutors all, which Mr. Starr acknowledged that he was
not, would have rejected bringing a criminal case against
the president, based on Mr. Starr's allegations, if he
were an ordinary citizen.
It's critical in this part of our hearing to understand the
vast difference between the allegations being considered by
the committee and the system of criminal justice that applies
to the rest of us. If no ordinary citizen, who had faced even
a criminal prosecution based on the allegations in the
referral--how can we justify considering the rarely used
remedy of impeachment for the same conduct? If no ordinary
citizen would face a criminal prosecution based on these
allegations, how can it be argued that to decline to vote for
impeachment places the president above the law? If no
ordinary citizen would face a criminal prosecution based on
these allegations, why should we bother to take the Senate
and the chief justice of our highest court, to spend months
resolving undignified and trivial questions of fact, rather
than in tending to the important business of the country? I
hope these questions raise serious issues and reservations
for all of my colleagues in the committee about the wisdom of
proceeding on the path that we apparently are on.
May I acknowledge the chairman of this committee's
accommodations that he has offered me concerning prompt
notice to all of us on the committee of any draft Articles of
Impeachment and his further willingness to consider the
motion that will be offered by the gentleman from Virginia,
Mr. Scott, to require that the specific allegations against
the president be provided to him before his counsel responds,
when we conduct our business session today or tomorrow.
May I reiterate my strong view to the Republican leadership
that fairness dictates that the American people not be
muzzled on the all-important issue of censure.
Overwhelmingly, the American people that we have referred to,
we've tested in the districts and the nation, do not want the
president impeached.
Our citizens either support doing nothing, under the theory
that the president has already been censured, or they support
an additional resolution of censure. But the important point
is that for the vast majority of those who do not want an
impeachment, a six-month Senate investigation with all of the
attendant political and economic turmoil, for all of those
who want a proportional and sensible alternative shouldn't be
muzzled.
And so your testimony here and this panel may well be the
most important that we will have because you have dealt so
significantly with these fact questions that have been
troubling us. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. I thank you, Mr. Conyers, and I want to say that
I, too, deeply appreciate the contribution which was and is
substantial that you've made to some of our knowledge on this
very difficult question. You've all been enormously helpful,
highly qualified, very forthcoming and you've made a great
contribution.
Now, we should take a 30-minute recess, but before I reach
that happy point I yield to Ms. Jackson Lee.
Rep. Jackson Lee. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to
submit into evidence of this proceedings the Constitution of
the United States, particularly noting that there is no
prohibition on censure noted in the Constitution of the
United States. I'd like to submit this into the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Rep. Hyde. Well, certainly, without objection, even though
ours is a government of delegated powers. But, nonetheless,
your motion is granted.
Rep. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
Rep. Hyde. Thanks. Thank you.
And now I will try again, we will have a half-hour recess.
Please come back at the end of a half-hour.
[Recess.]
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Barrett) a distinguished member of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I am the junior member of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, and when I walked in that room the
first time, I honestly felt that we would be addressing this issue not
as Democrats and Republicans, but as Americans. I was so naive I did
not even think that we would be sitting along our normal spots as
Democrats and Republicans. But I was wrong.
But I entered that room with hope, and I want to leave today with
hope because I have tremendous confidence not only in this institution
but this country.
I begged from the first hearing on that we not allow this process to
become what it has become because I fear for this institution. We are
consuming ourselves. We are lowering the respect for our democratic
institutions in this country by what we are doing today.
This is the great tragedy. The tragedy of the loss of the presidency
for Bill Clinton would be a personal loss. The tragedy of the loss of
two Speakers is a personal loss. But the greatest tragedy is if the
young men and women in this country do not respect this government,
because if they do not respect this government, we all lose.
That is why, Mr. Speaker, I tried time and time again to offer an
olive branch, to say to my colleagues, please, let us recognize that
the President's actions were wrong, because they were very wrong; let
us recognize the gravity of what we are doing; let us recognize that
after he leaves office he should remain accountable to appropriate
criminal and civil remedies. But, Mr. Speaker, I beg that we move on
because I could see no good coming from this for our country, and I
stand here
[[Page H12003]]
today and say if this process continues, we will continue to consume
ourselves, and that is not good for this country.
So, Mr. Speaker, today I again offer the olive branch. For the sake
of this institution, for the sake of this country, for the sake of our
children, please let us work together. This country will not accept a
partisan solution to this problem. This country recognizes that the
President's actions were wrong and he has to be held accountable. But
they do not want us to tear ourselves apart.
When I talk to young people about entering government, I tell them,
``Think of the worst thing you have ever done in your life. Don't tell
me what it is. Now think about having it on the 10 o'clock news.''
If that becomes more and more prevalent, what are we going to become?
We are going to become a Nation where people who have sins, and every
one of us is a sinner, will be afraid to enter the ranks of public
service.
Is that what we want?
Is that what we are coming to?
I pray not, Mr. Speaker. For if that is what we are coming to, our
country is in grave danger.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), a member of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I too come to extend the olive branch, and
I am deeply saddened by the events of today.
The American people have made it clear that their desire is for us to
censure the President and move on to the Nation's business. It is wrong
that there has been a decision made by the Republican leadership that
would not allow censure to come to the floor. Whether my colleagues
agree with censure or not, I submit it is their obligation to do so.
They say that censure is unconstitutional, but most historians and
constitutional scholars disagree with them. The founder of their party,
Abraham Lincoln, supported a censure of President Polk. Congress
actually did censure President Andrew Jackson. Earlier this session,
the majority whip, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) introduced a
resolution censuring President Clinton.
They have told us over again that this is a vote of conscience. But
what about the consciences of Democrat Members? And what about the will
of the people?
Mr. Speaker, I fear that we will do a terrible disservice for the
Constitution and to our country.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis), the minority deputy whip.
Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, today is a very sad day for this
House. This morning when I got up, I wanted to cry, but the tears would
not come.
Before we cast this one little vote, we all should ask the question:
Is this good for America?
Is this good for the American people?
Is this good for this institution?
When I was growing up in rural Alabama during the 40s and the 50s as
a young child, near a shotgun house where my aunt lived one afternoon
an unbelievable storm occurred.
{time} 1115
The wind started blowing. The rain fell on the tin top roof of this
house. Lightning started flashing. The thunder started rolling. My aunt
asked us all to come into this house and to hold hands, and we held
hands.
As the wind continued to blow, we walked to that corner of the house,
and as the wind blew stronger, we walked to another corner; as it tried
to lift another corner, we would walk there. We never left the house.
The wind may blow, the thunder may roll, the lightning may flash, but
we must never leave the American house. We must stay together as a
family: one house, one family; the American House, the American family.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Hyde) is recognized for 5\1/2\ minutes.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, those of us who are sinners must feel
especially wretched today, losing the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Bob
Livingston) under such sad circumstances. One's self-esteem gets
utterly crushed at times like this. I think of a character in one of
Tolstoy's novels who feels so crushed, he asked God if he couldn't be
useful in wiping something up, or filling a hole, or being a bad
example.
But something is going on repeatedly that has to be stopped. That is
a confusion between private acts of infidelity and public acts, where
as a government official, you raise your right hand and you ask God to
witness to the truth of what you are saying. That is a public act.
Infidelity, adultery, is not a public act, it is a private act. The
government, the Congress, has no business intruding into private acts.
But it is our business, it is our duty, to observe, to characterize
public acts by public officials. So I hope that confusion does not
persist.
``The rule of law,'' a phrase we have heard, along with ``fairness''
and ``reprehensible'', more often than not, is in real danger today if
we cheapen the oath, because justice depends upon the enforceability of
the oath.
I do not care what the subject matter is, if it is important enough
to say, I raise my right hand and swear by the almighty God that the
testimony I am about to give is the truth, the whole truth, nothing but
the truth, if it is solemn enough for that, it is solemn enough to
enforce.
When we have a serial violator of the oath who is the chief law
enforcement officer of the country, who appoints the judges and the
Supreme Court, the Attorney General, we have a problem. Members
recognize that problem because they want to censure him. That is
impeachment lite. They want to censure him with no real consequences,
except as history chooses to impose them.
But we suggest that censuring the President is not a function
permitted in this Chamber. Maybe across the Rotunda, where the
sanctions of an impeached person are imposed, that is another
situation. I daresay, they are innovative and creative over there on
Mount Olympus, but here we are confined by the strictures of the
Constitution which affords us one avenue, and that is impeachment,
impeachment.
There is a doctrine of separation of powers. We cannot punish the
President. Yet, a censure resolution, to be meaningful, has to at least
harm his reputation. We have no power to do that, if we believe in the
Constitution. The Constitution did not enumerate for us a power of
punishing the President. Again, I speak not for the gentlemen across
the hall.
No fact witnesses, I have heard that repeated again and again. Look,
we had 60,000 pages of testimony from the grand jury, from depositions,
from statements under oath. That is testimony that we can believe and
accept. We chose to believe it and accept it. Why reinterview Betty
Currie to take another statement when we already had her statement? Why
interview Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement under oath, and
with a grant of immunity that if she lied she would forfeit?
If Members on the other side did not trust those people, if they did
not accept their credibility, Members had the opportunity to call them
and cross-examine them to their heart's content. But no, they really
did not want to bring them in and cross-examine them, but they want to
blame us for having no fact witnesses. I think that is a little short
of the mark.
Lame duck? The cry was, get this over with, get this behind us. We
have an election, they pick up a few seats, and ``lame duck'' becomes
the cry. Please, be fair. Be consistent.
Now, equal protection of the law, that is what worries me about this
whole thing. Any of the Members who have been victimized by injustice,
and you have not lived until you have been sued by somebody and pushed
to the wall, and turned to the government and the government is on the
wrong side, justice is so important to the most humble among us, equal
justice under the law. That is what we are fighting for.
When the chief law enforcement officer trivializes, ignores, shreds,
minimizes, the sanctity of the oath, then justice is wounded, and
Members on that side are wounded and their children are wounded. I ask
Members to follow their conscience and they will serve the country.
[[Page H12004]]
Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Speaker, I quote: ``Do you solemnly swear in the
testimony you are about to give that it will be the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?''
Mr. Speaker, that is the oath President Clinton took before his
August 17th testimony of this year. The President answered ``I do''.
And despite repeated attempts by Deputy Independent Counsel Sol
Wisenberg to warn him of the consequences of providing false or
misleading testimony, the President went on to make perjurious
statements pertaining to his relationship with Monica Lewinsky and his
sworn testimony in the Paula Jones civil trial.
But why? Why would this President, who by anyone's account is a very
intelligent man and a very good lawyer, and thus knowing the
consequences of his actions, why would be proceed to commit perjury
before the grand jury?
I think the answer lies in the testimony of the President's political
consultant and confidant Dick Morris. After the story of the
President's extramarital relationship and his false testimony in the
Jones civil trial broke, he consulted with Morris about what strategy
he should employ. It was decided a poll should be taken to gauge what
conduct the American people would and would not forgive. According to
Morris' testimony, his poll found that the President's adultery could
be forgiven by the public.
However, the results also showed that if it were found that the
President committed perjury or obstructed justice, the public would
consider that grounds for removal from office. It is then when the
President made a defining statement to Morris. He said, ``Well, we just
have to win, then.'' And so it was, back in January, that the President
determined to continue his pattern of lies and deceit, to his staff,
his cabinet, the American public and to the grand jury on August 17th.
This first article of impeachment is perhaps the most serious. It is
clearly evident that President William Jefferson Clinton perjured
himself before a federal grand jury--certainly a ``high crime'' as
delineated in Article II, Section 4 of our Constitution.
We cannot, in good conscience, ignore the President's callous
disregard for the laws made on the floor of this House.
``Do you swear and affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?''--The oath taken by President
Clinton in the Jones versus Clinton civil trial.
There are some who say the second article, regarding the President's
perjurious testimony in the Jones versus Clinton case, does not amount
to an impeachable offense since it occurred as part of a civil and not
a criminal trial and since, ultimately, the case was thrown out of
court. In fact, some even claim the President's statements do not
amount to perjury.
However, one of the President's own special counsel, Gregory B.
Craig, in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee,
``conceded that in the Jones deposition, the President's testimony was
evasive, incomplete, misleading--even maddening,'' Given this and the
evidence derived from the sworn testimony of Vernon Jordan, Betty
Currie, Monica Lewinsky and others, there is clear and convincing
evidence that the President lied under oath and committed perjury in
the Jones deposition.
The fact that the case was subsequently thrown out of court does not
acquit the President from the perjury count. Because, in fact, the
President's perjurious statements denied Paula Jones a continuance of
that trial, and, in effect, her civil rights.
Obstruction of justice is an equally grave crime. The third article
of impeachment delineates how President Clinton set out on a course to
obstruct justice in seven instances, including the President's
tampering with witnesses in the Jones versus Clinton case, notably
Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky.
The President's actions prevented Paula Jones' suit from receiving a
fair and just decision in court on whether her civil rights had been
violated by the President. Each of us would expect that our grievance
would receive a fair hearing in a court of law, it is our
Constitutional right. No one, including the President of the United
States--especially the President of the United States--should be able
to deny someone that right and not suffer the consequences of their
actions.
President Clinton has displayed a pattern of lying, putting forth
perjurious testimony, and obstructing justice, all which undermine our
Constitution and the principle that no one individual is above the
law--that the law is applied equally to all. This despite his oath
before the American people on two occasions to ``faithfully execute the
Office of the President of the United States, and to . . . to the best
of [his] ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States.''
Furthermore, while I do not believe Article 4 necessarily rises to
the level of an impeachable offense in this instance, the President
has, with great disrepute, used his office to proliferate his own lies
and destroy the character of those who have sought to serve justice.
Unfortunately, this behavior is in no way a revelation to this
generation or to those past. In fact, in 1788, Sir Edmund Burke, in his
opening speech for the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the British
Governor General of Bengal and India, noted the employment of such
familiar tactics as character assassination and twisting the truth when
he criticized Hastings and his defenders that . . . ``When they cannot
deny the facts, they attack the accuser--they attack their conduct,
they attack their persons, they attack their language in every possible
manner.''
However, I bear no personal grudge against President Clinton. I
forgive him for what he has done. But forgiveness is not justice, and
since we are a nation of laws, we must see to it that the laws are
upheld and applied equally to all citizens. That principal is what this
nation was built on, it is for what our Founding Fathers pledged their
lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor.
And it is in this great legislative body that we are charged with
making the laws that govern our nation. To permit the chief executive
enforcing those laws to cast them aside as he pleases would, in effect,
sanction such actions. To do nothing would be to place a stamp of
approval on illicit conduct and transfer power to the executive branch,
thus upsetting the system of checks and balances devised by the
Framers. It would cheapen the law, which, in turn, would cheapen the
work by this House.
So it is with a heavy heart but a clear conscience that I cast my
votes in favor of three of the four articles of impeachment today. Of
course, the people of northwest Iowa did not send me 1000 miles from my
home in Alexander to the U.S. Congress to make the easy decisions. But
if a democratic republic were an easy system of government, America
would not be unique in this world. A republic is so difficult to
maintain because it demands greater sacrifice and restraint on the part
of the ruler and than the ruled. Part of this sacrifice is that our
leaders are held to a higher standard of conduct as they set the
example for the rest of the citizenry and are placed in a position of
trust.
It pains me to say that this President has placed himself above the
Office of the Presidency and above the people he took an oath to serve.
The House of Representatives is doing today what is our duty to do. We
should wait no longer, for as Burke opined, ``To have forborne longer
would not have been patience but collusion.''
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, this has been the most difficult, gut-
wrenching decision I have made in my 18 years of public service. In
making my decision, I have been obligated to put personal feelings and
political concerns aside to focus solely on my constitutional
obligation.
The impeachment matter is a trauma for our nation and the decision
demands careful and thoughtful deliberation and much soul searching. A
decision of this magnitude required me to examine all of the evidence,
listen to all the legal arguments and search my conscience.
As a former Criminal Justice Act lawyer, I have objectively reviewed
all the evidence, heard all the arguments and searched my conscience. I
have regrettably and sadly concluded that sufficient evidence of
perjury exists to send this matter to the Senate.
I cast my votes solely on the evidence and the law consistent with my
conscience.
Impeachment is similar to an indictment, or a formal charge of
wrongdoing, and I believe the evidence of perjury before the grand jury
and obstruction of justice meet the ``clear and convincing'' threshold
for moving the process forward. I have also concluded these charges
rise to the level of an impeachable offense pursuant to the
Constitution of the United States.
In the final analysis, it all comes down to perjury and covering up
perjury. The compelling reason for impeachment is that the President's
perjury has undermined the rule of law.
The laws against perjury are the glue that holds our legal system
together. To remain a nation of laws governed by the rule of law, all
people, including the President, must be treated equally and held
accountable. The President must abide by the same laws as every other
American.
In analyzing the four articles of impeachment, I have concluded that
the charge of perjury before the grand jury is substantial by clear and
convincing evidence. As the chief law enforcement officer of the United
States, the President has an obligation to tell the truth, under oath,
in judicial proceedings. He chose not to.
Similarly, I concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the
President obstructed justice in order to cover up his perjury.
At the same time, I have concluded that Articles 2 and 4 do not
present clear and convincing evidence of impeachable offenses by the
President.
In my judgment, the second article concerning perjury in a civil
deposition does not meet the ``clear and convincing'' standard because
[[Page H12005]]
of questions about materiality. In addition, the charge of abuse of
power--for the answers by the President's lawyers to the Judiciary
Committee's questions--is not justified by the evidence and raises Due
Process concerns.
This is truly a sad day for America and the American people. But,
long after the words spoken today have faded, and long after this
painful ordeal is concluded, we will remain a nation of laws. This
means we must sometimes make difficult decisions to ensure that our
national principles survive and public trust is maintained.
By the grace of God, I pray that this painful chapter in our nation's
history will be quickly put behind us by the Senate so we can address
our nation's pressing needs, heal our wounds and show the world
America's enduring strength and resiliency.
Mr. SANDLIN. Mr. Speaker, on this somber occasion I rise in strong
support of the Constitution of the United States of America and the
rule of law and in strong opposition to the Articles of Impeachment
before us today.
Impeachment is possibly the most difficult issue to face any
Congress. Attempting to impeach and remove a president strikes at the
very foundation of our constitutional scheme of government.
As has been correctly stated many times today, the Constitution of
the United States of America sets the standard for impeachment and
provides that the President can be removed only upon ``Impeachment for
and Conviction of Treason, Bribery or other high crimes and
Misdemeanors.''
Under our law and interpretations of the Constitution, it is clear
that impeachment requires wrongdoing by public officials while acting
in their public capacity. English precedent clearly illustrates that
impeachment applies only in cases of fundamental attacks against the
system of government itself. Further, legal scholars agree that the
Framers of our Constitution understood English precedent and intended
to authorize impeachment only in cases of serious harm to the state
such as treason or bribery.
Recent interpretations are consistent. In fact, a memorandum prepared
by the Republican Members of the Judiciary Committee in 1974 stated, in
a pertinent part, as follows:
. . . It is our judgment, based upon this constitutional
history, that the Framers of the United States Constitution
intended that the President should be removable by the
legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to
the system of government established by the Constitution.
[Nixon report at 364-365 (Minority views of Messrs.
Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott,
Moorhead, Marazati and Latta)]
Obviously, the historical and constitutional standards are clear.
Justice as obviously, the articles before us today do not even attempt
to allege official misconduct resulting in damage to our system of
government. Therefore, the articles must be rejected.
Is the conduct of the President disappointing? Certainly it is. Has
it been offensive to the American public? Again, the answer is yes.
However, neither of those standards is the test. We must follow the
law.
Attempting to impeach a President for any reason other than the
reasons set out in the Constitution will seriously erode our
constitutional order and will ignore the constitutionally-imposed
limits on legislative authority.
This is a serious matter. Either we respect the Constitution or we do
not. Either we follow the rule of law or we do not. I intend to vote
against the Articles of Impeachment. I urge my friends and colleagues
on both sides of the aisle to do the same.
Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, as you, know, the President has acknowledged
the shameful personal conduct that he engaged in to a grand jury, to
his family and to the American people. I think everyone agrees that
such indefensible behavior was reprehensible and immoral, and
appropriately, President Clinton has apologized for misleading the
country on this matter. Even more appropriately, he has repeatedly
recognized how harmful his conduct has been and the damage it has
caused to the nation and his family.
Congress has spent the last few months attempting to determine what
action should be taken in response to the President's offenses.
Unfortunately, I believe that the process by which the House of
Representatives has approached this matter has become tainted and
unfair.
From the start, the House Judiciary Committee promised a thorough,
bipartisan investigation that would command public support as in the
1974 Watergate hearings. Sadly, the Committee failed this test. Unlike
1974, they relied exclusively on the one-sided case of independent
counsel Ken Starr rather than interviewing the major participants in
this case who have contradicted allegations made by Starr. Unlike 1974,
there was no cross-examination opportunity for the President's lawyers.
Unlike 1974, there was littel access given to the President's counsel
for most of the proceedings. Unlike 1974, there was no bipartisan
decision to proceed with articles of impeachment, instead only a strict
party-line vote.
The Congress is considering resolutions which direct that President
Clinton's actions ``warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from
office.'' I am voting against these resolutions because I feel that
while the poor judgment and reprehensible behavior in which the
President engaged was wrong, it simply does not rise to the standard of
impeachment outlined in the Constitution--a crime comparable to treason
or bribery. This vote lowers the standard our Founding Fathers set for
such a drastic action. From this point forward, a simple vote of no
confidence by the majority party will empower them a president and
overturn a popular election.
I have called for the congressional censure and rebuke of President
Clinton as an appropriate punishment. Censure would be a shame of
historical proportion and would allow the President to be indicated and
tried in a court of law when he leaves office. Unfortunately, we will
be denied the opportunity to vote on this option on the floor of the
House.
Some have expressed concern that failure to impeach the President
sends a bad message to our families and children. I believe that public
officials need to strive constantly to set a high standard. However,
America's families are strong enough that the don't have to depend on
Congressional action to tell them right from wrong. In my family and in
every family across the country, the President's behavior has been
discussed, evaluated and rebuked. Wherever the President goes, he will
always carry this brand for his personal behavior, both now and
throughout history. That is why I believe censure in the proper and
appropriate formal declaration against his behavior. However,
impeachment under the high standards set by the Constitution is not
appropriate.
I vote against impeachment not to approve of the behavior of this
president, but to support the Constitution and the institution of the
Presidency.
Mr. QUINN. Mr. Speaker, article I section 2 of the United States
Constitution says in part that, ``. . . the House shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.'' It is one of the most awesome responsibilities
that Members of this chamber face, but one which we cannot ignore.
Today, it is with a heavy heart and much regret that I will support
three articles of impeachment against the President of the United
States.
The President, while appearing before a grand jury and answering
questions presented to him in a deposition, took an oath to, ``. . .
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.'' By
offering false and misleading testimony, the President failed to honor
that oath, and in doing so, committed perjury and obstructed justice.
Mr. Speaker, I did not reach this decision easily. In fact, this is
the most difficult decision I have made since being a member of
Congress. I arrived at my vote after speaking and meeting with my
constituents and after talking to clubs, school groups, friends and
neighbors. Most importantly, I reached my decision after a great deal
of soul searching. It is a decision based on principle, not politics.
My vote is one of conscience.
My decision is also based upon the clear evidence of perjury and
obstruction of justice as presented by the House Judiciary Committee.
After examining the record of the House Judiciary Committee, I am
convinced that the President committed an impeachable offense. The more
I learn about the serious details of perjury and obstruction of
justice, the more I am concerned about the President's failure to tell
the truth. All Americans must tell the truth while testifying in a
court of law. What precedent are we establishing within our legal
system if we do not uphold the most basic legal concept of telling the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? If the truth is
lacking, justice can not and will not prevail.
Some have said that a vote to impeach is unfair. I disagree.
Impeachment puts this matter right where it belongs, in the Senate,
where the evidence can be weighed, where the public can have time to
understand the charges and where a proper judgment can be reached.
Every Representative must swear or affirm to uphold the Constitution
of the United States. It is that very oath that demands this vote that
we are casting today. The right vote is not always the easy vote. I
would have liked nothing more than to have had this matter resolved
before it was taken under consideration by the full House of
Representatives. However, that was not the case. I see it as my duty to
cast a vote for justice.
Mrs. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the Republican
majority will vote to pass Articles of Impeachment against President
William Jefferson Clinton. This is truly a sad day for the nation. The
Republican majority has seen fit to trample the Constitution in
railroading these Articles through both the Judiciary Committee and the
House of Representatives.
[[Page H12006]]
The Republican majority insists that this is being done to preserve
the Presidency. This is not their true concern. The Republican majority
wants to destroy this President. He has been too effective for too
long. President Clinton is truly a representative of the American
people. He rose from poverty to gain an education, to gain the highest
office in the State of Arkansas, and finally, to gain the highest
office in the United States and the world. He has long been a threat to
the Republican party, and now the majority is looking to destroy this
man to save themselves.
The Republican majority insists that this is being done to preserve
the Constitution. The unfair and partisan process followed by the
Republicans is evidence that this is not true. The Framers of the
Constitution did not intend impeachment to be taken lightly. The
constitutional standard calls for impeachment when ``treason, bribery
and other high crimes and misdemeanors'' have been committed. This
standard envisioned crimes against the state--crimes which truly cut
deep through the fabric of the nation. The Republican majority's
Articles of Impeachment do not reflect such crimes. The President has
betrayed himself and his family. He exercised bad judgment. He did not
betray this nation.
The Republican majority insists that this is being done for the good
of the American people. This is clearly not true. The majority of
Americans have come out in opposition to impeachment and yet the
Republicans have gone forward with this process. Instead of listening
to the desire of the people to move forward, the Republicans have
chosen to ignore the public. This is not democracy, this is tyranny.
The Republicans have pushed forward in an atmosphere fraught with
unfairness, forcing through Articles of Impeachment without concern for
the rule of law. The Republicans have abandoned all due process in
their investigation, calling only the Independent Counsel to attest to
the so-called ``facts'' brought to bear in this case. The Republicans
have argued that the President is not above the law. Neither should the
President be held beneath the law. He deserves the basic protections
that we give all Americans in cases of this magnitude. The Office of
the President deserves better, the American people deserve better.
During the Iran-Contra investigation, the current chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, the Honorable Henry Hyde, was quoted as,
``mock[ing] those who `sermonized about how terrible lying is and
sa[ying] it made no sense to `label every untruth and deception an
outrage'' by the Los Angeles Times. Further, he characterized the
investigation of Col. Oliver North a ``witch hunt.'' What a difference
an election makes. The Republicans became the majority party in the
House of Representatives, and have long since forgotten those words.
The Republicans have embarked on a forty million dollar, six year
fishing expedition, hoping to find something to pin on the President.
What the Republicans have caught should be thrown back.
I do not condone the past actions of the President, but his actions
do not constitute ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I only hope that
history will forgive this House for the grave mistake we have made
today.
December 17, 1998.
To: Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson:
Dear Ms. Johnson. The Constitution is not the Bible. It is
bothersome to see Republicans wrap themselves so tightly
around this document as the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth. The Bible is the only publication that
claims this posture.
Interpreters of this same Constitution at one point did not
believe that blacks had the same rights as whites. Women were
not equal to men, they said. We have amended the Constitution
many times as time has revealed more and more reasons to do
so. Using the Constitution as a truth text disregards all the
amendments that have been added to it.
The President tried to cover up an affair. It was a wrong
to his wife and daughter. The only impeachment he deserves is
from them. Adultery is a sin. Bearing false witness is a sin.
It seems then, that the Bible is the best text to deal with
this sin, not the Constitution.
The Constitution gives all life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness. It also gives each of us rights--rights to
defend ourselves when accused, rights to legal counsel.
Hiring counsel or using our legal system should not be
twisted into a charge of obstruction of justice. Is it abuse
of power to defend yourself?
Hiding the truth about an adulterous affair is something
human beings often do. It is a character flaw that comes with
the territory. Those who are faithful to their wives and
husband are to be commended. Let's not be in denial, however,
about our country's divorce rate and the cheating rate in
history and in present times.
Let me get this straight. We're going to impeach the
President for: 1. Defending himself (a.k.a abuse of power?);
2. Hiring legal counsel (a.k.a. obstruction of justice?); 3.
Trying to conceal an affair (a.k.a. perjury?).
The Constitution gives all Americans a right to privacy.
Kenneth Star has violated Bill Clinton's right to privacy.
That's constitutional. To investigate this sexual affair is
not the governments' business--never was and never will be.
That's constitutional. A citizen can defend himself against
prosecution. That's constitutional. A citizen can hire a
legal counsel. That's constitutional. Lying under oath about
a constitutional right to privacy is constitutional.
The Bible should be our guide on this matter. The
Constitution is not the Bible.
Sincerely,
Thomas Henderson.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to address the matter before the
House regarding the four Articles of Impeachment that have been
reported by the Committee on the Judiciary. This is a situation that
demands our most careful consideration and devotion to duty as Members
of Congress. It is a matter that is not to be taken lightly. Each
Member of this body must reason individually to reach the determination
that must be made in order to fulfill our constitutional
responsibilities in the impeachment procedure. This is a process that
should not be partisan, as it should be based on the application of the
rule of law.
I believe that all of us recognize the seriousness of President
Clinton being charged with violations against the Constitution. Much
time and effort have been devoted to investigating and reviewing the
actions on which this resolution is based. I have followed the hearings
of the Committee on the Judiciary concerning this matter with great
interest and I am in agreement with the resolution (H. Res. 611) that
has been submitted by Chairman Hyde. H. Res. 611 outlines four articles
as the basis for impeachment, which I shall summarize:
Article I--President Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and
misleading testimony to a Federal Grand Jury. I agree.
Article II--President Clinton willfully corrupted and manipulated the
judicial process, in that, he willfully provided perjurious, false and
misleading testimony in response to written questions seeking
information in a Federal civil right action, which was brought against
him, as well as in a deposition in that action. I agree.
Article III--President Clinton prevented, obstructed and impeded the
administration of justice through a course of conduct or scheme in a
series of events between December 1997 and January 1998. I agree.
Article IV--President Clinton has engaged in conduct that resulted in
misuse and abuse of his high office, impaired the due and proper
administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, and
contravened the authority of the Legislative Branch and of a coordinate
investigative proceeding, in that, he refused and failed to respond to
certain written requests for admission, as well as willfully made
perjurious, false and misleading sworn statements in response to
certain written requests for admission that were propounded as part of
the impeachment inquiry that was authorized by the House. I agree.
It is clear to me that convincing evidence has been presented in
regard to each of the four Articles that have been reported by the
Committee on the Judiciary. Accordingly, I support the Articles as
stated in H. Res. 611.
Mr. Speaker, I would also like to address the assertion that I have
heard today that the consideration by the Congress of the impeachment
of President Clinton, who is the Commander in Chief of our Armed
Forces, would have a demoralizing effect on our men and women in
uniform, especially while our Nation is engaged in military operations
against Iraq. I can speak from experience, based on numerous
conversations with Americans from all walks of life, who are now
serving or who have previously served in our Nation's military, that
such a charge has no merit. In this regard, I would like to submit the
following article by Major Daniel J. Rabil, of the United States Marine
Corps Reserve:
[From the Washington Times, Nov. 9, 1998]
Please, Impeach My Commander in Chief
(By Daniel J. Rabil)
The American military is subject to civilian control, and
we deeply believe in that principle. We also believe, as
affirmed in the Nuremberg Trials, that servicemen are not
bound to obey illegal orders. But what about orders given by
a known criminal? Should we trust in the integrity of
directives given by a president who violates the same basic
oath we take? Should we be asked to follow a morally
defective leader with a demonstrated disregard for his
troops? The answer is no, for implicit in the voluntary oath
that all servicemen take is the promise that they will
receive honorable civilian leadership. Bill Clinton has
violated that covenant. It is therefore Congress' duty to
remove him from office.
I do not claim to speak for all service members, but
certainly Bill Clinton has never been the military's favorite
president. Long before the Starr report, there was plenty of
anecdotal evidence of this administration's contempt for the
armed forces. Yes, Mr. Clinton was a lying draft dodger, yes
his staffers have been anti-military, and yes, he breezily
ruins the careers of senior officers who speak up or say
politically incorrect things. Meanwhile, servicemen are now
in jail for sex crimes less egregious than those Paula Jones
and Kathleen Willey say Mr. Clinton committed.
[[Page H12007]]
Mr. Clinton and his supporters do not care in the least
about the health of our armed forces. Hateful of a
traditional military culture they never deigned to study, Mr.
Clinton's disingenuous feminist, homosexual and racial
activist friends regard the services as mere political props,
useful only for showcasing petty identity group grievances.
It is no coincidence that the media have played up one
military scandal after another during the Clinton years. This
politically-driven shift of focus, from the military mission
to the therapeutic wants of fringe groups, has taken its
toll: Partly because of Mr. Clinton's impossibly Orwellian
directives, Chief of Naval Operations Jay Boorda committed
suicide.
So Clinton has weakened the services and fostered a
corrosive anti-military culture. This may be loathsome, but
it is not impeachable, particularly if an attentive Congress
can limit the extent of Clinton-induced damage. As officers
and gentlemen, we have therefore continued to march,
pretending to respect our hypocrite-in-chief.
