[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 146 (Wednesday, October 14, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12575-S12577]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          TUG AND BARGE SAFETY

  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I rise today to thank the managers of the 
1998 Coast Guard Authorization Act for their help in addressing an 
issue of great importance in Rhode Island: the safety of the tug and 
barge industry. The managers' amendment to the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act that passed the Senate on Monday included a provision 
that will strengthen the regulation of transportation of petroleum by 
barges in the waters of the Northeast.
  I appreciate the cooperation of Commerce Committee Chairman McCain,

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Ranking Member Hollings, Subcommittee Chairwoman Snowe, and Ranking 
Member Kerry for incorporating my provision into the bill.
  I especially want to thank the cosponsor of the provision, Senator 
Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, for his support. We have worked 
closely on this issue for several years. Senator Dodd of Connecticut 
also lent his support to the effort.
  In order to understand why the Chaffee-Lieberman provisions are 
necessary, you must go back to the 1996 disaster when the tug Scandia 
and barge North Cape grounded on the coast of Rhode Island. After the 
accident, the Environment and Public Works Committee, which I chair, 
reported a bill to improve towing vessel safety, and important elements 
of the bill were included in the 1996 Coast Guard Authorization Act. My 
intent in enacting 1996 provisions was to improve safety in the towing 
industry so as to prevent a repetition of a disaster like the 1996 
Scandia/North Cape spill in Block Island Sound.
  In October, 1997 the Coast Guard issued rules to implement the 1996 
towing vessel legislation. I and others concluded that the proposed 
rules might not prevent a repetition of the Scandia/North Cape disaster 
and asked the Coast Guard to reconsider. The Coast Guard is now 
reworking the rules and expect to issue an interim final national rule 
on anchoring and barge retrieval systems in November 1998. They will 
repropose fire suppression regulations in January 1999.
  Senator Lieberman and I also were concerned that the proposed rules 
did not implement the recommendations of the Regional Risk Assessment 
Team or ``RRAT,'' which forged a remarkable consensus among Coast Guard 
District One, the States, the environmental community, and the 
regulated industry on rules, to improve safety and reduce risks in the 
waters of the Northeast States.
  The team was assembled by the Marine Safety Office in the First Coast 
Guard District shortly after the North Cape spill. The RRAT met for six 
months and, in February 1997, delivered a report with extensive 
regulatory recommendations. Regulations were proposed in the following 
areas: vessel manning, anchors and barge retrieval systems, voyage 
planning, navigation safety equipment aboard towing vessels, enhanced 
communications, vessel traffic schemes and exclusion zones, lightering 
activities, tug escorts, and crew fatigue.
  The report was signed by the RRAT Steering Committee members: the 
Chief of the Marine Safety Division of the First Coast Guard District, 
the American Waterway Operators (on behalf of the regulated industry), 
Save the Bay (on behalf of environmental organizations), and the Rhode 
Island Department of Environmental Management (on behalf of states 
participating in the RRAT).
  The Coast Guard was deeply involved in the RRAT process. The First 
Coast Guard District facilitated RRAT meetings, prepared the agendas 
and minutes, and lent other administrative support to the effort. In 
June 1997, the First Coast Guard District also forwarded its plan to 
implement the RRAT recommendations to Coast Guard Headquarters.
  It was the expectation of the state, environmental, and industry RRAT 
participants that the RRAT recommendations for regional regulations 
would be included as a part of the rulemaking to implement the towing 
vessel safety provisions in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996. 
This was a reasonable expectation based upon the level of Coast Guard 
involvement in the development of the consensus RRAT recommendations, 
which were then endorsed by the Coast Guard Officer charged with marine 
safety in the RRAT study area.
  Unfortunately, the regulations proposed by the Coast Guard in October 
1997, did not incorporate the RRAT's recommendations for regional 
regulations. It also rejected specific RRAT recommendations on anchor 
and emergency retrieval provisions. Subsequent inquiry by Senator 
Lieberman and myself revealed that the Coast Guard did not have any 
future plan to issue the RRAT's recommended regulations.
  This decision by the Coast Guard was simply not acceptable. In April 
1998, Senator Lieberman and I asked that the Coast Guard immediately 
issue the regional regulations. This same request was made by many 
others in New England, including States environmental departments, 
regional and local environmental organizations, and private citizens in 
written comments, and at an April 9, 1998, hearing in Newport, Rhode 
Island.
  To its great credit, the Coast Guard has reevaluated its initial 
rejection of regional regulations. The Coast Guard has embraced the 
RRAT recommendations, and has been making admirable progress of 
implementing the RRAT report. I am pleased to report that the Coast 
Guard will publish a proposed regional regulation in the Federal 
Register today. Because of its proactive reponse to the concerns that 
Senator Lieberman and I raised, the Coast Guard is in position to meet 
the aggressive deadlines in the Chafee-Lieberman provision in this 
year's Coast Guard bill.

