[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 140 (Thursday, October 8, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11896-S11900]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 KOSOVO

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to continue a series of remarks 
that I have placed before the Senate in the past several weeks 
regarding the increasing problems relating to Kosovo. Together, with 
other Senators, I have tried to avail myself of every opportunity to 
learn about this situation. Just weeks ago, I made a trip myself into 
the region, accompanied by two outstanding ambassadors, Miles and Hill, 
and had an opportunity to get firsthand impressions. My trip included 
Bosnia, Belgrade, Macedonia, and Kosovo.
  Those impressions, together with many years of really hard work 
studying the Balkan region, having first gone, in September 1992, into 
Sarajevo, I have even greater concern today about the implications of 
the problems unfolding in Kosovo and the necessity for the world to 
respond to stop the tragic killing that is taking place every day.
  I commend the majority leader--indeed, I am sure there are others who 
have worked diligently on this--but he has, in this busiest of all 
weeks of the year in the Senate, found time to convene in his office 
and otherwise meet with people--and I have joined him on several 
occasions--about this situation. Indeed, a few days ago a group of us 
sent a letter to the President of the United States expressing our 
concerns. This was a letter that followed the briefing by the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, with the National Security Adviser 
and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
  Mr. President, I will address particular parts of that letter to the 
President and his response. The response was quite comprehensive.
  Further today, I, and I am sure other Members of the Senate, have 
received drafts of proposed resolutions put forth by a Member on that 
side of the aisle and a Member on this side of the aisle. Given that 
they are drafts, and I don't know what the ultimate intention of the 
drafters will be, I will not identify the persons who distributed the 
drafts as a senatorial courtesy, but I would like to address my 
concerns relevant to both drafts.
  The purpose today is, again, to give my personal views regarding the 
plan of operation that has been laid before us publicly by this 
administration, by the NATO commanders and, indeed, by one or more of 
our allies, notably Great Britain.
  I commend their Minister for National Security and Defense. He has 
spoken most forthrightly. Indeed, I think his views closely match my 
own, and that is, any planning to go forward to correct the problems 
that exist in Kosovo today has to be, in my judgment, and in his, 
twofold--ground as well as air.
  One, a very decisive series of airstrikes, which I support. I 
believe, and others believe, that a necessary second component of any 
military action, to back up the airstrikes, has to be the quick 
placement of a stabilization ground force into Kosovo, into the region, 
primarily the capital, Pristina. If that is not done, Mr. President, 
the goals of the airstrikes can not have been fulfilled in my opinion.
  In my judgment, the predominant number of military units involved in 
that airstrike would be American, because of our specialized aircraft 
and air-to-ground precision ordinance. Our

[[Page S11897]]

Allies in NATO will provide other important air assets. I think in 
order to consolidate the gains that we can anticipate from those air 
strikes, a stabilization force has to be put in place on the ground.
  The main urgency of the moment--is some approximately quarter of a 
million Kosovars, Albanians who have been driven from their homes and 
villages into the hills who are confronting now another enemy. Once it 
was the Milosevic police, the Milosevic regular army, but now it is 
weather that is forcing these tragic people to endure conditions which 
will be severely injurious to their health and safety.
  Food, medicine, and shelter must be brought in beginning immediately, 
to alleviate that crisis. And secondly, we want to have a cessation to 
the conflicts that have gone on between these peoples for these many 
months which have resulted in some 2,000-plus deaths, largely again 
suffered by the Albanians, the 90 percent of the population. But, 
indeed, there are incidents where the KLA, the insurgent forces within 
the Albanian population, have got to answer, themselves, for their 
responsibility for certain tragic killings of Serbs in this area. There 
are not clean hands on either side.

