[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 151 (Wednesday, October 21, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12861-S12867]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S PLANS TO 
  USE A COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR TO PRODUCE TRITIUM FOR DEFENSE 
                                PURPOSES

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss an issue of the 
utmost importance to the safety and security of every American--the 
timely restoration of tritium production to maintain our nuclear 
deterrent. Some have attempted to focus this debate on cost. Mr. 
President, the most significant issue in this debate is not cost--it is 
the National Security of the United States.
  For those who do not know, tritium is a radioactive gas and is an 
essential component of modern nuclear weapons. It decays at a rate of 
five-and-a-half percent per year, so in order to maintain our nuclear 
deterrent the tritium must be continually replaced. We have not 
produced tritium in this country since 1988, when the reactors at the 
Savannah River Site in South Carolina were shut down. Since that time 
the Department of Energy has examined countless options and 
technologies, but has not yet selected a new source. The end result of 
almost a decade of stalling is millions in wasted taxpayer dollars and 
no progress in meeting the requirements of the Department of Defense. 
If the Department of Energy is unable to begin the production of 
tritium before 2007, the impact will be unilateral U.S. nuclear 
disarmament. Mr. President, given the perilous international security 
environment that exists, we cannot afford to allow this to happen. The 
National Security interests of our Nation demand that we have a 
reliable source of tritium.
  For a variety of reasons, the Clinton Administration has mismanaged 
this program by delaying implementation, issuing torrents of 
misinformation, and failing to acknowledge the true liabilities of the 
commercial light water reactor option. Make no mistake, through its 
actions, and inaction, this Administration has put our nuclear 
deterrent in jeopardy. This matter is of the utmost importance to the 
Nation and I feel compelled to raise my concerns with my colleagues 
here today.
  The Department has narrowed its choices down to two options--the use 
of a commercial light water reactor at the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) or the use of a defense linear accelerator at a dedicated defense 
site. In my opinion, the only viable option, in terms of cost, 
reliability, ability to meet Defense Department needs, and maintain a 
high non-proliferation stance, is the Accelerator for the Production of 
Tritium (APT).
  Over the past three months, a variety of inaccurate and misleading 
claims have been made regarding the APT option. To date, I have not 
come to the floor to correct these inaccuracies because my efforts were 
focused on completing work on the National Defense Authorization Act 
Conference Report. The enactment of this bill is essential to the armed 
forces of the United States. It provides the men and women who wear the 
uniform of our Nation with a much needed pay raise, it includes many 
vital readiness enhancements, and provides for the long-term 
modernization of our military. However, now that the Conference Report 
has been signed by the President and is law, I wish to take a few 
moments to voice my concerns with the Department of Energy's tritium 
production program.
  Despite the flood of misinformation, one fact remains abundantly 
clear and irrefutable--that we must have new tritium production source 
very soon or leave our Nation without the nuclear deterrent that has 
kept the peace so well for the past 50 years. Mr. President, let me 
state this plainly. My fear is that the commercial light water reactor 
option may never yield the tritium needed to maintain our defense 
nuclear stockpile. The regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
make a commercial reactor vulnerable to third party intervenor lawsuits 
and as a result, that litigation could easily block that facility from 
coming on-line before it ever produces the first kilogram of tritium 
for defense purposes. Only tritium produced in an accelerator, at a 
dedicated defense site, will assure that we have the tritium we need 
when we need it.
  Mr. President, the cold war is over, but many dangers remain. In 
fact, the world may be a much more uncertain place today than it was 
during the height of the cold war. Despite President Clinton's rhetoric 
on stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction, we continue to see new and troubling proliferation 
trends. Recently, we learned that Iraq's nuclear program is much more 
advanced than previously thought. Earlier this year we witnessed the 
very public entry of two new nations--India and Pakistan--into the

[[Page S12862]]

nuclear weapons club. In the last few months we have witnessed other 
nations boldly demonstrate their ability to deploy missile systems 
capable of delivering nuclear or chemical/biological warheads onto U.S. 
soil.
  Mr. President, these are very troubling developments indeed. All of 
these events demonstrate the need for the United States to maintain a 
viable nuclear deterrent. They also require consistent leadership on 
the part of the United States. Our policies on non-proliferation must 
be, as Secretary of State Albright said, ``unambiguous, decisive and 
clear.'' Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration's actions do not 
match up with its rhetoric. One prime example is in the area of tritium 
production.
  By the end of this year, the Clinton Administration is required to 
identify its preferred method to produce new tritium. One of the 
options being considered is the use of a civilian nuclear reactor to 
produce tritium for use in U.S. nuclear weapons. Such a decision would 
end a five-decade-long U.S. policy which has been upheld by every 
President since Harry Truman. That policy states very clearly and 
unquestionably that the separation of civilian and military nuclear 
energy programs is in the best interests of the United States. It 
states that we should not try to turn civilian nuclear power plants 
into nuclear bomb plants.
  Some are claiming that because the Tennessee Valley Authority is a 
government agency that producing nuclear weapons materials in their 
reactors is consistent with U.S. policy. I can tell you that it is not. 
The Atomic Energy Act, which governs this policy, was never intended to 
condone the use of commercial-use facilities to produce nuclear weapons 
materials. Additionally, the reactors that present the greatest threat 
to U.S. national security interests are, in fact, owned by the 
governments of Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan. The implications 
of changing our policy concerning civilian-use nuclear power reactors, 
despite whether they are owned by a government or a commercial entity, 
are far-reaching and potentially disastrous.
  Anyone who is concerned about National Security and nonproliferation 
must acknowledge that designating a commercial-use reactor as the new 
tritium production source would signal to the world that it is now 
acceptable to use commercial-use reactors to produce materials for 
nuclear weapons. Let me say that one more time--it would tell the rest 
of the world that we believe there should be no distinction between 
civilian and military nuclear facilities.
  Sending that message would also signal the end of commercial nuclear 
sales overseas. Now, every time a U.S. vendor attempted to sell a 
reactor to a foreign government, we would have to assess the potential 
of that plant becoming a nuclear weapons production site. The National 
Security of the United States demands that we operate at a higher 
standard--setting ourselves apart as a World Leader.
  I am a proponent of nuclear power and I support finding alternative 
missions for nuclear reactors, but using a commercial reactor to create 
nuclear weapons materials would be devastating to the nuclear industry. 
If we allow this ill-conceived Clinton Administration proposal to go 
forward, we will no longer be able to preach from the bully pulpit on 
non-proliferation. We will no longer be able to tell other nations that 
it is unacceptable to forgo the use of their commercial reactors for 
military purposes. We will have crossed that formerly well defined 
boundary that every President knew should never be violated since the 
dawn of the nuclear age. This President, however, seems to feel that it 
is perfectly acceptable to say to the rest of the world, ``do as we 
say, not as we do.'' Mr. President, we cannot allow this Administration 
to take such an action without the intense scrutiny of Congress.

