[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 147 (Thursday, October 15, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H10988-H10989]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        IN SUPPORT OF REFORMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Saxton) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, in the next day or so we will be voting on 
the spending plan, the rest of the spending plan, for fiscal year 1999. 
An important part of that is a matter involving the International 
Monetary Fund, and there were many of us who said that we would only 
vote for that provision with proper reforms.
  Mr. Speaker, I am now able to rise in support of reforming the 
International Monetary Fund and the provisions claimed in the bill 
ahead of us. The reforms to be included in the appropriations bill, and 
particularly the enforcement provisions, are not nearly as extensive as 
I would have liked. Nonetheless, if these reforms are permitted to take 
place and to be in effect, they will be steps in the right direction 
toward longer-term reform for the IMF.
  The implementation of IMF reforms in this bill will be an important 
test of the good faith and credibility of the Treasury Department and 
IMF officials. With regard to the reforms themselves, our review of 
their development from earlier legislation is critical to understand 
the intent of Congress.

  The structure of the reforms pertaining to transparency and market 
rates is clearly based on the IMF Transparency and Efficiency Act that 
was introduced earlier this year by myself and some others known as 
H.R. 3331, which was introduced, I might add, in conjunction with the 
majority leader.
  The reform proposals in the budget bill are essentially narrower 
versions of the policy changes mandated in the IMF Transparency and 
Efficiency Act. The biggest change is in the enforcement mechanism in 
this act, in the coming act, which has been replaced by a much weaker 
enforcement provision in the appropriations bill we will vote on in the 
next day or so.
  Obviously, I am disappointed with this change. But with respect to 
the IMF transparency reforms in the appropriations bill, suffice it to 
say they reflect a strong congressional consensus that IMF documents be 
publicly released, and that the minutes of the IMF board meetings 
should be publicly released in some form. Any abuse of the flexibility 
provided in this language would clearly not be acceptable.
  Second, with regard to the interest rate provisions, the higher 
interest rates are required any time the definition of conditions of a 
balance of payments problem emerge, regardless of other problems that 
may also exist.

[[Page H10989]]

 The compromise language uses some terms to describe these conditions 
also used by the IMF to describe an existing IMF loans facility, but 
there are essential differences that are important to note.
  Finally, or next, the clear intent of this reform initiative is to 
require interest rates comparable to market interest rates, as 
expressed in H.R. 3331. Prior to these negotiations, the staff of the 
Joint Economic Committee devised a floor to permit an objective limit 
on how the rate could go in an attempt to prevent backsliding.
  In the course of four hearings held by the Joint Economic Committee, 
the issues involving transparency and an end to the interest rate 
subsidies were explored in extensive detail, as well as many other 
issues. A complete legislative history of IMF reforms about to be 
enacted with a view towards establishing congressional intent must 
include not only H.R. 3331, but also the germane material covered in 
these JEC hearings, the only hearings held to examine these reforms in 
detail, I might add.
  Mr. Speaker, in summary, the congressional intent behind the IMF 
reforms is clear. It is reflected in the legislative history. A good-
faith effort to carry out these IMF reforms in keeping with the letter 
and spirit of the law will be as evident as will the failure to do so.

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