  But again, to summarize the objectives: Get immediate relief in for 
these refugees; and, secondly, stabilize the fighting among the 
minority Serbians and the majority Albanians.
  If that is not done, if that stabilization force is not quickly put 
in, this situation could even escalate in terms of the killing, because 
you will have removed that military force, i.e., the Serbian 
paramilitary police, and indeed the regular army, and the remnants that 
will be left of the Serbian people, such police that are left, will 
then be faced with the preponderance of a 90 percent ethnic Albanian 
population coming down out of the hills. And I doubt that they will 
come down and shake hands with their former Serbian neighbors--finding 
their homes ravaged, destroyed, their livestock killed, their fields 
burned. It will not be, Mr. President, a very peaceful setting once the 
air seals off the flow of heavy armaments and military down from 
Belgrade.
  Mr. President, herein is the problem as I see it. Our administration, 
regrettably--and I will refer to their letter momentarily--regrettably, 
has evaded, in my judgment, a full debate on the issue of the need for 
a stabilization force. They have focused the public attention in our 
country solely on the need for an airstrike, leaving out what I think 
should be responsible dialogue, beginning with the President and the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, on the need for a stabilization 
force.
  Yesterday, I met with a senior officer from NATO, together with other 
Senators, and he clearly understood the necessity for that 
stabilization force. Indeed, I happen to know firsthand NATO has 
studied the need for it. NATO has contingency plans to address that. 
The plans range all the way from taking the indigenous KDOM, which is a 
very interesting creation in this conflict--it is a combination of 
military people from the United States, Canada, and certain other 
European nations, and indeed I think some Russians, together with 
diplomatic officials from those nations who go out into this region, 
unarmed, for the purpose of reporting back on what is taking place in 
terms of the ravaging of the countryside, the condition of those who 
have been driven into the hills. And it has been a very valuable source 
of information for the free world to have had the reports of KDOM. I 
traveled with them; they are a brave lot.
  One option is to enlarge the KDOM. But again, KDOM is not there for 
military purposes. They are not trained as policemen. They are not 
trained as security forces. The individual military officers may have 
some training, but certainly by design and in terms of the logistic 
equipment, and the like, they are not prepared, in my judgment, to take 
on the potential parameters of conflicts that could break out following 
air strikes.
  Next it is thought that one or more organizations, like the O.S.C.E. 
in Europe, could come in and take over this situation to provide a 
stabilizing force. But that organization has no history. It has no 
history of taking on an operation of this magnitude. It has no 
logistical support. It has no experience in coordinating, bringing in 
troops from other countries.
  And so after dialogue with our guests yesterday, and dialogue with 
many others, it is my judgment that only NATO can provide such 
stabilization force as will be necessary in the immediate aftermath of 
a series of airstrikes--I repeat that--only NATO. I believe it unwise 
for the Administration now to rule out U.S. ground forces as being a 
part of a stabilization force composed of several NATO members.
  When we had the Secretary of Defense before the Armed Services 
Committee the other day, regrettably, he did not respond with the 
precision I would have liked regarding U.S. participation. Indeed, I 
think the record reflects statements to the effect that there will be 
no U.S. participation should a ground element for stabilization be 
necessary.
  Mr. President, I do not think that we should embark--I want to repeat 
that--I do not think we should embark on these airstrikes without a 
resolution of how that stabilization force is to be constituted and 
whether or not the United States will be a part of that force, because 
we will have started a situation of hitting a sovereign country. We 
have done that twice already here in the past month or two--hitting a 
sovereign nation with predominantly U.S. air assets--with really no 
clear understanding of what is going to take place immediately 
afterwards on the ground in Kosovo.
  We talk about a peace settlement. All of us would like to have a 
peace settlement, but I cannot believe that if you inflict severe air 
damage of the magnitude it will take to bring Milosevic, the principal 
wrongdoer in this whole situation--the principal wrongdoer for years 
and years, beginning back in Bosnia --you cannot suddenly expect him to 
come to the negotiating table in a matter of days. And it is within 
those days that the instability could grow in the Kosovo region. That 
is my concern.
  This instability could spread over into Albania, which is already 
torn by civil strife. Refugees could begin to flow into Montenegro. 
Montenegro is now burdened, heavily burdened, with refugees from 
Albania. More refugees into Macedonia. This whole region could be 
destabilized unless a stabilization force is put into Kosovo in a 
timely way.
  And further, in my judgment, the work that we have done, together 
with our allies over many years, to secure Bosnia, to the extent we 
achieved any results there--certainly relative peace compared to the 
war of several years ago--that could well be undermined, because if the 
insurgents down in Kosovo are not contained, that will spread into 
Bosnia and begin to undo what we have achieved, what little we have 
achieved thus far, toward the implementation of the Dayton accords.
  So my purpose in addressing Kosovo, again, is twofold. These 
resolutions in draft form call for only U.S. participation in 
airstrikes. I mean, it is very clearly laid out in both these 
resolutions. One of them states that: Whereas the Secretary of Defense, 
William Cohen, opposes the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo, as 
reflected in his testimony before Congress on October 6, and clearly 
says that while we support the use of air, it will be air, and air 
alone.
  That I think is an unwise position for the U.S. to take.
  Let me give you an example. Should it be the consensus of NATO that 
you have to bring a NATO ground force into Kosovo for stabilization, 
which is my judgment, and you plant the NATO flag, and the U.S. flag is 
not on the staff, we are not represented there, the question arises 
why? I mean, we bring into question, who is the commander in chief of 
NATO? It is an American officer. An American officer is to command of a 
stabilization force put into a hostile region, and there is not a 
single additional American there in that force! We should not take that 
position now.
  I fought for many years placing the ground troops in Bosnia. Year 
after year I voted against it. It was only on the last vote where I 
joined Senator Dole that I relented. I had no desire to see Americans 
go in there. I questioned, in some way, the vital security interests. 
But that s history; we are on the ground in Bosnia and our troops, with 
other SFOR elements are working

