[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 151 (Wednesday, October 21, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12861-S12867]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S PLANS TO
USE A COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR TO PRODUCE TRITIUM FOR DEFENSE
PURPOSES
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss an issue of the
utmost importance to the safety and security of every American--the
timely restoration of tritium production to maintain our nuclear
deterrent. Some have attempted to focus this debate on cost. Mr.
President, the most significant issue in this debate is not cost--it is
the National Security of the United States.
For those who do not know, tritium is a radioactive gas and is an
essential component of modern nuclear weapons. It decays at a rate of
five-and-a-half percent per year, so in order to maintain our nuclear
deterrent the tritium must be continually replaced. We have not
produced tritium in this country since 1988, when the reactors at the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina were shut down. Since that time
the Department of Energy has examined countless options and
technologies, but has not yet selected a new source. The end result of
almost a decade of stalling is millions in wasted taxpayer dollars and
no progress in meeting the requirements of the Department of Defense.
If the Department of Energy is unable to begin the production of
tritium before 2007, the impact will be unilateral U.S. nuclear
disarmament. Mr. President, given the perilous international security
environment that exists, we cannot afford to allow this to happen. The
National Security interests of our Nation demand that we have a
reliable source of tritium.
For a variety of reasons, the Clinton Administration has mismanaged
this program by delaying implementation, issuing torrents of
misinformation, and failing to acknowledge the true liabilities of the
commercial light water reactor option. Make no mistake, through its
actions, and inaction, this Administration has put our nuclear
deterrent in jeopardy. This matter is of the utmost importance to the
Nation and I feel compelled to raise my concerns with my colleagues
here today.
The Department has narrowed its choices down to two options--the use
of a commercial light water reactor at the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) or the use of a defense linear accelerator at a dedicated defense
site. In my opinion, the only viable option, in terms of cost,
reliability, ability to meet Defense Department needs, and maintain a
high non-proliferation stance, is the Accelerator for the Production of
Tritium (APT).
Over the past three months, a variety of inaccurate and misleading
claims have been made regarding the APT option. To date, I have not
come to the floor to correct these inaccuracies because my efforts were
focused on completing work on the National Defense Authorization Act
Conference Report. The enactment of this bill is essential to the armed
forces of the United States. It provides the men and women who wear the
uniform of our Nation with a much needed pay raise, it includes many
vital readiness enhancements, and provides for the long-term
modernization of our military. However, now that the Conference Report
has been signed by the President and is law, I wish to take a few
moments to voice my concerns with the Department of Energy's tritium
production program.
Despite the flood of misinformation, one fact remains abundantly
clear and irrefutable--that we must have new tritium production source
very soon or leave our Nation without the nuclear deterrent that has
kept the peace so well for the past 50 years. Mr. President, let me
state this plainly. My fear is that the commercial light water reactor
option may never yield the tritium needed to maintain our defense
nuclear stockpile. The regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
make a commercial reactor vulnerable to third party intervenor lawsuits
and as a result, that litigation could easily block that facility from
coming on-line before it ever produces the first kilogram of tritium
for defense purposes. Only tritium produced in an accelerator, at a
dedicated defense site, will assure that we have the tritium we need
when we need it.
Mr. President, the cold war is over, but many dangers remain. In
fact, the world may be a much more uncertain place today than it was
during the height of the cold war. Despite President Clinton's rhetoric
on stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction, we continue to see new and troubling proliferation
trends. Recently, we learned that Iraq's nuclear program is much more
advanced than previously thought. Earlier this year we witnessed the
very public entry of two new nations--India and Pakistan--into the
[[Page S12862]]
nuclear weapons club. In the last few months we have witnessed other
nations boldly demonstrate their ability to deploy missile systems
capable of delivering nuclear or chemical/biological warheads onto U.S.
soil.
Mr. President, these are very troubling developments indeed. All of
these events demonstrate the need for the United States to maintain a
viable nuclear deterrent. They also require consistent leadership on
the part of the United States. Our policies on non-proliferation must
be, as Secretary of State Albright said, ``unambiguous, decisive and
clear.'' Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration's actions do not
match up with its rhetoric. One prime example is in the area of tritium
production.
By the end of this year, the Clinton Administration is required to
identify its preferred method to produce new tritium. One of the
options being considered is the use of a civilian nuclear reactor to
produce tritium for use in U.S. nuclear weapons. Such a decision would
end a five-decade-long U.S. policy which has been upheld by every
President since Harry Truman. That policy states very clearly and
unquestionably that the separation of civilian and military nuclear
energy programs is in the best interests of the United States. It
states that we should not try to turn civilian nuclear power plants
into nuclear bomb plants.
Some are claiming that because the Tennessee Valley Authority is a
government agency that producing nuclear weapons materials in their
reactors is consistent with U.S. policy. I can tell you that it is not.
The Atomic Energy Act, which governs this policy, was never intended to
condone the use of commercial-use facilities to produce nuclear weapons
materials. Additionally, the reactors that present the greatest threat
to U.S. national security interests are, in fact, owned by the
governments of Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan. The implications
of changing our policy concerning civilian-use nuclear power reactors,
despite whether they are owned by a government or a commercial entity,
are far-reaching and potentially disastrous.
