[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 151 (Wednesday, October 21, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2272-E2274]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             MISSILE THREAT

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JOHN P. MURTHA

                            of pennsylvania

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, October 20, 1998

  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, the following is an excellent analysis of 
the world's missile threat presented by Mr. Robert Walpole to the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

        Speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

(By Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and 
                           Nuclear Programs)

       Good morning. I welcome the opportunity to be here today to 
     talk about the ballistic missile threat to the United States. 
     Assessing and defining that threat to our homeland and 
     interests worldwide is one of the most important intelligence 
     missions in the post-Cold War world. And I must tell you that 
     we consider foreign assistance to be fundamental to the 
     threat, not merely an incidental aspect of the problem. 
     Finally, the threat is real, serious, growing, and dynamic. 
     For example, since our annual report six months ago, the 
     Ghauri, Shahab 3, and Taepo Dong 1 missiles/launch vehicles 
     have all been tested. For these reasons, we are mandated by 
     Congress to report on our assessments of this threat 
     annually.
       At the outset, let me emphasize how appreciative we are of 
     the Commission's work. I particularly like the fact that they 
     received approval to publish a relatively detailed 
     unclassified report on the threat. As you have undoubtedly 
     heard, we gave the Commission access to all the available 
     intelligence information, regardless of classification. The 
     Commission made a number of excellent recommendations for how 
     we can improve our collection and analysis on foreign missile 
     developments. Indeed, their report reinforces the DCI's call 
     for a stronger investment in analysis and more aggressive use 
     of outside expertise. Incorporating the Commission's ideas 
     will strengthen our own work in this area.
       We and the Commission agree that the missile threat 
     confronts the Community with an array of complicated problems 
     that require innovative solutions. At the same time, the 
     Commission challenges some of our conclusions and 
     assumptions, particularly those in our 1995 National 
     Intelligence Estimate--Emerging Missile Threats to North 
     America During the Next 15 Years (NIE 95-19). Our March 1998 
     Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Missile Developments was 
     prepared in response to a request by Congress for a yearly 
     update of that assessment.
       Under the DCI's direction, the 1998 report responded to 
     legitimate criticisms levied at our earlier work. It also 
     incorporated the recommendations of outside experts who 
     reviewed the 1995 NIE. As a result, the 1998 report already 
     addresses many of the Commission's concerns, especially those 
     regarding how we discuss foreign assistance, alternatives to 
     increasing a missile's range, and approaches to circumvent 
     development. Work is already underway on the 1999 report, and 
     we are looking differently at how we characterize 
     uncertainties, alternative scenarios, and warnings as a 
     result of our interaction with the Commission the past 
     several

[[Page E2273]]

     months and I expect successive reports to be better, 
     addressing additional questions as they are asked.
       This morning, I will outline our March 1998 report; discuss 
     areas where the substantive conclusions of the Commission's 
     report and our thinking agree and differ; and discuss what we 
     are doing differently for our 1999 report.


