[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 146 (Wednesday, October 14, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12568-S12570]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______
                                 

                     THE RUMSFELD COMMISSION REPORT

 Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as you know, over the past year there 
has been a great deal of discussion in Washington about the growing 
ballistic missile threat to the United States and our forces and 
friends abroad. Although Members of Congress and the Administration 
have not always agreed on how to best respond to this growing threat, I 
think we can all agree that the Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, has made an indispensable contribution to the 
debate. The bipartisan, nine-member commission included many of our 
nation's most prominent experts on national security affairs. Due to 
Don Rumsfeld's leadership, this diverse group with divergent views on 
many policy issues, came together and produced an outstanding report 
that unanimously concluded that the ballistic missile threat to the 
U.S. is greater than previously assessed, that rogue nations like Iran 
could develop long-range missiles capable of reaching the U.S. in as 
little as five years, and that we might have little or no warning that 
such a threat had developed.
  At an event last week, the Center for Security Policy honored Don 
Rumsfeld by presenting him with the ``Keeper of the Flame'' award for 
his outstanding leadership as chairman of the Commission to Assess the 
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. It was a well deserved 
honor. For the benefit of those who were not able to attend the award 
ceremony, I ask that Mr. Rumsfeld's remarks at the event be printed in 
the Record.
  The remarks follow:

 Remarks of the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Center for Security Policy, 
                            October 7, 1998