Then came the Paula Jones perjury and the ensuing Starr
Report. I have always known that Clinton was integrity-
impaired, but I never thought even he could be so depraved,
so contemptuous, as to conduct military affairs as was
described in the special prosecutor's report to Congress. In
that report, we learn of a telephone conversation between Mr.
Clinton and a congressman in which the two men discussed our
Bosnian deployment. During that telephone discussion, the
Commander-in-Chief's pants were unzipped, and Monica Lewinsky
was busy saving him the cost of a prostitute. This is the
president of the United States of America? Should soldiers
not feel belittled and worried by this? We deserve better.
When Ronald Reagan's ill-fated Beirut mission led to the
careless loss of 241 Marines in a single bombing, few
questioned his love of country and his overriding concern for
American interests. But should Mr. Clinton lead us into
military conflict, he would do so, incredibly, without any
such trust. After the recent American missile attacks in
Afghanistan and Sudan, my instant reaction was outrage, for I
instinctively presumed that Mr. Clinton was trying to knock
Miss Lewinsky's concurrent grand jury testimony out of the
head-lines. The alternative, that this president--who ignores
national security interests, who appeases Iraq and North
Korea, and who fights like a leftover Soviet the idea of
an American missile defense--actually believed in the need
for immediate military strikes, was simply implausible.
And no amount of scripted finger wagging, lip biting, or
mention of The Children by this highly skilled perjurer
can convince me otherwise.
In other words, Mr. Clinton has demonstrated that he will
risk war, terrorist attacks, and our lives just to save his
dysfunctional administration. What might his motives be in
some future conflict? Blackmail? Cheap political payoffs?
Or--dare I say it--simply the lazy blundering of an
instinctively anti-American man? It is immoral to impose such
untrustworthy leadership on a fighting force.
It will no doubt be considered extreme to raise the
question of whether this president is a national security
risk, but I must. I do not believe presidential candidates
should be required to undergo background investigations, as
is normal for service members. I do know, however, that Bill
Clinton would not pass such a screening. Recently, I received
a phone call from a military investigator, who asked me a
variety of character-related questions about a fellow Marine
reservist. The Marine, who is also a friend, needed to update
his top-secret clearance. Afterward, I called him. We
marveled how lowly reservists like us must pass complete
background checks before routine deployments, yet the
guardian of our nation's nuclear button would raise a huge
red flag on any such security report. We joked that my
friend's security clearance would have been permanently
canceled if I had said to the investigator, ``Well, Rick
spent the Vietnam years smoking pot and leading protests
against his country in Britain. His hobbies are lying and
adultery. His brother's a cocaine dealer, and oh, yeah--he
visited the Soviet Union for unknown reasons while his
countrymen were getting killed in Vietnam.''
Do I show disrespect for this president? Perhaps it depends
on the meaning of the word ``this.'' If Clinton were merely a
spoiled leftist taking advantage of our free society, a la
Jane Fonda, that would be one thing. But you don't make an
atheist pope, and you don't keep a corrupt security risk as
commander-in-chief.
The enduring goodness of the American military character
over the past two centuries does not automatically derive
from our nation's nutritional habits or from a good job
benefits package. This character must be developed and
supported, or it will die. Already we are seeing declining
enlistment and a 1970s-style disdain for military service,
squandering the real progress made during the purposeful
1980s. Our military's heart and soul can survive lean
budgets, but they cannot long survive in an America that
would tolerate such a character as now occupies the Oval
Office. We are entitled to a leader who at least respects
us--not one who cannot be bothered to remove his penis from a
subordinate's mouth long enough to discuss our deployment to
a combat zone. To subject our services to such debased
leadership is nothing less than the collective spit of the
entire nation upon our faces.
Bill Clinton has always been a moral coward. He has always
had contempt for the American military. He has always had a
questionable security background. Since taking office, he has
ignored defense issues, except as serves the destructive
goals of his extremist supporters. His behavior with Paula
Jones and Kathleen Willey was bizarre and deranged--try
keeping a straight face while watching mandated Navy sexual
harassment videos, knowing that the president's own conduct
violates historic service rules to the point of absurdity.
For a while, it was almost possible to laugh off Mr.
Clinton's hedonistic, ``college protester'' values. But now
that we have clear evidence that he perjured himself and
corrupted others to cover up his lies, Bill Clinton is no
longer funny. He is dangerous.
William J. Clinton, perhaps the most selfish man ever to
disgrace our presidency, will not resign. I therefore risk my
commission, as our generals will not, to urge this of
Congress: Remove this stain from our White House. Banish him
from further office. For God's sake, do your duty.
Mr. SANDLIN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, I listened as Members explained
that the reason they were voting to impeach President Clinton was
because he had committed perjury. The fact of the matter is--and the
record is clear and undisputed--that the President did not commit and,
in truth, these proposed Articles of Impeachment do not actually accuse
the President of perjury.
Let's be very careful and clear about this loose talk of perjury.
Whatever you may think of Ken Starr, he has never accused Bill Clinton
of having committed perjury--neither in his own statement to the
committee on November 19 nor in the OIC Referral sent to the Congress
on September 9.
Everyone seems to have forgotten the testimony of the five expert
prosecutors who appeared and testified before the Judiciary Committee.
Three served in Republican administrations at the top levels of the
Justice Department; two served in Democratic administrations. They were
unanimous in their agreement that the evidence against Mr. Clinton
could not support a perjury charge and that no responsible prosecutor
would ever bring such a charge.
Let me quote Thomas P. Sullivan, the U.S. attorney from the Northern
District of Illinois from 1977 to 1981, someone who has had 40 years of
experience in the criminal justice system. He testified, ``It is not
perjury for a witness to evade or frustrate or answer non-responsively.
The evidence simply does not support the conclusion that the President
knowingly committed perjury, and the case is so doubtful and weak that
a responsible prosecutor would not present it to the grand jury.''
What are we really talking about in Article One when President
Clinton is charged with wilfully providing ``perjurious, false and
misleading testimony?'' It is not that President Clinton denied an
improper, intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He admitted that
relationship, and the whole world saw his testimony on that point when
the video tape of the grand jury testimony was played. Instead, the
allegation of perjury in the grand jury boils down to a disagreement
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky as to the graphic details of
their contact--whether he touched certain unclothed private parts of
her body. She says, ``He did.'' He said that he didn't.
According to the expert prosecutors, this kind of dispute would never
be prosecuted. To quote Mr. Richard Davis, a distinguished and
experienced prosecutor from New York City, ``In the end, the entire
basis for a grand jury perjury prosecution comes down to Monica
Lewinsky's assertion that there was a reciprocal nature to their
relationship, and that the president touched her private parts with the
intent to arouse or gratify her, and the president's denial that he did
so. Putting aside whether this is the type of difference of testimony
which should justify an impeachment of a president, I do not believe
that a case involving this kind of conflict between two witnesses would
be brought by a prosecutor . . . This simply is not a perjury case that
would be brought.''
For many years, it has been the practice of the Department of Justice
not to bring perjury charges based on ``he says/she says'' swearing
contests. That is what we have here. Nothing more.
Enough loose talk about perjury.
Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, it has been several months since I called on
the President to resign from office for the good of the country and the
honor of the Presidency.
Today I will cast my vote in favor of his impeachment because to this
day he has refused to live up to the honor demanded of that office.
For if the law is not respected and obeyed by the highest official in
the land--indeed the Commander in Chief--why should each of us seek to
uphold the law. Why could we not selectively choose when to lie and
when to tell the truth?
It is unbelievable to me today that President Clinton still continues
to lie about his affair.
He continues to deny that he had a sexual relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky.
[[Page H12008]]
He continues to deny that he has lied under oath.
Does he believe that the subject of his words make the truth of his
words irrelevant? The fact that he had an affair is not the issue.
Yet, when both the President--in swearing to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth--disregards his oath, he fails to
meet the high moral standard example demanded of our President.
Thus, such disregard for the rule of law demands impeachment action
by the Congress of the United States.
For, as Chairman Hyde has said, in this country, justice depends on
the enforceability of the oath.
Accoring to the evidence that I have reviewed, I see no option but to
recognize the President's actions as perjurious, and to conclude that
he has obstructed justice and abused the power that he has as President
of the United States.
There are more than 115 people in federal prison for perjury in this
country.
Should the man charged to lead our Nation with integrity and honesty
be allowed to be treated any differently for charges similar or worse
than those of individuals who have been convicted--solely because his
position of power? the President is not a king.
America was built on the ideal of equal justice under law. This
concept must apply equally to everyone, including the President.
As a Member of Congress, the very first of my duties was to swear an
oath to uphold the Constitution.
My duty this week goes beyond the normal task of making law and
directly reflect my sworn duty to maintain the integrity of the
Constitution and apply the rule of law, which has held this nation
together since its birth more than 200 years ago, to the illegal
actions of the President.
I soberly take part in this process with the weight of responsibility
to the Constitution on my shoulders.
Mr. FRANKS of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, it is with a profound sense of
sadness that I stand here today. All of us wish that the events
connected with this matter had never occurred. But they did.
Today, we are being asked to stand in judgment and decide whether
William Jefferson Clinton should become only the second president in
our Nation's history to be impeached. It is the most agonizing decision
I have ever been called upon to make.
As we address this matter, we must decide what is right for the
country and what is required to serve the interests of justice. In
making this decision, I recognize that the purpose of impeachment is
not to punish a political leader, but to preserve the integrity of our
institutions of government.
In order to meet our solemn responsibility, we must put aside public
opinion polls and avoid the temptation to pursue the politically
expedient course. Our responsibility is clear--we must uphold the
Constitution of the United States.
America is a government of laws--not of men. No individual--not even
the President of the United States--is above the law. These are the
principles embodied in our Constitution. It's what we teach children
every day in classrooms across America.
The evidence presented to this House lays out a compelling case that
President Clinton committed perjury on two separate occasions and
personally engaged in conduct to obstruct justice.
I recognize that some Americans question whether perjury and
obstruction of justice constitute adequate grounds for impeachment.
I've tried to weigh this issue very carefully. And in the final
analysis, it comes back to a basic principle--no American is above the
law.
Perjury and obstruction of justice are direct attacks on the
government's ability to dispense justice. Lying under oath undermines
the very foundation of our judicial system. If Congress fails to
confront President Clinton's violations of the law, we would fail to
meet our obligation under the constitution. We would be telling
America, particularly our nation's young people, that the crime of
perjury, even when committed by the President, is acceptable in certain
situations. Equally devastating, we would be holding the President of
the United States to a different standard of justice than ordinary
citizens.
I want to remind my colleagues and the American people that we are
voting on impeachment today not because the Republicans control
Congress or because the Independent Counsel was overzealous. We're here
because William Jefferson Clinton--our Nation's chief law enforcement
official--has subverted the judicial process and violated the laws he
swore to uphold.
Through his actions, the President--and the President alone--has led
the nation down the painful path toward impeachment. And he, and he
alone, has been in a position to spare the Nation the ordeal of an
impeachment trial in the United States Senate.
Over the past 2 weeks, I've written twice to the President asking him
to come to terms with the fact that he broke the law and to take
responsibility for his actions.
On December 3d, I urged the President to come before the American
people, admit that he committed perjury and indicate that he was
prepared to face the consequences.
On the eve of this debate, I wrote to the President one more time and
called on him to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth.
Tragically, President Clinton continues to put his own self interest
above America's interests. The President appears to be more concerned
about avoiding criminal prosecution after he leaves office than he is
about sparing the nation the ordeal of an impeachment trial.
The failure of the President to come forward and publicly admit that
he has broken the law, compels me to vote for impeachment articles, 1,
2, and 3 which are before the House today.
I want to issue one final plea to the President. It's not too late to
demonstrate real personal and moral leadership. Save the Nation the
trauma of an impeachment trial and save your Presidency. Admit that you
broke the law and violated the trust of the American people.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on the behalf of my
country and my party. I do not come to this floor easily--indeed, I am
disheartened that we are here today debating impeachment while our
Armed Forces are engaged in fighting in the Middle East. I am
disheartened that a distortion of the legal facts has brought us to
this point today. Impeachment of a President according to the
Constitution can only occur when that individual is guilty of high
crimes and misdemeanors. I strongly feel President Clinton has neither
violated the fundamental principles of the Constitution nor is he
guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor. He has not threatened the
security of our nation and this impeachment is not based on treason,
bribery or a threat to our democracy. This impeachment is based on
partisan party politics. Let me remind those who support impeacment
that the presumption of innocence until proven guilty is central and
basic to our system of justice. This impeachment is predicated on
perjury which has not been proven. I urge my colleagues to remember the
words of Martin Luther King, Jr., who said from his cell in the
Birmingham jail--``injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere
. . . whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.'' Mr.
Livingston's resignation proves the effect of his injustices affecting
his status. As in all prior impeachments, the allegations concerned
official misconduct not private misbehavior. In all of American
history, no official has been impeached for misbehavior unrelated to
his offical responsibilities. The Founding Fathers did not intend
impeachment or the threat of impeachment to serve as a device for
nullifying a duly elected President just because Members of Congress
disagree with him. Again, I say the President has not committed a crime
or misdemeanor and should not be impeached.
In face of this turbulent time for America, Bob Livingston's decision
to resign from Congress and relinquish his position as Speaker of the
House only demonstrates his personal shame for his own misdeeds. His
action does not lend any credence to this procedure against the
President.
America is a great county. I hope this impeachment, this attempted
coup d'etat, does not begin a downward slide to our economy, our image,
and our morale. I urge my colleagues to vote against impeachment.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the Congressional
Record a letter that I received from Mayor Roberta Cooper of Hayward,
CA. Mayor Cooper writes to express the sentimant that runs strong in my
district that the impeachment proceedings being conducted by House of
Representatitives are not in the best interest of our Nation and not
supported by our citizens.
City of Hayward,
Hayward, CA, October 26, 1998.
Hon. Pete Stark,
Member, House of Representatives, Cannon Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Pete: On the issue of the partisan driven Presidential
Impeachment, its time for you and the members of California
Congressional Delegation to hear from us at home!
Frankly, the speed at which this proceeding is proceeding,
it's as if the voice of the American people has fallen on
deaf ears and blind eyes!
Doesn't Congress see that President Clinton's ratings,
among the American people, are holding steady?
Can't Congress grasp the fact that we've had enough?
Isn't it glaringly clear that pursuing this matter with the
level of ruthlessness and aggression can ultimately serve no
greater public good?
Is Congress completely blind to the fact that the
collective mind and spirit of the United States of America
will suffer a massive societal depression should it succeed
in its effort to destroy President Clinton? Is it Congress's
intention to bring the citizens down with the President?
[[Page H12009]]
I am extremely troubled by the far reaching implication and
tremendously adverse outcomes presented by this partisan
feeding frenzy should it succeed.
I implore you to let your colleagues know that we strongly
object the proposal to impeach the President and urge that
this matter be resolved by means other than impeachment.
Sincerely,
Roberta Cooper,
Mayor.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, throughout this long process
as I have listened to this divisive debate, I have had to wonder about
the legacy of the 18th Congressional district. The first person to hold
this seat was the late Congresswoman Barbara Jordan. She was a member
of the Congress in 1974 during Watergate, and she was a member of the
House Judiciary Committee.
I have been careful not to mischaracterize her thoughts or words
during these serious and troubling times. However, throughout the
debate it seems at every moment the Republican majority continues to
misuse Ms. Jordan's comments.
I think it is important to acknowledge the remarks she made today,
and the impact that those words will have on the actions we take today.
In her July 24, 1974 speech, in citing the Framers of the Constitution,
she noted that ``the Framers confined in the Congress the power if need
be, to remove the President in order to strike a balance between a
president swollen with power and grown tyrannical * * *.'' This is not
the case today.
She also said impeachment was limited to high crimes and
misdemeanors, as she cited the federal convention of 1787. Finally, Ms.
Jordan sheds light on what she might have thought of today's
proceedings as she states ``A President is impeachable if he attempts
to subvert the Constitution.'' I think it is important for Congress to
hear these words that the late Barbara Jordan gave on July 24, 1974.
A sense of the Congress resolution on censure is not
unconstitutional, it is not prohibited by the words of the
Constitution. It is not specifically noted in the Constitution, but
however neither are postal stamps, education, or social security. This
resolution is germane and constitutionally sound. Mr. Speaker please
rule and allow a free standing resolution of censure to be voted on by
this House--do not deny the will of the people.
The Bible, Mark 3:25, teaches that ``[I]f a house be divided against
itself, that house cannot stand.'' It's time to stop the malicious
attacks because surely, we will all perish. It is time to close ranks
and get back to the business of America. It is time to heal this
Nation. Today let's restore the American public's faith in the
Constitution do not deny their will.
We need to begin that healing process now to return America to
greatness.
Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Speaker, I will vote to impeach the President because
by committing perjury he has violated his oath to uphold our
Constitution and has undermined the rule of law, which is the
foundation of our society.
The lifeblood of our legal system is honest testimony. When
falsehoods are tolerated then the system cannot function. Perjury,
therefore, cannot be dismissed as a minor infraction, but instead is a
serious felony offense because it undermines the very existence of our
system of justice. Accordingly, I will vote for the first article of
impeachment.
The second article of impeachment relates to the President's alleged
false testimony in a civil lawsuit which has been settled out of court.
Perjury in a civil lawsuit is a serious offense as well and, if
adequately proven, would warrant criminal prosecution. However, I do
not believe the evidence presented is adequate to reach the threshold
of an impeachable offense.
The third article of impeachment alleges the President obstructed
justice by, among other actions, engaging in a scheme to conceal and
willingly encouraging his employees to provide false testimony in order
to help conceal his pattern of lying under oath. This is a misuse of
power and a very telling sign of the lengths to which the President was
willing to go to subvert the legal system he swore to uphold in order
to hide his crimes. Article III deserves the support of the House.
The last article of impeachment charges the President with contempt
of Congress for presenting inaccurate testimony in response to written
questions submitted to him by the House Judiciary Committee. Though a
serious crime, the evidence provided by the Judiciary Committee does
not reach the necessary standard of ``clear and convincing'' in order
to justify impeachment.
The President's lies under oath do a disservice to the memory of
those who brought us the freedoms we enjoy and endanger the hopes of
future generations who will one day enjoy those freedoms. He has also
demonstrated a belief that he is above the law he has sworn to uphold
and enforce. Nothing is further from the truth.
The success and longevity of our republic are due to its foundation
upon principles tested by time, not specific people or personalities.
One of those principles is that Americans are equal under the rule of
law. No one is exempt from this standard.
Our democracy will survive this difficult time because its founding
principles will endure long after the players in this current drama
pass from the scene, and it will be stronger for having gone through
this struggle.
Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, as I fly back to South
Carolina for the last time as a Member of this House, I'm thankful that
the House has done its duty. We've kept the Republic; we've met our day
of obligation.
The Speaker-elect Mr. Livingston's dramatic resignation today on the
House floor has shined the light of truth and honor on the deception
that private conduct does not affect public morality and on the lie
that a civilization may persist where wrongdoing is devoid of
consequences. Repentance accompanied by acceptance of consequences
precedes true healing.
May our Land be healed as John Adams words ring down through history:
``Our constitution is meant for a moral and religious people and is
wholly in adequate for the government of any other.''
Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today with a heavy heart, a clear
conscience, and a strong resolve to move our nation forward. As we
stand on the edge of the 21st century, a veil of darkness hangs over
our democracy. Indeed, let no member of this institution nor the
American people minimize the gravity of today's actions. We are about
to cast our votes on whether or not we want to impeach the President of
the United States for only the second time in the history of the
republic.
I have heard a lot of talk today about the ``rule of law.'' I wish I
could hear more talk about the ``rule of fairness.'' Why couldn't we
have debated and voted on Monday after the bombings ceased in Iraq? Why
couldn't the majority party let us vote on a censure proposal where all
of us in the U.S. House of Representatives could vote our conscience?
Abraham Lincoln called this a government of the people, by the
people, and for the people. The people have made it abundantly clear
that they do not want to see the president impeached. Are we going to
put aside their wishes in favor of partisan politics that have no place
in this debate?
The Framers of the Constitution created the impeachment process, not
as a punishment for the president, but as a protection for the American
people against a chief executive whose actions would threaten our very
system of government. There are other ways to hold President Clinton
responsible for his actions: censure, fine, or criminal indictment
after he leaves office.
Peter Rodino, who presided over the impeachment hearings of Richard
Nixon, has said that President Nixon was impeached because of ``the
totality of the many actions which resulted in grave harm to the
republic, which if permitted to go on, would have destroyed the
constitutional system.''
If the President had stolen taxpayers' dollars or sold classified
information to a foreign government, I would not hesitate to vote for
impeachment. But do Members honestly believe that President Clinton's
actions have resulted in grave harm to the republic and would destroy
our constitutional system if he is allowed to remain in office? Or do
you believe, as I do, that President Clinton's conduct, while
appalling, immoral, and reprehensible, does not constitute an
impeachable offense under our Constitution? If so, then you must vote
no. Impeaching this President over his personal failings would be a
greater threat to public confidence in government and the rule of law
than all of his misdeeds.
Let's close this regrettable chapter in our nation's history and get
on with the business of the American people.
Mr. McINTOSH. Mr. Speaker, after weeks of reviewing the evidence,
quiet reflection and prayer, a few days ago I reached the decision that
I would be voting in favor of impeaching President Clinton. I came to
this decision only after a thorough review of documents from the House
Judiciary Committee's investigation along with Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr's report to Congress and information supplied by the
White House.
Although I have criticized the President frequently in the past
because of his policies, I will cast these votes with a heavy heart.
Nothing that Congress can do will completely heal our nation from the
injury it has sustained. Nothing that Congress can do will restore the
honor the office of the presidency previously held.
But there is one thing which our Constitution does allow Congress to
do, and which I believe Congress must do.
Before I explain why I believe we must do that, I want to make one
thing clear: censure will not do. What has happened over the last year
represents a blow to our Constitution, and only a Constitutional
solution will bring integrity back to our democracy.
A censure resolution will not unify our nation. Many of us feel that
a censure would be
[[Page H12010]]
exculpatory, since the President has repeatedly failed to acknowledge
the full effect of his action, particularly the grave damage that his
perjury caused to the rule of law on our constitutional republic.
Clearly, a censure resolution would not fully bring the President to
account for those actions.
In addition, our Constitution does not provide for censure. Some may
argue that just because the Constitution does not provide for it does
not mean that it is unconstitutional. I say that it is
unconstitutional, and that there is only one constitutional process.
Section 4 of Article II states: The President . . . shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' If the President has committed
such high crimes and misdemeanors, our responsibility is clear--
impeachment is the one and only mechanism that our Founders decided was
necessary to resolve the question of whether a President is discharged
of his duties under the Constitution.
Let us review the charges put forth by the Judiciary Committee. The
four articles passed by the Committee make very serious charges.
Article I asserts that William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning
the nature of his relations with a subordinate; concerning prior
perjurious, false and misleading testimony given in a Federal civil
rights action brought against him; concerning prior false and
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal
judge in that civil rights action; and concerning his corrupt efforts
to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of
evidence in that civil rights action.
Article II asserts that William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided
perjurious, false and misleading testimony in response to questions in
a Federal civil rights action concerning conduct and proposed conduct
with subordinate employees; and to a Federal judge concerning the
nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate; his
knowledge of that employee's involvement and participation in the civil
rights action brought against him; and his corrupt efforts to influence
the testimony of that employee.
Article III asserts that William Jefferson Clinton prevented,
obstructed and impeded the administration of justice, and engaged in a
course of conduct designed to delay, impede, cover up and conceal the
existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights
action by encouraging a witness to execute a sworn affidavit he knew to
be perjurious; encouraging a witness to give false testimony; engaging
in a scheme to conceal subpoenaed evidence; secured job assistance to a
witness in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that
witness; allowed his attorney to make false statements to a Federal
judge characterizing an affidavit in order to prevent questioning;
related a false account of an event to a potential witness in order to
corruptly influence the testimony of that witness; and made false
statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in
order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses, causing
the grand jury to receive false information.
Article IV asserts that William Jefferson Clinton engaged in misuse
and abuse of his high office, impaired the due and proper
administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, and
contravened the authority of the legislative branch and the truth-
seeking purpose of an investigate proceeding by refusing and failing to
respond to certain written requests for admission and willfully made
perjurious, false and misleading sworn statements in his response.
I think it is clear that if we study the evidence with an open mind
we will see that these actions do qualify as high crimes and
misdemeanors. The cooperation of citizens and their honesty before the
courts is absolutely necessary for our judicial system to work. It is
all the more important to our liberty that we insist that the
President, whose job it is to see that ``the laws are faithfully
executed'' as the highest law enforcement official, be subject to these
important legal requirements.
And here it is very important to say that we cannot make exceptions
for sex. Many will argue that sexual matters should never enter the
courtroom or the public domain. But I disagree with this. The days when
it was ok for male employers to hit on their female subordinates, and
then lie about it and not suffer any consequences, are long gone.
We cannot have a different standard for the President than we do for
other citizens. Any teacher, military officer, company executive, or
other person in a position of responsibility or leadership would have
been immediately fired for the sort of charges brought against Mr.
Clinton. To create a lower standard for Clinton is equivalent to
setting him above the law. This undercuts the core of Constitutional
democracy, in which the people are governed by laws, not kings or
queens.
Further, not keeping the President to the same standard as the rest
of the nation strikes me as fundamentally un-American. Allowing leaders
to turn public office into their private playgrounds is the sort of
thing that were appropriately associated with banana republics. We have
always sought a higher standard, and have defined ourselves as a nation
that does not tolerate corruption in its highest levels.
I would like to make reference to a recent letter signed by 96
scholars, lawyers and former government officials, including former
Attorneys General Griffin B. Bell (Carter administration) and Edwin
Meese III (Reagan administration), former Judge Robert H. Bork, former
Education Secretary William J. Bennett, Steven Calabresi (Northwest
University law school), and other luminaries. They assert that, not
only will impeaching the President not harm the presidency, but that
not doing so would cause irreparable harm to the presidency. They also
counter the argument that this vote is against the will of the people:
``The Constitution was made in order to remove some objects from
decision by momentary popular sentiment. . . Should the House and the
Senate shirk their responsibilities, they will establish a precedent
for lawless government.''
I am also concerned about another consequence of the President's
behavior, the effect it has on public attitudes toward morality. What
is the message we send to our nation's youth? How does this scandal--
played out on the evening newscast for months--affect parents' efforts
to teach their children the difference between right and wrong? One of
the saddest moments during the last year for me when reading a letter
from a mother in Indiana. She wrote:
Dear David: My sons and I were watching the news the other
night. They were discussing President Clinton and his sexual
affairs.
My eleven year old son commented, he wanted to grow up to
be President so he could have sex in the oval office with who
ever he wanted to.
I try to teach my children right from wrong and good moral
values. I feel the President has made himself a very fine
role model. Wouldn't we want all of America's youth to think
the same way! I think he has lied to us enough and should be
put out of office.
P.S. Do you now how embarrassing it was for my son to tell
me that?
A concerned Mother and an American Citizen,
Elaine Lechien.
My heart sank as I read Mrs. Lechien's letter. Being a parent
nowadays is difficult enough. Parents who want to teach their child to
live responsibly and morally already have a lot of competition.
Television, popular music, and multiple other media all vie for the
role of informing our youth's hearts and minds. Now parents must also
contend with competition from a President who engages in sexual
relations with a very young college intern, then lies to the American
people about it, then encourages his subordinates to lie about it, then
lies to the courts about it, and finally attempts to obstruct those
whose job it is to investigate his actions.
It is not surprising that Mrs. Lechien's son wants to be able to do
the same things that the President does. In his mind, the Presidency is
the pinnacle of power and honor in the adult world. If the President is
allowed to get away with such acts he must think, anything goes. It
imagine that every parent would be thrilled to hear his or her children
say they aspire to become President. But with Bill Clinton's actions,
the holder of that office is no longer an unambiguously good role
model.
America stands at the threshold of a new century, and as we take this
vote, we also stand at a crossroad. One leads to the principles that
are contained in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution--
justice, decency, honor and truth. These are the principles that for
over 200 years have so affected our actions as to earn the admiration
of the world and to gain for the United States the moral leadership
among nations. The other path leads to expediency, temerity, self-
interest, cynicism, and a disdain for the common good. That road will
inevitably end in shame, dishonor, and abandonment of the high
principles that we as a people rely upon for our safety and happiness.
There is no third road. So this is a defining moment for the presidency
and for the Members of this House.
I believe that Americans need leaders who will take us to that first
path, the path of honor. Americans are yearning in their hearts for
higher standards of conduct by our leaders--true fidelity to the
Constitution, moral character in their private lives, and integrity is
being honest with the American people.
As we vote today, we must be true to our God, true to our
Constitution, true to the American people, and true to ourselves.
Sadly, fidelity demands of us that we vote in favor of these articles
of impeachment.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, President Clinton has disgraced himself and
diminished the office he holds.
While this House may not censure Bill Clinton, history will.
[[Page H12011]]
But by failing to respond in a fair and measured way to the
President's conduct, the Republican leadership has assured that history
will also condemn the 105th Congress.
Others in this debate have made the point simply: the proven offenses
are not impeachable and the impeachable offenses are not proven.
``To depose the constitutional chief magistrate of a great nation,
elected by the people, on grounds so slight, would * * * be an abuse of
power.''
These are not my words, but the temperate statement 130 years ago of
a Maine Republican.
William Pitt Fessenden was one of seven courageous Republican
Senators who voted against the attempt by the Radical Republicans to
remove Andrew Johnson from office in 1868.
Fessenden understood the meaning of the Constitution's words,
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
An impeachable offense, Fessenden said, must be ``of such a character
to commend itself at once to the minds of all right thinking men, as
beyond all question, an adequate cause for impeachment. It should leave
no reasonable ground of suspicion upon the motives of those who inflict
the penalty.''
Fessenden knew what the framers meant and what the distinguished
chairman of our Judiciary Committee professed to believe at the outset
of this inquiry--a partisan vote of impeachment will be forever
suspect.
History will find, as people across America and around the world
already know, that there is more than ``reasonable ground of suspicion
upon the motives'' of the Republican leadership of the 105th Congress.
Just as the Radicals of 1868 abandoned the principles of Abraham
Lincoln in pursuit of a political vendetta, they have ignored the wise
counsel of cooler heads like Gerald Ford and Bob Dole and recklessly
abused the awesome power of impeachment for partisan purposes.
December 19, 1998 will go down with February 24, 1868 as sad days for
America.
More than the tawdry behavior admitted by Bill Clinton, today will be
remembered for the failure of this Congress to honor our constitutional
responsibility to act with fairness and justice before recommending
removal of a President elected by the people.
Let us all pray that the Senate has enough William Pitt Fessendens to
correct the mistake this House will make today.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong opposition to the
impeachment proceedings. Impeachment of President Clinton is not
warranted by the facts of this case.
Although the Republicans have couched their arguments in terms of
perjury, obstruction of justice, abuse of power and their
constitutional duty to do the ``right thing,'' this proceeding is in
fact a political move to use private, consensual sexual conduct to
subvert the constitution and remove a President.
Our constitution provided impeachment as a mechanism to remove a
President for crimes against the state such as ``treason, bribery, and
other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' The allegations in the Starr
referral, even if assumed to be true, do not rise to the level of
impeachable offenses. On this point, almost 900 constitutional
scholars, law professors and American historians agree. Yet, we proceed
with the impeachment process as if compelled to do so by our
constitution.
It is not, however, the constitution which compels today's action;
it's not even partisanship that brings us this sad day. Beyond
partisanship, this majority leadership has abused their power in a
dictatorial manner to impeach a President to satisfy a small block of
right wing conservatives. The majority leadership rejected the request
of over 200 Members of this body to allow a vote on censure, an option
that has the clear support of the American public, because the
conservation faction demands impeachment.
When the House completes this frenetic activity this weekend, history
will judge our activity. There will be no avoiding the fact that this
whole process has been propelled by a small group obsessed with
political revenge, not crimes against the state. This is not what the
Framers intended or what the people want. Today defines the GPO as a
group of vindictive, reactionary pharisees. It is a sad day for our
country.
Mr. POMBO. Mr. Speaker, I quote:
On January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the
oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to
faithfully execute the office of President; implicit in that
oath is the obligation that the President set an example of
high moral standards and conduct himself in a manner that
fosters respect for the truth; and William Jefferson Clinton
has egregiously failed in this obligation, and through his
actions violated the trust of the American people, lessened
their esteem for the office of the President, and dishonored
the office which they have entrusted to him.
(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements
concerning his reprehensible conduct with a subordinate;
(B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to delay
discovery of the truth; and
(C) in as much as no person is above the law, William
Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil
penalties.
These are not the words of the Articles of Impeachment but the words
of the Democrat resolution which was approved unanimously by the
Democrats on the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee. Even
President Clinton agreed to accept this severe language.
We all agree that the President committed these crimes, and yet there
is great debate over impeachment.