Anyone who is concerned about National Security and nonproliferation
must acknowledge that designating a commercial-use reactor as the new
tritium production source would signal to the world that it is now
acceptable to use commercial-use reactors to produce materials for
nuclear weapons. Let me say that one more time--it would tell the rest
of the world that we believe there should be no distinction between
civilian and military nuclear facilities.
Sending that message would also signal the end of commercial nuclear
sales overseas. Now, every time a U.S. vendor attempted to sell a
reactor to a foreign government, we would have to assess the potential
of that plant becoming a nuclear weapons production site. The National
Security of the United States demands that we operate at a higher
standard--setting ourselves apart as a World Leader.
I am a proponent of nuclear power and I support finding alternative
missions for nuclear reactors, but using a commercial reactor to create
nuclear weapons materials would be devastating to the nuclear industry.
If we allow this ill-conceived Clinton Administration proposal to go
forward, we will no longer be able to preach from the bully pulpit on
non-proliferation. We will no longer be able to tell other nations that
it is unacceptable to forgo the use of their commercial reactors for
military purposes. We will have crossed that formerly well defined
boundary that every President knew should never be violated since the
dawn of the nuclear age. This President, however, seems to feel that it
is perfectly acceptable to say to the rest of the world, ``do as we
say, not as we do.'' Mr. President, we cannot allow this Administration
to take such an action without the intense scrutiny of Congress.
How could we go to the United Nations or the G-8 Summit and condemn
nations like Iraq, Libya, Iran, North Korea, or any other nation that
is so eager to establish a nuclear weapons program if we are not living
up to our own standards? The simple answer is that we will not be able
to do so, because civilian workers in a Tennessee Valley Authority
commercial nuclear power plant will be producing weapons grade
materials. Our moral authority will be lost in a cloud of hypocrisy.
Because this issue is essential to our National Security, I have
asked the Secretary of Energy to re-examine the non-proliferation
concerns associated with the commercial light water reactor option. I
have asked him to personally confer with the Secretaries of Defense and
State and with the President's National Security Advisor. I have also
written Secretary of State Albright asking her to personally evaluate
this issue and provide her assessments to Congress. I ask unanimous
consent that this letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of
my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. THURMOND. For the past two years, I have expressed my concern
with the Administration's plans to turn civilian reactors into
materials production plants. I have communicated that concern to the
Secretaries of Energy and Defense. As a part of last year's Defense
Authorization Act, we included a provision that required the
Administration to clearly state what proliferation risks were entailed
in the commercial light water reactor option. That report was not
delivered until well after both the House and Senate Defense
Authorization bills were completed. It stated, however, that there were
non-proliferation concerns with the use of commercial light water
reactor for tritium production, but indicated that such concerns were
``manageable.'' Mr. President, given the volatile proliferation risks
were are facing in South Asia, the Middle East, and other quarters of
the globe, do we want to settle for a ``manageable'' non-proliferation
policy? This finding is hardly a glowing endorsement of the reactor
option being considered by the Clinton Administration. I suggest that
today's international security environment requires U.S. non-
proliferation policies to be absolutely unquestionable.
To establish any other policy for the United States will not go
without consequences. The series of nuclear tests carried out by the
Governments of India and Pakistan is clear evidence that the Clinton
Administration's credibility with the rest of the world is being
questioned when it comes to non-proliferation matters. This Congress
has to step up to this issue and state that civilian and military
nuclear programs cannot and will not be mixed.
In addition to claiming that there is no problem with producing
tritium in a non-defense facility some proponents of the reactor option
have made many false statements concerning the costs of the different
options.
First, many point to a review of the United States nuclear weapons
program conducted by the Congressional Budget Office at the request of
the Clinton Administration as proof positive of the lower cost of the
reactor option. This initial review, conducted over a year and a half
ago, included an assessment of DOE's tritium program only as a cursory
footnote in the larger report. The CBO did not assess the current
modular accelerator design, which everyone agrees is dramatically
cheaper, nor did the CBO conduct any assessment of the proposed cost to
complete the reactor option.
Several months ago, the CBO attempted to justify its earlier report
by updating its findings. The result was an even more inaccurate
depiction of the two tritium production options. This report was
riddled with inaccuracies. In my response to this flawed report, I
identified a number of deficiencies in the CBO analysis. I ask
unanimous consent that my letter of September 2 be printed in the
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 2.)
Mr. THURMOND. Here are just a few of the glaring errors. CBO did not
consider the independent cost evaluations conducted on the accelerator
design and construction estimates. CBO did not even mention the
significantly lower cost modular accelerator design, which is the
design currently being considered by DOE. Their report made no mention
of the ancillary benefits of the accelerator that could help lower its
operating cost. There was no contingency cost assessed for the reactor-
based options, yet the estimated cost
[[Page S12863]]
for the accelerator was increased an astounding $500 million without
any justification. There was no consideration of TVA's sizable debt
service costs in the reactor option. The Tennessee Valley Authority
currently has an outstanding $4.6 billion debt on the incomplete
reactor that would have to be recovered over the life of the reactor
option. This would dramatically reduce the revenue stream projected for
the reactor option. Current law requires that TVA recuperate such costs
on a schedule and basis that advantages the ratepayers. In short, if
the gross revenues projected by TVA fall short or operating expenses
cost more, TVA would face a legal conflict--fulfill its contractual
obligation to pay DOE a share of gross revenues or fulfill its legal
obligation to recover the costs. CBO did not account for this
liability. There were no management and support or startup cost
included in the reactor option.