       Chairman Ed Meese, distinguished Members of the House and 
     Senate, public officials--past and present--ladies and 
     gentlemen. Good evening.
       I see so many here who have served our country with 
     distinction in so many important ways--Senators Cochran, Kyl 
     and Wallop, Secretaries Jim Schlesinger and Al Haig, and many 
     others. And there is Dr. Fritz Kraemer. There is a true 
     ``keeper of the flame.'' It is a privilege as well as a 
     pleasure to be with you all.
       Frank--my congratulations to you for your ten years of 
     contributions to our country's security. You and your 
     associates at the Center deserve, and have, our appreciation. 
     We all know and respect the energy, persistence and 
     patriotism that you have brought to the national security 
     debate and are grateful for it.
       Senator Thad Cochran, I thank you for your generous words. 
     As you know, your Committee's very useful ``Proliferation 
     Primer'' was given to each of our Commission members at our 
     first session. You have made important contributions on these 
     key subjects, and I congratulate you for them.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       I find since I first arrived in Washington, D.C., to work 
     on Capitol Hill back in 1957, fresh out of the Navy, that 
     while we went back home at regular intervals, I seem to keep 
     finding myself back here on some project or another for over 
     several decades now. I must say that this most recent 
     assignment, the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, has been 
     particularly interesting, because the subject is so 
     important.
       This evening I want to talk a bit about our report, first 
     because it is a message that needs to be heard, and, second, 
     because there's no group who has done more and can do still 
     more to carry that message.
       As you will recall, the U.S. Intelligence Community's 1995 
     National Intelligence Estimate caused quite a stir in the 
     national security community for a number of reasons. As a 
     result, the Congress established our Commission to provide an 
     independent assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the 
     United States--including Alaska and Hawaii. Our charter was 
     not to look at other threats or possible responses.
       As one of our Commissioners put it, our task was to find 
     out, Who has them? Who is trying to get them? When are they 
     likely to succeed? Why do we care? and, When will we know?
       Thanks to Speaker Gingrich and Minority Leader Gephardt for 
     the House, and Senate Leaders Lott and Daschle, the members 
     of our bipartisan Commission were truly outstanding. They 
     included: Dr. Barry Blechman, the former Assistant Director 
     of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Carter 
     Administration; Retired four-star general Lee Butler, former 
     Commander of the Strategic Air Command/ Dr. Richard Garwin of 
     IBM, a distinguished scientist; General Larry Welch, former 
     Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and CEO of the IDA; Paul 
     Wolfowitz, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 
     former Ambassador to Indonesia, and Dean of the Nitze School 
     at Johns Hopkins University; and James Woolsey, former 
     Director of the CIA in the Clinton Administration. Also with 
     us this evening is Dr. Steve Cambone, currently the Director 
     of Research at the National Defense University. Steve did a 
     superb job as Staff Director for the Commission.
       Two of our Commissioners are here this evening, and I'd 
     like them to stand and be recognized for their important 
     work.
       Dr. William Graham, former Science Advisor to President 
     Reagan. Bill Graham has done a superb job. Thank goodness we 
     had the benefit of his technical experienced and knowledge.
       Dr. William Schneider, former Undersecretary of State for 
     Security Assistance in the Reagan Administration. Bill kept 
     us sane with his unfailing good humor, penetrating as it is, 
     and challenged by his keen insights.
       The members of the Commission spent an enormous number of 
     hours, over six months and received over 200 briefings. Not 
     surprisingly, given our different backgrounds and 
     experiences--military, technical, policy oriented, but all 
     with decades of experience dealing with the Intelligence 
     Community and its products--we started out with a variety of 
     viewpoints. As we proceeded, each time we seemed to be 
     diverging in our views, we called for more briefings and 
     focused back on the facts.
       After extensive discussion and analysis, we arrived at our 
     unanimous conclusions and a unanimous recommendation. As 
     General Welch said, the facts overcame our biases and 
     opinions and drove us to our unanimous conclusions. And in 
     this city, unanimity is remarkable, especially on a subject 
     as heated as this.
       Given that so few people will be able to read our 
     classified final report of some 307 pages, with several 
     hundred additional classified pages of working papers and 
     technical analysis, and that the unclassified executive 
     summary was only 36 pages, that our conclusions were 
     unanimous makes them considerably more persuasive.
       During the course of our deliberations, almost every week 
     there was an event somewhere in the world related to 
     ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction--whether 
     the Ghauri missile launch by Pakistan, the Indian and 
     Pakistani nuclear explosions, continued stiff-arming of the 
     U.S. and the U.N. inspectors by Iraq, the Shahab 3 missile 
     firing in Iran, and more recently North Korea's Taepo Dong 1 
     three-stage launch. The pace of these significant events, 
     while disturbing to be sure, provided a vivid backdrop for 
     our work.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       It is clear the Gulf War taught regional powers that they 
     are ill-advised to try to combat U.S. or Western armies and 
     air forces. They can neither deter nor prevail against those 
     vastly greater conventional capabilities. That being the 
     case, it's not surprising that they week asymmetrical 
     advantages and leverage to enable them to change the 
     calculations of Western nations and ways to threaten and 
     deter them as well as their neighbors.
       They have several cost effective options. Terrorism is one. 
     Cruise missiles are also an increasingly attractive option in 
     that they are both versatile and relatively inexpensive. At 
     some point they may well become a weapon of choice.
       And, third, there are ballistic missiles. It is not 
     happenstance that some 25-30 countries either have or are 
     seeking to acquire ballistic missiles. They are very 
     attractive, and relatively inexpensive when compared to 
     armies, navies, and air forces; second, like cruise missiles, 
     they can be launched from land, sea or air and have the 
     flexibility of carrying chemical, biological or nuclear 
     warheads; and third, they have the compelling advantage of 
     being certain to arrive at their destinations--since there 
     are no defenses against them.
       Those of us from Chicago recall Al Capone's remark that 
     ``You get more with a kind word and a gun than you do with a 
     kind word alone.'' We can substitute ``ballistic missile'' 
     for ``gun'' and the names of some modern day Al Capones.

[[Page S12569]]