The President's defenders claim that this issue is only about a
consensual sexual relationship. Tell that to Paula Jones. Her case
started as a sexual harassment lawsuit where the President was
subpoenaed and required to tell the truth, just like any other
defendant. He made the decision to lie. In protecting himself from
political and legal jeopardy, he deprived Paula Jones of her fair day
in court. You or I would expect our fair day in court and no less.
We have also been told that these hearings and this process were
unfair and partisan. Partisan? Yes, the hearings were very partisan. It
was very disturbing to watch the hearings as no Democrat came forward
to work with the Republican majority. The partisan protection of the
President at all costs will without doubt damage future Congresses. The
process was fair to a fault. The Republicans allowed the President's
defenders panels of witnesses who testified over dozens of hours. The
Judiciary Committee allowed the President witnesses of his choice to
defend his actions in front of Congress and the country. The committee
offered the President an opportunity to appear in person, which he
declined. Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde went beyond the norm
to be fair.
Another desperate claim made by the President's partisans is that
impeaching and convicting the President would overturn an election. If
the President is forced from office, his defeated opponent Bob Dole
would not become President! Clinton's own Vice President Al Gore would.
Gore was elected on the same ticket as Clinton and would step in, as
the Constitution requires. Our Founding Fathers included impeachment in
our Constitution to remove a sitting President. There is never a good
time nor the right time to conduct an impeachment and convict a
President, but unfortunately it has become necessary.
When I had to make this very difficult decision I tried to put aside
ideological and partisan differences. I cleared my head and made a
decision based on facts, not emotion. I read the report, supporting
documents and the conclusion the committee came to.
I made the decision to support the four articles of impeachment, not
as a matter to punish Bill Clinton, but to protect the rule of law.
Future presidents and congresses will look at this precedent to
determine the proper behavior of those presidents and congresses.
Perjury on multiple occasions, obstruction of justice, and abuse of
power are impeachable offenses and Bill Clinton and no future President
should be allowed to hold office after having committed these offenses.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I had hoped not to have to make this
statement today. I love this country and our democratic institutions,
which are the strongest and most unique in the world. I have the
highest respect for the Office of the President, and I respect the
talents and accomplishments of President Clinton, with whom I have
worked on a number of important national issues. My respect for much of
the President's work makes this decision even more difficult. Yet,
based on a careful review of the evidence in the record, watching the
Judiciary Committee hearings and listening to the presentations by all
sides, I have come to the conclusion that there is clear and convincing
evidence that the President's material false statements to a federal
grand jury meet the standard for impeachment and I will vote to refer
Impeachment Article One to the United States Senate. I intend to vote
against Articles Two, Three and Four.
This is certainly the most difficult decision I have faced in thirty
years of public life. It has been personally agonizing for me and it
has also tremendously affected the people of Delaware and our nation.
In the last week alone, I have received many thousands of calls,
letters and E-mails from people in Delaware on this issue. I have never
seen this number of heartfelt comments and this level of intensity in
the arguments from people on both sides of any issue. Delawareans have
not reacted purely along partisan lines. I have heard from people who
describe themselves as ``life long Democrats'' who believe the
President should be impeached. I have also heard from Republicans who
have urged me to vote against impeachment. Individuals have shared
their experiences of having to testify in legal proceedings or their
painful discussions with their children about the President's behavior.
One man said it was the first time in fifty years that he moved to
write to a public official. Their words
[[Page H12012]]
have further impressed upon me the seriousness of this decision.
I delayed my decision as long as possible to review the evidence
carefully and also to attempt to find a solution that would be fair and
just and would allow us to end the turmoil that has enveloped our
nation. No one wants this process to go on any longer than necessary. I
still believe that a strong censure and financial penalty could be a
solution to bring this matter to a close in the best interest of our
nation.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the President acted deceitfully in
attempting to hide his adulterous sexual relationship with Monica
Lewinsky. He made false statements in his deposition before a federal
judge in the Paula Jones lawsuit; he made false statements to his
staff, his Cabinet and the American people. Finally, he made false
statements before a federal grand jury. In short, he lied to all of us.
The President's wounds are self-inflicted. One can almost understand
his initial effort to hide his sexual affair which was wrong, but
certainly not impeachable. However, he continued to weave a fragile
pattern of deceit which he allowed to build to the point where he was
not only repeating falsehoods to the public, but he continued them
before a federal grand jury.
It is critical to note that the President's lawyers have not
attempted to rebut the essential facts of any of the allegations. The
only question that remains is whether the President's lies and other
steps to hide his relationship with Miss Lewinsky posed the type of
threat that the Founding Fathers envisioned when the provided for
impeachment of the President in our Constitution, the greatest
democratic document in the world.
In reviewing the Articles of Impeachment, I believe that the most
troubling issue is in Article One--whether the President made material
false statements under oath to a federal grand jury on August 17, 1998.
I have reviewed the President's grand jury testimony and the arguments
on both sides regarding this issue. The President had months to decide
whether to appear before the grand jury and to prepare his testimony,
he was permitted to have his attorney present--a privilege no other
person would be afforded--and to set a time limit on his testimony. In
short, there was little chance the President could be surprised by
questions and he was able to ask for breaks to confer with his
attorney. So it is especially disturbing that in his testimony, he
continued the pattern of false statements and evasions regarding his
relationship with Miss Lewinsky and his efforts to conceal it. He did
not tell the truth in his grand jury testimony. That is the inescapable
fact that troubles so many Americans because it poses a real threat to
the credibility of our legal system and raises the question of the
President's fitness for office.
I have known President Clinton for over a decade. We have worked
together on a number of policy issues when we served as governors and
since he became President. He is very capable on policy matters. In
meetings with the President, I have seen him display an excellent
recall of policy details on complex issues. Because I have seen this
sharp intellect and memory in other settings, it is difficult for me to
believe his statements to the grand jury that he does not recall key
events involving his own actions in the Lewinsky matter. It is
necessary to conclude that whatever happened prior to his grand jury
testimony, the President had the opportunity to set the record straight
and tell the truth and he chose not to do it.
The evidence supporting Impeachment Articles Two, Three and Four,
while showing the President's actions to be morally and legally
questionable, is not clear and convincing as required to meet the
standard for high crimes and misdemeanors under the Constitution. There
are very real and serious doubts regarding the truthfulness and
legality of the President's testimony in the Paula Jones deposition,
his discussions with Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky about their
potential testimony in legal proceedings, the handling of the gifts the
President and Ms. Lewinsky exchanged, and the President's responses to
the questions from the Judiciary Committee. However, I believe that the
case for these Articles is not strong enough to merit sending them to
the Senate for trial. The President may be guilty of wrongdoing in
these matters, but he can remain liable for civil and criminal
penalties for those actions after he leaves office.
This whole episode has been terribly sad for the entire nation. But
the unfortunate fact is that the President's own reckless behavior has
led us to this point. There were numerous times during the past year
when the President could have ended this matter by telling the
unvarnished truth, especially before the grand jury. At that time, even
some of the President's strongest supporters warned that lying before
the grand jury could very well be grounds for impeachment. It was his
decision to continue to shade or avoid the truth and rely on
questionable definitions to defend his actions. In the end, his answers
were not, as he insisted, ``legally accurate.''
I do believe that the Independent Counsel law is flawed and should be
reviewed carefully and possibly terminated. This investigation has gone
on too long and cost too much. Yet, the President's own denials and
refusal to provide answers by invoking executive privilege prolonged
the process. Most important, the essential findings of the
investigation have not been disputed.
I am particularly saddened by these events because I have had a
positive working relationship with the President and am proud to have
worked with him to enact the 1994 crime bill, the 1996 Welfare Reform
Act, the 1997 balanced budget agreement and other positive legislation
for the nation. President Clinton is a talented politician and public
official. But, I cannot escape the conclusion that the charges against
the President in Article One do meet the standard for impeachment in
the House of Representatives. Our system of justice was established to
insure that every American, including the President, is accountable for
their actions.
A vote by the House on Articles of Impeachment is only part of the
process envisioned by the Constitution. The House determines only
whether the President should be, in effect, indicted and then the
Senate has the responsibility to try the case. The Senate has the
responsibility to consider the charges against the President, and it
also has the authority to consider censure as a possible alternative to
removing the President from office. It is my hope that in the end, the
Senate will make its decision expeditiously and in the best interest of
all Americans.
This has been the most difficult decision I have ever had to make in
my public life. I am tremendously disappointed that while the President
has apologized for his actions, he has been unable or unwilling to
admit that he lied both in legal proceedings and to the American
people. His testimony before the grant jury was false and he repeatedly
made statements in public and private that prevented the discovery of
the truth. His false grand jury testimony strikes at the heart of what
our legal system and form of government are about. I still hope that
this matter can be resolved quickly to avoid unnecessary turmoil for
the country. While it may not ultimately require that he be removed
from office, it does require that the Senate consider a trial on this
matter and reach a conclusion. I hope it can be done fairly and quickly
and in the best interest of the nation.
I hold no malice toward the President and I would far refer to
vindicate him of these charges. While the President's actions could
result in criminal and civil prosecution, what has truly haunted the
President throughout this matter is his repeated failure to tell the
truth and that his lies led others to do the same. It is these facts
that affect Americans so deeply and that I can not ignore. My
unavoidable obligation is to hold the President accountable for this
actions as required by the Constitution.
Mr. LUTHER. Mr. Speaker, the United States Constitution states that
``The President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.'' Clearly, consideration of the impeachment of a
democratically elected President is one of the most serious duties of a
Member of the United States House of Representatives.
Because impeachment overturns a national election, the framers of the
Constitution set a very high threshold so that our head of state would
not be removed for political expediency. They intended impeachment to
be the ultimate check in our system of checks and balances so we would
never have a President destroy our democracy, reign as a despot, or
emerge as a king.
In the case against President Clinton, I have reviewed the
Independent Counsel's allegations as well as voluminous other
information on the subject. I have also heard from many constituents
and listened to the debate. It is undisputed that the President's
conduct was wrong. It is also quite clear that some people in and out
of Congress see this as an opportunity to rid themselves of a President
they have never liked.
Impeachment, however, is reserved for Presidential action that
threatens the very nature of our democracy. The framers of the
Constitution considered other possibilities, but they settled on the
well known phrase, ``Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors'' and chose not to allow impeachment for lesser offenses
that do not threaten our system of government. After reviewing all of
the information available, I have concluded that President Clinton's
actions, however reprehensible, do not come close to that level.
I nevertheless believe the President should be held accountable for
his actions. In my judgment, former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole's
suggestion to convert the Articles of impeachment into censure
resolution is a sound alternative. Allowing a vote on this approach
would enable each member of Congress to truly vote his or her
conscience on this issue. Because a vote for censure will not be
allowed
[[Page H12013]]
in the House and since the only votes will be on impeachment, I will
vote against the Articles of Impeachment.
If the House impeaches the President, it will be up to the Senate to
determine how best to proceed with this matter. In that event, I
believe the Senate should end this melodrama just as quickly as
possible in order to get back to work on the other important issues
facing our country.
Mr. WALSH. Mr. Speaker, I submit to the House a December 16, 1998
editorial from the Syracuse Post-Standard entitled ``Duty Calls''
relating to the impeachment process presently before us.
I ask my colleagues to carefully review this thoughtful and
insightful piece.
Duty Calls
if laws are to have worth, the house must vote to impeach the president
It is regrettable that the impeachment process never quite
reached a high-minded tone of solemn purpose and
bipartisanship, as those responsible for conducting it had
vowed it would.
It is vexing that a majority of American people apparently
say, in response to opinion polls, that President Clinton
should not be impeached. It is almost certain that
impeachment by the full House of Representatives would make a
political martyr of the president.
But these are insufficient reasons for the House to avoid
its duty. If the laws of this land have worth, if the office
of presidency has sanctity left to protect, then the House
must vote to impeach the president. His fate then goes in the
full Senate which can, after trial and by a two-thirds
majority, vote to remove him from office.
Absent bold action by the congressmen and women, President
Clinton will have shown brazenly that power begets exceptions
to the law whenever those in power decide the lawless act is
too trivial for pursuit.
The House Judiciary Committee in votes almost strictly
along party lines, has sent four articles of impeachment to
the full House. The members will begin to debate them
Thursday. Assent by a simple majority of the representatives
on any one of the articles will result in Clinton's
impeachment.
The House should toss out the fourth article immediately.
It relates to the president's answers to 81 questions
submitted to him by the Judiciary Committee. It is more an
expression of the committee's pique at the tone and
evasiveness of the president's answers than a real finding of
wrongdoing. It comes closest to appearing petty political.
The first two articles, in contrast, have abundant
supporting evidence. They accuse the president of perjury.
These relate to the answers he gave in grand jury testimony
last January about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The
third article, obstruction of justice, has to do with
accusations that he tried to influence testimony of others
by, among other things, directing efforts to get Lewinsky
a job. The intentions behind many of the facts here are at
least debatable.
What is beyond debate is Clinton's unyielding faith in his
own ability to grease his exit from a knotty situation by the
application of slick words. He remains a believer in a small
truth--the precision of his own language--rather than the
larger truths that his words defy.
This is not Watergate, his defenders cry. But nothing in
the Constitution says that Watergate is the standard for
impeachment inquiries. It is merely one other case from
history, with its own set of facts and its own kind of
assault on this nation's core values.
Impeachment is not the will of the people, other defenders
say. But the people did not have this set of facts before
them when they re-elected Clinton. They had only his word
about Gennifer Flowers--which we now know to be a lie--when
they first elected him president in 1992. Opinion polls are
snapshots in time, framed by the way questions are asked and
by the choices given to respondents, and are unreliable
guides.
Remember that Dick Morris had told Clinton many months ago
that his own polls showed that the people would forgive
adultery, but not perjury.
Impeachment on charges of lying about sex trivializes the
process, others say. Remember that this sex occurred between
the most powerful man in America and an intern on his staff.
That inherently abuses the power of office, a point on which
many male and female feminists have been strangely silent.
On the contrary. Failure to hold a president accountable
for his misdeeds and his lies about them trivializes the law,
the presidency and the meaning of truth. If it's possible to
debase them more than Clinton has already. It's time for the
House to take the next step to clean house.
Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, short of a declaration of war, a U.S.
Representative can never be called upon to make a decision requiring
more solemn thought than to vote on articles of impeachment against the
President of the United States. Only five times in our nation's history
has the Congress voted to declare war, and this is only the second time
the full House of Representatives has considered articles of
impeachment against a President of the United States. Other than voting
to send our troops into harm's way during Desert Storm, this is the
most somber responsibility I have been asked to address. Therefore, I
would ask for the opportunity to share with you the careful
deliberations I made before casting our district's vote on impeachment.
Like some, I am repulsed by the President's actions which were
immoral and sinful. It is impossible to think of what the President has
done without stirring up emotions in all of us. However, I also have a
responsibility to the oath I have taken to defend and protect the
Constitution. As such, I cannot allow myself to simply follow the
immediate impulses of my emotions and moral convictions, but must also
be cognizant of the Constitutional and historical consequences of this
decision on our form of government.
The Constitution is simple and straightforward, yet it still lends
itself to interpretation. Accordingly, from time to time it becomes
necessary to turn to the writings and records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1789. It was at this convention that our basis of
government was formulated. George Mason, who proposed Article II,
Section 4 (the impeachment clause) of the Constitution, defined
``treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors'' as ``great
and dangerous offenses'' of ``attempts to subvert the Constitution.''
After extensive reading and review on the creation of our Constitution
and our country's history, particularly the discussions and writings
dealing with the impeachment process. I concluded that the President's
actions did not reach the high threshold our forefathers envisioned to
remove a President from office, and, in effect, thwart the elective
will of our citizens.
It is clear from those writings, that impeachment is not about
punishing the President, but about protecting the country from the
unlawful and the illegal exercise of executive power against its
citizens. The Starr referral contained no allegations of this type.
In fact, Judge Starr exonerated the President of all charges relating
to using the FBI to investigative private citizens, or the firing of
federal civil service employees in the White House travel office,
charges that would fit the mold set forth as impeachable offenses by
the framers of our Constitution. In the final analysis, the Starr
report did not present conclusive evidence that this President used the
power of his office against our nation or its citizens.
I also believe that our founding fathers did not intend for
impeachment to be used as a judicial tool. It was not intended to be
utilized as a mechanism to prosecute the President for crimes
committed. This view was clearly articulated by Alexander Hamilton,
when in the Federalist No. 65 he writes, ``The punishment which may be
the consequences of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate
the chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a
perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and
emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and
punishment in the ordinary course of law.''
In other words, the founding fathers did not intend for impeachment,
itself, to be the punishment. The debate clearly indicates the framers
belief that the prosecution of crimes remain within the Judicial
branch, not the Legislative branch. Nowhere did the founding fathers
suggest that impeachment, or any other Constitutional process for that
matter, be used to prosecute a President. Rather, they held the
President should be subject to the scrutiny and prosecution of the
criminal justice system, just like any other citizen. That is not to
say that they intended for the Constitution to shield the Chief
Executive from being punished for any and all crimes which fall short
of the ``great and dangerous offenses'' or ``attempts to subvert the
Constitution'' standard for impeachment. To the contrary, the
historical debate suggests the framers intent was that the Chief
Executive be accountable to the criminal justice system for all crimes
that do not meet the high threshold for impeachment.
As the statute of limitations will not expire before the President
leaves office, it will be possible to prosecute him for perjury or any
other alleged offense. It convicted, he would still be subject to
imprisonment and/or fines, just like you or me, as he should be.
During the Watergate hearings, the standard for impeachment was
defined as ``a Constitutional remedy addressed to serious offenses
against the system of government.'' Several Republican Members of the
committee in the minority report, argued for an even higher standard of
judgment, saying in their report ``the President should be removable by
the legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the
system of government established by the Constitution.''
For example, President Nixon was found to have cheated on his federal
income taxes. On July 30, 1974, the Committee considered an article of
impeachment stating that President Nixon knowingly and fraudulently
failed to report certain income and claimed unauthorized deductions in
the years 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972. They concluded that President
Nixon lied by signing a false income tax return. After debate by the
Judiciary Committee, the Committee decided not to report this Article
of Impeachment to the House of Representatives. While this action by
President Nixon was a crime, the Judiciary Committee found that it
[[Page H12014]]
did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. It was a matter of
personal wrongdoing, and not considered to be a crime committed
according to their standard for impeachment, ``against the system of
government.''
It is also critically important to realize that moving forward with
such a low threshold for impeachment will almost certainly jeopardize
the viability of the presidency. We must take great care to ensure that
the long-term consequence of this House's action is not one that
establishes a precedent that dramatically weakens any President and the
Office of the President compared with the other two ``separate but
equal'' branches of government. For our system of government to work,
raw political power cannot be invested in one branch of our government
to the exclusion of the other two. Checks and balances are imperative
and the Constitution's framers recognized that clearly. One can forget
about President Clinton because he will be leaving office in 24 months
regardless of this process. Nevertheless think about the ramifications
of this kind of precedent relative to future Presidents. The Supreme
Court recently said, wrongfully I believe, that anyone can file a civil
lawsuit against any President at any time over a matter which did not
occur while he/she was in office and has nothing to do with the
presidency. Are we setting a precedent whereupon a future President can
be made to give a deposition where his whole life can be combed
through, and if there is any misrepresentation in that deposition, then
the political opposition can bring that to Congress and ask that he be
impeached for perjury? Any political enemy could bring a lawsuit
against a future President and require him to go through this process.
In my judgment, this could threaten the presidency with judicial
tyranny.
The President's independence from Congress and the Judiciary is
fundamental to America's unique structure of government. The lower the
threshold for impeachment, the weaker and less equal is the President
compared with the Judicial and Legislative branches of government.
On the final analysis, I concluded that impeachment was established
to guard against a President's use of the authority conferred on him/
her to carry out activities against the country or its citizens. After
weeks of deliberations, I came to the conclusion that alleged perjury
and efforts to conceal a consensual sexual relationship did not reach
the threshold needed to impeach a President of the United States. I do
not think the President's actions reach the high Constitutional bar set
by our forefathers.
Mr. Speaker, I do not condone what Bill Clinton did. I think his
actions were despicable. He says he is paying a dear price with his
wife and daughter. He deserves to. This President's actions have been
committed to history's record and his legacy will forever be cloaked in
shame. History and God will be his ultimate judge.
Mr. MALONEY of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, as one of only 31 Democrats
to cross party lines and support the comprehensive impeachment inquiry,
I did so because I believed a full and fair review of the serious
charges of misconduct against the President was the only way to seek
the truth. During this process, I have carefully monitored the
Judiciary Committee hearings, thoroughly analyzed the Republican and
Democratic Committee recommendations, and personally read the Special
Prosecutor's report and the President's rebuttals before reaching my
decision. As I did with the inquiry vote, I have approached this matter
in a non-partisan, open and fair-minded manner.
It is clear from the inquiry that President Clinton's actions were
immortal, harmful to our nation, and deserving of serious moral and
legal rebuke. Not only did the President engage in morally
inappropriate conduct, he also lied to the American people and perjured
himself before a grand jury. He must be held morally accountable by
Congress on behalf of the American people, and legally accountable in
full for his perjury by the courts after he leaves office, just like
any other American would be held accountable for perjury.
Our Constitution, however, authorizes impeachment only for ``treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors'' (Article II, Section
4) which is why I urge my colleagues to oppose impeachment and allow us
an opportunity to vote on a Resolution of Censure. The great weight of
informed legal and scholarly judgment is that the impeachment clause is
intended to cover offenses that involve the misuse of Presidential
powers. As Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story made clear in the
earliest days of American jurisprudence, ``[impeachable offenses] are
committed by public men in violation of their public trust and duties .
. . '' 2 Joseph Story, ``Commentaries on the Constitution,'' Sec. 744
(1st ed. 1833), emphasis supplied. While President Clinton clearly
engaged in morally and legally inexcusable behavior, his misconduct was
personal in nature and did not constitute a misuse of his Executive
authority. His perjury before the grand jury pertained to his personal
life, and could well have been committed by any individual; it did not
entail the power or privileges of the Presidency. Accordingly,
President Clinton's misconduct does not meet the threshold of ``high
crimes and misdemeanors'' necessary to impeach him. That doesn't excuse
his conduct or imply that he should go unsanctioned; it simply means
that the punishment for his offense should meet and be appropriate to
his wrongdoings.
The distinction between misconduct related to government duty, which
is necessary for impeachment, and non-impeachable misconduct related to
personal activity, was once previously before the Congress, when
President Nixon knowingly filed a false tax return. The filing of a
false tax return is an incident of perjury and, therefore, a very close
precedent for the current situation. In 1974, the House Judiciary
Committee recognized the difference between ``government'' and
``personal'' wrongdoing and voted not to bring an article of
impeachment for President Nixon's perjury precisely because it was a
form of personal misconduct. The articles of impeachment that were
filed against President Nixon were for actions that went to the misuse
of presidential power (i.e. subverting the FBI for political purposes).
Those supporting impeachment make the argument that because the
President has a duty to ``take care that the laws are faithfully
executed'' (U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3) his perjury was,
specifically because of that delineated duty, not merely personal but
also technically public. That interpretation, however, disregards the
inherent connection between the nature of the offense and the terms of
the impeachment clause. The impeachment clause explicitly pertains only
to ``High'' offenses (i.e. offenses involving the misuse of
Presidential power or heinous acts), not those other offenses that are
committed--as in this case--in an individual, not governmental,
capacity.
During this extremely difficult time, it is our responsibility to
remain especially vigilant in upholding our Constitution, and only use
impeachment for its intended constitutional purpose--``treason,
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors''--not as a substitute
for other measures. While President Clinton's actions are clearly
deserving of censure, and at the conclusion of his term make him liable
for criminal prosecution for perjury, it would be wrong for this House
to abuse its power of impeachment and attempt, without proper cause, to
overturn the electoral choice of the people.
Mr. SNOWBARGER. Mr. Speaker, you have called the 105th Congress back
into session to address the most distressing circumstances this country
has faced in decades. We have been called back to vote on the issue of
impeachment of the President of the United States. It will be the final
legacy of our second session. It has been a session where legislative
achievements have been eclipsed by media coverage of the President's
personal activities and his cover-up. While we may disapprove of his
personal behavior, and I certainly do, I would find it difficult to use
this as a basis for impeachment.
However, we are not here today to judge the President on the basis of
his personal behavior. We are focused on his cover-up of his shameful
behavior by lying, by abusing the judicial system, and by using his
office and its resources to prevent our court system and the duly
appointed federal prosecutors from discovering the truth.
Let's remember that this series of events began with a federal civil
rights action involving allegations of sexual harassment against the
President. By its very nature, such an action involves very personal
behavior. However, our society has determined that behavior of this
nature is so inappropriate that we have provided legal remedies for
victims. It was in pursuit of such a remedy that the President was
brought before our system of justice to answer to charges. In that
process, the President gave an oath. Because our judicial system is a
search for the truth, that oath is a vow, a promise that is essential.
It is an oath `` . . . to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth . . . '' so our courts can do justice, protect the
innocent and right wrongs. Our expectations of justice cannot be
realized unless we demand truth of those before our courts. We have
enforced that requirement of truth throughout this country by
prosecuting witnesses who have felt that it was in their best interests
to tell courts a ``less than accurate'' version of events. We can get
caught up in a debate over whether such behavior is misleading, lying
or perjuring, but if we fail to hold the truth sacred, justice cannot
follow.
In today's debate and through the weeks and months of investigation
by the independent counsel and the able review of his report and the
inquiry by our Judiciary Committee, we have been presented credible
evidence that the President has violated this oath to tell the truth on
numerous occasions. He lied in the civil action I referenced. He lied
before a
[[Page H12015]]
federal grand jury. He lied to our own Judiciary Committee. The lies
which form the basis for these impeachment articles were all preceded
by these very sacred words, ``I swear to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth so help me God.'' Justice has been
impeded.
Every citizen of this country who comes before our court system takes
similar oath and suffers consequences if he is found to have violated
that oath. However, there is another oath involved in this case that
not every citizen takes. Although it is not an oath unique to the
President, he is and should be bound by it maybe more than anyone else.
It is his oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United
States. Most school children know that the President is the chief law
enforcement officer of the country. (Of course, this President seems
willing to debate and parse even this well-accepted concept.) Our
Constitution provides the framework for our society to pursue our
valued goals of personal liberty and justice. As shown through the
process of this impeachment inquiry, in his personal involvement with
the legal system of this country, the President has shown a preference
for abusing that system rather than protecting or defending it. In so
doing, he has violated this second oath.
Interestingly, I have been admonished by two constituents to follow
the lead of one of my fellow Kansans from history. Senator Edmund G.
Ross from Kansas was one of the few Republicans who voted against
convicting President Andrew Johnson of the charges made against him in
his impeachment. Ross was immortalized by his inclusion in John F.
Kennedy's book, ``Profiles in Courage.''
To one constituent the lesson from this incident is that a vote for
impeachment was the wrong choice, an inappropriate course to pursue in
light of the current circumstances. He felt I should reject partisan
pressures and vote against impeachment. To the other constituent the
lesson was equally clear but the result was the opposite. He felt I
should reject the pressures of public opinion and vote for impeachment.
The contrast led me to again read the story of Senator Ross. It
helped to remind me of the significance of this process and the
decision that will result. It was ironic that I was reading the story
of the thinking and actions of a fellow Kansan who was involved in the
process of impeachment of the President of the United States. Now I am
dealing with similar issues for only the second time in our nation's
history where the process has gone this far. The lessons of this story
were embodied in the words of a telegram sent by Ross to a group of
constituents and supporters that demanded he vote for impeachment.
That telegram read in part,
I have taken an oath to do impartial justice according to
the Constitution and laws, and trust that I shall have the
courage to vote according to the dictates of my judgment and
for the highest good of the country.
Mr. Speaker, I have attempted to put aside the pressures that have
been placed on us by outside influences, whether by popular opinion or
by supporters of one outcome or the other. I have tried to weigh my
decision ``according to the dictates of my judgment and for the highest
good of the country.''
After consideration of the evidence presented and of the applicable
laws, and after measuring the resulting decision against and standard
set by my Kansas predecessor, and in full adherence and submission to
my own oath of office, I vote in favor of impeachment and ask that our
colleagues in the Senate bring this matter to trial pursuant to the
Constitution. This mandate should be executed in a timely manner so
that faith and trust in the integrity of the office of the Presidency
can be restored to prevent further damage to the political institutions
of our great nation.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, last night, after making a statement on the
floor, I filed for extension of my remarks a longer statement, which I
prepared as I reviewed the committee report on H. Res. 611. I have
rewritten the last page of my longer statement, and file it as an
amendment to my extended remarks:
The majority argues that articles of impeachment are required by the
rule of law. The rule of law starts at the source, with the
Constitution and specifically Article II, Section IV. How the Congress
removes a President elected by the people is vitally important to the
rule of law in a democracy. The Frames of our Constitution did not
choose a prime minister beholder to a parliament, but a president
independent of Congress, so that each could counter the other and
maintain a balance of power. Having made that fundamental decision,
they did not intend for the impeachment power to be used as a vote of
no confidence, so that the president serves, in effect, at the will of
Congress. They knew that in extreme cases the power to impeach might be
needed, so that Congress could rid the country of a president who took
bribes or became a traitor or tyrant. For 210 years, Congress has
regarded the impeachment power in that light, as extraordinary, and
abused it only once, in the case of Andrew Johnson.
In this case, the decision is not easy. President Clinton has
disgraced himself; his conduct has been sordid; but his conduct does
not amount, in my opinion, to a ``high crime'' like bribery or treason.
Not for his sake, but for the sake of the presidency, we should not
``define down'' the grounds of impeachment. We have an alternative. We
can rebuke this president and leave a stain on his legacy forever,
without leaving a precedent for impeachment we may live to regret. I
think censure is the choice we should make.
Mr. MORAN of Kansas. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, Congress was called into
session to consider whether President Clinton should be impeached as
provided by the United States Constitution. Never would I have thought
I would be called upon to determine whether another elected official
should be allowed to remain in office, especially the President of the
United States. I have tried to use my position to make policy decisions
beneficial to the people of Kansas and to make certain that each
individual Kansan receives a fair shake in his or her dealings with the
federal government. Judging others' conduct is not a task I seek, but
one required of me by the U.S. Constitution. I am humbled by the
responsibility and hope I am equal to the task.
I refrained, despite the constant demand from some, from reaching a
conclusion on the merits of the case against President Clinton until I
had as much factual information as possible and until I had an
understanding of the meaning of the words of the U.S. Constitution, ``.
. . or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' I especially wanted to
examine the Judiciary Committee Report concerning the impeachment of
the President. I have now had the opportunity to personally review the
work product of the Committee and to question the Committee members.
No task in my life has created a greater burden. I have no compulsion
to turn this president out of office. Whether President Bill Clinton
has the requisite qualities or abilities to be president or whether his
administration's policies are right for the country was decided by the
American people in November, 1996 and is not now the issue before
Congress. At issue are the facts and whether such facts demonstrate
that the President of the United States committed impeachable offenses.
I want this president to succeed for the benefit of all Americans. I do
not represent Republican Kansans or Democrat Kansans; I have been
granted a privilege to represent all Kansans.
I regret the highly partisan manner in which the impeachment of the
President has been presented to the American people. I have said, from
the beginning of these proceedings, that the process matters; at the
end of the day, whatever the outcome, the American people must know
that the end result was reached for the right reasons. In my opinion,
the Independent Counsel, Congressional leadership and the White House
have all contributed to the failure to meet this standard. Many
citizens unfortunately will wonder and even be convinced that this is a
Republican effort to oust a Democrat president. This belief increases
the cynicism already prevalent in our political process.
Having now read the Judiciary Committee report, discussed its
provisions with Committee members, consulted the Constitution, inquired
of many Kansans, both Republican and Democrat, whose judgment I value,
and reviewed my basic beliefs of right and wrong, I am compelled to
vote for articles of impeachment.
Having to make a choice, I choose to be on the side that says no
person is above the law, that this is a nation of laws not men, that
telling the truth matters, and that we should expect our public
officials to conduct themselves in compliance with the highest ethical
standards.
It is clear that President Clinton on numerous occasions lied to a
federal grand jury, lied in a civil proceeding affecting the civil
rights of an American citizen, and orchestrated an attempt to obstruct
justice. The requirement that a party to a civil or criminal proceeding
tell the truth, no matter how humiliating or harmful such statements
might be, is a cornerstone of our system of justice. No one wants to
tell the truth when the truth hurts. But we all know we have no choice,
and if we lie, we know we suffer the consequence. We learn this as
children, and President Clinton, a lawyer, knows this as an officer of
the Court.
The untruthful actions of the President are not mere technical
violations of federal law; rather, the President's lies, obfuscation
and overt acts to obstruct justice are serious and felonious, and they
tear at the essential foundation of our judicial system. His actions
were part of a pattern of conduct over many months and not a mere
moment of poor judgment. There are those who argue that the subject
matter of the President's lies is such that one could not reasonably be
expected to tell the truth. But if you cannot believe someone who
[[Page H12016]]
has raised his hand and has sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, when could you ever rely on that person to
be truthful? If we each are allowed to determine on which topics we
must tell the truth there will be no due process, no equal protection
and no justice.
