[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 140 (Thursday, October 8, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11896-S11900]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
KOSOVO
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to continue a series of remarks
that I have placed before the Senate in the past several weeks
regarding the increasing problems relating to Kosovo. Together, with
other Senators, I have tried to avail myself of every opportunity to
learn about this situation. Just weeks ago, I made a trip myself into
the region, accompanied by two outstanding ambassadors, Miles and Hill,
and had an opportunity to get firsthand impressions. My trip included
Bosnia, Belgrade, Macedonia, and Kosovo.
Those impressions, together with many years of really hard work
studying the Balkan region, having first gone, in September 1992, into
Sarajevo, I have even greater concern today about the implications of
the problems unfolding in Kosovo and the necessity for the world to
respond to stop the tragic killing that is taking place every day.
I commend the majority leader--indeed, I am sure there are others who
have worked diligently on this--but he has, in this busiest of all
weeks of the year in the Senate, found time to convene in his office
and otherwise meet with people--and I have joined him on several
occasions--about this situation. Indeed, a few days ago a group of us
sent a letter to the President of the United States expressing our
concerns. This was a letter that followed the briefing by the
Secretaries of State and Defense, with the National Security Adviser
and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Mr. President, I will address particular parts of that letter to the
President and his response. The response was quite comprehensive.
Further today, I, and I am sure other Members of the Senate, have
received drafts of proposed resolutions put forth by a Member on that
side of the aisle and a Member on this side of the aisle. Given that
they are drafts, and I don't know what the ultimate intention of the
drafters will be, I will not identify the persons who distributed the
drafts as a senatorial courtesy, but I would like to address my
concerns relevant to both drafts.
The purpose today is, again, to give my personal views regarding the
plan of operation that has been laid before us publicly by this
administration, by the NATO commanders and, indeed, by one or more of
our allies, notably Great Britain.
I commend their Minister for National Security and Defense. He has
spoken most forthrightly. Indeed, I think his views closely match my
own, and that is, any planning to go forward to correct the problems
that exist in Kosovo today has to be, in my judgment, and in his,
twofold--ground as well as air.
One, a very decisive series of airstrikes, which I support. I
believe, and others believe, that a necessary second component of any
military action, to back up the airstrikes, has to be the quick
placement of a stabilization ground force into Kosovo, into the region,
primarily the capital, Pristina. If that is not done, Mr. President,
the goals of the airstrikes can not have been fulfilled in my opinion.
In my judgment, the predominant number of military units involved in
that airstrike would be American, because of our specialized aircraft
and air-to-ground precision ordinance. Our
[[Page S11897]]
Allies in NATO will provide other important air assets. I think in
order to consolidate the gains that we can anticipate from those air
strikes, a stabilization force has to be put in place on the ground.
The main urgency of the moment--is some approximately quarter of a
million Kosovars, Albanians who have been driven from their homes and
villages into the hills who are confronting now another enemy. Once it
was the Milosevic police, the Milosevic regular army, but now it is
weather that is forcing these tragic people to endure conditions which
will be severely injurious to their health and safety.
Food, medicine, and shelter must be brought in beginning immediately,
to alleviate that crisis. And secondly, we want to have a cessation to
the conflicts that have gone on between these peoples for these many
months which have resulted in some 2,000-plus deaths, largely again
suffered by the Albanians, the 90 percent of the population. But,
indeed, there are incidents where the KLA, the insurgent forces within
the Albanian population, have got to answer, themselves, for their
responsibility for certain tragic killings of Serbs in this area. There
are not clean hands on either side.
But again, to summarize the objectives: Get immediate relief in for
these refugees; and, secondly, stabilize the fighting among the
minority Serbians and the majority Albanians.
If that is not done, if that stabilization force is not quickly put
in, this situation could even escalate in terms of the killing, because
you will have removed that military force, i.e., the Serbian
paramilitary police, and indeed the regular army, and the remnants that
will be left of the Serbian people, such police that are left, will
then be faced with the preponderance of a 90 percent ethnic Albanian
population coming down out of the hills. And I doubt that they will
come down and shake hands with their former Serbian neighbors--finding
their homes ravaged, destroyed, their livestock killed, their fields
burned. It will not be, Mr. President, a very peaceful setting once the
air seals off the flow of heavy armaments and military down from
Belgrade.
