[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 138 (Tuesday, October 6, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11529-S11531]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, in a 1985 speech attended by President 
Ronald Reagan, the acclaimed writer and lecturer Elie Wiesel, a witness 
and survivor of the Holocaust, recounted the lessons he learned over 
the years since this dark chapter in our history. He said:

       I learned that in extreme situations when human lives and 
     dignity are at stake, neutrality is a sin. It helps the 
     killers, not the

[[Page S11530]]

     victims. I learned the meaning of solitude, Mr. President. We 
     were alone, desperately alone.

  Mr. President, years from now, we may hear similar words from some of 
the survivors of the recent atrocities committed in the former 
Yugoslavia. This past week, Americans and people from all over the 
world have been witness to some horrific images coming from the tiny 
province of Kosovo in the Republic of Serbia. These images, of murdered 
ethnic Albanian civilians, from the very young to the very old, are the 
latest in a series of systematic attacks over the last 7 months by 
Serbian military and security forces against Albanian Kosovars--both 
rebel insurgents and unarmed civilians.
  The victims of this latest massacre included old men, women, and 
children. The death toll since last February is estimated to be as low 
as 500 and as many as 1,000 although, frankly, no one knows how many 
victims there have been. Homes have been firebombed. Entire villages 
have been bulldozed to the ground. Hundreds of thousands of Albanian 
Kosovars literally have run for their lives and are seeking refuge in 
the forests and mountains of Kosovo, or in the neighboring states of 
Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia.
  Mr. President, what perhaps makes last weekend's attack more 
difficult to bear is that it causes us to pause and wonder if these 
lives could have been saved if NATO had stepped in sooner. I think we 
all know the answer to that.
  Congress has struggled with the issue of brutal violence in the 
Balkans for the better part of this decade. The images broadcast this 
week are a somber reminder of very similar pictures that came from 
places not far from Kosovo--places like Mostar or Tuzla in Bosnia. I 
can recall, as I am sure can many of my colleagues, during our many 
discussions on Bosnia in 1995, several of our colleagues, including our 
former Majority Leader, Bob Dole, warning us that tensions in Kosovo 
could lead to the level of outright violence and ethnic cruelty that 
crippled Bosnia.
  I am certain that this is one instance in which Senator Dole today 
wishes he had been wrong.
  It has long been thought that Kosovo was an area where America's 
national resolve was clear. In 1992, President George Bush warned 
President Milosevic that violent acts against Albanian Kosovars would 
lead to military intervention.
  President Bush's warning was prompted by President Milosevic's 
single-handed efforts to strip Kosovo of its autonomy in 1989, and 
abolish Kosovo's parliament and government 1 year later.
  At that time, the Albanian Kosovars, which represent 90 percent of 
the total population of Kosovo, chose to exercise a form of nonviolent 
protest against the Serbian government. A shadow government, 
parliament, and society emerged. Besides electing their own President 
and legislature, Kosovars established their own education and medical 
systems.
  Although there were scattered reports of human rights violations 
against Albanian Kosovars during this period, they were not connected 
with the reports of an extensive ethnic cleansing campaign underway in 
Bosnia. Many factors were involved, but perhaps most important was the 
threat of a larger regional war that could be sparked if the carnage in 
Bosnia spread to Kosovo. Besides the United States, the countries of 
Albania, Macedonia, Turkey, and Greece at one time or another warned 
that violence in Kosovo could force any one of these countries, if not 
all of them, to intervene. Certainly, with his resources engaged in the 
conflict in Bosnia, Serbian President Milosevic could not risk taking 
action in Kosovo.
  Now, with instability in Albania and Macedonia, and the growth of the 
pro-independence faction of Kosovars known as the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, or KLA, President Milosevic has engaged his security and military 
forces in Kosova under the guise of putting down the KLA.

