[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 146 (Wednesday, October 14, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12488-S12490]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            KOSOVO: A CRISIS AVERTED OR A CRISIS POSTPONED?

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, for the first time in weeks, the news from 
Belgrade regarding Kosovo is encouraging. It would appear--with 
emphasis on the word ``appear''--that Slobodan Milosevic has agreed to 
NATO's terms to withdraw his forces, begin peace negotiations, and 
allow 2,000 international observers into Kosovo.
  If Mr. Milosevic can be taken at his word, this is truly a turning 
point in the negotiations. Unfortunately, as we know from the trail of 
broken promises and from the trail of tears he has left in his wake, 
Slobodan Milosevic's word is worthless. Hopefully, the concurrent 
action NATO has taken to authorize air strikes if Mr. Milosevic does 
not abide by the agreement will be sufficient to persuade him to 
cooperate. I have my doubts.
  As welcome as these new developments are, they do not let Congress 
off the hook. Over the past several weeks, as we have rushed to 
complete our work prior to adjournment, we have tiptoed carefully 
around the role of Congress in authorizing military intervention in 
Kosovo without ever mustering up the courage to confront the issue head 
on.
  On the topic of Kosovo, we have lectured, we have criticized, we have 
urged this or that action, but we have been strangely silent on the 
subject of introducing and voting up or down on a resolution that would 
fulfill our duty, under both the Constitution and the War Powers 
Resolution, to authorize the use of force in Kosovo and throughout 
Serbia.
  The Constitution invests in Congress the power to declare war. The 
War Powers Resolution prohibits the President from waging war beyond 60 
days without Congressional authorization. Whether we are acting 
unilaterally, or as part of a multinational force, or as one member of 
a formal alliance such at NATO, the burden of responsibility on the 
Congress is the same.
  The bottom line here is that Congress has a duty to authorize the use 
of force if and when offensive military action is called for. By 
blinking at the prospect of an authorization of force resolution, we 
are abdicating our responsibility to the Executive Branch and shirking 
our duty to the nation.
  For weeks, Congress has wrung its hands over conditions in Kosovo 
while NATO was moving toward a military showdown in the region and 
while some of us were making solemn speeches condemning the brutality 
of Mr. Milosevic, our NATO allies were moving to authorize air strikes 
in and around Kosovo. The agreement reached with Milosevic has, at the 
very least, bought some time, but it has by no means removed the threat 
of military intervention in Kosovo. If NATO chooses to move forward 
with air strikes in the next few days or weeks, Congress, the only 
branch of Government with the power to declare war, will be just 
another bystander, watching from the sidelines as U.S. troops are 
placed in a hostile environment.
  Mr. President, none of us wants to rush this nation into military 
conflict. None of us wants to place the life of even one American at 
risk. None of us

[[Page S12489]]