Many Americans do not want the President to be impeached because they
do not want any disruption in their lives. Most of us did not want to
know the details of the President's personal activities. Other worry
that this process of impeachment will interfere with the economic
prosperity which some in this country are enjoying. We just want it to
go away. I regret that the Independent Counsel chose this path of
inquiry. But now that the facts are known, none of us have the luxury
of closing our eyes. President Clinton describes this as a private
matter. It is not. What the President does affects each of us,
especially parents. As much as we would otherwise prefer, we have an
obligation to deal with this issue, and our obligation requires some
sacrifice. There are some ideals more important than our comfort or our
economic well being. We have responsibilities to the next generation.
The Preamble to the Constitution reminds us of our responsibility to
``. . . secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity.'' We owe the next generation our unwavering support for
certain essential ideals on which our nation was founded.
Impeaching the President is not popular across the country nor is it
supported by all the people I represent. I have received thousands of
letters, faxes, e-mails and telephone calls from my constituents,
expressing strong and unequivocal positions on both sides of the issue.
But this cannot be about polls, partisan politics, which party controls
Congress, or even who is the next president, and unfortunately there is
no middle ground.
Years from now, when my school age children look back on their
father's time in Congress, I want them to see their dad as a guy who
struggled to make certain he was doing the right thing for the right
reason, not one who was persuaded by the political passions of the
moment, influenced by party politics, or unable to make a tough
decision because of contrary polling data. I want my children to know
that their dad chose the side of holding elected officials to high
ethical standards, as an advocate for truth and a supporter of the rule
of law.
Contrary to the impression which one would receive from the
television cable shows, the impeachment of the President is not all-
consuming. My work in Congress on behalf of the people of the First
District has and will go on unabated. We face significant problems on
our farms and ranches, the Kansas oil and gas industry is on the verge
of extinction, and, if we are not careful, adequate health care,
particularly in rural communities, will be a thing of the past. These
issues continue to receive my complete attention. It is time for
Congress to address our military needs, strengthen social security and
insist on a truly balanced budget. The impeachment process must be
completed as quickly as possible. Although we cannot close our eyes, we
can insist that these proceedings be conducted in a respectable manner
and without undue delay.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide my thoughts. It is a
privilege to represent the people of the First District in the United
States Congress.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, throughout the debate on the resolution
before this House, there has been much discussion of the opinions of
``experts'' on Constitutional law. This discussion reminds me of the
testimony of Lino A. Graglia, the A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law at
University of Texas School of Law in testimony before the Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives on May 15, 1997 when he states,
``The first and most important thing to know about constitutional law
is that it has virtually nothing to do with the Constitution.'' I have
not had the title bestowed upon me as an ``expert'' on Constitutional
law so therefore I had to read the Constitution and determine its
meaning. And how would I do that? I believe Thomas Jefferson gave the
most persuasive advice on the topic of Constitutional meaning when he
wrote in a letter to Justice William Johnson on June 12, 1823, ``On
every question of construction let us carry ourselves back to the time
when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in
the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed our of
the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which
it was passed.'' In order to determine its meaning and be faithful to
the wisdom of the Chief Architect of the Declaration of Independence,
the third President of the United States of America and the founder of
the Democratic Party, Mr. Jefferson, it was necessary to understand the
meaning of the words as they were written by the Framers because, as
was stated by Charles Louis Joseph de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu,
France: Author of ``Spirit of the Laws,'' ``Society, notwithstanding
all its revolutions, must repose on principles that do not change.''
That being said, there has likewise been much discussion about
whether the information that has been acquired by the House of
Representatives is sufficient to accuse the President of an offense or
offenses which proceed from what Alexander Hamilton referred to in
Federalist #65 as ``the misconduct of public men.'' The virtually
infinite spectrum of potential wrongdoings that may--to use the modern
day vernacular--``rise to the level of an impeachable offense,'' is
defined in Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution to be those
offenses situated inclusively between the levels of ``. . . high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.'' While I have heard several opinions that what the
President did does not rise to the level of a crime, does what William
Jefferson Clinton did while in office constitute misconduct of a
``public'' man? It would obviously be necessary to know what the term
``Misdemeanor'' means as was intended by the Framers. Noah Webster, one
of the first Founding Fathers to call for a Constitutional Convention,
wrote and published the first American dictionary in 1828 where he
defined ``misdemeanor'' as, ``ill behavior, evil conduct, fault,
mismanagement.'' He also included the definition given by the
individual most influential on the process of jurisprudence in the
colonies at the time of ratification of the Constitution, William
Blackstone: ``In law, . . . the word crime is made to denote offenses
of a deeper and more atrocious dye, while small faults and omissions of
less consequence are comprised under the gentler name of
misdemeanors.''
And so today we, as members of the United States House of
Representatives, are asked to determine whether there is sufficient
information to accuse the President of some wrongdoing less than or
equal to a ``high crime'' and greater than or equal to a ``small fault
[or] omission.'' I believe there are two reasons why there is much more
consensus on this issue than has been perceived by either ourselves in
the House of Representatives or the people of the United States.
Initially, any individual who would support a resolution of censure
accusing President William Jefferson Clinton of:
1. egregiously fail[ing] in [his] obligation [to] set an example of
high moral standards and conduct[ing] himself in a manner that fosters
respect for the truth,
2. through his actions violat[ing] the trust of the American people.
3. lessen[ing] [the American people's] esteem for the office of
President,
4. dishonor[ing] the office which [the American people] have
entrusted to him,
5. [making] false statements concerning his reprehensible conduct
with a subordinate and,
6. wrongly [taking] steps to delay discovery of the truth would have
to admit that the President may be at least accused of a ``small
fault'' and therefore impeached. Secondly, I have heard the
consternation of the Minority that they will not be able to ``vote
[their] conscience'' because they will not be able to censure the
President. Also, I have heard my colleagues in the Majority state that
it is not Constitutional to censure the President. This is where the
consensus of the members of this House is, if not known, nonetheless
present. The consensus being that both the Minority and the Majority
are wrong. Once again we need only to look to the enlightment of the
original definition of the term ``impeach'' as it was most probably
known at the time of the ratification of the United States Constitution
and observed in Webster's first dictionary of 1828. That definition of
``impeach'' was given to us to be ``Censure, accusation, a calling in
question the purity of motives or the rectitude of conduct. . .''
Therefore, by definition quit literally, to impeach is to censure. It
follows that those compelled by their conscience to vote for censure
may salve that conscience with a vote for impeachment of President
William Jefferson Clinton.
In conclusion, I will vote for all four articles of impeachment
outlined in H. Res. 611 of the 105th Congress because my conscience
compells me to consider the facts as they have been presented and
render the judgement obligated to me by my oath to ``. . . support and
defend the Constitution of the United States. . .''
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, our Constitution tells us: ``The
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
To impeach, which lies within the power of the House, means to accuse
or charge with a crime. Only the Senate can actually convict and remove
from office.
As a distinguished Democratic member of the Judiciary Committee said
during the Nixon impeachment proceeding, ``It is wrong, I suggest, it
is a misreading of the Constitution for any member here to assert that
for a member to vote for an article of impeachment means that that
member must be convinced that the President should be removed from
office. The
[[Page H12017]]
Constitution doesn't say that. The powers relating to impeachment are
an essential check in the hands of this body, the legislature, against
and upon the encroachment of the executive. In establishing the
division between the two branches of the legislature, the House and the
Senate, assigning to the one the right to accuse and to the other the
right to judge, the Framers of this Constitution were very astute. They
did not make the accusers and the judges the same person.'' (Opening
statement of the House Judiciary Committee, proceedings On the
Impeachment of Richard Nixon, by Barbara Jordan)
After consideration of all the evidence presented, I am convinced it
is sufficient for the House to charge the President with several
wrongful actions. I feel the evidence shows that the President
committed perjury by lying under oath, obstructed justice, and abused
the power of his office.
Both historical precedent and current practice support the conclusion
that perjury is a ``high crimes and misdemeanor.'' The Constitution
applies that same phrase both to the President and to ``all civil
officers of the United States.'' Several Federal judges have been
impeached and removed from office for perjury. That is why the
President can be, too.
Also, bribery and perjury are equivalent means of interfering with
the justice system. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines include bribery
and perjury in the same Guideline.
Some of the President's defenders would like to change the subject
and talk about anybody else but the President and about anything else
except the allegations of lying under oath, obstruction of justice, and
abuse of office. Such efforts are an affront to all who value truth
over tactics, substance over spin, principles over politics.
House Members will be consistent if they follow the precedent
established in 1974 by the Judiciary Committee. Individuals from both
parties agreed with a Democratic Congresswoman from Texas when she
said, ``The President engaged in a series of public statements and
actions designed to thwart the lawful investigation by government
prosecutors. Moreover, the President has made public announcements and
assertions * * * which the evidence will show he knew to be false.
These assertions, false assertions,'' she said, are ``impeachable.''
(Ibid.)
By any commonsense measure, the President did not ``tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,'' as his oath required,
when he testified before a judge and then before a grand jury, as many
Democrats now admit.
We should not underestimate the gravity of the case against the
President. When he put his hand on the Bible and recited his oath of
office, he swore to faithfully uphold the laws of the United States.
Not some laws; all laws.
Many people have gone to jail for doing what the President did--lying
or knowingly making false statements after swearing in court not to do
so. However, others have not been punished for failing to tell the
truth.
So, if the President were just an ordinary person living in the
United States, it is not certain that he would be found to have
committed a crime.
What, then, makes this a case that rises to the impeachment level?
I think there are two factors: the repeated and deliberate nature of
the lies, and the uniqueness of the Office of the Presidency.
It was determined by the independent counsel that, ``On at least six
different occasions--from December 17, 1997, through August 17, 1998--
the President had to make a decision. He could choose truth, or he
could choose deception. On all six occasions, the President chose
deception--a pattern of calculated behavior over a span of months.''
(Statement of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr before the Committee
on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, November 19, 1998)
During this time, not only did the President tell a judge and then a
grand jury less than the truth, he also told lies to the American
people, the news media, Members of Congress, his Cabinet, and senior
White House advisors.
One of his own former advisors commented, ``President Clinton turned
his personal flaws into a public matter when he made the whole country
complicit in his cover story. This was no impulsive act of passion; it
was a coldly calculated political decision. He spoke publicly from the
Roosevelt Room. He assembled his Cabinet and staff, and assured them
that he was telling the truth. Then he sat back, silently, and watched
his official spokespeople, employees of the U.S. government, mislead
the country again and again and again.'' (Column by George
Stephanopoulos, Newsweek, August 31, 1998)
The President himself, when he was a law professor in Arkansas,
defined an impeachable offense this way: ``I think that the definition
should include any criminal acts plus a willful failure of the
president to fulfill his duty to uphold and execute the laws of the
United States. Another factor that I think constitutes an impeachable
offense would be willful, reckless behavior in office * * *''
The President consciously and persistently made an effort to deceive,
give misleading answers, and tell lies. He made statements and engaged
in actions designed to impede the investigation of the Independent
Counsel. We all know the President still might be deceiving us today
were it not for physical evidence that forced him to change his story.
As to the uniqueness of the office the president holds, he is a
person in a position of immense authority and influence. He influences
the lives of millions of Americans. He sets an example for us all.
A sixth grader from Chisolm Middle School in Round Rock, Texas,
recently wrote me. She said bluntly, ``He has lied to the American
people! And although I realize what he lied about has nothing to do
with him running the country, then what else would he lie about? He let
us down! Kids that think he is a role model now are heart broken!
(Letter from Kara Kothmann, November 17, 1998)
The President sets an example for adults, too. When he took the oath
of office he swore to ``preserve, protect and defend the Constitution
of the United States'' and to ``take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.'' The president has rightly been called ``the number-one law
enforcement officer of the country.'' (Leon Jaworski in ``The Right and
the Power.'') As such, he has a special responsibility to ``take care''
that he not commit any crime, particularly such a serious one as
perjury, a felony for which a person can go to jail for up to five
years.
When someone is elected president, they receive the greatest gift
possible from the American people--their trust. To violate that trust
is to raise questions about fitness for office. My constituents often
remind me that if anyone else in a position of authoirty--for example a
business executive a military officer, or a professional educator--had
acted as the evidence indicates the President did, their career would
be over.
The rules under which President Nixon would have been tried for
impeachment, had he not resigned, contained this statement: ``The
office of the President is such that it calls for a higher level of
conduct than the average citizen in the United States.'' (Drafted in
1974 with the help of Hillary Rodham, a staff attorney of the Judiciary
Committee)
The President has a higher responsibility for another reason. The
Arkansas Rules of Conduct for attorneys states that ``lawyers holding
public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other
citizens,'' because they know how important the rule of law is to a
stable and civilized society. And the President doesn't hold just any
public office, he holds the most powerful one in the world.
It is for these two reasons--the President's premeditated and
repeated efforts while under oath to tell less than the truth, and the
special responsibility that comes with holding the highest office in
our country--that I feel the President's actions have reached the level
of impeachable offenses.
I have been surprised by the assertion of the President's defenders
that we should not impeach him for his actions because it would set a
precedent.
If our actions send a message that future Presidents should not lie
under oath, should tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth--as President Clinton swore to do when giving testimony before
both a judge and then a grand jury; that future Presidents should
uphold the law--as President Clinton swore to do when he took the oath
of office as President; that future Presidents should not obstruct
justice--as President Clinton did for seven months as he admittedly
deceived the American people and those associated with the
investigation* * * if these are the precedents Congress sets, if these
are the standards future Presidents then live by, we need not fear our
actions.
This will not be an easy task; in fact, it is a difficult ordeal for
all Americans. But we will get through it: we are a great nation and a
strong people. our country will endure because our Constitution works
and has worked for over 200 years.
As much as one might wish to avoid this process, we must resist the
temptation to close our eyes and pass by. The President's actions must
be evaluated for one simple reason--the truth counts.
As this process goes forward, some good lessons can be reaffirmed. No
one is above the law. Actions have consequences. Always tell the truth.
We the people should insist on these high ideals. That the President
has fallen short of the standard doesn't mean we should lower it. If we
keep excusing away the President's actions, we as a nation will never
climb upwards because there will be no firm rungs.
Let me quote another insightful letter from a student in that same
sixth grade class:
``As everyone knows,'' it begins, ``President Clinton is going
through hearings about lying under oath and tampering with the
evidence. Perjury especially in front of the Grand Jury is
[[Page H12018]]
unacceptable. These many months of investigation could have been
avoided if President Clinton would have told the truth in the
beginning.''
She concludes her letter with words I will use to conclude my
remarks, ``I know you are being bombarded with letters each with
different opinions, but this is a big issue. Now it is up to you and
your fellow congressmen to decide to the best of your ability what
should happen next. Please take into consideration what I have stated
and make a decision that would be the best for America's future.''
(Letter from Brandi Bockhorn, November 19, 1998)
That, my colleagues, to me, says it all.
Mr. RIGGS. Mr. Speaker, this is a profoundly sad and disturbing time
for me. I had hoped to conclude my Congressional service on a high note
after the Congress passed, and the President signed, my bills improving
literacy, expanding vocatinoal and technical education, and increasing
the number of federally-funded charter schools in the final days of the
105th Congress, before the November elections. Unfortunately, it is not
to be.
Before I focus on the question of impeachment and the fate or Bill
Clinton, led me address the situation in Iran. As an Army veteran, I
strongly support our troops in the field. That probably goes without
saying. But while i--like my colleagues--support our men and women in
uniform in the Persian Gulf, I must question the timing of the mission
(``Operation Desert Fox'') and our foreign policy towards Iraq in
generel.
It has been eight years since the United States went to war against
Saddam Hussein and the Iraq military. It is about time we finish the
job.
In my first official vote as a newly-elected Member of Congress in
1991, I voted against the use of military force against Iraq. I was
convinced we were not committed to removing Saddam Hussein from power.
We left in power a man who, for corrupt, venal reasons, would rather
hold on to his personal power and military might than help his own
people.
As columnist Richard Cohen recently pointed out in the Washington
Post: ``As long as Saddam rules, the U.S.-Iran conflict will continue.
Either his military has to be hurt so badly it will turn on him, or
dissent elements--and they exist--will sense weakness and rise in
revolt. Force has to be applied in such a way--sustained and
punishing--that this eight-year conflict is brought to a conclusion.''
I recognize that many of my fellow Americans also support our troops
but question the timing of this mission. One could argue that a
President facing the imminent prospect of impeachment should not use
military force unless the national security interests of the United
States are directly and immediately threatened.
That so many Americans question the timing and necessity of this
mission indicates the widespread, and in my opinion, corrosive cynicism
in America that is yet another sign of the weakened state of this
presidency. President Clinton has lost credibility and standing with
the American people. We are witnessing the steady erosion of the moral
authority of the presidency under his tenure.
A majority of Americans now believe that President Clinton lied to us
and damaged the basic trust between the American people and their
president. Just as seriously, if the American people do not believe the
president, why should our allies or our enemies? I believe that the
president can no longer effectively perform the duties and
responsibilities for which he was elected. For the good of the country
he should resign, as I have said for months.
Furthermore, true contrition and the shame that accompanies it should
compel President Clinton to resign. He has disgraced his family and his
office. He alone can forestall the national ordeal and the ugly
spectacle of an impeachment trial in the United States Senate, and
salvage some dignity for himself and the presidency, by resigning now.
Yet Clinton refuses to resign, even though his conduct is contemptible
and renders him unfit to be president of our nation.
In a 1910 address in New York, Theodore Roosevelt said of the
presidency: ``Any man who has ever been honored by being made President
of the United States is thereby forever after rendered the debtor of
the American people, and is honor-bound throughout his life to remember
this as a prime obligation; and in private life, as much as in public
life, so to carry himself that the American people may never have
course to feel regret that once they placed him at the head.''
Some partisans and pundits are suggesting that we should short-
circuit the impeachment process or simply shunt the whole matter aside
based on poll ratings. But we in Congress have an obligation to do
exactly the opposite. That was our duty before the election and it
continues to be so now. Our oath of office requires no less. Our sworn
constitutional obligations may be onerous, but we cannot abdicate our
responsibilities because what is popular is not always right, and what
is right is not always popular.
My responsibility is to inform and mold public opinion but even if
unsuccessful, to vote my conscience and convictions. In my service in
the U.S. House, I have tried to follow the dictum of Sir Edmund Burke,
who told his constituents: ``Your representative owes you his judgment
as well as his industry. He betrays your best interests if he
sacrifices his judgment to your opinion.''
A few thoughts on the impeachment process itself: The House is
charged by the constitution with determining whether the president
should be impeached. Judge Starr's referral under the Independent
Counsel statutes is his conclusion that evidence exists that President
Clinton has committed ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' But it is only
his opinion; the House is certainly not bound by it, nor is Congress
required to accept his evidence.
In fact, it is the House's constitutional obligation to investigate
de novo, that is, make an independent assessment: What are the facts
and what are the legal implications of those facts? That is what an
impeachment inquiry does.
If the Judiciary Committee, then the full House, find the facts show
high crimes and misdemeanors by the president, Articles of Impeachment
are adopted. That is still not a finding of guilt, but more akin to an
indictment. The House proceeding is thus like a special Grand Jury
devoted to the president's conduct. The actual finding of guilt would
have to be made by a two-thirds vote by the Senate, after a trial
presided over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
(Maintaining the analogy to a grand jury, it also follows that the
president does not have the same automatic rights of cross-examination
or presentation of his case at this stage as he would at a trial. The
fact that, nonetheless, he was given those rights is further evidence
that Congress has undertaken a fair inquiry.)
I have tried to approach this historic vote of great import in a
serious, solemn and objective way. I have endeavored to be as honest,
fair, thorough, and deliberate as humanly possible. I have consulted
with the Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee and sought
the advice of national leaders like former Presidents Gerald Ford and
Jimmy Carter, former Vice President Dan Quayle, and Bob Dole, who,
because of their unique experiences, had valuable insights and
perspective to offer. In preparation for this vote, I also asked myself
a series of questions.
(1) Would one of my constituents be held accountable for lying before
a federal grand jury or a federal judicial officer?
(2) Does lying before a federal grand jury or a federal judicial
officer undermine the rule of law?
(3) Is it possible that the president of the United States lied
before a federal grand jury or a federal judge, thereby violating his
oath of office which requires him to uphold and abide by the rule of
law?
In reaching my decision, I have read the referral report to Congress
from the Office of Independent Counsel, closely followed the Judiciary
Committee's deliberations, and, most recently, studied the Judiciary
Committee's Report on the Articles of Impeachment in detail. I have
given great weight to the Committee's report, which contains a full
discussion of the facts and the Committee's rationale and justification
for approving the articles. I have satisfied myself that I would be
voting the same way if the alleged misconduct involved a Republican
president and/or if I had stood for re-election to Congress.
After a thorough review of the record, careful deliberation, much
soul-searching, and due consideration of the consequences for our
nation, I have reached the conclusion that President Clinton lied under
oath and encouraged others to lie under oath in a federal court
proceeding. He has thereby violated his fundamental constitutional
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He has
flouted the rule of law by lying before a federal grand jury and a
federal judge. His false and misleading testimony before the grand jury
is especially egregious since he knew going in that he had to ``come
clean''--but instead he continued to obfuscate the truth. That is
grounds for the President's resignation. It is also grounds for
impeachment under the first three articles reported out by the
Judiciary Committee.
I believe that the laws should be applied equally to all, regardless
of their financial or political stature. The foundation of our criminal
justice system is that no man is above the law. Impeachment is
essential to preserving the rule of law, because under our constitution
a sitting president cannot be indicted for crimes. The only way to make
him subject to the law and preserve the rule of law, is through the
process of impeachment.
If the President, arguably the most powerful man on earth, can
distort the truth, break the law, and avoid accountability, what are
the consequences for ordinary Americans?
Do we want to establish the precedent that presidents may with
impunity hold the law in
[[Page H12019]]
contempt? How can we expect anyone who is subpoenaed to court to have
to tell the truth when the head of our government (and it's legal
system) has not? In my opinion, to overlook such conduct would invite
further social abdication of morality and accountability and breed
contempt for the law.
As former U.S. Senator John Danforth said recently: ``What's
important here is what Congress says in the end about what has
generally been an accepted and basic standard in this country: that
lying under oath is not permitted. If that standard is in any way
watered down, then the country and all it stands for will be sorely
harmed and the future will be in grave doubt.''
I believe that the President has lied under oath and that he
continues to flout the rule of law by refusing to admit publicly that
he lied under oath, and therefore should be impeached and removed from
office. Truth is on trial.
Eight years ago, I stood in the well of the House and voted my
conscience on the Persian Gulf resolutions. One year later seven of
us--all Republican freshmen--forced the House to confront corruption in
the House Bank and Post Office scandals.
Today, too, is a vote of conscience. It is a vote about our country--
its proud heritage and promising future--not about the politics or
polls of the moment. As the father of our country George Washington
said: ``Let prejudices and local interests yield to reason. Let us look
to our national character and to things beyond the present period.''
We are duty bound today by our solemn oath of office to defend our
country and the common commitment to its political principles--the
constitution, the rule of law, the right to life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness--that unites all Americans. We must not, we cannot
fail, for the sake of the future generations of Americans. For the
sacred purpose of preserving the honor of the Office of President of
the United States and the integrity of our Constitution, I will vote to
impeach William Jefferson Clinton.
Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, today the House of Representatives meets to
vote on the impeachment of the president. In the 210-year life of our
Constitution and of the House, the Congress has met to vote on this
critical question only one other time. This is our most serious
constitutional duty.
This duty is required by the unique system of checks and balances
that has made our system so strong. This concept, born in Philadelphia
in 1787, has served us well. It has served us well because the
representatives of one branch of government cannot subvert the others.
No president can be allowed to subvert the judiciary or thwart the
investigative responsibility of the legislature.
There is clear evidence that President Clinton committed perjury on
two or more occasions, and urged others to obstruct justice. These are
serious felonious acts that strike at the heart of our judicial system.
Oaths taken in the American system of government are serious
commitments to truth and the rule of law. Violating these oaths or
causing others to impede the investigation into such acts are serious
matters that meet the standard for impeachment.
The House Judiciary Committee, after a month of hearings, returned
four Articles of Impeachment all dealing with President Clinton's
statements made in a civil trial deposition, to a federal grand jury
his actions with others who were likely to testify and in his response
to the committee's inquiries. This is not about the President's
personal conduct, it is about the President's conduct under oath. It is
about his subversion of the judicial system and his unwillingness to
cooperate with the legislative investigation of that failure; it is
about the rule of law.
The President's actions and statements have brought the country to
this difficult decision. The vote today holds great consequence for the
President and the constitutional process. This is about determining the
facts, seeking the truth, and giving the President the forum to rebut
the charges against him. The duty of the House of Representatives is to
determine if sufficient evidence exists to proceed with a trial in the
Senate. The House Judiciary Committee has met that burden. After
reviewing the material gathered by the Judiciary Committee and the
corroborated nature of hard evidence, it is my conclusion that the
allegations against the President warrant a formal trial in the Senate.
Many of my colleagues advocate some other punishment for the
President. They say for the first time in the history of the United
States the Congress should censure the President. Censure would set a
dangerous precedent for this President and successors. The Constitution
prescribes one option for the Congress which is to determine whether
the President's action are impeachable or not. Today, you could censure
the President for bad conduct, five years from now another Congress
could decide to censure a president for a bad policy and a few years
later the Congress could censure a president for good policies that did
not work out and suddenly, we don't have a presidential system, but a
parliamentary system. One of the great strengths of our system of
government is the lack of a requirement that a president be popular
between elections. The Congress has only one standard, the actions of
the President are either impeachable or they are not impeachable. The
decision to censure would head our government in the wrong direction.
It is my desire that this embarrassment on the presidency and our
country end quickly, but the Constitution cannot be rewritten by public
opinion polls or by political expediency. When I took the oath of
office to serve in Congress, I did not swear to uphold the Constitution
only if it was popular. Today the Constitution gives the House of
Representatives the responsibility to determine if the President's
conduct is impeachable or not. There are no other options. Tomorrow
this House should get on with the business of the new Congress. Our
next job is to work to defend the country, balance the budget, find tax
relief for working families, keep our commitments to Social Security,
Medicare, Veterans and Military retirees and the next generation.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of all four articles of
impeachment against the President. There is neither pleasure nor
vindictiveness in this vote and I have found no one else taking this
vote lightly. It seems though many of our colleagues are not pleased
with the investigative process; some believing it to have been overly
aggressive and petty, while others are convinced it has been
unnecessarily limited and misdirected. It certainly raises the question
of whether or not the special prosecutor rather than the Congress
itself should be doing this delicate work of oversight. Strict
adherence to the Constitution would reject the notion that Congress
undermine the separations of power by delivering this oversight
responsibility to the administration. The long delays and sharp
criticisms of the special prosecutor could have been prevented if the
Congress had not been dependent on the actions of an Attorney General's
appointee.
The charges against the President are serious and straight forward:
lying, perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power. The main
argument made in his defense is that these charges surround the sexual
escapades of the President and therefore should not be considered as
serious as they otherwise would be.
But there are many people in this country and some members of
Congress who sincerely believe we have over concentrated on the
Lewinsky event while ignoring many other charges that have been pushed
aside and not fully scrutinized by the House. It must not be forgotten
that a resolution to inquire into the possible impeachment of the
President was introduced two months before the nation became aware of
Monica Lewinsky.
For nearly six years there has been a steady and growing concern
about the legal actions of the President. These charges seem almost
endless: possible bribery related to Webb Hubble, foreign government
influence in the 1996 presidential election, military technology given
to China, FBI files, travel office irregularities, and many others.
Many Americans are not satisfied that Congress has fully investigated
the events surrounding the deaths of Ron Brown and Vince Foster.
The media and the administration has concentrated on the sexual
nature of the investigation and this has done a lot to distract from
everything else. The process has helped to make the President appear to
be a victim of government prosecutorial overkill while ignoring the
odious significance of the 1,000 FBI files placed for political reasons
in the White House. If corruption becomes pervasive in any
administration, yet no actual fingerprints of the president are found
on indicting documents, there must come a time when the ``CEO'' becomes
responsible for the actions of his subordinates. That is certainly true
in business, the military, and in each congressional office.
There is a major irony in this impeachment proceeding. A lot has been
said the last two months by members of the Judiciary Committee on both
side of the aisle regarding the Constitution and how it must be upheld.
But if we are witnessing all of a sudden the serious move toward
obeying constitutional restraints, I will anxiously look forward to the
next session when 80 percent of our routine legislation will be voted
down.
But the real irony is that the charges coming out of the Paula Jones
sexual harassment suit stem from an unconstitutional federal law that
purports to promote good behavior in the work place. It's based
entirely on ignoring the obligations of the states to deal with
physical abuse and intimidation. This whole mess resulted from a legal
system institutionalized by the very same people who are not the
President's staunchest defenders. Without the federal sexual harassment
code of conduct--which the President repeatedly flaunted--there would
have been no case against the President since the many other serious
charges
[[Page H12020]]
have been brushed aside. I do not believe this hypocrisy will go
unnoticed in the years to come. Hopefully it will lead to the day when
the Congress reconsiders such legislation in light of the strict
limitations placed on it by the Constitution and to which many members
of Congress are now publicly declaring their loyalty.
Much has been said about the support the President continues to
receive from the American people in spite of his acknowledged
misconduct. It does seem that the polls and the recent election
indicate the public is not inclined to remove the President from office
nor reward the Republicans for their efforts to investigate the
Lewinsky affair. It is quite possible as many have suggested that the
current status of the economy has a lot to do with this tolerance.
The public's acceptance of the President's behavior may reflect the
moral standards of our age, but I'm betting there's a lot more to it.
It is true that some conservative voters, demanding the Republicans in
Congress hold the President to a greater accountability, ``voted'' by
staying home. They did not want to encourage the Republicans who were
seen as being soft on Clinton for his personal behavior and for
capitulating on the big government agenda of more spending, and more
taxes. But hopefully there is a much more profound reason for the
seemingly inconsistent position of a public who condemns the President
while not having the stomach for punishing him through impeachment.
If my suspicion is correct we can claim a major victory. Polling
across Texas, as well as nationally, confirms that more than 80 percent
of the people are fearful of the Federal Government's intrusion into
our personal privacy. That's a healthy sign and indicates that the
privacy issue could be the issue that will eventually draw attention to
the evils of big government.
The political contest, as it has always been throughout history,
remains between the desire for security and the love for liberty. When
economic security is provided by the government, privacy and liberty
must be sacrificed. The longer a welfare state lasts the greater the
conflict between government intrusiveness and our privacy. Government
efficiency and need for its financing through a ruthless tax system
prompts the perpetual barrage of government agents checking on
everything we do.
Fortunately, the resentment toward government for its meddling in all
aspects of our lives is strong and becoming more galvanized, and that
should give us hope that all is not lost.
But this resentment must be channeled in the right direction. Belief
that privacy and liberty can be protected while the welfare state is
perpetuated through ever higher taxes is an unrealizable dream.
The ``sympathy'', if that's what we want to call it, for the
President reflects the instinctive nature of most Americans who resent
the prying eyes of big government. It's easy to reason: ``If the
President of the United States can be the subject of a `sting
operation' and FBI ordered tape recordings, how can any of us be secure
in our homes and papers?''
The ambivalence comes from fear that demanding privacy, even for the
President, means that his actions are then condoned. And turning this
into a perjury issue has been difficult.
The President, his advisors, and the friendly media were all aware
that the sexual privacy issue would distract from the serious charges
and knew it was their best chance to avoid impeachment.
But the President, this Administration and the Congress have all been
hypocritical for demanding privacy for themselves yet are the arch
enemies of our privacy. Although other Administrations have abused the
FBI and the IRS, this Administration has systematically abused these
powers like none other.
Let's declare a victory in despite of the mess we're in. The
President is not likely to be removed from office. We'll call it a form
of ``jury nullification'' and hope someday this process will be used in
our courts to nullify the unconstitutional tax, monetary, gun, anti-
privacy, and seizure laws that are heaped upon us by Congress, the
President, and perpetuated by a judicial system devoid of respect for
individual liberty and the Constitution.
Hopefully, the concept of the overly aggressive prosecutor will be
condemned when it comes to overly aggressive activities of all the
federal police agencies whether it's the IRS, the BATF or any other
authoritarian agency of the federal government.
A former U.S. Attorney, Robert Merkle, recently told the Pittsburgh
Post Gazette that ``the philosophy of (the Attorney General's office)
the last 10 to 15 years is whatever works is right,'' when it comes to
enforcing federal laws which essentially all are unconstitutional. It's
this attitude by the federal police agents that the American people
must reject and not only when it applies to a particular President some
want to shield.
Even though we might claim a victory of sorts, the current
impeachment process reveals a defeat for our political system and our
society. Since lack of respect for the Constitution is pervasive
throughout the Administration, the Congress and the Courts and reflects
the political philosophy of the past 60 years, dealing with the
President alone, won't reverse the course on which we find ourselves.
There are days when I think we should consider ``impeaching'' not only
the President, but the Congress and the Judiciary. But the desired
changes will come only after the people's attitudes change as to what
form of government they desire. When the people demand privacy, freedom
and individual responsibility for everyone alike, our government will
reflect these views. Hopefully we can see signs in these current events
that more Americans are becoming serious about demanding their liberty
and rejecting the illusions of government largesse as a panacea.