       The term ``rogue countries'' is an unfortunate phrase, 
     since it suggests that their behavior might be erratic. While 
     unusual to us, their actions are rational for them and not 
     unpredictable. To say that such countries would be deterred 
     or dissuaded from using terrorist attacks, cruise missiles or 
     ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction, because 
     of the vastly greater power of the U.S. and the West, is to 
     misunderstand. As Lenin said, ``the purpose of terrorism is 
     to terrorize.'' these are terror weapons, and they work.
       Having these capabilities in the hands of such countries 
     forces a different calculation on the part of the U.S. and 
     any nation that has interests in their regions.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       The Commission's unanimous conclusions were these:
       China and Russia continue to pose threats to the U.S., 
     although different in nature. Each is on an uncertain, albeit 
     different, path. With respect to North Korea and Iran, we 
     concluded each could pose a threat to the U.S. within five 
     years of a decision to do so, and that the U.S. might not 
     know for several years whether or not such a decision had 
     been made. Given that UNSCOM sanctions and inspections are 
     unlikely to be in place it is increasingly clear that Iraq 
     has to be included with North Korea and Iran.
       We concluded unanimously that these emerging capabilities 
     are broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than had 
     been reported, and that the intelligence community's ability 
     to provide timely warning has been and is being eroded and 
     that the warning time of deployment of a ballistic missile 
     threat to the United States is reduced. Finally, we concluded 
     that under some plausible scenarios, including re-basing or 
     transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air-launch 
     options, shortened development programs that might include 
     testing in a third country, or some combination of these, the 
     U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational 
     deployment.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       One important reason is that the emerging powers are 
     secretive about their programs and increasingly sophisticated 
     in deception and denial. They know considerably more than we 
     would like them to know about the sources and methods of our 
     collection, in no small part through espionage. And they use 
     that knowledge to good effect in hiding their programs.
       We concluded that there will be surprises. It is a big 
     world, it is a complicated world, and deception and denial 
     are extensive. The surprise to me is not that there have been 
     and will continue to be surprises, but that we are surprised 
     that there are surprises. We don't, won't, and can't know 
     everything. We must recognize that some surprises will occur 
     and take the necessary steps to see that we invest so that 
     our country is arranged to deal with the risks that the 
     inevitable surprises will pose. As von Clausewitz wrote, 
     ``The unexpected is the prince of the battlefield.''

                           *   *   *   *   *

       The second key factor relative to reduced warning is the 
     extensive and growing foreign assistance, technology transfer 
     and foreign trade in ballistic missile and weapons of mass 
     destruction capabilities. Foreign trade and foreign 
     assistance are, in our view, not a ``wild card.'' They are a 
     fact. The contention that we will have ample warning of 
     developments in nations with ``indigenous'' ballistic missile 
     development programs misses the point. I don't know of a 
     single nation on earth with an ``indigenous'' ballistic 
     missile program. There may not have been a truly indigenous 
     ballistic missile development program since Robert 
     Goddard. The countries of interest are helping each other. 
     They are doing it for a variety of reasons--some 
     strategic, some financial. But, be clear--technology 
     transfer is not rare or unusual, it is pervasive.
       The intelligence task is difficult. There are more actors, 
     more programs and more facilities to monitor than was the 
     case during the Cold War. Their assets are spread somewhat 
     thinly across many priorities. Methodological adjustments 
     relative to collecting and analyzing evidence is, in our 
     view, not keeping up with the pace of events. We need to 
     remember Baldy's Law: ``Some of it (what we see), plus the 
     rest of it (what we don't see) equals all of it.'' Or, as Dr. 
     Bill Graham frequently reminded us, ``The absence of evidence 
     is not evidence of absence.''
       Specifically, Russia and China have emerged as major 
     suppliers of technology to a number of countries. There is 
     the advent and acceleration of trade among second-tier powers 
     to the point that the development of these capabilities may 
     well have become self-sustaining. Today they each have 
     various capabilities the others do not. As they trade--
     whether it's knowledge, systems, materials, components, or 
     technicians--they benefit from each other and are able to 
     move forward on separate development paths, all of which are 
     notably different from ours or that of the Soviet Union. And, 
     they are able to move at a more rapid pace.
       To characterize the programs of target nations as ``high-
     risk'' is a misunderstanding of the situation. These 
     countries do not need the accuracies the U.S. required. They 
     do not have the same concerns about safety that the U.S. has. 
     Nor do they need the high volumes the U.S. acquired. As a 
     result, they are capable of using technologies, techniques 
     and even equipment that the U.S. would have rejected as too 
     primitive as much as three decades ago. But let there be no 
     doubt--they are successfully and rapidly developing the 
     capabilities necessary to threaten the United States.
       As I mentioned, we considered a series of ways nations can 
     shorten the missile development process and, therefore, 
     warning time. They include launching shorter-range missiles 
     by air or sea, by placing them in another country, by missile 
     testing in another country, by the turn-key sale of entire 
     ballistic missile systems to other countries, or some 
     combination.
       These approaches have been characterized as ``unlikely.'' 
     But each has been done. They are not new, novel, high-risk or 
     unlikely.
       As Jim Woolsey pointed out, making ICBMs was like the old 
     4-minute mile barrier. It seemed impossible until Roger 
     Bannister broke it. Today it's relatively easy.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       On the subject of sanctions, you will recall that President 
     Clinton recently said that sanctions legislation causes them 
     to ``fudge.'' It was an honest statement. However, 
     ``fudging'' can have a dangerous effect.
       There are several ways to ``fudge'': First, simply don't 
     study or analyze a matter if the answer might put your 
     superiors in an uncomfortable position; delay studying or 
     reporting up information that would be ``bad news''; narrowly 
     construe an issue, so that the answer will not be adverse to 
     your boss's views or positions; and last, select assumptions 
     that assume that the answer will lead to your desired 
     conclusions. For example, you could study carefully whether 
     or not the U.S. will have adequate warning of ``indigenous'' 
     ballistic missile development programs, even though 
     ``indigenous'' ballistic missile development programs don't 
     exist.
       In short, the effect of ``fudging'' is to warp and corrupt 
     the intelligence process. It is corrosive. Leaders have to 
     create an environment that is hospitable to the truth--
     whether it is bad news or good news--not an environment that 
     forces subordinates to trim, hedge, duck and, as the 
     President said, ``fudge.''

