[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 146 (Wednesday, October 14, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12486-S12488]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by thanking the distinguished 
Senator from West Virginia for allowing me to go first. Mr. President, 
the reason I didn't say anything initially is because I hoped to be 
able to still make my commitment in Delaware and hear the Senator from 
West Virginia. I mean that sincerely. It is rare for the Senator from 
West Virginia ever to take the floor if he does not have a serious 
piece of business to conduct. He is going to speak on the same subject 
I am speaking to. I will not get to hear his speech, but I am sure I 
will read it in the Record.
  Mr. President, I had originally intended today to introduce a 
resolution authorizing United States airstrikes against Yugoslavia in 
connection with the Kosovo crisis because I believe our Constitution 
requires the President to come to us for that authority. I have 
decided, however, not to offer the resolution because of recent 
developments, not on the constitutional front, but recent developments 
on the ground. The reality is that we are about to go out of session, 
and my ability to get a vote on this issue is problematic, at best.
  Instead, I rise to discuss the implications for U.S. policy regarding 
the agreement on Kosovo worked out 2 days ago by Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, after more than a 
week of intensive negotiations.
  I might note that it seems at every important point in our history we 
have diplomats and elected officials who rise to the occasion to meet 
the needs of the Nation. I would like to suggest that Richard Holbrooke 
is the right man, at the right time, at the right spot. I compliment 
him. We are fortunate to have his diplomatic skills available to this 
Nation at this moment.
  On Monday, NATO's 16 member nations voted unanimously for what they 
call an ACTORD. That is military terminology for an activation order, 
which allowed the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, U.S. General Wes 
Clark, to order airstrikes, which reportedly would begin with cruise 
missiles and escalate to a phased bombing campaign that would move 
beyond Kosovo.
  Because this action order was taken, I believe, and only because of 
this, our negotiator, Mr. Holbrooke, was able to get an agreement from 
Mr. Milosevic, the criminal President of the Republic of Yugoslavia, to 
agree to certain of NATO's demands. In response, the alliance has 
postponed launching the airstrikes, which have been authorized for 4 
days, in order to assess whether or not he, Mr. Milosevic, will comply. 
I assure you that he will not comply if he believes we are not serious 
about using significant force. The cruise missiles are now on immediate 
standby; B-52s stand ready on the runway equipped with cruise missiles 
to move if Milosevic fails to meet his commitments. The cruise missiles 
are now in immediate standby until Friday evening, U.S. eastern 
daylight time.
  In addition, more than 400 allied aircraft, the majority of them 
American, remain available for a phased air campaign, should that later 
become necessary.
  Mr. President, let me give my assessment right up front. As I said, I 
believe that Ambassador Holbrooke has done a good job. The agreement he 
negotiated in Belgrade is a good one, as long as we can be sure that if 
Milosevic does not keep his word, NATO air power will be used against 
the Yugoslav military and security forces.
  I must tell you, as the senior member in the minority on the Foreign 
Relations Committee, I have mixed emotions about Milosevic's having 
agreed. I believe he only understands force. I believe that he is the 
problem. I believe that, ultimately, force will have to be used. And, 
quite frankly, I wish we had just used this force.
  Mr. President, this agreement has, at least temporarily, averted NATO 
airstrikes against Yugoslavia, which, as I indicated, I strongly 
support. I support them recognizing that they would have endangered the 
lives of American military personnel, which I do not take

[[Page S12487]]