Mr. President, herein is the problem as I see it. Our administration,
regrettably--and I will refer to their letter momentarily--regrettably,
has evaded, in my judgment, a full debate on the issue of the need for
a stabilization force. They have focused the public attention in our
country solely on the need for an airstrike, leaving out what I think
should be responsible dialogue, beginning with the President and the
Secretaries of State and Defense, on the need for a stabilization
force.
Yesterday, I met with a senior officer from NATO, together with other
Senators, and he clearly understood the necessity for that
stabilization force. Indeed, I happen to know firsthand NATO has
studied the need for it. NATO has contingency plans to address that.
The plans range all the way from taking the indigenous KDOM, which is a
very interesting creation in this conflict--it is a combination of
military people from the United States, Canada, and certain other
European nations, and indeed I think some Russians, together with
diplomatic officials from those nations who go out into this region,
unarmed, for the purpose of reporting back on what is taking place in
terms of the ravaging of the countryside, the condition of those who
have been driven into the hills. And it has been a very valuable source
of information for the free world to have had the reports of KDOM. I
traveled with them; they are a brave lot.
One option is to enlarge the KDOM. But again, KDOM is not there for
military purposes. They are not trained as policemen. They are not
trained as security forces. The individual military officers may have
some training, but certainly by design and in terms of the logistic
equipment, and the like, they are not prepared, in my judgment, to take
on the potential parameters of conflicts that could break out following
air strikes.
Next it is thought that one or more organizations, like the O.S.C.E.
in Europe, could come in and take over this situation to provide a
stabilizing force. But that organization has no history. It has no
history of taking on an operation of this magnitude. It has no
logistical support. It has no experience in coordinating, bringing in
troops from other countries.
And so after dialogue with our guests yesterday, and dialogue with
many others, it is my judgment that only NATO can provide such
stabilization force as will be necessary in the immediate aftermath of
a series of airstrikes--I repeat that--only NATO. I believe it unwise
for the Administration now to rule out U.S. ground forces as being a
part of a stabilization force composed of several NATO members.
When we had the Secretary of Defense before the Armed Services
Committee the other day, regrettably, he did not respond with the
precision I would have liked regarding U.S. participation. Indeed, I
think the record reflects statements to the effect that there will be
no U.S. participation should a ground element for stabilization be
necessary.
Mr. President, I do not think that we should embark--I want to repeat
that--I do not think we should embark on these airstrikes without a
resolution of how that stabilization force is to be constituted and
whether or not the United States will be a part of that force, because
we will have started a situation of hitting a sovereign country. We
have done that twice already here in the past month or two--hitting a
sovereign nation with predominantly U.S. air assets--with really no
clear understanding of what is going to take place immediately
afterwards on the ground in Kosovo.
We talk about a peace settlement. All of us would like to have a
peace settlement, but I cannot believe that if you inflict severe air
damage of the magnitude it will take to bring Milosevic, the principal
wrongdoer in this whole situation--the principal wrongdoer for years
and years, beginning back in Bosnia --you cannot suddenly expect him to
come to the negotiating table in a matter of days. And it is within
those days that the instability could grow in the Kosovo region. That
is my concern.
This instability could spread over into Albania, which is already
torn by civil strife. Refugees could begin to flow into Montenegro.
Montenegro is now burdened, heavily burdened, with refugees from
Albania. More refugees into Macedonia. This whole region could be
destabilized unless a stabilization force is put into Kosovo in a
timely way.
And further, in my judgment, the work that we have done, together
with our allies over many years, to secure Bosnia, to the extent we
achieved any results there--certainly relative peace compared to the
war of several years ago--that could well be undermined, because if the
insurgents down in Kosovo are not contained, that will spread into
Bosnia and begin to undo what we have achieved, what little we have
achieved thus far, toward the implementation of the Dayton accords.