The CBO analysis also ignored many programmatic requirements found in
the Department's August 1998 Draft Environmental Impact Statement for
the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor (EIS).
The EIS states that ``at least two reactors would be needed'' and
further states that ``DOE could use as many as 3 reactors.'' The CBO
report should have included additional costs in the reactor option to
account for the requirement to operate at least two reactors if a
reactor-based option were selected. The entire reactor-based option
rests on whether or not it can meet our nuclear defense needs for
tritium. The CBO failed to address this fact. It should not have been
ignored and therefore undermines the credibility of the entire analysis
of the commercial reactor option.
The CBO report failed to include any contingency costs in the reactor
option to account for TVA's poor record in completing large reactor
projects. The average TVA cost overrun on reactor construction projects
is well over 150 percent. This fact was also ignored by the CBO
analysis.
These are but a few of the deficiencies in the CBO cost analysis.
Yet, this is the report that some are relying on when they tell you
that the reactor is the lowest cost option. Well, I don't buy that. I
also don't put much stock in the argument that says the reactor option
can't cost more, because it is a fixed price contract. Given the
Department's recent setbacks in fixed price contracting, it is
inconceivable that DOE or CBO would simply accept a ``fixed price''
offer at face value and not consider the issues I have just raised.
Many are aware of the fixed price contract that DOE signed at the Idaho
Pit 9 facility. Those who are aware of this contract know that DOE
spent several hundreds of millions of dollars on this cleanup project
and not one square inch of that facility has been cleaned up. Three
years later, that matter is still in dispute. We cannot afford to allow
such delays to threaten an activity as vital as tritium production.
I have asked the CBO to re-examine this matter and provide a thorough
and complete assessment to Congress by early 1999. In addition, I have
requested that the GAO provide a complete and independent review of the
competing tritium production options. I ask unanimous consent that my
letters of August 26 and September 4, 1998, be printed at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibits 3 and 4.)
Mr. THURMOND. I have just told you about the CBO review. Now let me
tell you about an analysis conducted by the Congressional Research
Service which was an exhaustive and complete examination of both the
reactor and accelerator options. This assessment was released June 18,
1998, by the defense staff at the Congressional Research Service. This
report found that the reactor and the accelerator options are
``competitive on a cost basis.'' The CRS report states that the cost of
the reactor option ranges from $2.5 billion to $3.7 billion, while the
cost of the accelerator ranges from $2.5 to $2.9 billion. In other
words the accelerator could cost less than the reactor.
The CRS assessment is the most in depth assessment conducted on the
costs of the two tritium options to date. It represents the most recent
information available and it says the costs of the reactor and the
accelerator are comparable, that there are no technical risks
associated with the accelerator, and that the accelerator actually has
a greater chance of returning revenue to the U.S. Treasury than the
reactor.
The revenue producing potential of the accelerator is one of the many
things that the CBO assessment failed to account for fully. Because the
accelerator will operate on a continuous basis, it is possible to use a
portion of the accelerator beam to produce much needed medical isotopes
which can be used to treat prostate, breast, and many other types of
cancers. The production of these isotopes will have no impact on the
facility's tritium production. This ``swords to plowshares'' approach
could, conservatively, raise $100 or $500 million per year in revenue
for the Federal government. This compares with the $25 to $100 million
annual revenue projected to be available from the reactor option, and
the accelerator produces no hazardous legacy materials like spent
nuclear fuel while at the same time maintaining our strong non-
proliferation policies.
It is critical that the facts about the options for producing tritium
are known. Choosing to produce this nuclear defense material in a
commercial light water reactor will sacrifice our position as the world
leader on this issue. The accelerator is the right option for our
Nation.
I have mentioned a few of the advantages of the accelerator, but the
real advantage is that it is the technology of the future. Unlike the
reactor option, the accelerator generates no nuclear waste, cannot
threaten surrounding communities, and requires no hazardous materials
to be shipped across the country.
In fact, the accelerator may actually help destroy the ever growing
volumes of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear wastes. The accelerator
could be used in a full-scale demonstration of a process known as the
accelerator for the transmutation of waste (ATW). This innovative new
process could reduce by 95 percent the volume of high level nuclear
waste currently planned to be buried in a repository in the Nevada
desert. The ATW would also generate electricity in the process.
As I previously stated, the accelerator could be used to create
medical isotopes. The U.S. has very little indigenous isotope
production capability. The accelerator will make it possible to create
revolutionary new medical treatements to treat a wide variety of
cancers. For example, one isotope that can be created in the
accelerator would allow victims of prostrate cancer to be fully treated
without any surgery. The radioactive medicines created in the
accelerator could be designed specifically to attack only cancerous
cells, obviating the need for surgery or radical, whole body radiation
treatments. New treatments could also be developed for breast and other
terminal cancers. In addition to medical isotopes, industrial isotopes
can be created which have important and beneficial applications for
both our National Defense and NASA.
There are many other uses for the accelerator that could enhance the
lives of citizens throughout the country. These ancillary benefits are
achieved without the generation of a single cask of spent nuclear fuel,
without any compromise in our stance against the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and without any added cost to the Department of Energy
or Department of Defense.