  How could we go to the United Nations or the G-8 Summit and condemn 
nations like Iraq, Libya, Iran, North Korea, or any other nation that 
is so eager to establish a nuclear weapons program if we are not living 
up to our own standards? The simple answer is that we will not be able 
to do so, because civilian workers in a Tennessee Valley Authority 
commercial nuclear power plant will be producing weapons grade 
materials. Our moral authority will be lost in a cloud of hypocrisy.
  Because this issue is essential to our National Security, I have 
asked the Secretary of Energy to re-examine the non-proliferation 
concerns associated with the commercial light water reactor option. I 
have asked him to personally confer with the Secretaries of Defense and 
State and with the President's National Security Advisor. I have also 
written Secretary of State Albright asking her to personally evaluate 
this issue and provide her assessments to Congress. I ask unanimous 
consent that this letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of 
my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. THURMOND. For the past two years, I have expressed my concern 
with the Administration's plans to turn civilian reactors into 
materials production plants. I have communicated that concern to the 
Secretaries of Energy and Defense. As a part of last year's Defense 
Authorization Act, we included a provision that required the 
Administration to clearly state what proliferation risks were entailed 
in the commercial light water reactor option. That report was not 
delivered until well after both the House and Senate Defense 
Authorization bills were completed. It stated, however, that there were 
non-proliferation concerns with the use of commercial light water 
reactor for tritium production, but indicated that such concerns were 
``manageable.'' Mr. President, given the volatile proliferation risks 
were are facing in South Asia, the Middle East, and other quarters of 
the globe, do we want to settle for a ``manageable'' non-proliferation 
policy? This finding is hardly a glowing endorsement of the reactor 
option being considered by the Clinton Administration. I suggest that 
today's international security environment requires U.S. non-
proliferation policies to be absolutely unquestionable.
  To establish any other policy for the United States will not go 
without consequences. The series of nuclear tests carried out by the 
Governments of India and Pakistan is clear evidence that the Clinton 
Administration's credibility with the rest of the world is being 
questioned when it comes to non-proliferation matters. This Congress 
has to step up to this issue and state that civilian and military 
nuclear programs cannot and will not be mixed.
  In addition to claiming that there is no problem with producing 
tritium in a non-defense facility some proponents of the reactor option 
have made many false statements concerning the costs of the different 
options.
  First, many point to a review of the United States nuclear weapons 
program conducted by the Congressional Budget Office at the request of 
the Clinton Administration as proof positive of the lower cost of the 
reactor option. This initial review, conducted over a year and a half 
ago, included an assessment of DOE's tritium program only as a cursory 
footnote in the larger report. The CBO did not assess the current 
modular accelerator design, which everyone agrees is dramatically 
cheaper, nor did the CBO conduct any assessment of the proposed cost to 
complete the reactor option.
  Several months ago, the CBO attempted to justify its earlier report 
by updating its findings. The result was an even more inaccurate 
depiction of the two tritium production options. This report was 
riddled with inaccuracies. In my response to this flawed report, I 
identified a number of deficiencies in the CBO analysis. I ask 
unanimous consent that my letter of September 2 be printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 2.)
  Mr. THURMOND. Here are just a few of the glaring errors. CBO did not 
consider the independent cost evaluations conducted on the accelerator 
design and construction estimates. CBO did not even mention the 
significantly lower cost modular accelerator design, which is the 
design currently being considered by DOE. Their report made no mention 
of the ancillary benefits of the accelerator that could help lower its 
operating cost. There was no contingency cost assessed for the reactor-
based options, yet the estimated cost

[[Page S12863]]