It's sad but there is another example of a most egregious abuse of
presidential power, committed by the President, that has gotten no
attention by the special prosecutors or the Congress. That is the
attempt by the President to distract from the Monica Lewinsky testimony
to the Grand Jury by bombing with cruise missiles both Sudan and
Afghanistan, and the now current war against Iraq.
Two hundred million dollars were spent on an illegal act of war
against innocent people. The pharmaceutical plant in Sudan was just
that, a pharmaceutical plant, owned by a Muslim businessman who was
standing up to the Islamic fundamentalists, the same people we pretend
to oppose and use as scapegoats for all our Middle-Eastern policies.
And now we have the controversial and unconstitutional waging of war in
Iraq.
And to add insult to injury both military operations ordered by
Clinton were quickly praised by the Republican leaders as good and
necessary policy. These acts alone should be enough for a serious
consideration of impeachment, but it's never mentioned--mainly because
leadership of both parties for decades have fully endorsed our jingoism
and bellicosity directed toward other nations when they do not do our
bidding.
Yes, the President's tawdry affair and the acceptance of it to a
large degree by the American people is not a good sign for us as a
nation. But, let's hope that out of this we have a positive result by
recognizing the public's rejection of the snooping actions of Big
Brother. Let's hope there's a renewed interest in the Constitution and
that Congress pays a lot more attention to it on a daily basis
especially when it comes to waging war.
The fact that President Clinton will most likely escape removal from
office I find less offensive than the Congress's and the media's lack
of interest in dealing with the serious charges of flagrant abuse of
power, threatening political revenge, issuing unconstitutional
Executive Orders, sacrificing U.S. sovereignty to world government,
bribery, and illegal acts of war, along with the routine flaunting of
the constitutional restraints that were placed there to keep our
government small and limited in scope.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, the Republican-led House of Representatives
is about to do something that is nearly unique in our nation's history.
It is about to cast a party line vote to impeach a President of the
opposite party against the will of the majority of the American people.
The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Henry Hyde, said at the
beginning of this process that impeachment must be bipartisan in order
to be legitimate. Well, Mr. Speaker, this process is the furthest thing
from bipartisan. Every vote in the Judiciary Committee was along party
lines, and the final votes on articles of impeachment will almost
certainly be party line votes, as well. This sorry chapter in the
nation's history creates a new gold standard for partisanship--a
standard that will be hard to beat in the decades to come.
But this impeachment drive is illegitimate for other, more
fundamental reasons: the charges brought against the President by House
Republican leaders are not only lacking in merit, they are not the kind
of high crimes and misdemeanors that warrant impeachment. Chairman Hyde
has painted his crusade in moral terms--he claims to be upholding the
rule of law. The rule of law is not at risk here, but the Constitution
is. The Constitution reserves impeachment for treason, bribery and
other high crimes and misdemeanors. It does not say fornication,
adultery and other high crimes and misdemeanors. Nor does it say
perjury, evasiveness and other high crimes and misdemeanors. These are
misdeeds that have other remedies under the law. Calling them
impeachable offenses demeans the Constitution and undermines our system
of government.
And finally, Mr. Speaker, this impeachment is illegitimate because it
is taking place in a Congress that the voters have rejected. In the
election just six weeks ago, the American people made clear their
distaste for impeachment. Many of the members of this House who will
vote today lost their elections last month--in many cases their support
for impeachment was one of the issues that led their constituents to
reject their candidacy. Yet those very
[[Page H12021]]
members are here today supporting impeachment and violating the will of
the voters who turned them out of office.
Mr. Speaker, I expect to hear a rising clamor of calls for the
President to resign. That would be an even greater disaster for our
democracy than this partisan proceeding has been. Having voted--however
illegitimately--for impeachment, the nation, the Constitution and the
President deserve a trial in the Senate. We must determine once and for
all whether these charges are grave enough to warrant impeachment. And
these unproven charges must be judged. The President is innocent until
proven guilty, and Chairman Hyde and his colleagues have not made their
case.
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, I pledge allegiance to the flag of the
United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
The Pledge of Allegiance is recited frequently by all Americans,
including school children and government leaders. It starts each day of
Congress. It is a statement that in this country, our system of justice
is for all people--elected and non elected. Unequal justice is no
justice under the law.
Before I entered Congress in 1993, I practiced law for 22 years. I
have been a student of the Constitution and the powers of Congress
since college in the mid 60's and wrote a book on constitutional law,
which was published in 1973. I am also a father of three young
children. I, therefore, approach the subject of impeachment of the
President with this perspective.
I believe the President should be impeached, which means a finding by
the House of Representatives that there is evidence the President
committed acts sufficient for the Senate to consider the charges and
vote on whether or not he should be removed from office.
The Constitutional Background of High Crimes and Misdemeanors
Wehn the founders of our Constitution met in Philadelphia, they used
English law as the basis for our founding document. The English view of
impeachment meant two things: removal from office and the imposition of
a criminal penalty (sentence and/or fine). Our founders, however, when
they wrote the impeachment section in the U.S. Constitution, chose to
make removal from office the only penalty, but specifically allowed any
criminal actions against the officeholders to be taken by others (state
or federal prosecutors).
This distinction means the American Constitution contemplates two
very different proceedings: the removal from office was to be separate
from criminal proceedings, because removal protects the people and
criminal proceedings punish the officeholder.
Futhermore, the impeachable offense could, but does not have to be, a
violation of a criminal statute. George Mason, who wrote the Bill of
Rights, said impeachment was to be used for ``attempts to subvert the
Constitution.'' Hamilton said impeachment should be used for ``those
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men . . . from the
abuse or violation of some public trust . . . as they related chiefly
to injuries done immediately to the society itself'' (Federalist
Papers, No. 65). Other works by James Wilson, a signatory of the
Constitution, and the pre-eminent jurist, Justice Joseph Story,
conclusively verify this. When the House of Representatives in 1974
considered Articles of Impeachment for President Nixon, the Democratic-
led House Judiciary Committee, for which attorney Hillary Rodham
worked, stated the Articles were premised upon ``injury to the
confidence of the nation and great prejudice to the cause of law and
justice.''
Why Censure is Not an Option in the House of Representatives
The House of Representatives must consider the charges to remove the
President only in terms of how the Constitution governs the procedure.
The Constitution speaks of this duty only in terms of ``impeachment,''
that is, the House finding enough evidence to send to the Senate for a
final resolution as to whether there should be a conviction (removal)
on the impeachment charges. The Constitution provides no option for the
House of Representatives to consider anything less than impeachment,
such as censure. Censure is a formal scolding or reprimand. It has no
legal consequences.
The Charges against President Clinton
The Articles of Impeachment charge President Clinton with perjury,
which is lying under oath, before a federal grand jury and during a
deposition (a sworn statement under oath with attorneys for all parties
present). He is also charged with encouraging a witness to lie under
oath. These charges cannot be dismissed and are not ``simply about
sex.'' Watergate was not about breaking and entering, but about cover
up and perjury after the fact. It is the same here.
Why is perjury and encouraging a witness to lie under oath so
serious?
The U.S. Supreme Court (US v. Mandurano, 1974) said that ``perjured
testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of
judicial proceedings.'' When somebody perjures himself under oath, this
does two things: first, it deprives a party to the lawsuit of the
constitutional right to a fair trial (because truth is frustrated)
and, second, it is a frontal assault upon the intergrity of the system
of justice in this Nation.
The fact that President Clinton lied under oath at the federal grand
jury and the deposition is not refuted. Period. Does his perjury have
to be of such a nature that criminal charges could be brought against
him? The answer is no, (even though I believe criminal charges could be
brought). Under the English system, the question is probably yes. But
because impeachment under the American Constitution is aimed at removal
and not criminal punishment of the officeholder, the criminal rules of
evidence and other rules in a regular criminal proceeding sumply do not
apply. That's why it is incorrect to compare impeachment proceeding in
the House of Represenatives with a criminal trial.
Encouraging a witness to lie under oath is akin to the following: you
own a business (Party A) and get involved in a lawsuit with another
businessperson (Party B). Your livelihood is threatened. An independent
distribution who has a business relationship with you and Party B can
verify your claim. Party B has a conversation with the independment
distrubutor and says, ``I understand you have been named as a witness
in this case. I know you'll do the right thing, possibly by simply
signing and filing an affidavit in court. That way you might not be
called as a witness. By the way, I understand you are looking for more
business, and perhaps we could do something on that.'' Party B's
attorney then picks up the distributor, takes him to another lawyer's
office. That lawyer prepares an affidavit that is false, and that
lawyer goes over the affidavit with Part B's attorney. The affidavit is
filed in court. You lose your lawsuit, or it is greatly hindered, and
the trial suffers a serious blow because the notion of justice based
upon truth is destroyed. This is what the President is charged with.
The President discovers Monica Lewinsky is on the witness list in the
case where Paula Jones has charged the President with a federal
Constitutional civil rights case of sexual harassment. The President
suggests to Ms. Lewinsky that if an affidavit is signed, she won't have
to testify and that he is sure she'll do the right thing. The President
talks to his close friend, attorney Vernon Jordan, who then takes Ms.
Lewinsky to another lawyer, who prepares a false affidavit about Ms.
Lewinsky's relationship with the President. Her attorney goes over the
affidavit with Mr. Jordan. After she signs the affidavit, Mr. Jordan
again enters the picture and Ms. Lewinsky gets another job.
The U.S. Supreme Court rule unamimously that Paula Jones has a right
to file and pursue her federal constitutional remedy against the
President while he is in office.
Paula Jones has a constitutional right to a trial based upon
factual--not perjured--testimoney, and thus the false affidavit
deprives her of that constutional right. Second, the entire judicial
system, based upon people seeking redress for legal wrongs, suffers a
serious blow. This is why perjury is so serious. This is why 115 people
are sitting in federal prison because they committed perjury. This is
why four Northwestern students have been indicated for perjury because
they lied about betting on sports. This is why a 17-year-old student in
McHenry County, Illinois, received six months in jail for lying in open
court under oath. The Northerwestern students cannot defend their
actions because they were simply lying about ``just a little sports
betting'' any more that the President can defend his lie because the
Jones lawsuit was ``just about sex.''
And this is why impeachment, in the words of the founders, is to
remove those officeholders who violate the ``public trust and subvert
the Constitution.''
The Oath of Office
As a member of Congress, I swore an oath ``to defend the Constitution
of the United States. . . .'' This means I have an obligation to defend
the Constitution and to do everything I can to make sure the powers and
protections of the Constitution are enjoyed by the rest of America.
This is a solemn obliation. That is why elected officials have oaths.
The President's Constitutional oath says he is to ``preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States.'' The Constitution
further provides that the President ``shall take Care that the Law be
faithfully executied.'' The worlds ``care'' and ``laws'' in the
Constitution are purposely, capitalized for emphasis. Other words for
``take Care'' are to ``nurture,'' ``conserve,'' ``supervise,'' and ``be
vigilant over'' the law of this land. The President is, therefore,
constitutionally charged with being a caretaker of the Constitution and
the laws of this nation, holding these in trust for the protection of
the American people. This is such an awesome responsibility that the
Constitution makes the President the Commander
[[Page H12022]]
in Chief of the Armed Forces with the power to use force, if necessary
to protect the people's Constitutional right to equal application of
the Constitution and the laws.
Teddy Roosevelt said it best, as recorded in The Strenuous Life
(1900): ``We . . . differ on the currency . . . tariff and foreign
policy; but we cannot . . . differ on the question of honesty if we
expect our republic permanently to endure. Honesty is . . . an absolute
prerequisite to efficient service to the public. Unless a man is
honest, we have no right to keep him in public life, it matters not how
brilliant his capacity . . . No man who is corrupt . . . who condones
corruption in others can possibly do his duty by the community. If a
man lies under an oath or procures the lie of another under an oath, if
he perjures himself or suborns, perjury, he is guilty under the statute
law.''
This paper opened with the Pledge of Allegiance, which is a pledge
taken by Americans, including those who serve in public office, to do
whatever is necessary to assure equal justice under law. Unequal
justice is no justice under the law.
Even if the President were my best friend, I would still vote to
impeach him because the Rule of Law is more important to me than
friendship, popularity or politics.
Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, Article IV alleges that President Clinton
``refused and failed to respond to certain written requests for
admission and willfully made perjurious, false and misleading sworn
statements in response to certain written requests propounded to him as
part of the impeachment inquiry authorized by the House of
Representatives.'' The ``written requests'' consisted of 81 written
questions posed to the President by the House Judiciary Committee.
I find President Clinton's responses to the Judiciary Committee's
questions misleading, evasive and incomplete. They show disrespect for
an authorized impeachment inquiry--the most serious proceeding the
House can undertake.
While President Clinton's responses show disrespect, even contempt,
for the Congress of the United States, their most disturbing elements
are really just repetitions of the perjurious statements alleged in
Articles I and II.
I am also concerned that the wording of Article IV could set a
negative precedent for the balance of power between future White House
and future Congresses. We do not want the President of the United
States to be concerned about impeachment allegations every time a
provocative communication is sent to the Congress or every time he
responds in an aggressive manner to a Congressional inquiry. I am
concerned that Article IV may have the effect of unduly weakening the
Presidency.
For this reason and because I believe its core is redundant to the
other Articles, I cannot support Article IV.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, as members prepare for this historic vote, I
would like to say that I take this matter as seriously as any issue I
have ever voted on during my tenure here in Congress.
I know that I will have to look back on this as one of the most
critical votes I will ever cast. Out of thousands of votes over the
past eight years, the two most important have been this vote and my
very first vote in 1991 to commit our country to war in the Persian
Gulf.
I have carefully and thoroughly examined each of the articles of
impeachment. I have reflected on this matter at great length and
listened to every possible opinion through each step of this process.
Having done that, I will not vote to impeach the president.
Mr. Speaker, as deplorable and disgusting as the president's personal
conduct has been, and as much as I condemn what he, through his own
actions, has put this country through, I do not believe that it reaches
the level that the framers of our Constitution set for impeachment.
There are many pressing issues for this country to address, and we need
to focus our energies on these issues as quickly and strongly as
possible.
I still believe the president should be punished. I had hoped that
censure would be an option. I have done everything I could to create
the momentum to put forth a strong censure motion that would condemn
the president and penalize him with a considerable fine. I feel that
this is a way to hold him accountable without damaging the Constitution
or further punishing the nation.
I believe that the president can be held accountable for his actions
after he leaves office through the criminal justice system. After
considering all of these factors. I will vote against impeachment.
Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, my Republican colleagues have made history
in the four years since they took control of the House. But it's not a
history future will view with pride.
Over and over again, our Republican colleagues have called for the
``rule of law.'' Let me suggest that if the President has committed a
crime, that he be tried in a court of law after he leaves office.
There, even he will have the protections of the law. Here in the House
of Representatives he is not getting the rule of law--but the rule of
politics.
President Clinton has been subjected to an unprecedented and
deliberate strategy to use taxpayer funded investigations to ``get
him.'' Millions have been spent, and a series of reckless charges have
been investigated to death and turned out to have no basis in fact.
The reality is that many of my Republican colleagues intensely
dislike the President. Some have never been able to accept the fact
that the American people have twice elected him. Some have never been
able to accept him as their President. Indeed, one of my distinguished
Republican colleagues, Majority Leader Dick Armey, once derisively
referred to the President as ``your President'' during a debate with a
Democratic House member. Another Republican member called Mr. Clinton
an ``illegitimate President'' as early as January 1995.
That intensity of feeling has transformed itself into a deliberate
strategy to use taxpayer-funded investigations to cripple the
President. Over three years ago, just after the Republicans took
control of Congress, the Speaker's top political strategist wrote a
memo urging Republicans to ``get the Clinton Administration under
special prosecutor problems.'' Two years ago, the House of Republican
leadership directed Committee chairmen to compile ``examples of
dishonesty or ethical lapses in the Clinton Administration.''
The result has been an extraordinary series of personal attacks on
the President. I won't recount every accusation, but I do want to
mention some of the most notable.
President Clinton and his Administration has been accused of misusing
the IRS and the FBI to punish political enemies. The President and his
Administration have been accused of compiling an enemies list and of
intentionally obtaining secret FBI files for those on the list.
The President and his Administration have been accused of doctoring
White House video tapes that Congress subpoenaed.
The President and his Administration have been accused of selling
cemetery plots at Arlington Cemetery in exchange for campaign
contributions.
The President and the First Lady have been accused of stealing
government property.
The president has even been accused of killing one of his closest
friends, Vince Foster.
Most serious of all, the President has been accused of committing
treason. That word, treason, was tossed around on this floor earlier
this year. It is without question the most serious charge one American
can make against another American.
All of these charges have been investigated, and all turned out to
have no basis in fact. And while the accusations were trumpeted in
press headlines around the country, their debunking at best made the
back pages.
One of our colleagues even introduced an impeachment resolution last
year, months before anyone had heard of the President's affair with Ms.
Lewinsky, and it was based on all these ridiculous, unsubstantiated,
and false accusations
This has been an impeachment in search of an impeachable offense.
Durign these past four years, my Republican colleagues have taken all
the tools of traditional congressional investigations and twisted them
into something no American can be proud of. They have misused and
abused the subpoena process. They have misused and abused the
deposition process. They have misused and abused the power to grant
immunity. They have misused and abused the power to hold others in
contempt of Congress.
We have trivialized these important powers and set horrifying
precedents for future congressional investigations. In years to come,
almost anything imaginable will be justified--by whichever party is in
control--by pointing to the actions of the past four years. It's
remarkable and remarkably sad that so much harm could be done in so
little time.
I suppose today's impeachment is the natural evolution of all those
prior excesses. Every abuse of the past four years has built to this
day. As one of my Republican colleagues said in the Washington Post on
December 15, ``impeachment is icing on the cake.''
The impeachment resolution is the ultimate indulgence of the House
Republican leadership. It puts their anger, their hatred of the
President, their political interests, ahead of the national interest.
Despite the Republicans' premeditated and constant attack on him,
today's vote would have been impossible had the President not acted
irresponsibly, if not recklessly, in his personal and sexual
misconduct. Feeling trapped, he lied. He acted dishonorably and
dishonestly. The Republicans were desperate to find a crime, and the
President, unfortunately, provided them with irresistible ammunition.
For that President Clinton deserves censure and he deserves to be
prosecuted if he violated the law. His crimes, if any, do not amount to
impeachable offenses envisioned by the Constitution. He does not
deserve--and our country does not deserve--this impeachment resolution.
[[Page H12023]]
What has been presented to us by the Judiciary Committee do not
amount to impeachable offenses. I call for the rule of law and the
supremacy of the Constitution. I urge all my colleagues to oppose these
articles of impeachment.
Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Speaker, with solemn thought and a certain sadness we
are brought together to speak of removing the President of our United
States. This is a task I did not choose, but as with all of us in this
chamber, this task was thrust upon us by the actions of our President.
Before us are four articles of impeachment. Two for perjury, one for
obstruction of justice and the last for abuse of power. In these
articles, we are required to judge our President and determine if his
actions rise to the level of impeachable offenses. But we judge not
only the character of the President, we judge ourselves and our nation.
What standard must we raise for our President and ourselves? What
standards will come from this for each of us to live up to and what
expectations will we set for our nation? Will we accept the degradation
of untruth or attempt to bring ourselves and our nation to its highest
and best?
With sadness we view the crisis of character in the words and deeds
of the last year and we must hold the President accountable for those
actions. Over 2,500 years ago, the philosopher Heraclitus said, ``A
man's character is his fate.'' Anne Frank, quoting her father said,
``Parents can only give good advice or put them (children) on the right
paths, but the final forming of a person's character lies in their own
hands.'' I believe this to be right. I believe in personal
responsibility. I believe the president is responsible for his own
character and his own actions.
The standard of conduct and personal character we expect from our
President should be no less than what we expect of ourselves. So we
must ask, do we expect to carry out our duties and our responsibilities
with integrity or do we stoop to the lowest levels of personal
character? Stephen L. Carter, in his book ``Integrity'' defines
integrity in three steps. First, to conduct ourselves with integrity we
must discern right from wrong. This is a judgment based on all we are
and all we know. What we learned from our parents, our teachers, people
of faith, the wisdom of our years and that small, still voice inside
which guides us to the judgment of what is right. Second, we must do
the right thing. And third, we must tell others why we are doing what
we are doing.
Our decision must also determine what we hope for our nation.
Tolerating actions that abuse the law, without repercussions, moves the
entire nation to a place beneath its rightful one. We must work to
raise our nations goals, ideals and future. We must protect the rule of
law for it brings justice to us all. If we refuse to hold the President
accountable for his actions, then we accept the degradation of our
society and his actions. This cannot be.
It is clear to me the President committed perjury and broke the law.
It is against the law to deny another American their civil rights by
withholding information and coordinating an effort to mislead a court
as the President has done. It is obstruction of justice when the
President used taxpayer funded resources to cover up, delay, and
propagate misdeeds and lies. Finally, it is an abuse of power for the
President to deliberately mislead Congress. All of these rise to the
level of impeachable offenses.
It is my hope that we expect the highest and best from ourselves, our
nation and our President. Honesty is a simple concept but it is at the
foundation of our system of justice which protects our free society and
our free enterprise system. For these reasons, I have chosen to vote
for articles of impeachment.
Mr. BARCIA. Mr. Speaker, one of the greatest moments of my life was
when I walked into this chamber, the House of Representatives, to take
my oath of office as a Member of this elected body. I had spent my
entire life being enthralled by the dignity and the humility of this
special Chamber within our Capitol.
One of the reasons I wanted to serve as a Congressman was to actively
work to express my appreciation for what this nation means to me, and
to be an advocate for my constituents, people who often thought that
their government overwhelms them with demands, but fails to understand
their needs.
I then had another thrill in my life. I met our President. I met a
man who cares about ordinary people. He wants children to have the best
possible opportunities for education. He wants working men and women to
earn a decent wage and be better prepared for an increasingly
competitive world. He wants our senior citizens to have access to the
health care they need, and to make sure that their Social Security is,
indeed, secure.
When I heard about President Clinton's involvement in an extramarital
affair last January, I was just as shocked as any of my constituents.
Certainly I joined the chorus of people who said ``say it isn't true.''
And when President Clinton said it wasn't true, I was pleased.
But as events have unfolded over this past year, I, like so many of
you, have been bitterly disappointed in the President's personal
failings. He has done wrong, and he should face an appropriate penalty.
I personally believe that the President should be censured, and I would
support a fine.
Mr. Speaker, since my arrival in Washington in 1993, indeed for more
than a decade, the growing acrimony between parties and people has made
our government increasingly powerless to attack the critical problems
of our nation. Impeachment of this President and his ultimate removal
from office would make that climate of anger and distrust all the more
palpable. I weigh this decision, against the probability of this
outcome. Those who care more about getting a person whom they
personally dislike than they do about the ability of this government to
solve this nation's problems have an easy decision. Those who want to
provide a safe and prosperous future for our citizens recognize the
excruciating nature of this decision, regardless of the outcome of
their personal deliberation.
There has been a wealth of learned experts who testified before the
Judiciary Committee that the failings of the President are not crimes
against the state. They are not a misuse of Presidential authority.
Yes, he did mislead the American people. He offered answers that may
have met technical legal requirements, but did not provide full
satisfaction. But so did our leaders during wars and foreign
negotiations. They didn't answer questions to the fullest degree. Are
we now going to make that impeachable, or are we creating a standard
that you can be impeached, for personal lies, not professional ones? If
Bill Clinton truly did commit perjury, then legal authorities should be
ready to bring charges against him when they can--the same way any
other American can be charged with perjury. If he lied, he is not
getting away with it.
Did he encourage others to lie for him? The very people he was
supposed to have suborned said that he did not. If we are to depend
upon the factual record that the Judiciary Committee provided for us in
which it depended upon prior statements under oath of Betty Currie and
Monica Lewinsky, then we have to accept those statements as true. After
all, that is what the Judiciary Committee did.
What Bill Clinton did was wrong and I don't condone it. Since he did
it while President, he demeaned the office of the President. Had he
done it as a private citizen, certainly he would be subject to perjury
charges, the same as he is now. But the story might not have been made
the page before the classifieds in your local paper, let alone the
front page. He may have lost some credibility with the American people,
but he hasn't with world leaders. Ask British Prime Minister Tony Blair
who joined the President in attacking Saddam's Iraq by committing young
British men and women to Operation Desert Fox.
To all of my constituents who have called and written to me with
their strong views, I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Your
comments have given me reassurance on many issues, and have raised
challenges on others that made me think even harder. The people I
represent are truly split on this issue, and I know that regardless of
which way I vote, some will be disappointed and perhaps angered. I wish
this were not the case, but it is the likely outcome of any divisive
issue.
So many have said to me to vote my conscience, and that is exactly
what I am doing. I am disappointed in Bill Clinton and believe he
should pay a penalty. But I do not believe that the personal failings
of the individual meet the constitutional tests of high crimes and
misdemeanors of the President acting in a Presidential capacity. I will
not be surprised if my position is not the prevailing one at the end of
this debate, but it is the right one for me.
This is a very solemn moment in our nation's history. May God guide
us swiftly through the difficult days ahead.
Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this is a sad day for our
Nation, but, unfortunately, a necessary one. The President took an oath
to uphold all the laws of the Nation. I recognize in that many respects
the Nation has become a morass of regulations that have the effect of
law, which sometimes contradict each other and can confuse the average
citizen. The Congress, to its shame has allowed such regulations to
become so multiplied and so confusing.
This President was not caught up in bureaucratic regulations, but has
been charged, and an overwhelming amount of evidence has been produced,
which proves he has violated some of the most fundamental laws
recognized by almost every government. The President had violated
common law and some of the first laws adopted by this country, perjury,
suborning perjury, and obstruction of justice. He has added insult to
our constitution by abusing his power in covering up his crimes.
These are serious felonies for which convicted citizens are placed in
prison and Federal public official have been and are impeached and
expelled from office.
I and other Member of Congress did not wish to be here today,
however, we must fulfill
[[Page H12024]]
our constitutional oath. Serious charges, which go to the heart of our
constitution and rule of law, were placed before the Congress. As
required by law, we have to fulfill our oath and vote for impeachment
to send the matter to the Senate for trial if there is sufficient
evidence.
It is clear that after serious and due consideration of the evidence
presented and available that the President committed felonies of which
he is charged. I believe that his actions of perjury, obstruction of
justice, suborning perjury and abuse of power are of a serious nature
and that they merit impeachment by this body and trial by the Senate.
If they were committed by any citizen, they would be serious. When they
have been committed by the Chief Executive Officer who functions as the
chief law enforcement officer of the Nation, they merit impeachment by
this body and trial by the Senate.
Accordingly, it is my duty to the Constitution, the people of the
United States, and to the rule of law to vote for impeachment of the
President.
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Speaker, as all of America knows, on December 11 and
23, the House Judiciary Committee approved four separate articles of
impeachment against the President of the United States, William
Jefferson Clinton. Today, with profound sorrow, but firm conviction, I
cast my vote in support of Articles 1 and 2 of those charges. Articles
3 and 4, while constituting disturbing accusations alleging obstruction
of justice and the failure of the President to deal honestly with the
House of Representatives in the discharge of its constitutional duties,
do not, in my judgment, contain sufficient specificity of clear and
unquestioned misconduct to rise to a level of an impeachable offense.
Clearly, however, the accusations described in Article 3 strongly
suggest activity that warrants further examination and possible legal
action against the President following the conclusion of his current
term of office.
This has been the most difficult and heart-wrenching decision I have
ever faced in my 14 years of elective office. It is a circumstance I
never envisioned and it's certainly a choice I never sought to make.
And yet, the honor the good people of the 24th Congressional District
have bestowed upon me requires that I now make a judgment.
For the past 12 months, I have watched and listened as the
President's predicament has evolved. With each new revelation, with
each additional shred of evidence, it has become increasingly clear
that the President has committed grievous wrongs. Still, like most
Americans, I wanted desperately to forgive, to heal, and to direct our
Nation's gaze toward other challenges. Sadly, the continued failure of
the President to face his guilt fully and honestly, in addition to the
overwhelming body of highly credible evidence, no longer permits me
such a course.
To those who would say this action of impeachment is the result of
nothing more than an admittedly unseemly, but nevertheless consensual,
relationship between two adults, I would respond that I deeply wish it
were so. I would much prefer to leave judgment of highly private
transgressions to those who have been most directly harmed by them.
While the President's indiscretions did, in fact, add to and even help
light the path to his current legal troubles, they are not the cause of
my decision today. In this instance, my vote is based on the fact that
the America of today has grown from certain convictions of the past.
Our democracy has outlived all others because, through all our
marvelous diversity, we have always shared certain common bonds: belief
in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and the recognition that
all are created and must live equally. The binding force of our
national ideals has always been the rule of law--the recognition that
the passage of the tyranny of kings brought an era wherein no citizen,
man or woman, for lack of power or position, would ever be judged
differently from all others. For some 222 years, that irreplaceable
belief has nurtured our freedom and our liberties. It's that belief
that the President's actions have so directly assailed and, as such,
requires my affirmative vote on Articles 1 and 2.
When the President submitted a false affidavit to the courts during
the Paula Jones case, he was going far beyond an illegal, yet somewhat
understandable, effort to conceal an illicit affair. He was, instead,
attempting to avoid legal responsibility for his alleged actions of
sexual harassment of an employee during his tenure as Governor of the
State of Arkansas. To excuse the deliberate act of falsifying testimony
in a Federal civil rights case because the truth may have proven
somehow embarrassing would be to lay waste to the essential tenet that
an oath of honesty before a court requires the whole truth, no matter
how disruptive or unfortunate its consequences. The President knowingly
and willfully ignored this solemn duty, a failure that in America today
has caused dozens of citizens to be incarcerated in prisons, denied of
their liberty and rights, simply for not telling the truth.
As tragic as this original failure was unto itself, the President
went beyond, seeking to further obscure, conspiring to conceal. When
the President again swore an oath of honesty before a federal grand
jury and repeated his deceptions, he again crossed a line that cannot
be ignored. To do so would be to say to the thousands of Americans that
each day pledge their truthfulness in the courtrooms of this land that
their oath is meaningless as well, and that like their President, their
personal convenience is the superior concern. I firmly believe such a
message would result in a dangerous and irreversible decline in the
respect for our Nation's laws, our judicial system, and the liberties
we rely upon them to protect.
I realize there are those who will claim that this impeachment is but
an attempt to secure some political advantage or revenge. Such
assertions are wholly without foundation and in themselves seek
political gain. In truth, the easy political path would be to turn from
this crisis, pretending that somehow it all never occurred. But
thoughtful people understand that, in our democracy, where the heart
may be fooled, the head will not be deceived. The false, short-term
sense of security that such a self-deception might produce would be
buried under the longer term costs of a nation blind to the wrongdoings
of its highest official.
Through its actions today, the House seeks not to imprison or punish
this President as we normally use these terms. Rather, we seek to
express our outrage and dismay at his lawlessness through the sole
means provided to us under the Constitution. Whether the President is
held to account through a trial and possible removal from office is a
question solely to be decided by the Senate. I, for one, would accept,
even welcome, their mercy. But through the adoption of these articles
of impeachment, the House of Representatives seeks to reaffirm our most
solemn national principle that in the United States, equal treatment
under the law requires its universal and uniform respect.
I join those who long for a conclusion to this seemingly endless and
trying ordeal. But, for the sake of those who will follow us, and in
solemn respect for those who have sacrificed and gone before, that end
must be reached in a fashion that, above all else, preserves the high
principles and standards upon which this great Nation was built. To do
otherwise would be to dishonor the blood that has been spilled by so
many in pursuit and preservation of the American dream. To do otherwise
would be to hasten the goal of so many others whose perverse objective
is a world of tomorrow that is devoid of American honor and ideals. I
cannot, I will not, be an accomplice to such a foul scheme.
To the President and his family, I would say I am deeply saddened by
your pain. I pray that you find peace and redemption from your anguish.
In his remarks to the American people on December 11, the President
recalled the words of Omar Khayyam, wherein he noted the futility of
struggling to erase the failures of the past. Truly, those words hold
much wisdom. It is important to remember, however, that especially in
this most holy time of year, the greatest promise our faith can provide
is that of redemption from our transgressions. The first step in that
salvation is the acceptance of our failings. May our actions this day,
as wrenching as they may be, hasten us up the long, difficult path to a
higher and better place. May God bless America.
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, this is a sad day for me. It is a sad day
for the country. Each of us in this body, on both sides of the aisle,
today faces what is surely the most solemn duty of our lives; to decide
whether it has become necessary to impeach a President of the United
States. It is a duty, I dare say, that none of us cherish. Having spent
considerable time listening to my district, I've heard many voices. All
Americans struggle with the dilemma we face. The great debate is what
to do with a popular President who has violated the very constructs of
our safe, legal society. Ours is not a monarchy. Unfortunately, there
is no easy way out. This is not about sex, it is about the law.
