[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 145 (Tuesday, October 13, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E2114]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 USEFUL RECOMMENDATIONS ON NORTH KOREA

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, October 13, 1998

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, a few days ago members of an independent 
task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and created to 
examine U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula wrote to President 
Clinton about the deteriorating situation on the peninsula.
  The task force members pointed out that the 1994 Agreed Framework 
with North Korea is a necessary but not sufficient component of a U.S. 
policy designed to enhance stability on the peninsula. Task force 
members offered the President a number of recommendations, with a view 
to ensuring the long term viability of U.S. policies toward the 
peninsula.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that Members will profit by reading the 
recommendations of the task force. Accordingly, I ask leave to reprint 
the task force's letter to President Clinton in the Congressional 
Record.

                                 Council on Foreign Relations,

                                  Washington, DC, October 7, 1998.
     Hon. Bill Clinton,
     President of the United States of America,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President. We are members of an independent task 
     force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations to 
     examine U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. In this 
     letter we write from our deep concern about the 
     sustainability of U.S. policy after the discovery of what may 
     be an underground nuclear facility in North Korea. At the 
     very least, this development contradicts the American 
     people's expectations of North Korea under the 1994 Agreed 
     Framework. At worst, it represents an outright violation of 
     the accord and a continuing determination by the DPRK to 
     develop nuclear weapons that would threaten the entire 
     region. The credibility of existing arrangements with 
     Pyongyang has been further undermined by the August 31 launch 
     of a North Korean ballistic missile over Japan, even assuming 
     it was just a missile to launch a satellite. Thus far, 
     negotiations aimed at clarifying North Korean adherence to 
     the Agreed Framework have yielded little. Meanwhile, the U.S. 
     Congress is close to eliminating funding for the Korean 
     Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which also 
     could lead to a collapse of the Agreed Framework.
       In our opinion, the Agreed Framework is a necessary--but 
     not sufficient--component of a policy designed to enhance 
     stability on the peninsula. Unless and until it is proven 
     that North is violating the accord, it should remain a 
     centerpiece of U.S. policy. Although the Agreed Framework 
     does not, in itself, address the larger threat represented by 
     North Korean terrorism, missiles, conventional weapons, and 
     weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we recognize that these 
     issues will be more difficult to address if we unilaterally 
     dismantle the Agreed Framework and attempt to start over from 
     square one. We also recognize that any unilateral U.S. move 
     that precipitates the collapse of the Agreed Framework would 
     seriously complicate our relations with Seoul and Tokyo. 
     Moreover, we note that an end to the Agreed Framework would 
     allow North Korea to accelerate any nuclear weapons program 
     by utilizing the facilities at Yongbyon, which are now 
     effectively capped by the bilateral agreement.
       However, in view of the deteriorating situation, we urge 
     you to consider the following steps:
       1. Order a careful examination of current U.S. policy, in 
     light of new circumstances, to include: our interpretations 
     of North Korean intentions; the effectiveness of our 
     coordination with allies; our long-term policy objectives; 
     integration of our disparate negotiating instruments with 
     Pyongyang into a more comprehensive approach; and a 
     consideration of our posture, should the North Korean nuclear 
     effort remain active or the Agreed Framework collapse. This 
     examination should be completed within 60 days.
       2. As part of the examination, it is essential to clarify 
     North Korean intentions with regard to the suspect 
     underground facility and adherence to the Agreed Framework. 
     Future funding for KEDO, in our view, should therefore be 
     conditioned on: North Korean clarification of the underground 
     facility and any other suspect sites, with full inspections 
     as required; completion of all canning of the fuel rods at 
     Yongbyon; and a firm deadline for completion of both 
     requirements, set sometime before delivery of FY 99 Heavy 
     Fuel Oil is completed in October 1999.
       3. Appoint a senior person (or persons) from outside 
     government to lead this examination of U.S. policy. This 
     person should have the stature necessary to establish 
     bipartisan support in the Congress and to work closely with 
     our South Korean and Japanese allies on a common approach. 
     This senior person should convey directly to those at the 
     center of power in Pyongyang the seriousness with which the 
     United States views recent North Korean actions and should 
     test North Korean actions and should test North Korean 
     willingness to engage in more constructive approaches to our 
     long-standing confrontation.
       4. If North Korean adherence to the Agreed Framework is 
     credibly reaffirmed, then the re-examination of longterm U.S. 
     policy on the peninsula should also consider a decision to 
     eliminate on a case by case basis those trade sanctions on 
     North Korea implemented under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 
     This step would complement Seoul's approach to the North, 
     which is designed to expose North Korea to external forces 
     for gradual change by allowing a limited degree of private 
     cultural and economic interaction with the North. It must be 
     emphasized, however, that such moves are unthinkable without 
     Pyongang's clarification of its adherence to the Agreed 
     Framework, and that failure on North Korea's part to do so 
     will lead eventually to a collapse of the accord in any case.
       In sum, we believe: (a) that the actions of North Korea and 
     mounting opposition to the Agreed Framework could lead 
     quickly to a new crisis; (b) that recent developments require 
     a re-examination of our approach to North Korea; (c) that the 
     Agreed Framework shall remain the cornerstone of building a 
     new relationship with North Korea only if North Korea can 
     provide access to demonstrate that it is not pursuing a 
     nuclear weapons capability.
       We believe the gravity of the situation requires no less 
     than these steps, and that the longterm viability of U.S. 
     policy toward the peninsula will be put at risk by short-term 
     fixes designed only to obtain funding for the Agreed 
     Framework.
           Respectfully,
         Morton Abramowitz, James Laney, Richard L. Armitage, 
           Daniel E. Bob, Jerome A. Cohen, James Delaney, William 
           Drennan, L. Gordon Flake, Micael J. Green, Donald P. 
           Gregg, Morton H. Halperin, Frank S. Jannuzi, Richard 
           Kessler, Robert A. Manning, Marcus Noland, Sam Nunn, 
           Donald Oberdorfer, Kongdan Oh, James J. Przystup, 
           Robert W. RisCassi, Jason T. Shaplen, Stephen J. 
           Solarz, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 
           William Watts, Donald S. Zagoria.

           

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