So my purpose in addressing Kosovo, again, is twofold. These
resolutions in draft form call for only U.S. participation in
airstrikes. I mean, it is very clearly laid out in both these
resolutions. One of them states that: Whereas the Secretary of Defense,
William Cohen, opposes the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo, as
reflected in his testimony before Congress on October 6, and clearly
says that while we support the use of air, it will be air, and air
alone.
That I think is an unwise position for the U.S. to take.
Let me give you an example. Should it be the consensus of NATO that
you have to bring a NATO ground force into Kosovo for stabilization,
which is my judgment, and you plant the NATO flag, and the U.S. flag is
not on the staff, we are not represented there, the question arises
why? I mean, we bring into question, who is the commander in chief of
NATO? It is an American officer. An American officer is to command of a
stabilization force put into a hostile region, and there is not a
single additional American there in that force! We should not take that
position now.
I fought for many years placing the ground troops in Bosnia. Year
after year I voted against it. It was only on the last vote where I
joined Senator Dole that I relented. I had no desire to see Americans
go in there. I questioned, in some way, the vital security interests.
But that s history; we are on the ground in Bosnia and our troops, with
other SFOR elements are working
[[Page S11898]]
to secure a lasting peace. NATO's credibility is on the line now in
Kosovo, for only a credible threat to use force can move settlement
talks in Belgrade.
If NATO leaders, upon failure of diplomacy, launch a NATO air
operation, the credibility of NATO is on the line.
I think you should not start the air until we have fully answered the
question: How do you secure the benefits flowing from the air operation
and stabilize that region until the negotiators can come to the table
and work out a cease fire.
The other resolution being circulated today, likewise, calls solely
for air, very explicitly. It has another provision in here which
troubles me a great deal; that is, you can only use air for 6 months
unless there is further consideration by the Congress.
Mr. President, we have known for a long time that setting deadlines
with regard to troops just does not work. Therefore, the placing of a
deadline in connection with the use of air and limiting it to 6 months,
to me, is not a wise way to proceed. Therefore, I have indicated I
would not participate; indeed, I would vote against either of these
resolutions should they come back in this form. Both resolutions limit
the U.S. participation to air. The President is authorized to use the
U.S. Armed Forces for the purpose only of conducting air operations and
missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Again, you cannot plan an air operation without a concomitant means
to secure the ground.
Let me pose the hypothetical: Suppose you strike with air and you are
successful in destroying certain targets, then is Milosevic likely to
sit there and do nothing? He could counterattack. His only means of
counterattack, in all probability, given his air capability is largely
destroyed, his naval capability is hopefully bottled up in the caves or
elsewhere, his only avenue to retaliate would be on the ground;
perhaps, once again, send out his column of tanks and his column of
heavy artillery. Bad weather and darkness of night travel could inhibit
air operations.
Air could interdict, I am sure, much of it, but it might require a
ground force at some point to interdict such actions as may be taken in
retaliation by Milosevic.
I urge the Senate to be very, very cautious as we proceed. I hope to
continue our debate with other Senators here as it relates to this
situation.
I turn to the response of the President. As I said, it contained
specific responses. This is the President speaking. On page 4 he
states:
Second, on the question of ground force, although NATO
planners reviewed a broad range of options, some of which
would involve grounding forces and hostile circumstances. I
can assure you [this is written to all nine of us] the United
States would not support these options and there is currently
no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The mission under
consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not
military forces on the ground.
Now, to me, that is just faulty planning.
I do support the use of force to stop the killing, to enable the NGOs
and others to have an environment into which they can bring supplies to
help these people. I do not give my support unless a convincing
argument is put forth about a stabilizing force and the need to have
that force in order to secure the Kosovo region.
We have to be very careful that the credibility of NATO is protected.