This vote is about what kind of country we will live in from this day
forward. It is about whether we really believe in the ``rule of law''
or just pretend to abide it. It is about whether we really have faith
in the principles and mechanisms set forth by our founding fathers in
the Constitution, or will instead choose to be guided by TV pundits and
polls. Perhaps we would all best be guided by the words of Edmund Burke
who, in a speech to the Electors of Bristol on November 3, 1774 said,
``Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his
judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to
your opinion.''
In the words of the New York Times (12/14/98), ``Mr. Clinton did lie
repeatedly, in plain sight, while under oath.''
Mr. Clinton is not the first President who has lied to the American
people. He is the first in
[[Page H12025]]
modern times to perjure himself in front of a grand jury. He lied not
to protect the safety of American soldiers, to save the Republic, nor
to trick a foreign despot in a game of political poker. He lied to
thwart a court proceeding, in a sad attempt to conceal.
He broke his oath of office.
A CEO in my district would be fired for this. An attorney in my
district would face disbarment; a member of my staff dismissed. All
would face prosecution.
Should I overlook the President's crime because, as some suggest, he
remains popular? Are we to disregard the President's perjury to spare
the Country the agony of a Senate trial? Am I to vote against
impeachment, thereby forgiving the President's conduct for which my
constituents would face prosecution?
Certainly, the President has the same right as everyone else to the
equal and unfettered protection of our judicial system. This process we
undergo today is about whether we will ever again be able to honestly
say to ourselves and to our children that we live in a country where no
one is above the law. I still believe in that country. It's not a
perfect country. Unfortunately, there is hypocrisy, there is
dishonesty, there is evasion of laws. These things surely exist in that
country I believe in.
But if by our actions today we sanction hypocrisy, if by our vote we
ratify dishonesty, if by our vote we permit evasion of laws at the very
highest level of our Government, then we will have forevermore
surrendered the thing that makes us uniquely American--a free, yet
legal, society.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, as I walked from my office yesterday morning
to this chamber, I was almost overcome by the weight of the
responsibility thrust upon us. The idea of having to make a decision on
the impeachment of a President is sobering and no one should approach
it casually.
Mr. Hyde and Mr. Gephardt both did an excellent job of framing the
issues, but from that point it was mostly downhill. The debate
degenerated into small sound bytes of partisan demigogery interspersed
with infrequent moments of lucidity.
Many talked of the inappropriateness of proceeding while our troops
are in combat, as if we were somehow doing something to impede their
efforts. Nonsense!
Others, argued that the President's behavior was ``reprehensible'',
but that censure was the appropriate punishment. No, we are not here to
contrive novel types of punishment for the President, or even to decide
whether he should be removed from office.
We, in this House, are to determine whether enough evidence has been
presented to convince us there is substantial cause to believe that the
President has committed offenses for which he should stand trial in the
Senate.
This is our responsibility! No more! No less!
One of the themes put forth by a number of speakers yesterday was,
``He who is without sin, cast the first stone'' or `'vote'' as it were.
If this is the criteria, there will be no impeachments, or grand jurys,
or trial jurys, for that matter. The scripture tells us, ``All have
sinned and come short of the glory of God.'' As I look out over this
House I know this must be true.
We are a group with great strengths, but also great weaknesses. We
have virtues and flaws. We are the representatives of over 250,000,000
Americans who themselves lack perfection.
No, no one here claims perfection and shame on any of us who wrap our
robes of self-righteousness around ourself and finds joy in the task
before us.
But perfection is not the question. The President is being judged not
by saints but by a jury of his peers as the Constitution provides.
The questions we must answer center narrowly around a limited number
of legal concepts. Perjury! Obstruction of justice! Misuse of office!
The decisions we must make should not be based upon polls, or number of
phone calls, or political party, or even how we feel about the
President personally.
Our decisions should be based on the evidence alone. It is on this
evidence I have seen presented that I will cast my vote for
impeachment.
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I must rise today in support of the
impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton.
Having reviewed the compelling evidence that shows our President
intentionally lied under oath and used his position to hinder the due
process of law, I can reach no other conclusion.
Mr. Speaker, while my decision may be painful for the country, my
conscience and high regard for the rule of law dictates that I support
impeachment. I did not reach this conclusion in haste. I have carefully
reviewed the facts of the case and consulted with my distinguished
colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, including the esteemed Chairman,
Henry Hyde.
Contributing to my decision, but not dictating it, is that I received
an overwhelming number of calls and letters from Arizonans expressing
their profound interest in ensuring that the President is not allowed
to enjoy a special status before the law. I talked personally with many
of these people, They are law-abiding people who have the utmost
respect for our laws. They know that great damage will be done to our
justice system if we dismiss the President's actions, and they have
urged that we not turn our backs on this matter.
Our duty today is not pleasant and, contrary to the misguided charges
of some of the President's supporters, no Member takes joy in what we
must do. Mr. Speaker, I regrettably submit that we have no choice. We
must move ahead with impeachment and hold President Clinton responsible
for his crimes.
Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, on October 1, I received a message from Mike
Hagerty, a Retired Marine Corps Officer from my Eastern North Carolina
District. He now works with the young people in Jacksonville, where he
serves as a Boy Scout leader.
Mr. Hagerty wrote:
The Boy Scouts in my town are smart young men and they ask
many questions about the President. Most of the discussion
among our Scouts is to the effect that the President's
conduct is simply unacceptable.
He then went on to write, and I quote:
I explain to our Scouts that our current President did not
take the same oath that they take and retake each week. I
stress that, unfortunately, we hold our Scouts to a higher
standard than our current President. That is a bitter pill.
Mr. Hagerty concluded his message by writing:
Sir, I would like to ask you a favor. When the time comes
for the United States House of Representatives to deal with
the issues involving our President, please cast your vote in
a manner consistent with our Constitution.
. . .There is not an elite class that is above the law;
there is not a clause in the Constitution that gives an
elected official license to conduct himself in a reckless,
wanton, and unlawful manner because of his popularity.
Mr. Speaker, when I think about the letter from Mr. Hagerty, I
realize that the decision we are making about the violation of the law
by the President of the United States is critical to the youth of
America. They must understand that the strength of our nation is that
every American--no matter their status--must absolutely abide by the
laws of this land.
I hope, if nothing else, that we have learned from this experience
that character and integrity are vital to maintaining a strong America.
Mr. Speaker, today millions of teachers, parents--and even Scout
Leaders--are watching to see whether we in Congress will ensure that
the President of the United States is held to the same laws as everyone
else.
I want Mike Hagerty to be able to look those young men in the eye and
tell them that lying under oath is not acceptable behavior, and that no
man is above the law.
I want him to be able to tell those Scouts that despite the fact that
it wasn't fun, or popular, their Congressman voted to put the
Constitution above any single politician--even the President of the
United States.
The young people of America must see by our vote--no matter how
distasteful and regretful--that we are ensuring that the America of
tomorrow will be a nation of strength, because the Congress of today
has upheld the dictates of the Constitution.
Mr. Speaker, as a man of faith, I will vote for the articles because
I believe it is the right vote to ensure the strength of America for
the next generations.
Mr. WEYGAND. Mr. Speaker, twenty-three short months ago, I stood in
the well of this House to take the oath of office. At that time, I
could not imagine that during my first term I would be asked to
consider the impeachment of the President of the United States. In
fact, I could not imagine that I would do so at anytime during my
career in the House. I believe that as a member of the House of
Representatives, short of sending young men and women to risk their
lives in battle, impeachment is the gravest vote I can make.
More than two centuries ago, when our forefathers met to draft our
Constitution, they were aware that from time to time extreme
circumstances would arise in the life of the nation that would require
the right of the people who freely elect their representatives to be
superseded in order to protect the Union and preserve our political
system, through the process of impeachment by the Hose of
Representatives and removal by the United States Senate.
Throughout the process leading us to our historic vote, members of
Congress have heard quite often the phrase in the Constitution
outlining which offenses are considered grave and serious enough to
merit impeachment. As it states in the Constitution in Article II,
Section 4, ``The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.''
[[Page H12026]]
At this juncture, it is critical to examine the framers' expectations
and understandings of this important phrase. The authors of the
Constitution carefully chose every word, phrase and punctuation and, by
doing so, created a timeless document. The Constitution has persevered
throughout our nation's history and has guided our republic through
both its darkest and proudest time because of its deliberately chosen
words.
The phrase describing what were considered impeachable offenses took
many shapes before final adoption. At the beginning, the phrase
`malpractice or neglect of duty' was suggested, but shelved by the
Committee of Detail which suggested the phrase `treason, bribery or
corruption'. This phrase was also altered because it was too limited in
scope and specifically mentioned certain crimes, all of which were
official in nature. Immediately prior to the adoption of the final
phrase. `high crimes and misdemeanors', the Constitutional Convention
also considered the term `maladministration'. Concerns were raised that
`maladministration' would be far too broad. By adopting the phrase
`high crimes and misdemeanors' in lieu of `maladministration' I believe
the framers of the Constitution were more interested in limiting the
number and kind of offenses which are considered impeachable than
expanding the type of transgressions deemed serious enough to warrant
the removal of a President duly elected by the people. Each of the
terms considered prior to the adoption of the final wording, `neglect
of duty', `maladministration' and `corruption', referenced acts related
to the official duties of the President not personal matters conducted
by the President during his tenure in office.
In addition, I believe the word `other' in the phase `treason,
bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors' was precisely selected
by the authors of the Constitution (emphasis added). In my view, the
inclusion of `other' reflects the desire of our forefathers to include
crimes and misdemeanors akin to treason and bribery in the list of
impeachment offenses. Without the adjective `other', the phrase would
have another meaning entirely and would be interpreted very
differently.
Before us today are four articles of impeachment, two of which bring
forth accusations of perjury, one which alleges presidential abuse of
power and one which indicts the President for obstruction of justice.
The first two articles, Article I and Article II, accuse the
President of perjury in testimony given before a federal grand jury and
during a deposition in a private civil case. Although I believe perjury
is evident and there is a strong possibility that perjurious statements
may have been made in both the civil deposition and before the grand
jury, it does not reach the threshold for impeachment envisioned by our
forefathers and authors of the Constitution. As reprehensible as this
behavior is,I do not believe that the alleged transgressions are linked
to his official capacity as President of the United States, and thus
will not support these two articles of impeachment.
Article III and Article IV allege obstruction of justice and abuse of
presidential power. These two articles, due to their connection to the
official duties of the President, were extremely serious charges and
deserved intense examination. If proven, these offenses could have been
impeachable. As one of the 31 members of my party who joined with my
Republican colleagues on the vote to authorize the impeachment inquiry,
I had hoped for fair and open hearings in the Judiciary Committee. To
my dismay, that did not occur. In fact, I believe the Judiciary
Committee failed to live up to its solemn duty and responsibility,
under the authority of H. Res. 581 which stated that ``the Committee on
the Judiciary . . . is authorized and directed to investigate fully and
completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of
Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach William
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America.''
The Committee, in my opinion, did not fully examine the fundamental
questions behind the charges of abuse of power and obstruction of
justice. The Committee did not hold the allegations up to the bright
light needed for an ardent cross-examination. Based on evidence and
testimony presented to the Judiciary Committee, we do not know if the
assertions made in the report by the Office of Independent Counsel can
be corroborated or even contradicted. No material witnesses were called
before the committee to answer specific questions about necessary
details to uncover the truth. As our investigatory panel, the Judiciary
Committee did not question witnesses who held the keys to discovering
the facts behind these serious allegations. These two articles are
built upon an unstable foundation. None of the alleged charges,
particularly those in Articles III and IV, are substantiated by any
standard of proof, much less proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Prior to the debate today, I joined with many of my colleagues in
urging the leadership of the House of Representatives to permit a fair
and reasonable vote on censure. Unfortunately, they have consistently
refused to allow such a vote. Like the vast majority of American people
and my constituents in Rhode Island, I believe that a severe censure
and substantial fine is the most appropriate method to punish the
President's extremely reprehensible behavior. Censure is neither
expressly permitted nor prohibited by the United States Constitution
but has been used by Congress to express its opinion on public
officials throughout the history of our nation, most notably by the
censure of President Andrew Jackson. While later expunged by a
subsequent Congress, his censure has stood the test of time and has not
been erased from the history books. In fact, history will forever
proclaim President Jackson as being censured by the Senate, which
remains an unenviable mark on his tenure as President. There should be
no doubt that censure is an exceptionally serious rebuke and should be
treated as such. If censure was approved, history would indelibly stain
this President as committing acts serious enough to earn an official
condemnation from Congress.
A strongly written resolution of censure and substantial monetary
fine requiring the acceptance of the President through his signature,
is the most appropriate form of condemnation for the President's
reprehensible behavior.
In Federalist 65, Alexander Hamilton writes:
The prosecution of them (impeachable charges), for this
reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole
community, and to divide it into parties more or less
friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will
connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will
enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and
interest on one side or the other; and in such cases there
will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be
regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by
the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
And so, two hundred and eleven years later, we find ourselves exactly
where Mr. Hamilton said we would be. The President engaged in extremely
reprehensible and inappropriate behavior with a subordinate. He lied to
his wife and his daughter, his friends, staff, the court, and most of
all to the American people. The President's actions were wrong, immoral
and reckless. But, Mr. Hamilton was right. The charges have divided the
nation. Congress is divided amongst ``parties and pre-existing
factions''. The President's fate is not being decided on the facts but
rather based on partisonship.
We are a nation led by our President carrying the flag of our
country, the banner of principles of our people. He has been wounded by
his own wrongdoing. But to abandon him or another for political reasons
would be abandoning the very principles upon which the country was
founded, a doctrine of fairness and justice for all. We cannot and must
not tolerate or accept a system that dismantles the very foundation of
our republic and this action today unfortunately sends such a signal.
The role of the House of Representatives in the impeachment process
is not to be abused nor is it to be taken lightly. A vote for
impeachment is by far one of the gravest and most challenging votes for
any Congress and for any member. I urge my colleagues, on both sides of
the aisle, to listen to your conscience, to realize the gravity of your
vote and to realize that at the end of the day, you can act in a fair
and reasonable manner and disprove Mr. Hamilton's theory that the House
of Representatives is incapable of acting justly. For to impeach the
president for the charges as outlined in these Articles would be to
affirm the partisanship feared by Mr. Hamilton, and how sad a
commentary that is for our Congress and our country.
Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I have not to this point formally
announced how I would vote on these four articles of impeachment. In
reaching my decision, I have weighed not only my constitutional duty
and this President's fate, but I have weighed what vote is the right
one for the country at this time.
I have concluded that this President can and should continue in
office for the remainder of his elected term.
In making my decision, I have looked carefully at the words of our
Framers, particularly the founder of my hometown of Paterson, New
Jersey, Alexander Hamilton.
In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton not only outlined what offenses rise
to the level of impeachment. He also left us a clear, unambiguous
warning against the dangers of unruly partisanship in this process.
Hamilton spoke of offenses that are an ``abuse or violation of some
PUBLIC trust,'' and ones that ``relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.''
The President's misdeeds, as wrong as they are, were NOT acts against
the society as a whole. In fact, he was exonerated of any wrongdoing
that fit that definition.
In that same passage, Hamilton stated that a partisan impeachment
``threatened to agitate the passions of the whole community . . . to
[[Page H12027]]
divide it into parties . . . to connect itself with pre-existing
factions . . . and to enlist their animosities, partialities, influence
and interest.''
Ironically, our colleague on the other side, Mr. Linder, echoed
Hamilton's warning just a few months ago, saying, ``One party cannot
impeach the other party's President.''
Well, this is exactly what has happened in this body. This process
has been driven solely by those in one party--the majority party--the
very path Hamilton told us to avoid.
No one has denied that the President acted in a manner unbecoming of
the high office he is privileged to hold.
His actions are NOT, however, offenses that rise to the level of
treason, bribery or other ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
In short, these are reprehensible acts for which the President should
surely be punished. That punishment should fit his misdeeds. Censure is
the appropriate penalty, but we have been denied this option by those
driving this process for fear they will not extract the ``pound of
flesh'' they seek.
My colleagues, I urge you as you cast your vote to look to history
and the real facts in this case, and to look beyond partisan interests
as the Constitution requires, and vote ``no'' on these articles of
impeachment.
Mr. LaFALCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to all four of
the pending articles of impeachment for the following reasons.
First, I believe the investigation by the Independent Counsel which
has led us to this point has been a tainted and politicized process
designed to produce a political, not a legal or Constitutional result.
Second, if this House is to impeach the President, the burden of
proof to establish clear and convincing evidence of wrongdoing rests
with us. It is a burden the Republican majority has not sustained.
Third, the articles of impeachment before us do not specifically and
meaningfully cite any conduct that remotely rises to the level of an
impeachable offense: ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.''
Fourth, passage of this resolution will subject this country to a
Senate trial that the vast majority of Members in this House, and a
vast majority of our citizens, do not believe will result in conviction
or removal of this President. Indeed, there are Members voting for this
resolution precisely because they expect the Senate will not convict
the President. That constitutes a cynical manipulation of an important
constitutional process to a petty political end.
Finally, it is fundamentally unfair that the Republican Leadership
will not permit a vote on censure as an alternative to impeachment. At
the very least, the Republican leadership, and especially so-called
moderate Republicans who, for whatever reasons, have decided to vote
for impeachment themselves, should give Members the option of
presenting an alternative censure resolution on the floor of the House.
Let us vote our conscience. If they do not, they can never again be
called fair and just individuals.
The President has admitted wrongful and reprehensible conduct. I was
the first in this institution to call for a censure of him for his
misleading of the American public. I believe that remains the
appropriate response--a response that the vast majority of the American
people can and do endorse. Further, the President has not only
acknowledged the wrongfulness of what he has done, he has apologized
repeatedly, indicated a willingness to take the appropriate
consequences of his conduct, and sought forgiveness. he is also subject
to legal prosecution for any alleged offenses, as he should be. But
what he has done does not come close to ``Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' which the Framers intended to be the
tough and exacting standards those seeking impeachment must meet.
the starr investigation
There is clearly an abuse of power in this case, and behavior by
someone in authority that strikes at the heart of our legal and
political system. But it is the behavior of the Independent Counsel
that is the abuse of power, and it is his conduct that is the most
threatening to our republic. To quote a respected journalist writing in
one of my local papers, what we have in Ken Starr is a ``self-
righteous, underhanded prosecutor dedicated to destroying someone,''
and ``a man willing to deploy the full resources of federal
government's investigative and police powers'' to do so. It is this
man, and the biased case he has put forward, on which the Republican
majority is willing to rely.
I strongly believe that the Independent Counsel has not conducted an
impartial investigation of a possible crime, as is his duty under the
law. Instead, we have been subjected to a partisan investigation by a
man in search of a crime. Ken Starr has conducted a biased inquiry
designed to produce a pre-ordained result.
After four years and the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars,
Ken Starr was able to find nothing whatsoever that would subject the
President to criminal liability regarding those issues that were within
his purview--i.e., Whitewater, ``travelgate'', or misuse of FBI files.
Yet Starr decided not to issue any report on those issues, and
deliberately said nothing exculpatory until after the November
election. Failing to come up with any criminal conduct on these
potentially substantive issues, he has been forced to try to make an
impeachment case out of very misleading statements about conduct which,
however reprehensible and inexcusable, should have remained what it
was--a private matter between consenting adults.
In passing the Independent Counsel statute, the intent of the
Congress was to create a mechanism to ensure that anyone who
investigated the President or a Cabinet official be of the highest
ethical standards, completely impartial, free of conflicts of interest,
and respectful of his own legal obligations and the rights of others.
What we have instead in Ken Starr is a man of unseemly zeal in search
of any excuse that might suffice to bring down a President. Let me
review some of the conduct that brings me to that unfortunate
conclusion.
Ken Starr used information from Linda Tripp that he knew she had
obtained in violation of the law, and in fact encouraged her to further
violate the law to obtain more information. He set up a sting operation
with Monica Lewinsky, threatened her with twenty-seven years in prison
and the indictment of her mother if she failed to cooperate,
trivialized her Constitutional rights, and suggested he would deny her
a grant of immunity if she exercised her right to call a lawyer. He
grilled Ms. Lewinsky for ten hours without her being represented by
counsel, and attempted to wire her in an effort to entrap the President
or his aides.
When Starr asked the Attorney General for jurisdiction to extend his
inquiry to encompass the President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky,
he withheld critical information relevant to the Attorney General's
assessment of his request. He had long been working in concert with
Paula Jones' attorneys, conduct which necessarily suggested a clear
bias, but he failed to disclose that fact. Starr was contacted several
times by Mrs. Jones' lawyer to discuss constitutional issues related to
her suit against President Clinton and provided such assistance. In
fact, Starr considered helping Mrs. Jones by joining in a friend-of-
the-court brief.
Ken Starr's report repeats and exaggerates any conceivable evidence
of wrongdoing, but egregiously omits any exculpatory evidence. It is
not, as Congress intended, an even-handed report. In fact, no one can
even claim it is even-handed. Ken Starr has crossed the line and moved
from being an objective and impartial investigator to being a clear
advocate for impeachment. His conduct in this regard has been so
excessive and inappropriate that his own ethics adviser, Sam Dash, has
charged Starr with abuse of his office and resigned.
Ken Starr's actions are not now, and have never been, the actions of
a man engaged in an impartial investigation. His conduct is the conduct
of a zealot with a diabolical obsession--bringing down the President of
the United States. It is Ken Starr's conduct that is frightening and
threatening to the rule of law. And this is the man on which the
Republican majority has chosen to rely to make their case for
impeachment.
the burden of proof
If the Legislative Branch is to impeach the President, I believe it
must meet a high standard and establish clear and convincing evidence
of an impeachable offense.
Impeachment is not a slap on the wrist. It is not just a different
way to censure the President for wrongful conduct of which we
disapprove. It is one of the most significant and momentous steps that
the House can take. It is the first step in the removal of a sitting
President from office and the reversal of the results of an election.
And it is being taken in defiance of the will of the majority of the
public which has been, and remains, clearly in opposition to the
impeachment and removal of this President on the basis of the facts
thus far presented.
The members of both parties have a responsibility to be judicious in
what we do here today. This should not be a partisan proceeding. There
should be no impeachment unless there is clear and convincing evidence
of conduct that clearly constitutes the equivalent of a high crime and
misdemeanor. This is too important to be a close call.
Impeachment is neither a purely legal nor a purely political act. It
requires a judicious balancing of both legal and political judgment.
But if the action we take is to be judicious and defensible not only
today, but in the eyes of history, certain parameters are clear. We
should only impeach for a grave offense of a public nature. We should
only impeach when the evidence is so strong and the conduct so clearly
within the parameters of what the Constitution intends that the
resolution to impeach can pass by a sizable and bipartisan majority. We
should only impeach if the American public supports impeachment, or at
the very least is ambivalent--certainly not when the vast majority of
the American public is opposed.
[[Page H12028]]
And we should not impeach in a lame duck session of the Congress when
votes are being cast by many Members who have been defeated and/or will
not return. In fact, some argue such action is unconstitutional.
Whatever the merits of that argument, such action is clearly
unnecessary. There is no need or justification for us to take this
important action in such haste.
Finally, we should only proceed if there are reasonable grounds for
believing the evidence is such that the Senate might reasonably move to
convict. Few believe the Senate will muster the 2/3 vote necessary to
convict. It is the worst kind of cynicism to put the country through
the trauma of a trial in the Senate in the face of a high probability
that the impeachment process will end without conviction.
If there is a real desire for bipartisanship in this context, it
would be reasonable to look to what the elder statesmen of the
Republican party are suggesting. Both Republican former President
Gerald Ford, who knows something about impeachment, and Republican
presidential candidate Senator Robert Dole, who lost to President
Clinton in the most recent election believes censure, not impeachment,
is the appropriate option.
failure to identify and prove an impeachable offense
What, indeed, are we supposed to be impeaching the President for? I
have read the reports and followed the hearings. But I believe I am not
alone in being unable to answer that question. Certainly my Republican
colleagues have not answered it.
The Constitution very clearly prescribes the grounds for
impeachment--treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors. If
Congress wants to violate the spirit of the Constitution, we can
impeach for almost anything. But if we want our action to be in keeping
with both Constitutional spirit and history, our authority is limited
to conduct that rises to the high level indicated. The Framers clearly
believed that impeachment was intended to redress seriously wrongful
public conduct, and requires a very high and very clear standard
because impeachment nullifies the popular will.
Some would impeach because the President allegedly violated his oath
of office. That is far too vague and ambiguous a charge for anyone to
seriously argue it rises to the level of an impeachable offense. What
is required is a high crime that is comparable to treason or bribery.
Assuming that the worst charges against the President are true and
convincing, his alleged misconduct does not rise to that level.
Indeed, there is not clear and persuasive proof that the President
committed any crimes. Those who would impeach the President have tended
to use important words cavalierly and interchangeably as if they have
fungible content. Words have meaning, they are the skins of living
thoughts. To mislead, to lie, to perjure oneself are all, in varying
but important degrees, wrong. But to mislead is not necessarily to lie,
to lie is not necessarily to perjure. Unfortunately, words can be and
have been used interchangeably and carelessly, leading to obfuscation
or confusion. Some who favor impeachment have too frequently used them
to manipulate rather than to clarify.
Some believe that the President committed perjury. I believe
responsible people can disagree about where to draw the line on what
does or does not constitute perjury. But there is widespread agreement
that few prosecutors would bring a case on the factual basis we have
before us today, let alone be able to convict anyone on these grounds.
There are two articles of impeachment that allege perjury, one
incident in the context of the Paula Jones deposition, the other in the
context of the grand jury deposition. Yet the Republican majority has
repeatedly refused to pinpoint exactly what statements constitute
perjury or elements of perjury. In the Paula Jones case, there is clear
evidence of obvious confusion on the part of the attorneys and the
judge about the definition of sex, and concern that its use would make
it harder to get at the truth. If the attorneys and the judge were
confused, is it inconceivable that the President was confused as well?
Are we going to impeach a President over a definition he used that
accorded with the definition of every dictionary I am aware of--i.e.,
``intercourse?''
The other purported perjury, that in the grand jury testimony, is
that the President said he abided by his testimony in the Paula Jones
case. Does anyone seriously believe that response rises to the level of
a crime against the state?
Some suggest that there are precedents where individuals have been
impeached for perjury, and cite the impeachment of judges. However, in
those cases perjury was the gravamen of, not peripheral to, the charges
brought against the individuals. More importantly, I believe different
constitutional standards apply in regard to the impeachment of judges
than pertain for the impeachment of the President. First, judges are
appointed for life, by one individual. They are not elected for a
finite term by the people of the United States. Secondly, the
Constitution says, with regard to judges, that they ``shall hold their
offices during good behavior.'' That is a much lower constitutional
standard, and far easier to meet.
The specifics of our legal system and its procedures are not always
easy to understand or appreciate. But I believe all Americans
understand that, in this country, we operate under a rule of law, and
every citizen--even the President--is innocent until proven guilty. No
one is obligated to admit guilt, or to assist the prosecutor to convict
him. It is expected and proper for a witness to be cautious under oath,
to keep his counsel, to give away as little as possible. Any citizen
would and should do the same. Yet some would impeach the President for
exercising his most basic legal rights.
As for abuse of power and obstruction of justice charges, I believe
they are specious on their face. There are charges of witness
tampering, of hiding evidence. But those are disputed charges, and
there is evidence on the record that calls their legitimacy into
question. There is no proof whatsoever that the President tampered with
witnesses or attempted to hide evidence. We cannot impeach on the basis
of unproven charges. To suggest that written responses prepared by the
President's attorneys to a congressional committee that the committee
deems inadequate constitute an abuse of power is so frivolous as not to
merit further comment. Indeed, such charges are themselves an abuse of
congressional power, or at the very least, a cavalier, indiscriminate
use of such powers.
Conclusion
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the sincerity of those who want
to impeach the President--and that is in some cases a hard assumption
to make--shouldn't they permit those who sincerely disagree but believe
some punishment is appropriate, the right to pursue the alternative
they believe is legitimate--i.e., a resolution of censure? That would
allow all Members to vote their consciences on this important issue.
The rights of those who would impeach would not be infringed--they
could simply vote ``no'' on a censure resolution.
But the Republican majority will not allow that option, because they
are afraid it would pass. Instead, they are forcing Members who have
serious doubts about impeachment but believe some serious punishment is
appropriate to choose between impeachment and nothing.
The Republican majority has taken what should be an historic vote on
an issue of conscience and trivialized it into political gamesmanship.
On a vote of this import, that conduct is unconscionable. I will vote
against the resolution.
Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R.
611, the four articles of impeachment against President William
Jefferson Clinton. I do strongly support the motion to recommit so that
censure of the President, a fair and bipartisan compromise, can be
debated. To deny us the right to vote on censure is to deny us the
right to express the truth of our conscience, and to deny the will of
the majority of Americans who want Congress to censure the President,
not impeach him.
I have carefully studied the evidence and arguments presented to the
Judiciary Committee and have concluded that the articles of impeachment
drafted by the Committee do not meet the impeachment threshold
established by the framers as specifically outlined in our
Constitution. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution of the United
States provides that the House of Representatives ``shall remove from
office [the President] on impeachment for treason, bribery or other
high crimes and misdemeanors.'' My interpretation of the intent of the
framers is that the phrase ``other high crimes and misdemeanors'' is
limited to acts with the magnitude and gravity of the crimes of treason
and bribery, crimes that do direct harm to the institutions of our
government. Perhaps to avert use of impeachment in a partisan effort to
derail a political agenda, Alexander Hamilton wrote that an impeachable
offense is of the nature ``which may with peculiar propriety be
denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.'' The Judiciary Committee has not
demonstrated that the President has so subverted our Constitution and
threatened our system of government as to corrupt our Republic.
I do support a strong and punitive censure resolution of the
President for his reprehensible actions. It is unfair to deny America's
Representatives in Congress the opportunity to take positive action on
a bipartisan compromise of censure. Censure is warranted, appropriate,
and would not undo two national elections nor preclude future legal
action that a federal prosecutor could undertake or judgment a court
could find when the President returns to the private sector. In
addition, the President will face the judgment of history just
[[Page H12029]]
as we in the Congress will be judged by this defining moment.
I urge all of my colleagues to vote to recommit H.R. 611, the
articles of impeachment, and support a motion to censure. By not
achieving the threshold established in the Constitution's Article II,
Section 4, we will have failed in our duty to preserve and protect the
law of our land.
Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, it is not our job to determine if the
president is guilty of being a philanderer, a coward, a sinner, or even
a liar.
This issue is not whether he was unfaithful but whether he was
unfaithful to our laws, and our Constitution. No president, even a
popular one, has the right to cheat on the most sacred document in the
world.
For those who favor a censure that amounts to nothing more than a
verbal spanking, how do we adequately rebuke a man who insists he's
done nothing wrong, who flaunts the law and wants to manipulate the
Constitution?
The law does recognize that a lesser penalty should apply to those
with remorse and a contrite spirit, but there is none.
There cannot be two standards under the law, just as there cannot be
a geographically desirable place to lie under oath. The law does not
pause, even if you are the President of the United States.
If we can court-martial members of our military and subject them to
50 years of jail time for lying under oath to cover up sexual
indiscretions, should the punishment be nothing for a president or any
other citizen of this land? We cannot reconcile that which makes no
sense.
Sometimes in this life somebody has to not just be the adult, but the
bigger adult. Our president refuses to go down that path.
He allowed a casual workplace flirtation to go to a place it never
should have gone, and then acted as if he was somehow victimized.
He put our country through months of denials and defiance and
outright lies. He knew the stakes and the consequences of lying under
oath, and then did so anyway.
I gave this president every benefit of the doubt. I remain stunned by
his inability and refusal to place the country first.
Lying under oath is not nothing. Perjury is not nothing. As a
prosecutor, I sent people to jail for this crime.
I would give anything to be elsewhere today, to not have to cast this
vote. Our President left us, left me, with no other option.
Mr. President, you gave into your shame. I refuse to do the same.
While partisan politics makes an easy foil for the predicament
President Clinton finds himself, it cannot be blamed.
When the spin and partisan hostility fade, I am confident that
history will reveal that President Clinton was the master of his own
demise in both words and deeds.
Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I do not approve of nor defend, the behavior
of the president that has brought us here. I have no interest in
helping him avoid the legal consequences of those acts. However, I have
every interest in making sure those consequences are constitutional.
The constitution tells us a President can only be impeached and
removed by Congress for treason, bribery and other high crimes and
misdemeanors. The founding fathers were clear that the careful balance
of powers between the branches could be altered in only the most
extraordinary circumstances.
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist #65 argued that impeachment is
meant to address ``the misconduct of public men,'' ``the violation of
some public trust,'' or ``to address injuries done immediately to the
society itself.''
Wooddeson, a legal scholar whose writings in 1777 were nearly
contemporaneous with the drafting of the constitution, and whose views
on English impeachment provided the foundation for much of the
impeachment discussion in Jefferson's Manual spoke to the use of
impeachment to prosecute ``magistrates and officers instrusted with the
administration of public affairs [who] abuse their delegated powers to
the extension detriment of the community, and. . . in a manner not
properly cognizable before ordinary tribunals.''
The standards set forth by the founding fathers remain vital and
immutable--we are not free to add to the list of impeachable offenses,
no matter how worthy our additions.