[[Page S11898]]

to secure a lasting peace. NATO's credibility is on the line now in 
Kosovo, for only a credible threat to use force can move settlement 
talks in Belgrade.
  If NATO leaders, upon failure of diplomacy, launch a NATO air 
operation, the credibility of NATO is on the line.
  I think you should not start the air until we have fully answered the 
question: How do you secure the benefits flowing from the air operation 
and stabilize that region until the negotiators can come to the table 
and work out a cease fire.
  The other resolution being circulated today, likewise, calls solely 
for air, very explicitly. It has another provision in here which 
troubles me a great deal; that is, you can only use air for 6 months 
unless there is further consideration by the Congress.
  Mr. President, we have known for a long time that setting deadlines 
with regard to troops just does not work. Therefore, the placing of a 
deadline in connection with the use of air and limiting it to 6 months, 
to me, is not a wise way to proceed. Therefore, I have indicated I 
would not participate; indeed, I would vote against either of these 
resolutions should they come back in this form. Both resolutions limit 
the U.S. participation to air. The President is authorized to use the 
U.S. Armed Forces for the purpose only of conducting air operations and 
missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  Again, you cannot plan an air operation without a concomitant means 
to secure the ground.
  Let me pose the hypothetical: Suppose you strike with air and you are 
successful in destroying certain targets, then is Milosevic likely to 
sit there and do nothing? He could counterattack. His only means of 
counterattack, in all probability, given his air capability is largely 
destroyed, his naval capability is hopefully bottled up in the caves or 
elsewhere, his only avenue to retaliate would be on the ground; 
perhaps, once again, send out his column of tanks and his column of 
heavy artillery. Bad weather and darkness of night travel could inhibit 
air operations.
  Air could interdict, I am sure, much of it, but it might require a 
ground force at some point to interdict such actions as may be taken in 
retaliation by Milosevic.
  I urge the Senate to be very, very cautious as we proceed. I hope to 
continue our debate with other Senators here as it relates to this 
situation.
  I turn to the response of the President. As I said, it contained 
specific responses. This is the President speaking. On page 4 he 
states:

       Second, on the question of ground force, although NATO 
     planners reviewed a broad range of options, some of which 
     would involve grounding forces and hostile circumstances. I 
     can assure you [this is written to all nine of us] the United 
     States would not support these options and there is currently 
     no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The mission under 
     consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not 
     military forces on the ground.

  Now, to me, that is just faulty planning.
  I do support the use of force to stop the killing, to enable the NGOs 
and others to have an environment into which they can bring supplies to 
help these people. I do not give my support unless a convincing 
argument is put forth about a stabilizing force and the need to have 
that force in order to secure the Kosovo region.
  We have to be very careful that the credibility of NATO is protected. 
It is on the line. We cannot allow the NATO force to be considered as 
acting in concert with the KLA. That is a tough call. Try and find a 
KLA leader. They are difficult to find. I am not talking about Rugova 
in Pristina. He has been accessible to all. These militants, the heads 
of the KLA troops, in this area of Kosovo are not well defined, not 
well known, and not well coordinated. It is a problem to contain them 
once we begin to use our air. We cannot seem to be coming in here with 
a military hand to support Kosovo gaining independence from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. That is not our goal.
  Again, only a ground force containing this situation in Kosovo, until 
such time as a settlement can be worked out at the table, is the only 
way, in my judgment, that this matter can be resolved.
  I hope other Senators will come forward and give their views because 
this could break in military action any day now. I don't predict in any 
way when the strike may begin. Hopefully, diplomatic efforts, which are 
still ongoing, can prevent the necessity of the use of force. It is 
only that credible determination to use force, as perceived in 
Belgrade, that will bring about successful diplomatic negotiations.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the letter to the 
President and his response to the majority leader, which I referred to 
earlier, printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follos:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                Office of the Majority Leader,