It is on the line. We cannot allow the NATO force to be considered as
acting in concert with the KLA. That is a tough call. Try and find a
KLA leader. They are difficult to find. I am not talking about Rugova
in Pristina. He has been accessible to all. These militants, the heads
of the KLA troops, in this area of Kosovo are not well defined, not
well known, and not well coordinated. It is a problem to contain them
once we begin to use our air. We cannot seem to be coming in here with
a military hand to support Kosovo gaining independence from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. That is not our goal.
Again, only a ground force containing this situation in Kosovo, until
such time as a settlement can be worked out at the table, is the only
way, in my judgment, that this matter can be resolved.
I hope other Senators will come forward and give their views because
this could break in military action any day now. I don't predict in any
way when the strike may begin. Hopefully, diplomatic efforts, which are
still ongoing, can prevent the necessity of the use of force. It is
only that credible determination to use force, as perceived in
Belgrade, that will bring about successful diplomatic negotiations.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the letter to the
President and his response to the majority leader, which I referred to
earlier, printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follos:
U.S. Senate,
Office of the Majority Leader,
Washington, DC, October 2, 1998.
Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
The White House, Washington, DC
Dear Mr. President: We are writing to express our concerns
about your Administration's policy toward Kosovo. Since the
Serbian military offensive began in Kosovo more than seven
months ago, senior Administration officials have repeatedly
stated that Serbian actions would not be tolerated. For
example, in March 1998, Secretary of State Albright stated,
``We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian
authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away
with in Bosnia.'' The same month, your Special Representative
threatened ``the most dire consequences imaginable'' in
response to Serbian offensives. Since these statements, many
of us indicated we would support military action to halt
Serbian ethnic cleansing. However, it is now more difficult
for us to have confidence that military action accomplish the
stated goals. U.S. credibility has suffered great damage
because U.S. threats have not been carried out. Milosevic has
had the luxury of time to accomplish his goals in Kosovo.
We listened carefully as your senior national security
officials briefed Senators yesterday. Clearly, we recognize
the stakes involved in Kosovo, including the danger the
conflict will spread to neighboring countries, the importance
for our credibility and for that of the NATO alliance, and
the ongoing human tragedy created by months of ruthless
attacks by Serbian forces. We also recognize the seriousness
of the action you are contemplating. It means, as Senator
Lugar stated yesterday, going to war with an attack on a
sovereign country. We do not believe you have taken the
necessary steps to prepare the Congress and the American
people for such a weightily decision. In fact you have not
even asked the Congress to authorize the use of military
force.
We are troubled by a number of aspects of the plans and
policies contemplated by your Administration.
First, we cannot support military operations by U.S. Armed
Forces in Kosovo unless and until you commit to request a
significant increase in the defense budget to address the
shortfalls in military readiness, personnel and modernization
recently acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
crisis in military readiness that has only belatedly been
acknowledged by your Administration is grave. To support
ongoing operations around the world, our men and women in
uniform are deployed away from their homes and families for
unprecedented lengths of time during peacetime. Morale among
the troops is suffering, and recruiting and retention
statistics are dangerously low. Modernization of the force is
seriously underfunded across the services. Training in many
of the combatant commands must halt well before the end of
the fiscal year due to funding and supply shortages. Nearly
12,000 military families rely on food stamps. Failing to
provide additional funding for a potentially costly military
operation in Kosovo, while U.S. forces are about to complete
three years in Bosnia at a cost of nearly $10 billion, will
severely and perhaps irreparably exacerbate this critical
readiness crisis.
Second, the issue of potential deployment of U.S. ground
forces was not adequately addressed in yesterday's briefing.
Press accounts report that detailed plans for nearly 50,000
ground troops in Kosovo have been developed. Yet Secretary of
Defense Cohen stated that there has been no discussion of
deploying U.S. ground forces in Kosovo. We believe that a
ground force in Kosovo, which could be a likely follow-on to
airstrikes, should be European, not American.
Third, we are concerned about the proposed use of NATO
airpower. Press reports contain information about U.S.
targeting plans that was not discussed in the briefing. To
the extent we understand the proposed strikes, they appear to
envision gradual and incremental measures. General Ralston
discussed a ``limited option'' that may or may not achieve
its stated objectives. A more ``robust'' option is under
consideration but apparently has not yet been finalized. We
believe any air attack should be sustained and overwhelming.