It is because of these concerns that I rise to express my opposition
to the use of a commercial facility to produce tritium for defense
purposes and wholeheartedly endorse the APT as the preferable choice to
protect the National Security interests of the United States.
Exhibit 1
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, September 23, 1998.
Hon. Madeleine K. Albright,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Albright: The recent nuclear arms race in
India and Pakistan has underscored the need to maintain the
most vigilant nuclear nonproliferation programs and policies.
You validated that sentiment on June 3, 1998, when you
stated, ``American leadership should be unambiguous,
decisive, and clear.'' In light of your strong stance against
nuclear proliferation, I would appreciate your personal
position on this important National Security issue.
A cornerstone of our nonproliferation policy for the past
50 years has been the strict
[[Page S12864]]
separation of the commercial and defense nuclear programs in
the United States. As the Atomic Energy Act, Section 57e
confirms, materials made for ``nuclear explosive purposes''
may not be produced in a commercial facility.
The policy of separating commercial and defense facilities
in the production of nuclear weapons materials is now being
jeopardized. As you may know, tritium gas is a radioactive
material used to boost the explosiveness of a nuclear weapon.
The United States produced tritium at a defense-only facility
for over 40 years. We have not produced any tritium since
1988, relying on a large stored quantity. Because tritium
decays over time, the United States will need a new source of
tritium by 2005, in order to meet the level allowed by the
START I treaty. Without this material the weapons of our
Nation's nuclear arsenal are useless.
During the FY 1993 budget process, Congress directed the
Department of Energy (DOE) to examine possibilities of a new
source for tritium. DOE has since adopted a dual-track
strategy to investigate a Commercial Light Water Reactor
option and an Accelerator for the Production of Tritium
option. The Commercial Light Water Reactor option being
considered is the completion of the Bellefonte reactor owned
by the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Accelerator would be
built at a DOE facility, the Savannah River Site--the site
which produced tritium until 1988.
In the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act, Congress
requested that the Department of Energy take the lead to
identify and assess any policy issues associated with the
various reactor options for the production of tritium for
national security purposes. In July 1998, in conjuction with
the Department of State Arms Control Office, the Department
of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the DOE
issued a report entitled ``Interagency Review of the
Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium
Production Technologies Under Consideration by the DOE.''
This report assessed the proliferation risks associated
with producing tritium in a commercial light water reactor
and concluded that these risks were ``manageable.''
Further, the report cites a number of examples in an
attempt to show that the separation of civilian and
military facilities has not been strictly upheld.
First, I believe that any new policy which could
inadvertently result in the proliferation of fissile
materials cannot be classified as ``manageable.'' Second, all
of the examples of dual-use facilities described in the
report involved deriving a civilian benefit from a defense
facility. Using facilities developed initially for military
purposes and then converting them to civilian use has found
ready acceptance in the past. I embrace the concept of peace
coming from war, but not the reverse.
Given today's international security environment, would you
please outline how the United States would defend a
``manageable'' proliferation risk?
Do you believe that abandoning the 50 year separation
between commercial and defense nuclear facilities in regards
to producing nuclear weapons material and implementing the
new policy of producing nuclear weapons materials in a
commercial light water reactor will undermine our moral
authority to press for the strongest possible
nonproliferation regime?
As you know, India claims to have detonated a boosted
nuclear weapon, which would require the use of tritium. This
claim raises the question, did India produce tritium in its
government owned, commercial reactors? Moreover, if India is
able to produce tritium in a commercial reactor, supposedly
under IAEA inspection, could they also have successfully
diverted fissile material from the same reactor? Do you
believe that changing the existing United States policy of
separating civilian and military nuclear facilities in
regards to producing nuclear weapons material will validate
the India weapons program and send a signal to other nations
that the United States is not opposed to the use of
government owned, commercial reactors for the production of
nuclear weapons materials?
The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars
to prevent the production and spread of weapons-usable
materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Do
you believe we would lose this important investment if we
initiate a new policy which could embolden threshold nuclear
states to embark on new fissile material production programs
in commercial nuclear plants?
I contend that relying on commercial nuclear reactors to
supply nuclear materials for our warheads will cross a
boundary that all U.S. Presidents from Harry Truman to George
Bush knew should never be violated. Furthermore, I suggest
that given the international security environment we live in
today, our Nation's nonproliferation policy should be
absolutely unquestionable. Our leadership in the area of
nuclear non-proliferation will be emulated around the World.
The consequences of our example will be solely ours to bear.
I have worked to preserve the security of our Nation
throughout my career as a United States Senator. As Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee one of my top
priorities has been the timely resumption of tritium
production at a facility that is both cost-effective and
politically defensible. I believe the National Security of
the United States and our leadership in the international
community depends upon maintaining the 50 year policy which
separates commercial and defense facilities for the
production of vital nuclear materials.
Due to the many sensitive foreign policy issues facing the
United States, such as the nuclear reactor project in North
Korea for peaceful purposes, I believe we need to be very
cautious in changing an established United States policy
which might send mixed signals to countries who depend upon
our consistent leadership. Again, I would appreciate your
personal position on this matter as well as your response to
the specific questions I have raised in this letter. I look
forward to hearing from you soon.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
Strom Thurmond.