  The Chafee-Lieberman provision, section 311 of the managers' 
amendment to H.R. 2204, directs the Coast Guard to issue regulations 
for towing and barge safety for the waters of the Northeast, including 
Long Island Sound. Section 311 directs the Coast Guard to give full 
consideration to each of the regulatory recommendations made by the 
RRAT and explain in detail if any recommendation is not adopted.
  Section 311 directly addresses anchoring and barge retrieval systems 
on a regional basis only. It is my understanding the Coast Guard is 
planning to issue a nationwide national interim final regulation on the 
anchor requirement by the end of November 1998. The amendment gives the 
Coast Guard the discretion to forego a regional requirement if the 
national requirement for anchoring and barge retrieval are no less 
stringent than those required for the waters of the Northeast.
  Though not a part of the Chafee-Lieberman provision adopted in H.R. 
2204, I wish to address the issue of fire suppression systems on 
tugboats. The fire on board the Scandia was the critical link in the 
chain of events that led to the grounding of the barge North Cape and 
the resultant oil spill. It is my view that the October 1997 proposed 
rules badly missed the mark on this issue. The Coast Guard proposal did 
not require a fire suppression system that would flood the engine room 
with a gas to extinguish a serious fire. This is a fatal defect in the 
proposed rule, and is inconsistent with the 1996 Coast Guard 
Authorization Act.
  The Coast Guard's October 1997 proposal inferred a mandate ``to 
prevent casualties involving barges which are the result of a loss of 
propulsion of the towing vessel.'' The 1996 Coast Guard Authorization 
Act's actual mandate is quite explicit: ``The Secretary shall require * 
* * the use of a fire suppression system or other measures to provide 
adequate assurance that fires on board towing vessels can be suppressed 
under reasonably foreseeable circumstances.'' This is a clear mandate 
that onboard equipment be able to suppress reasonably foreseeable fires 
such as occurred on the Scandia.
  The 1996 statute reflects Congress' judgment that the preferred 
alternative is to suppress a fire quickly enough so that damage is 
limited and propulsive power can be restored if interrupted due to fire 
fighting efforts. A fixed fire suppression system is an option that any 
vessel master would desire if faced with an engine room fire that could 
not be controlled by other means.
  The proposed regulations used vessel size as a principal criterion, 
while failing to consider adequately any differential requirements 
based on the ``characteristics, methods of operation, and nature of 
service'' as required by the law, which intentionally omitted size from 
the list of factors to consider.
  Not all towing vessels are the same when considering the imposition 
of a requirement for a fixed flooding fire suppression system. 
Specifically, tugboats like the Scandia which tow barges on the East 
Coast of the United States, are essentially seagoing vessels with 
sealable watertight doors and port holes. Tow boats operating on rivers 
and inland waterways are not designed for the same type of service. On 
these inland vessels, engine rooms may be located on the main deck, and 
they may have conventional doors and windows.
  The proposed Coast Guard rule correctly noted that, looking at towing 
vessels as a whole, certain types of vessels are ``constructed with 
engine rooms that would not be sufficiently

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air tight'' to be able to use a system that floods the space with a gas 
to extinguish an out-of-control blaze. This is certainly true in the 
case of inland tow boats.
  Tug boats designed for ocean service such as the Scandia, if they are 
operated in a prudent and seamanlike manner, do have the requisite 
water and air tightness to use a fixed flooding fire suppression system 
to good advantage. Congress specifically required that the proposed 
regulations account for the variations within the commercial towing 
fleet.
  My preference was to simply mandate a fire suppression system for 
ocean-going tugboats in this year's Coast Guard bill. After hearing the 
concerns raised by the Coast Guard and colleagues on the Commerce 
Committee, I will not pursue fire suppression changes this year. I look 
forward to the Coast Guard's new proposal on fire suppression, which is 
due for publication in January 1999. I expect it will be a marked 
improvement over the flawed October 1997 proposal.
  In closing, I again thank my colleagues on the Commerce Committee for 
accommodating my concerns on this issue. I also want to thank the Coast 
Guard. They could have waited until section 311 became law before 
starting on the regional regulations. Instead, the Coast Guard, by 
proposing the regional regulations this very day, has accelerated the 
date when the Northeast will have the protection it deserves. Finally, 
I thank my long-time collaborator on oil spill issues, Senator Joseph 
Lieberman of Connecticut, for his steadfast support in this effort.

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