Just last year in Clinton v. Jones--in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme
Court referred to the historical standard for impeachment when it
quoted James Wilson--delegate to both the Philadelphia and Pennsylvania
conventions--who said ``that although the President is placed on high,
not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being
above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a
citizen and in his public character by impeachment.'' The justices go
on to say that ``with respect to acts taken in his ``public
character''. . . that is official acts. . . the President may be
disciplined, principally by impeachment. . . But he is otherwise
subject to the laws for his purely private acts.''
As you probably recall, the Supreme Court allowed Ms. Jones lawsuit
was allowed to go forward expressly because it was the personal,
private conduct of the President that was at issue. The conduct before
us is the same.
The history is clear and so is our duty. The behavior at issue here--
if proven--are punishable in the Courts. They are not, however, of the
``public'' character necessary to rise to the level of impeachable
offenses.
I will vote no--not because I believe the President should be able to
avoid the legal consequences ordinary Americans would face in similar
circumstances, but because I believe he should face exactly the same
consequences: trial in a court of law. This outcome does not subvert
the law, as the majority argues, but in fact, observes the law as the
Constitution demands. The founding fathers, more than 200 years ago,
and the Supreme Court, just last year, laid out the course we must
follow.
The Constitution must be our guide. The wrath that the citizens of
this country delivered upon us when we shut down the government will be
nothing compared to what will happen if we rape the Constitution.
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, voting for the articles of impeachment
will be one of the most difficult votes I will cast in my career. I
cannot think of anything more serious for myself and the nation. I have
put more effort into this decision than any other I have made in
elected office. I have spoken personally with hundreds of constituents,
read mountains of correspondence, and carefully listened to legal
arguments on both sides of the issue.
The President has an obligation set out in Article II, Section 3 of
the Constitution to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.''
The President is the Nation's chief law enforcement officer who
appoints the Attorney General and nominates all federal judges
including the Supreme Court. I cannot in good conscience allow the
President to violate the law and his Constitutional duty without
consequence.
I have come to my decision after a long and careful consideration of
the facts. These facts have not been disputed. There is clear and
convincing evidence that the President broke the law. The laws he broke
are serious enough to warrant impeachment. Specifically, the evidence
demonstrates that the President committed perjury and perjury is a
felony punishable by up to five years in prison. If Congress chose to
ignore the President's actions, we would set the dangerous precedent
that some are above the law. But the truth is no one is above the law,
and everyone has an obligation to uphold the law no matter how
personally uncomfortable compliance might be.
If the House ultimately decides to approve one or more impeachment
articles, the Constitution charges the Senate with the responsibility
to decide what proper action should be taken. I hope they act
expeditiously and I will abide by their decision. This has been an
extremely wearisome experience for the country and it is in everybody's
best interest to bring closure soon.
Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Speaker, over the past few months I have reviewed,
in some instances more than once, the evidence in this case in an
objective and dispassionate manner.
Perjury, or lying under oath, is a felony. As evidence, there are
American citizens in jail today because they did not tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth in a court of law. The
foundation of our legal system is premised upon the rule that when any
citizen raises his or her hand and swears to tell the truth, he or she
will tell the truth.
In my community, as in every community throughout our nation, juries
have reaffirmed that fundamental principle. Today in New York due to a
felony conviction: A Police Officer would lose his job, lose his
pension and go to jail; an attorney would face automatic disbarment and
go to jail; and a captain in the United States Army could be subject to
court martial and go to jail.
In reviewing the evidence, it became clear and convincing to me that
the President lied under oath in a civil proceeding and in testifying
before a Federal Grand Jury. In this case I believe there is sufficient
evidence that William Jefferson Clinton committed perjury and abused
the office of the Presidency. Accordingly, I will take the only course
of action that the United States Constitution has mandated me to do--I
will vote for impeachment and let the United State Senate conduct a
trial to determine the ultimate outcome.
I understand that this decision may not sit well with some people.
And I appreciate that many Americans have take the time to voice their
opinions. But, it is my firm belief that I must do what I believe is
right. Indeed, there are those who acknowledged that the President has
committed a felony, yet will not summon the courage to vote to move
this matter to the Senate for trial. I cannot defend the indefensible
and maintain a clear conscience. I
[[Page H12030]]
cannot in good conscience justify a vote against impeachment.
The integrity of the judicial system and the rule of law must be
maintained regardless of who comes before it. We cannot ignore the rule
of law for the President, but apply it to the ordinary citizen.
Our founding fathers and many of our ancestors escaped the tyranny
where the King was law. Millions have fought, hundreds of thousands
have died and many are fighting today, far from our shores, to preserve
the freedom and rule of law that we enjoy. This vote is cast to
preserve the notion for our children and future generations of
Americans yet unborn that in the United States of America the law is
King.
Mr. LAZIO of New York. Mr. Speaker, after accompanying the President
as he returned home from the Middle East, I return to the House of
Representatives to vote on authorizing his trial of impeachment in the
Senate. Aloft in Air Force One I was deeply impressed once again by the
Presidency itself, a great and stable institution that transcends even
the finest men who have occupied the office. Through some may add to it
and others may subtract from it, the office remains imperturbable
because it represents not only the Nation but the constitutional order.
I bear no animus for Bill Clinton. I have no grudge against him. Nor
would I consider removing a President from office because of partisan
differences. For one thing, the President has on many occasions adopted
Republican positions, and on various subjects his political outlook is
congenial to mine. For another, his replacement should he be removed
from office or resign would be the Vice President, a man who has been
less aligned with my party's views.
This is neither a personal nor a partisan decision. Its difficulty
lies in the rare but important conflict between what is expedient in
the short term and what resonates as a guiding principle for time with
no limit. It is not about the fate of one man, but the value of truth
itself, the principle that no man, no matter how rich or powerful, is
above the law. It is about the notion of accountability, and about
dealing straight and keeping one's word.
Public ethics and the truth must be partners. A leader who tells the
truth no matter what the cost to him is a leader who puts the interests
of the country before his own, and thus with these priorities, has the
power of moral suasion. He is able to call upon a vast reservoir of
public esteem to marshal the people for great things and in defense of
essential principles. And great leaders do not arise without this
understanding clearly in mind. They are recruited by expectations, and
their repayment for the trust the people vest in them is their
integrity.
Duty. Honor. Trust. Sacrifice. These are the qualities that, for the
sake of people they had never known and the principles formulated
centuries before their births, enabled millions of American soldiers to
put their lives on the line in far-off lands and in horrific moments.
If they could do so then, at the price of their lives, then it should
not be difficult now to tell the truth or vote according to the
dictates of conscience even if it means the end of one's career. And
that is what I will do. With the greatest respect and humility for
those who made far more difficult decisions and at a far greater price,
I will simply abide by what I think is right, without political
calculation.
And what do I think is right in this case? When I was a Suffolk
County prosecutor my entire duty was based on the integrity and conduct
of the men and women who took an oath to tell the truth. In many cases
it was difficult for these people to testify honestly, sometimes it was
even disastrous. But when they were sworn-in they understood that this
was different, that here the truth was required, that it was almost
holy, that upon their respect for their oath would ride many things,
including the functioning of the system of justice, the existence of a
government of laws, the equality of one citizen with another, and, not
least, their own honor. These were ordinary people. They understood. In
many cases, they sacrificed. In many cases, they suffered. But they
told the truth.
If an anonymous citizen, with no reward for his actions other than
the knowledge that he has done right, can abide by his oath, what about
a President, upon whom someday the light of history will shine? We have
strengthened the office and given the President immense power and
privilege not only with the expectation that he will be scrupulously
honest but also with the thought of helping him to be so. Unlike the
ordinary citizen, his decisions are insulated and he is protected. And
history is poised to look kindly on him for every instance in which he
sacrifices for the sake of the nation he leads, for every instance in
which he chooses forthrightness rather than obfuscation: in short, for
his character.
Therefore, when a President fails in his duty as an ordinary citizen
does not, the failure is catastrophic. Shall less be expected of the
President than of you or me? It has always been that we expect and
deserve of the President a great deal more. Nor is the case in question
a private matter. For a high school principal, a corporate executive, a
military officer, or anyone else, it would not be a private matter.
Here, the trustee of the greatest of world powers knows that he will be
in a sworn legal proceeding, consults with advisers (including
taxpayer-paid White House lawyers) for many months, has full notice,
appears voluntarily before a criminal grand jury (though only due to
the existence of incontrovertible evidence), and still cannot bring
himself to do what the Government he heads insists every day that we
all do--tell the truth.
For me, the turning point was the President's written response to the
81 questions posed by the Judiciary Committee. The only thing required
of him was the truth. The questions were submitted with the hope and
expectation that he would put the interests of the country and the
constitution before his own, that he would cease the very elaborate
game that he had long been playing, that he would tell the truth and
reclaim the honor and dignity of the Presidency. But he did not.
What choice is there, then? What choice is there when the President's
own witnesses before the Judiciary Committee claim that he has
``disgraced the Presidency'' and acted without morals? His own lawyer
testified that the President, having taken the oath that promises ``the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,'' gave an answer that
amounted to a ``false denial.'' And the President continues to profess
that ``false denials'' are not lies. This is a catastrophic abdication
of ethical leadership and a grave departure from our most fundamental
practices.
I have chosen my course, and will vote for impeachment, to hammer
home as best I can that we must continue to insist that no one is above
the law and that the truth must be told. We simply cannot tolerate
dishonesty in the heart of our Government. This is what I was brought
up to believe, and I believe it still.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, today, December 19, 1998, is a day of infamy
in the House of Representatives. I believe history will record that on
this day, the House of the People, through searing partisanship,
disallowed the right of each Member to express his or her own
conscience. Today, only votes on impeachment are allowed.
A flawed case was brought forward by the House Judiciary Committee. I
say ``flawed'' because the Framers' intent for removal of the Chief
Executive was set at the highest level--treason, bribery, and high
crimes against the people. The President's actions, morally wrong as I
judge them, do not meet this constitutional standard.
The lessons of history--1868 and 1974 are instructive. Today, our
Chamber, in 1998, mirrors the 1868 experience wherein the highly
partisan action of the Congress ripped at the fabric of our nation and
weakened the Constitution and the Presidency for decades.
The 1974 experience differed in that the evidence brought forward and
the deliberations were highly bipartisan--some even say nonpartisan.
And importantly, the people of our Nation agreed with the actions
Congress took.
I believe that censure is not barred by the Constitution. The
Constitution and the Federalist Papers are silent on censure. Hundreds
of scholars have spoken on this. Why would the Republican majority so
fear a vote being allowed and taken in the House today?
Impeachment of the President is the constitutional equivalent of the
death penalty. But the rule of law--a principle so often invoked in the
debate--also relies on proportionality. And impeachment of the
President for moral laxity is beyond the proportionality of what the
President has done and the punishment deserved.
The citizens of our nation do not support impeachment. Almost half
the Congress does not support impeachment. Without clear consensus in
our Nation, without critical bipartisanship in this House, without
proportionality relative to the rule of law, and without a clear case
that can withstand the scrutiny of history, we stand on a slippery
slope, and I believe our Nation is placed in jeopardy.
Mr. Speaker, our flag is the symbol of our Nation but the
Constitution is the soul of our Nation.
Today we tear at the soul of our Nation.
There is no doubt that by his actions Bill Clinton has brought shame
as President. But today this body has set itself on a treacherous
course of both weakening the Presidency and diminishing the
Constitution. This action in 1998 I believe will haunt us in history
just as 1868 did.
Mrs. CUBIN. Mr. Speaker, after weeks of soul-searching, hearing from
the people of Wyoming, and a thorough review of the evidence, I have
reached a painful decision which I realize will severely impact our
country and bring humiliation to another human being. At this crucial
time, however, we have to put the good of the Republic, the integrity
of the Constitution, and the rule of law above all else to protect the
future of the United States America. For this reason, I will vote to
impeach the President.
This is an awesome responsibility that none of us take lightly,
certainly not me.
[[Page H12031]]
Perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power undermine the
basis of our judicial system, our system of laws, thereby undermining
the very foundation of this great country.
I recognize the profound effect my vote will have on the future of
our democracy and most importantly, the effect and impact it will have
on the future of our children. It may well be the most important vote I
ever cast during my years of public service.
I want you to know I have prayed for guidance every day. After
examining all the material, watching the hearings, listening to the
testimony and to the President, and making myself familiar with all the
information I can, I have come to the sad conclusion that I must vote
for all four proposed articles of impeachment against the President of
the United States. In my view, there is no doubt the President's
actions warrant impeachment and a subsequent trial in the Senate.
None of us are perfect, and we can all be forgiven for what we do in
life. However, forgiveness does not negate the fact that every action
we take in life has consequences. President Clinton is not just our
head of state. He is the most powerful public servant in the country,
probably the world. He took an oath to uphold the Constitution and the
laws of our land. The American people are right to hold him to this
high standard, and the Congress is right to uphold the Constitution
when the President fails to do so.
I implore the President to resign in order to spare the country and
the people of America the painful and embarrassing experience of going
through further impeachment proceedings. If he does not resign, I have
the solemn duty to vote to impeach William Jefferson Clinton.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, December 18, 1998, the
previous question is ordered on the resolution.
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Boucher
Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?
Mr. BOUCHER. I am, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Boucher moves to recommit the resolution H. Res. 611 to
the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report
the same back to the House forthwith with the following
amendment:
Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the
following:
That it is the sense of the House that--
(1) on January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the
oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States
faithfully to execute the office of President; implicit in
that oath is the obligation that the President set an example
of high moral standards and conduct himself in a manner that
fosters respect for the truth; and William Jefferson Clinton,
has egregiously failed in this obligation, and through his
actions violated the trust of the American people, lessened
their esteem for the office of President, and dishonored the
office which they have entrusted to him;
(2)(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements
concerning his reprehensible conduct with a subordinate;
(B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to delay
discovery of the truth; and
(C) inasmuch as no person is above the law, William
Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil
penalties; and
(3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
States, by his conduct has brought upon himself, and fully
deserves, the censure and condemnation of the American people
and this House.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point of order against the
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Solomon)
reserves a point of order.
Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, December 18, 1998, the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) for 5
minutes.
Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, this debate comes very late, and it comes
in a procedurally awkward manner. The resolution of censure that I am
pleased to offer today was made in order for consideration in the
Committee on the Judiciary by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde),
the chairman.
He understood the importance of an evenhanded process. He understood
the need for balance. He perceived that fairness required the
availability to the Members of the outcome for this investigation,
which is the clear preference of the American people, the passage of a
resolution of censure that admonishes the President for his conduct.
I commend the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) for that
evenhandedness. I can only wish that his example had been followed by
the majority leadership in the House. With the leadership's
concurrence, the Committee on Rules could have been convened, and a
procedural resolution allowing floor consideration of both the articles
of impeachment and a resolution of censure could have been reported and
adopted by the House. This censure resolution could have and should
have been made in order from the start.
But that did not occur. The Members of the House did not have a
censure alternative available to them from the beginning, and a point
of order has been reserved to this resolution offered at the present
time. I very much regret this procedure. I think it is a monument to
unfairness.
Not only is a censure and rebuke of the President the public's clear
choice, but it is the right thing to do. The constitutional history
clearly instructs us that the presidential impeachment power is to be
used only as a last resort at times of true national emergency. Its
purpose is to remove from office a president whose conduct threatens
the very foundations of our system of government. It is a drastic
remedy for the removal of a tyrant. It should not be used to remove a
president whose offense is a shameful affair and its efforts to conceal
it. For that offense he can be tried in a court of law. For that
offense he can and should be censured by this House. That would be a
perfect expression of the public's entirely justified outrage.
But to use the impeachment power for that conduct defines it down,
cheapens its use, lowers the standard of impeachment for all time, and
will inherently weaken the presidential office. Censure is the right
approach. I urge approval of this resolution.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the Democratic leader.
(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I stood on this floor yesterday and
implored all of us to say that the politics of slash and burn must end.
I implored all of us that we must turn away from the politics of
personal destruction and return to the politics of values.
It is with that same passion that I say to all of you today that the
gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Bob Livingston) is a worthy and good and
honorable man.
{time} 1130
I believe his decision to retire is a terrible capitulation to the
negative forces that are consuming our political system and our
country, and I pray with all my heart that he will reconsider this
decision.
Our Founding Fathers created a system of government of men, not of
angels. No one standing in this House today can pass the puritanical
test of purity that some are demanding that our elected leaders take.
If we demand that mere mortals live up to this standard, we will see
our seats of government lay empty and we will see the best, most able
people unfairly cast out of public service.
We need to stop destroying imperfect people at the altar of an
unobtainable morality. We need to start living up to the standards
which the public in its infinite wisdom understands, that imperfect
people must strive towards, but too often fall short.
We are now rapidly descending into a politics where life imitates
farce, fratricide dominates our public debate, and America is held
hostage to tactics of smear and fear.
Let all of us here today say no to resignation, no to impeachment, no
to hatred, no to intolerance of each other, and no to vicious self-
righteousness.
We need to start healing. We need to start binding up our wounds. We
need to end this downward spiral which will culminate in the death of
representative democracy.
I believe this healing can start today by changing the course we have
begun. This is exactly why we need this today to be bipartisan. This is
why we ask the opportunity to vote on a bipartisan censure resolution,
to begin the process
[[Page H12032]]
of healing our Nation and healing our people.
We are on the brink of the abyss. The only way we stop this insanity
is through the force of our own will. The only way we stop this spiral
is for all of us to finally say ``enough.''
Let us step back from the abyss and let us begin a new politics of
respect and fairness and decency, which realizes what has come before.
May God have mercy on this Congress, and may Congress have the wisdom
and the courage and the goodness to save itself today.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. Sensenbrenner) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Canady).
Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) for yielding to me, and I rise in
opposition to the motion to recommit.
The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt) has, with his customary
dignity and good grace, made a passionate appeal for the motion to
recommit. I submit to the House, however, that the motion to recommit
must be rejected by this House.
The motion to recommit must be rejected first and foremost because we
today in this House do not sit in judgment on the President for his
sins. We do not sit in judgment on the President for his frailties, for
his human failings. That is not our responsibility.
But today in this House we do sit in judgment on the President of the
United States for his crimes. And it is because of his crimes that this
motion must be rejected.
It must be rejected first because the proposal for censure is outside
the framework established by our Constitution. As the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Hyde), chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, so
eloquently explained, the Constitution establishes a single method for
this Congress to sit in judgment on the misconduct of a President. The
constitutional method is impeachment by the House and trial in the
Senate.
Other methods may seem to us more convenient or more comfortable, but
our standard cannot be comfort or convenience. Our standard must be and
always remain our Constitution.
Are we in this House so fearful of following the constitutional
standard? Do we have so little faith in the institutions of our
government and the path marked out for us in our Constitution that we
would turn aside and substitute our opinions for the wisdom of the
Framers and go down another path? Our answer must be no. We must stay
on the path laid out for us in the Constitution.
To those who say that a vote of censure is a matter of conscience, I
must say that their consciences do not bind the Committee on the
Judiciary to bring before this House a measure which we judge to be
harmful and dangerous because it is outside the constitutional
framework, a measure which violates the separation of powers. Their
consciences do not trump our Constitution.
And I must also ask this: If expressing a censure of the President is
such a matter of conscience, why have they not done what is clearly
within their power and which raises no constitutional problems to
censure President Clinton? Why has the Democratic Caucus, by its own
solemn act and resolution, not censured President Clinton? With all due
respect to my Democratic friends, I must suggest, if their consciences
were so stricken, they would have censured him by their own collective
judgment through the action of their own Caucus long before we came to
this sad day.
There are, of course, other reasons that this House must reject
censure. We must reject censure because the facts of the case against
the President, facts establishing a calculated and sustained pattern of
perjury and obstruction of justice, are overwhelming. All the attacks
on the Independent Counsel, all the attacks on the Committee on the
Judiciary do not alter the stubborn facts of the case against President
William Jefferson Clinton.
We must reject censure because the President's defense rests
squarely, we must sadly conclude, on the denial of the obvious and the
assertion of pure nonsense. To this day, the President's defense rests
on the claim that he told the truth in his deposition when he denied
that he had any specific recollection of ever being alone with Ms.
Lewinsky. Who in this House believes that? Who in this country believes
that? To this day, the President's defense rests on the argument that
Ms. Lewinsky had sex with him, but he did not have sex with her.
How sad it is that the President of the United States is reduced to
making such nonsensical arguments. What rational person can accept such
a defense? Such a defense is an insult to our intelligence, an insult
to judgment and to common sense.
Finally, we must reject censure because under our Constitution, the
President's crimes, not his sins, not his human failings, but his
crimes demand impeachment. William Jefferson Clinton has willfully, he
has willfully turned aside from the unique role assigned to him under
our Constitution. He has willfully turned aside from the oath of office
that he swore. He has willfully turned aside from his preeminent duty
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Such a President
should not remain in office. Such a President must be impeached by this
House and brought to account before the Senate.
Point of Order
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Solomon) insist on his point of order?
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I do insist on my point of order and I wish
to be recognized on the point of order.
Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order against this motion to
recommit on the grounds that it does violate clause 7 of House Rule
XVI, that is the germaneness rule.
Mr. Speaker, this rule is a rule of the House and it requires
amendments to be germane to the text that one is attempting to amend.
And, Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 611, a resolution impeaching
President Clinton for high crimes and misdemeanors, was reported as a
question of privileges of the House under Rule IX. This privileged
status is established by the Constitution in Article I, Section 2,
which grants the House the sole power of impeachment.
{time} 1145
It is also established by numerous precedents in the history of this
House in which resolutions of impeachment have been called up as
privileged matter on the floor.
Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit contains matter which is not
privileged for consideration by this House. An attempt to insert
nonprivileged matter into privileged matter by amendment clearly
violates the germaneness rules of this House.
Mr. Speaker, in order to be held germane, an amendment must share a
fundamental purpose with the text one attempts to amend. Impeachment is
the prescribed mechanism to address this conduct by the chief
executive, and any other procedure has no foundation in the
Constitution and is not contemplated by the separation of powers. To
attempt to substitute a censure for impeachment is to violate the
overall purpose of the Constitution's impeachment clause.
Mr. Speaker, the fundamental purpose of the motion to recommit
presently before the House obviously does not conform to the
fundamental purpose of the impeachment resolution. It proposes a
different end, a different result and a different method of achieving
that end.
Mr. Speaker, I urge the Chair to sustain this point of order.
I ask unanimous consent to insert extraneous matter at this point in
the Record. It is a ``Dear Colleague'' letter to Members from myself
and the incoming chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Dreier).
Finally, Mr. Speaker, let me just say that this House has a
tradition, it has a tradition of nonpartisan rulings by the Chair on
questions of germaneness. Indeed, the parliamentarian of the House is a
nonpartisan officer of the majority and minority party Members. These
recommendations are based on an orderly set of factual rulings from
[[Page H12033]]
the past which establish precedents of the future.
Mr. Speaker, I urge you to continue your reputation of fairness and
sustain this point of order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Extraneous material will be
inserted after the point of order is disposed of.
Does the gentleman from Massachusetts wish to be heard on the point
of order?
Mr. MOAKLEY. Yes, I do, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley).
Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, there is nothing unusual or unprecedented
in offering this motion. On many occasions the House has debated
resolutions to censure presidents, other executive officials, even
private citizens. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the House has even debated an
amendment to convert articles of impeachment into a censure resolution.
In 1830, Mr. Speaker, no one even questioned the legitimacy of that
amendment.
The Boucher amendment to censure the President is germane to the
articles of impeachment that we find before us.
Mr. Speaker, in proposing this amendment, we are simply following the
precedents of the House. The 3rd volume of Hinds' Precedents, section
2367, clearly records that during the impeachment of Judge James Peck,
Representative Edward Everett of Massachusetts offered an amendment to
an impeachment resolution. That amendment stated that the ``House does
not approve of the conduct of James Peck'' and goes on to recommend
that he not be impeached. This is, in essence, Mr. Speaker, what the
motion of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) does.
The Boucher amendment strikes out the articles of impeachment and, in
a more expansive formulation, states that the ``House does not approve
of the conduct of'' President Clinton. The House went on to defeat
Representative Everett's amendment, but it was offered, it was debated,
and it was voted upon.
Mr. Speaker, we are asking for the same consideration that the
precedents of the House prove was given before. And furthermore, Mr.
Speaker, the Peck case is not the only time that the House has
considered censure of an individual subject to impeachment.
In a recent study, the Congressional Research Service reported that
the House has considered censuring executive officials a total of 9
times. And the House also has censured its own Members.
The Republican-led House has considered numerous resolutions
expressing its disapproval of individuals and their conduct. Just
recently the House condemned travel by Louis Farrakhan and the House
castigated the remarks of Sara Lister, Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Manpower. The House even expressed itself on the President's
assertions of executive privilege. And the House expressed its views on
many other matters.
Surely, Mr. Speaker, if the House can approve the display of the Ten
Commandments, it can censure the deplorable behavior of President
Clinton, and we are simply asking for that opportunity.
The gentleman from New York (Mr. Solomon) makes the point of order
that the amendment is nongermane. The amendment could be challenged on
three grounds: First, that it is not germane to amend privileged
material with nonprivileged material; second, that even if censure is
considered as privileged, the fundamental purpose of impeachment is
different from censure; and third, that censure is not a
constitutionally sound remedy.
On the first argument, Mr. Speaker, the Chair may be tempted to
follow footnote 8 in Deschler's volume 3, chapter 14, section 1.3 which
states that it is not germane to amend impeachment which is privileged
material with censure which is nonprivileged material. But I ask the
Chair to withhold judgment on that. The footnote itself acknowledges
that this is not a matter of precedent because the issue has never
arisen. Again, Mr. Speaker, this is not a matter of precedent because
the issue has never arisen.
Moreover, it is clearly established that resolutions of censure have
been considered as privileged in the past.
In the second volume of Hinds, section 1625, a Mr. A.P. Field was
reprimanded in the well of the House by the Speaker pursuant to a
privileged resolution. And this is not the only case, Mr. Speaker. The
6th volume of Cannons precedents, section 333, records that in 1913, a
Mr. Charles Glover was also brought to the well of the House. He was
reprimanded by the Speaker pursuant to a privileged resolution.
Mr. Speaker, it is clearly established that resolutions that provide
for censure or reprimand have been considered as privileged in the
past. In sum, it is supported by the precedents that resolutions of
censure have been treated as privileged by this House and, therefore,
the argument that it is not germane to amend privileged matters with
nonprivileged material is not at issue in this case.
The second line of argument my Republican colleagues use is that
censure has a fundamentally different purpose than impeachment. The
argument is that impeachment is intended to remedy a constitutional
crisis whereas censure is designed to punish.
Mr. Speaker, let me ask, where is the remedial meaning in phrases
such as ``acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice''
``has brought disrepute on the presidency'' and ``exhibited contempt
for the inquiry''?
These words of censure are found in the very articles before us.
Clearly, Mr. Speaker, this language is meant to inflict punishment on
the President, punishment that is at odds with the remedial nature of
impeachment.
The articles of impeachment also touch on this issue of punishment by
recommending to the Senate that the President be tried, convicted,
removed from office and forbidden to hold any office in the future. In
fact, Mr. Speaker, the House has never, ever recommended to the Senate
that the person being impeached also be prohibited from holding other
office. Even in the highly-charged, politically-motivated impeachment
of President Andrew Johnson, the House did not dare recommend to the
Senate an appropriate punishment.
The committee clearly intends not only to remedy the situation by
impeaching the President but also intends to punish him by its
disqualification to hold and enjoy office of honor, trust or profit
under the United States.
The words of Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 65 are instructive.
When discussing impeachment, Hamilton uses the word ``punishment'' to
describe being denied future public office. It certainly sounds like
punishment to me, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Hamilton also describes that punishment as being ``sentenced to a
perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence and honors and
emoluments of this country.'' Clearly, Alexander Hamilton believed that
denial of future public office was intended to be punitive as well as
remedial.
Mr. Speaker, since this resolution contains both remedial impeachment
and punitive censure, it should be germane to propose censure alone.
The Committee on the Judiciary itself has opened the door by censuring
the President.
The last argument that is being propounded is that censure is not a
constitutionally sound remedy. I would urge the Speaker not to
entertain this argument. It is well established that the presiding
officer does not pass judgment on the constitutionality of any proposed
legislation, 8 Cannon section 3031.
If the Speaker still feels constrained to address the constitutional
question, I remind the Chair that the House has attempted to censure
Federal officials numerous times in the past and has in fact voted to
censure such individuals.
Not once, Mr. Speaker, not once has there been a successful
constitutional challenge. Clearly, censure is not prohibited by the
Constitution.
Mr. Speaker, I respectfully remind the Chair that you are ruling on a
profoundly important matter, a matter of whether to allow us a vote of
conscience in the matter of impeachment. In the 210 years of Congress,
210 years that Congress has been in existence, no Chair has ever been
called on to rule whether censure is germane to impeachment. I repeat
that. In 210 years, the Chair has never been called on to rule on that.
Your decision would be
[[Page H12034]]
the first and the only such decision and will be recorded in the rule
books as such.
Volume 3 of Deschler's notes, and I quote, ``the issue of whether a
proposition to censure a Federal officer would be germane to a
proposition for his impeachment has not arisen.'' While the Chair was
not asked to rule on the question then, the House has considered an
amendment to the impeachment resolution to censure Judge Peck and in
has in other instances considered censure resolutions as privileged.
Mr. Speaker, it has happened in the past. I urge the Chair to follow
the weight of House practice and to overrule the point of order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does any other Member wish to be heard on
the point of order?
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.
Sensenbrenner).
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the point of
order on the motion to recommit because it is not germane to House
Resolution 611.
Clause 7 of rule XVI of the rules of the House of Representatives
provides that ``no motion or proposition on a subject different from
that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.''
Prior rulings of the House have held this provision applicable to
motions to recommit with or without instructions. A motion to recommit
is not in order if it would not be in order as an amendment to the
underlying proposition.
The constitutional prerogatives of the House, such as impeachment and
matters incidental thereto, are questions of high privilege under rule
IX of the House rules.
A joint or simple resolution evincing the disapproval of the House is
not a question of privilege under the rules of the House.
Furthermore, the fundamental principle of such a censure resolution
is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of an impeachment
resolution.
I would point out to the Chair that the motion to recommit with
instructions that is under consideration here is not even a censure
motion. It is a sense of the Congress resolution, and I would refer the
Chair to the last four lines of their resolution, that William
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, by his conduct has
brought upon himself and fully deserves the censure and condemnation of
the American people and this House.
It says he deserves the censure but it does not censure him.
We have heard an awful lot about the rule of law during this debate,
which I think has been one of the finest debates that the House of
Representatives has had.
{time} 1200
This is our opportunity to uphold our rules, our laws, and I would
strongly urge the Chair to sustain the point of order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Are there other Members who
wish to be heard?
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard on the point of order
and I urge you to overrule the point of order.
Mr. Speaker, the argument has been made that censure is
unprecedented, uncommon or unconstitutional. That simply is not the
case.
In the impeachment of Judge Peck, an amendment was offered that
contained a censure. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley)
spoke to this in his remarks. I want to point out that on many other
occasions the House has chosen censure over impeachment. I would like
to cite a few examples.
In the case of Judge Speers, the committee report stated, and I am
quoting, ``The record presents a series of legal oppressions that
demand condemnation and criticism.'' Even in the light of this finding,
the committee did not recommend proceeding with impeachment and the
report containing censure was adopted.
In the cases of Judge Harry Anderson, Judge Frank Cooper, Judge
Grover Moscowitz, Judge Blodgett, Judge Boarman, Judge Jenkins and
Judge Ricks, the committee recommended censure instead of proceeding
with impeachment.
The fact of the matter, Mr. Speaker, is that there is a long-standing
history in the House of substituting censure for impeachment.
Sometimes, as in the Louderback case, the Committee on the Judiciary
recommends censure and the House rejects that recommendation and votes
impeachment. Other times the committee has recommended censure over
impeachment and the House has agreed with that recommendation. Mr.
Speaker, what is important is that the House has had a choice between
censure and impeachment.
There is also a long tradition in the House of censuring executive
officers. As we have heard, a recent Congressional Research Service
study found nine instances where the House has attempted to censure
Federal officials. Presidents John Adams, John Tyler, James Polk and
James Buchanan were all subject of censure resolutions. In addition,
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, Navy Secretary Isaac Toucey,
former War Secretary Simon Cameron, Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, and
Ambassador Thomas Bayard as well, were all subject to censure
resolutions.
Indeed, private citizens have also been censured by the House. The
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) cited two examples in his
opening argument. The House has also censured a Mr. John Anderson, a
Mr. Samuel Houston, and moved to censure Mr. Russel Jarvis.
I believe these examples will dispel the myth that censure by the
House is uncommon, unprecedented or unconstitutional.
The most salient fact is that when the House wants to censure an
individual, both private citizens and executive officers, it can and it
has. There is no constitutional prohibition against such an action, and
the Congress has freely engaged in passing such censures.
The question before the Speaker is, with this long line of precedent,
can censure be offered as an alternative to impeachment? The answer is
clearly yes. As I cited above, the House has on many occasions adopted
reports from the Committee on the Judiciary that has given the House
the opportunity to express its views, its lack of regard, its censure,
its condemnation, as an alternative to impeaching a judge. The same
model should hold here.
Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the reason this is such a long-
standing practice and precedent of the House is because it just makes
good common sense. When the House does not feel impeachment is
warranted, but does want to go on the record censuring certain
behavior, it has. One only need look at the precedents.
Mr. Speaker, I urge that you overrule the point of order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Are there any other Members who wish to
speak on the point of order?
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Rogan).
Mr. ROGAN. Mr. Speaker, I join with the gentleman from Wisconsin in
rising to a point of order and also noting the dichotomy in this
particular proposal of censure; that if this were to pass, we would go
on record as stating that the President deserves censure, but the
document itself does not grant censure.
There are two other interesting areas relating to the proposal before
us. In the House Committee on the Judiciary, when this matter came
before us, the maker of the proposed resolution of censure was the same
maker as the proposal today, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia.
The resolution of censure that was presented to the Committee on the
Judiciary had two distinguishing characteristics that are absent today.
In the Committee on the Judiciary, the resolution that was put before
us would have required not only a vote of the House but a vote of the
Senate to bring the condemnation of Congress upon the President. That
is absent here. It also had an additional element. It had an element of
requiring the President to come to Congress and to affix his signature
to the document in recognition of the censure. That too is absent.
Impeachment, and not censure, is properly before the House at this
time. The paradox between the two was demonstrated during our debate in
the Committee on the Judiciary on the proposed resolution of censure.
In committee I asked the author if there was any language in the
proposal that would preclude any future Congress, by a simple majority
vote, from erasing or expunging the censure from
[[Page H12035]]
history. I knew in advance the answer to that question. No. There can
be no such language in a resolution of censure because, under the rules
of Congress, this Congress cannot bind a future Congress.
What does this mean? It means that any censure adopted by this House
today can be expunged from the record by a simple majority vote of this
House. Now, in a courtroom, convicted felons seek to have their
criminal convictions expunged. When that request is granted, that felon
may truthfully state that he was never convicted of a crime. In the
eyes of the law, the criminal conduct simply never happened when
expungement is granted. It is forgotten.
A censure resolution of this President today can be erased from our
journals and from our history books forever tomorrow, and it may be
done by a simple majority vote. Censure is a remedy designed for the
polls, it is not a remedy designed for the Constitution. It is a
phantom remedy and the amendment should be turned back.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.
Barrett) wish to speak to the point of order?
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Yes, Mr. Speaker, I wish to speak. But
before I do that, I want to compliment you on the evenhandedness you
have displayed in presiding over this matter.
Mr. Speaker, the argument that censure is of a fundamentally
different purpose than impeachment has been made; that impeachment is
remedial in nature while censure is punitive in nature. Ordinarily, I
would agree. The words in the censure resolution are meant to be
punishment. But unlike previous articles of impeachment, the
impeachment articles before us also raise the issue of punishment, and
it does so in three ways:
The articles incorporate language which clearly condemns and, in
effect, censures the President. I quote from the articles: ``In all of
this William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his
office and has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his
trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of
law and justice to the manifest injury of the people of the United
States.'' This language appears in all four articles of impeachment.
The article also states that he has, ``violated his constitutional
duty'', and ``willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial
process.'' If this language were considered on its own, it clearly
would be considered a condemnation and censure of the President.
Second, and more importantly, last night I looked through the 16
previous articles of impeachment that this House has considered. And
for the first time in the history of the Congress, for the first time
in 210 years, this House is taking the additional step and telling the
Senate that not only should the President be tried and removed from
office but also disbarred from ever holding public office again. That
language did not even appear in the articles of impeachment for Andrew
Johnson or Richard Nixon.
Let me repeat that, Mr. Speaker. For the first time in the history of
the United States, the House is taking it upon itself to say that the
power of disqualification from office should be invoked. Until today,
no Member of this House has voted to do this. Until today.
This is important. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 65, talks about
this very issue. Hamilton says, ``Punishment is not to terminate the
chastisement of the offender.'' Hamilton goes on to talk about the
offender having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem
and confidence, and honors and emoluments of this country when the
person is disqualified from holding public office. While this penalty
is partly remedial, one can only conclude that there is something
inherently punitive in forever disqualifying an individual from holding
public office, and this punishment quality is intentional.
Third, article 4 states that the President exhibited contempt for the
inquiry. By charging the President with contempt, the articles open up
the possibility for the House to address that contempt.
Mr. Speaker, the precedents clearly show that contempt can be
remedied by a censure of this House. It is equally clear that contempt
of the House can be addressed by a privileged resolution of censure.
The articles before us contain language that clearly raises the issue
of punishment and censure.
To a proposition that contains both impeachment and censure, clearly
it is germane to offer a proposition for censure. For rather than
expanding the purpose of the articles of impeachment, our censure
resolution, in a real sense, narrows the focus of the resolution. We do
not expand, we narrow the focus.
One final point, Mr. Speaker. You have discretion. You can put the
question of germaneness to this body. This is an issue that this body
has never considered before. And in doing so, you could truly let the
people decide.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does anyone on the majority side wish to be
heard?
The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pease) is recognized.
Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, what is clear from the debate in the
Committee on the Judiciary and on the floor of this House is that the
meaning, even the intent of a resolution of censure is not clear.
Some contend that its purpose, no matter what it is called, is to
punish the President. Others argue that it is not intended to punish
but merely to state the opinion of the House on the matter. Without
determining which it is, this much is now clear. If its purpose is to
punish the President, no matter how it is captioned, it is a bill of
attainder, that is, special legislation intended to punish and identify
an individual or group without benefit of judicial proceedings, and
constitutionally prohibited.
I understand that the proposal originally before the committee has
been amended so as not to require Senate action, thus diminishing it
substantially in order to meet the constitutional infirmity. If it is
not intended to punish the President, but merely state our opinions, it
is clearly meaningless, for we have already done that extensively, some
would say exhaustively.
If anything, the debate of the last few months has brought consensus
on one thing, the centrality of the rule of law to our system of
government. Some contend that the rule of law is best acquitted through
impeachment of the President; others that it will be upheld because of
the President's exposure to proceedings in civil and criminal courts of
this Nation after he leaves office.
{time} 1215
But all of us agree that following the rules is essential. The rules
of this House, as we were reminded yesterday by both our outgoing rules
chairman the gentleman from New York and the incoming rules chairman
the gentleman from California, do not allow the interjection of
nonprivileged matter into privileged matter by amendment. The articles
of impeachment are privileged. The sense of the House resolution is
not. The motion, though perhaps so across the rotunda, is not germane
here and the point of order should therefore be sustained.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel).
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the point of order
that has been made by the gentleman from New York and in support of the
motion to recommit so that this body could have before it the question
as to whether or not we can vote for censure.
As you look over the rules and precedents of this House, you will
have the broad discretion to include in your ruling the question of
fairness and the question of equity. Mr. Speaker, the whole world is
watching.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Buyer).
Parliamentary Inquiry
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, the debate is getting to be repetitive on
the point of order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has discretion to hear Members who
wish to speak to the point of order. As long as Members speak to the
point of order, the Chair hopes to allow Members to do that. The Chair
will make a ruling after a sufficient number
[[Page H12036]]
of Members have had a chance to speak.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer).
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, if many of my colleagues are sitting here
somewhat confused and scratching their heads and trying to follow this
debate and they think this is a bunch of lawyers speaking lawyerly
language, I kind of agree with them. They are right. I am confused.
Now, I sat on the Judiciary Committee and I watched this debate. Let
me share with my colleagues why. Here is why I am confused. When the
censure resolution was offered in the Judiciary Committee, I asked
questions of the author about what is its clear intent. The gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) was very clear to me. He said the intent of
the censure resolution is not to have findings of guilt and it is not
to punish. Then I questioned that, looking at the four corners of the
document and got into the exact words, because it did have findings of
guilt, that the President had egregiously failed, that he had violated
his trust, that he lessened the esteem of his office, that he brought
dishonor to his office and then as a form of punishment it sought that
the President's actions were entitled to condemnation.
The reason that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) would
assert that his intent was not to have findings of guilt and not to
punish is because it would have brought it within the clear prohibition
of the Constitution of bills of attainder. Now, even up to yesterday on
this House floor we were still discussing bills of attainder. But now
there is a problem. The problem is that how do they make a censure
resolution germane as an alternative to impeachment? So they have
gotten clever. The cleverness is to change the title but leave the
words the same. It is no longer called a censure resolution, it is now
called a sense of the House. So being clever, they have now tried to
distance themselves from the clear, express constitutional prohibition
on bills of attainder and now say that because this is a sense of the
Congress resolution, it comes under the speech and debate clause.
That is what is happening here, Mr. Speaker. So now that the same
Members who yesterday in debate said that our intent by this was not to
have findings of guilt and not to punish, if you are confused that now
the same Members are saying that we are having findings of guilt and
our intent is to punish, the same Members are saying that now because
they have changed the title and it is merely now under the speech and
debate clause.
As one of the legal scholars testified before the Judiciary
Committee, they said that if it is a sense of the Congress, it is the
equivalency of Congress shouting down Pennsylvania Avenue at the
President and saying, ``We think what you have done was a bad thing,''
and it has no other clear legal effect.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the point of order on the
motion to recommit because censure is not germane as an alternative to
the impeachment resolution. I have great respect for every Member of
this body. I have had opportunities to speak with many of them. I had a
good conversation with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer)
yesterday and he and I disagree on this issue.
I understand the motives and the intentions of the Members of this
House who would like to censure the President for his lack of
integrity, responsibility and violations of the rule of law. I
understand their convictions and that is why they offer this sense of
the House resolution.
Americans all across the country every day, we all try very hard to
live by the rules, principles and proverbs and we teach them to our
children. What are they? It is called honesty: You tell the truth, be
sincere, do not deceive, mislead or be devious or use trickery. Do not
withhold information in relationships of trust. Do not cheat or lie to
the detriment of others nor tolerate such practice. You honor your
oath. Be loyal. Support and protect your family, your friends, your
community and your country. Do not violate the law and ethical
principles to win personal gain. Do not ask a friend to do something
wrong. Judge all people on their merits. Do not abuse or demean people.
Do not use, manipulate, exploit or take advantage of others for
personal gain. Be responsible and accountable, think before you act,
consider the consequences on all people by your actions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members will confine their remarks to the
point of order.
Mr. BUYER. You do not blame others for your mistakes.
Unfortunately, the President did not follow these principles. His
criminal misconduct and dereliction of his executive duties do meet the
constitutional threshold of high crimes and misdemeanors.
The founders in their infinite wisdom made three coordinate branches
of government in a system of checks and balances. When the President
and the Vice President, Federal judges and other executive officials
are accused of high crimes and misdemeanors, the Constitution gave this
body the express authority as the accusatory body to bring the charges.
That is why many of my colleagues have referred to the House as the
grand jury function. That is accurate. That is why the House is the
accusatory body. There is not a grand jury in this country that can
investigate, prosecute and have findings, guilt and sentence. That is
why in the Constitution they said we accuse and the Senate tries. It is
not expressly authorized for anyone to use censure as an alternative to
impeachment. Impeachment is our only course of action.
Mr. HEFNER. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has the discretion to recognize
Members on a point of order. The Chair is going to exercise that
discretion to recognize two more Members on the minority side and two
more Members on the majority side before ruling.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hefner)
on the point of order.
Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Speaker, I do not understand why anybody would be
confused, this being an exercise in lawyers here and all the technical
things we have talked about.
Let me just mention something here. I have been here longer than most
of the people that have talked on this point of order. The most
powerful committee in this House is the Rules Committee. It is the
Speaker's committee. The leadership in this House and the Speaker in
this House dictates the rules that will be considered on this House
floor. Make no mistake about it.
Now, it has been said that we cannot have a vote on censure because
it is not constitutional. But no one, no one, has shown us why it is
unconstitutional. It is an opinion. Nobody has given us concrete
evidence that it is not constitutional for us to consider censure.
Now, if that be the case and you want to make the argument that we
want to be fair in these proceedings, well, then you would give us a
vote on censure. The Rules Committee could have met, the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Solomon) I think will agree, and you could have crafted
any rule that you wanted. You could have waived any points of order to
have a rule that comes to this floor, and you would have the votes to
enforce the rule that you brought.
But to say that it is unconstitutional and hide behind the fact that
it is unconstitutional to me says we are going to have a vote for
impeachment to get rid of this President and that is going to be it,
period. We are not going to allow anybody to vote his conscience if it
conflicts with our conscience.
Now, I do not know about you, but this will be the last time that I
will probably ever speak on the floor of this House of Representatives,
and it has been the greatest privilege of my life. It has been the
greatest privilege of my life to serve on this House of
Representatives, and for every Member of Congress, whether I have
agreed with you or not, if there is anything that I have said over
these years that would have offended anybody, I would ask your
forgiveness.
The President of the United States stood before the whole world and
said, I have sinned and I ask forgiveness, and that is what it is all
about.
I do not know how you are going to rule on this but just as soon as I
can get finished, I want to go home and go to the Christmas programs
and watch these children stand out front and spell out the name of
Christmas and Jesus Christ. I want to go home and celebrate the birth
of the savior Jesus Christ, the
[[Page H12037]]
prince of peace, and if people want to stay here forever and ever and
berate the President, then you just have to let that be your Christmas
legacy.
But if you do not allow us a vote on censure, you are saying to me
our mind is made up and we are going to get this President and we are
not going to give you a vote on it and the deal is cut. If that be the
case, we may as well all go home and have the vote now. But I hope that
the Chair will not rule that this is not germane.
I thank you very much, God bless you, and have a merry Christmas.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Barr).
Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, precedents are important and for
precedent in this dispute, in discussing the germaneness of the motion
to recommit, I believe one of the most important precedents one can
turn to is the founder of the Democrat Party, President Andrew Jackson.
His words, indeed, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of this particular debate
are particularly relevant, because it was President Jackson who was the
subject of a censure motion, and his words printed at great length in
the registry of the proceedings of this Chamber in 1834 very clearly
discuss, illustrate and stand for the proposition that the very
carefully balanced system of checks and balances and separation of
powers in our government was violated, would be violated then as it is
today by any motion to censure the President as a substitute for
impeachment.
The words of Andrew Jackson should be in our minds today, should be
in these halls today, because they say that a motion for censure as a
substitute for impeachment is offensive to the fundamental work of this
Congress, the fundamental powers of this Congress and the powers of the
presidency.
This is the precedent, Mr. Speaker, that we should follow today and
rule this motion for recommittal out of order as repugnant and
offensive to the constitutional separation of powers on which our
system of government is based.
Parliamentary Inquiry
Mr. TRAFICANT. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, there has not been one Member that has
addressed the legal precedents of the challenge to this motion.
{time} 1230
By removing further debate, there is no one else standing. I believe
there is only one governing principle here today because of a lack of
legislative precedents and action, and that is the Constitution. The
Constitution, as has been stated, does not permit censure, but the
Constitution does not prohibit censure.
Insofar, under my parliamentary inquiry, as there is no legislative
precedence that has been set, and the Founders did not place this with
the elected judges of the Supreme Court, they left it to the elected
Congress, therefore, they choose not to send it to judicial process but
to the political process, and Congress should have the right to work
its political will.
Therefore, this motion should be defeated on the grounds that there
is no precedence, it is lacking, and it cries out for further
interpretation of the Founders' actions. And the Founders' actions were
clear. They did not want to place it with the Supreme Court judges that
were not responsible to voters; they placed it to the Members of
Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I ask that this motion be defeated.
Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard on the point of order.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. It is the Chair's prerogative to indicate
that this will be the last speaker on the point of order.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher).
Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Moakley) has answered well the arguments that have been made in support
of the point of order. There is actual precedent for the acceptance by
the House of a resolution of censure as an amendment to the impeachment
resolution. That occurred in the matter of the impeachment of Judge
Peck in 1830.
In response to the argument that censure is nonprivileged material
and that it may not be used to amend privileged material, the gentleman
has pointed to instances in which the House has treated censure as
privileged. And the gentleman persuasively argues that by their own
language the articles of impeachment have a fundamental purpose that is
both remedial and punitive. The punitive language of the censure
resolution is, therefore, not inconsistent with the fundamental purpose
of the articles of impeachment.
Mr. Speaker, this is a question of first impression. The Chair has
never ruled before on this precise matter. We have had in our Republic
200 years of silence on the question of whether the substitution of a
resolution of censure for the President's conduct to articles of
impeachment shall be considered as germane.
Given the unprecedented nature of the question, given the
extraordinary gravity of the matter that is now before the House, given
the inherent unfairness of not making a censure alternative available
to the Members and the inherent unfairness of disallowing the
consideration of the House by the American public's clearly preferred
outcome for this inquiry, which is the passage of a resolution of
censure, I urge the Chair to resolve all ambiguities in the rules and
all doubts about their proper application in favor of finding that the
resolution of censure is germane and permitting its consideration by
the House.
A finding of germaneness would do no violence to the precedents of
the House. It would not overturn previous rulings of the Chair. It
would allow us today to give voice to the public's overwhelming desire
to put this unfortunate matter behind us with the stern censure and
rebuke which the President, for his conduct, deserves.
I thank the Chair for his patience in listening to these arguments,
and I urge his finding that the resolution of censure is germane.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The Chair understands that the
ranking member of the Committee on Rules wishes to make a brief
statement to the Chair.
Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask to be heard to make a different
appeal.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Briefly.
Mr. MOAKLEY. Arguing in the alternative, Mr. Speaker, and I thank the
Chair for its patience, arguing the alternative, if the Chair finds
some merit in our argument but is not convinced in the sufficient merit
to overrule the point of order, I respectfully urge the Chair to
consider to put the motion, the question, directly to the House, and
there is precedent for this action.
One of the issues in deciding the germaneness of censure to
impeachment is the notion that the censure is not privileged, but
impeachment is. On a question of privilege, however, the early practice
of the House was for the House to determine whether it should be
entertained. In fact, the practice was so well established that in 1842
the Speaker, Representative John White of Kentucky, remarked he could
find no instance on record where the Chair had determined what
constituted a question of privilege. On the contrary, he found numerous
instances where the House had settled it. This occasion is described in
the third volume of Hinds' Precedents, section 2654.
When the Speaker was asked to rule on whether a resolution regarding
charges made by a Cabinet officer about Members of Congress committed a
question of privilege, he said, the Speaker speaking:
For the Chair to decide in such a case would be an
usurpation on its part, and what the Chair might deem a
breach of privilege, the House may not deem so, and vice
versa.'
Again, Mr. Speaker, I remind the Chair that this is a question of
first impression. The Speaker has never in the 210 years of history of
the Congress been asked to rule on whether censure is germane on
impeachment. There is no precedence directly on point. The question has
not arisen in the past, although the House has taken up an amendment
that would have converted impeachment to censure in the matter of Judge
Peck.
Mr. Speaker, in a matter so grave as this, to deny the House a vote
of conscience, I beg the Chair not to base its decision on a narrow and
technical interpretation, and if the Chair cannot see its way to accept
entirely our argument on the merits, I ask the Chair to put the
question directly to the House.
[[Page H12038]]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair is prepared to rule.
Knowing that the House may wish to express its will on this question,
the Chair nevertheless will follow the course set by presiding officers
for at least the past 150 years by rendering a decision from the Chair.
The gentleman from New York has made the point of order that the
amendment in the motion to recommit offered by the gentleman from
Virginia is not germane to House Resolution 611.
The rule of germaneness derives directly from the authority of the
House under section 5 in article I of the Constitution to determine its
own rules. It has governed the proceedings of the House for all of its
210-year history. Its applicability to a motion to recommit is well
established. As reflected in the Deschler-Brown Precedents in volume
10, chapter 28, both at section 1 and at section 17.2, then-Majority
Leader Carl Albert made these general observations about the rule in
1965, and I quote:
It is a rule which has been insisted upon by Democrats and
Republicans alike ever since the Democratic and Republican
parties have been in existence.
It is a rule without which this House could never complete
its legislative program if there happened to be a substantial
minority in opposition.
One of the great things about the House of Representatives
and one of the things that distinguish[es] it from other
legislative bodies is that we do operate on the rule of
germaneness.
No legislative body of this size could ever operate unless
it did comply with the rule of germaneness.
At the outset the Chair will state two guiding principles.
First, an otherwise privileged resolution is rendered nonprivileged
by the inclusion of nonprivileged matter. This principle is exemplified
in the ruling of Speaker Clark on January 11, 1916, which is recorded
in Cannon's Precedents at volume 6, section 468. Accordingly, to a
resolution pending as privileged, an amendment proposing to broach
nonprivileged matter is not germane.
Second, to be germane, an amendment must share a common fundamental
purpose with the pending proposition. This principle is annotated in
section 798b of the House Rules and Manual. Accordingly, to a pending
resolution addressing one matter, an amendment proposing to broach an
intrinsically different matter is not germane.
As the excellent arguments in debate on this point of order have made
clear, these two principles are closely intertwined in any analysis of
the relationship between the amendment proposed in the motion to
recommit and the pending resolution. The Chair thanks those who have
brought their arguments to the attention of the Chair.
The pending resolution proposes to impeach the President of the
United States. As such, it invokes an exclusive constitutional
prerogative of the House. The final clause of section 2 in Article I of
the Constitution mandates that the House, ``shall have the sole power
of impeachment.'' For this reason, the pending proposal constitutes a
question of the privileges of the House within the meaning of rule IX.
Ample precedent is annotated in the House Rules and Manual at section
604.
The amendment in the motion to recommit offered by the gentleman from
Virginia proposes instead to censure the President. It has no
comparable nexus to an exclusive constitutional prerogative of the
House. Indeed, clause 7 of section 3 in article I of the Constitution
prescribes that ``judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States.''
An instructive contrast appears in clause 2 of section 5 in article I
of the Constitution, which establishes a range of alternative
disciplinary sanctions for Members of Congress by stating that each
House may, ``punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.'' This contrast demonstrates
that, while the constitutional power of either body in Congress to
punish one of its Members extends through a range of alternatives, the
constitutional power of the Congress to remove the President,
consistent with the separation of powers, is confined to the
impeachment process.
Thus, a proposal to discipline a Member may admit as germane an
amendment to increase or decrease the punishment (except expulsion,
which the Chair will address presently), in significant part because
the Constitution contemplates that the House may impose alternative
punishments. But a resolution of impeachment, being a question of
privileges of the House because it invokes an exclusive constitutional
prerogative of the House, cannot admit as germane an amendment to
convert the remedial sanction of potential removal to a punitive
sanction of censure, as that would broach nonprivileged matter. For
this conclusion the Chair finds support in Hinds' Precedents at volume
5, section 5810, as cited in Deschler's Precedents at volume 3, chapter
14, section 1.3, footnote 8.
The qualitative difference between these two contrasting sources of
disciplinary authority in the Constitution signifies an intrinsic
parliamentary difference between impeachment and an alternative
sanction against the President. The Chair believes that this
distinction is supported in the cited precedents and is specifically
discussed in the parliamentary notes on pages 400 and 401 of the cited
volume. An analogous case emphasizing an intrinsic difference is
recorded in Cannon's Precedents at volume 6, section 236, reflecting
that on October 27, 1921, Speaker Gillett held that an amendment
proposing to censure a Members of the House was not germane to a
resolution proposing that the Member be expelled from the House.
{time} 1245
The cited precedent reveals several occasions when the Committee on
the Judiciary, having been referred a question of impeachment against a
civil officer of the United States, reported a recommendation that
impeachment was not warranted and, thereafter, called upon the report
as a question of privilege.
The occasional inclusion in an accompanying report of the Committee
on the Judiciary of language recommending that an official be censured
has not been held to destroy the privilege of an accompanying
resolution that does not, itself, convey the language of censure.
The Chair is aware that, in the consideration of a resolution
proposing to impeach Judge James Peck in 1830, the House considered an
amendment proposing instead to express disapproval while refraining
from impeachment. In that instance no Member rose to a point of order,
and no parliamentary decision was entered from the Chair or by the
House. The amendment was considered by common sufferance. That no
Member sought to enforce the rule of germaneness on that occasion does
not establish a precedent of the House that such an amendment would be
germane.
Where the pending resolution addresses impeachment as a question of
the privileges of the House, the rule of germaneness requires that any
amendment confine itself to impeachment, whether addressing it in a
positive or a negative way. Although it may be possible by germane
amendment to convert a reported resolution of impeachment to resolve
that impeachment is not warranted, an alternative sanction having no
equivalent constitutional footing may not be broached as a question of
privilege and, correspondingly, is not germane.
The Chair acknowledges that the language of House Resolution 611
articulates its proposition for impeachment in language that, itself,
tends to convey opprobrium. The Chair must remain cognizant, however,
that the resolution does so entirely in the framework of the articles
of impeachment. Rather than inveighing any separate censure, the
resolution only effects the constitutional prayer for judgment by the
Senate.
The Chair is not passing on the ultimate constitutionality of a
separate resolution of censure. Indeed, the Chair does not judge the
constitutionality of measures before the House. Rather, the Chair holds
today only that the instant proposal to censure or otherwise admonish
the President of the United States--as it does not constitute a
question of the privileges of the House--is not germane to the pending
resolution of impeachment--an intrinsically separate question of the
privileges of the House.
The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the minority leader, is
recognized.
[[Page H12039]]
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, with all due respect, I must appeal the
ruling of the Chair.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is, shall the
decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the House?
Motion Offered by Mr. Armey
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I move to lay the appeal on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) to lay the appeal of the ruling of the
Chair on the table.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Let the Chair announce that this will be a
15-minute vote, followed by 15-minute votes thereafter.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 230,
noes 204, not voting 1, as follows:
[Roll No. 542]
YEAS--230
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--204
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--1
Miller (CA)
{time} 1304
So the motion to table was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on the point of order. Mr.
Speaker our Republican colleagues have agreed that censure is not
constitutional. Censure is indeed a Constitutional option. In 1800,
Rep. Ed Livingston (NY) introduced a censure motion against President
John Adams. The President was successfully represented by Congressman
John Marshall of Virginia. Representative Marshall argued the case on
the merits and never once argued that censure was unconstitutional.
John Marshall went on to become the Chief Justice of the United
States and was the father of much of our constitutional law. Indeed in
the landmark 1819 decision McColluch vs Maryland, the court ruled that
``there is no phrase in the Constitution which excludes incidental or
implied powers.'' The power of Congress to censure is an obvious
corollary of the legislatures inherent power as a deliberative body to
speak its mind.
It is therefore clear that censure is not prohibited by the
Constitution and is indeed a germane penalty. I urge the Chair to rule
the censure motion in order.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard on the point of order
and I urge you to overrule the point of order.
Mr. Speaker, the argument has been made that censure is
unprecedented, uncommon or unconstitutional. That simply is not the
case.
In the impeachment of Judge Peck, an amendment was offered that
contained a censure. Mr. Moakley spoke to this in his remarks. I want
to point out that on many other occasions, the House has chosen censure
over impeachment. I would like to cite a few examples. In the case of
Judge Speers, the committee report stated ``the record presents a
series of legal oppressions (that) demand condemnation and criticism.''
Even in light of this finding, the committee did not recommend
proceeding with impeachment and the report containing the censure was
adopted. (6 Cannon 527) In the cases of Judge Harry Anderson (6 Cannon
542), Judge Frank Cooper (6 Cannon 549), Judge Grover Moscowitz (6
Cannon 552), Judge Blodgett (3 Hinds 2516), Judge Boarman (3 Hinds
2518), Judge Jenkins (3 Hinds 2519) and Judge Ricks (3 Hinds 2520) the
committee recommended censure instead of proceeding with impeachment.
The fact of the matter, Mr. Speaker, is that there is a long-standing
history in this House of substituting censure for impeachment.
Sometimes, as in the Louderback case, the Judiciary committee
recommends censure and the House rejects that recommendation and votes
impeachment.
Other times, the committee has recommended censure over impeachment,
and the House has agreed with that recommendation.
Mr. Speaker, what is important is that the House has had a choice
between censure and impeachment.
There is also a long tradition in the House of censuring executive
officers. A recent Congressional Research Service study finds nine
instances where the House has attempted to censure federal officials.
Presidents John Adams, John Tyler, James Polk and James Bucanan were
all subjects of censure resolutions. In addition, Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton, Navy Secretary
[[Page H12040]]
Isaac Toucey, Former War Secretary Simon Cameron, Navy Secretary Gideon
Welles and Ambassador Thomas Bayard, as well, were all subject to
censure resolutions.
Indeed private citizens have also been censured by the House. Mr.
Moakley cited two examples in his opening argument. The House has also
censured a Mr. John Anderson (2 Hinds 1606), a Mr. Samuel Houston (2
Hinds 1619) and moved to censure a Mr. Russel Jarvis (2 Hinds 1615).
I believe these examples will dispel the myth that censure by the
House is uncommon, unprecedented or unconstitutional.
The most salient fact is that when the House wants to censure an
individual--both private citizens and executive officers--it can and it
has. There is no constitutional prohibition against such an action and
the Congress has freely engaged in passing such censures.
The question before the Speaker is, with this long line of precedent,
can censure be offered as an alternative to impeachment. The answer is
clearly yes. As I cited above, the House has on many occasions adopted
reports from the Judiciary Committee that have given the House the
opportunity to express its views, its lack of regard, its censure, its
condemnation as an alternative to impeaching a judge. The same model
should hold here.
Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the reason this is such a long-
standing practice and precedent of the House is because it just makes
good common sense. When the House does not feel impeachment is
warranted, but does want to go on record censuring certain behavior, it
has. One only need look at the precedents.
Mr. Speaker, I urge that you overrule the point of order.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, throughout this long process
as I have listened to this divisive debate, I have had to wonder about
the legacy of the 18th Congressional district. The first person to hold
this seat was the late Congresswoman Barbara Jordan. She was a member
of the Congress in 1974 during Watergate, and she was a Member of the
House Judiciary Committee.
I have been careful not to mischaracterize her thoughts or words
during these serious and troubling times. However, throughout the
debate it seems at every moment the Republican majority continues to
misuse Ms. Jordan's comments.
I think it is important to acknowledge the remarks she made today,
and the impact that those words will have on the actions we take today.
In her July 24, 1974 speech, in citing the Framers of the Constitution,
she noted that ``the Framers confined in the Congress the power if need
be, to remove the President in order to strike a balance between a
President swollen with power and grown tyrannical . . .''
She also said impeachment was limited to high crimes and
misdemeanors, as she cited the federal convention of 1787. Finally, Ms.
Jordan sheds light on what she might have thought of today's
proceedings as she states ``A President is impeachable if he attempts
to subvert the Constitution.'' I think it is important for Congress to
hear these words that the late Barbara Jordan gave on July 24, 1974.
A sense of the Congress resolution on censure is not
unconstitutional, it is not prohibited by the words of the
Constitution. It is not specifically noted in the Constitution, but
however neither are postal stamps, education, or social security. This
resolution is germane and constitutionally sound. Mr. Speaker please
rule and allow a free standing Resolution on Censure to be voted on by
this House--do not deny the will of the people.
The Bible, Mark 3:25, teaches that ``[I]f a house be divided against
itself, that house cannot stand.'' It's time to stop the malicious
attacks because surely, we will all perish. It is time to close ranks
and get back to the business of America. It is time to heal this
nation. Today let's restore the American public's faith in the
Constitution; do not deny their will.
We need to begin that healing process now to return America to
greatness.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question has been divided
for a vote.
The question is on the adoption of article I.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 228,
nays 206, not voting 1, as follows:
[Roll No. 543]
YEAS--228
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shimkus
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--206
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Houghton
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E.B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--1
Miller (CA)
{time} 1323
So Article I was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
[[Page H12041]]
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the adoption
of Article II.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 205,
nays 229, not voting 1, as follows:
[Roll No. 544]
YEAS--205
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrich
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Granger
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Quinn
Radanovich
Redmond
Regula
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Saxton
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--229
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Burr
Campbell
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Foley
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Graham
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Holden
Hooley
Houghton
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E.B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Lazio
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Ney
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Scarborough
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--1
Miller (CA)
{time} 1340
So Article II was not agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the adoption
of Article III.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 221,
nays 212, not voting 2, as follows:
[Roll No. 545]
YEAS--221
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Riggs
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shimkus
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--212
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
[[Page H12042]]
Fazio
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Houghton
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Shays
Sherman
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--2
Allen
Miller (CA)
{time} 1356
So Article III was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The question is on the adoption
of Article IV.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 148,
nays 285, not voting 2, as follows:
[Roll No. 546]
YEAS--148
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehner
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Everett
Ewing
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Gallegly
Gekas
Gibbons
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Graham
Gutknecht
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Herger
Hilleary
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kingston
Knollenberg
LaHood
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
Lucas
Manzullo
McCollum
McDade
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Myrick
Neumann
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Radanovich
Redmond
Riley
Rogan
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanford
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Tiahrt
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--285
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Bass
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Burr
Campbell
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fawell
Fazio
Filner
Foley
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Furse
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Gordon
Goss
Granger
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefley
Hefner
Hill
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Holden
Hooley
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E.B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Kolbe
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Riggs
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogers
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Souder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Walsh
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--2
Allen
Miller (CA)
{time} 1413
Mr. HEFLEY changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
So Article IV was not agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________