Exhibit 2
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, September 2, 1998.
Ms. June E. O'Neill,
Director, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. O'Neill: I am writing to respond to your August
27, 1998 report on the Department of Energy's (DOE) tritium
production options. I have reviewed the report and find it to
be incomplete and based on preliminary, unverifiable
information. As such, I consider the conclusions of the
report to be inaccurate. I am disappointed that the
Congressional Budget Office appears to have fallen far short
of its customary high quality work.
First, let me say that the cost figures presented for the
Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) options have not been
validated by the Department of Energy's Chief Financial
Officer and are based solely on preliminary contractual
discussions between DOE and a potential vendor. Additionally,
while the Accelerator for the Production of Tritium (APT)
option has been subjected to numerous independent cost
evaluations (ICE) for all design and construction costs, none
of the reactor-based options have been subjected to an ICE
review. Your report failed to note the tentative nature of
the CLWR cost figures. In the case of the irradiation
services option, there is not even a valid proposal. The
potential vendor for that option, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), withdrew its proposal to provide such
services many months ago. Your report failed to note this
fact as well.
Second, your report left out many critical pieces of
information, including the following:
1. Your report states, ``All of the options assume that DOE
must make enough tritium to support a nuclear stockpile of
the size allowed by the START I treaty.'' However, the
analysis ignored many programmatic requirements found in the
Department's August 1998 Draft Environmental Impact Statement
for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water
Reactor (EIS). The EIS states that ``at least two reactors
would be needed'' and further states that ``DOE could use as
many as 3 reactors,'' to produce the tritium required to
support a START I stockpile. The CBO report should have
included additional costs in the CLWR option to account for
the requirement to operate at least two and possibly three
reactors in order to satisfy the START I requirements. Your
failure to do so produced an invalid comparison.
2. There was no mention of the significantly lower cost of
the modular APT design currently being considered by DOE, nor
was the option of pursuing a modular APT even mentioned. The
cost of constructing the modular APT is equivalent to the
cost of completing the Bellefonte reactor and would still
allow the United States the option to meet a START I
production level in the future should START II not be
ratified.
3. There was no mention of the fact that the TVA option
assumes full up-front, block funding over a one or two year
period. It would be virtually impossible for the DOE Office
of Defense Programs to make two $1 billion payments to TVA in
fiscal years 2000 and 2001, therefore the cost assumptions on
the Bellefonte option are invalid.
4. There was no mention of any ancillary benefits of the
APT. The APT would be highly effective in conducting research
in high energy physics, medical treatments, and waste
management. It could also directly support DOE research or
transmutation of high level nuclear waste. Not only could
these programs be a source of additional revenue for the APT,
but such activities would also serve the larger public good.
5. There was no mention of the independent cost evaluations
that have been conducted for the APT design and construction
costs.
6. There was no consideration of TVA's sizable debt service
costs in the total estimated cost of the Bellefonte option.
Your report correctly asserts that TVA's $4.6 billion
outstanding debt on the Bellefonte plant must be recovered
through gross revenues at the plant. Ultimately, TVA rate
payers will pay the full cost of this debt and the associated
interest costs. Current law requires that TVA recuperate such
costs on a schedule and basis that advantages the rate
payers. In short, if the gross revenues projected by TVA fall
short or operating expenses cost more, TVA would face a legal
conflict. It would either have to fulfill its contractual
obligation to pay DOE a share of gross revenues or fulfill
its legal obligation to recover the costs on behalf of the
rate payers.
7. There were no management and support or startup costs
included in the Bellefonte
[[Page S12865]]
cost projections despite TVA's poor facility start up record.
The report added $500 million to the APT cost to account for
such activities. It is clear that DOE will incur added
management, operations and startup costs for the CLWR. If
these costs are not included for the TVA option, they should
not be included for the APT project.
8. The CBO report assessed the APT option a 35% contingency
cost penalty to account for DOE's poor record in completing
large construction projects on time and within budget. The
report accurately states that the average overrun for large
DOE construction projects is 50%. However, the CBO report did
not include a similar contingency penalty in the TVA
Bellefonte cost estimate, despite the fact that according to
the 1995 Congressionally mandated TVA Integrated Resource
Plan, the average TVA cost overrun on reactor construction
projects ranged from 100 percent to 230 percent. In addition,
the cost estimates for the CLWR tritium extraction facility
and the target fabrication facilities should have included a
contingency cost penalty.
9. There was no mention of the regulatory and schedule
barriers which could slow or block licensing a new or
existing CLWR to produce tritium for defense purposes.
Licensing commercial nuclear facilities falls under the
jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
most recent attempts to build and license new CLWR's have
resulted in extraordinary challenges by anti-nuclear groups
and other intervenors. Numerous work stoppages have resulted
in massive time delays and cost overruns. The last TVA CLWR
to be licensed was the Watts-Barr I facility. That facility
received a construction permit on January 23, 1973 and
finally began operating on May 26, 1996--over 23 years later.
The Bellefonte Reactor would prove especially contentious due
to the obvious controversy of producing materials for nuclear
weapons in a commercial nuclear facility. I am greatly
concerned if the CLWR option is chosen, delays could occur
which would result in tritium being unavailable when the
current stored supply is exhausted and when a new source is
required.