                           *   *   *   *   *

       The recent TD-1 space launch vehicle test is an object 
     lesson and also a warning. Many were skeptical for technical 
     reasons that the TD-1 could fly at all. It had been the 
     conventional wisdom that ``staging'' and systems integration 
     were too complex and difficult for countries such as North 
     Korea to accomplish in any near time frame. Yet North Korea 
     demonstrated staging twice.
       The likelihood that a TD-2 will be successfully tested has 
     gone up considerably since the August 31st flight. The 
     likelihood that a TD-2 flight could exceed 5,000 to 6,000 
     kilometers in range with a nuclear payload has gone up as 
     well. And, the likelihood that we will not know very much in 
     advance of a launch what a TD-2 will be capable of continues 
     to be high.
       Now, the TD-1 launch was interesting with respect to North 
     Korea, but given the reality of technology transfer, what 
     happens in North Korea also is important with respect to 
     other countries, for example, Iran. We can be certain that 
     North Korea will offer that capability to other countries, 
     including Iran. That has been their public posture. It has 
     been their private behavior. They are very, very active 
     marketing ballistic missile technologies. In addition, Iran 
     not only has assistance from North Korea, but it also has 
     assistance from Russia and China, which creates additional 
     options and development paths for them.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       What does this all mean by way of warning? Well, it 
     powerfully reinforces our Commission's conclusions that 
     technology transfer is pervasive and that deception and 
     denial work. I've mentioned ``surprises,'' which of course go 
     to the issue of warning. When do we know something? Put 
     another way--when is what we do know sufficiently clear that 
     it becomes actionable?
       Roberta Wohlstetter's brilliant book Pearl Harbor, and the 
     foreword to it, compellingly argue that: ``. . . we were not 
     caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. We just expected 
     wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but 
     our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some 
     ``obvious'' Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against 
     the choice they actually made.''
       It may have been a somewhat ``improbable'' choice, but it 
     was not all that improbable. We provided the undefended 
     target, and if we know anything from history, it is that 
     weakness is provocative. Weakness entices others into 
     adventures they otherwise would avoid. ``The risk is that 
     what is strange is thought to be ``improbable,'' and what 
     seems improbable is not taken seriously.''
       The book goes on to point out that: ``Surprise, when it 
     happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, 
     diffuse bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of 
     responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or 
     so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes 
     gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a 
     string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to 
     give to those who need it (and this is happening today). It 
     includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm 
     that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It 
     includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows 
     he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher 
     authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that 
     occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes 
     somebody else is taking care

[[Page S12570]]

     of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also 
     decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, 
     in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise 
     to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion, which 
     is usually too late.
       ``The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, 
     and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, 
     widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why 
     surprise, when it happens, is everything involved in a 
     government's failure to anticipate effectively.''
       Does that sound familiar?