                                  Washington, DC, October 2, 1998.
     Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
     The White House, Washington, DC
       Dear Mr. President: We are writing to express our concerns 
     about your Administration's policy toward Kosovo. Since the 
     Serbian military offensive began in Kosovo more than seven 
     months ago, senior Administration officials have repeatedly 
     stated that Serbian actions would not be tolerated. For 
     example, in March 1998, Secretary of State Albright stated, 
     ``We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian 
     authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away 
     with in Bosnia.'' The same month, your Special Representative 
     threatened ``the most dire consequences imaginable'' in 
     response to Serbian offensives. Since these statements, many 
     of us indicated we would support military action to halt 
     Serbian ethnic cleansing. However, it is now more difficult 
     for us to have confidence that military action accomplish the 
     stated goals. U.S. credibility has suffered great damage 
     because U.S. threats have not been carried out. Milosevic has 
     had the luxury of time to accomplish his goals in Kosovo.
       We listened carefully as your senior national security 
     officials briefed Senators yesterday. Clearly, we recognize 
     the stakes involved in Kosovo, including the danger the 
     conflict will spread to neighboring countries, the importance 
     for our credibility and for that of the NATO alliance, and 
     the ongoing human tragedy created by months of ruthless 
     attacks by Serbian forces. We also recognize the seriousness 
     of the action you are contemplating. It means, as Senator 
     Lugar stated yesterday, going to war with an attack on a 
     sovereign country. We do not believe you have taken the 
     necessary steps to prepare the Congress and the American 
     people for such a weightily decision. In fact you have not 
     even asked the Congress to authorize the use of military 
     force.
       We are troubled by a number of aspects of the plans and 
     policies contemplated by your Administration.
       First, we cannot support military operations by U.S. Armed 
     Forces in Kosovo unless and until you commit to request a 
     significant increase in the defense budget to address the 
     shortfalls in military readiness, personnel and modernization 
     recently acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
     crisis in military readiness that has only belatedly been 
     acknowledged by your Administration is grave. To support 
     ongoing operations around the world, our men and women in 
     uniform are deployed away from their homes and families for 
     unprecedented lengths of time during peacetime. Morale among 
     the troops is suffering, and recruiting and retention 
     statistics are dangerously low. Modernization of the force is 
     seriously underfunded across the services. Training in many 
     of the combatant commands must halt well before the end of 
     the fiscal year due to funding and supply shortages. Nearly 
     12,000 military families rely on food stamps. Failing to 
     provide additional funding for a potentially costly military 
     operation in Kosovo, while U.S. forces are about to complete 
     three years in Bosnia at a cost of nearly $10 billion, will 
     severely and perhaps irreparably exacerbate this critical 
     readiness crisis.
       Second, the issue of potential deployment of U.S. ground 
     forces was not adequately addressed in yesterday's briefing. 
     Press accounts report that detailed plans for nearly 50,000 
     ground troops in Kosovo have been developed. Yet Secretary of 
     Defense Cohen stated that there has been no discussion of 
     deploying U.S. ground forces in Kosovo. We believe that a 
     ground force in Kosovo, which could be a likely follow-on to 
     airstrikes, should be European, not American.
       Third, we are concerned about the proposed use of NATO 
     airpower. Press reports contain information about U.S. 
     targeting plans that was not discussed in the briefing. To 
     the extent we understand the proposed strikes, they appear to 
     envision gradual and incremental measures. General Ralston 
     discussed a ``limited option'' that may or may not achieve 
     its stated objectives. A more ``robust'' option is under 
     consideration but apparently has not yet been finalized. We 
     believe any air attack should be sustained and overwhelming. 
     Air attacks should be designed to decimate Milosevic's forces 
     in Kosovo and in Serbia--in order to permanently end his 
     ability to perpetuate the conflict in Kosovo.
       Finally and most importantly, we are concerned that U.S. 
     policy is not based on a coherent and convincing plan and 
     neither protects our interests nor recognizes the danger of 
     becoming involved in another open-ended