The totality of these deficiencies in the CBO's cost
analysis of the tritium production options being considered
by DOE makes the report's findings highly speculative and not
entirely useful as a planning document. It does not appear as
though CBO held any discussions with the DOE, vendor, or
laboratory program leaders for the options under
consideration. Further, it does not appear that CBO
considered a wide variety of external reviews that have
already been conducted, such as the July 1998 Congressional
Research Service report which presented extensive
documentation for its findings. Given the Department's recent
setbacks in the Idaho Pit 9 fixed price contract, it is
inconceivable that DOE or CBO would simply accept a ``fixed
price'' offer at face value. A fixed price contract is only a
good deal if you believe the vendor can perform the work
described within the cost and schedule projections estimated.
The resumption of reliable tritium production that meets
the National security requirements of the United States is
one of the most difficult issues facing the Defense
Authorization process this year. Unfortunately, your analysis
of the costs of the various options is flawed and rather than
shedding light on the true potential costs, it has caused
further confusion. You are responsible for ensuring that the
parameters governing CBO assessments are not skewed to assure
a particular outcome and that the information used in
conducting such analyses is balanced and fully transparent. I
believe this report falls far short of the standard the CBO
has traditionally met, and given the inaccuracies and
deficiencies I have outlined in this letter, I am confident
that you will move forward with all due haste to review and
reconsider your incomplete findings. I look forward to
receiving your revised and accurate report as soon as
possible.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
Strom Thurmond.
Exhibit 3
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, August 26, 1998.
Mr. James Hinchman,
Acting Comptroller General, General Accounting Office,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Hinchman: Tritium gas is a critical element of
thermonuclear weapons and is used in every U.S. nuclear
warhead. Without this element the nuclear weapons of our
Nation's arsenal are useless. As the recent nuclear arms race
in India and Pakistan have underscored, and as rogue nations
such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq continue efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, it is absolutely
essential that the United States maintain a nuclear stockpile
at the highest level of readiness.
Tritium has not been produced by the United States since
1988. Since this gas decays over time, identifying a new
source is clearly vital to our National Security. I have
consistently maintained that it is one of our highest
responsibilities to identify and develop a viable and secure
tritium production source.
During the FY 1993 budget process, Congress directed DOE to
examine possibilities for a new source of tritium. DOE has
since adopted a dual-track strategy to investigate the
Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) option and the
Accelerator for the Production of Tritium (APT) option.
On August 25, 1998 while visiting the Savannah River Site,
Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson stated that, ``The
decision (on the tritium production source) will be made on
the bases of science and not politics.'' Unfortunately, it is
no secret that the Administration has been leaning heavily
toward the CLWR option, Recently, numerous allegations have
surfaced which suggest that senior level officials at DOE
have engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine the
validity of the APT option. These allegations are extremely
disturbing. The National Security of the United States
demands that the study of the two tritium production options
be approached with the utmost care and precision.
In light of the enormous implications of this decision and
the allegations which imply that the final selection may be
based on factors other than merit, I request you conduct an
in-depth analysis of the competing tritium production
options. This investigation should include, but not be
limited to, the following aspects:
Is the Dual Track Strategy Balanced?--Does the evidence
support the allegations that DOE principals and staff are
attempting to skew the outcome of the tritium selection
process to advance the CLWR option over the APT option? Has
Dr. William Bishop, the Director of the APT office, or any
other DOE employee been threatened, pressured, censured,
reprimanded, etc. because their actions might enhance the APT
option over the CLWR option? Have threats, pressures or
reprimands created an environment which would limit the
ability or desire of DOE employees to present balanced
information about the tritium source selection process? Have
key DOE employees, specifically Chief Financial Officer
Michael Telson and the Director of Nonproliferation and
National Security Rose E. Gottemoller, been excluded from
fully participating in the ``dual track'' process?
Proliferation Concerns--President Clinton recently
indicated in a July 24, 1998 press release that nuclear
nonproliferation is ``one of the nation's highest
priorities.'' A cornerstone of our nonproliferation policy
for the past fifty years has been the strict separation of
the commercial and defense nuclear programs of the United
States. DOE recently stated that the nonproliferation
involved in producing tritium in a CLWR are ``manageable.'' I
contend that relying on commercial nuclear reactors to supply
nuclear materials for our warheads will cross a boundary that
all U.S. Presidents from Harry Truman to George Bush knew
should never be violated. Furthermore, I suggest that given
the international security environment we live in today, our
Nation's nonproliferation policy should be absolutely
unquestionable.
Environmental and Safety Concerns--This issue has many
facets. Clearly one of the more contentious aspects of the
environmental issue is the storage and disposal of the legacy
materials and wastes from our defense programs and our
nuclear power generation industry. Your analysis should
examine the impact of the two options on this problem. I am
aware that the addition of one production reactor would not
greatly exacerbate the current situation. However, it is my
understanding that the APT option could actually serve to
reduce the storage of waste problem through the Accelerator
Transmutation of Waste process. DOE, which is responsible for
managing the significant nuclear waste we have produced,
appears to have ignored this ground breaking technology in
their considerations.