lightly. But we must honestly and forthrightly point out to the 
American people that although the risk was low for high casualties, it 
was high for some casualties. No one wants war, and this agreement may, 
in fact, begin to lay the foundation for a political settlement of the 
crisis in Kosovo. We must understand, though, that war has not been 
permanently averted in Kosovo.
  I would like to review the substance of the agreement negotiated, 
whose broad outlines are clear, but whose details understandably remain 
to be hammered out over the next several days. Milosevic, according to 
the agreement, must take several steps:
  First, he must maintain a cease-fire and scale back the presence of 
both the special police, the so-called MUP, and of the Yugoslav Army, 
or VJ, to February 1998 levels, dropping the regular army presence from 
18,000 to 12,500 and the MUP from 11,000 to 6,500. I, and others, I am 
sure, including Ambassador Holbrooke, would have liked to have seen it 
taken back further. But I acknowledge that this was what was possible.
  Second, Milosevic must sign an agreement with the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe--the so-called OSCE--to allow up to 
2,000 ``compliance verifiers'' full access on the ground in Kosovo to 
make sure that Milosevic is keeping his promises.
  Third, Milosevic must sign an agreement with NATO to allow unarmed 
aircraft to fly over Kosovo to verify compliance with the cease-fire.
  Fourth, he must begin serious negotiations with the Kosovars by 
November 2, with a goal of giving Kosovo at least autonomy within 
Serbia.
  Fifth, he must allow complete access for humanitarian organizations 
to deliver assistance to the hundreds of thousands of internally 
displaced persons within Kosovo. These are the people you see on 
television, huddled in tents in the middle of fields and out in the 
forests.
  I believe it is unrealistic to think that Milosevic can draw down the 
special police and the Army units in Kosovo to February levels by the 
time the Serb-Kosovar negotiations begin on November 2, but he will 
have to have shown substantial movement in that direction by that time.
  Within a day or two, we can expect a statement by Milosevic proposing 
a timetable for negotiations with the Kosovars. These negotiations are 
supposed to be without preconditions. But the United States has made it 
clear that it expects Kosovo to regain a substantial part of the 
autonomy within Serbia that it lost in 1989. Although we do not presume 
to negotiate for the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA, or for Dr. 
Ibrahim Rugova, the moderate Kosovar leader, that is the minimum we 
expect.
  Yesterday, Serbia's President, a Milosevic puppet, announced support 
for elections to a Kosovo parliament, a general amnesty, and the 
formation of a Kosovar police force to maintain order over the ethnic 
Albanian community that comprises more than 90 percent of Kosovo's 
population.
  President Clinton has described the verification regime that 
Milosevic has agreed to as intrusive. It gives the OSCE verifiers a 
broad mandate, including the authority to establish a permanent 
presence in locations of their choosing in Kosovo, to accompany 
remaining Serb military units on patrol, and to coordinate humanitarian 
relief efforts. These verifiers would be backed up by American U2 spy 
planes and lower altitude P3 Orions and British Canberra photo 
reconnaissance planes to verify that compliance was underway. The 
verifiers will be unarmed, but NATO is putting together what we refer 
to as an over-the-horizon Quick Reaction Force, which will be ready to 
intervene on short notice if problems arise.
  Let me explain what was meant by that. There will be armed NATO 
military on the ground--not in Kosovo, not in Serbia--ready to react 
and cross the border if, in fact, Milosevic goes back to his ways of 
ethnic cleansing.
  Although the basing of this Quick Reaction Force has not yet been 
announced, I am told that there is an increasing likelihood that 
Macedonia, rather than Hungary or Italy, will be chosen as the 
location. Obviously, military requirements must dictate the basing 
decision, but in my view the choice of Macedonia would provide a needed 
political and psychological boost for that small country, which itself 
has a restive ethnic Albanian minority.
  I feel our European allies should take the lead on this Quick 
Reaction Force. I have reason to believe that the United Kingdom, which 
is in the best position of our allies to play such a role, may step up 
to the plate and take on this responsibility.
  Meanwhile, Milosevic has, as expected, orchestrated the crisis to 
move against domestic opposition within Serbia. Democratic politicians 
in Serbia--and there are some--have been threatened. Many independent 
radio stations have been forced off the air, and dozens of university 
professors who find Milosevic's conduct abhorrent, have been dismissed.
  Diplomacy is not an easy art. Ambassador Holbrooke, as I said 
earlier, is to be congratulated for his persistence and stamina in 
crafting this agreement. As yet, no text has been released, and many of 
the details remain to be worked out in the coming days.
  Although all Kosovar politicians, from the nonviolent leader Dr. 
Rugova to the KLA, vociferously maintain their insistence on 
independence for Kosovo, I believe most are prepared to accept the 
return of the pre-1989 autonomy, with the decision on the final status 
to be deferred for several years.
  My supposition is that between now and November 2, U.S. diplomats 
will work on a fresh draft that will be accepted by Milosevic and the 
Kosovars as the basis for negotiations. This will not be an easy task.
  Assuming that the Belgrade agreement holds, where are we, and what 
are the implications for U.S. policy?
  In the short term, the Belgrade agreement will be seen by some in the 
Balkans as a victory for Milosevic, since Kosovo will remain part of 
Serbia and the KLA, temporarily at least, will be denied its goal of 
independence. I might add, though, that in the short term, a NATO air 
campaign, most likely would also have redounded to Milosevic's credit, 
since the Serbs' first reaction would have been to rally round their 
flag.
  It is important to note, however, that if the Belgrade agreement is 
implemented, Serbian sovereignty will be undermined by the large 
international presence with wide powers and, eventually, I believe, by 
some sort of stipulation regarding a decision on final political status 
for Kosovo after a period of several years.
  As I have said many times on this floor, I do not favor independence 
for Kosovo. It would send the message in the region that state 
boundaries should be determined by ethnicity. The first casualty of 
independence of Kosovo at this moment would be the multiethnic, 
multireligious, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina that underpins Dayton and 
is the goal of American policy. I believe it would also seriously 
destabilize neighboring Macedonia.
  Instead of independence, I have argued for a status in Kosovo between 
that of autonomy within Serbia and independence. But that is for the 
parties to work out. This could possibly take the form of republic 
status within Yugoslavia, but within a democratic Yugoslavia, not the 
current plaything of the thug named Milosevic.
  That brings me to the fundamental Balkan policy point that we should 
cease regarding Milosevic as part of the solution rather than as the 
problem incarnate. There is simply no chance for peace in the long term 
in the region until Milosevic is replaced by a democratic government in 
Belgrade that is willing to grant cultural and political rights to all 
of its citizens, Serbs and non-Serbs alike, and to respect the 
sovereignty of its neighbors.
  I have no illusions that Belgrade is full of politicians who read 
Jefferson and Madison in their spare time. Nonetheless, I do not think 
we have paid adequate attention to the democratic opposition that does 
exist. Let's not forget that a democratic coalition did win control of 
17 major city councils, including that of Belgrade, in the elections of 
November 1996. Even now, despite many divisions within the democratic 
ranks, there are significant elements in Serbian politics, in the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, among journalists, and in academe that could 
and should be assisted in a major way by the United States of America.