  Mr. President, from the evidence that we have, Mr. Milosevic has gone 
beyond a simple police action. This has been a seven month campaign of 
intimidation and conquest.
  Our government, as well as European governments, vowed not to allow 
in Kosovo a repeat of the vicious war crimes we found in Bosnia. Yet, 
some who have recently visited the region, believe these crimes have 
already happened. The extent of these crimes cannot be confirmed. 
Relief workers and humanitarian organizations are being barred from 
reaching victims and refugees.
  Should this be a surprise to any of us? Certainly not. Slobodan 
Milosevic is a cold, calculating tyrant. He is a war criminal. He was 
not moved by diplomatic threats in Bosnia--what drove him to the Dayton 
peace talks was the military success of the Bosniak-Croat alliance in 
reclaiming land once held by the Serbs.
  Kosovo is no different. Milosevic and his subordinates often have 
pledged to end the carnage in Kosova. Yet, no pledge has been followed 
by a clear cessation of hostilities. Mr. Milosevic has demonstrated 
that he will not withdraw his forces until he feels he has achieved the 
most from the use of violence. And he will not engage in peace talks 
unless he believes that no other course of action will preserve his 
position or advance his goals.
  So it should not be a surprise to any of us that now, as NATO 
prepares for a military response, the Serbian government has declared 
victory and now is making plans to reduce its military and police 
presence in the region.
  We have been witness to a brutal military and police action against 
unarmed civilians that was done with the expectation, if not certainty, 
that both Europe and the United States would not respond, or indeed 
would not even know how to respond.
  There is little to ponder about what must occur.
  The threat or actual use of military action by NATO, such as air 
strikes, is needed if some form of Serbian withdrawal or cease fire in 
the Kosovo province is going to occur.
  I believe we cannot escape the fact that, in the short term, some 
form of NATO or United Nations presence on the ground will be needed to 
police any cease fire or withdrawal, or to ensure the transport of 
needed food, medical and other supplies to the refugees. In addition, 
war crime investigators will need to be able to determine the actual 
atrocities committed and who is responsible.
  It is uncertain if ground forces will be called for by NATO. In fact, 
we know very little of what NATO plans to do beyond air strikes. That 
is of concern to me because a number of uncertainties remain--
uncertainties that if left unresolved will not deal with the root cause 
of the conflict between the Serbs and Albanian Kosovars. The 
administration needs to articulate a clear strategy or plan to address 
the current humanitarian crisis, and the even larger questions about 
the political future of the Kosovars over the long term.
  For example, what fate lies ahead for the estimated 300,000 Kosovars 
who were uprooted from their homes and villages and forced to seek 
refuge as far away as Albania, Macedonia, or Bosnia? And of those 
refugees, what lies ahead for the 50,000 or more who are in hiding in 
the hills within the province--without shelter, food, or medicine--with 
winter just around the corner?
  Clearly, our first and foremost goal is to achieve a cease-fire. I am 
hopeful NATO air strikes can ensure a cease-fire. Second, we must 
ensure humanitarian organizations can safely reach out to these refugee 
populations without fear of obstruction or even destruction by hostile 
Serbian forces.
  And once they get cared for, when can the displaced Kosovars return 
home? And what kind of home do they expect to see when they return? It 
is estimated that approximately 200 villages in the province have been 
completely destroyed or heavily damaged. When can they expect to see 
some restoration of the kind of livelihood that affords them the chance 
to live in peace?
  These are the harder questions, but right now, it seems that NATO has 
yet to consider how they are to be answered. These issues must be 
addressed and answered if this conflict is going to be contained over 
the long term.
  I'm sure we all agree that these issues must be addressed and 
answered not at either end of a rifle, but at a conference table. Yet, 
how can NATO get both sides--the Kosovars and the Serbs--to the 
conference table? That remains unclear.

[[Page S11531]]

  And should some kind of long-term agreement be reached, how will that 
be enforced? What role, if any, can we expect NATO to play to ensure 
long-term peace in Kosovo? That too remains unclear.
  What is clear is that the actions we take in the next few weeks have 
implications for long-term peace not just in the province but 
throughout the Balkans. That's why it's in NATO's interest to act, and 
act with resolve. Unfortunately, the only resolve we see is to strike 
at the Serbs by air, but nothing more beyond that.
  NATO needs to begin to look at these larger questions and soon if our 
resolve for peace will achieve results and be real over the long-term. 
It's in our interests to do so. We still risk the threat of a larger 
conflict in the region, involving Albania, Macedonia, Turkey, and 
Greece. We also put in jeopardy the progress we have made thus far to 
maintain peace in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, we cannot and should not dictate the terms of any 
agreement between the Serbs and Kosovars, but NATO can insist--through 
force if necessary--that peace be achieved through cooperation, not 
conquest.
  This, Mr. President, ought to be the U.S. policy. I thank the chair 
and yield the floor.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for 
up to 5 minutes.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, first of all let me commend our colleague 
from Ohio. At some point today or tomorrow I also want to address this 
issue of Kosovo.
  I will tell you that the expressions given by our colleague from Ohio 
are certainly appreciated by all. I think for most of our colleagues it 
is our sincere hope that we will not once again play this game with Mr. 
Milosevic as he has played it so effectively over the last few years 
with Bosnia, and now Kosovo, where the threat of retaliation causes 
some warm statements to be made, and once again we back off, and once 
again more people suffer terribly as a result of it.

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