Regulatory and Schedule Concerns--Licensing a new CLWR
falls under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). The most recent attempts to build and
license new CLWR's have resulted in extraordinary challenges
by anti-nuclear groups and other intervenors. Numerous work
stoppages have resulted in massive time delays and cost
overruns. The last Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) CLWR to
be licensed was the Watts-Barr I facility. That facility
received a construction permit on January 23, 1973 and
finally began operating on May 26, 1996--over 23 years later.
The Bellefonte Reactor would prove especially contentious due
to the obvious controversy of producing materials for nuclear
weapons in a commercial nuclear facility. I am greatly
concerned if the CLWR option is chosen, delays could occur
which would result in tritium being unavailable when the
current stored supply is exhausted.
Cost--I have consistently maintained that the production of
tritium is not a cost issue, it is a National Security issue.
Therefore, ensuring the capacity to produce the material in a
manner which is consistent with our proven nonproliferation
policy is more important than cost considerations. However,
in this era of constrained spending it is essential that we
select a production technology which is fiscally responsible.
On July 21, 1998 then Acting Secretary of Energy, the
Honorable Elizabeth A. Moler, sent a letter to me in which
she cited DOE's ``official'' departmental cost estimates. In
my response, dated July 24, 1998, I outlined a number of
serious concerns I had regarding her ``official'' estimates.
I have included copies of both of these letters for your
review. As I indicated at that time, I was informed by DOE
Chief Financial Officer Michael Telson, that the numbers
cited as ``accurate'' and ``official'' for the CLWR option
were not validated by DOE, but were merely forwarded from the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as the Bellefonte proposal.
DOE embraced these
[[Page S12866]]
numbers and forwarded them to Congress as ``accurate'' and
``official'' despite the fact that TVA's record of
forecasting the cost to complete nuclear plants is woeful. As
part of the Congressionally mandated TVA Integrated Resource
Plan, TVA reviewed the accuracy of estimates it has produced
since 1987. The review found that TVA's rate of error for
predicting future nuclear plant costs ranged from 100% to
230%. Furthermore, DOE allows TVA to claim that revenue from
selling electricity from Bellefonte would repay the costs the
American taxpayers would incur for completing the reactor.
Given that the Bellefonte reactor has a current debt of $4.5
billion and that the cost of electricity is expected to
decline, the Congressional Research Service, in the recent
report ``the Department of Energy's Tritium Production
Program'', indicated that the likelihood that a completed
Bellefonte plant could sell electricity at a price high
enough to recover the taxpayer's investment is ``highly
uncertain.'' By contrast, when APT program officials
attempted to study the possibility of generating revenue
through the commercial leasing of the APT to produce medical
isotopes, they were instructed to ``cease any work''. Why
would DOE allow the ``official'' CLWR numbers to include
highly suspect revenue potential from power generation and
not consider revenue from a market which is projected to
exceed $5 billion by 2010? Your providing an accurate and
complete cost comparison of the two competing tritium
production options will finally clarify the costs and allow
the debate to be based on truly accurate information.
I firmly believe that this is one of the most important
issues facing the nation. The security of the United States
and the world depends on the maintenance of a credible U.S.
nuclear deterrent. Due to the extraordinary consequences of
the tritium production technology decision, I request you
begin this investigation as soon as possible. Thank you for
your attention and I look forward to hearing from you soon.
With kindest regards and best wishes,
Sincerely,
Strom Thurmond.
______
Exhibit 4
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, September 4, 1998.
Mr. James Hinchman,
Acting Comptroller General, General Accounting Office,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Hinchman: I am writing to follow up my August 26,
1998 letter to you regarding tritium production. There are
additional issues that I would like your report to address
concerning this important National Security program.
On August 27, 1998, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
issued a report analyzing the two options for producing
tritium, the Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) and the
Accelerator for the Production of Tritium (APT). After
reviewing the CBO report (Attachment I), I find it to be
incomplete and based on preliminary, unverifiable
information. As such, I consider the conclusions of the
report to be inaccurate. The fact that the Congressional
Budget Office appears to have fallen far short in their
analysis makes your investigation of the tritium program even
more important.
There are a number of problems with the CBO report which
you should be made aware of as you begin your own
investigation. First, the cost figures presented for the CLWR
option have not been validated by the Department of Energy's
Chief Financial Officer and are based solely on preliminary
contractual discussions between DOE and a potential vendor.
Additionally, while the APT option has been subjected to
numerous independent cost evaluations (ICE) for all design
and construction costs, none of the reactor-based options
have been subjected to an ICE review. The report failed to
note the tentative nature of the CLWR cost figures. In the
case of the irradiation services option, there is not even a
valid proposal. The potential vendor for that option, the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), withdrew its proposal to
provide such services many months ago. The report failed to
note this fact as well.
Second, the report left out many critical pieces of
information, including the following:
1. The report failed to make a parallel comparison of the
options needed to make the required amount to tritium for our
Nation's nuclear stockpile. CBO states, ``All of the options
assume that DOE must make enough tritium to support a nuclear
stockpile of the size allowed by the START I treaty.''
However, the analysis ignored the programmatic requirements
set forth in the Department's August 1998 Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for the Production of Tritium in a
Commercial Light Water Reactor. The EIS states that ``at
least two reactors would be needed'' and further states
that ``DOE could use as many as 3 reactors,'' to produce
the tritium required to support a START I stockpile.
