[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 155 (Saturday, December 19, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2363-E2364]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 EXPRESSING UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT FOR MEN AND WOMEN OF OUR ARMED FORCES 
   CURRENTLY CARRYING OUT MISSIONS IN AND AROUND PERSIAN GULF REGION

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                     HON. MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD

                           of south carolina

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, December 17, 1998

  Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today very reluctantly to voice 
opposition to H. Res. 612. If this resolution is truly about honoring 
our servicemen and women, I would vote differently. However, it is 
clear to me that voting for this resolution is tantamount to endorsing 
the President's capriciously-timed, to use a euphemism, invocation of 
the War Powers Act. That is something my conscience cannot allow.
  I have the most profound respect for our nation's military and it is 
for just this reason that I cannot support this resolution. I have come 
to this floor on innumerable occasions to provide for my unconditional 
support of those initiatives which prudently and honestly promote our 
armed forces. My support of H. Res. 322 in November of last year which 
urged military action to assure full Iraqi compliance with U.N. 
Security Council resolutions, for example, delineates my record on the 
use of military force in the Persian Gulf.
  It is the right thing to do at the wrong time. The timing of 
Wednesday's air strikes on Iraq raised too many red flags for me. I am 
left with too strong a perception that our men and women of the 
military are being put in harm's way for political reasons. I say this 
for several reasons:
  Red Flag #1--On several occasions over the past few years, we have 
walked to the brink of further military engagement with Iraq. In every 
instance, we have walked away from that brink. Yet on the eve of a 
historic vote, one that has not occurred for the last 130 years in the 
House, we choose to cross the line? For thirteen months, the President 
has watched and dithered, then, after 400 days of inaction, hours 
before the House vote, the President decides that this is the day to 
take America to war. The President declared Saddam Hussein a ``clear 
and present danger''. But, he has been a clear and present danger for 
400 days. Now all of a sudden, kowtowing is out and the danger is 
present.
  Red Flag #2--There seems to be discrepancy in the messages that we 
get out of the White House. Rowan Scarborough's article in The 
Washington Times pointed out that the White House notified the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff on Sunday that President Clinton would order air 
strikes this week. Now that's a full 48 hours before he saw the United 
Nations report declaring Iraq noncompliant. However, on

[[Page E2364]]

Wednesday night and in a number of press briefings since then, 
Administration officials insist that Mr. Clinton made the decision to 
strike based on the U.N.'s finding of noncompliance. My question is: 
which version is it? Did they decide it on Sunday or did they decide on 
Tuesday? This, at minimum, undermines their argument that they learned 
about it Tuesday and had to act Wednesday. Excluding the two interim 
reports and several infringements they knew about it for weeks and days 
and chose to strike Wednesday.
  Red Flag #3--Though I agree with what the President said on Wednesday 
night, the problem lies in the fact that it is old news. In some ways 
it's old news over the last year, and it has certainly been reinforced 
several times over the last several months. Scott Ritter, a former 
United States Marine Corps officer and Gulf War veteran, resigned his 
post on the U.N. Inspection Team in August. In September he testified 
before Congress on the reasoning behind that resignation. In both his 
testimony and his resignation, Mr. Ritter's reasoning and facts were 
the same that the President suggested was new information on Wednesday. 
In fact, since mid-November, the Iraqis have thrown a series of 
impediments in front of the U.N. inspection teams. As you might 
remember, the inspections team returned to Iraq on November 17th and 
within days their efforts were being thwarted on November 25th, 
November 26th, November 29th, December 4th and December 9th the Iraqis 
hampered our efforts. The government of Iraq thwarted UN Inspection 
Teams in a number of different efforts ranging from proposed schedule 
of work to inspections of a variety of different sites. The White House 
knew about each of these incidents and in fact, Richard Butler produced 
two interim reports. Suddenly, this week, the Administration has 
painted Saddam Hussein as a ``clear and present danger'' when his 
actions are no different now than they were last year or earlier this 
year.

  Red Flag #4--I am struck with the unconventional use of force. Any of 
the Pentagon folks that I've been around over the last several years 
have suggested that the American military typically places overwhelming 
force at the beginning of engagement to minimize the risks of 
casualties to Americans. That is certainly not the case in this present 
conflict with Iraq. In 1991, we had a full six carrier battle group in 
the Persian Gulf. Today, we have just one. Even on November 15, the 
date of our last staredown with Saddam, we had 2 carrier battle groups 
in place in the Persian Gulf. Now, we are told by Secretary Cohen, 
another carrier battle group is on the way and will be there by the 
weekend and that more aircraft are on the way. This raises another 
question: Is our new military strategy to amass a force slowly after 
the initial moment of engagement?
  On this point, not only have we amassed our forces slowly, we have 
little over 200 planes prepared for this engagement, while we had 2,700 
aircraft in the Persian Gulf of 1991. More significantly, we've 
essentially made no efforts to build support in the region for our 
undertaking. In the Persian Gulf War, we had 36 allies. In this 
engagement, only Great Britain has joined us in risking military 
personnel.
  Red Flag #5--This hasty engagement broke previous procedure used 
prior to the use of force. I spoke with Porter Goss, head of Select 
Intelligence Committee in the U.S. House of Representative, who learned 
of this incident the same way I did--on CNN. This is highly unusual 
policy. Typically in a military engagement or a buildup to a military 
engagement, he would have been forwarded and briefed.
  Red Flag #6--We are not sure of our strategy. Some have suggested 
that because of the onset of Ramadan, a month of peace in the Muslim 
world, we will be wrapping up our efforts in a matter of days. If so, 
this pin prick effort is sure not to do any great damage to Saddam. 
Using 2,700 aircraft in a 42 day engagement, he stayed in power. Does 
he have to do little more than hide for a few days if he knows an 
engagement is going to be curtailed by a religious holiday?
  Red Flag #7--With air strikes limited to just a few days, what is the 
outcome we hope to get? We were told that we want to thwart his ability 
to produce weapons of mass destruction and yet the very nature of 
biological or chemical weapons makes them very difficult to detect. If 
one was charged with hiding gallon-sized milk jugs across the state of 
Texas, and then someone else 30 days later was charged with bombing 
those gallon sized milk jugs, my bet is that at the end of the month 
there would be plenty of well-hidden milk jugs absolutely unharmed. 
Similarly, we can tear down buildings maybe 4, maybe 40, maybe 400, but 
if they are not buildings that weaken what the military calls his 
center of gravity, his access to strength, then it will do little to no 
good. If we're serious about this we ought to be aiming for his 
Republican Guard and other pieces of the formula that's keeping him in 
power. There are no clear efforts to weaken these components of his 
power.
  In summary, as you walk through these red flags, too many of them 
suggest that the timing of this engagement may have been politically 
motivated. I think we should make every effort to ensure that even the 
appearance of that politicization doesn't come back to rest on the 
shoulders of American troops. We can do better than that and the men 
and women of our armed services deserve it.

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