[[Page S11899]]

     military commitment in the Balkans. Your policy seems to 
     recognize that Milosevic is the problem but also proposes to 
     make him part of the solution. By so doing, your policy helps 
     to perpetuate his hold on power, your Administration has yet 
     to formulate a policy for replacing Milosevic with a 
     democratic government.
       Yesterday, your officials stated that the credible threat 
     of force was necessary to induce Milosevic to negotiate 
     seriously. Yet in June, Secretary of State Albright stated, 
     ``The issue here is that we want a diplomatic solution. And I 
     don't want to threaten strikes when what I'm trying to do is 
     get a diplomatic solution.'' This is a disturbing and 
     confusing inconsistency. A central question involves 
     subsequent actions if any use of military force is not 
     immediately successful in accomplishing its stated objective. 
     If Milosevic does not accept U.S. or NATO demands either 
     before or after the employment of military force, what is our 
     next step? It is not sufficient to state, as Secretary of 
     Defense Cohen did yesterday, that you have not reached that 
     decision point.
       Your policy apparently envisions a status of limited 
     autonomy for Kosovo, a status that both parties have shed 
     blood to reject. Independence has been the choice of the 
     majority of inhabitants in Kosovo. Serb assaults since 
     February have served to increase this sentiment. Your policy 
     currently opposes independence for Kosovo but we are 
     concerned that you do not have an achievable program to 
     implement your policy.
       Mr. President, we believe in bipartisanship in foreign 
     policy. We will not support any plan that requires American 
     military personnel alone to bear the burden of the sacrifice 
     and risk involved. To the contrary, we expect other members 
     of NATO and their military personnel to share the sacrifice 
     and risk. We stand ready to work with you and your officials 
     to protect American interests in southeastern Europe.
           Sincerely,
         Strom Thurmond, Chuck Hagel, Pete V. Domenici, Ted 
           Stevens, Don Nickles, Trent Lott, John Warner, Richard 
           G. Lugar, Jesse Helms.
                                  ____



                                              The White House,

                                  Washington, DC, October 6, 1998.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
       Dear Mr. Leader: Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. 
     You have raised a number of critical issues. Before 
     addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is 
     appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach 
     and the vital interests at stake.
       We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in 
     Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of 
     atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced 
     persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an 
     international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the 
     conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, 
     adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community 
     reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:
       Immediately cease offensive operations;
       Withdraw security forces;
       Allow full access to international monitors and relief 
     agencies; and
       Negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.
       Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these 
     requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the 
     potential use of force. I want to provide you and others in 
     the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.
       As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when 
     Serbian special police launched an offensive against the 
     Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven 
     months that have followed, Serbian military and police have 
     steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and 
     expulsions designed to terrorize the local populations and 
     suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current 
     crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic 
     revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since 
     1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore 
     the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making 
     clear that this was a prerequisite to Serbia's reintegration 
     into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted 
     our support for building an effective dialogue with the 
     Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting 
     civilians with increasing brutality.
       Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain 
     and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive 
     humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian 
     track, we have committed more than $45 million in emergency 
     relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged 
     the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do 
     the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has 
     had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanaian 
     negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining 
     Milosevic's acknowledgment of an ``interim'' agreement that 
     would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also 
     worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a 
     settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would 
     allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local 
     affairs, including education, justice and a separate police 
     force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites 
     of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It 
     would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity, 
     we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a 
     viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the 
     wrong signal to those in the region calling for a ``greater 
     Albania,'' and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to 
     greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic 
     efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's 
     security forces.
       In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military 
     action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations 
     of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. 
     However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance 
     with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises 
     or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed 
     hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.
       It is important to focus on U.S. national interests that 
     are at stake here.
       First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider 
     European war with dangerous consequences for the United 
     States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic conflicts often 
     have been used for political manipulation. The violence 
     directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has 
     exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in 
     neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo 
     likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania 
     and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with 
     dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability 
     and refugee flows further south would threaten the 
     differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and 
     Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The 
     radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support 
     radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a 
     foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new 
     sources of instability and increasing the threat of 
     terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.
       Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human 
     rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe. 
     Yesterday, the United Nations Secretary General's report on 
     the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction 
     perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have 
     destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200 
     villages. They have committed atrocities, including the 
     mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and 
     children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the 
     onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to 
     demonstrate that the international community will not 
     tolerate such acts.
       Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the 
     principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as 
     NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing 
     influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in 
     responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for 
     Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has 
     deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic 
     first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, 
     also are challenged.
       We prefer to advance each of these interests through 
     diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, 
     as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But 
     largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating 
     efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I 
     believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to 
     use force, has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO 
     allies share this view.
       I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your 
     letter.
       First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I 
     discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As 
     noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary Cohen, we have 
     moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts 
     initiated by my Administration over the past several months 
     to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we 
     worked with Congress to secure a $1 billion reprogramming 
     that reallocated funds to readiness programs and a $1.85 
     billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated 
     costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For FY 
     1999, I have proposed a $1.9 billion emergency funding 
     measure to cover the continuing costs of our Bosnia 
     deployment. To preclude serious readiness problems in FY 
     1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure.
       In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration 
     to work with Congress to provide adequate resources for 
     readiness and other defense programs in FY 1999 and beyond. 
     For the short term, I proposed that members of my 
     Administration work with you prior to the Congressional 
     adjournment to craft a $1 billion supplemental package that 
     will augment FY 1999 funding for key readiness programs. For 
     the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget and the 
     National Security Council have been instructed to work with 
     Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year 
     plan that provides the resources necessary to preserve 
     military readiness, support our troops, and modernize aging 
     weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my FY 2000 
     defense budget request to Congress. As I wrote you last 
     month, the men and women of our armed forces will have the 
     resources they need to do their job.
       The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would 
     be a function of the scope and intensity of such operations. 
     My Administration will work with the Congress to ensure 
     timely passage of appropriate funding measures and that this 
     does not come at the expense of our defense program.