for the accelerator was increased an astounding $500 million without 
any justification. There was no consideration of TVA's sizable debt 
service costs in the reactor option. The Tennessee Valley Authority 
currently has an outstanding $4.6 billion debt on the incomplete 
reactor that would have to be recovered over the life of the reactor 
option. This would dramatically reduce the revenue stream projected for 
the reactor option. Current law requires that TVA recuperate such costs 
on a schedule and basis that advantages the ratepayers. In short, if 
the gross revenues projected by TVA fall short or operating expenses 
cost more, TVA would face a legal conflict--fulfill its contractual 
obligation to pay DOE a share of gross revenues or fulfill its legal 
obligation to recover the costs. CBO did not account for this 
liability. There were no management and support or startup cost 
included in the reactor option.
  The CBO analysis also ignored many programmatic requirements found in 
the Department's August 1998 Draft Environmental Impact Statement for 
the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor (EIS). 
The EIS states that ``at least two reactors would be needed'' and 
further states that ``DOE could use as many as 3 reactors.'' The CBO 
report should have included additional costs in the reactor option to 
account for the requirement to operate at least two reactors if a 
reactor-based option were selected. The entire reactor-based option 
rests on whether or not it can meet our nuclear defense needs for 
tritium. The CBO failed to address this fact. It should not have been 
ignored and therefore undermines the credibility of the entire analysis 
of the commercial reactor option.
  The CBO report failed to include any contingency costs in the reactor 
option to account for TVA's poor record in completing large reactor 
projects. The average TVA cost overrun on reactor construction projects 
is well over 150 percent. This fact was also ignored by the CBO 
analysis.
  These are but a few of the deficiencies in the CBO cost analysis. 
Yet, this is the report that some are relying on when they tell you 
that the reactor is the lowest cost option. Well, I don't buy that. I 
also don't put much stock in the argument that says the reactor option 
can't cost more, because it is a fixed price contract. Given the 
Department's recent setbacks in fixed price contracting, it is 
inconceivable that DOE or CBO would simply accept a ``fixed price'' 
offer at face value and not consider the issues I have just raised. 
Many are aware of the fixed price contract that DOE signed at the Idaho 
Pit 9 facility. Those who are aware of this contract know that DOE 
spent several hundreds of millions of dollars on this cleanup project 
and not one square inch of that facility has been cleaned up. Three 
years later, that matter is still in dispute. We cannot afford to allow 
such delays to threaten an activity as vital as tritium production.
  I have asked the CBO to re-examine this matter and provide a thorough 
and complete assessment to Congress by early 1999. In addition, I have 
requested that the GAO provide a complete and independent review of the 
competing tritium production options. I ask unanimous consent that my 
letters of August 26 and September 4, 1998, be printed at the 
conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibits 3 and 4.)
  Mr. THURMOND. I have just told you about the CBO review. Now let me 
tell you about an analysis conducted by the Congressional Research 
Service which was an exhaustive and complete examination of both the 
reactor and accelerator options. This assessment was released June 18, 
1998, by the defense staff at the Congressional Research Service. This 
report found that the reactor and the accelerator options are 
``competitive on a cost basis.'' The CRS report states that the cost of 
the reactor option ranges from $2.5 billion to $3.7 billion, while the 
cost of the accelerator ranges from $2.5 to $2.9 billion. In other 
words the accelerator could cost less than the reactor.

  The CRS assessment is the most in depth assessment conducted on the 
costs of the two tritium options to date. It represents the most recent 
information available and it says the costs of the reactor and the 
accelerator are comparable, that there are no technical risks 
associated with the accelerator, and that the accelerator actually has 
a greater chance of returning revenue to the U.S. Treasury than the 
reactor.
  The revenue producing potential of the accelerator is one of the many 
things that the CBO assessment failed to account for fully. Because the 
accelerator will operate on a continuous basis, it is possible to use a 
portion of the accelerator beam to produce much needed medical isotopes 
which can be used to treat prostate, breast, and many other types of 
cancers. The production of these isotopes will have no impact on the 
facility's tritium production. This ``swords to plowshares'' approach 
could, conservatively, raise $100 or $500 million per year in revenue 
for the Federal government. This compares with the $25 to $100 million 
annual revenue projected to be available from the reactor option, and 
the accelerator produces no hazardous legacy materials like spent 
nuclear fuel while at the same time maintaining our strong non-
proliferation policies.
  It is critical that the facts about the options for producing tritium 
are known. Choosing to produce this nuclear defense material in a 
commercial light water reactor will sacrifice our position as the world 
leader on this issue. The accelerator is the right option for our 
Nation.
  I have mentioned a few of the advantages of the accelerator, but the 
real advantage is that it is the technology of the future. Unlike the 
reactor option, the accelerator generates no nuclear waste, cannot 
threaten surrounding communities, and requires no hazardous materials 
to be shipped across the country.
  In fact, the accelerator may actually help destroy the ever growing 
volumes of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear wastes. The accelerator 
could be used in a full-scale demonstration of a process known as the 
accelerator for the transmutation of waste (ATW). This innovative new 
process could reduce by 95 percent the volume of high level nuclear 
waste currently planned to be buried in a repository in the Nevada 
desert. The ATW would also generate electricity in the process.
  As I previously stated, the accelerator could be used to create 
medical isotopes. The U.S. has very little indigenous isotope 
production capability. The accelerator will make it possible to create 
revolutionary new medical treatements to treat a wide variety of 
cancers. For example, one isotope that can be created in the 
accelerator would allow victims of prostrate cancer to be fully treated 
without any surgery. The radioactive medicines created in the 
accelerator could be designed specifically to attack only cancerous 
cells, obviating the need for surgery or radical, whole body radiation 
treatments. New treatments could also be developed for breast and other 
terminal cancers. In addition to medical isotopes, industrial isotopes 
can be created which have important and beneficial applications for 
both our National Defense and NASA.
  There are many other uses for the accelerator that could enhance the 
lives of citizens throughout the country. These ancillary benefits are 
achieved without the generation of a single cask of spent nuclear fuel, 
without any compromise in our stance against the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and without any added cost to the Department of Energy 
or Department of Defense.
  It is because of these concerns that I rise to express my opposition 
to the use of a commercial facility to produce tritium for defense 
purposes and wholeheartedly endorse the APT as the preferable choice to 
protect the National Security interests of the United States.