Air attacks should be designed to decimate Milosevic's forces
in Kosovo and in Serbia--in order to permanently end his
ability to perpetuate the conflict in Kosovo.
Finally and most importantly, we are concerned that U.S.
policy is not based on a coherent and convincing plan and
neither protects our interests nor recognizes the danger of
becoming involved in another open-ended
[[Page S11899]]
military commitment in the Balkans. Your policy seems to
recognize that Milosevic is the problem but also proposes to
make him part of the solution. By so doing, your policy helps
to perpetuate his hold on power, your Administration has yet
to formulate a policy for replacing Milosevic with a
democratic government.
Yesterday, your officials stated that the credible threat
of force was necessary to induce Milosevic to negotiate
seriously. Yet in June, Secretary of State Albright stated,
``The issue here is that we want a diplomatic solution. And I
don't want to threaten strikes when what I'm trying to do is
get a diplomatic solution.'' This is a disturbing and
confusing inconsistency. A central question involves
subsequent actions if any use of military force is not
immediately successful in accomplishing its stated objective.
If Milosevic does not accept U.S. or NATO demands either
before or after the employment of military force, what is our
next step? It is not sufficient to state, as Secretary of
Defense Cohen did yesterday, that you have not reached that
decision point.
Your policy apparently envisions a status of limited
autonomy for Kosovo, a status that both parties have shed
blood to reject. Independence has been the choice of the
majority of inhabitants in Kosovo. Serb assaults since
February have served to increase this sentiment. Your policy
currently opposes independence for Kosovo but we are
concerned that you do not have an achievable program to
implement your policy.
Mr. President, we believe in bipartisanship in foreign
policy. We will not support any plan that requires American
military personnel alone to bear the burden of the sacrifice
and risk involved. To the contrary, we expect other members
of NATO and their military personnel to share the sacrifice
and risk. We stand ready to work with you and your officials
to protect American interests in southeastern Europe.
Sincerely,
Strom Thurmond, Chuck Hagel, Pete V. Domenici, Ted
Stevens, Don Nickles, Trent Lott, John Warner, Richard
G. Lugar, Jesse Helms.
____
The White House,
Washington, DC, October 6, 1998.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Leader: Thank you for your letter about Kosovo.
You have raised a number of critical issues. Before
addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is
appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach
and the vital interests at stake.
We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in
Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of
atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced
persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an
international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the
conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199,
adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community
reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:
Immediately cease offensive operations;
Withdraw security forces;
Allow full access to international monitors and relief
agencies; and
Negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.
Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these
requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the
potential use of force. I want to provide you and others in
the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.
As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when
Serbian special police launched an offensive against the
Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven
months that have followed, Serbian military and police have
steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and
expulsions designed to terrorize the local populations and
suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current
crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic
revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since
1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore
the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making
clear that this was a prerequisite to Serbia's reintegration
into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted
our support for building an effective dialogue with the
Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting
civilians with increasing brutality.
Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain
and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive
humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian
track, we have committed more than $45 million in emergency
relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged
the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do
the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has
had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanaian
negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining
Milosevic's acknowledgment of an ``interim'' agreement that
would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also
worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a
settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would
allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local
affairs, including education, justice and a separate police
force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites
of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It
would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity,
we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a
viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the
wrong signal to those in the region calling for a ``greater
Albania,'' and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to
greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic
efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's
security forces.
In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military
action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations
of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur.
However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance
with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises
or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed
hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.
It is important to focus on U.S. national interests that
are at stake here.
First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider
European war with dangerous consequences for the United
States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic conflicts often
have been used for political manipulation. The violence
directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has
exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in
neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo
likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with
dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability
and refugee flows further south would threaten the
differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and
Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The
radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support
radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a
foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new
sources of instability and increasing the threat of
terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.
Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human
rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe.