Solely estimating the cost to complete the Bellefonte
reactor as the CLWR option to produce tritium is not in
line with current DOE programmatic assessments because it
will not satisfy the stockpile needs at a Start I level.
Your report should analyze the costs associated with
producing tritium in an APT compared to producing tritium
in the required number of reactors to achieve a START I
level. A more accurate comparison would be to analyze the
costs of producing tritium in an APT versus producing
tritium at Bellefonte at a START II level, an amount that
could be achieved by a single reactor during an 18-month
refueling cycle.
2. Again, due to the unparalleled comparison by CBO, a more
appropriate comparison of the two options would be to analyze
the costs of a Stat II level. However, in the CBO report
there was no mention of the significantly lower cost for the
modular APT design currently being considered by DOE, which
would meet START II requirements. Furthermore, the option of
pursuing a modular APT was never mentioned. The cost of
constructing the modular APT is equivalent to the cost of
completing the Bellefonte reactor and would still allow the
U.S. to move to a START I production level in the future if
START II is not ratified.
3. There was no mention of the fact that the TVA option
assumes full up front, block funding over a one or two year
period. It would be virtually impossible for the DOE Office
of Defense Programs to make two one-billion dollar payments
to TVA in fiscal years 2000 and 2001; therefore, the cost
assumptions are invalid.
4. There was no mention of any ancillary benefits of the
APT. The APT would be highly effective in conducting research
in high energy physics, medical treatments, and waste
management. It could also directly support DOE research on
transmutation of high level nuclear waste. Not only could
these programs be a source of additional revenue for the APT,
but such activities could serve the larger public good.
5. There was no mention of the independent cost evaluations
that have been conducted for the APT design and construction
costs.
6. There was no consideration of TVA's sizable debt service
costs in the total estimated cost of the Bellefonte option.
The report correctly asserts that TVA's $4.6 billion
outstanding debt on the Bellefonte plant must be recovered
through gross revenues at the plant. However, the debt
service on $4.6 billion over 40 years averages well over $200
million per year. Taking this into account, it would appear
that Bellefonte will operate at a significant loss every year
it produces tritium. Current law requires that TVA recuperate
such costs on a schedule and basis that advantages the
ratepayers, therefore TVA would face a legal conflict. It
must either fulfill its contractual obligation to pay DOE a
share of gross revenues or fulfill its legal obligation to
the ratepayers. In either scenario there will be significant
outstanding costs that will have to be assumed by either
TVA ratepayers or, in a more likely situation, the
American taxpayers.
7. There were no management and support or startup costs
included in the Bellefonte cost projections despite TVA's
poor facility start up record. The report added $500 million
to the APT cost to account for such activities. It is clear
that DOE will incur added management, operations and start up
costs for the CLWR. If these costs are not included for the
TVA option, they should not be included for the APT project.
8. The CBO report assessed the APT option a 35% contingency
cost penalty to account for DOE's poor record in completing
large construction projects on time and within budget. The
report accurately states that the average overrun for large
DOE construction projects is 50%. However, the CBO report did
not include a similar contingency penalty in the TVA
Bellefonte cost estimate, despite the fact that according to
the 1995 Congressionally mandated TVA Integrated Resource
Plan, the average TVA cost overrun on reactor construction
projects ranged from 100 percent to 230 percent. In addition,
the cost estimates for the CLWR tritium extraction facility
and the target fabrication facilities should have included a
contingency cost penalty.
9. There was no mention of the regulatory and schedule
barriers which could slow or block licensing a new or
existing CLWR to produce tritium for defense purposes.
Licencing commercial nuclear facilities falls under the
jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
most recent attempts to build and license new CLWR's have
resulted in extraordinary challenges by anti-nuclear groups
and other intervenors. Numerous work stoppages have resulted
in massive time delays and cost overruns. The last TVA CLWR
to be licenced was the Watts-Barr I facility. That facility
received a construction permit on January 23, 1973 and
finally began operating on May 26, 1996--over 23 years later.
The Bellefonte Reactor would prove especially contentious due
to the obvious controversy of producing materials for nuclear
weapons in a commercial nuclear facility. I am greatly
concerned if the CLWR option is chosen, our nation runs the
risk of subjecting the entire nuclear arsenal to lawsuits
from third-party intervenors. This delay would result in
tritium being unavailable when the current stored supply is
exhausted.
The totality of these deficiencies in the CBO's cost
analysis of the tritium production options being considered
by DOE makes the report's findings highly speculative and not
entirely useful as a planning document. It does not appear
that CBO considered a wide variety of external reviews that
have already been conducted, such as the July 1998
Congressional Research Service report which presented
extensive documentation for its findings. Given the
Department's recent setbacks in the Idaho Pit 9 fixed price
contract, it is inconceivable that DOE or CBO would simply
accept a ``fixed price''
[[Page S12867]]
offer at face value. A fixed price contract is only a good
deal if you believe the vendor can perform the work described
within the cost projections estimated.
Your investigation of the tritium program should
incorporate an analysis of the above issues as well as those
mentioned in my previous letter. While the CBO report could
have shed light on the pros and cons of each option to
produce tritium, it only clouded the matter further. The
General Accounting Office report should ensure a balanced
discussion of this issue that is so vital to the National
Security of our Nation.
With kindest regards and best wishes.
Sincerely,
Strom Thurmond.
____________________