[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 138 (Tuesday, October 6, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H9649-H9650]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 SHOULD PRESIDENT CLINTON BE IMPEACHED?

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentlewoman from Oregon (Ms. Hooley) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from 
Oregon (Ms. Furse).
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Speaker, the letter goes on to say:

       ``It goes without saying that lying under oath is a serious 
     offense. But even if the House of Representatives had the 
     constitutional authority to impeach for any instance of 
     perjury or obstruction of justice, a responsible House would 
     not exercise this awesome power on the facts alleged in this 
     case. The House's power to impeach, like a prosecutor's power 
     to indict, is discretionary. This power must be exercised not 
     for partisan advantage, but only when circumstances genuinely 
     justify the enormous price the nation will pay in governance 
     and stature if its President is put through a long, public, 
     voyeuristic trial. The American people understand this price. 
     They demonstrate the political wisdom that has held the 
     Constitution in place for two centuries when, even after the 
     publication of Mr. Starr's report, with all its extraordinary 
     revelations, they oppose impeachment for the offenses alleged 
     therein.
       We do not say that a `private' crime could never be so 
     heinous as to warrant impeachment. Thus Congress might 
     responsibly determine that a President who had committed 
     murder must be in prison, not in office. An individual who by 
     the law of the land cannot be permitted to remain at large, 
     need not be permitted to remain President. But if certain 
     crimes demand immediate removal of a President from office 
     because of their unspeakable heinousness, the offenses 
     alleged against the President in the Independent Counsel's 
     referral are not among them. Short of heinous criminality, 
     impeachment demands convincing evidence of grossly derelict 
     exercise of official authority. In our judgment, Mr. Starr's 
     report contains no such evidence.

  Mr. Speaker, I include the following letter for the record:
                                                  October 2, 1998.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: Did President Clinton commit ``high 
     Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for which he may properly be 
     impeached? We, the undersigned professors of law, believe 
     that the misconduct alleged in the Independent Counsel's 
     report does not cross that threshold.
       We write neither as Democrats nor as Republicans. Some of 
     us believe that the President has acted disgracefully, some 
     that the Independent Counsel has. This letter has nothing to 
     do with any such judgments. Rather, it expresses the one 
     judgment on which we all agree: that the Independent 
     Counsel's report does not make a case for presidential 
     impeachment.
       No existing judicial precedents bind Congress's 
     determination of the meaning of ``high Crimes and 
     Misdemeanors.'' But it is clear that Members of Congress 
     would violate their constitutional responsibilities if they 
     sought to impeach and remove the President merely for conduct 
     of which they disapproved.
       The President's independence from Congress is fundamental 
     to the American structure of government. It is essential to 
     the separation of powers. It is essential to the President's 
     ability to discharge such constitutional duties as vetoing 
     legislation that he considers contrary to the nation's 
     interests. And it is essential to governance whenever the 
     White House belongs to a party different from that which 
     controls the Capitol. The lower the threshold for 
     impeachment, the weaker the President. If the President could 
     be removed for any conduct of which Congress disapproved, 
     this fundamental element of our democracy--the President's 
     independence from Congress--would be destroyed.
       It is not enough, therefore, that Congress strongly 
     disapprove of the President's conduct. Under the 
     Constitution, the President cannot be impeached unless he has 
     committed ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
     Misdemeanors.''
       Some of the charges laid out in the Independent Counsel's 
     report fall so far short of this high standard that they 
     strain good sense: for example, the charge that the President 
     repeatedly declined to testify voluntarily or pressed a 
     debatable privilege claim that was later judicially rejected. 
     These ``offenses'' are not remotely impeachable. With 
     respect, however, to other allegations, the report requires 
     careful consideration of the kind of misconduct that renders 
     a President constitutionally unfit to remain in office.
       Neither history nor legal definitions provide a precise 
     list of high crimes and misdemeanors. Reasonable people have 
     differed in interpreting these words. We believe that the 
     proper interpretation of the Impeachment Clause must begin by 
     recognizing treason and bribery as core or paradigmatic 
     instances, from which the meaning of ``other high Crimes and 
     Misdemeanors'' is to be extrapolated. The constitutional 
     standard for impeachment would be very different if, instead 
     of treason and bribery, different offenses had been 
     specified. The clause does not read, ``Arson, Larceny, or 
     other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' implying that any 
     significant crime might be an impeachable offense. Nor does 
     it read, ``misleading the People, Breach of Campaign 
     Promises, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' implying 
     that any serious violation of public confidence might be 
     impeachable. Nor does it read, ``Adultery, Fornication, or 
     other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' implying that any 
     conduct deemed to reveal serious moral lapses might be an 
     impeachable offense.
       When a President commits treason, he exercises his 
     executive powers, or uses information obtained by virtue of 
     his executive powers, deliberately to aid an enemy. When a 
     President is bribed, he exercises or offers to exercise his 
     executive powers in exchange for corrupt gain. Both acts 
     involve the criminal exercise of presidential powers, 
     converting those awful powers into an instrument either of 
     enemy interests or of purely personal gain. We believe that 
     the critical, distinctive feature of treason and bribery is 
     grossly derelict exercise of official power (or, in the case 
     of bribery to obtain or retain office, gross criminality in 
     the pursuit of official power). Nonindictable conduct might 
     rise to this level. For example, a President might be 
     properly impeached if, as a result of drunkenness, he 
     recklessly and repeatedly misused executive authority.
       The misconduct of which the President is accused does not 
     involve the derelict exercise of executive powers. Most of 
     this misconduct does not involve the exercise of executive 
     powers at all. If the President committed perjury regarding 
     his sexual conduct, this perjury involved no exercise of 
     presidential power as such. If he concealed evidence, this 
     misdeed too involved no exercise of executive authority. By 
     contrast, if he sought wrongfully to place someone in a job 
     at the Pentagon, or lied to subordinates hoping they would 
     repeat his false statements, these acts could have involved a 
     wrongful due of presidential influence, but we cannot believe 
     that the President's alleged conduct

