[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 141 (Friday, October 9, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E2008]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

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                            HON. KEN CALVERT

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, October 8, 1998

  Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Speaker, last December I attended the international 
global warming summit in Kyoto, Japan. I took with me to the meeting 
information I had gathered at three hearings I convened in my Science 
Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. At those hearings, where 
the Subcommittee took testimony from experts in climatology, it became 
obvious that there is no clear scientific consensus on which the 
Administration can base its claim that human-induced global warming is 
harming our planet.
  Over the next few days I will submit for the Record portions of 
studies that bring to light the weaknesses in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Today, I am submitting an Executive Summary of an analysis of the 
agreement conducted by the Business Roundtable. The summary gives an 
excellent account of the key issues of concern regarding the Protocol, 
making clear that the agreement has serious flaws in terms of its 
ability to improve the environment without harming the economy:

        Executive Summary of the Kyoto Protocol: A Gap Analysis

       In an in-depth analysis of an international agreement to 
     curb greenhouse-gas emissions, The Business Roundtable finds 
     that the accord, known as the Kyoto Protocol, contains major 
     gaps that must be filled before its impact on the world's 
     environment and economy can be evaluated. The Business 
     Roundtable recognizes that the Protocol is only a first step 
     toward a comprehensive agreement to reduce emissions, but 
     urges the Clinton Administration not to sign the Kyoto 
     Protocol until these gaps have been addressed.
       Background: On December 11, 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, the 
     Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
     reached an agreement, known as the Kyoto Protocol, that sets 
     legally binding limits on the man-made emissions of 
     greenhouse gases from 38 industrialized countries. Global 
     carbon emissions would continue to increase under the 
     agreement because it exempts Developing Countries--including 
     China, India, Mexico, Brazil, and 130 others--from any 
     commitments to limit their rapidly growing emissions. 
     Continued growth in energy demand, and thus greenhouse-gas 
     emissions, by Developing Countries will more than offset the 
     reductions made by Developed Countries. President Clinton is 
     expected to sign the Kyoto Protocol later this year, but he 
     does not intend to submit the agreement to the Senate for its 
     constitutional role of advice and consent until ``key'' 
     Developing Countries agree to ``participate meaningfully'' in 
     the effort.


                         key issues of concern

       The targets and timetables would require the United States 
     to make significant and immediate cuts in energy use. The 
     Protocol would require the U.S. to reduce emissions 7 percent 
     below 1990 levels by 2008-2012, an unprecedented 41 percent 
     reduction in projected emission levels. The process of Senate 
     ratification and the subsequent lengthy domestic 
     implementation process post-ratification would leave the U.S. 
     very little time to make the painful choices regarding energy 
     use that will be necessary to achieve these reductions. In 
     addition, because the Protocol sets different targets for 
     each industrialized country and the target is based on what 
     is now an eight-year old baseline, the U.S. in effect will 
     shoulder a disproportionate level of reduction and may be 
     placed at a competitive disadvantage.
       Unless the Developing Countries also commit to emission 
     reductions, the Protocol is incomplete and will not work. The 
     Byrd-Hagel Resolution unanimously adopted by the U.S. Senate 
     in July 1997 states that the U.S. should not be a signatory 
     to any protocol unless it mandates ``new specific scheduled 
     commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse-gas emissions for 
     the Developing Country Parties within the same compliance 
     period.'' Many Developing Countries are rapidly growing their 
     economies and will become the largest emitters of greenhouse 
     gases in the next 15-20 years. Greenhouse gases know no 
     boundaries, and stabilization of greenhouse-gas 
     concentrations cannot be achieved without global 
     participation in a limitation-reduction effort. Moreover, 
     regulating the emissions of only a handful of countries could 
     lead to the migration of energy-intensive production--such as 
     the chemicals, steel, petroleum refining, aluminum and mining 
     industries--from the industrialized countries to the growing 
     Developing Countries.
       Certain carbon ``sinks'' may be used to offset emission 
     reductions, but the Protocol does not establish how sinks 
     will be calculated. Carbon sinks, a natural system that 
     absorbs carbon dioxide, have tremendous potential as a means 
     of reducing emissions, but too much is currently unknown to 
     make a fair determination. It is unclear how sinks might help 
     the U.S. reach its emission-reduction commitment and, though 
     the Parties to the Convention will work to develop rules and 
     guidelines for sinks in Buenos Aires, the rules cannot be 
     adopted until after the Protocol enters into force.
       The Protocol Contains no mechanisms for compliance and 
     enforcement.
       Simply put, it would be inappropriate for any country to 
     ratify a legally binding international agreeement which lacks 
     compliance guidelines and enforcement mechanisms. The 
     Protocol outlines a system of domestic monitoring with 
     oversight by international review teams, but what constitutes 
     compliance and who judges it will not be determined until 
     after the Protocol enters into force. The means of 
     enforcement--also unknown--is equallly critical, since a 
     country's noncompliance could give it a competitive advantage 
     over the U.S., and eviscerate the agreement's environmental 
     goals.
       The Protocol includes flexible, market-based mechanisms to 
     achieve emission reductions, but it does not establish how 
     these mechanisms would work and to what extent they could be 
     used. The U.S. intends to rely heavily on market-based 
     mechansims to find the most efficient and cost-effective ways 
     to reduce emissions. But until the rules and regulations are 
     established it is uncertain how effective these mechanisms 
     will be and to what extent they can be used by companies. 
     Many countries are resisting these market-based mechanisms 
     and their reluctance may hinder the development of adequate 
     free-market guidelines. The absence of many countries from 
     the marketplace, and the possible limitations and 
     restrictions on the marketplace, could render these 
     mechanisms useless or of little value.
       The Protocol leaves the door open for the imposition of 
     mandatory policies and measures to meet commitments. Just as 
     the U.S. favors flexible market mechanisms, the European 
     Union and many Developing Countries favor harmonized, 
     mandatory ``command-and-control'' policies and measures--such 
     as carbon taxes and CAFE standards--to meet commitments, and 
     they will have numerous opportunities to seek adoption of 
     these policies.
       Finally, the procedures for ratification of, and amendment 
     to, the Kyoto Protocol make it difficult to remedy before it 
     enter into force. The Protocol may not be amended, nor can 
     rules and guidelines be adopted, until after the Protocol 
     enters, into force. The Clinton Administration is now 
     considering the negotiation of a separate or supplemental 
     protocol to attain necessary additional commitments, but this 
     approach would open all issues to further negotiation.
       The Business Roundtable believes that the Congress and the 
     American people cannot evaluate the Kyoto Protocol until the 
     Administration sets out a plan as to how it intends to meet 
     the targets of the Protocol. To place the magnitude of the 
     U.S. reduction commitments in perspective, it is the 
     equivalent of having to eliminate all current emissions for 
     either the U.S. transportation sector, or the utilities 
     sector (residential and commerical sources), or industry. The 
     Administration needs to detail how targets in the Protocol 
     will be met, and how the burden will be distributed among the 
     various sectors of the economy.
       The Business Roundtable feels it is imperative that a 
     public dialogue take place on the major issues highlighted in 
     our Gap Analysis before the Protocol becomes the law of the 
     land and government agencies begin to write regulations.

     

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