                            Our 1998 Report

       Secretary Rumsfeld has expressed concern that people not 
     judge the Commission's report before they read it. While I 
     share that concern regarding our 1998 annual report--which 
     gives a full appreciation for our views and concerns about 
     this growing threat--it remains classified, and therefore 
     cannot be released to the public. But, I can give you a feel 
     for what the report says.
       In our report, we underscore the significant role foreign 
     assistance has played and continues to play--indeed 
     throughout the report are several major discussions of 
     technology transfer. For example, the report begins with 
     several pages discussing the extent of foreign assistance 
     from numerous suppliers to even more recipients. It 
     also notes how foreign assistance has helped specific 
     missile programs, such as assistance with Iran's Shahab 3 
     missile.
       Our report also underlines the immediate threat posed by 
     medium-range missiles, our continuing concern about existing 
     and emerging ICBMs, and the increasing danger that comes from 
     the proliferation activities of countries that possess or are 
     developing such systems. We and the Commission have some 
     different views on some of our timelines for ICBM 
     development, using the available evidence, group debate, and 
     outside expert review. Nevertheless, where evidence is 
     limited and the stakes are high, we need to keep challenging 
     our assumptions--a role we will perform on this issue at 
     least annually.
       Let me make three points on our methodology.
       First, we do not expect countries to follow any specific 
     pattern for missile development. In fact, the United States, 
     the former Soviet Union, and China all took different 
     approaches. We frequently caution ourselves against any 
     mirror-imaging. Just because the United States, Russia, or 
     China was able to accomplish certain feats certain ways in a 
     specific period of time--short or long--does not mean another 
     country will.
       Second, we recognize that foreign countries can hide many 
     activities from us. These countries are generally increasing 
     their security measures and are learning from each other and 
     from open reporting of our capabilities.
       Third, our methodologies really are not that different. 
     Given the fact that in many cases we have limited data, we 
     are both forced somewhat to use both input and output 
     methodologies to evaluate the threat. The biggest difference 
     in methodology is that the Intelligence Community must attach 
     likelihood judgments to our projections; the Commission did 
     not. Thus, we project our most likely scenarios and then 
     include other scenarios with likelihood judgments attached. 
     The Commission illustrated several possible scenarios, which 
     we agree are possible, but did not attach likelihood 
     judgments. But let me repeat, we agree that their scenarios 
     are possible, as are many other scenarios we have looked at, 
     including outright sales.
       Let me now summarize the body of our 1998 report, which 
     focused on threat projections through 2010:
       Theater-range missiles already in hostile hands pose an 
     immediate threat to U.S. interests, military forces, and 
     allies. The threat is increasing. More countries are 
     acquiring ballistic missiles with ranges up to 1,000 km, and 
     more importantly, with ranges between 1,000 km and 3,000 km. 
     As Iran's flight test of its Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic 
     missile (MRBM) demonstrates, this is not a hypothetical 
     threat. It is a reality that has to be dealt with now. With a 
     range of about 1,300 km, the Shahab 3 significantly alters 
     the military equation in the Middle East by giving Tehran the 
     capability to strike targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and 
     most of Turkey. The Pakistani Ghauri, also tested this year, 
     allows targeting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf.
       Foreign assistance is fundamental to the growing theater 
     missile threat. As we describe in the 1998 report, for 
     example, Iran received important foreign assistance in 
     developing its Shahab 3 MRBM. Moreover, countries are seeking 
     the capability to build these missiles independently of 
     foreign suppliers. The growth in the sharing of technology 
     among the aspiring missile powers is also of concern.
       While we project that Russia's strategic forces will 
     shrink, they continue to be modernized and will remain 
     formidable. China has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMS, in addition to 