[[Page S11900]]

       Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO 
     planners have reviewed a broad range of options, some of 
     which would involve ground forces in hostile circumstances, I 
     can assure you the United States would not support these 
     options and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such 
     a mission. The mission under consideration involves the use 
     of graduated air power, not military forces on the ground.
       In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 
     1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some 
     form of international presence may be needed. Whether this 
     can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and 
     whether Americans should participate are matters we will need 
     to consider in the context of any such agreement and with 
     full consultations with the Congress.
       Third, regarding the nature of the air campaign in Kosovo, 
     NATO has developed a clear military plan. It entails the 
     graduated but effective use of air power harnessed to two 
     achievable objectives. The primary objective is by threat of 
     force, or its use, to persuade Milosevic to comply with the 
     demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. 
     If initial use of air power does not result in compliance, 
     NATO's secondary objective is to strike Belgrade's military 
     capabilities in ways that will damage his ability to conduct 
     repressive operations in Kosovo, the same objective you 
     identify in your letter.
       Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power 
     to be used effectively. There will be no ``pin prick'' 
     strikes. Even the initial use of air power will send a very 
     clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY 
     military and special police, and follow-on phases will 
     progressively expand in their scale and scope. These 
     operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.
       Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to 
     our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air 
     power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to 
     advance our overall objectives of promoting a political 
     settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are 
     not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are 
     combining the two to achieve our objectives. Secretary 
     Albright recently dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the 
     region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs 
     under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if 
     Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we 
     will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to 
     Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.
       Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three 
     parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance 
     with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus reducing the 
     risk of wider conflict, averting a humanitarian catastrophe 
     and lessening the chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term 
     objective is to secure a political settlement that grants 
     broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within 
     the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the 
     Kosovars have their own bodies of government and police. Our 
     longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the 
     path to European integration. This requires a responsible 
     government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all 
     ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations 
     abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to 
     support opposition parties and free and independent media in 
     the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part 
     of our broader strategy.
       The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my 
     Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary 
     responsibility for the current situation including the brutal 
     tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a 
     quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also 
     suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and 
     forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN 
     economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.
       While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the 
     current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong 
     and exacerbate it. I am referring in particular to the 
     various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the 
     Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Ambassador Holbrooke this 
     week delivered a firm message to these groups to cooperate in 
     bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against 
     Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by 
     military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes 
     of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true 
     autonomy. We have told them that failure to cooperate will 
     cause us to reassess our operations against the Serbs.
       Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
     once said that the war in Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will 
     ultimately end there. His prediction was correct. Our job is 
     to bring that war to an end, to keep it from destabilizing 
     the region and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I 
     appreciate your willingness to work with the Administration 
     to protect American interests in southeastern Europe. We will 
     continue to consult closely with you in the critical days and 
     weeks ahead.
           Sincerely,
     Bill Clinton.

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