Yesterday, the United Nations Secretary General's report on
the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction
perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have
destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200
villages. They have committed atrocities, including the
mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and
children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the
onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to
demonstrate that the international community will not
tolerate such acts.
Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the
principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as
NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing
influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in
responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for
Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has
deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic
first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me,
also are challenged.
We prefer to advance each of these interests through
diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement,
as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But
largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating
efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I
believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to
use force, has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO
allies share this view.
I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your
letter.
First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I
discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As
noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary Cohen, we have
moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts
initiated by my Administration over the past several months
to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we
worked with Congress to secure a $1 billion reprogramming
that reallocated funds to readiness programs and a $1.85
billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated
costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For FY
1999, I have proposed a $1.9 billion emergency funding
measure to cover the continuing costs of our Bosnia
deployment. To preclude serious readiness problems in FY
1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure.
In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration
to work with Congress to provide adequate resources for
readiness and other defense programs in FY 1999 and beyond.
For the short term, I proposed that members of my
Administration work with you prior to the Congressional
adjournment to craft a $1 billion supplemental package that
will augment FY 1999 funding for key readiness programs. For
the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget and the
National Security Council have been instructed to work with
Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year
plan that provides the resources necessary to preserve
military readiness, support our troops, and modernize aging
weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my FY 2000
defense budget request to Congress. As I wrote you last
month, the men and women of our armed forces will have the
resources they need to do their job.
The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would
be a function of the scope and intensity of such operations.
My Administration will work with the Congress to ensure
timely passage of appropriate funding measures and that this
does not come at the expense of our defense program.
[[Page S11900]]
Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO
planners have reviewed a broad range of options, some of
which would involve ground forces in hostile circumstances, I
can assure you the United States would not support these
options and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such
a mission. The mission under consideration involves the use
of graduated air power, not military forces on the ground.
In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR
1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some
form of international presence may be needed. Whether this
can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and
whether Americans should participate are matters we will need
to consider in the context of any such agreement and with
full consultations with the Congress.
Third, regarding the nature of the air campaign in Kosovo,
NATO has developed a clear military plan. It entails the
graduated but effective use of air power harnessed to two
achievable objectives. The primary objective is by threat of
force, or its use, to persuade Milosevic to comply with the
demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199.
If initial use of air power does not result in compliance,
NATO's secondary objective is to strike Belgrade's military
capabilities in ways that will damage his ability to conduct
repressive operations in Kosovo, the same objective you
identify in your letter.
Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power
to be used effectively. There will be no ``pin prick''
strikes. Even the initial use of air power will send a very
clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY
military and special police, and follow-on phases will
progressively expand in their scale and scope. These
operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.
Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to
our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air
power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to
advance our overall objectives of promoting a political
settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are
not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are
combining the two to achieve our objectives. Secretary
Albright recently dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the
region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs
under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if
Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we
will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to
Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.
Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three
parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance
with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus reducing the
risk of wider conflict, averting a humanitarian catastrophe
and lessening the chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term
objective is to secure a political settlement that grants
broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within
the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the
Kosovars have their own bodies of government and police. Our
longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the
path to European integration. This requires a responsible
government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all
ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations
abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to
support opposition parties and free and independent media in
the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part
of our broader strategy.
The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my
Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary
responsibility for the current situation including the brutal
tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a
quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also
suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and
forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN
economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.
While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the
current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong
and exacerbate it. I am referring in particular to the
various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the
Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Ambassador Holbrooke this
week delivered a firm message to these groups to cooperate in
bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against
Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by
military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes
of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true
autonomy. We have told them that failure to cooperate will
cause us to reassess our operations against the Serbs.
Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador to Yugoslavia,
once said that the war in Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will
ultimately end there. His prediction was correct. Our job is
to bring that war to an end, to keep it from destabilizing
the region and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I
appreciate your willingness to work with the Administration
to protect American interests in southeastern Europe. We will
continue to consult closely with you in the critical days and
weeks ahead.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
____________________