                               Exhibit 1


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                               Washington, DC, September 23, 1998.
     Hon. Madeleine K. Albright,
     Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Albright: The recent nuclear arms race in 
     India and Pakistan has underscored the need to maintain the 
     most vigilant nuclear nonproliferation programs and policies. 
     You validated that sentiment on June 3, 1998, when you 
     stated, ``American leadership should be unambiguous, 
     decisive, and clear.'' In light of your strong stance against 
     nuclear proliferation, I would appreciate your personal 
     position on this important National Security issue.
       A cornerstone of our nonproliferation policy for the past 
     50 years has been the strict

[[Page S12864]]

     separation of the commercial and defense nuclear programs in 
     the United States. As the Atomic Energy Act, Section 57e 
     confirms, materials made for ``nuclear explosive purposes'' 
     may not be produced in a commercial facility.
       The policy of separating commercial and defense facilities 
     in the production of nuclear weapons materials is now being 
     jeopardized. As you may know, tritium gas is a radioactive 
     material used to boost the explosiveness of a nuclear weapon. 
     The United States produced tritium at a defense-only facility 
     for over 40 years. We have not produced any tritium since 
     1988, relying on a large stored quantity. Because tritium 
     decays over time, the United States will need a new source of 
     tritium by 2005, in order to meet the level allowed by the 
     START I treaty. Without this material the weapons of our 
     Nation's nuclear arsenal are useless.
       During the FY 1993 budget process, Congress directed the 
     Department of Energy (DOE) to examine possibilities of a new 
     source for tritium. DOE has since adopted a dual-track 
     strategy to investigate a Commercial Light Water Reactor 
     option and an Accelerator for the Production of Tritium 
     option. The Commercial Light Water Reactor option being 
     considered is the completion of the Bellefonte reactor owned 
     by the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Accelerator would be 
     built at a DOE facility, the Savannah River Site--the site 
     which produced tritium until 1988.
       In the FY 1998 Defense Authorization Act, Congress 
     requested that the Department of Energy take the lead to 
     identify and assess any policy issues associated with the 
     various reactor options for the production of tritium for 
     national security purposes. In July 1998, in conjuction with 
     the Department of State Arms Control Office, the Department 
     of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the DOE 
     issued a report entitled ``Interagency Review of the 
     Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium 
     Production Technologies Under Consideration by the DOE.'' 
     This report assessed the proliferation risks associated 
     with producing tritium in a commercial light water reactor 
     and concluded that these risks were ``manageable.'' 
     Further, the report cites a number of examples in an 
     attempt to show that the separation of civilian and 
     military facilities has not been strictly upheld.
       First, I believe that any new policy which could 
     inadvertently result in the proliferation of fissile 
     materials cannot be classified as ``manageable.'' Second, all 
     of the examples of dual-use facilities described in the 
     report involved deriving a civilian benefit from a defense 
     facility. Using facilities developed initially for military 
     purposes and then converting them to civilian use has found 
     ready acceptance in the past. I embrace the concept of peace 
     coming from war, but not the reverse.
       Given today's international security environment, would you 
     please outline how the United States would defend a 
     ``manageable'' proliferation risk?
       Do you believe that abandoning the 50 year separation 
     between commercial and defense nuclear facilities in regards 
     to producing nuclear weapons material and implementing the 
     new policy of producing nuclear weapons materials in a 
     commercial light water reactor will undermine our moral 
     authority to press for the strongest possible 
     nonproliferation regime?
       As you know, India claims to have detonated a boosted 
     nuclear weapon, which would require the use of tritium. This 
     claim raises the question, did India produce tritium in its 
     government owned, commercial reactors? Moreover, if India is 
     able to produce tritium in a commercial reactor, supposedly 
     under IAEA inspection, could they also have successfully 
     diverted fissile material from the same reactor? Do you 
     believe that changing the existing United States policy of 
     separating civilian and military nuclear facilities in 
     regards to producing nuclear weapons material will validate 
     the India weapons program and send a signal to other nations 
     that the United States is not opposed to the use of 
     government owned, commercial reactors for the production of 
     nuclear weapons materials?
       The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars 
     to prevent the production and spread of weapons-usable 
     materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Do 
     you believe we would lose this important investment if we 
     initiate a new policy which could embolden threshold nuclear 
     states to embark on new fissile material production programs 
     in commercial nuclear plants?
       I contend that relying on commercial nuclear reactors to 
     supply nuclear materials for our warheads will cross a 
     boundary that all U.S. Presidents from Harry Truman to George 
     Bush knew should never be violated. Furthermore, I suggest 
     that given the international security environment we live in 
     today, our Nation's nonproliferation policy should be 
     absolutely unquestionable. Our leadership in the area of 
     nuclear non-proliferation will be emulated around the World. 
     The consequences of our example will be solely ours to bear.
       I have worked to preserve the security of our Nation 
     throughout my career as a United States Senator. As Chairman 
     of the Senate Armed Services Committee one of my top 
     priorities has been the timely resumption of tritium 
     production at a facility that is both cost-effective and 
     politically defensible. I believe the National Security of 
     the United States and our leadership in the international 
     community depends upon maintaining the 50 year policy which 
     separates commercial and defense facilities for the 
     production of vital nuclear materials.
       Due to the many sensitive foreign policy issues facing the 
     United States, such as the nuclear reactor project in North 
     Korea for peaceful purposes, I believe we need to be very 
     cautious in changing an established United States policy 
     which might send mixed signals to countries who depend upon 
     our consistent leadership. Again, I would appreciate your 
     personal position on this matter as well as your response to 
     the specific questions I have raised in this letter. I look 
     forward to hearing from you soon.
       With kindest regards and best wishes,
           Sincerely,
                                                   Strom Thurmond.