     shorter-range missiles. Most of these are targeted against 
     the United States, and modernization efforts will likely 
     increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United 
     States.
       Our report further noted that we judge that an unauthorized 
     or accidental launch of a Russian or Chinese strategic 
     missile is highly unlikely, as long as current security 
     procedures and systems are in place. Russia employs an 
     extensive array of technical and procedural safeguards and 
     China keeps its missiles unfueled and without warheads mated.
       Among those countries seeking longer-range missiles, we 
     believe North Korea is the most advanced. Its Taepo Dong-2 
     (TD-2), which we judged will have a range between 4,000 and 
     6,000 km, could reach mainland Alaska and the Hawaiian 
     Islands. Our report noted that North Korea could flight test 
     the missile this year and that it could be deployed in a few 
     years. Beyond the North Korean TD-2, we judge it unlikely, 
     despite the extensive transfer of theater missile technology, 
     that other countries (except Russia and China as just 
     mentioned) will develop, produce, and deploy an ICBM capable 
     of reaching any part of the United States over the next 
     decade.
       Of course, the key word here is develop. As the report 
     noted, the purchase of a missile, either complete or as 
     components of a kit, is a different matter. In fact, we 
     identified several alternative scenarios for a country to 
     acquire an ICBM capable of reaching the United States sooner 
     than 2010. These include buying an ICBM or SLV to convert 
     into an ICBM, or buying a complete production facility for 
     either. We judge that the current policies of Russia and 
     China make these scenarios unlikely, given potential 
     political repercussions, the creation of a self-inflicted 
     threat, and China's own military needs. Our report points out 
     that we cannot be certain that this will remain true over the 
     long term. Indeed, the further into the future we project the 
     politico-economic environment, the less certain we would be 
     that the `value' of the sale would not outweigh these 
     factors in foreign thinking. And, as North Korea develops 
     its Taepo Dong missiles, their sales become an increasing 
     concern.
       A number of countries have the technological wherewithal to 
     develop the capability to launch ballistic (or cruise) 
     missiles from a forward-based platform, such as a surface 
     ship. Forward-basing from dedicated vessels or from 
     freighters could pose a new threat to the United States in 
     the near term--well before 2010.
       Our 1998 report assesses that our abilities to warn about 
     the above-mentioned threats and postulated concerns vary:
       We could provide five years warning before deployment that 
     a potentially hostile country was trying to develop and 
     deploy an ICBM capable of hitting the United States, unless 
     that country purchased an ICBM or space launch vehicle (SLV), 
     including having another country develop the system for 
     them); had an indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV); or 
     purchased a turnkey production facility.
       We could not count on providing much warning of either the 
     sale of an ICBM or the sale and conversion of a SLV 
     (conversion could occur in as little as two years). 
     Nevertheless, if a hostile country acquired an SLV, we would 
     warn that the country had an inherent ICBM capability. I 
     note, however, that both the United States and the Soviet 
     Union used systems we did not consider as ICBMs to place 
     their first satellites into orbit. The satellite we orbited 
     weighed only 14 kg.
       These two warnings need to be understood in tandem. 
     Unfortunately, the warning related to sales may dominate in 
     the near term. As North Korea proceeds with its Taepo Dong 
     developments, we need to assume that they will follow their 
     current path and market them; at a minimum, aspiring 
     recipients will try to buy them.
       We probably would obtain indications of the construction of 
     a turnkey facility before it was completed, providing several 
     years' warning.
       If a country had an SLV, it could probably convert it into 
     an ICBM in a few years, significantly reducing warning time.
       Adapting missiles for launch from a commercial ship could 
     be accomplished covertly, and probably with little or no 
     warning.
       Finally, our report noted that nonmissile delivery of 
     weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, nuclear 
     and radiological weapons--pose a serious, immediate threat to 
     US interests at home and abroad.