wants to give the order to shoot. But we do not have the luxury of 
avoiding such decisions. Whether we like it or not, Congress cannot 
bury its head in the sand when faced with tough issues like declaring 
war or authorizing military action overseas. And whether we wish to 
admit it or not, that is exactly what Congress is doing. When it comes 
to tough issues like Kosovo, Congress seems to want it both ways: we 
want to be able to criticize the administration, but we do not want to 
step up to the plate and take the responsibility of giving the 
administration any guidance.
  Now, this matter of responsibility is a two-way street. Congress has 
responsibility, but so does the administration--at the other end of the 
avenue. The administration has the responsibility--the duty--to consult 
with Congress before committing to military action. And the 
administration has been woefully remiss in accepting its share of the 
responsibility.
  This administration, like so many before it, seems to have confused 
the concept of consultation on the one hand with the act of advising on 
the other. Advising Congress of what the administration has already 
decided to do does not constitute consultation. And charging ahead 
without making a case to Congress and to the American people does not 
even constitute common sense.
  Like many of my colleagues, I have been troubled by several aspects 
of the proposed military intervention in Kosovo by the United States 
and NATO, particularly by the absence of a clear-cut game plan beyond 
the initial air strikes. Given the complexity of the problem and the 
potential consequences of any action we take, it is inexcusable and 
frankly foolhardy for the administration to wait until the eleventh 
hour to make its case to Congress.
  Yes, Congress has the responsibility to exercise its constitutional 
authority, but that does not give the administration the right to toss 
what amounts to a live grenade into Congress's lap and expect action 
before that grenade explodes. Yet, that is the situation with which we 
were forced to deal. We were told by the administration that air 
strikes could come at any time once NATO reached consensus on such 
action. We were alerted that American citizens were being evacuated 
from Yugoslavia. We watched American diplomats ping-ponging back and 
forth between Washington and Belgrade and Brussels. And we were given 
to understand that the administration would like for Congress to 
endorse its efforts.
  Mr. President, this is no way to conduct grave matters of war and 
peace. I congratulate the administration officials who have been 
tirelessly working to find a solution to the perilous situation in 
Kosovo. I am convinced that Secretary of Defense Cohen and Special 
Envoy Richard Holbrooke have gone the extra mile--literally--to end the 
bloodshed and turmoil in Kosovo, and to bring Mr. Milosevic to the 
bargaining table. I spent over an hour meeting with Secretary Cohen 
this past week, and I believe he understands fully the stakes involved 
in attempting to broker peace through the use of force in the Balkans. 
I am confident that he is well aware of the risks and uncertainties 
associated with the actions that have been taken and those being 
contemplated by the United States and our allies.
  I am not ready to give the administration a blanket endorsement--or a 
blank check--to carry out any plan for NATO air strikes on Kosovo. I 
believe there are too many loose ends, too many uncertainties. But I am 
equally unwilling to close my eyes to the problem and simply let the 
chips fall where they may. I commend Senator Daschle and Senator Biden 
and Senator Levin and others for the efforts they have made to deal 
with this situation. They are among a number of Senators who have 
worked to craft a resolution authorizing U.S. intervention in Kosovo, 
if wisdom dictates such intervention. I appreciate their taking my 
concerns into account as they worked to draft a resolution. They took 
my concerns into account by incorporating into the resolution 
provisions that would place some restraints on the administration, 
guard against an open-ended mission, in terms of its length and scope, 
and inject some accountability into the operation, without 
micromanaging the process. The result may or may not have been the best 
solution; it may or may not have been a resolution that I or a majority 
of my colleagues could have supported after reasonable debate, but at 
the very least, it was an effort to acknowledge our constitutional 
responsibility and articulate our concerns.
  Unfortunately, the clock up there on the wall is ticking, and this 
Senate has neither the time nor the inclination to take up such a 
resolution, particularly in light of the recent breakthrough in 
negotiations. I sincerely hope that the agreement Mr. Holbrooke has 
achieved in Belgrade means that military intervention will be averted, 
but I have little confidence that Mr. Milosevic will honor his 
commitment.
  I have a feeling he may do the same as Saddam Hussein has done in 
Iraq. Just watch.
  I would recommend that the sine die adjournment resolution contain 
authority to call Congress back into session. I am not talking about 
the President calling us back. He has that right under the 
Constitution. I am talking about our own leadership calling Congress 
back into session in order to deal with any crisis that might erupt 
over the period between the end of this Congress and the beginning of 
the 106th Congress. I further recommend that the administration 
immediately institute new procedures to truly consult with Congress 
before committing American troops to hostilities overseas.
  Mr. President, I have heard this old record played and replayed over 
and over and over again; a process in which we Senators on both sides 
of the aisle will be notified that there will be a meeting in room 407, 
where classified information can be divulged, at such and such a time, 
such and such a date. And the administration will appear there, the 
administration's Representatives will appear there. I have been to 
several of those meetings.
  Very, very seldom have I found anything, any information divulged in 
those meetings that I haven't already read in the newspapers. And yet 
the administration, whether it be this one or a preceding 
administration, feels that the administration has consulted with 
Congress. The administration hasn't consulted at all. They appear up 
there, and many times they appear to be talking down to us as though we 
are new kids on the block, they know it all and we should just be nice, 
nice boys and girls; they will handle everything; they know everything.
  For me, as far as I am concerned, for the most part, it has become an 
empty exercise to go up to room 407 and listen to the administration's 
people. Consultation involves far more than that.
  In addition to the elected leadership of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, I think the administration should consult--and I do 
mean consult, not merely advise--the chairmen, no matter what their 
gender, and the ranking members of the Appropriations, Armed Services, 
Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees.
  If military action becomes necessary in Kosovo, the administration 
will have to come back to Congress to pay for the operation, and the 
attitude which most administrations appear to have is that if they put 
American men and women into areas where hostilities are either already 
going on or imminent, Congress certainly will not turn its back on 
those men and women; Congress will fork over the money. So the 
administration always--most administrations in recent years--certainly 
seemed to have the idea, ``Well, once we get our men in there, Congress 
will have to come along,'' and we do. Congress isn't going to turn its 
back on our men and women who are in harm's way. But it doesn't breed 
confidence between the two bodies. We were told we would only be in 
Bosnia, oh, something like a year, about a year. That was 3 years ago, 
3 or 4, several years back.
  I predict that administration officials would find the task a good 
deal easier if, when they come back before Congress and ask for money, 
they had truly counseled with Congress, built a case for their request 
and sought the advice of the pertinent committee leadership beforehand.
  Mr. President, I understand absolutely the serious nature of the 
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and the threat to regional stability in 
the Balkans that are posed by Mr. Milosevic's brutal repression of the 
ethnic Albanian

[[Page S12490]]

Kosovars. With winter closing in on Kosovo and up to 70,000 ethnic 
Albanians hiding in the mountains without food or shelter, we are 
looking at the virtual certainty of a humanitarian catastrophe if 
something is not done to bring relief to those people and to ensure the 
safety of the other 250,000 to 400,000 Kosovars who have been forced 
from their homes by the fighting.
  There is a strong case to be made that dealing with the situation in 
Kosovo now will help to prevent it from becoming a flashpoint that 
could draw other nations into the conflict like moths to a flame.
  Viewed in that light, Kosovo is much, much more than a humanitarian 
endeavor. But we in the Congress have no right to wring our hands over 
the plight of the Kosovars while refusing to even debate whatever role 
wisdom may dictate that Congress should play. We have no right to be 
bold when it comes to criticizing NATO's proposed action while being 
timid when it comes to doing our job. Regardless of what anyone else 
does, Congress has a constitutional duty to authorize whatever action 
it deems necessary. We do no one any favor by surrendering our duty to 
the executive branch.
  Mr. President, we cannot adequately address the crisis in Kosovo in 
the time we have remaining in this Congress, but that does not mean we 
ought to completely abandon our responsibility. NATO is prepared to 
conduct airstrikes in the event the agreement reached in Belgrade falls 
apart. Congress should be equally prepared in its sine die adjournment 
resolution. Congress should be ready and should manifest that it is 
ready to reconvene on the call of the bipartisan joint leadership of 
the two Houses of Congress if the situation warrants it.

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