                               Exhibit 2


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, September 2, 1998.
     Ms. June E. O'Neill,
     Director, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
       Dear Ms. O'Neill: I am writing to respond to your August 
     27, 1998 report on the Department of Energy's (DOE) tritium 
     production options. I have reviewed the report and find it to 
     be incomplete and based on preliminary, unverifiable 
     information. As such, I consider the conclusions of the 
     report to be inaccurate. I am disappointed that the 
     Congressional Budget Office appears to have fallen far short 
     of its customary high quality work.
       First, let me say that the cost figures presented for the 
     Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) options have not been 
     validated by the Department of Energy's Chief Financial 
     Officer and are based solely on preliminary contractual 
     discussions between DOE and a potential vendor. Additionally, 
     while the Accelerator for the Production of Tritium (APT) 
     option has been subjected to numerous independent cost 
     evaluations (ICE) for all design and construction costs, none 
     of the reactor-based options have been subjected to an ICE 
     review. Your report failed to note the tentative nature of 
     the CLWR cost figures. In the case of the irradiation 
     services option, there is not even a valid proposal. The 
     potential vendor for that option, the Tennessee Valley 
     Authority (TVA), withdrew its proposal to provide such 
     services many months ago. Your report failed to note this 
     fact as well.
       Second, your report left out many critical pieces of 
     information, including the following:
       1. Your report states, ``All of the options assume that DOE 
     must make enough tritium to support a nuclear stockpile of 
     the size allowed by the START I treaty.'' However, the 
     analysis ignored many programmatic requirements found in the 
     Department's August 1998 Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
     for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water 
     Reactor (EIS). The EIS states that ``at least two reactors 
     would be needed'' and further states that ``DOE could use as 
     many as 3 reactors,'' to produce the tritium required to 
     support a START I stockpile. The CBO report should have 
     included additional costs in the CLWR option to account for 
     the requirement to operate at least two and possibly three 
     reactors in order to satisfy the START I requirements. Your 
     failure to do so produced an invalid comparison.
       2. There was no mention of the significantly lower cost of 
     the modular APT design currently being considered by DOE, nor 
     was the option of pursuing a modular APT even mentioned. The 
     cost of constructing the modular APT is equivalent to the 
     cost of completing the Bellefonte reactor and would still 
     allow the United States the option to meet a START I 
     production level in the future should START II not be 
     ratified.
       3. There was no mention of the fact that the TVA option 
     assumes full up-front, block funding over a one or two year 
     period. It would be virtually impossible for the DOE Office 
     of Defense Programs to make two $1 billion payments to TVA in 
     fiscal years 2000 and 2001, therefore the cost assumptions on 
     the Bellefonte option are invalid.
       4. There was no mention of any ancillary benefits of the 
     APT. The APT would be highly effective in conducting research 
     in high energy physics, medical treatments, and waste 
     management. It could also directly support DOE research or 
     transmutation of high level nuclear waste. Not only could 
     these programs be a source of additional revenue for the APT, 
     but such activities would also serve the larger public good.
       5. There was no mention of the independent cost evaluations 
     that have been conducted for the APT design and construction 
     costs.
       6. There was no consideration of TVA's sizable debt service 
     costs in the total estimated cost of the Bellefonte option. 
     Your report correctly asserts that TVA's $4.6 billion 
     outstanding debt on the Bellefonte plant must be recovered 
     through gross revenues at the plant. Ultimately, TVA rate 
     payers will pay the full cost of this debt and the associated 
     interest costs. Current law requires that TVA recuperate such 
     costs on a schedule and basis that advantages the rate 
     payers. In short, if the gross revenues projected by TVA fall 
     short or operating expenses cost more, TVA would face a legal 
     conflict. It would either have to fulfill its contractual 
     obligation to pay DOE a share of gross revenues or fulfill 
     its legal obligation to recover the costs on behalf of the 
     rate payers.
       7. There were no management and support or startup costs 
     included in the Bellefonte

[[Page S12865]]

     cost projections despite TVA's poor facility start up record. 
     The report added $500 million to the APT cost to account for 
     such activities. It is clear that DOE will incur added 
     management, operations and startup costs for the CLWR. If 
     these costs are not included for the TVA option, they should 
     not be included for the APT project.
       8. The CBO report assessed the APT option a 35% contingency 
     cost penalty to account for DOE's poor record in completing 
     large construction projects on time and within budget. The 
     report accurately states that the average overrun for large 
     DOE construction projects is 50%. However, the CBO report did 
     not include a similar contingency penalty in the TVA 
     Bellefonte cost estimate, despite the fact that according to 
     the 1995 Congressionally mandated TVA Integrated Resource 
     Plan, the average TVA cost overrun on reactor construction 
     projects ranged from 100 percent to 230 percent. In addition, 
     the cost estimates for the CLWR tritium extraction facility 
     and the target fabrication facilities should have included a 
     contingency cost penalty.
       9. There was no mention of the regulatory and schedule 
     barriers which could slow or block licensing a new or 
     existing CLWR to produce tritium for defense purposes. 
     Licensing commercial nuclear facilities falls under the 
     jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The 
     most recent attempts to build and license new CLWR's have 
     resulted in extraordinary challenges by anti-nuclear groups 
     and other intervenors. Numerous work stoppages have resulted 
     in massive time delays and cost overruns. The last TVA CLWR 
     to be licensed was the Watts-Barr I facility. That facility 
     received a construction permit on January 23, 1973 and 
     finally began operating on May 26, 1996--over 23 years later. 
     The Bellefonte Reactor would prove especially contentious due 
     to the obvious controversy of producing materials for nuclear 
     weapons in a commercial nuclear facility. I am greatly 
     concerned if the CLWR option is chosen, delays could occur 
     which would result in tritium being unavailable when the 
     current stored supply is exhausted and when a new source is 
     required.
       The totality of these deficiencies in the CBO's cost 
     analysis of the tritium production options being considered 
     by DOE makes the report's findings highly speculative and not 
     entirely useful as a planning document. It does not appear as 
     though CBO held any discussions with the DOE, vendor, or 
     laboratory program leaders for the options under 
     consideration. Further, it does not appear that CBO 
     considered a wide variety of external reviews that have 
     already been conducted, such as the July 1998 Congressional 
     Research Service report which presented extensive 
     documentation for its findings. Given the Department's recent 
     setbacks in the Idaho Pit 9 fixed price contract, it is 
     inconceivable that DOE or CBO would simply accept a ``fixed 
     price'' offer at face value. A fixed price contract is only a 
     good deal if you believe the vendor can perform the work 
     described within the cost and schedule projections estimated.
       The resumption of reliable tritium production that meets 
     the National security requirements of the United States is 
     one of the most difficult issues facing the Defense 
     Authorization process this year. Unfortunately, your analysis 
     of the costs of the various options is flawed and rather than 
     shedding light on the true potential costs, it has caused 
     further confusion. You are responsible for ensuring that the 
     parameters governing CBO assessments are not skewed to assure 
     a particular outcome and that the information used in 
     conducting such analyses is balanced and fully transparent. I 
     believe this report falls far short of the standard the CBO 
     has traditionally met, and given the inaccuracies and 
     deficiencies I have outlined in this letter, I am confident 
     that you will move forward with all due haste to review and 
     reconsider your incomplete findings. I look forward to 
     receiving your revised and accurate report as soon as 
     possible.
       With kindest regards and best wishes,
           Sincerely,
                                                   Strom Thurmond.