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Our Commission's unanimous recommendation was that U.S. 
     analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations 
     of extended warning of deployment of ballistic missile 
     threats be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect 
     the reality of an environment in which there may be little or 
     no warning. Specifically, we believe the Department of State 
     should review its policies and priorities, including 
     sanctions and non-proliferation activities, as well as our 
     alliance activities; the intelligence community should review 
     U.S. collection capabilities, given their changing and 
     increasingly complex task; and, last, that the defense 
     establishment should review both U.S. offensive and defensive 
     capabilities as well as strategies, plans, and procedures 
     that are based on an assumption of extended warning.
       In short, we are in a new circumstance and the policies and 
     approaches that were appropriate when we could rely on 
     extended warning no longer apply.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Recently I have been asked about the reception our report 
     has received. I would say it has been surprisingly good.
       First, the press. The reaction was superb from Bill Safire, 
     but across the country it has been modest. But then there has 
     been a lot of unusual news competition here in Washington, 
     D.C., to say nothing of the news of:
       Russia's economic problems and protests and the last Soviet 
     intelligence chief, Mr. Primakov, being named Prime Minister.
       The Asian financial crisis.
       The Chicago Cubs' Sammy Sosa's brilliant chase for the home 
     run title, to say nothing of Mr. McGwire's accomplishment.
       And, if you can believe it, Quaddafi, of all people, 
     holding a 5-nation summit.
       As to the Department of State and the National Security 
     Council, I am not aware of any public reaction.
       The only reaction from the Department of Defense I am aware 
     of was to reiterate their belief that the U.S. will have 
     ample warning of ``indigenous'' ballistic missile development 
     programs, with which we, of course, would readily agree, if, 
     in fact, any ``indigenous'' ballistic missile programs 
     actually existed--which they don't. As General Lee Butler 
     said at one of our Commission's Congressional hearings, ``If 
     you are determined to do it, there is no body of evidence 
     that cannot be ignored.''
       In the Intelligence Community we see positive changes 
     already. I think it is reasonably certain that the next 
     National Intelligence Estimate will look quite different from 
     the last one. The initial press report on the release of the 
     Commission's findings quoted an ``anonymous CIA source'' as 
     contending that our report was a ``worst case.'' But that was 
     before the North Korean three-stage TD-1 launch in August. We 
     have not seen that phrase used again since. Indeed, our 
     report could prove to have been a ``best case,'' if and when 
     North Korea and/or Iran announce and demonstrate still 
     greater ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction 
     capabilities, as they most surely will in the months ahead.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       We are in a relaxed post-Cold War environment, with 
     increased exchanges of scientists and students, relaxed 
     export controls, leaks of classified information appearing in 
     the press almost daily, espionage continuing apace, an 
     explosion of ``demarches,'' which provide vital information 
     that eventually is used to our disadvantage, and increased 
     international trade of sophisticated dual-use technology.
       It is increasingly clear that anti-proliferation efforts, 
     coupled with the inevitable imposition of still more 
     sanctions--which already cover a large majority of the people 
     on earth--are not stopping other nations from acquiring 
     increasingly sophisticated weapons of mass destruction and 
     missile technologies.
       There are two schools of thought as to how to deal with 
     this obvious failure:
       One is to try still harder and impose still more sanctions.
       The second approach is to seriously work to prevent the 
     availability of the most important technologies, try to delay 
     the availability of the next tier of information, but to 
     recognize that we live in a world where those who don't wish 
     us well will inevitably gain sophisticated weapons, and that, 
     therefore, the answer is to invest as necessary in the 
     offensive and defense capabilities and the intelligence 
     assets that will enable us to live with these increasingly 
     dangerous threats.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       We hear a lot about the defense budget and the top line 
     pressure--that we can't afford more. Look, our country may 
     not be wealthy enough to do everything in the world that 
     everyone in the world may wish, but the first responsibility 
     of government is to provide for the national security. And, 
     let there be no doubt, our country is more than wealthy 
     enough to do everything important that we need to do. Defense 
     expenditures at 3% of GNP are the lowest in my adult 
     lifetime. We need to stop the mindless defense cuts, 
     rearrange our national defense to fit the post-Cold War 
     world, and invest as necessary to assure our nation's ability 
     to contribute to peace and stability in our still dangerous 
     and increasingly untidy world.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       I am optimistic that we will find our way. We are not a 
     nation with but one leader. Our strength is that we have 
     multiple centers of leadership.
       Our central purpose remains as compelling as ever. Quite 
     simply, it is to guard the ramparts of freedom and to expand 
     freedom at home and light its way in the world. This means 
     encouraging freedom abroad and enriching it here at home. It 
     requires purposeful diplomacy underpinned by strong, flexible 
     military power and persuasive moral leadership.
       As Theodore Roosevelt once said, ``Aggressive fighting for 
     the right is the noblest sport that the world affords.'' To 
     those gathered here this evening, who do that each day, you 
     have my thanks and appreciation. Thank you very much.

                          ____________________