                             Where We Agree

       Now I'll go over some of the points of agreement between 
     our 1998 report and the Commission's work. We agree that:
       The threat is real and growing. The medium-range ballistic 
     missile threat to US interests in the world is already upon 
     us. Missile forces of Russia and China pose a significant 
     threat to the United States and this threat will continue to 
     exist for the foreseeable future. Our reports also agree on 
     North Korea's capabilities.
       Foreign assistance and the proliferation of ballistic 
     missile technology is the fundamental reason for the growing 
     ballistic missile threat.
       Foreign denial and deception efforts and resource 
     constraints are making it more difficult for us to monitor 
     foreign missile developments.
       Finally, there are plausible scenarios that could result in 
     an increased missile threat to the United States for which 
     there would be little or no warning.


                           Where we disagree

       I will now walk through some of the areas of disagreement 
     between the Commission and our 1998 report. The Commission's 
     report indicates that intelligence analysts are too dependent 
     on evidence and seem unable to make judgments without it. In 
     actuality, despite the lack of evidence in some areas, our 
     analysts make judgments and projection. I highlight that to 
     allay concerns that we would consider `the absence of 
     evidence' to be `the evidence of absence.' Quite the 
     contrary, our analysts routinely face gaps in

[[Page E2274]]

     their evidence and must make analytical judgments to project 
     plausible scenarios. We need to do better. Working with 
     limited evidence and make judgments is central to our job, as 
     long as we underscore where we have little or no evidence. 
     They did so in the case of the critical threats some missiles 
     pose. In fact, we note that successful missile tests would 
     give countries an emergency, launch capability with any 
     missiles in their inventory, even without evidence of 
     deployment.
       As I indicated earlier, we are in basic agreement with the 
     Commission on North Korea. While they did not indicate so, I 
     assume they do not disagree with our judgments that North 
     Korea was capable of testing both the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 this 
     year.
       The Commission considers Iraq to be behind North Korea and 
     Iran relative to ballistic missile technology. We view Iraq 
     as further along in some ways. Iraq was ahead of Iran before 
     the Gulf war. They have not lost the technological expertise 
     and creativity. If sanctions were lifted and they tried to 
     develop indigenously a 9,000 km range ICBM to be able to 
     reach the United States, it would take them several years. If 
     they purchased an ICBM from North Korea or elsewhere, it 
     would be quicker, depending on the range and payload 
     capability of the missile. If the missile already had the 
     range capability, further development would be moot.
       The Commission considers Iran to be as far along in its 
     technological development efforts as North Korea. In our 
     view, that is not the case. The recently tested Iranian 
     Shahab 3 is based on the No Dong and followed North Korea's 
     test, even with foreign assistance, by several years. Iran 
     will likely continue to seek longer range missiles, and would 
     need to develop a 10,000 km range ICBM to be able to reach 
     the United States. If they follow a pattern similar to the 
     Shahab 3 time frame, it would take them many years. On the 
     other hand, if they purchased an ICBM from North Korea or 
     elsewhere, it would be quicker, and depending on the range 
     and payload capability of the missile, further development 
     might be a moot point.
       The Commission indicates that our ability to warn is 
     eroding and that we may not be able to provide warning at 
     all. I've covered our views on warning earlier, and I fear 
     further detail would only help proliferators more. They're 
     already learning how to hide some aspects of missile 
     programs, I'd rather they not learn more. I will say this, 
     however. We need to be much more explicit in our warnings 
     about missile developments--not just indicating that a 
     country has an ICBM program and that it could flight test an 
     ICBM this year, both of which are important messages. We need 
     to include clearer language and more details about how we 
     might and might not be able to warn about specific milestones 
     in an ICBM development effort, judgments that will likely 
     vary by country.


                              1999 report

       We are already working on the 1999 annual report and are 
     planning to include significant additional outside expertise 
     and red teaming into next year's report:
       Private-sector contractors will be asked to postulate 
     missile threats that apply varying degrees of increased 
     foreign assistance. These will be in addition to the 
     Commission's postulations and some of our own.
       We are also asking academia to postulate future politico-
     economic environments that foster missile sales and ever 
     increasing foreign assistance.
       In addition, the Intelligence Community recently published 
     a classified paper that postulates ways a country could 
     demonstrate an ICBM capability with an SLV, and examines 
     various ways it could convert its SLVs into ICBMs. This work 
     will also feed into the 1999 report, as a generic look at 
     some alternative approaches.
       Finally, drafting is underway on a paper that examines how 
     countries could push Scud technology beyond perceived limits. 
     Scientists and non-scientists are involved. Sometimes, those 
     already outside the box can think so more readily.
       We also intend in the 1999 report--after discussing our 
     projected timelines for likely missile developments and 
     deployments, as well as our concerns for ICBM sales--to 
     postulate and evaluate many alternative scenarios, including 
     those developed during the Commission's efforts and those 
     mentioned above. Finally, we will be much more explicit in 
     our discussions about warning. All these evaluations will be 
     made through the lens of potential denial and deception 
     efforts, to ensure that as our task gets more difficult, we 
     provide our policymakers with a clear representation of what 
     we know, what we don't know, what we can't know, and finally 
     what we judge based on evidence, the lack thereof, and 
     expertise from inside and outside the government.