                               Exhibit 3


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                  Washington, DC, August 26, 1998.
     Mr. James Hinchman,
     Acting Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Hinchman: Tritium gas is a critical element of 
     thermonuclear weapons and is used in every U.S. nuclear 
     warhead. Without this element the nuclear weapons of our 
     Nation's arsenal are useless. As the recent nuclear arms race 
     in India and Pakistan have underscored, and as rogue nations 
     such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq continue efforts to 
     acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, it is absolutely 
     essential that the United States maintain a nuclear stockpile 
     at the highest level of readiness.
       Tritium has not been produced by the United States since 
     1988. Since this gas decays over time, identifying a new 
     source is clearly vital to our National Security. I have 
     consistently maintained that it is one of our highest 
     responsibilities to identify and develop a viable and secure 
     tritium production source.
       During the FY 1993 budget process, Congress directed DOE to 
     examine possibilities for a new source of tritium. DOE has 
     since adopted a dual-track strategy to investigate the 
     Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) option and the 
     Accelerator for the Production of Tritium (APT) option.
       On August 25, 1998 while visiting the Savannah River Site, 
     Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson stated that, ``The 
     decision (on the tritium production source) will be made on 
     the bases of science and not politics.'' Unfortunately, it is 
     no secret that the Administration has been leaning heavily 
     toward the CLWR option, Recently, numerous allegations have 
     surfaced which suggest that senior level officials at DOE 
     have engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine the 
     validity of the APT option. These allegations are extremely 
     disturbing. The National Security of the United States 
     demands that the study of the two tritium production options 
     be approached with the utmost care and precision.
       In light of the enormous implications of this decision and 
     the allegations which imply that the final selection may be 
     based on factors other than merit, I request you conduct an 
     in-depth analysis of the competing tritium production 
     options. This investigation should include, but not be 
     limited to, the following aspects:
       Is the Dual Track Strategy Balanced?--Does the evidence 
     support the allegations that DOE principals and staff are 
     attempting to skew the outcome of the tritium selection 
     process to advance the CLWR option over the APT option? Has 
     Dr. William Bishop, the Director of the APT office, or any 
     other DOE employee been threatened, pressured, censured, 
     reprimanded, etc. because their actions might enhance the APT 
     option over the CLWR option? Have threats, pressures or 
     reprimands created an environment which would limit the 
     ability or desire of DOE employees to present balanced 
     information about the tritium source selection process? Have 
     key DOE employees, specifically Chief Financial Officer 
     Michael Telson and the Director of Nonproliferation and 
     National Security Rose E. Gottemoller, been excluded from 
     fully participating in the ``dual track'' process?
       Proliferation Concerns--President Clinton recently 
     indicated in a July 24, 1998 press release that nuclear 
     nonproliferation is ``one of the nation's highest 
     priorities.'' A cornerstone of our nonproliferation policy 
     for the past fifty years has been the strict separation of 
     the commercial and defense nuclear programs of the United 
     States. DOE recently stated that the nonproliferation 
     involved in producing tritium in a CLWR are ``manageable.'' I 
     contend that relying on commercial nuclear reactors to supply 
     nuclear materials for our warheads will cross a boundary that 
     all U.S. Presidents from Harry Truman to George Bush knew 
     should never be violated. Furthermore, I suggest that given 
     the international security environment we live in today, our 
     Nation's nonproliferation policy should be absolutely 
     unquestionable.
       Environmental and Safety Concerns--This issue has many 
     facets. Clearly one of the more contentious aspects of the 
     environmental issue is the storage and disposal of the legacy 
     materials and wastes from our defense programs and our 
     nuclear power generation industry. Your analysis should 
     examine the impact of the two options on this problem. I am 
     aware that the addition of one production reactor would not 
     greatly exacerbate the current situation. However, it is my 
     understanding that the APT option could actually serve to 
     reduce the storage of waste problem through the Accelerator 
     Transmutation of Waste process. DOE, which is responsible for 
     managing the significant nuclear waste we have produced, 
     appears to have ignored this ground breaking technology in 
     their considerations.
       Regulatory and Schedule Concerns--Licensing a new CLWR 
     falls under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission (NRC). The most recent attempts to build and 
     license new CLWR's have resulted in extraordinary challenges 
     by anti-nuclear groups and other intervenors. Numerous work 
     stoppages have resulted in massive time delays and cost 
     overruns. The last Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) CLWR to 
     be licensed was the Watts-Barr I facility. That facility 
     received a construction permit on January 23, 1973 and 
     finally began operating on May 26, 1996--over 23 years later. 
     The Bellefonte Reactor would prove especially contentious due 
     to the obvious controversy of producing materials for nuclear 
     weapons in a commercial nuclear facility. I am greatly 
     concerned if the CLWR option is chosen, delays could occur 
     which would result in tritium being unavailable when the 
     current stored supply is exhausted.
       Cost--I have consistently maintained that the production of 
     tritium is not a cost issue, it is a National Security issue. 
     Therefore, ensuring the capacity to produce the material in a 
     manner which is consistent with our proven nonproliferation 
     policy is more important than cost considerations. However, 
     in this era of constrained spending it is essential that we 
     select a production technology which is fiscally responsible. 
     On July 21, 1998 then Acting Secretary of Energy, the 
     Honorable Elizabeth A. Moler, sent a letter to me in which 
     she cited DOE's ``official'' departmental cost estimates. In 
     my response, dated July 24, 1998, I outlined a number of 
     serious concerns I had regarding her ``official'' estimates. 
     I have included copies of both of these letters for your 
     review. As I indicated at that time, I was informed by DOE 
     Chief Financial Officer Michael Telson, that the numbers 
     cited as ``accurate'' and ``official'' for the CLWR option 
     were not validated by DOE, but were merely forwarded from the 
     Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as the Bellefonte proposal. 
     DOE embraced these