[[Page H9650]]

     of this nature amounts to the grossly derelict exercise of 
     executive power sufficient for impeachment.
       Perjury and obstructing justice can without doubt be 
     impeachable offenses. A President who corruptly used the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation to obstruct an investigation 
     would have criminally exercised his presidential powers. 
     Moreover, covering up a crime furthers or aids the underlying 
     crime. Thus a President who committed perjury to cover up his 
     subordinates' criminal exercise of executive authority would 
     also have committed an impeachable offense. But if the 
     underlying offense were adultery, calling the President to 
     testify could not create an offense justifying impeachment 
     where there was none before.
       It goes without saying that lying under oath is a serious 
     offense. But even if the House of Representatives had the 
     constitutional authority to impeach for any instance of 
     perjury or obstruction of justice, a responsible House would 
     not exercise this awesome power on the facts alleged in 
     this case. The House's power to impeach, like a 
     prosecutor's power to indict, is discretionary. This power 
     must be exercised not for partisan advantage, but only 
     when circumstances genuinely justify the enormous price 
     the nation will pay in governance and stature if its 
     President is put through a long, public, voyeuristic 
     trial. The American people understand this price. They 
     demonstrate the political wisdom that has held the 
     Constitution in place for two centuries when, even after 
     the publication of Mr. Starr's report, with all its 
     extraordinary revelations, they oppose impeachment for the 
     offenses alleged therein.
       We do not say that a ``private'' crime could never be so 
     heinous as to warrant impeachment. Thus Congress might 
     responsibly determine that a President who had committed 
     murder must be in prison, not in office. An individual who by 
     the law of the land cannot be permitted to remain at large, 
     need not be permitted to remain President. But if certain 
     crimes demand immediate removal of a President from office 
     because of their unspeakable heinousness, the offenses 
     alleged against the President in the Independent Counsel's 
     referral are not among them. Short of heinous criminality, 
     impeachment demands convincing evidence of grossly derelict 
     exercise of official authority. In our judgment, Mr. Starr's 
     report contains no such evidence.
           Sincerely,
       Jed Rubenfeld, Professor of Law, Yale University.
       Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law and Political 
     Science, Yale University.
       Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale 
     University.
       Susan Bloch, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
     Center.
       Paul D. Carrington, Harry R. Chadwick Sr. Professor of Law, 
     Duke University School of Law.
       John Hart Ely, Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law, 
     University of Miami School of Law.
       Susan Estrich, Robert Kingsley Professor of Law and 
     Political Science, University of Southern California.
       John E. Nowak, David C. Baum Professor of Law, University 
     of Illinois College of Law.
       Judith Resnik, Arthur L. Liman Professor, Yale Law School.
       Christopher Schroeder, Professor of Law, Duke University 
     School of Law.
       Suzanne Sherry, Earl R. Larson Professor of Law, University 
     of Minnesota law School.
       Geoffrey R. Stone, Harry Kalven, Jr. Dist. Serv. Professor 
     & Provost, University of Chicago Law School.
       Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitution Law, 
     Harvard University Law School.
       Note: Institutional affiliations for purposes of 
     identification only.

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