                         community enhancement

       In recent months we have undertaken numerous steps that 
     will enhance the Community's abilities to tackle the 
     increasingly difficult tasks we face, including addressing 
     the emerging missile threat. For example, we have increased 
     ``red teaming'' efforts to ensure that we question our 
     assumptions and examine out-of-the-box possibilities. 
     Furthermore, last year the DCI strengthened the 
     Nonproliferation Center to ensure that we have an aggressive, 
     well-coordinated effort to address the nonproliferation 
     target. At DCI direction we are taking actions to ensure that 
     we have the analysts and skills needed to cover those issues 
     of greatest importance. These include: increasing the size of 
     the analytic cadre; creation of the Community executive 
     boards to leverage the best experts on critical issues to 
     drive collection and analysis against the most significant 
     intelligence needs and gaps; introducing new training 
     methodologies, technologies and analytic tools, and improving 
     the mix of skills to address our most pressing problems; 
     creating mechanisms to increase cooperation and better 
     integrate the efforts of all analytic production centers.


                               conclusion

       This is a serious and complex issue, one of many others 
     that we're working. The Intelligence Community uses many 
     vehicles, including estimates and annual reports, to convey 
     our analyses to policy makers and Congress. We will continue 
     to do so.


                          Taepo Dong 1 Launch

       Before I close, let me make a few comments about the Taepo 
     Dong 1 satellite launch attempt. While the system's third 
     stage failed, the launch confirmed our concerns regarding 
     North Korea's efforts to pursue an ICBM capability and 
     demonstrated some unanticipated developments.
       We have been following North Korea's ICBM progress since 
     the early 1990s, most notably, their efforts to develop what 
     we call the Taepo Dong 1 medium-range missile and the Taepo 
     Dong 2 ICBM, which we assessed were two-stage missiles.
       This recent launch used the Taepo Dong 1 and a third stage. 
     They tested some important aspects of ICBM development and 
     flight roughly on the timetable we expected. And, for 
     example, they were successful at multiple stage separation.
       As we have analyzed the information that has come in so 
     far, we have been able to determine much of what happened.
       Indeed, this is a work in progress, and as we continue to 
     receive information, it will give us a more detailed picture.
       Although the launch of the Taepo Dong 1 as a missile was 
     expected for some time, its use as a space launch vehicle 
     with a third stage was not.
       The existence of the third stage concerns us; we had not 
     anticipated it.
       We need to conduct more analysis on it, trying to identify 
     more about it, including its capabilities and why it failed.
       The first and second stages performed to North Korean 
     expectations, providing what could amount to a successful 
     flight test of the two-stage Taepo Dong 1 medium-range 
     missile.
       However, we believe North Korea would need to resolve some 
     important technical issues--including the problems with the 
     third stage--prior to being able to use the three-stage 
     configuration as a ballistic missile to deliver small 
     payloads to ICBM ranges; that is, ranges in excess of 5,500 
     km.
       The Intelligence Community is continuing to assess the 
     North Korean capabilities demonstrated by this launch and the 
     treat implications of the missile.
       In particular, the Community is assessing how small a 
     payload would have to be for this system to fly to something 
     on the order of an ICBM range.
       We need to look at the implications of lighter payloads and 
     possibly a third stage for the Taepo Dong 2.
       We also need to ensure that we continue aggressive 
     collection and analysis efforts against proliferation and 
     foreign transfers, and their effects on advancing missile 
     programs.
       And we need to be much more explicit in our warnings about 
     missile developments--not just indicating that a country has 
     an ICBM program and that it could flight test an ICBM in a 
     given year, both of which are important messages. We need to 
     include clearer language and more details about how we might 
     and might not be able to warn about specific milestones in an 
     ICBM development effort, judgments that will likely vary by 
     country.

     

                          ____________________