[[Page S12866]]

     numbers and forwarded them to Congress as ``accurate'' and 
     ``official'' despite the fact that TVA's record of 
     forecasting the cost to complete nuclear plants is woeful. As 
     part of the Congressionally mandated TVA Integrated Resource 
     Plan, TVA reviewed the accuracy of estimates it has produced 
     since 1987. The review found that TVA's rate of error for 
     predicting future nuclear plant costs ranged from 100% to 
     230%. Furthermore, DOE allows TVA to claim that revenue from 
     selling electricity from Bellefonte would repay the costs the 
     American taxpayers would incur for completing the reactor. 
     Given that the Bellefonte reactor has a current debt of $4.5 
     billion and that the cost of electricity is expected to 
     decline, the Congressional Research Service, in the recent 
     report ``the Department of Energy's Tritium Production 
     Program'', indicated that the likelihood that a completed 
     Bellefonte plant could sell electricity at a price high 
     enough to recover the taxpayer's investment is ``highly 
     uncertain.'' By contrast, when APT program officials 
     attempted to study the possibility of generating revenue 
     through the commercial leasing of the APT to produce medical 
     isotopes, they were instructed to ``cease any work''. Why 
     would DOE allow the ``official'' CLWR numbers to include 
     highly suspect revenue potential from power generation and 
     not consider revenue from a market which is projected to 
     exceed $5 billion by 2010? Your providing an accurate and 
     complete cost comparison of the two competing tritium 
     production options will finally clarify the costs and allow 
     the debate to be based on truly accurate information.
       I firmly believe that this is one of the most important 
     issues facing the nation. The security of the United States 
     and the world depends on the maintenance of a credible U.S. 
     nuclear deterrent. Due to the extraordinary consequences of 
     the tritium production technology decision, I request you 
     begin this investigation as soon as possible. Thank you for 
     your attention and I look forward to hearing from you soon.
       With kindest regards and best wishes,
           Sincerely,
                                                   Strom Thurmond.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Exhibit 4