[[Page S12488]]

  For now, Milosevic has strengthened his grip on power by suppressing 
much of the opposition and spinning the news to emphasize his defiance 
of the West and NATO's supposed backing down, but that will be short 
lived. As Serbia's already pathetic economy worsens, opportunities will 
reemerge for a broad-based democratic opposition to challenge 
Milosevic.
  We should be patient while protecting life.
  We should lay the groundwork for that day by continuing to insist 
that the Serbian authorities lift the onerous restrictions under which 
the independent media chafe, by funding those independent media, and by 
encouraging intensive contact between democratic Western political 
parties and trade unions and their Serbian counterparts.
  In my first visit to Serbia, when I had a long meeting in Belgrade in 
1993 with Milosevic, I indicated to him then as forthrightly as I could 
when he asked what I thought of him, I said to him in the privacy of 
his office, ``Mr. President, I think you are a war criminal and should 
be tried as such.''
  I then met with over 100 people in opposition to Milosevic of all 
stripes, some extreme nationalists in opposition and some Democrats.
  The only point I wish to make is that there are roots for democratic 
growth in Serbia, and we should seek them out.
  In the coming days, NATO must watch Milosevic like a hawk and not be 
afraid to act militarily if he fails to fulfill the terms of the 
Belgrade agreement, particularly the movement toward reducing the 
numbers of his special police in Kosovo and sending the army back to 
its barracks and its heavy weaponry into cantonments.
  One must not forget, Mr. President, who have been the big losers in 
the tragedy of the last eight months. They are the approximately one-
third of the Kosovar population whose ranks include perhaps one 
thousand killed, over three hundred thousand driven from their homes, 
and over four hundred villages destroyed.
  All this in order for Milosevic, whose legacy already includes 
hundreds of thousands of Bosnian and Croatian dead, to cling to power 
by once again diverting the attention of the Serbian people from the 
failure of his ignorant and hopelessly inept domestic policies.
  At least we can be thankful that if the Belgrade agreement is 
implemented, international relief supplies should reach the hundreds of 
thousands of displaced Kosovars, including many living in the open, 
thereby preventing massive fatalities this winter.
  On the wider stage, NATO has set the important precedent that in 
certain circumstances it has the right to intervene in the internal 
affairs of a European state, without an explicit U.N. Security Council 
authorization.
  This is a big deal.
  NATO has also made clear to Russia that, in accordance with the 1997 
NATO-Russia Founding Act, negotiated by NATO Secretary General Solana 
and the President of the United States, Moscow has ``a voice, not a 
veto'' over NATO policy. That has been reemphasized here as well.

  Nevertheless, partly because of Russian objections and partly because 
of the congenital Western European aversion to using force to achieve 
political ends, NATO waited several months too long to create the 
credible threat necessary to compel Milosevic to stop his brutal 
repression notwithstanding U.S. urging.
  In effect, the delay enabled Milosevic to complete the short-term 
destruction of the KLA and the ethnic cleansing in western and central 
Kosovo that he desired.
  If similar crises arise in the future, we should give ad hoc bodies 
like the Contact Group one chance to get its act together.
  If it doesn't, then we should, without delay, go to NATO and call for 
resolute action.
  The kind of ethnic conflict we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo was 
specifically mentioned in NATO's so-called Strategic Concept nearly 
seven years ago as the prototype for threats to the alliance in the 
post-Cold War era.
  So this is not a surprise to NATO. For that reason--not to mention 
the thousands of lives that can be spared--we must never again allow 
racist thugs like Milosevic to carry out their outrages while the 
alliance dawdles.
  The Belgrade agreement on Kosovo is a first step in the right 
direction. And President Clinton should be complimented. Its details 
need to be fleshed out.
  After they are we must brook no more opposition from Milosevic on its 
implementation. To use a domestic American term, we must adopt a policy 
of ``zero tolerance'' with the Yugoslav bully.
  Many of us had hoped that the mistakes that enabled the Bosnian 
horrors to take place would teach us a lesson.
  Unfortunately, we have repeated many of those errors and have thereby 
allowed Milosevic and his storm troopers to repeat their atrocities in 
Kosovo.
  Twice is enough. There must not be a third time.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  I particularly thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, my 
leader.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has 5 minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware.

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