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, September 4, 1998.
     Mr. James Hinchman,
     Acting Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Hinchman: I am writing to follow up my August 26, 
     1998 letter to you regarding tritium production. There are 
     additional issues that I would like your report to address 
     concerning this important National Security program.
       On August 27, 1998, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
     issued a report analyzing the two options for producing 
     tritium, the Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) and the 
     Accelerator for the Production of Tritium (APT). After 
     reviewing the CBO report (Attachment I), I find it to be 
     incomplete and based on preliminary, unverifiable 
     information. As such, I consider the conclusions of the 
     report to be inaccurate. The fact that the Congressional 
     Budget Office appears to have fallen far short in their 
     analysis makes your investigation of the tritium program even 
     more important.
       There are a number of problems with the CBO report which 
     you should be made aware of as you begin your own 
     investigation. First, the cost figures presented for the CLWR 
     option have not been validated by the Department of Energy's 
     Chief Financial Officer and are based solely on preliminary 
     contractual discussions between DOE and a potential vendor. 
     Additionally, while the APT option has been subjected to 
     numerous independent cost evaluations (ICE) for all design 
     and construction costs, none of the reactor-based options 
     have been subjected to an ICE review. The report failed to 
     note the tentative nature of the CLWR cost figures. In the 
     case of the irradiation services option, there is not even a 
     valid proposal. The potential vendor for that option, the 
     Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), withdrew its proposal to 
     provide such services many months ago. The report failed to 
     note this fact as well.
       Second, the report left out many critical pieces of 
     information, including the following:
       1. The report failed to make a parallel comparison of the 
     options needed to make the required amount to tritium for our 
     Nation's nuclear stockpile. CBO states, ``All of the options 
     assume that DOE must make enough tritium to support a nuclear 
     stockpile of the size allowed by the START I treaty.'' 
     However, the analysis ignored the programmatic requirements 
     set forth in the Department's August 1998 Draft Environmental 
     Impact Statement (EIS) for the Production of Tritium in a 
     Commercial Light Water Reactor. The EIS states that ``at 
     least two reactors would be needed'' and further states 
     that ``DOE could use as many as 3 reactors,'' to produce 
     the tritium required to support a START I stockpile. 
     Solely estimating the cost to complete the Bellefonte 
     reactor as the CLWR option to produce tritium is not in 
     line with current DOE programmatic assessments because it 
     will not satisfy the stockpile needs at a Start I level. 
     Your report should analyze the costs associated with 
     producing tritium in an APT compared to producing tritium 
     in the required number of reactors to achieve a START I 
     level. A more accurate comparison would be to analyze the 
     costs of producing tritium in an APT versus producing 
     tritium at Bellefonte at a START II level, an amount that 
     could be achieved by a single reactor during an 18-month 
     refueling cycle.
       2. Again, due to the unparalleled comparison by CBO, a more 
     appropriate comparison of the two options would be to analyze 
     the costs of a Stat II level. However, in the CBO report 
     there was no mention of the significantly lower cost for the 
     modular APT design currently being considered by DOE, which 
     would meet START II requirements. Furthermore, the option of 
     pursuing a modular APT was never mentioned. The cost of 
     constructing the modular APT is equivalent to the cost of 
     completing the Bellefonte reactor and would still allow the 
     U.S. to move to a START I production level in the future if 
     START II is not ratified.
       3. There was no mention of the fact that the TVA option 
     assumes full up front, block funding over a one or two year 
     period. It would be virtually impossible for the DOE Office 
     of Defense Programs to make two one-billion dollar payments 
     to TVA in fiscal years 2000 and 2001; therefore, the cost 
     assumptions are invalid.
       4. There was no mention of any ancillary benefits of the 
     APT. The APT would be highly effective in conducting research 
     in high energy physics, medical treatments, and waste 
     management. It could also directly support DOE research on 
     transmutation of high level nuclear waste. Not only could 
     these programs be a source of additional revenue for the APT, 
     but such activities could serve the larger public good.
       5. There was no mention of the independent cost evaluations 
     that have been conducted for the APT design and construction 
     costs.
       6. There was no consideration of TVA's sizable debt service 
     costs in the total estimated cost of the Bellefonte option. 
     The report correctly asserts that TVA's $4.6 billion 
     outstanding debt on the Bellefonte plant must be recovered 
     through gross revenues at the plant. However, the debt 
     service on $4.6 billion over 40 years averages well over $200 
     million per year. Taking this into account, it would appear 
     that Bellefonte will operate at a significant loss every year 
     it produces tritium. Current law requires that TVA recuperate 
     such costs on a schedule and basis that advantages the 
     ratepayers, therefore TVA would face a legal conflict. It 
     must either fulfill its contractual obligation to pay DOE a 
     share of gross revenues or fulfill its legal obligation to 
     the ratepayers. In either scenario there will be significant 
     outstanding costs that will have to be assumed by either 
     TVA ratepayers or, in a more likely situation, the 
     American taxpayers.
       7. There were no management and support or startup costs 
     included in the Bellefonte cost projections despite TVA's 
     poor facility start up record. The report added $500 million 
     to the APT cost to account for such activities. It is clear 
     that DOE will incur added management, operations and start up 
     costs for the CLWR. If these costs are not included for the 
     TVA option, they should not be included for the APT project.
       8. The CBO report assessed the APT option a 35% contingency 
     cost penalty to account for DOE's poor record in completing 
     large construction projects on time and within budget. The 
     report accurately states that the average overrun for large 
     DOE construction projects is 50%. However, the CBO report did 
     not include a similar contingency penalty in the TVA 
     Bellefonte cost estimate, despite the fact that according to 
     the 1995 Congressionally mandated TVA Integrated Resource 
     Plan, the average TVA cost overrun on reactor construction 
     projects ranged from 100 percent to 230 percent. In addition, 
     the cost estimates for the CLWR tritium extraction facility 
     and the target fabrication facilities should have included a 
     contingency cost penalty.
       9. There was no mention of the regulatory and schedule 
     barriers which could slow or block licensing a new or 
     existing CLWR to produce tritium for defense purposes. 
     Licencing commercial nuclear facilities falls under the 
     jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The 
     most recent attempts to build and license new CLWR's have 
     resulted in extraordinary challenges by anti-nuclear groups 
     and other intervenors. Numerous work stoppages have resulted 
     in massive time delays and cost overruns. The last TVA CLWR 
     to be licenced was the Watts-Barr I facility. That facility 
     received a construction permit on January 23, 1973 and 
     finally began operating on May 26, 1996--over 23 years later. 
     The Bellefonte Reactor would prove especially contentious due 
     to the obvious controversy of producing materials for nuclear 
     weapons in a commercial nuclear facility. I am greatly 
     concerned if the CLWR option is chosen, our nation runs the 
     risk of subjecting the entire nuclear arsenal to lawsuits 
     from third-party intervenors. This delay would result in 
     tritium being unavailable when the current stored supply is 
     exhausted.
       The totality of these deficiencies in the CBO's cost 
     analysis of the tritium production options being considered 
     by DOE makes the report's findings highly speculative and not 
     entirely useful as a planning document. It does not appear 
     that CBO considered a wide variety of external reviews that 
     have already been conducted, such as the July 1998 
     Congressional Research Service report which presented 
     extensive documentation for its findings. Given the 
     Department's recent setbacks in the Idaho Pit 9 fixed price 
     contract, it is inconceivable that DOE or CBO would simply 
     accept a ``fixed price''

[[Page S12867]]

     offer at face value. A fixed price contract is only a good 
     deal if you believe the vendor can perform the work described 
     within the cost projections estimated.
       Your investigation of the tritium program should 
     incorporate an analysis of the above issues as well as those 
     mentioned in my previous letter. While the CBO report could 
     have shed light on the pros and cons of each option to 
     produce tritium, it only clouded the matter further. The 
     General Accounting Office report should ensure a balanced 
     discussion of this issue that is so vital to the National 
     Security of our Nation.
       With kindest regards and best wishes.
           Sincerely,
     Strom Thurmond.

                          ____________________